Preventing Mass Killing in Côte d’Ivoire:

A Case Study in Early Warning Mark A. Whitlock

Ivoirité. A slogan, a watchword, a normative category, ivoirité has created a new taxonomy of belonging: there are “Ivorians by circumstance” and “Ivorians by descent.” At the pinnacle, with the most ivoirité, are the Ivoiriens de souche multiséculaire - Ivorians of indubitable, multigenerational descent. At the other end of the scale, there are foreigners and “people who present themselves as Ivorian.1

The Republic of Côte d’Ivoire was once viewed as the quintessential West African success story. In a region mired by poverty, political instability, and violent conflict, Côte d’Ivoire experienced unprecedented security and economic growth after achieving independence from France in 1960. Under the guidance of one of Africa’s original ‘old fathers’, Côte d’Ivoire became a regional beacon for those seeking economic opportunity and ethnic inclusivity. The façade was to be short-lived, however, following an economic downturn in the late 1980s, and the subsequent death of the patriarch in 1993. The introduction of polarizing identity politics, centered on the concept of ivoirité, started the nation down its current path of dissolution and violence. Commencing in 1999, a succession of coups and failed elections tore the country apart, culminating in a civil war marked by wide-spread abuse of civilians and, more specifically, genocidal violence committed by government proxies. Today Côte d’Ivoire sits perched atop a precipice, stalemated by the economic and political interests of various competing factions. The specter of deterioration into further genocidal violence

remains as constructive dialogue takes a back seat to political discourse strategically targeting ethnic divisions. The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire threatens to further destabilize the Sahel and coastal regions of West Africa just as decade-long turmoil in Liberia and Sierra Leone came to an end. Nationalistic appellations to ethnic identity have marked many post-colonial conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa. Complex historical relationships, refitted by the colonial experience and informed by its interminable residue, have greatly shaped the character of the conflict in contemporary Côte d’Ivoire. Identity manipulation has been a key element with pre-colonial identities having been altered under the colonial experience, and then hardened by recent violence. The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire was born of, as Gagnon writes, “a response by ruling elites to shifts in the structure of domestic political and economic power”.2 The military coup in 1999 was an attempt by the politico-military elite to “fend off domestic challengers seeking to mobilize the population against the status quo”.3

After an authoritarian regime failed to address socio-economic concerns in Côte

d’Ivoire, the instrumentalization of identity (ivoirité) as political discourse accompanied an extended period of economic downturn following the death of the long-ruling president. Political exclusion of the northern “other” by self-identified “true Ivorians” of the south led to violent armed clashes resulting in a defacto partitioning of the country. Although popularly conceptualized as an ethno-religious conflict between Dioula speaking Muslims of the Sahel, and Akan speaking Christians/Animists of the coast, the current conflict is rooted in politics, with ethnicity brandished as an instrument. The Ivorian saga challenges theories of lasting solutions to ethnic conflict - as well as theories of identity formation - and offers an opportunity to conceptualize the extent to which identities are malleable. It is apparent that self-interested political entrepreneurs have utilized identity to manipulate their constituencies when threatened in the past. If identities are prone to top-down manipulation, then domestic and international peace builders may alternatively utilize this strategy as an instrument of policy for constructive purposes. This case study will examine the current conflict in Côte d’Ivoire through the analysis of Ivorian political identity, its construction, and subsequent manipulation by actors in the ongoing conflict. This study also serves to explore early warning for the expressed purpose of preventing Mass Killing and Genocide. Mass Killing is defined as the intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants.4 Genocide, according to Benjamin Valentino, is a particular form of ethnic mass killing characterized by explicitly racist or nationalist ideologies and goals of the perpetrators.5 The delineation between ethnic mass killing and

counterinsurgent mass killing is one that directly engages the nature of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire (For more on nomenclature, see Valentino 2004: Ch. 1, 5, 6). The recent history of violence in Côte d’Ivoire exhibits several worrisome characteristics - including a zero-sum political struggle, attempted status-quo revision, elite identity manipulation, and burgeoning insurgency - that facilitated fundamental shifts in relationships between potential perpetrator groups and potential victim groups6 in previous paths to mass killing in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Balkans. The violent conflict has had significant sub-regional implications and the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) early warning mechanism (ECOWARN)7 has been active in monitoring ongoing violence through its conflict early warning mandate.∗ However, a clear theoretical framework (See Appendix A) is necessary delineating the prevention of conflict from the prevention of mass killing and genocide - specifically highlighting temporal transitions from structural violence (conflict prevention) to targeted physical violence (prevention of mass killing and genocide).

∗A working paper by the author examines the ECOWARN sub-regional mechanism for conflict early warning. The paper explores the following themes: relationships between regional and sub-regional security mechanisms and the UN, models of decision-making and the formation of political will in the context of the Responsibility to Protect, and challenges and opportunities facing ECOWARN in the West African sub-region for the prevention of mass killing and genocide.

Finally, I will explore policy options for lasting peace in Côte d’Ivoire. I argue that a policy centered on transitional governance - marked by sequencing from an initial power sharing approach, to a program of top-down identity reconstruction which culminates in civic nationalism - is the best short and medium term strategy for long-term peace. Several questions will animate this exploration; in the context of Côte d’Ivoire, what is the strategic logic behind a potential mass killing? What factors might compel potential perpetrators to initiate a program of mass, identity-based political violence against perceived or real threats? Once this logic is understood, what preventive policies seem most promising in the future? Can individual and collective identities be reconstructed after periods of intense, internal violence or ethnic civil war? Also, is the top-down promotion of civic nationalism a plausible alternative to Westphalian disintegration and ethnic partitioning in Côte d’Ivoire? Competing theories of lasting solutions to ethnic conflict will be treated including ethnic partitioning as an alternative to participatory systems and civic reintegration.

Côte d’Ivoire

CONFLICT HISTORY Modern Côte d’Ivoire was a colonial creation, meant to serve the mercantilist ambitions of a handful of French elites. The land composed two distinct geographical zones, the northern Sahel (composing semi-arid scrub lands) and the southern forests. From the outset of the colonial period, these geographical divisions would dictate the depth of administrative, social, and economic engagement. It would be the southern forestland that would attract the interest of

French planters and they quickly turned Côte d’Ivoire into a world-leading exporter of coffee and cocoa. In 1960, at independence, Côte d’Ivoire was booming. Its new president Félix Houphouët-Boigny, had been the colony’s leading political figure... A Catholic and an ethnic Baoulé from the south of the country, Houphouët had risen to power through the Syndicat Agricole Africain, representing the new landlords and custodians of national wealth. This was an ethnically mixed class…recognizing the secret of his country’s success, Houphouët promoted a kind of self-interested Pan-Africanism… he opened his country to African migrants and they came by the tens of thousands.8

Many of these new arrivals came from the north to work on the cocoa and coffee plantations in the southern zones. These traditional market traders came from the present day territories of northern Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Burkina Faso seeking well-paid work in the Akan-dominated south. The immigrants were overwhelmingly Muslim and spoke a common market language:

A substantial minority of the region’s population…were native speakers of dialects of Manding, a northern Mande language…These Manding speakers called themselves “Dyula” (Dioula), which in their own language means “traders”… These “Dyula” were part of a vast Manding-speaking trade diaspora.9

Historically, relations between the myriad ethnicities in Côte d’Ivoire developed in an environment of mutual respect. Miscegenation was never outlawed,

although living arrangements, according to Launay, followed a segregated pattern; “All the Dioula, and consequently all the Muslims, lived in that half of the village (Korhogo Muslim Quarter)”.10 Intermarriage was uncommon, though not unheard of in more populated areas. The first President of Côte d’Ivoire assiduously guided his fledgling nation along a path of economic growth and ostensible ethnic harmony much envied by his regional counterparts. Félix Houphouët-Boigny was an astute politician, an unabashed Francophile who had masterly navigated the political minefield of pre-independence Côte d’Ivoire, rising through the ranks of power with the aid of French patrons, bypassing traditional systems of authority. “Unlike the British, the French colonial system did not favor the traditional African hierarchy. Instead, the French passed political power in their colonies to elites they had consciously tried to create in their own image”.11 Houphouët’s benign dictatorship provided Côte d’Ivoire a political stability not found in other newly independent African states. Abidjan quickly became known as the “Paris of West Africa” and under Houphouët-Boigny’s autocratic rule, Côte d’Ivoire became a showpiece for French investment in Africa. “Before the outbreak of civil war, Côte d’Ivoire accounted for forty percent of the economic output of the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UMEOA), a group of eight mainly French-speaking countries that share the CFA franc as their common currency”.12

But underlying this façade of economic prosperity and multi-ethnic inclusivity ran a creeping undercurrent of ethnic nationalism. Born from southern Akan resentment toward the perceived economic

opportunism of migratory northerners, fissures had appeared in the fabric of national identity long before the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993.

In an article published in 1974, Pierre Niava, gives an account of …‘some elements approaching a new concept, that is ivorité. It was born of rise of conscience, of a scale of traits and characters exclusive to Ivorians’… If one supposes the idea (ivoirité) existed… in the behavior of politicians before or just after independence, ivoirité dates to this period”.13

An important moment in the institutionalization of ethnic identity occurred in 1990 when the President issued residence cards for non-Ivorian nationals in order to shore up his election bid. “…the perception that immigrants had been granted illegitimate status through fraud was to contribute to considerable future problems. Many northern Ivorians and Burkinabé immigrants dated the start of institutionalized harassment and exhortation by state security forces to the issuance of these residence cards in 1990”.14

The Death of Houphouët-Boigny

“The death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 marked the onset of overt political tension in Côte d’Ivoire and the end of the fragile ethnic balance he had maintained. Candidates representing the key major ethnic groups [Henri Konan Bédié - Baoulé, Laurent Gbagbo - Bété, Alassane Ouattara – Dioula]…. began vying for the presidency in the run-up to 1995 elections”.15 Houphouët’s successor, Henri Konan Bédié, immediately introduced an ethnicity-based campaign aimed at discrediting the

Ivorian credentials of his primary opponent, Alassane Ouattara. Ouattara was disqualified for “holding Burkinabé nationality”, and Bédié was declared the winner.

A very effective tool for containing popular pressure for democratization is the use of nationalist doctrine to exclude so-called enemies of the nation from enjoying democratic rights. Nationalist elites commonly argue that ethnic minorities, the working classes, rival elites [in this case, Alassane Ouattara], or other political opponents should be excluded from political participation, often alleging that these groups lack the proper national credentials and are in league with foreign powers.16

The rift of ethnicity was quickly metastasizing into a chasm. “During Bédié’s six-year rule allegations of corruption and mismanagement multiplied, and he increasingly relied on ethnicity as a political tactic to garner support in an unfavorable economic climate”.17 Bédié’s tenuous control over the state ended in 1999 when disgruntled soldiers staged a coup, thus beginning the current cycle of Ivorian instability. Rigged elections the ensuing year (Ouattara was again banned) failed to elect the coup leader, General Robert Guei, to the presidency and he fled behind a wave of mass protest and violence. Laurent Gbagbo was named the winner. “Under President Gbagbo’s regime, ethnic and religious splits deepened as security forces and vigilante groups again clashed with supporters of the RDR (Ouattara’s party) in the lead up to parliamentary

elections”.18 During this time period state-sponsored violence became normative as Gbagbo’s regime suffered through a crisis of legitimacy. The formation of state trained and sponsored militias (such as the now infamous “Young Patriots”) occurred and large-scale abuses were reported in Abidjan. What first appeared as an army mutiny on September 19, 2002 quickly spread into a nation-wide rebellion as troops demanded the removal of President Gbagbo, as well as fresh elections. The government response to this rebellion was harsh and operations were “accompanied by numerous serious human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, “disappearances”, rape, and summary executions…by the end of September 2002, the rebels, composed mainly of “Dioula” or northerners of other ethnicities were in control of most of northern Côte d’Ivoire (about 50 percent of the country).19 Consolidating the various rebel groups was a priority of their newly emerging spokesperson and later leader, Guillaume Soro. As the conflict continued political elites increased their rhetoric. In one appearance, the wife of the president, Simone Gbagbo, chose strongly polarizing language to condemn an AU brokered program of concurrent disarmament and registration for anti-government rebels. Voicing her disapproval of the proposal during an April 2006 speech, she publicly stated that nationality would not be granted to “foreigners who have killed, sliced throats and sometimes even drank the blood of Ivorians”.20 The First Lady’s language framed the struggle as an assault against “true Ivorians” by an alien entity. Organizers of the pro-government Young Patriots militia have increasingly utilized

the media to provoke violence; “To get their supporters out into the streets… youth leaders aired hate messages on radio and state TV, a favored medium for whipping up political sentiment in Côte d’Ivoire since the country descended into civil war”.21 Discussing the institutional weaknesses of newly democratizing states Snyder writes:

Many newly democratizing Third World states lack institutions to break up governmental and non-governmental information monopolies, to professionalize journalism and to create common public forums… In the absence of such institutions, an increase in the freedom of speech can create an opening for the nationalist mythmakers to hijack public discourse.22

The politics of exclusion have been prevalent dating back to Bédié’s questioning the true citizenship of former Prime Minister and Presidential opponent Alassane Ouattara. Belgian sociologist Benoit Scheuer quoted in Hartill; “It was the intellectuals around Mr. Bédié who brought ivoirité back into the picture”. Comparing the exclusionary discourse in Côte d’Ivoire to that used in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, he says Côte d’Ivoire has “a political elite that wants power or is in power but has a legitimacy problem. In these cases, the elites are going to manipulate the spirit and the mentality of the citizens and are going to develop a discourse, a rhetoric of ‘them and us’”.23 The current situation remains volatile as the country awaits perpetually stalled Presidential elections. A deal between Gbagbo and Soro awarded the latter the title of Prime Minister but elections previously scheduled to take place in October 2006

were cancelled multiple times throughout 2007 and 2008, and are now scheduled for 2009. Against the backdrop of this political stalemate, numerous human rights abuses occur.

ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

Côte d’Ivoire is a ‘low income’,24 developing economy illustrated by its reliance on the export of primary agricultural commodities, namely cocoa. The global price of cocoa soared in the 1970s allowing Côte d’Ivoire to reap the economic benefits as the world’s leading producer of the bean. The significant increase in bean price led other nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia to invest in expanded cocoa output, eventually flooding the market with lower quality cocoa. As prices were driven down, a concurrent global recession had a sobering effect on the once bustling Ivorian economy. The economic roots of the current conflict allow us to look beyond the rhetoric of ethnicity, and more critically examine the motivation behind the use of the “ethnic-card” in identity politics. Among pro-government southerners, the belief that Dioulas are foreigners, outsiders from Mali and Burkina Faso who came to Côte d’Ivoire as invited guests to work in the cocoa fields during the colonial period, is a powerful rallying cry for their “otherness”. Although they provided the labor that helped build Côte d’Ivoire into the “economic miracle” of West Africa, extremist ideologues claim they were merely tolerated guests. One author foreshadowed the coming economic crisis, as well as relating French interests; “Costly anomalies like the Ivory Coast’s cocoa producer subsidies cannot be sustained indefinitely, although the French

again provided a surprisingly generous bailout in late 1988 by buying a large portion of the Ivorian crop at inflated prices”.25 After the death of the patriarch, it would be this economic non-sustainability, exacerbated by the collapse in world cocoa prices that would lead Bédié’s handlers in search of a political rallying point. The common currency of French-speaking West Africa, the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine) Franc underwent a 50% devaluation in 1994 with France’s approval. The CFA had long been seen as over-valued on the world market making Ivorian exports much more expensive than other nations with a weaker currency. By

comparison with Rwanda, a creeping economic downturn crippled its previously prosperous (by regional standards), agriculture-based economy in the lead up to the 1994 genocide. Rwanda’s reliance on world coffee prices exposed the vulnerability of its commodity-centered, developing economy and, as economic, social, and political pressure mounted on the ruling regime, ethnic appellations became more attractive. Similarly, Côte d’Ivoire’s reliance on cocoa had allowed it to build the most vibrant economy in West Africa. This economic stability faltered with the world price of cocoa during the downturn of the late 1980s.

Global cocoa and coffee prices (cents/kg) over time*

*Graph is skewed in favor of the period 1990-2004, but shows the precipitous drop in world cocoa prices from an industry high in the late 1970s/early 1980s, to the period marking the end of the Boigny regime in the mid 1990s. This drop in world cocoa and coffee prices coincided with public pressure for political liberalization and democratization in Côte d’Ivoire: The gross national income of Côte d’Ivoire per capita was $660 ranking 152 globally. However, still the leader for a region mired in poverty when compared to relatively stable neighbors Ghana ($320 and 181, respectively), Burkina Faso ($300 and 183), and Mali ($290 and 187), less stable Guinea ($430 and 171), and recovering war zones Liberia ($110 and 205) and Sierra Leone ($150 and 201).26

SOCIAL DIMENSIONS Increased pressures resulting from demography continue to strain resources in the south of Côte d’Ivoire. A comparison of population data for the year 2000 and projections for 2025 relate the constraints on scarce resources by population stress.

The population pyramid data for year 200027 shows the youth bulge during a time of economic uncertainty. A closer look details almost 5 million Ivorian males below the age of 25. This data is cause for concern when presented with the grim economic data for Côte d’Ivoire since the late 1990s and subsequent outbreak of war. Even more discouraging for peace prospects is the projected population growth over the next two decades, considering the recruitment potential of young people into armed conflict (Growth to 7 million by 2025 with an explosion in youth population).

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Early Warning and the Strategic

Logic of Mass Killing

Several characteristics of the violence in Côte d’Ivoire have alerted observers to the potential for mass killing. Government loyalists as well as rebel fighters have committed mass atrocities in the past28, and the nature of the conflict as a potentially high intensity insurgency and counterinsurgency proxies for greater violence targeting civilians and non-combatants in the future. Depending on the potential for future elections or unforeseen developments to act as triggers for mass violence, policy makers would do well to revisit the empirical evidence presented by the previous eight years of violence in Côte d’Ivoire. Understanding the nature of the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the strategic interests and goals of those either in positions of power29 or close to it, evaluating their capability to enact programs of mass violence, and examining possible scenarios for future conflagrations serve to guide policies aimed at prevention. A culture of impunity has existed in Côte d’Ivoire for sometime dating back to the initial political instability. Paramilitary gendarmes, in particular, operated with impunity throughout the country before partitioning. Targets of violence have been pre-meditated through the creation of opposition death lists. Summary executions and the murder of civilians have occurred on both sides of the conflict, with minimal response from the international community. The earliest incident of mass murder

attributed to governmental gendarmes alerted observers to the potential for mass killing and genocide; “the bodies of fifty-seven young men were discovered in Youpougon, on the outskirts of Abidjan, a massacre that became known as the Charnier de Youpougon…those responsible for the killings (the gendarmerie)…have yet to be properly investigated and brought to justice”.30

Security Dimensions Côte d’Ivoire has become a highly militarized society since the onset of conflict in 1999. Regional insecurity has unfortunately been the norm for the sub-region dating back to the early 1990s with the onset of war in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Côte d’Ivoire’s porous borders, shared with recovering conflict zone Liberia and chronically unstable Guinea, have led to both an influx of cheap weapons, and the incentive for decommissioned Liberian fighters to immigrate to the Ivorian conflict. Further exacerbating the conflict, sophisticated criminal networks for resource and arms flows established during neighboring wars, and accelerated by the de facto partitioning of the country in 2002, left Côte d’Ivoire awash with weapons. The Ivorian government imported 22 million dollars US in arms in 2003 compared to 2 million dollars in 1995,31 before the conflict erupted. This 11-fold increase underscored the importance the government placed on the insurgency in the north of the country, as well as illustrated the redirection of scarce state resources away from more pressing needs including education and healthcare. The government of Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso has, likewise, been actively supporting the New

Forces rebellion in the procurement of weapons and training of troops.32 (The conflict) ‘is inextricably tied to the country's regional policy and its relations with neighboring states. The Ivorian government has accused the Burkina Faso government, and to a lesser extent that of Mali, of conspiring with the northern-based opposition against it, but these links have not been proven.’33 Considering the nature of previous counterinsurgency violence in Côte d’Ivoire, it is not unrealistic to expect coordinated efforts to eliminate opposition elements if the current attempt at identification and presidential elections falter and war is renewed. Despite the imposition of weapons sanctions, the intermittent period of relative calm has allowed armament of multiple state and non-state actors. Benjamin Valentino discussing the threat of future mass killings writes, “Mass Killing is usually driven by instrumental, strategic calculations. Perpetrators see mass killing as a means to an end, not an end in itself…mass killing was never the only strategy that leaders considered to achieve their ends. Mass Killing has not always been a policy of last resort, but rarely has it been a policy of first resort either”.34 He continues by addressing the threat posed by counterguerrilla (counterinsurgency or COIN) operations, “We should expect counterguerrilla mass killing to remain the most common [form of mass killing]” in the future.35 This description should alert policy makers observing the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire as, similar to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, elite architects could seek to frame co-ethnic opposition civilians as supporters of insurgent elements, marking them as threats to the interests of the national collective, and potential targets of state-orchestrated violence.

Current Situation The military conflict has come to an end with the recent formation of a coalition government and subsequent dismantling of observation posts and checkpoints along the zone of confidence. Peace talks in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso demonstrated the important role Burkinabé President Blaise Compaoré plays in the region as observers see his involvement as crucial to the new agreement. Charles Taylor’s trial at The Hague has publicized Compaoré’s complicity in the Liberian war, putting international pressure on the regime in Ouagadougou. In an effort to deflect international criticism, Compaoré may see an opportunity to act as peacemaker in Côte d’Ivoire. After calculating that Gbagbo may not be as dangerous to Burkinabé interests as once perceived, he cajoled Soro into the agreement. President Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, for their part, have apparently come to the realization that a military stalemate exists, and positioning for the stalled presidential elections may take precedence over continued military clashes. The formulation of a coalition government with President Gbagbo naming Guillaume Soro the Prime Minister was received with skepticism among observers within Côte d’Ivoire and from the international community. A wait and see attitude prevails among the international actors as many observers believe this is a short term move meant to allow for future positioning in the run-up to stalled presidential elections.36 Of specific interest for those observers interested in the early warning and prevention of mass killing is the strategic logic motivating the decisions of various political actors in Côte d’Ivoire. A scenario that involves the identification and registration of numerous northerners, such that Gbagbo’s position is

threatened at the polls, may represent an aforementioned fundamental shift in relationships between various parties, resulting in a flawed or cancelled election by the threatened elite and sparking renewed insurgency and counterinsurgency. The probability of mass atrocities would then increase exponentially.

Potential Triggers

Proximate causes of increased conflict include the upsetting of the status quo for criminal elements in the western part of the country. Years of uninterrupted business were placed in jeopardy through peace attempts in Burkina Faso. The severely damaged institutions in Côte d’Ivoire create an opportunity for a wide-range of triggers as the judiciary and legislative branches of the Ivorian government are corrupted and decaying, unable to manage small pressures that quickly overwhelm the system. The internally displaced population combined with Liberian and Leonese refugees illustrates the demographic pressures that could trigger conflict, specifically when combined with pre-existing land disputes in the north and center of the country. Of course, the greatest potential trigger for large-scale violence is the stalled Presidential election. If the vote is perceived as unfair by a significant portion of the population, violence may be accepted as a viable alternative to continuing the political status quo. If the recent past is any indication, Ivorians have become accustomed to voicing their disapproval in the streets. Political violence triggered by the election remains the greatest concern in the upcoming months, and a loss in the election could represent an intolerable outcome for multiple actors.

Long-term Trends

The near future will remain relatively calm as the various elite position themselves for stalled elections. Although Soro benefited greatly from the agreement with President Gbagbo that gave him the Prime Minister portfolio, it remains to be seen if his constituency will continue to support the unity government. He has enriched himself at the expense of numerous civilians in the north, and the brutality with which his forces treated locals did little to endear the New Forces movement to the people with the passage of time. The key issues of registration and political representation are slowly being addressed for supporters of Alassane Ouattara, but this remains a central concern for the consolidation of peace in Côte d’Ivoire. Bédié’s supporters have also failed to have their grievances addressed so that the current situation reflects a suspicious deal between two of the four principal political figures in the conflict. The long-term trend, therefore, remains President Gbagbo continuing to manipulate the international community including ECOWAS, the African Union, and the United Nations in a sophisticated effort to maintain and consolidate his power, at the expense of true reform. The international community remains preoccupied with France taking the international lead in mediation efforts despite its criticized position as former colonial overlord. Unless wide-scale human rights abuses or ethnic expulsion occurs, the diplomatic status quo will continue with the UN likely engaged, ineffectually, in shuttle diplomacy.

POLICY OPTIONS How does one recreate a tenuous equilibrium once a system has transitioned into disequilibrium? In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, what stabilizing characteristics of Houphouët-Boigny’s regime are replicable in today’s volatile environment? Given the dysfunctional nature of his client-patron regime – current president Gbagbo’s long-time opposition to Boigny’s ‘benign authoritarianism’ girded his initial popularity - is it prudent to attempt to recreate an exploitative, unstable house of cards? The lessons gathered from analysis of differing approaches to peace in ethnically divided societies can be examined to inform contemporary Côte d’Ivoire. I argue that a sequencing program beginning with a traditional power-sharing model, transitioning into top-down civic nationalism is required for lasting peace in Côte d’Ivoire. Although attractive at first contact, ethnic partitioning is implausible in Côte d’Ivoire. Writing about lasting solutions to ethnic wars, Daniel Byman identifies four causes of ethnic conflict – ethnic security dilemma, status concerns, hegemonic ambitions, and elite aspirations37 - and prescribes policy options for maintaining the peace. While the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire exhibits elements of status concerns and marginalization among the Dioula, the primary cause of the violence has been elite competition. Byman notes that elite exploitation often coexists with other conflict causes, “Elites exploit broader mass grievances concerning security, status, or dominance”.38 His internal policy prescriptions include control policies (preventing ethnic political action through intimidation), Co-optation of ethnic groups, manipulating ethnic identities, participatory systems (including power-sharing), and

ethnic partition. International Military intervention remains a last resort when the government is part of the problem (and perhaps justifiably so in Côte d’Ivoire depending on the Center’s response to future election outcomes). I will briefly critique ethnic partition as a policy option, then discuss its applicability in the context of Côte d’Ivoire. Lastly, I promote a concurrent program of participatory systems and identity manipulation to end the ongoing conflict.

PARTITIONING TO END ETHNIC

CIVIL WARS

The outbreak of ethnic violence in Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s revived old debates surrounding the plausibility of power-sharing models in ethnically divided states. Using the Balkan crisis as a model, new vigor was given to the idea of ethnic partitioning as a means to stabilize deeply divided societies. Chaim Kaufmann argued forcefully, from the realist perspective, for the separation of ethnic groups into “defensible enclaves”, stating that partition was the only realistic answer leading to a cessation of violence when ‘all else had failed’.39 However, an analysis of the current reality in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the uneven history of partitioning, calls this policy recommendation into question. Kaufmann’s argument for ethnic partitioning tells much about fractured societies, but is less helpful when one considers the empirical evidence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although Kaufmann’s definition of ethnic identity, “Ethnic identities are hardest, since they depend on language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change”,40 applies to the

principal groups in Côte d’Ivoire, it fails to address why differing groups peacefully co-existed before the introduction of Ivoirité into the national political discourse of the 1990s. The author writes “to save lives threatened by genocide, the international community must abandon attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states… stable resolutions of ethnic civil wars are possible, but only when the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves… while ethnic fighting can be stopped by other means, such as peace enforcement by international forces or by a conquering empire, such peaces last only as long as the enforcers remain”.41 The presence of the United Nations peacekeeping mission deployed along the zone of confidence in Côte d’Ivoire acted as Kaufmann’s peace enforcer, but while the dismantling of the zone in 2006 spurred sporadic criminal violence (non-ethnic based) in the weeks following Côte d’Ivoire’s elimination of its security buffer42 - mainly in the volatile west along Liberia’s porous border - results nationwide have marked a relative calm. This calm cannot be explained by an international ‘peace enforcer’ or by a conquering empire, as none has existed for two years. So what explains the current peace? Political elite have been unwilling to engage in violent identity manipulation during this period as they calculate their positions relative to upcoming elections. Further proof that violence in Côte d’Ivoire can be stoked as an instrument of the various political entrepreneurs. Kaufmann’s description of “ethnic identity” is guiding in the context of Côte d’Ivoire. He draws a clear delineation between

ideological identity, religious identity, and ethnic identity;

Ideological identity is relatively soft, as it is a matter of individual belief, or sometimes of political behavior. Religious identities are harder, because while they also depend on belief, change generally requires formal acceptance by the new faith, which may be denied. Ethnic identities are hardest, since they depend on language, culture, and religion, which are hard to change, as well as parentage, which no one can change.43

Linguistic, religious, and cultural cleavages exist between the two primary groups in Côte d’Ivoire, and geographical separation is evident as the previous de facto partitioning between north and south indicated. Although there are very few Ivorians identifying themselves as Akan living in the north, the south previously exhibited highly mixed populations of northern Dioula’s living among southern Akans. This reality is a perfect example of Kaufmann’s scenario. Partitioning could, therefore, be logistically viable in Côte d’Ivoire if a future catastrophe were to occur, albeit with considerable consequences (There is recent evidence suggesting that voluntary and coerced migration has occurred to some degree in the ensuing period since the outbreak of war, representing a contemporary defacto partitioning44). Perhaps Kaufmann’s strongest argument relates to the security dilemma present in ethnic civil wars. According to the author, ethnic wars create security dilemma’s “both because the escalation of both side’s mobilization rhetoric presents a real threat to the other, and even more because

intermingled population settlement patterns create defensive vulnerability and offensive opportunities…Once this occurs, the war cannot end until the security dilemma is reduced by physical separation of the rival groups”.45 The intermingled population patterns argument is crucial to the character of Côte d’Ivoire. As stated before, Akan and Dioula populations have coexisted throughout the region, for centuries. Ultimately, Kaufmann’s solution to the security dilemma too narrowly focuses on ethnic demography:

The severity of ethnic security dilemmas is greatest when demography is most intermixed, weakest when community settlements are most separate. The more mixed the opposing groups, the stronger the offense in relation to the defense; the more separated they are, the stronger the defense in relation to the offense. When settlements patterns are extremely mixed, both sides are vulnerable to attack not only by organized military forces but also by local militias or gangs from adjacent towns or neighborhoods… each side has a strong incentive-at both national and local levels-to kill or drive out enemy populations before the enemy does the same to it, as well as to create homogenous enclaves more practical to defend.46

Southern Côte d’Ivoire clearly falls into the “extremely mixed” pattern of human settlement Kaufmann describes. In his words, both sides exhibit vulnerability to attack, and simple offense versus defense calculations will dominate. Dioula speaking northerners currently living in the

south of the country, specifically, would be vulnerable according to his description. Kaufmann’s chief criticism is reserved for those that would attempt to “reconstruct ethnic identities” according to the “Constructivist Model” of nationalism.

Constructivists argue that individual and group identities are fluid, continually being made and re-made in social discourse. Further, these identities are manipulable by political entrepreneurs… even if constructivists are right that the ancient past does not matter, recent history does. Intense violence creates personal experiences of fear, misery, and loss which lock people into their group identity and their enemy relationship with the other group…47

Kaufmann’s theory fails to account for the “peace” in Côte d’Ivoire following the outbreak of war, as well as the seeming willingness of disparate groups to work together to build government coalitions. Furthermore, this theory fails to account for inter-ethnic cooperation and coexistence following the dismantling of the Zone of Confidence and withdrawal of Peacekeeping troops from the zone in 2006. A more pragmatic solution for a lasting peace is to continue down the road of “constructivist” state building. Critics of Partitioning say that, “rather than separating irreconcilable ethnic groups, (partitioning) foments further violence and forced migration.48 Furthermore, attempts at partitioning in the Balkans have hardened identities, making attempts at civic nationalism more difficult than an attempt

at sequencing beginning with power sharing. A key criticism of Kaufmann’s argument, and partitioning in general, is the recommendation that partitioning be instituted as a last resort measure, when ‘all else has failed’. Taking into consideration Côte d’Ivoire’s recent past, current attempts at power sharing, identification, and civic reintegration, how can policy makers determine when relationships have entered a stage in which fundamental shifts toward mass violence are likely? Ultimately, if the Popular Rivalries (Ancient Hatreds) explanation is true, then partitioning must occur as a solution, or consociational democracy (elite power-sharing) where partitioning isn’t feasible. However, if elite persuasion is true, partitioning would serve to lock in divisive national identities, unnecessarily heightening distrust between groups.49

CIVIC NATIONALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PARTITIONING

Central to Kaufmann’s theory of ethnic partitioning is the importance of hardened identities (so-called identity ‘lock-in’). The genesis of identity lock-in is insignificant, according to Kaufmann, as once enmity has hardened individual and group identities, they can’t be reconstructed. Applied to Côte d’Ivoire, colonial divide and rule is irrelevant as the result of the recent violence is the hardening of group identity. Programs of top-down civic nationalism will be fruitless. However, I propose that since identities are socially constructed and manipulable, they are never locked-in, and always open to reconstruction from the elite. A top-down program of civic nationalism, is possible when civil wars have ended and

rudimentary security has been established. The sequencing entails a short-term power-sharing agreement, as proposed by Arend Lijphart, to run concurrently with a program of civic nationalism. Identity reconstruction is an integral part of Arend Lijphart’s theory of consociational democracy. Contrary to Kaufmann, Lijphart sees identity reconstruction as something attainable in fractured societies; “recent scholarship has moved away from the primordial view, which sees ethnicity as an unalterable given, and toward an instrumental or situation approach that instead sees ethnicity as taking shape only when it is manipulated by political elites”.50 The restructuring of collective identity is possible in this environment because much of the recent violent ideology present in the Côte d’Ivoire conflict was introduced in the post-colonial period. There was no history of massacre prior to political upheaval of the last decade, and it wasn’t until the post- Houphouët-Boigny period that political entrepreneurs realized the rewards to be had from manipulating constituents’ identity. Identity manipulation has been a key element of the Ivorian conflict, and reconstruction of these individual and group identities may be the best hope for peace and stability in the future. Sequencing is an important aspect of civic reintegration, as prolonged power sharing could prove counter-productive to long-term nationalist prospects. The danger of prolonged power sharing is that ethnic or religious identities may be exacerbated the longer the divisions of power sharing exist.51 This has been particularly evident in Lebanon. Extracting power-sharing agreements from belligerents by third party mediators has proved an increasingly popular policy option by the international community. Long-term implementation of these agreements while

preventing competing elites from hijacking the process, however, has proved exceedingly difficult with backtracking in Burundi and Kenya - and, most recently, the debacle in Zimbabwe - serving as sobering examples. If the elite-persuasion view of ethnic conflict is correct, such separation measures (consociational democracy) might serve to lock in divisive national identities, unnecessarily heightening distrust between groups. When this is the case, a better solution would be to take advantage of the fluidity of national identity during the formative stages of democratization to promote more inclusive, civic identities and cross-ethnic political alignments.52

The solution should, thus, be an attempt to take advantage of this fluidity, focusing on the generational reconstruction of national identity during an internationally supported transition from the current autocratic, ethnicity-based system, to a power-sharing agreement composed of moderate technocrats and civil society participants. Agreed upon national school curriculums and ethnically mixed national military and police forces are two examples of a move toward civic reintegration that play a vital role in the sequencing phase. These efforts at identity reconstruction are potentially decades-long programs requiring the initiative of international interests - namely the UN and regional/sub-regional actors including the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), respectively - in support of Ivorian civil society. The conundrum of such an ambitious reconstruction program is the potential spoiler role that status quo ethnic entrepreneurs and hardliners may seek to play once a possibly damaging revision has commenced. Marginalizing their ability to

wreak havoc, while protecting political moderates and civilians during the transition pose central challenges.

POLICY RELEVANCE International Security Policy experts have debated the role of identity in conflict from differing perspectives. Agreement surrounding the nature of identity would do much to further policy objectives related to current and post-conflict situations. One need only examine ongoing discourse concerning American Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to discern the prevalence of identity-centric debate in American policy formulation. Although much less significant to US national interests than the painful attempts at sequencing a democratic peace in Iraq, the Ivorian conflict provides a laboratory for the greater exploration of identity reconstruction in not-yet-failed states. The cleavages present in Côte d’Ivoire have been exacerbated relatively recently, unlike the cleavages in other so-called intractable conflicts, thus providing a “real-time” model for those wishing to study the machinations of identity manipulation by political elites. Attempts at peace have failed in Côte d’Ivoire due to a failure by government and opposition elites - and the international community - to address local conflict and engage civic national identity as a cornerstone to the peace process. Self-interested parties, beneficially engaged in the violence and instability, will continue to manipulate ethnic identities for personal gain. Conflict transformation will require cooptation or marginalization of potential spoilers, and the benefactors of peace must commit to inclusive identity reconstruction. Programs of top-down identity reconstruction are necessary after

communities have been divided by prolonged ethnic violence or civil war. The promotion of civic nationalism and the reconstruction of these individual and group identities in Côte d’Ivoire may be the best hope for peace and stability in the short and long term. Civic nationalism - coupled with participatory systems and governmental representation - incorporates each ethnicity into the collectivity, thus providing a stake, as well as a dividend for peace. If the international community is genuinely interested in political stability in

the context of sustainable, just peace, a serious inquiry into the plausibility of identity reconstruction is required. Early warning signals for mass violence have been prevalent for over a decade now in Côte d’Ivoire. Domestic, regional, and international action that facilitates the construction of civic nationalism in post-conflict states will be necessary if we continue to adhere to the orthodoxy of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states, while seeking to prevent future programs of mass killing and genocide.

ACTORS

MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES53

• FPI (Front populaire ivoirien) – Current ruling party led by President Laurent Gbagbo.

• PDCI (Parti démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire) – The oldest political party in Côte d’Ivoire, ruled from Independence until 1999 when Henri Konan Bédié was overthrown in coup led by General Robert Guei. The party of first President Félix Houphouët-Boigny.

• RDR (Rassemblement des Républicains) – Led by Alassane Ouattara, the RDR is affiliated with the northern Dioula speaking population, and is linked with the Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) rebellion.

• MINOR POLITICAL PARTIES

• MFA (Mouvement des Forces de l’Avenir) – Small, unarmed party (opposed to President Gbagbo) that forms part of unity government.

• PIT (Parti ivoirien des travailleurs) – Small party makes up part of unity government and is supportive of President Gbagbo.

ARMED FORCES

• FA – FN (Force Armees des Forces Nouvelles) – A conglomeration of armed groups in the north loyal to the New Forces rebellion and adopted in 2003, it has since become the FDS – FN (Force de Defense et Securites des Forces Nouvelles).

• FANCI (Force Armee Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire) – The national armed forces of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire. Composed of a dilapidated Navy and Air force that was effectively destroyed by French bombing on November 6, 2004 in response to the killing of French soldiers, the national army remains the only functioning element of the armed forces. President Gbagbo’s power is consolidated via direct control of loyal elements in the army, bypassing constitutionally mandated chains of command.54 The national gendarmerie is

composed of 6000 paramilitary police and, along with the 1000 strong Republican Guard, comprises President Gbagbo’s most loyal force.

• FDS – FN (Force de Defense et Securites des Forces Nouvelles) – Previously mentioned latest incarnation of northern rebel movement. Former members of the national armed forces comprise the core of the estimated 25,000 fighters. The governments of Mali and, in particular, Burkina Faso are suspected of supporting the New Forces.55

MILITIAS AND ARMED POLITICAL GROUPS

• AP – WÊ (Alliance Patriotiques – WÊ) – Well-armed, Pro-Gbagbo militia operating in the west of the country. Operates (with FANCI support) in the former zone of confidence, involved in criminal behavior including extortion and harassment/intimidation of rival ethnic groups, particularly the Baoulé, Burkinabé, and Malinké.56

• FLGO (Front de Liberation de Grand Ouest) – Pro-government militia in the West sharing good relations with AP – WÊ.

• FSCO (Front de Securite du Centre Ouest) – Pro-government militia operating in Abidjan.

• Jeune Patriotes – Most notorious of pro-government youth militias. Have received military training and could fight as light infantry with regular forces. Responsible for violence throughout the south and pose a serious threat in Abidjan.

• ‘Lima Militias’ - Name given to mercenary and bandit gangs from the war in Liberia who continue to destabilize western Côte d’Ivoire.

• MJP (Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix) – Anti-government force composed of ethnic Yacoubas, and based around Man.

• MILOCI (Mouvement de Liberation de l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire - Pro-government militia operating in the west around the former zone of confidence.

• MPIGO (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest) – Anti-Government militia that forms part of New Forces Comprised predominantly of ethnic Yacoubas, but also include Liberian and Sierra Leonese mercenaries. Accused of arms trafficking throughout the region.

CIVILIAN GROUPS

• Comites de Surveillance – Self-Defense forces raised by villagers throughout the zone of confidence to provide protection from militias and bandits.

• Dozos – Traditional society of hunters that follow a strict moral code. Code calls for them to fight oppression and many have sided with the New Forces.

• Operation L’Icorne – 4000 strong French military contingent tasked to support UNOCI.

EXTERNAL ACTORS • ONUCI (Operation des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)) – 9000

soldiers sent as part of UN Security Council peacekeeping mandate to Côte d’Ivoire.

• BURKINA FASO – President Blaise Compaoré’s regime in Ouagadougou has much at stake in the current Ivorian conflict, as anywhere from 2.5 to 4 million Burkinabe’s57 currently reside in Côte d’Ivoire. The fragility of Campaoré’s government is illustrated by his desire to keep this massive Burkinabé population abroad where it cannot mount a threat to his autocracy. Campaoré has been distrustful of Gbagbo in the past, and has been responsible for supplying the Rebellion with arms and material support.

• LIBERIA – The long-running civil war in Liberia has had a devastating effect on the national economy. The slow rebuilding process has left many former fighters dispossessed and they have sought employment in Cote d’Ivoire where their skills as fighters are in demand.

• GUINEA – Recent political upheaval in Guinea has further contributed to Ivorian insecurity through non-secured borders and illegal weapons flows. The calming of political tensions in the last few weeks has seen a drop in cross-border movements of armed belligerents.

• FRANCE – Former colonial ruler and heavily invested in Côte d’Ivoire. French interest in the country is a rallying cry for multiple Ivorian political entrepreneurs and throughout the conflict France has been viewed domestically as hostile toward Gbagbo and the FPI. France maintains a military presence in the country in the form, ostensibly, of a peacekeeping force (see Operation L’Icorne above).

1 Mitter, Siddhartha, Ebony and Ivoirité: War and Peace in Ivory Coast. Transition Magazine, vol. 94 Duke University Press, 2003. Available online at: http://www.transitionmagazine.com/online/ivoirite.htm 2 Gagnon, V.P. Jr., ‘Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict’ International Security 3 Ibid, p. 132 4 Valentino, Benjamin, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004. p. 10 5 Ibid. p. 152 6 Ibid. Ch. 3 on the Strategic Logic of Mass Killing pp. 66-90. 7 For a review of the ECOWARN mechanism see John Mark Opoku West African Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System: The Role of Civil Society Organizations – KAIPTC Paper, No 19, September 2007. Available at: http://www.kaiptc.org/_upload/general/KAIPTC_11.pdf 8 Mitter, Siddhartha, Ebony and Ivoirité: War and Peace in Ivory Coast. Transition Magazine, vol. 94 Duke University Press, 2003. Available online at: http://www.transitionmagazine.com/online/ivoirite.htm 9 Launay, Robert, Beyond the Stream: Islam and Society in a West African Town, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press: 1992. p. 84 10 Ibid. p. 84. 11McNamara, Terry Francis, France in Black Africa, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989. p. 129 12 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks: November 23, 2004. West Africa; Economic Aftershocks From Côte d’Ivoire May Be Felt Around Region For Years To Come 13 Ramsés, L. Boa Thiémélé, L’Ivoirité: Entre Culture et Politique, Paris: Editions

L’Harmattan, 2003. 14 Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians In Western Côte d’Ivoire, August 2003 vol. 15, No. 14(A) p. 7. 15 Ibid, p. 7 16 Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 37. 17 Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians In Western Côte d’Ivoire, August 2003 vol. 15, No. 14(A) p. 8. 18 Ibid, p. 8 19 Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians In Western Côte d’Ivoire, August 2003 vol. 15, No. 14(A) p. 10. 20 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks: April 28, 2006. ‘Storms Still Brewing Over Disarmament’, 21 UN Integrated Regional Information Networks: November 1, 2005. ‘What’s In A Name? A Fight For Identity” 22 Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 269 23 Hartill, Lane 2006, ‘Clouding Ivory Coast’s Peace: Ivoirité’, The Christian Science Monitor. [On-line] http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0127/p07s02-woaf.html January 27, 2006. 24 Economies are divided according to 2005 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. Low income is $875 or less. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 25McNamara, Terry Francis, France in Black Africa, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989. p. 232. 26WorldBank Atlas available at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 27 http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbpyrs.pl?cty=IV&out=s&ymax=250 28 For more on atrocities in Côte d’Ivoire: Rebel Massacre of 130 government gendarmes and their families in 2002 see Daniel Balint-Kurti, “Côte d’Ivoire’s Forces Nouvelles” Chatham House: Africa Programme Armed Non-State Actors Series. September 2007 http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/535/ Charnier de Youpougon - Government Security Forces massacre of youths linked to opposition in Abidjan see “Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte d'Ivoire” Human Rights Watch Report 2003: 9. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/08/04/trapped-between-two-wars-0 29 Valentino, Benjamin, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004 p. 240. 30 Charnier de Youpougon Human Rights Watch Report, 2003: 9 31 http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Section5.htm Section 5.8 - Defense expenditures and arms transfers 32 Author’s interview with ICG West Africa Chief, Gilles Yabi, April 19, 2007

33 “Côte d’Ivoire, External Affairs, Assessment.” Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – West Africa August 1, 2006. Jane’s Online Research http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/wafrsu/cotes080.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=cote%20d'ivoire%20world%20armies&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=WAFR& 34 Valentino, Benjamin, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004 p. 235. 35 Ibid. p. 240. 36 Author’s interview with ICG West Africa Chief, Gilles Yabi, April 19, 2007 37 Byman, Daniel Keeping the Peace: Lasting Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. p. 13. 38 Ibid, p. 42 39 Kaufmann, Chaim, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars’ International Security vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996). 40 Ibid, p. 138. 41 Ibid, p. 136. 42 ‘See Attacks increase in Ivory Coast’ James Copnall, Thursday, 26 April 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6594787.stm 43 Ibid, p. 138. 44 Author’s discussion with unnamed researcher in Abidjan – February 2009. (Identity withheld) 45 Kaufmann, Chaim, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars’ International Security vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), p. 138. 46 Ibid, p. 141. 47 Ibid, p. 145. 48 See R. Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 1997. pp. 22-35. 49 Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 33. 50 Lijphart, Arend, ‘The Power Sharing Approach’ in Joseph Montville, ed. Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990. p. 492. 51 Snyder, Jack and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma” In Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention, edited by Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, 15-37. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. p. 19. 52 Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000. p. 33. 53Actors synopsis is summarized from ‘A Summary of Armed Groups and Political Parties in Côte d’Ivoire’ Safer Access Online, January 17, 2007. http://www.saferaccess.org/documents/Summary%20of%20Armed%20Groups%20and%20Political%20Parties%20in%20Cote%20d'Iv..pdf 54 Ibid, p. 2. 55 Ibid. p. 3. 56‘Ibid, p. 1. 57 Author’s interview with ICG West Africa Chief, Gilles Yabi, April 19, 2007

United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/unoci.pdf