connecting the slums

The Water and Sanitation Programis an international partnership forimproving water and sanitation sectorpolicies, practices, and capacities toserve poor people

February 2006

Field Note

Connecting the Slums

A Utility’s Pro-PoorApproach in BangaloreThe Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board began experimenting with service delivery in slumsin 2000. Over the next five years, its newly created in-house Social Development Unit mobilized 46 poorcommunities, approximately 10 percent of the city’s slums, of which more than half have successfullyconnected to the BWSSB network and continue to be served with water, receive bills, and make payments.

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BWSSB managed to significantly increase access for the poor to pipedwater supply while committing to good management and cost recovery.Its slum program is slowly but surely being scaled up and provides animportant model for pro-poor utility reform in other cities.

Executive Summary

Over a five-year period from 2000 to 2005, the Bangalore Water

Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB) experimented with service

delivery in slums, first through three pilot projects under a

donor-funded program, and then through a newly created

Social Development Unit (SDU). By early 2005, the SDU had

mobilized 46 poor communities, approximately 10 percent of the

city’s slums, of which more than half had successfully connected

to the BWSSB network and continue to be served with water,

receive bills, and make payments. The Board’s work in slums

achieved important objectives by:

• increasing the number of slum households connected to the

metered network;

• decreasing residents’ dependency on ‘free’ water through public

taps or illegal connections; and

• reducing non-revenue water.

The program has had significant impact despite the fact that it

was launched without a set of specific objectives, operated in a

rather ad hoc manner, and received variable support from the rest

of the utility. It is, however, indigenous to the BWSSB, has provided

an important model, and is slowly but surely being scaled up.

This field note summarizes the experience of the BWSSB. It

examines the major external triggers – a successful pilot project,

expansion of the water supply network and the end of external

funding for public taps – that led to the utility embarking on a

program to connect the poor and bring them onto the customer

base. It also looks at the internal factors contributing to success,

which included willingness to make internal policy changes, the

establishment of a unit tasked with reaching out to the slums,

and the unexpected impact of revenue targets on the incentives

for frontline staff. It concludes that the BWSSB managed to

significantly increase access for the poor within the context of a

commitment to good management and cost recovery, and that

there are valuable lessons for pro-poor utility reform in other cities.

Slums inBangaloreAlthough the percentage of thepopulation living in slums is certainlygreater in Mumbai or Delhi, it isestimated that up to 20 percent ofBangalore’s 6.5 million people live inslums with little or no access to basicservices (see Boxes 1 and 2). Thenumber of slums in Bangalore varieswidely according to how they aredefined, and figures are frequentlyinconsistent. This Field Note focuseson the area within greater metropolitanBangalore under the jurisdiction ofthe Municipal Corporation. Accordingto the Census of India, in 2001,this area had 4.3 million inhabitantsand 733 ‘slum enumeration blocks’that housed 345,200 people. Incontrast, the Karnataka Slum ClearanceBoard (KSCB), based on 2004 data,maintains there are only 367 slums inthe same area, but with a much greaterpopulation of 592,000 people.

Thus, while contradictory, official figuresput the proportion of the city’spopulation residing in slums somewherebetween 8 and 15 percent. NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs),however, consistently estimate an evenlarger figure, closer to 20 percent.

Water Supplyin SlumsUntil recently, most slum dwellersobtained their water from a combinationof private boreholes, water vendors,government tankers, public taps andillegal tapping of BWSSB lines. Legal

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Greater Metropolitan Bangalore: Comprises the Bangalore City Municipal Corporation plus seven adjoiningmunicipalities, one town municipal council, and parts of neighboring district areas; 2001 population 6.5 million;nearly 500 documented slums housing over one million people.

Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BMP): The Municipal Corporation of Bangalore; strongly aligned with the stategovernment (despite the recent 74th amendment to the Indian Constitution advocating decentralization); in charge ofstorm water drains, solid waste management, street lighting, and public foot paths; does not have a dedicated slumdivision so slum work is carried out by ward-level engineers alongside other routine works; 2001 population 4.3 million,including approximately 400 slums.

Bangalore Development Authority (BDA): Responsible for the preparation of city development plans, approvalof building and housing plans, land acquisition, development and subdivision of agricultural land, provision of municipalservices in newly developed land, including pockets of slums; after works are complete newly developed areas arehanded over to the BMP; approximately 20 percent of city slums are on land owned by BDA; in some cases BDAregularizes slums under its jurisdiction and issues land tenure documents.

Karnataka Slum Clearance Board (KSCB): Nodal agency for slum improvement for the state of Karnataka;authorized to execute improvement works, demolish buildings, clear an entire slum or acquire the land a slum is situatedon, and provide some security to slum dwellers; less than 4 percent of slums are on KSCB land.

Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB): Parastatal water and sewerage utility, noobligation to supply water to slums, but directed by its governing Act to provide ‘gratuitous water supply through publichydrants or other conveniences…subject to payment by the Corporation’.

Box 1: Bangalore’s institutions

household connections were rare inthe slums, as BWSSB’s policy statedthat a connection would not beapproved unless the resident couldprovide proof of tenure. Most slumdwellers were unable to do this, eitherbecause they did not have legal landtenure, or else had no paperwork toprove it. (For example, only 53 of all theslums in the city had formal tenure andvery few residents of these slumsactually paid any property tax.)

In addition, an estimated 250 slumsettlements were in areas of the city farfrom the main network. This wasbecause the municipal boundaryrevision to include 27 new wards and

This did not mean that none of the slumdwellers were using BWSSB water – infact a 2001 survey1 reported that justover half of the slums had access to

extend the borders of 28 older wardsoccurred as late as 1995. These newareas had yet to be provided withwater distribution systems.

Connecting the Slums:A Utility’s Pro-PoorApproach in Bangalore

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1 AusAid Master Plan, Baseline Socio-Economic Survey Report, Aug 2001.

In an unimproved slum, children collect puddle water and filter it through a cloth.

Slums in Bangalore are often classified in terms of their status in the process of ‘declaration’, a lengthy and byzantinemechanism to formalize the status of slums and make them eligible for development. Declared slums are entitled to landrights and certain benefits, including infrastructure services, so declared slum status is coveted by slum dwellers.

The first step in the process is for a slum to be ‘identified’, which means that it is merely known to exist by the KSCB.A ‘notification’ is then issued for the slum (for this reason declared slums are also sometimes referred to as notifiedslums), allowing anyone with a claim to the land to come forward. The status of the slum in the declaration process isrelated to the section of the Karnataka Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act that it falls under; and whether it is‘preliminary’ (P) or ‘final’ (F). Most slums start out under the general section 3 of the Act, and are thus categorized as 3P.Slums on land deemed to be unsuitable for habitation may be notified under section 11 of the Act, which allows for themto be relocated (‘cleared’), or section 17, through which the land they are on is acquired by the KSCB itself. Thus an 11Fslum has been relocated, and a 17F slum is on land fully under the control of the KSCB.

Slum residents may be issued with what are called ‘possession certificates’, and land in slums is often informally boughtand sold. However, there is controversy over the extent of official land title even fully-declared 17F slum dwellers actuallyhave. In a few cases, BDA has issued slum dwellers with ‘lease-cum-ownership’ papers that provide full tenure after a10-year lease period during which the recipient pays a regular nominal lease payment.

The completion of the declaration process can take years, if not decades. It is not a good indicator of the level ofinfrastructure and housing in a given slum; usually the process lags far behind the development of a slum. Moreover, thereare cases in which undeclared slums have actually received more attention than declared ones because political influencewas exerted in their favor.

In 2004, KSCB had 367 slums in its records, of which 209 had been declared. Estimates show that there are just under600,000 people in the 367 officially-recorded slums, but there are slums in the city which are not in KSCB records at all.These remain marginalized in terms of official provision of network services other than what they can obtain throughpolitical patronage or the intermediation of NGOs.

Box 2: The process of slum ‘declaration’

BWSSB water, either through one of thethousands of public taps or throughindividual, mostly illegal, connections.An informal estimate by the statefederation of slum dwellers – theKarnataka Kolegeri NivasigalaSamyuktha Sanghatane (KKNSS) –estimated the number of illegal slumconnections in the city to be between20,000 and 30,000.2

Public taps are an important part of thisstory. Until recently there were about

15,000 operational taps fed by theBWSSB network, and another3,000 supplied from local boreholes.About half of these taps were inlow-income areas and about aquarter in slums.Their installationwas frequently politically motivated,usually in the run-up to an election.The public taps have never provideda particularly good level of service:there are up to 50 households pertap, water suppy is for short periodson alternate days, and long queuesare common.

While slum dwellers living in thecenter of the city were more likelyto have access to BWSSB water, inthe newly-added wards and areasof the city with poor network servicewater on-selling and self-supply werecommon. This was disadvantageousto the poor, resulting in high copingcosts. The cost of installing ahandpump can be more than thecost of a connection, and the costof water from vendors has alwaysbeen significantly higher than the perliter cost of water supplied by the

Public taps have never provided a particularly good level of service: there areup to 50 households per tap, water supply is for short periods on alternatedays, and long queues are common.

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2 Report by KKNSS (2005), Water, Sanitation and Sewerage Systems.

BWSSB; at Rs 23 per 20 liter container,the volumetric price of this water isalmost 17 times that provided atprivate taps at the lowest band ofthe tariff.

The UtilityBWSSB is a publicly-owned waterutility created in 1964 by the stategovernment of Karnataka. The Act thatestablished it says that its primary tasksare providing water supply, seweragenetworks and sewage disposal;ensuring the sufficiency of domesticwater supply to the required standards;and levying and collecting watercharges on a no loss-no profit basis.Although its current responsibility is toprovide for the city of Bangalore, theChairman of the Board is appointed bythe Karnataka state government andreports directly to the state UrbanDevelopment Department.

BWSSB faces many challenges; likemany Indian utilities, it is struggling tocope with insufficient funds, an agingdistribution system, high unaccounted-for water, explosive population growth,expanding urban boundaries, hiringand promotion constraints, high bulkwater costs, and political interference,primarily in tariff setting. One of itsmajor sources of bulk water, theCauvery River, is 100 km away andwater must be pumped to the city atgreat expense; as a result BWSSB’sproduction costs, at close to Rs 20 perm3 supplied, are the highest of anymajor urban utility in India. However,BWSSB is one of the best-managedand most efficient utilities in the

country. It boasts 100 percentmetering, the lowest ratio of staff-to-connections in the country, aneffective customer grievance redressalsystem; and an active program toreduce non-revenue water.

Organizationally, BWSSB is divided intosix geographically discrete MaintenanceDivisions. These six divisions are furtherdivided into 20 sub-divisions, each withabout three to four local ‘servicestations’. These service stations arestaffed by the engineers, waterinspectors, contractors, meter readers,linesmen and valvemen who engage inthe real frontline work with customers.It is important to differentiate thisfrontline staff from senior managementin the Maintenance Division since theirrespective physical locations, customerinteraction and responsibilities createdifferent kinds of incentives fortheir performance.

Corporate planning, capital works,auditing, water source developmentand finance are dealt with at a centrallevel, separately from maintenance.Unlike most utilities in India, BWSSBcovers its expenditures on operations

and maintenance entirely from tariffrevenues; these revenues are generatedthrough a system of differing watertariffs for bulk, industrial, non-domesticand domestic consumption (with someof these users cross-subsidizing theothers) as well as from fixed sanitarycharges to offset the costs of runningthe sewerage system. However,the tariff does not cover debt servicingor capital expenditure. The utilityreceives loans for capital worksfrom the state government andagencies such as the Housing andUrban Development Corporation(HUDCO) and the Karnataka UrbanInfrastructure Development andFinance Corporation (KUIDFC).

BWSSB Serviceto the PoorHistorically, BWSSB had few incentivesto work in slums. Other agencies weregiven the mandate to improve livingconditions in slums, and BWSSBremained focused on its core task ofsupplying its existing customer base.An organizational culture, in which thestaff was reluctant to work on tasks

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Women queue at a public tap, waiting for the water to be turned on.

3 US$ 1 = Rs 45 (February 2006).

perceived as either technically simple orpolitically sensitive, also prevailed.Until recently, BWSSB’s service toslums consisted solely of supplyingwater, on behalf of the BMP, to thefree public taps connected to thenetwork, and maintaining someboreholes for public use in areasbeyond. BWSSB policy regarding landtenure requirements was a barrier toresidents of informal settlementsobtaining connections, as was the cost.Thus, despite the fact that BWSSBsupplied water to the poor, slumdwellers had no opportunity to becomeregular customers.

A critical point relevant to service to thepoor is that BWSSB itself does not payfor capital investment in new distributionmains to connect previously unservedneighborhoods. The capital worksdivision of BWSSB finances newinfrastructure through direct ‘depositcontribution’ of funds from third parties,such as the BMP or KSCB. This means

BWSSB will never initiate an expansionprogram without the required funds inhand; this has in the past clearly provedto be a stumbling block to ensuring thatthe poor living in underserved wards,or on the periphery of this rapidly-expanding city, actually get service.

Given these obstacles, very few slumcommunities have, in the past,approached BWSSB directly for newconnections. Instead, improving slumwater supply was left to one of themany authorities responsible forthe development of the city andimprovement of the slums, such as theBangalore Development Authority(BDA), BMP, or KSCB. These agenciescould decide to use some of their ownfunds for water services; for instance,the Corporation could use its 18percent budget allocation reserved for‘scheduled castes and scheduled tribes’to pay for the cost of extending waterlines and putting in public taps in someof the slums under its jurisdiction.

If one of these agencies decided toundertake slum improvement in aparticular area, or responded to arequest from a community (or, morecommonly, from a local politician), itwas required to submit a proposalto BWSSB describing the requestedintervention, obtain an estimatefrom BWSSB engineers, and thencontribute the funds. Not surprisingly,this approach was piecemeal,prone to political interference, andresulted in very uneven levels of servicefor the poor.

Changes inthe Relationshipwith the PoorIn recent years, BWSSB has made aconcerted effort to become moreaccountable to its customers. It remainsa state-owned public utility weigheddown by bureaucratic hurdles, but theprogress made in engaging withconsumers, sharing information andaddressing grievances has been bothsignificant and substantive.

However, because of the financingmechanisms described above,obtaining access to water supply hasinvolved direct communication betweenslum dwellers and practically allstakeholders except the utility. Thescope for direct interaction betweenslum dwellers and BWSSB staff wastruly minimal, and the utility did notconsider them either existing orpotential customers.

Three specific events prompted achange in BWSSB’s overall approachto slums.

Community participation was a central component of the project, and itshowed that involvement with NGOs active in slum areas and with theresidents themselves could rally slum communities to work with BWSSBengineers and other frontline staff, rather than against them.

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Community members gather to discuss whether to opt for shared or individual connections.

A Precedent is Set

Pilot projects implementedunder an AusAID master planningproject, designed to demonstratehow water and sanitation servicescould be delivered by a utility toslum households, set animportant precedent.

These pilots addressed both the issueof whether slum households would payfor water from metered connectionsand the lack of land tenure in slums.At the suggestion of the AusAIDproject team, the Board of Directors ofBWSSB adopted a resolution to acceptgovernment-issued ‘lease-cum-ownership’ documents provided tosome slum dwellers rather than actualland titles as an adequate basis forgranting connections.

This decision was later informallyextended by the chief engineers toinclude ration cards, identity cards,election cards and even electricity bills,as admissible proof of occupation,because these documents state wherethe beneficiary lives. BWSSB wasaware that this pragmatic resolutionand its later extension was acourageous – and potentiallycontroversial – break with previouspractice. The tacit support of the stateUrban Development Department wascrucial; the Secretary of the Departmentwas a member of the Board ofDirectors that adopted the initialresolution and did not object to laterpractice. Taking this administrative andbureaucratic route circumvented goingto the State Legislative Assembly forapproval, where the issue could havebeen bogged down in heated and

lengthy debate on the overall status ofslums and their regularization.

The three slums for the pilot projectswere carefully selected to represent thedifferent kinds of slums scatteredacross the city – one a small, denseslum in the city center, one a mediumsize slum without land title in a newly-added ward, and one a large partially-planned slum fully ‘declared’ by KSCB.Community participation was a centralcomponent of the project, and itshowed that involvement with NGOsactive in slum areas and with theresidents themselves could rally slumcommunities to work with BWSSBengineers and other frontline staff, ratherthan against them.

The overall experience of the pilots wasvery positive. In total, more than 1,000slum households, or almost 6,000people, became new utility customers.A combination of shared and individualmetered connections was installed,and on average 70 percent ofhouseholds in the project slumsopted to participate.

In addition to the new water network,AusAID paid private contractors toinstall sewerage networks, constructnew drains, improve roads, andestablish solid waste managementsystems. A local water and sanitationcommittee was established in each slumas the institutional focal point forcommunity participation.

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SDU staff and community leader visit each home to introduce the new BWSSB program.

The pilots left an important legacy.They demonstrated that slum dwellerswere willing to pay regular tariffs forutility water and that individual andgroup connections were a viable optionin dense, insecure and poor slums.They also proved to BWSSB that localprivate contractors, usually reluctantto work in slums, would do sounder good supervision and withadequate compensation.

The City Stops Payingfor Public Taps

Subject to the 1964 Act, BWSSB hadfull responsibility for the managementof public taps, but the BMP wassupposed to pay for the water. Thiswater was, in turn, provided free ofcharge to the users, and no chargeswere levied at the taps themselves. In2002, there were approximately 15,000of these public taps supplied by theBWSSB network. Of these, BWSSBbilled for the water supplied at 7,000

(the others were unauthorized ordeemed to be out of service, though inpractice they still operated). In theory,the BMP paid the bill from its municipalrevenues, using a pricing structurebased on gauging the water flow, anexercise jointly undertaken by the utilityand the Corporation every few years.

The last gauging exercise took place in1997 when it was estimated that theaverage public tap supplied 22,000liters of water per day, billed at a cost ofRs 3,000 per tap per month. This isequivalent to Rs 4.5 per m3, a very lowrate equivalent to less than the lowestblock of the domestic tariff, and wellbelow BWSSB’s cost for supplyingthe water. In actual fact, the Corporationpaid these bills erratically, and by 2002had accumulated arrears of nearlyRs 150 crore, equivalent to US$ 30 million.

In 2002, BMP announced it would cutfunding for public taps altogether.It seems that the decision was taken

because the city’s revenues were simplyinsufficient to finance the payments.As part of its broader reform initiatives,in particular to clean house financially,BWSSB began to exert strongpressure on BMP to pay its debts.Certain of its inability to finance futurepayments and large arrears, theCorporation sought and obtained theapproval of the Urban DevelopmentDepartment to cancel the arrangementfor city funding of public taps and tofinalize a debt repayment plan.

The decision was justified to the publicon the basis that increasingly erraticwater supply throughout the city alteredthe original terms of agreement, andthat it was BWSSB that had the socialresponsibility to provide water for slumdwellers and to fund public taps throughits own cross subsidies.

This development created a seriousdilemma for BWSSB. It was estimatedthat water supplied by the utility topublic taps amounted to a staggering20 percent of all water going intothe distribution system, and thusrepresented a very important loss ofrevenue if no one paid for it. GivenBWSSB’s mandate to operate on ano profit-no loss basis, and its ongoingstruggles to reduce non-revenuewater, it could not afford to continuethe practice of supplying water free ofcost. Initially, the Corporation gave tacitapproval to BWSSB to disconnect thepublic taps over time, and it agreed toleave the matter to them. However, itwas clear that a city-wide disconnectiondrive would incite large-scaleopposition from the community,most likely with the support of the verycouncillors who had voted in favor

BWSSB began thinking about how to curb the loss of water and revenue,ideally transforming users of public taps to paying customers withdomestic connections.

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Household tasks are simplified after private connections increase water availability.

of ceasing municipal payment for publictaps in the first place.

BWSSB began thinking about how tocurb this loss of water and revenue,ideally transforming users of publictaps to paying customers withdomestic connections.

The Network is Extended

to All Wards

Although 27 new wards had beenadded to the official Corporationroster in 1995, only the original 73wards were supplied with mains anddistribution network, and of theseonly 45 had systems that providedcomplete coverage.

In view of its responsibilityto fund basic infrastructure withinmunicipal boundaries, BMP decidedto pay for the full extension ofBWSSB’s piped network to the newand partially-served wards. TheCorporation agreed with the BWSSB’scapital works division to divide the work

Connection CostsNormal rate for a new domestic connection: Rs 1,800.In slumsFor plots less than 150 square feet only the water meter cost is covered: Rs 550.For plots between 150 and 600 square feet a sanitary charge is added: Rs 800.If slum dwellers coordinate and have their additional piping and taps installed by the same plumber the additional cost perhousehold is between Rs 800 and 1,000.TariffsThe old tariff structure required all customers to pay a minimum charge equivalent to 15 m3 of water a month. Most slumdwellers consumed around half this amount, so essentially paid for water they did not use. The new tariff reduced theminimum charge to 8 m3. A family using this amount or less now pays Rs 73 per month, compared with Rs 115 under theold structure. For shared connections, the total volume consumed is divided by the number of families sharing a tap, afterwhich the same tariff structure is applied to the amount consumed by each family.

Box 3: Connection cost and tariff adjustments to make water affordable

into three major contracts, nine wardsat a time, instead of through the usualproliferation of small contracts. This‘Package Program’, as it came to beknown, was completed in 2005.

The effect of this decision wassignificant in terms of potential futureaccess for the urban poor. Whereaspiecemeal projects to extend the pipeswould have been slow and unlikely toreach slum areas of the city, under thePackage Program distribution mainswere to be installed in practically

every street in the city. Even if slumhouseholds could not afford toconnect to the pipes through BWSSB’sregular individual connections,their chances of securing accessto water through other meansincreased exponentially.

Network extension thus mobilizedBWSSB to consider working with slumdwellers to pre-empt a surge in illegalconnections, informal connectionsobtained through political pressure,and unauthorized public taps.

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SDU staff and a BWSSB valveman debate how to improve water pressure.


A New DirectionTogether these events changed thenature of access to water for theurban poor by creating a kind oftipping point, after which internalpolicies had to change. Interestingly,these events were all prompted bydecisions external to BWSSB,compelling the utility to startconsidering the unconnected –the poor – in a different light, aspotential customers contributingto cost recovery.

First, BWSSB initiated a series ofbold policy changes. These measureswere approved at regular meetingsof the Board of Directors, and approvalfor some of them was obtained

Selection of slums is based on good relationships with NGOs forged during the pilots and subsequent post-pilotoperations, as well as on genuine need, client demands, engineer requests, state of network extension, and wateravailability. The SDU ensures that the local distribution network is either already in place through the Package Program orfeasible through minor extension works from nearby mains.Initial forays into communities consist of a preliminary assessment of the existing water and sanitation situation,meetings with local leaders and community groups, and door-to-door house visits. During these visits, the BWSSB slumprogram is explained, information on service levels (individual connections, private connections) and costs isdisseminated, and willingness to connect to the network is assessed.Site visits with the engineers from BWSSB’s local service station are carried out in order to bring engineers on board,introduce them to the community, and discuss technical issues flagged during the initial visits. These visits alsodemonstrate to slum dwellers the visible presence and commitment of engineers.Application forms are distributed, either directly to residents or community leaders, or through the NGO who willmonitor and assist in compiling and collecting them. Applications are submitted for approval, with proof of occupancyand the connection fee, in batches of about 50 at a time.Meters are issued and slums connected to the network after at least 50 percent of the slum has paid. The time lagbetween the submission of applications and the issuing of meters can be lengthy, as this step is often delayed if water isnot available or the distribution network is not yet ready.Distribution of water and billing commences as soon as meters are issued. Water is usually supplied on alternate daysfor two to six hours at a time. Monthly billing is carried out by meter readers and cash payments are collected at theservice station.

Box 4: The process of connecting slums

from the state Urban DevelopmentDepartment to which BWSSB reports.

• The requirement for formal tenuredocuments to be submitted withapplications for new connectionswas replaced with a simpleobligation to prove occupancy.

• The Board decided to innovate withservice levels, allowing sharedconnections for groups of five to10 families as an alternative option,particularly for the very poor or forslum dwellers living in dense andcongested slums.

• Connection fees were reduced forslums to a rate that covered thecost of the meter only, with anyadditional costs associated with

new extensions being absorbed bythe Maintenance Division, and thedomestic tariff structure wasmodified to introduce a lowerminimum monthly charge whichconsiderably lowered the monthlybill for those using small volumesof water (see Box 3).

Second, BWSSB made changes toits own organizational structureby creating an in-house SocialDevelopment Unit (SDU). As therewere no suitable personnel within theutility to head this unit, the officer whohad been seconded from the stateWomen and Child DevelopmentDepartment to the AusAID pilotproject was retained in the sameposition on a contract with BWSSB.

A low risk approach, allowing BWSSB to ‘try its hand’ in slums, was crucialto ensuring that the program got off the ground. Rigid performance targetsand time frames would have limited the SDU’s freedom to experiment withmethods and processes.

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Representatives of a water and sanitation committee discuss how to improve revenue collection.

Retaining a key staff member from thepilot project, particularly one withtraining in community mobilization, wasan important signal of BWSSB’s newwillingness to continue working withslums, and the value it placed on theknowledge and capacity built up duringthe pilots. Although the SDU wasstrongly supported by some membersof senior management, it faced severalorganizational challenges. It was notgiven a budget or support staff, andconsisted essentially of the singleofficer heading it.

The capacity and character of thisparticular person proved to be acrucial factor in translating the newwillingness to work with slums into

actual outcomes. Without theperseverance and drive of this‘champion’ of pro-poor reform, allefforts at BWSSB to reach out to slumscould easily have floundered.

Another obstacle was the fact thatthe SDU reported to the BWSSB’sCorporate Planning Division – a legacyof the AusAID project which thisdivision had overseen – despite thefact that the vast majority of the SDU’swork was with field-level engineersfrom the Maintenance Division.

The small scale of the financialinvestment made by BWSSB in theslum program is noteworthy, andwas a factor in the challenges the SDU

faced, but also, surprisingly, in itssuccess. The capital costs of thenew distribution network for unservedwards were paid for by BMP throughthe Package Program, and elsewherein the city the network was largelyalready in place. Households wantingto connect were required to pay forthe out-of-pocket costs associatedwith the purchase of the meter,materials to connect to thedistribution network, and plumbingcosts. BWSSB’s financial obligationswere thus limited to the salary of thehead of the SDU.

This low-risk approach, allowingBWSSB to ‘try its hand’ in slums, wascrucial to ensuring that the program got

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off the ground. More substantial financialinvestment would undoubtedly havecome with strings attached, such asrigid performance targets and timeframes, and would have limited theSDU’s freedom to experiment withmethods and process.

The MethodologyOver the three years between 2002 and2005, the SDU initiated work in 46slums, following a series of steps asdetailed in Box 4.

Community Mobilization

The importance of communitymobilization in the process ofconnecting slums cannot be overstated.Unlike households in middle classneighborhoods that the utility dealt withas individual clients, the slums inBangalore had to be treated as a ‘unit’,at least in the initial stages of bringingthem on to the network. For technicaland management reasons, it did notmake sense for BWSSB to extendhousehold connections to only a fewhouses in an underserved area – at leasthalf the households have to committo connecting by registering their

applications and paying the initialconnection fees. This strategy of dealingwith slums as communities made thework particularly daunting for BWSSBengineers unaccustomed to massconnections and the dynamics ofpoor neighborhoods.

Community consultations developedorganically and the SDU did nothave a systematic method ofeliciting community preferences andascertaining local demand. Initial foraysinto a given slum consisted largely ofinformal meetings with residents andcommunity leaders, followed by alane-by-lane assessment based onvisual observation and casualdiscussions. The head of the SDUdeliberately chose specific people to actas liaisons and representatives of thecommunity in later negotiations withengineers and NGOs.

The choice of contact persons wasusually based on a record of communityleadership, an expressed interest in thework of the SDU on the part ofvolunteers, and interpersonal dynamicswith the SDU and the NGO. Communityleaders who were deeply engaged inparty politics were avoided and, in most

Box 5: Differing NGO styles

Each NGO brought its own philosophy and style to the program, and the quality of their work had a strong impact onoutcomes. They did not work closely together or form a united policy front, and the greatest hurdle was convincing someNGOs that charging slum dwellers for reliable network water was beneficial. Some NGOs, in particular KKNSS whichlobbies for slum dwellers’ rights and organizes communities throughout the state, were wary of the approaches used byBWSSB in slums. In May 2003, KKNSS organized a demonstration outside the BWSSB premises to protest the closureof public taps and to advocate for free water for slums. In contrast, AVAS campaigned directly and personally with theSDU and the Chairman of BWSSB to ensure network extension in their slums and to lobby for a rationalized tariff thatmade water affordable for slum dwellers.

cases, expressed no interest anyway.The vast majority of community liaisonschosen in this way were women andmembers of local community-basedorganizations (CBOs).

Although gender-balanced water andsanitation committees had beenestablished during the pilots, thisinstitutional focal point was notreplicated in other slums, mostlybecause the SDU did not have the time,manpower or sway over communitiesto develop such institutions in the sameway the pilots had been able to.

The Role of the NGOs

It was key that a degree of cohesionwas achieved within the communitythrough intense fieldwork by the SDUbeforehand. The SDU was greatlyassisted in this by forming partnershipswith local NGOs. These NGOs werewell-established developmentorganizations that both commandedrespect from the community and couldcapture the attention of engineers inways unorganized community membersand local community groups could not.The NGOs introduced the SDU to keycommunity leaders, aided in mobilizing

Many engineers had never worked in a slum before and the SDU spenta lot of time sensitizing them and helping them innovate with solutions,for example, for late payments and arrears, as well as the conversion ofillegal connections to legal, metered connections without penalty.

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the community, assisted slum dwellersin filling out applications, collectedconnection fees, and generally acted asliaisons between the community andBWSSB. They also assisted withsavings for households unable to paythe connection fee upfront, holdingcash on behalf of individuals until afamily was ready to submit itsapplication. NGOs were also effectiveadvocates and applied pressure whenengineers delayed new connections orstalled in other ways.

Although these roles can be (and havebeen) filled by smaller and more localCBOs, the SDU found good NGOs tobe strong and effective partners.

NGOs had also played a role during thepilot project, although at the time theirrelationship with BWSSB was governedby formal contracts and they wereremunerated for their services. As thenew SDU had no budget, it was obligedto rely on the NGOs’ commitment totheir general mission of helping slumcommunities (see Box 5). Two of theNGOs the SDU had worked with duringthe pilot projects, AVAS and MythriSarva Seva Samiti, were willing tocontinue engaging with BWSSBwithout remuneration.

They went on to broker deals withBWSSB in five other slums, most ofthem locations where they had a longhistory of involvement. The SDU wasable to engage with eight additionalNGOs, many of which coordinatedwomen’s groups and thrift and creditsocieties which were also tapped toenhance community mobilization. Thisbrought the total number of NGOpartners for the 46 slums to 10.

The Role of the Engineers

In addition to community and NGOmobilization, the SDU had to engagethe sub-divisional and service stationengineers. Most engineers stayed outof the early stages of communitymobilization, becoming involved onlywhen a slum was ‘ready’, and technicaland management inputs were needed.These inputs consisted of determininghow slums could be connected to thenearest network, deciding the hoursand timing of supply depending ondistribution cycles for the entire servicestation, and issuing monthly bills oncemeters were installed. Many engineershad never worked in a slum before,and those that had often recalled badexperiences when poor services ledto tension.

The SDU spent a lot of time sensitizingthem to the nature of the program, howit worked, and what was required ofthem. For example, the SDU helped the

engineers innovate with solutions forlate payments and arrears, as well asthe conversion of illegal connectionsto legal, metered connectionswithout penalty.

Working with the engineers waschallenging. Although seniormanagement approved of the work ofthe SDU, they stayed out of practicalmatters entirely. While the SDU wastechnically part of BWSSB, the head ofthe unit still found she had ‘outsider’status from the point of view of many ofthe staff. In most instances, BWSSBstaff, from the engineers down to thevalvemen, needed to be convinced ofthe merits of the program and thereason they should spend their timeworking with the SDU to brokercomplex neighborhood agreements.An additional reason for this may bethat the new approach disrupted thewell-established system of pettyrent-seeking associated with erraticsupply to slums.

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SDU staff meets with BWSSB engineers and contractors to discuss technical options for laying pipes in slums.


The Outcomes ofthe Slum ProgramOf the 46 slums in which the SDUstarted working, 26 had beenconnected to the network by early2005. In these communities, 4,300households, or 65 percent of the total,chose to take a connection and werebeing provided with water on alternatedays. The record on bill delivery bymeter readers and payment by slumdwellers has been mixed but it isestimated that, overall, well over halfof the newly-connected slum dwellersdo receive and pay their bills regularly.BWSSB has thus targetedapproximately 10 percent of the slumsin the BMP area, and rolled out theprogram successfully in over half ofthese slums. When the 1,000households connected during theAusAID pilot program are included,BWSSB has brought just over5 percent of the slum households inthe city onto their customer base.

Although BWSSB still has a long wayto go to roll out the program to everyone of the nearly 400 slums in the city,progress is real and many lessons havebeen learnt. The SDU and the utility have

gone through an important learningperiod and the slum program hastransitioned successfully from a discretepilot project to a city-wide program.Moreover, as the SDU and engineershave developed their approach andlearnt from their own mistakes, the paceof new slum connections has increased.

Factors inSuccess:Incentives,Disincentives,and ConstraintsThe success of BWSSB’s slumprogram has been extremely variedacross the organization. One reason forthis is that engineers and frontline staff inthe field offices were not required torespond to overtures from the SDU,and compliance with the new slumprogram was not a factor in theirmonthly performance assessments.As a result, in the initial stages, the SDUhad to rely on a great deal of goodwillfrom BWSSB staff to get responsesto its requests for technical andmanagement support. Even whenengineers and their field staff were willing

to engage in slum work and supplywater, their ability to do so was notguaranteed. Several specific factors ledto engineers’ willingness to engageand increased the probability of asuccess in a given slum.

In general, whether the SDU receivedpositive responses to their requests forassistance depended both on personalfactors, such as staff members’empathy with the urban poor and localpolitical alliances, and on professionalenvironments, such as performanceincentives given by superiors and thecharacteristics of the local servicestations. Targeting the 46 slumsinvolved working with 19 differentAssistant Executive Engineers, each incharge of a service station, of whichonly 11 successfully connected atleast one slum.

There were no direct incentivesfor engineers to work in slums, ororganizational targets associated withthe slum program. When asked, thesuccessful engineers sometimes statedthat they worked in slums because of“humanity considerations” or “socialjustice”. But in fact this does not seemto have been a particularly powerfulimpetus – after all, BWSSB’s previous

Box 6: The impact of revenue targets

The most successful service station in the slum program, Machalibetta in the East Division, has connected 12 slums tothe network and is in the process of mobilizing another two. Over three years, the engineer in charge added about 2,500connections from the slums, which represents 32 percent of his total customer base of 7,730 domestic connections.Approximately 5 percent of his total domestic revenue collection comes from this new slum customer segment. Thisfigure is likely to range between 2 and 15 percent for an average service station. Although a high proportion of revenue inMachalibetta comes from high-tariff non-domestic and industrial connections, the engineer has still used slums to meetand surpass his monthly targets, achieving a collection efficiency relative to a target of 106 percent.

Although BWSSB still has a long way to go to roll out the program to everyone of the nearly 400 slums in the city, progress is real and many lessonshave been learnt. The slum program has developed successfully from adiscrete pilot project to a city-wide program.

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record was one of large-scaleindifference to slums. And althoughexternal factors triggered a changein policy and approach by seniormanagement, this new attentionto the urban poor was notcommunicated to frontline engineersin any explicit way. They were merelyinformed that they could now, in theory,connect slums to the network throughindividual connections.

In practice, engineers respondedto the SDU according to a set ofindirect incentives and disincentives,which did not apply equally to theentire organization.

First, slums provided an untappedmarket for engineers when they neededto increase revenue. Around the sametime that the SDU was rolling out theslum program, senior managementstarted increasing monthly revenuetargets for service stations anddemanded they be met either by

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SDU staff distributes meters to households who have paid connection fees.

increasing the number of connectionsor improving collection efficiencies.

When the gap between projectedcollection and revenue targets for agiven service station was large, slumspresented a new customer segment.

However, when the gap was small orrevenue targets could more easily bemet through high-tariff-paying industrialconnections, the incentive was muchlower for engineers to engage inlaborious slum work.

High revenue targets thus motivatedengineers to consider connectingslums, even though this was not theiroriginal purpose (see Box 6).

Second, in addition to increasingmonthly revenue targets, seniormanagement emphasized theregularization of illegal connections.Service station engineers made greaterefforts to work in slums with the SDUwhen sub-division and divisionsuperiors proactively sought todecrease the illegal connections.

Community leader collects BWSSB application formsfrom residents.


Third, service stations in areas withsmall pockets of slum households hada higher rate of servicing the poor.Engineers, particularly thoseencountering slums for the first time,were more willing to try their hand ina small slum than a large one.

Fourth, engineers working either in areaswith acute water scarcity or problemsof ‘tail-end supply’, or in the 27 newly-added wards where the network wasincomplete, were more reluctant towork with slums.

This was because once newconnections were sanctioned, meterswere issued, and customers were ‘onthe books’, engineers were madeaccountable and had to provide waterand collect payment. If not, they riskedthe wrath of a local politician, visits byslum dwellers en masse to registercomplaints, and a future pattern oflow collections from a dissatisfiedcustomer base. Engineers in wards or

neighborhoods lacking either water orpipes feared being held accountablefor customers they could not serveadequately and thereby resistedextending service to slums.

Fifth, engineers and frontline staffresponded, or failed to respond, to theSDU based on their own perceptions ofthe nature of slum work. These weresometimes based on facts and priorexperience of working with the urbanpoor, and sometimes on personalconvictions, some inaccurate, aboutwhat slum dwellers and theirenvironments were like. For example,many of them were convinced that slumdwellers were neither able nor willing topay for water, that local leaders andelected officials would interfere andcause trouble, or that communitieswould ‘gang up’ on frontline staff.

If engineers and their staff did respondpositively to the SDU, their ability tosupply a slum with pipes, water, and

ongoing operations and maintenancedepended in turn on characteristicsof the particular slum community andthe quality of negotiation betweenthe slum and the utility. Three ofthe most important characteristicsof a community which affectedsuccess were:

The presence of active, reputable,and well-networked NGOs andCBOs: In the most successful cases,local CBOs and NGOs introduced thecommunity to the SDU, providedextensive inputs, and acted as ongoingliaison. NGOs with the longest presencein communities and the mostcharismatic and pro-active extensionworkers achieved the best results.

The extent of investment in theexisting supply arrangements:Engineers encountered the mostresistance in slums where residentsalready had access to either illegalBWSSB supply or good qualitygroundwater. Water obtained throughillegal connections was free, and insome cases provided a relativelyhigh level of service.

Slum dwellers were unlikely to suddenlyagree to pay for the same level ofservice, though the promise of reliablelegal service delivery combined with thethreat of disconnection carried someweight. The greatest success was inthose areas that had been newlynetworked, and in slums with noaccess to groundwater.

Involvement in slum affairs byelected officials: The activeparticipation of elected officials in slumaffairs could have either a positive ora negative impact. Not all political

Senior management stressed the regularization of illegal connectionsand high revenue targets motivated engineers to consider slums asuntapped makets.

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A newly-installed meter and outside tap locked by the household for private use.

intervention was bad and, in manycases, elected members of the BMPand the state legislative assembly actedas champions, calling for accountabilityand putting pressure on engineersto complete works on time.

However, the political imperative tosecure votes by appearing to be thesole provider of a new service wassometimes an obstacle. Engineersoften had to delay new connections inorder to appease political ambition,particularly in 2004 which was animportant election year.

Once a slum was connected tothe network, detrimental politicalinterference diminished. At thispoint, politicians were more likelyto engage in demanding betteroperation and maintenance fromBWSSB when it lapsed into poorservice delivery.

The quality of negotiation betweenBWSSB and slum dwellers wasalso a critical factor in increasing theprobability of successful connection ofthe slum. When meetings were rushedand communities did not feel genuinelyconsulted, slum dwellers increased theirlevels of resistance to the program.High quality negotiations required:

• Frequent, visible and directinvolvement of BWSSB engineersand the SDU from the beginning;

• Unbiased attention to all the areasin a slum;

• Committed champions within thecommunity; and

• Substantial time commitments fromthe NGO.

Strengths andWeaknessesBWSSB’s program to serve the poorhas several strengths from which wecan derive useful lessons. From theperspective of the utility, the initiative isentirely consistent with effective utilitymanagement – increasing both theconsumer and revenue base,regularizing illegal connections, andreducing non-revenue water. From theperspective of the slum dwellers, theprogram provided a better quality watersupply, enabled direct communicationwith service providers, and recognizedresidents as legitimate urban citizensand valid customers of the utility.

Perhaps one of the more interestingaspects of this program is the slowspeed at which it developed. Onceexternal triggers made finding new waysto serve the poor a necessity, BWSSBdeveloped a program to do this inhalting and piecemeal ways. However,the very fact that the initiative wassomewhat ‘fuzzy’ offers someinteresting strengths. For example,because the objectives of the programwere never clearly defined, the SDU wasable to focus on mobilizing stakeholdersrather than on meeting output-orientedtargets set by senior management.This unwittingly enabled innovation andclose engagement with stakeholders,by enabling the SDU to experiment withmethods to mobilize slum communitiesand, even more critically, ways toengage field-level engineers.

The slow start enabled intenseinvolvement of frontline staff with theSDU, which convinced these engineers

of the merits of the approach andgradually brought them on boardas reformers themselves. Of the11 engineers who successfullycompleted a program in at least oneslum, four went on to connect asecond slum and one connected atotal of 12 slums.

However, the BWSSB programalso continues to suffer fromseveral weaknesses:

• The SDU remains severelyunder-staffed and under-funded.Achieving city-wide scale will requiresignificant changes to the SDUas an organization.

• Incentives for BWSSB staff toengage with the poor are still weak.Apart from the unintentional effectsof revenue targets, there have beenno direct incentives for engineers towork in slums.

• There is an almost total reliance onNGOs as voluntary, unremuneratedpartners. Communities without linksto suitable NGOs are likely tobe bypassed.

• Initial beneficiaries have not beenconsulted as to the success of theprogram so far and whether theirdemands are being met. There hasbeen no monitoring of outputs orperiodic assessment of the programto date.

• Although slum dwellers areconsulted and they can opt out,they are under intense pressure toregularize illegal connections, andthe choice of service levels offeredto them remains limited. Thismeans that although some form of

17


After a period of learning and experimentation, BWSSB has accumulatedvaluable lessons. It has achieved a great deal, and changed the attitudesand perception of services to the urban poor within the organization.

18

participation by slum dwellers exists,it is limited, unsystemized, and notalways genuine.

• BWSSB’s efforts to date have beenalmost entirely confined to water.Apart from a few individualconnections to the seweragenetwork and the installation ofindividual latrines, there has been noconcerted effort on the part of theutility to address sanitation orhygiene in slums, either throughprivate sewer connections orcommunity toilets.

Finally, and perhaps most notably,BWSSB continues to operate withoutan explicit poverty policy. The pro-poorprogram is really no more than a seriesof experiments and decisions thathave, over time, developed into ameaningful whole.

Although there were benefits from theabsence of a defined policy duringthe period that the slum programwas being consolidated anddeveloped, a policy is now clearlyneeded to formalize the program, formthe foundation of a roll-out strategy,and ensure organization-widecompliance from senior managersand frontline staff.

Lessons andRecommendationsAfter a period of learning andexperimentation, BWSSB hasaccumulated valuable lessons. It hasachieved a great deal, and changedthe attitudes and perception ofservices to the urban poor within theorganization. BWSSB has become a

model for other utilities trying toimprove slum water supply.

BWSSB now recognizes that it mustensure that both the impact andscale of the program increase. Notonly does the utility want to increasecoverage in the area of the city ofBangalore for which it is alreadyresponsible, it is now being asked toimplement network extensions in thegreater metropolitan area. As effortsto scale up gain momentum, BWSSBrecognizes that the ad hoc nature ofthe program to date cannot continue,and that the utility must act tosystematize the approach. Mostimportantly, BWSSB must addressthe problems of a lack of explicitpolicy, the absence of incentivesfor its staff to participate in theprogram, and an under-resourced SDU.

The challenges that BWSSB hasovercome, and those it still faces, allowfor a number of recommendations forpro-poor utility reform in general:

A well-documented, explicit policyon slums and a publicized roll-outstrategy are crucial.

• The approach specified in the policyneeds to be systematic, withoutleaving slums at the mercy of localcircumstances. The policy mustpay equal attention to waterand sanitation, including ahygiene component.

• The kinds of connections beingmade available, for instance sharedor individual connections, should bedescribed in this policy, with a set ofclear eligibility rules. These rulesmust be easily applied according to

a set of external factors, such astype of settlement, water availability,and proximity to the network. Aslum community should have thefinal say in which level of service theywish to adopt, given a choice ofkinds of connections they areeligible for.

• The focus of the policy should beon outputs rather than inputs, forexample on working connectionsrather than on rigid levels of service,or on customer care rather thanrules-based minimum obligations.The overall thrust of the policy mustbe to develop and institutionalizeincentives within the utility to servethe poor as customers, and not justto connect them.

• A roll-out strategy is required whichincludes clear plans for addingnew slums within a time frameand linked to the utility’s overallinfrastructure development plans.

• Both the policy and the roll-outstrategy should be the subject ofpublic information releases andconsultation. Consultations areimportant both with knowledgeableCBOs who are actively engagedin poverty alleviation in slums,and with the poor themselves.In order to participate inconsultation, the poor will needintermediaries and support –this can be provided throughsuitable federations, NGOs orother organizations.

Utilities should undertake planningfrom a position of knowledge.Where possible, research should beundertaken to determine the extent of

19

slum settlements and their existingservice characteristics, as well as theirfuture expectations and demand.

• Research should combine analysisof existing data from many research,policy and NGO sources, with thecollection of new data at thefield level.

• NGOs and CBOs can assistwith compiling and collectingthese data.

• The results should be used inidentifying coverage gaps,determining levels of service,setting priorities, and planningnew investments.

• Research should include carefulattention to the expectations of slumdwellers. Demand studies should beused to ascertain their demand forimproved water and sanitation inthe future, and the extent to whichexisting reform initiatives havesatisfied the demands of thoseostensibly already served.

An adequately funded, suitablystaffed, and respected PovertyOutreach Unit or SocialDevelopment Unit is a powerful wayto operationalize pro-poor reform.

To be effective:• The unit should have suitable profile

within the utility.

• The unit should liaise closelywith senior managementfrom the division most closelyassociated with provision of newconnections, either throughdirect reporting or a designatedpoint person.

• The unit must have the right mix ofskills. This may require bringingon new staff trained in communitydevelopment from outside theutility, even if under parallel reformactivities staff hiring has been frozenor reduced.

There must be clear incentivesfor staff to support the aims ofthe program.

• Staff members who implementconnections, such as the servicestation engineers in BWSSB,should have clear targets forimproving slum water supply,either through outcomemeasurements such asnumber of new connections inslums or process obligationssuch as number of communitymeetings held.

• These targets should be consideredduring the monthly performancereview of individual engineers.

• Staff should be incentivized toachieve these targets throughcredible rewards and penalties.

Staff must be informed of theapproaches to serving the poor,including new policies, expectations,outcomes and changes as theprogram evolves.

• Information dissemination isimportant and engineers should beencouraged to share knowledgeamong each other, either throughcollaborative field visits, paneldiscussions, or a professionalnewsletter.

The extension of network mainsto unserved areas of a city iscostly. A source of fundingmust be identified to ensureresources are available to install theinfrastructure required.

• The amounts required must bedetermined during investment

A BWSSB service station where slum dwellers pay bills, register complaints, and interact with frontline staff.


Water and Sanitation Program-South AsiaWorld Bank55 Lodi EstateNew Delhi 110 003India

Phone: (91-11) 24690488, 24690489Fax: (91-11) 24628250E-mail: [email protected] site: www.wsp.org

February 2006

WSP MISSIONTo help the poor gain sustained access toimproved water and sanitation services.

WSP FUNDING PARTNERSThe Governments of Australia, Belgium,Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan,Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,Sweden, Switzerland, and the UnitedKingdom, the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme, and the World Bank.

AusAID provides WSP-SAprogrammatic support.

AUTHORSGeneviève ConnorsClarissa Brocklehurst

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe authors would like to acknowledge thevaluable peer review provided by:Barbara EvansAlain LocussolSmita MisraDennis D. MwanzaCatherine RevelsSalma Sadikha

TASK MANAGED BYShubhagato Dasgupta

Photographs: Provided by Geneviève ConnorsCreated by: Write MediaPrinted at: Thomson Press

planning, and clearly allocated(‘ring-fenced’) to improvedservices to the poor, so theycannot be absorbed into otheractivities of the utility.

• Funding arrangements for sanitationwill differ and appropriate financialand institutional strategies must bedeveloped accordingly.

• The costs may be borne by a thirdparty, such as a government agencyor a donor.

These grants may be inthe form of output-based subsidies,whereupon fund disbursement islinked to working connections

(usually defined as connectionsoffering some minimumconsumption and in use byslum dwellers).

• Slum households can and will paythe cost of household connections,meters and plumbing chargesthemselves, but they must be madeas affordable as possible.

It is generally better to channelavailable subsidies towards the initialconnection costs, rather than toongoing consumption.

Without a ‘broker’, negotiationsbetween the utility and the communityare likely to stall or fall apart. ReputableNGOs or community groups arevital partners.

• These NGOs or CBOs must havethe capacity and commitment toact as organizers, leaders, andchampions of reform.

• The utility must have a clear policyfor interacting with them, forinstance in terms of what they areexpected to do, and whether theircosts will be covered.

• These expectations should bedocumented in contracts ormemoranda of understandingbetween the NGO and the utility,particularly if NGO costs are tobe reimbursed.

ABOUT THE SERIES

WSP Field Notes describe andanalyze projects and activities inwater and sanitation that providelessons for sector leaders,administrators, and individualstackling the water and sanitationchallenges in urban and ruralareas. The criteria for selectionof stories included in this seriesare large-scale impact,demonstrable sustainability,good cost recovery, replicableconditions, and leadership.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed are entirely those of the authors and should not be attributed in any mannerto The World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the companies they represent.

Connecting the Slums:A Utility’s Pro-Poor Approach in Bangalore

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What impact, if any, does this information have on:

•You: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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•Your organization: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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•Your colleagues: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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What are the main lesson(s) you have learnt from the information contained in this field note?

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Would you like to share any study/research similar to the information in this field note?

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5. Give up to three subjects/issues in the Water Supply and Sanitation sector that interest you and you would like toknow more about:

i) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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ii) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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iii) ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

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6. Do you know anyone else who might benefit from receiving our publications?If yes, provide the following details (optional)

Name: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Designation: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Organization: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Address: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Phone Numbers: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

E-mail: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Area of work: Government / NGO / Private Sector / Academia / Consultant / Bilateral Agency / Dev Bank / any other

7. Please provide your particulars:

Name: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Designation: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Organization: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Address: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Phone Numbers: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

E-mail: ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Area of work: Government / NGO / Private Sector / Academia / Consultant / Bilateral Agency / Dev Bank / any other

8. Indicate your area of interest:

� Water

� Sanitation

� Rural

� Urban

Water and Sanitation Program-South Asia55 Lodi Estate, New Delhi 110 003 • Tel: 91-11-24690488/89 • Fax: 91-11-24628250

• E-mail: [email protected] • Website: www.wsp.org

connecting the slums

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