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“Satellites, Slums and Social Networks: Evidence on the Origins and Consequences of Property Rights from 157 Slums in Bangalore” Erik Wibbels Department of Political Science Duke University Anirudh Krishna Sanford School of Public Policy Duke University M S Sriram Faculty of Public Policy Indian Institute of Management Bangalore Version 2.0 For most households, the single most important asset is their home, and insecurity of ownership in that asset is associated with all manner of difficulties. Obviously the protection of property rights looms large in the literature on development. This paper seeks to understand both the consequences and causes of tenure security. Our contribution to this area of research is two-fold. First, building on a massive data collection effort in 157 slums in Bangalore we describe a setting in which collectively held property rights serve many of the functions of individual title. Where slums are formally recognized, i.e. when the government acknowledges the existence of a habitable settlement, households behave as if they had private title, and the additional receipt of private title does little to change household behavior or enhance wellbeing. Indeed, we develop and test the claim that the poor find collective rights easier to defend than private ones. Second, we provide and test an argument on the origins of these collectively held property rights. Our argument links the density of slum-level social networks to the capacity of slum residents to trade votes and collective action for formal recognition by the government. In emphasizing the explanatory power of local social networks, our argument echoes Ostrom’s (1990) work on the role of social coordination, albeit with a more explicit focus on the need for urban communities to engage in political exchanges with the broader political system to extract protection. This and related ongoing work in several hundred additional slums has implications for research on economic development, property rights, political networks and social heterogeneity. NOTE: The authors would like to thank the Jana Urban Foundation, Shafali Sharma, and a host of fabulous field researchers for their help in collecting the data for this project. Adam Auerbach and Gareth Nellis provided generous comments on an even earlier draft.

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Page 1: Property Rights from 157 Slums in Bangalore”...“Satellites, Slums and Social Networks: Evidence on the Origins and Consequences of Property Rights from 157 Slums in Bangalore”

“Satellites,SlumsandSocialNetworks:EvidenceontheOriginsandConsequencesof

PropertyRightsfrom157SlumsinBangalore”

ErikWibbelsDepartmentofPoliticalScience

DukeUniversity

AnirudhKrishnaSanfordSchoolofPublicPolicy

DukeUniversity

MSSriramFacultyofPublicPolicy

IndianInstituteofManagementBangalore

Version2.0

Formosthouseholds,thesinglemostimportantassetistheirhome,andinsecurityofownershipinthatassetisassociatedwithallmannerofdifficulties.Obviouslytheprotectionofpropertyrightsloomslargeintheliteratureondevelopment.Thispaperseekstounderstandboththeconsequencesandcausesoftenuresecurity.Ourcontributiontothisareaofresearchistwo-fold.First,buildingonamassivedatacollectioneffortin157slumsinBangalorewedescribeasettinginwhichcollectivelyheldpropertyrightsservemanyofthefunctionsofindividualtitle.Whereslumsareformallyrecognized,i.e.whenthegovernmentacknowledgestheexistenceofahabitablesettlement,householdsbehaveasiftheyhadprivatetitle,andtheadditionalreceiptofprivatetitledoeslittletochangehouseholdbehaviororenhancewellbeing.Indeed,wedevelopandtesttheclaimthatthepoorfindcollectiverightseasiertodefendthanprivateones.Second,weprovideandtestanargumentontheoriginsofthesecollectivelyheldpropertyrights.Ourargumentlinksthedensityofslum-levelsocialnetworkstothecapacityofslumresidentstotradevotesandcollectiveactionforformalrecognitionbythegovernment.Inemphasizingtheexplanatorypoweroflocalsocialnetworks,ourargumentechoesOstrom’s(1990)workontheroleofsocialcoordination,albeitwithamoreexplicitfocusontheneedforurbancommunitiestoengageinpoliticalexchangeswiththebroaderpoliticalsystemtoextractprotection.Thisandrelatedongoingworkinseveralhundredadditionalslumshasimplicationsforresearchoneconomicdevelopment,propertyrights,politicalnetworksandsocialheterogeneity.NOTE:TheauthorswouldliketothanktheJanaUrbanFoundation,ShafaliSharma,andahostoffabulousfieldresearchersfortheirhelpincollectingthedataforthisproject.AdamAuerbachandGarethNellisprovidedgenerouscommentsonanevenearlierdraft.

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Oneofthedefiningfeaturesoftheeconomiclivesofthepoorisinsecurity—insecurityrootedinuncertainemployment,poorhealth,irregularaccesstofood,arbitrarypublicofficials,andtheexpropriationofassets.Formosthouseholds,theirsinglemostimportantassetistheirhome,andinsecurityofownershipinthatassetisassociatedwithallmannerofdifficulties.Obviouslytheprotectionofpropertyrightsloomslargeintheliteratureondevelopment,butitiseasytolosesightofwhatlandtenureinsecuritymeansforhouseholds.Onebriefstoryfromourresearchservestofixideas:PattandurAgraharawasaverypoorinformalsettlementinBangalorethathousedabout800peoplescrapingbyonthemarginsofabooming,globalizedmetropolis.Settledin2008byruralmigrantsfromAndhraPradeshandMaharashtrainsearchofwork,manyofitsresidentshadlivedthereforyearsinhomesconstructedfromwoodandplastictarp.OurfieldteaminterviewedresidentsonSeptember11,2012.Afewweekslater,satelliteimageryshowsthatnotonesinglehomeremained.Appendix1providesPatttandurAgrahara’sstoryinafewpictures.Thispaperseekstounderstandboththeconsequencesandcausesoftenuresecurity.Privatepropertyrightsplayacentralroleininstitutionalapproachestodevelopment(North1981;DeSoto2000;BesleyandGhatak2009;GoldsteinandUdry2008).Theguaranteeofpropertyrightsensuresthatownersandinvestorscannotbealienatedfromtheirassets;assets,therefore,canreliablyserveascollateral,promoteinvestment,andserveasanimpulsetothedevelopmentoffinancialmarkets.Historyislitteredwithexamplesofimprovementsinthesecurityoflanddrivingincreasesinproductivity,includingtheintroductionofbarbedwireintheAmericanwestandtheenclosureofEnglishcommonlands.Afondnessforprivatetitlehasdrivendecadesoflandmanagementprogrammingintheinternationaldonorcommunity.Therearethreeoverarchingchallengestothecentralroleofprivatelandtitleinpromotingdevelopment.First,thereisgrowingevidencethattitlinguntoitselfandinmanycontextsprovideslimitedbenefits.Inseveralstudies,titledoesnotleadtoincreasedaccesstofinancialmarkets,investmentinhomes,orreductionsinpoverty(vanGelder2009;Payneetal.2009;).Thesenullfindingsonprivatepropertyrightsprobablyhavemultipleroots,includingthedifficultyofenforcingprivatetitleandthethinnessoffinancialmarketsinmanycountries.Secondandrelatedly,thereisalargebodyofevidencethatalternativeformsofpropertyrights,oftencommunallyheld,servetoprovideconsiderablesecurityandprovideanalternativetoformal,individualtitle(Ostrom1990;DeiningerandBinswanger1999;Payneetal.2009).Thesealternativeformsofpropertyrightsmightbeparticularlyvaluabletothepoor,ifthedefenseofindividualtitlerequiresresourcesand/ortheruleoflawisweak.Thirdandfinally,despitearichbodyoftheoryandhistoriographyontheoriginsofindividualpropertyrights,particularlyinWesternEurope(North1990;NorthandWeingast1989),muchoftheworkaimsatexplainingcross-countrydifferences.Suchaccountsprovidelimitedinsightintowhyandhowpropertyrightsareoftenhighlyunevenwithincountries(Boone2013),norhowthepoliticalpoweroflandholdersmightconditiondevelopmentaloutcomesinsettingscharacterizedbyunevenpropertyrights(GoldsteinandUdry2008).Ourcontributiontothisareaofresearchisthree-fold.First,buildingonamassivedatacollectioneffortin157slumswedescribeanewempiricalsetting,namelytheslumsof

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Bangalore,inwhichcollectivelyheldpropertyrightsservemanyofthefunctionsofindividualtitle.Whereslumsareformallyrecognized,i.e.whenthegovernmentacknowledgestheexistenceofahabitablesettlement,householdsbehaveasiftheyhadprivatetitle,andtheadditionalreceiptofprivatetitledoeslittletoimprovesecurityoftenure,changehouseholdbehaviororenhancewellbeing.Putdifferently,slumrecognitionwouldalmostcertainlyhavebeenenoughtoprotecttheresidentsofPatttandurAgraharafromthelossoftheirhomes,evenintheabsenceofprivatetitle.Wedevelopandtesttheclaimthatthepoorfindcollectiverightseasiertodefendthanprivateones.Second,weprovideandtestanargumentontheoriginsofthesecollectivelyheldpropertyrights.Ourargumentlinksthedensityofslum-levelsocialnetworkstothecapacityofslumresidentstotradevotesandcollectiveactionforformalrecognitionbythegovernment.Inemphasizingtheexplanatorypoweroflocalsocialnetworksandcollectiveaction,ourargumentechoesOstrom’s(1990)workontheroleofsocialcoordination,albeitwithamoreexplicitfocusontheneedforurbancommunitiestoengageinpoliticalexchangeswiththebroaderpoliticalsystemtoextractlegalrecognitionandprotection.Consistentwiththisargument,oursurveyexperimentalevidencesuggeststhathouseholdsindenselyorganizedslumsaremorelikelytodeploytheirvotesinamannersuggestedbylocalleaders.Thirdandrelatedly,wecontributetoawaveofworkthatisbringingthestudyofpropertyrightstocities.Agrowingbodyofworkonslumsaside(Marx,StokerandSuri2015;GalianiandSchargrodsky2010;Field2007),muchofthemicroworkonpropertyrightshasfocusedonruralareas.Yetrecentdecadeshaveseenaboomincities,theproliferationofslums,andanexplosionofpropertyconflictsbearingontheurbanpoor.Citiesofferdistinctcharacteristics,rangingfromhighpopulationdensities,thecapacitytoeasilydisrupttrafficandservices,welldevelopedpropertymarkets,gangs,andconsiderablepresenceofgovernmentpersonnelthatshapethecapacityofslumdwellerstoprotecttheirhomes.Giventhathundredsofmillionsofthepoorliveinslums,understandingthenatureandoriginsoftheirpropertyrightsiscrucial.Weproceedinfivesections.Inthefollowingsection,weplacedebatesabouturbanpropertyrightsinthebroadercontextofthenewinstitutionaleconomicsandlayoutaseriesofquestionsthatweseektoanswer.Insection2,wefleshoutourargument.Insection3wedescribeourempiricalsettinganddatacollectionefforts.Insection4,weprovideevidencebearingontherelationshipbetweenslumrecognition,privatetitleandaseriesofkeyhouseholdleveloutcomes,includingtheaccumulationofassets,accesstoformalfinancialmarkets,andperceivedsecurityoflandtenure.Insection5,weprovideapreliminarytestofourargumentlinkingthesocialcoherenceandpoliticalmobilizationofslumstotheircapacitytoextractlegalrecognitionfromthegovernment.Wealsopresentsurveyexperimentalevidenceontheincidenceofvoteselling,whichsuggeststhatvotersindenselyorganizedcommunitiesaremorelikelytovoteinamannerconsistentwithlocalvotebrokers.Weconcludewithbroaderimplicationsfortheliteratureonpropertyrightsanddevelopmentaswellasthegrowingbodyofworkonurbangovernanceinthedevelopingworld.II.PropertyRights,PrivateTitleandDevelopment

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Privatepropertyrightsarecentraltostandardaccountsofeconomicandpoliticaldevelopment.Contractarianmodelsofthestateemphasizetheroleoftaxationandpropertyprotectionsinpromotingtheaccountableexerciseofpower(NorthandWeingast1989;AnsellandSamuels2014;Stasavage2010).Asneweconomicinterestsarise,theyseekprivatepropertyprotectionsfromthestateasameanstoprotecttheirassets;whererulersbehaveasstationarybanditsinterestedinsustainingdevelopment,theyprovidepropertyprotectionsandabidebypoliticalchecksandbalancesasthecostofencouragingprivateinvestment.Thisaccountdovetailsnicelywithmodelsthatemphasizetheimportanceofprivatepropertyrightsfordevelopment(North1981,1990;Besley1995).Accordingtotheseaccounts,privatetitletolandhasatleastthreekeybenefits.First,sincepropertyissuchalargeshareofmostfamily’sassets,secureownershipservesasakeyformofcollateralthatincreasesthesupplyofformalcreditandpromotesinvestment.Privatetitlethusprovidesstimulustofinancialmarkets,thedensityofwhichiscloselyassociatedwitheconomicdevelopment(Pagano1993;deSoto2000;NorthandWeingast1989).Second,privatetitleincreasestheliquidityoflandmarketsbyreducinginformationasymmetriesandriskassociatedwithtransactinginassetsofdubiousqualityandlegality.Thisisparticularlytrueinurbanareaswerelandisexpensiveandthequalityofservicesoftenvariessignificantlyacrossneighborhoods.AsDeiningerandBinswangernote,“onewouldexpectthetransferabilityoflandbroughtaboutbybetter-definedpropertyrightstobeofincreasingrelevancewithhigherlevelsofpopulationdensityandnonagriculturaldevelopment.”1Thirdandfinally,privatetitlereduceswastefulinvestmentsinmeasuresaimedatprotectinginsecureland/homesandliberatesthoseresourcesforproductiveinvestment.Inaruralcommunitythoseresourcesmightinvolvetheeffortsinvolvedprotectinglandfromcompetingfarmersorranchers.Inurbanareas,thisinvolvesthetimespentathomekeepingthievesorbulldozersatbay;timethatcannotbespentworkingoutsidetheslum(Field2007).Inthesecases,privateinvestmentsinprotectionareindividuallyefficientbutsociallywasteful,andprivatelandtitleservestopromoteefficiency.Thereisagreatdealofrigorousevidencethattheprovisionofprivatelandtitleandtheenforcementofthosetitleshasimportanteffects—insomecasesitincreasesemploymentoutsidethehome(Field2007),increasesinvestmentsinhomesandchildren(GalianiandSchargrodsky2010;Field2008;VanGelder2009;Deiningeretal.2011),increasesproductivity(Hornbeck2010),andpromotesapositiveorientationtowardthemarket(DiTellaetal.2007).Thesefindingshavehelpedpromoteatwodecadelongeffortamonginternationaldonorstoformalizelandrightsandprovideprivatetitleacrossmany,manycountriesinthedevelopingworld(Baharoglu2002).2BiginitiativesincludetheHighLevelCommissionfortheLegalEmpowermentofthePoor,the1999UN-HabitatGlobalCampaignforSecureTenureandtheWorldBank’slongrunningLand-TitlingProgram.Thoughanopennesstoalternative,traditionalapproachestotenuresecurityhasgrown 11999:p.251.2Thesereasonswhyprivatetitlemightnotpromoteefficiencydonotaccountforthefactthattheymight,infact,detractfromsocialwelfare.Thismighthappenwhenprivatetitlingprogramsareignorantofon-the-groundrealitiesandthereforepromotea“raceforrights”thatbenefitsthepowerfulanddisplacestraditionalrightsholdersorusers.

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throughtime,donorshavetypicallyconsideredprivatetitlethebedrockofmodern,efficientandtransparentlandadministration.3AsDurand-LasserveandSelodsummarize,“Theinfluenceofthepropertyrightsapproachondonors’thinkingonlandpolicyandadministrationappearstohavebecomehegemonic….”4Therearetwocentralcritiquesoftheemphasisonprivatelandrights—oneempiricalandtheothertheoretical.First,thereisnowadecent-sizedbodyofevidence,muchofitlinkedtoevaluationsoftitlingprogramsacrossthedevelopingworld,suggestingthatprivatetitledoesnotalwaysworkasthecommandingheightsofthenewinstitutionaleconomicswouldsuggest,particularlyinurbansettings.Whilethelinkbetweentitleandinvestmentinhousingseemsquitesolid,theevidencelinkingtitlingtoimprovedaccesstocreditandtheformalfinancialsectorisweak(Durand-Lasserve2009;GalianiandSchargrodsky2005;Varley2002).Thefindingsontheimpactoftitlingonlabormarketoutcomesisalsohighlyheterogeneous,withnoeffectsinBuenosAires,Argentina(GalianiandSchargrodsky2005)andGuyaquil,Ecuador(Rose2006)standingagainstlargepositiveeffectsinLima,Peru(Field2007).Therearemanypotentialreasonsfortheweakeffects,includingimperfectfinancialmarkets,governancefailuresintheenforcementoftitles,increasedinsecurityresultingfrommarket-drivendisplacement,etc.Second,asaddressedmostthoroughlybyOstromandcolleagues,communaltenuresystemscanbeanefficientalternativetoprivatetitleinmanagingresources(Ostrom1990;cites).TheyargueandshowinsettingsasdiverseastheMaasaiofKenyaandalpinecommunitiesofSwitzerlandthatunderageneralsetofconditions,locallydevelopedinstitutionsforcollectivelymanagingcommonpoolresourcescanserveasacooperative,non-governmentalandefficientalternativetoprivatetitle.Otherformsofmanagingcollectiveproperty,suchasthosepracticedbychiefsinGhana,mightindeedsacrificeefficiency,buttheydosoinfavorofothervaluableaspectsofsocialwelfare,suchascaringfortheleastwelloffthatarenotaddressedbyprivatepropertymarkets(PandeandUdry2005).Inourempiricalcontext,collectivelyheldrightsareembodiedin“slumrecognition”;formalrecognitionoccurswhentherelevantgovernmentagency(whichhaschangedovertime)rulesthattheslumisonhabitablelandandthatitsresidentscanlegallyresidethere.Atitsmostbasic,slumrecognitionentailstherighttonotbeforciblyremovedfromoneshome.Recognitionappliestotheslumasawholeandatleastformallypermits(butdoesnotrequire)thecitygovernmenttoprovidebasicservicestotheslum.Whileworkoncommonpoolresourcesandtraditionallandtenureprovideanimportantlinchpininourunderstandingofcollectivepropertyrights,therearetwounderlyingquestionsthatweseektoaddress.First,wheredothesealternativeformsoftenuresecuritycomefrom?Big,macro-historicalaccountsontheemergenceofpropertyrightsaside,thesecurityofpropertyrightsareoftenhighlyunevenwithincountries(Boone2013),andwhererightsareambiguous,theirsecurityismediatedbythepoliticalinfluenceoflandholders(GoldsteinandUdry2008).InOstrom’sownworkitisnotalwaysclearwhy 3TheUNexplicitlyrecognizes“avarietyofformsoflegaltenure”(2002:p.25),butitisquitevagueonwhatthosemightbe.TheWorldBank,likewiserecognizescustomaryuse,butitsprogrammingistypicallyaimedattitling(WorldBank2011).41997,p.29.

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somecommunitiessettleonacooperativeequilibriumformanagingcommonpoolresourceswhileothersdonot.Herpath-breakingworkonthecooperativemanagementofcattlegrazinginTörbel,Switzerland,forinstance,doesnotexplainwhythesameinstitutionsandpracticesdidnotdevelopinKippel,analpinecommunityofthesamereligion,language,sizeandecologyinthesamecanton(Demarchi2014).Second,howistenuresecurityachievedspecificallyinurbansettings,wheresettlementsarenecessarilyembeddedinbroadersocialandpoliticalstructures?Whileahugeamountofresearchhasexploredhowtenuresecurityaffectsbehaviorinagricultural,forest,andranchingcommunities,considerablylessworkhasfocusedonlandissuesinurbanareas.Oneresultisthatmuchoftheworkinthecommonpooltraditionhasfocusedstrictlyoncommunitycharacteristicsgoverningpropertyrightsratherthanthebroaderpoliticalregimeinwhichcommunitiesareoftenembedded.Pastoralistsandfishingcommunitiesmightbefreetogoverneconomicresourcesinwhatevermannertheychoose,butthatisrarelythecaseinthedevelopingworld’scities.Inslums,propertyrightsemergeornotasaresultoftheinteractionbetweenhouseholds,localleadersandcityandstategovernments.YetasPayneetal.summarize,“Surprisinglyfewindependentstudiesexistoflandtitlingprogrammesinurbanorperi-urbanareasoflow-andmiddle-incomecountries.”(2009:444).Thisisunfortunatebecauseurbanizationhasresultedinboomingcitypopulationsacrossthedevelopingworld,andaspoor,ruralmigrantshaveenteredcitieswithouttheresourcesand/orwilltoformallyintegratethemintotheeconomicandpoliticallivesoftheseboomingmetropolises,thenumberandpopulationsofslumshaveexploded.Asnotedabove,thereareseveralexamplesofexcellentevaluationsofrandomizedor“as-if”randomizedroll-outsofprivatetitleincitiesthatshowimportantpositiveeffectsonhouseholdwellbeing.5Thosefindingsareimportant,butpropertyrightsareveryrarelyrandomlyassigned,andtheiracquisitiontypicallyrequirespoliticalcontestation.Totheextentrandomizedprogramevaluationsexploitdonor-orgovernment-drivenexperiments,it’sunclearhowwelltheyspeaktotheday-to-daystruggleforpropertyprotectionfacedbyhundredsofmillionsoftheurbanpooraroundtheworld.III.SocialNetworks,CollectiveActionandSharedPropertyRightsOurargumentproceedsintwosteps.Inthefirst,wediscussourexpectationthatthecollectively-heldlandrightembodiedinslumrecognitionplaysamoresignificantroleinhouseholdbehaviorthanindividualtitle.Inthesecondstagewedevelopanargumentaimedatexplainingwhysomesettlementsachieverecognitionandothersdonot.Beforeproceeding,however,itisworthclarifyingthedistinctionbetweenthelegalrecognitionofslumsandindividual,privatetitletoproperty.InBangalore,legalrecognitionappliestotheslumasawhole,impliesthatitislegallyhabitable,andprovideslegalfoundationforthecitygovernmenttoprovidebasicservicestothesettlementasawhole.Privatetitle(knownashakkupatra)impliesthatanindividualhouseholdownsthehome.Asettlementmustberecognizedbeforeindividualscanreceivetitle,butnotallindividualsinrecognizedsettlementsreceiveprivatetitles.Indeed,inoursamplehouseholdsinrecognized

5SeethepapersbyField,whoacrossarangeofoutcomes,evaluatesajointGovernmentofPeruandWorldBankprojectthatprovidedtitletomorethan1.2millionurbanhouseholds.

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settlementsareevenlydividedbetweenthosewithandwithoutprivatetitle.Theprocessofachievingrecognitionoftentakesyears;politicalpressureandinducementsofdifferentkindsplayalargepartinwhogetsrecognitionandwhen.Thesubsequentprocessofreceivingprivatetitlecantakeyetadditionalyears.Individualtitlesarenotdeliveredenmassetohouseholdsinrecognizedsettlementsbutareprovidedatthediscretionoftheadministrativeandpoliticalmachineryofthecity.Appendix2describesinadditionaldetailtheprocessofmovingfrominitialsettlementtolegalrecognitiontoprivatetitleinBangalore.Butthekeypointtomakehereisthatthisdistinctionbetweencollectivelyheldprotectionsembeddedinslum-levellegalrecognitionandprivatelyheldtitleisquitecommoninthedevelopingworld.Thoughweareunawareofanysystematic,cross-nationaldataonurbanpropertyregimes,ourownreadingofcountry-specificregulationssuggeststhatlegalrecognitionisoftenaprerequisitefortitleandthatrecognitionandtitlecomewithdistinctbundlesofrightsacrossagreatmanycountries.6III.2:SlumRecognition,PrivateTitleandHouseholdWellbeingTurningtoanalyticsandfocusingfirstonthehousehold-leveleffectsoflegalrecognitionandprivatetitle,wearguethatlegalrecognitionshouldhavealargereffectonthesecurityoftenureandthefinancialbehaviorofhouseholdsthantheprovisionofprivatetitles.ThestandardDeSoto-likeclaimisthattheprovisionofprivatetitlesprovidessecurity,anassetthatcaneaseparticipationinformalfinancialmarkets,andtherebyprovidethefoundationforentrepreneurialismandtheaccumulationofassets.Yetlegalrecognitionalonegreatlycomplicatesthecapacityofoutsideagents—betheylanddevelopersorpolice—toalienateresidentsfromtheirhomes.Legalrecognition,forinstance,allbutprecludesthegovernmentfromdisplacingresidents.Ofcourse,thecomplexityofanyefforttoenforcelegalrecognitionviathecourtsinthefaceofoutsideencroachmentisuncertainandcostly,butthesameholdsforindividualtitleholders,whichisexactlywhyweexpectindividualtitletohaveamodestimpactonbehavioroncelegalrecognitionisachieved.Indeed,inlightofthelimitedfinancialresourcesofindividualpoorpeopletoprotecttheirprivatetitleagainstencroachment,weexpectthatslum-levelcollectionactionisasurermeanstoprotectrightsthanprivateavenues.Sincecollectiveactionismorelikelywhenencroachmentsbearonsharedrightsratherthanprivatetitles,wehypothesizethatperceivedtenuresecurityfallswithprivatetitle.Second,withlegalrecognitioncomestheprospectofpublicservices—servicessuchassewagegutters,accesstowater,andapublictoiletthathavevery,verylargeeffectsonhouseholdwellbeing.Indeed,ourneighborhoodsurveyaskedresidentswhytheyhadsoughtrecognition(whetheritwasprovidedornot),andtheoverwhelmingcommonresponseisthattheywantedaccesstobasicfacilities,evenastheprospectoflegaltitleloomedlargeaswell.Third,legalrecognitionofhabitability,evenintheabsenceofprivatetitle,shouldhaveitsgreatesteffectwhereland-relatedinvestmentsproduceahighrateofreturn,wheretenureisitsmosttenuous,andwherecertificationwillberecognizedbythird

6WehavedoneaninitialreviewoftherelevantregulationsinGhana,SouthAfrica,Ethiopia,Kenya,Nigeria,Egypt,Brazil,Bolivia,Colombia,Peru,Thailand,Vietnam,Turkey,andBangladesh.

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parties(betheypropertydevelopers,competingclaimants,orpotentialhomebuyers).Legalrecognitionofaslumfulfillstheseconditions.III.3:ThePoliticalOriginsofSlumRecognitionButwhyaresomecommunitiesabletoachievelegalrecognitionwhileothersarenot?Slumrecognitionresultsfromapoliticalprocesswherebycityofficialsmakeadecisionasaresultofthephysicalcharacteristicsofthelandandtheextenttowhichpoliticalofficialsseeitintheirinteresttosupporttheclaimsofresidents.Fromthepointofviewofresourceconstrainedelectedofficials,itmakesmostsensetoworkonbehalfofresidentswhoprovidethemostelectoralbenefits.Thosebenefitsincludevotesandpoliticalmobilization.Fromthepointofviewofresidents,thisrequirescollectionaction.Collectiveactioncan,ofcourse,helpresistattemptstodisplacesettlementsbygovernmentofficialsandlandspeculators.Butmoreimportantly,collectiveactionoffersthecapacitytopressurelocaladministrativeandelectedofficialsandexchangevotesforbenefits.Collectiveactionvis-à-visvotingproducesvotebanks.Givenitsobviousimpactontenuresecurityandhouseholdwellbeing,oneofthemostimportantbenefitsthatresidentscanextractfromgovernmentofficialsinexchangeforvotesandmobilizationisslumrecognition.Whileitisclearthatthecommonpoolresourceproblemisdistinctfromthatfacingslumdwellers,theunderlyingcollectiveactionproblemissimilar.7LikethecommonsproblemthatOstromfocusedon,slumrecognitionisalocalpublicgoodsubjecttocollectiveactionproblems.Ifthecommonsareover-fishedasaresultofuncooperativebehavior,theyaredestroyedforall;ifslumdwellersbehaveuncooperatively,legalrecognitionisunlikelyandthecommunitysuffers.Onceasettlementisrecognized,allofitshomesbenefitfromanincreaseintenuresecurity,whetherthehouseholdscontributedtothepoliticaldemandsofachievingrecognitionornot.Underabroadsetofconditions,theutilitymaximizingresponsetothissettingistodefectfromparticipatinginthepoliticalorganizationthatincreasesthelikelihoodofrecognition,andifenoughhouseholdsdefectthesettlementcannotprotest,attendelectionralliesorserveasavotebank.Andrecognitionwillnothappen.Theprevalenceofcompetingpartyoperativeswhoofferindividual,clientelisticbenefitsforvotesonelectiondayservesasatemptationtodefectfromelectoralcoordinationandsuccessfulvotingbanking.Theoretical,experimentalandobservationalresearchhasalsoshown,however,thatundercertainconditions,cooperativesolutionstocollectiveactionproblemsarepossible(Olson1965;Axelrod1981).Iteratedinteractions,institutionsforinformationrevelation,cartels,andnormsofreciprocityallhelpalignindividualutilitymaximizationwithsocialwelfare.AsOstromnotes,“Somehowparticipantsmustfindwaysofcreatingmutuallyreinforcingexpectationsandtrusttoovercometheperverseshort-runtemptationstheyface.”8Shegoesontonotethatthiscanhappenviamutuallearningandnormdevelopmentintightsocialnetworksorbyagreeingtofollowsomeoneelse’slead.Densesocialnetworksarecharacterizedbyalargenumberoftiesamongtheirmembersandtheirlocalleadersor 7Urbanproperty,forinstance,isnon-renewableandthelanditselfdoesnotprovidesustenanceoraprimarysourceofwell-being(whichistypicallyachievedviathelabormarket).82001:p.176.

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votebrokers.Consistentwithwell-establishedtheorizingonnetworks(Huckfeldt1983;UzziandSpiro2005;Wardetal2011),densenetworksinslumsprovidetwocrucialmechanismsforcollaborationandcoordinatingcollectiveaction.First,theyprovideamonitoringtechnologythatprovidesinformationonhowmembersofthenetworkbehave.Whileitisverydifficultforformalpartiesandotheroutsiderstoknowwhetherindividualslumresidentsmobilizeontheirbehalforvoteinaparticularway,itismucheasierfortightlyknitneighborsandlocalleaderswholiveinthosecommunitiestoknowthesethingsabouteachother.Adensesocialnetwork,moreover,providesameansofefficientlytransmittingthatinformationtoothermembersoftheneighborhood.Second,densesocialnetworksprovideamechanismforsanctioningcommunitymemberswhodeviatefromsociallyexpectedbehaviorandmonitoringprincipal-agentrelationshipsbetweenlocalleadersandcitizens(Auerbach2014).Inthecontextofslumpolitics,thismightinvolveaninabilitytoextracthouseholdbenefitsfromneighborhoodleadersorvotebrokers.Third,localleadersorvotebrokersserveasfocalpointsforcoordinatingwithinthecommunitywhileservingasthepublicfaceandfixervis-à-viselectedandadministrativeofficials.9Thisislikelytomattermostatelectiontime,whenlocalleadersservetocoordinatethevote-seekingneedsofpartieswithvotersinasettlementwhomustvotetogetheriftheyaretoserveasasuccessfulvotebank.Inshort,theinformationandsanctioningprovidedbydensenetworksprovidethetoolsforovercomingslum-levelcollectiveactionandexchanginganentirevotebankforthetenureprotectionembodiedinslumrecognition.10Whencomparedtosmallcommunitiesmanagingcommonpoolresources,slumdwellersfaceanumberofobstaclestocooperativebehavior.Theydonotrelyonacommonresourceformaterialwell-being;theyhavehighlyvariedemploymentrelations;11slumsareoftenquiteheterogeneousintermsoflanguage,religion,casteandethnicity;andtheyaredeeplyembeddedinabroadersetofeconomicandpoliticalrelationsthatthreatenlocalresourcesandimpingeonpurelyneighborhood-basedsolutionstoproblems.Ontheotherhand,theurbanpoorhavesomeadvantagesoverruralcommunities.Slumsettlementshaveclearlydelineatedboundaries(residentsinvariablyknowwheretheirsettlementendsandothersbegin)thatpasturesandfarmsoftendonot.Unliketheircounterpartsinthecountryside,theyareembeddedindenselypopulatedsettingsthatpromotethekindofiteratedinteractionsthatcanpromotetrust.Asaresult,theycanalsoengageinthemonitoringandsanctioningthatfacilitatecollectivechoiceandconflictresolutionarrangements.12Suchconditionscanalsobepropitiousfortheemergenceofaccountablelocalleadershipthatcanserveasfocalpointsforcoordinatingcollectiveaction.Finally,whilehierarchy,social

9SeeStokesetal.2013forthemostcomprehensivestatementontheroleofvotebrokersinelectoralpolitics.Theirfocusisontherelationshipbetweenvotebrokersandparties.SeeRojoandWibbels(2014)forafocusontherelationshipbetweenlocalvotebrokersandslumresidents. 10Itgoeswithoutsayingthatwhileslumnetworksmaywellreflectcooperativebehavior,theymightalsoreflectthecoercionthatisinherentinwell-organizedslumleadersthreateningresidentsbywithholdingofhouseholdaidintheeventtheysufferfromacrisis.ThisneednotbeaPutnamesque,idealizedlocaldemocracyforittowork.11Laboringinacommonworkplacewas,ofcourse,akeyprecursortounion-basedcollectiveactionamongworkersintheindustrialeconomiesofWesternEuropeandNorthAmericaintheirfordistheydays.12Itgoeswithoutsayingthatthiskindofsocialmonitoringandsanctioningneednotbedemocratic.

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distanceandinequalitymilitateagainstcooperation(Chandrasekharetal.2015)innetworks,slumstypicallyevincealowlevelofeconomicinequality.Alargebodyofresearchmakesclearthatthestrengthofpropertyrightsarecontingentontechnology(Hornbeck2010)andpoliticalpower(GoldsteinandUdry2008).Inaveryabstractsense,onecanconsiderthecapacitytoorganizeandcoordinatecollectiveactionasa“social”technologythatimprovesthesecurityoftenureinmuchthesamewaythatprivateenclosureofcommonlandandbarbedwireprovidedanimpetusfordevelopmentinpre-industrialEnglandandthelate19thcenturyU.S.Thesearen’ttechnologiesthatprecludeviolationsofpropertyrights,buttheymakethemlesslikely.Thekeydifferenceinslumssettlementsisthatthesocialtechnologyproducesacollectivepropertyrightwithimportantprivatebenefits.IV.EmpiricalSetting:SlumsinBangaloreThediscussionaboveyieldsfourkeyhypothesesthatwetest:1)Slumrecognitionhasalargereffectonhouseholdbehaviorthanprivatetitle;2)Tenuresecurityincreaseswithslumrecognitionbutdecreaseswithprivatetitle;and3)Theprobabilityofachievingslumrecognitionisincreasinginthesocialdensityofslumsettlements;and4)Votersindensepoliticalnetworksaremorelikelytovoteinamannerrecommendedbytheirlocalleader.WetestthesehypotheseswithdatafromacombinationofhouseholdandneighborhoodsurveydatafromslumsinBangalore,India.Bangaloreisacityofabout8.5millionthathasgrownrapidlyoverrecentdecadesasithasbecometheepicenterofIndia’sITrevolution.Theprospectofjobshasresultedinconsiderableruraltourbanmigration,andanexplosioninthenumberandsizeofslumsettlements.Studyingslumsisdifficult.Giventhedynamicnatureofurbandevelopment,governmentinformationaboutslumsistypicallyoutdatedorwrong.UrbanizationandslumgrowthinBangaloreseemtobetypicalofothercitiesinthedevelopingworld.Newmigrantsarrivewithvaryinglevelsofconnectionstothecity;thepoorestamongstthemsettleinplasticandwoodstructures,ofttimesonthemostmarginaloflands—landsthatmightbeownedbythefederalgovernment,thestate,thecityorprivatelandowners.Overtime,settlementsmightsurvivelongenoughtogrow.Atleastformally,suchsettlementsarenotentitledtoeventhemostbasicofpublicservices.UnderafairlyvaguesetofconditionsestablishedbytheKarnatakaSlumAreasActof1973,slumsmightbelegallyrecognizedornotbythestate(andlater,thecity)government;alternatively,theymightberehabilitated.13Iflegallydeclareduninhabitable,residentsaresupposedtoberelocated.Onceasettlementhasbeenlegallyrecognized,however,ithastherighttobasicservices.BetweenthefactthattheSlumActissubjecttobroadinterpretationandthattheKarnatakaSlumDevelopmentBoard(KSDB)andtheBangaloreMetropolitanAuthority(BBMP)sufferfromanexcessofdemands,itcomesasnosurprisethatadministrativeofficialsreportthattheprioritizationofcasesisresponsivetopoliticalpressure.

13Seep.8oftheActandnotehowopentointerpretationthestatuteis:http://ksdb.kar.nic.in/docs/Board_Docs/Karnataka%20Slum%20Development%20Act.pdf

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Inordertounderstandthesedynamics,wehaveundertakenthreewavesofhouseholdsurveysbetween2010and2015in62settlements.ThefirstwaveofsurveyswasundertakenbetweenJuneandAugust2010.Followingmostpriorresearch,weobtainedalistofslumsfromthestateslumauthority(KSDB)andrandomlyselected14slums.Surveysof1,481householdswerecarriedoutbyalocallyrecruitedresearchteam.Theinterviewsshowedthat“slums”ontheofficiallistrepresentthepinnacleofavasticeberg,homenotsomuchtothepoorestpeopleastoasettledlower-middleclass,mostofwhomhavelivedinBangaloreformultiplegenerations.Inthissetofsettlements,multi-storypermanentconstructionprevails;electricityconnectionsandcleandrinkingwateraretypical;TVs,pressurecookers,andelectricfansarecommonlyowned;povertyislowcomparedtotheaverageforthecity.41percentownthehomesinwhichtheylive,andofthem,70percentpossessofficialpapersestablishingownershipofthelandonwhichtheirhomeswerebuilt.Itbecameclearthatinordertostudythe“real”slums,placesthatcomecloserbothtotheUN-HABITATdefinitionofslumaswellasthecommon-senseunderstandingoftheterm,wewouldhavetolookatslumsnotongovernmentlists.Buthowdoesonecreatealistofunlistedslumstostudy?Sinceexistingdatasourcesareoflittlehelp,welookedatsatelliteimagesavailableonGoogleEarth.14Afterseveraliterationsbetweensatellite-imageidentificationanddetailedverificationontheground,weshortlistedalistofcriteriaforidentifyinglow-incomesettlements.Basedonthefollowingidentificationcriteria,weinitiallyidentified279low-incomepolygons:

• lackofspacebetweenhousingunits;• roofsthatappearedtobelow-qualitybasedonbrownorweatheredgreycoloring;• ahodgepodgepatternofhousingunits;• lackofproperroads(ifthereareroads,theyarebrown,narrowandunpaved);• lackofshadowsadjoiningtheshelterunits,signifyingthattheyarelowtothe

ground,thusnotmulti-storied.

On-the-groundverificationsofatotalof193low-incomesettlementshelpedusidentifyarangeofsettlements,fromnotifiedslumsondeclaredgovernmentlandallthewayto“bluepolygon”,tentsettlementthatareneitherofficiallylistednorrecognized.Bluepolygonsarethepoorestsettlements,andmostofthemarecompletelylackingineventhemostbasicservices.Homesinthesenewersettlementsareingeneralcoveredbyblueplasticsheets(referredtoastarpaulins,butmadeofplasticbasedmaterial).Weundertookdetailedinvestigationsinasampleof18bluepolygonsettlementsbetweenAugustandDecember2012,conductinginterviewswithatotalof631households,alittlemorethanhalfofallhouseholdsthenlivinginthesettlements.Weselectedhouseholdsforinterviewsfollowingaprocessofrandomselection(pickingeverysecondhouseholdstartingfromacommonpoint).Theseresidentstendedtobesuspiciousofoutsiders.Appealstolocalleadersortheownersoftheselandswereoftennecessaryinordertogainentry. 14Wefoundthatexaminingimagesatanaltitudeof4,000feetwasmosthelpfulforourpurposes.Formostsettlements,therearesatelliteimagesstartingin2000.However,someonlyhaveimagesdatingbackto2002or2004.Similarly,thevastmajorityhasanupdated2011image,butsomeonlysomehaveimagesdatingto2010.

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Inthethird,mostrecentwaveofsurveys,webeganlookingattheintermediateslums–thosebetweenthehighest(notifiedordeclared)andlowest(blue-polygon)slums.Homesintheseslumsareconstructedfrommaterialsrangingfromwoodtoconcrete.Roofsrangefromplastictomouldsheeting(akintothinmetalroofs)toconcrete.Alltold,thesehouseholdscoverthebroadrangebetweenthetwoendpointsofslumsettlements—theverypoorestresidentswholiveinbluepolygonslumstothelowermiddleclasswhooccupylong-recognized“slums”.BeginninginMay2015,weinterviewed30+householdsineachof30settlementsrepresentingarangeofphysicalandlegalstatuses.15Wealsoresampled30householdsin5bluepolygonsettlementswehadinvestigatedin2012and5declaredsettlementswehadsampledin2010.Alltold,wecollecteddatafrom1,272households.Bothduringandbetweenthethreewavesofhouseholdsurveys,fieldteamsconductedneighborhoodsurveys,i.e.focusgroupswithasmallgroupofresidents,in171slumsinordertogetthesettlement’shistory,physicalcharacteristics,demographics,neighborhoodorganization,andlegalstatus.Theyalsogeoreferencedtheboundariesofthesettlements.Figure1providestwoGoogleEarthimagesofslumboundariesfromthepointofviewofa4kmx5kmand800mx400msectionofthecity.ofthoseneighborhoodsurveysareintheprocessofbeingdouble-checked,andsoweareleftwith157neighborhoodsurveys.Alltold,wedrawonevidencefrom3,384householdinterviews,157neighborhoodsurveys,andyearsofadministrativedatacollection.

Figure1Here

V.Results:Assets,FinancialMarkets,andHousingSecurityInordertocomparetheeffectofslumrecognitionandprivatetitleonhouseholdbehavior,wetakethreeslicesatthedatawitheachslicecorrespondingtoakeymicro-leveloutcomeofinterestinresearchonpropertyrights.First,weanalyzetheaccumulationofassets,sincetenuresecurityispositedtoincreaseoverallmaterialwellbeingthroughseveralpaths.Second,weanalyzeaccesstoformalfinancialmarkets,sincethisparticularmechanismloomslargeinaccountslinkingprivatetitletohouseholddevelopmentandthereisalargebodyofevidencethatinformalfinancialmarketsareextremelyexpensiveforthepoor.Thirdandfinally,wefocusonhouseholdperceptionsoftenuresecurity.Ononehand,privatetitlenecessarilyrequiresanimprovedperceptionoftenuresecurityifitistohaveanymaterialeffectonhouseholdbehavior(VanGelder2009).Ontheotherhand,weclaimthatcollectivepropertyrightsareeasiertodefendforthepoorthanprivatetitles;whiletheformercanbedefendedwithcollectiveaction,thelattercanonlybedefendedwithprivateresources,whichareinshortsupplyformostslumresidents.Tomeasureassetaccumulation,werelyonthefirstcomponentfromaprincipalcomponentanalysisofanextensiveseriesofsurveyquestionsaskingrespondentsiftheirhousehold 15Weestablishedthesampleintervalbydividingthenumberofhouseholdsby30andagainpursuedtheleft-handsiderule.Weinterviewedmorethan30inslumswhereourinitialfieldworkyieldedlessthan40percentmalerespondents.Inthosecaseswereturnedtothesettlementstopurposivelysampleanadditional8men.

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ownsasetofassets.16Theresultingassetindexrangesfrom-3.5to5.9withastandarddeviationof2.WeestimateOLSregressionswitherrorsclusteredbyslum(inthenextiterationIwillestimateHLMsforModels5and6).Wereportresultsfromsixmodels.Thefirstoneincludesonlythoseindividual-levelcovariatesforwhichwehavethebestcoverage:whetherthehouseholdhasafemalehead,religiousaffiliationandcaste;thesecondmodeladdsrespondentageandthenumberofyearsthehouseholdhasbeeninthehome,twoquestionsthatwerenotaskedinthefirstroundofhouseholdsurveys.Models3and4addanindicatorvariableforwhetherthehouseholdhasprivatetitletothecovariatesinModels1and2.Finally,Models5and6includeanindicatorvariableforwhetherornottheslumhasbeenrecognizedbythegovernment.17AcomparisonofModels3and4withmodels5and6providessomeinitialinsightintotheshareofthetotalvarianceslumrecognitionaccountsforandhowmuchoftheinitialtitlingresultsareactuallyduetoslumrecognition.ThefulltabularresultsarereportedinAppendixA.3.Theyshowthatgeneralcasteandreligiousminorityhouseholds(i.e.the“caste”variable)arewealthierthanscheduledcaste,scheduledtribeandOBChouseholds.Likewise,householdsthathavelivedintheirhomeslongertendtobewealthier.Moretoourinterestintenure,Models3and4suggestthathavingprivatetitleisassociatedwithconsiderablywealthierhouseholds,andinclusionofthevariableraisestheshareofvarianceexplainedto12and32percent,respectively.TheinclusionoftheslumrecognitionvariableinModels5and6haveamuchlargereffectonthefindings.Thecoefficientsonprivatetitleremainssignificant,buttheirsizefallbybetweentwo-thirdsandthree-quarters;theslumrecognitionvariablealsoexplainsaveryimpressiveshareofthevarianceastheR-squaredsincreaseto.61and.76.Figure2providesavisualmeansofassessingthesimulatedeffectofslumrecognitionandprivatetitleonhouseholdwealth.ItcontraststhepredictedlevelofassetaccumulationderivedfromModel5whenaslumisnotrecognized,whenitisrecognized,whenahomeownerdoesnothavetitle,andwhentheydo.Theobviousandhugedifferenceoccursbetweenrecognizedandunrecognizedslums;householdsinunrecognizedslumsaremuch,muchpoorerthanthoseinrecognizedslums.Theadditionoftitledoeshaveapositiveadditionaleffectonassetaccumulation,butitisquitesmallbycomparison.Thus,privatelytitledhouseholdsare,onaverage,alittlebitwealthierthanthosewithouttitle.Furthertotheseresults,principalcomponentsanalysisontheentireassetlist,privatetitleandslumrecognitionyieldsaprincipalcomponentonwhichslumrecognitionloadsverystrongly,whilehomeownershipdoesnot.Theseresultsarerobusttomoresophisticatedmodelingapproachesthatexplicitlyincorporatethemultilevelnatureofourdata,includingtwo-level,mixed-effectsregression.

Figure2HereTherelativelysmallfindingonprivatetitleisinteresting,becauseoneinferentialchallengewhenrelyingonthiskindofcross-sectionaldataisthattheprovisionofformaltitlemight 16Thequestionsaswhetherornottherespondent’shouseholdowns:arickshaw,bicycle,car,DVDplayer,gasstove,worktools,agriculturalland,ceilingfan,mobilephone,motorbike,CDplayer,apettybusiness,pressurecooker,pumpstove,radio,refrigerator,sewingmachine,andtelevision.1773percentofrespondentsliveinrecognizedslums.

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promotethelocalpropertymarket,increaseprices,anddrawinwealthierbuyers;theresultissometimesreferredtoasmarket-drivendisplacement.Putdifferently,householdswithtitlecouldbewealthierindependentoftitlestatus,andthiswouldbereflectedintheaccumulationofmoreassetsbeforeownersboughtintoaneighborhood.Wedonotfindevidenceconsistentwithsuchaselectioneffect.Wenextturntotherelationshipbetweenprivatetitle,slumrecognitionandhouseholdengagementwiththeformalfinancialsector.Ourdependentvariableiswhetherornotahouseholdusesaformalsavingsinstitution.Homesavingsareaveryinefficientmeansofsaving,becausetheyaresubjecttotheftandtemptation(BanjerjeeandDuflo2011),andformalsavingshavebeenassociatedwithverylargeimprovementsinhouseholdwellbeingandfutureproductivity(Bruneetal.2015).InIndia,householdshaveaccesstomanysavingsinstitutions,andwecodethemallas“1”.18Inoursample,41percentofhouseholdsmakeuseofoneortheothersavingsinstitution.Oursamplesizefallsinthissetofmodelsbecausethesavingsquestionwasonlyaskedinthe2012and2015surveywaves.Weestimatelogisticregressionmodelsusingmaximumlikelihoodwithslum-clusteredstandarderrorsanddeploythesamesetofcovariatesdiscussedabove;theresultsarerobusttorandomeffectlogitestimation.AppendixA.3reportsthetabularresultsofthreemodels,onewithjusttheindividual-levelcovariates,asecondwiththeindicatorforhouseholdtitle,andathirdthatincludesthemeasureofslum-levellegalrecognition.Inthiscaseweareexplainingrelativelylittleofthevariation,butconsistentwiththepatterndescribedaboveslumrecognitionisdoingmuchofthework,evenasprivatetitlehasasignificantbutsmallereffect.Toeaseinterpretation,wesimulatethepredictedprobabilityofusingformalsavingsinstitutionsoffModel3atthedifferentvaluesofrecognitionandtitle.TheresultsarepresentedinFigure3.Thefigureshowsthatshiftingfromanunrecognizedslumtoarecognizedoneincreasestheprobabilityofformalsavingsfrom.23to.36,anincreaseof57percentoffthebaselineprobability;subsequentlymovingfromanuntitledhouseholdtoatitledoneincreasestheprobabilityofformalsavingsfrom.36to.45,oranincreaseof25percent.Bothoftheseincreasesassubstantivelylarge,eveniftheifslumrecognitionissomewhatlarger.

Figure3Here

Ourlastattempttoassesstheeffectofslumrecognitionandtitleonhouseholdsturnstotheextenttowhichtheirsettlementfeelssecurefromeviction.Inthe2015surveyweaskedrespondents:“Wehaveheardthatsometimesfamiliesarethreatenedwithevictionfromtheirhomes.Whataboutinyoursettlement?Domostpeoplefeelveryinsecure,somewhatinsecure,alittlebitinsecure,orverysecureintheirhome?”Nearlyallofthetheorizedbenefitsoftitlearerootedinasenseofsecurity,sothisquestionprovidesusleverageonthecognitiveeffectofslumrecognitionandprivatetitle.Thisalsoallowsustoexamineourclaimthatthepoorwillfindcollectivetitleseasiertodefendthanindividualonesandthereforefeelmoresecurewithlegalrecognitionbutwithoutprivatetitle.Respondents 18Theoptionsare:chitfunds,selfhelpgroups,MFIs,cooperatives,banks,postoffices,andinsurancecompanies.

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weregivenasetofoptionsrangingfromverysecuretoveryinsecure.Wefitorderedlogitmodels,whereinsecurityisincreasingacrossthedependentvariable,withthesamesetofcovariatesdiscussedabove.WereporttheresultsforthreemodelsinAppendixA.4.Thethreemodelspaintastraightforwardpicture.Individualcharacteristicshavenobearingonhowsecurerespondentsfeelfromeviction,andhavingprivatetitledoesnoteither.Theonlyvariablethatimpactsperceivedtenuresecurityisslumrecognition.Toeaseinterpretation,wesimulatethepredictedprobabilityofarespondentresponding“veryinsecure”andpresenttheresultsinFigure3.Thefigureshowsthatatypicalrespondentinanunrecognizedslumhasabouta30percentpredictedprobabilityoffeelingveryinsecureintheirtenure;thatfallstolessthan15percentforresidentsofrecognizedsettlements.Thefigurealsoshowsthatthereisasmall,insignificantincreaseinthepredictedprobabilityoffeelingveryinsecurewhenahouseholdhasprivatetitle.Thisinsignificantresultisnotworthmakingmuchof,butitisconsistentwithafearofmarket-drivendisplacementandgentrificationthatcanoccurwiththeintroductionofindividualtitle.19ItisalsoconsistentwithnulleffectsoftitlingonperceivedsecurityinPeruandelsewhere,whereformalizationofsettlementsismoreimportantthanindividualtitle(Baharoglu2002).Aswiththeearlierresults,thesearerobusttoestimationapproachesthatexplicitlymodelthehierarchicalnatureofthedata.

Figure4HereVI.Results:ThePoliticalOriginsofLegalRecognitionGiventhatslumrecognitionprovideshouseholdswithincreasedconfidencethattheywillnotbeevicted,encouragesaccesstoformalfinancialmarketsandisassociatedwiththeaccumulationofwealth,itisnosurprisethatitiscovetedbyagreatmanyresidentsofinformalsettlementsinBangalore.Butwhydosomeslumsachieveitwhileothersdonot?OnepossibilityisthatthemunicipalgovernmentofBangalore(BBMP)andtheKarnatakaSlumDevelopmentBoard(KSDB)followthetechnicalsetofcriteriaestablishedintheSlumRecoveryAct.TheAct,however,allowsforsubstantialinterpretation,andboththeBBMPandKSDBareunder-fundedagenciesoverwhelmedwithwork.Asperourtheoreticaldiscussionabove,wehypothesizethatformalrecognitionistheresultofapoliticalstruggle.InterviewswithemployeesinboththeBBMPandKSDBsuggestthatelectedofficialsplayacrucialroleinsensitizingtheagenciestotheimportanceofworkingwithsomesettlements.Indeedandasperourtheoreticaldiscussionabove,weexpectthatformalrecognitionistheresultofapoliticalstruggle.Wehypothesizethatsettlementsthataredenselyorganizedwillbeabletocapturetheattentionofcorporators(officialselectedinward-wisecityelections)andmembersofthestatelegislativeassembly(MLAs)andtherebyaremorelikelytoachieverecognition.

19EvidencefromJakarta,forinstance,showsthatmarketpricesareabout50%higherforregisteredpropertiesinthecentralbusinessdistrict(DowallandLeaf1990).

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Totestthisproposition,weinitiallyrelyonneighborhoodsurveysof157slums.Thesesurveysprovideinformationonthelegalstatusoftheslum,itslocationvis-à-vissensitiveland(i.e.landthatislegallydifficulttorecognizeashabitable),thedemographicsofhabitants,andthesizeandageofthesettlement.Wealsoderivefromthesurveystwoindirectindicatorsofslum-levelsocialdensityandpoliticalengagement.Thefirstisanestimateoftheshareoftheinhabitantswhoparticipateinaneighborhoodgroup,wheretheneighborhoodgroupsrangefrommicro-financegroupstoneighborhoodself-helpassociationstocommunitysafetyassociations.Thesecondisaroughmeasureofthepoliticalengagementofasettlement.Respondentswhereaskedwhotheywouldgotointheeventthesettlementhadalocalserviceneedorproblem.Respondentsweregivenarangeofoptions,whichweturnintoanindicatorvariabletakingonavalueof“1”ifthesettlementwouldturntoapoliticalofficial—betheyanMLA,acorporator,apartyofficialoralocalleader.20Weestimatelogitmodelswithrecognitionstatusasthedependentvariable.AppendixA.5presentsthetabularresults,whichshowthatinthreeoutoffourmodels,themeasuresofsocialdensityandpoliticalengagementarepositivelyandsignificantlycorrelatedwithslumrecognition.Figure5presentstheresultsgraphically.Itshowsthatunderconditionsofsocialanomie,thereisa20percentpredictedprobablityofrecognition;thatclimbstoover80percentwheneveryoneintheslumparticipates(whichdoesoccurinoursample!).Theseresultsarerobusttotheinclusionofmeasuresoflandtype(industrialwastesitesandgarbagedumpsmilitateagainstrecognition)andlandownership(thefederalgovernmentisnotoriouslydifficulttoworkwith).Obviously,thesearepreliminaryresults,buttheyarebroadlysuggestivethatsocialandpoliticallyorganizedneighborhoodsaremorelikelytoachieveslumrecognition,evenafterwetakeaccountofphysical,historicalanddemographiccharacteristicsthatmightimpactadministrativedecisions.

Figure5HereOurhouseholdsurveysofferthepotentialformuchricheranalysisinfuturedrafts.Wehavequestionsthatallowustoassesstheextenttowhichindivualhouseholdsareconnectedtotheprofessionalandpoliticallivesofthebroadercity;othersthatallowustoassessinterpersonaltrustandsharedattendanceatweddings;andyetothersthatallowustomeasuretheextenttowhichpartisanorientationandneighborhoodleadershiparesharedacrosshouseholds.Figure6providesaviewofthehugevariationacrossslumsinsocialattitudesandpoliticalcoherence.Thefigureshowstheslum-wisedistributionofhouseholdresponsestothefollowingquestions:

• Doyouthinkyourneighborhoodisaneffectivevotebank?(top-leftpanel,theshareofhouseholdswhosayyes);

20Theotheroptionsforwhotheslummightturntoare:Yourself,Relatives,Friends,Neighbors,ReligiousLeaders,Employers(Contractor/Mukaddam),anagent,Caste/ReligiousOrganizations,oranNGO.

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• Canyougivemethenameofthefirstmostimportantleaderofyourneighborhood?(top-rightpanel,theshareofrespondentsnamingthesameperson);

• Pleasetellmewhetheryouagreeordisagreewiththefollowingstatement:'Mostpeoplewholiveinthisneighborhoodcanbetrusted'(bottom-left,theshareresponding“stronglyagree”or“somewhatagree”);

• Supposethat10ofyourneighborswereinvitedtohelpincommunitywork,suchasacommunitywaterproject,cleaningofgutters,orweedingonthesideoftheroad.Howmanydoyouthinkwouldshowup?(bottom-right,themeanresponse,byslum).

Obviously,thereareslumswherehouseholdsthinktheyarestrongvotebanks,wherenearlyeveryoneagreesonwhothelocalleaderis,andwheresocialtrustandengagementarehigh.Therearealsoslumswithnoneofthesecharacteristics.Interestingly,preliminaryanalysissuggeststhatthisisnotsimplyafunctionofhowlongsettlementshaveexisted,theirsocialheterogeneityortheresourcesavailabletotheirhouseholds.

Figure6HereVI.2:LocalLeadershipCentralityandLegalRecognitionRecentworkonclientelismsuggeststhatlocalleaders/partybrokersplayacrucialroleinmediatingtherelationshipbetweenlocalcitizensandthebroaderpoliticalworld(Stokesetal.2013;Auerbach2014;RojoandWibbels2014),andagrowingbodyofworkemphasizestheroleofleadershipinmobilizinglatentsocialcapital(Krishna2007;Ostrom2001;AhlquistandLevi2011).Wedonothavedetailedleadershipdataforall157slums,butinthe2015householdsurveywedidaskrespondentsthenamesofthemostimportantlocalleaders.21Afterturningtheresultingnamesintoadjacencymatrices,weareabletoconstructnetworkgraphswhichprovideasenseofhowthese40slumsareorganizedataverylocallevel.Figure7providessixsuchgraphsthatrepresentthediverserangeofleadershipnetworks.FromUttarahalli,whereallbutonerespondentrecognizethesameleader,toGorguntepalay,whichischaracterizedbyalmosttotalpoliticalanomie,todifferentformsofbipolarand/orpartiallyorganizedsettlements,thereishugevariationinthemicro-politicalorganizationoftheseneighborhoods.Asapurelydescriptivematter,residentsinslumswithmorecentralizedleadershipnetworksreporthigherlevelsofinterpersonaltrust,greatersuccessinslum-levelvotebanking,andlessfrequentandseriousintra-slumconflict.

Figure7Thoughoneshouldbeskepticalofnetworkmeasuresdrawnfromsamples(ChandrasekharandLewis2011),weintroduceameasureofleadershipcentralityinto 21Dealingwithpropernamesinsurveysisverydifficult.Giventhepropensityformisspellingsanddifferentversionsofthesamenames,thesupervisorsandenumeratorsharmonizedthenameseachday.Inambiguouscases,supervisorscalledrespondentsforclarification(wecollectedcellphonenumbers).

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theslumrecognitionmodelsdesribedabove.Wemeasurenetworkcentralityusingaverageharmonicclosenessandincludenon-respondentsasisolates.22TheresultsarepresentedgraphicallyinFigure8.Obviouslythereisagooddealofuncertaintyaroundtheprediction,butthefiguresuggeststhatmovementfromtheleasttomostcentralizedleadershipnetworkincreasestheprobabilityofrecognitionfrom.4to.9.

Figure8HereObviouslythereisscantprospectofcausallyidentifyingtheeffectoflocalsocialstructureonslumrecognitionandlandtitling—wecannotexperimentonsocialstructureorleadershipcapability,andconvincinginstrumentsarenowheretobeseen.Nevertheless,wecandesignresearchtogetatplausiblemechanisms.Themostimportantmechanismlinkingthedensityoflocalleadershipnetworkstopoliticaloutcomesrunsthroughvoting.Wherelocalleadersservetocoordinatelocalvotersthesettlementservesasavotebank,andthereiswidespreadrecognitionthatelectedofficialsinIndiatargetresourcestotheirvotebanks.Toseeifthatisthecase,weranalistexperimentinthe2005surveywave.23BuildingonsimilarsurveyexperimentsbyGonzalez-Ocantosetal.(2012),eachrespondentwasgiventhefollowingintroduction:

Peopledecidewhotovoteforbasedonmanydifferentconsiderations.Iwillreadyousomeofthereasonspeoplehavetoldus.Pleasetellmehowmanyoftheseinfluenceyourvotechoice.Don’ttellmewhichones,justtellmehowmany.

Thecontrolwasgiventhreeinnocuousoptionsthatweredesignedtoavoidceilingeffects:TravelingtoBJPheadquarterstospeakwiththepartyheadabouttheelection;listeningtoradiocoverageofthecampaign;anddiscussingtheelectionwithfriendsorfamily.Thetreatmentgroupwasgivenafourthoption,namely“Thesuggestionsofyourneighborhoodleaderbecausehe/shehasmadearrangementswithapoliticalparty.”Appendix6reportsthatrandomassignmentsuccessfullyproducedbalanceonahostofindividual-levelcharacteristics.Weareweaklypoweredtolookatheterogeneouseffects(approximately200observationsperbin),butFigure9reportsthemaineffectofthetreatment(leftpanel),andthemeancountandcorresponding95%confidenceintervalsforthetreatedwhoareincommunitieswith:a)decentralizedleadershipnetworks;andb)centralizedleadershipnetworks(rightpanel).24Themeandifferencebetweenthetreatmentandcontrolgroupsforthesampleasawholeisinsignificant.Thedifferencebetweenthetreatedindecentralizedversuscentralizedslumsissignificantat.04,andthedifferencebetweenthetwoimpliesthat13percentmorevotersinsettlementswithcentralizedleadershipnetworksvoteinmannersconsistentwiththeeffortsoftheleader.Moresophisticatedtreatmentofthissurveyexperimentaldataisyettocome,butwearealsobusily

22Forexample,aleaderwith4followerswillhavecloseness4,becauses/heisdistance1from4othernodes.Eachofthisleader'sfollowershascloseness2.5,becauses/heisdistance1fromtheleaderanddistance2fromeachoftheotherfollowers(1/1+3*(1/2)=2.5).Thenetworkischaracterizedbytakingtheaverageoverallnodes.23ThesurveywasprogrammedinODKanddeliveredbytablet.Therandomizationwasachievedviarandomnumbergenerator. 24 I define centralized settlements as those with average harmonic closeness scores above the mean

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matchingvotingboothdatatoslumboundariesinordertoassesswhere,whenandhowslumsdo,infact,voteasvotebanks.

Figure9HereVII.ConclusionInourempiricalsetting,itistruethatincreasingtenuresecuritydoesindeeedleadtowealthandsavings.Butthemostimportantbarriertosecurityisnotprivatetitlesomuchasitisacollectively-heldtenureembodiedinslumrecognition.ThiscollectivelyheldrightbearsresemblancetoacommonpoolresourcealaOstrom,butitisdistincttotheextentthatitrequiresrecognitionandenforcementbyoutsidepoliticalandlegalauthorities.Theinterfacebetweenlocalcommunitiesandthatbroaderpoliticalworldisconditionedbymobilizationandthecapacitytodelivervotes.Thatcapacityreflectsmanyofthecharacteristicsthatareconsistentwiththesharedmanagementofcommonpoolresourcesinruralandforestcommunities.Unlikeinthoseisolatedcommunities,however,theurbanpoormustbepoliticallyattractivetooutsiderswhomakekeydecisions.Wheretheyare,theyaremorelikelytoextractslumrecognition,andrecognitionhasverylargepositiveeffectsforhousehold-andcommunity-leveldevelopment.Ourfindingsarebroadlyconsistentwiththegrowingcallforafocusontenuresecurityattheexpenseofformaltenureprovision(seeDurand-Lasserve2009forareview). Interestingly,thecapacitytobecomepoliticallyattractiveisunrelatedtothecasteorreligiousheterogeneityofcommunities.ItseemsthereisconsiderableroomforhumanagencyintheslumsofBangalore. Thereareseveralanglesforfuturework.Subsequentrevisionsofthismanuscriptwillbringmorehouseholdlevelevidencetobearonthedensityofsocialnetworksintheslumsandcoverawiderrangeofhousehold-levelfinancialbehavior.Inextensions,wewillfocusexplicitlyonexplaininghighlyvariedaccesstokeypublicservices,theelectoralbehaviorofsettlements,andtheroleoflocalleadershipandpoliticalnetworksinconditioningslum-andhousehold-leveloutcomes.Finally,wewouldliketoexploreinfinerdetailthemicrofoundationsunderpinningourfindingsinthispaper.Ouraccountandevidencebegtwobigquestions,onebearingonvariationacrossspaceandtheotherbearingonvariationovertime.Thefirstquestionis:Howwellwillthesefindingstravel?Ourempiricsaredrawnfromslumsandgovernmentinonecity.Giventhatthereissubstantialleewayforcityandstategovernmentstomanageinformalsettlements(Durand-LasserveandRoyston2012),itisimportanttoresearchthesedynamicsinothercitiesinIndiaandother“worldcities”inthedevelopingworldthatsharethesameboomsthathavedrivenurbanpropertydynamicsinBangalore.Questionsabound:Howdolandlawsbearonrecognition?Howdoesvariationintheorganizationofcitygovernmentimpactthepoliticsofurbanlandtenure?OurinitialworksuggeststhatthelegaldistinctionbetweenslumrecognitionandindividualtitleinIndiadoesmapontopropertyregimeselsewhere,butthereisalotofworktobedone.

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Finally,wehavedonelittletoaddresstheobviousquestionthatbedevilsmostworkonsocialcapitalandsocialnetworks:Wheredoesdensesocialorganizationcomesfrom?Wearelimitedbythecross-sectionalnatureofourdata,butweadmittoagoodbitoftheoreticaluncertaintyaswell.Dodensesocialnetworksandpoliticallymobilizedslumsemergefromsomeideal,primordialsocialconditionsearlyinaslum’shistory?Ordogoodneighborhood,wardandMLAleaders(i.e.successfulpoliticalentrepreneurs)producedenselyorganizedcommunitiesandvotebanksbyvirtueoforganizing,constituencyservice,andthecontinuousapplicationofhardwork.Considerableresearchonsocialheterogeneitysuggeststhatcaste-andreligious-baseddiversityshouldplayanimportantroleinconditioningthecapacityoflocalcommunitiestoengageincollectiveaction,andwecanpointtoparticularsettlementswherethatseemstobethecase.Yet,wefindnosystematicevidencethatmoreheterogeneousslumshavemorespartansocialnetworksorarelesspoliticallyengaged.Obviouslythismightsimplyreflectthemodestnumberofslumswecandrawevidencefrom,butitisworthnotingthatoursampleisaboutaslargeasthecross-countrysamplesthathavedrivenmuchofthecurrentthinkingontherelationshipbetweensocialheterogeneity,publicgoodsprovisionanddevelopment(Alesinaetal.2003).Emprically,studyingtheemergenceandevolutionofsocialnetworksinarealworldsettingsuchasslums(i.e.asettingthatisnotwellcapturedbyFacebook,LinkedInorothersocialnetworksitesthathaveprovidedimportantinsight)isincrediblydifficult.Butitisforexactlythatreasonthatourlong-runningworkinBangaloreisnowherenearcomplete.

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ReferencesAhlquist,JohnandMargaretLevi.2011.“Leadership:WhatItMeans,WhatItDoes,andWhatWeWanttoKnowAboutIt.”AnnualReviewofPoliticalScience14:1-24.Alesina,Alberto,ArnaudDevleeschauwer,WilliamEasterly,SergioKurlatandRomainWacziarg.2003.“Fractionalization.”JournalofEconomicGrowth8:155-94.Auerbach,Adam.2014.“ClientsandCommunities:ThePoliticalEconomyofPartyNetworkOrganizationandDevelopmentinIndia’sUrbanSlums.”WorkingPaper,AmericanUniversity.Baharoglu,Deniz.2002.“WorldBankExperienceinLandManagementandtheDebateonTenureSecurity.”HousingResearchBackground-LandManagementPaper.Banerjee,AbhijitandEstherDuflo.2011.Pooreconomics:Aradicalrethinkingofthewaytofightglobalpoverty.PublicAffairs.BesleyandGhatak.2009.“PropertyRightsandEconomicDevelopment.”InDaniRodrikandMarkRosenzweig,editors:HandbookofDevelopmentEconomics,Vol.5,TheNetherlands:North-Holland,2010,pp.4525-4595.Besley,BurchardiandGhatak.2012.“IncentivesandtheDeSotoEffect.”QuarterlyJournalofEconomicsBrune,Lasse,etal.“FacilitatingSavingsforAgriculture:FieldExperimentalEvidencefromMalawi.”No.w20946.NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,2015.Chandrasekhar,ArunandRandallLewis.2011.“EconometricsofSampledNetworks.”WorkingPaper,StanfordDepartmentofEconomics.Deininger,KlausandHansBinswanger.1999.“EvolutionoftheWorldBank’sLandPolicy:Principles,Experience,andFutureChallenges.”TheWorldBankResearchObserver14:247-76.Deiningeretal.2011.“ImpactofLandCertificationonTenureSecurity,Investment,andLandMarketParticipation:EvidencefromEthiopia.”LandEconomicsDemarchi,Scott.2014.“Institutions,DomainRestrictionsandCognition.”Manuscript,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,DukeUniversity.deSoto,Hernando.1990.TheOtherPath:TheInvisibleRevolutionintheThirdWorld.PerennialLibrary.

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DiTella,Rafael,SebastianGalianiandErnestoSchargrodsky.2007.“TheFormationofBeliefs:EvidencefromtheAllocationofLandTitlestoSquatters.”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics122:209-41.Durand-Lasserve,AlainandLaurenRoyston.2012Field,Erica.2005.“PropertyRightsandInvestmentinUrbanSlums.”JournaloftheEuropeanEconomicAssociationPapersandProceedings3:279-290.Field,Erica.2007.“EntitledtoWork:UrbanPropertyRightsandLaborSupplyinPeru.”TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomics122:1561-1602.Galiani,SebastianandESchargrodsky.2010.“Propertyrightsforthepoor:Effectsoflandtitling.”JournalofPublicEconomics94:700-29.Goldstein,MarkusandChristopherUdry.2008.“TheProfitsofPower:LandRightsandAgriculturalInvestmentinGhana.”JournalofPoliticalEconomy116:981-1022.Gonzalez-Ocantos,Ezequiel,ChadKiewetdeJone,CarlosMelendex,JavierOsorioandDavidNickerson.2012.“VoteBuyingandSocialDesirabilityBias:ExperimentalEvidencefromNicaragua.”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience56:202-17.Hornbeck,Richard.2010."Barbedwire:Propertyrightsandagriculturaldevelopment."TheQuarterlyJournalofEconomics125:767-810.Krishna,Anirudh.2007.“HowDoesSocialCapitalGrow?ASeven-YearStudyofVillagesinIndia”.JournalofPolitics,69:941-956.Marx,StokerandSuri.2015.“ThereisnoFreeHouse:EthnicPatronageandPropertyRightsinaKenyanSlum.”WorkingPaperMIT.North,Douglas.1990.Institutions,InstitutionalChange,andEconomicPerformance.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.North,DouglasandBarryWeingast.1989.“ConstitutionsandCommitment:TheEvolutionofInstitutionsGoverningPublicChoiceinSeventeenthCenturyEngland,JournalofEconomicHistory49:803-32.Ostrom,Elinor.1990.Governingthecommons:Theevolutionofinstitutionsforcollectiveaction.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Ostrom,Elinor.2001.“SocialCapital:AFadoraFundamentalConcept?”InParthaDasguptaandIsmailSerageldin,eds.SocialCapital:AMultifacetedPerspective.Washington,DC:WorldBankPublications.

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Payne,Geoffrey,AlainDurand-Lasserve,andCaroleRakodi.2009.“SocialandEconomicImpactsofLandTitlingProgramsinUrbanandPeriurbanAreas:AShortReviewoftheLiterature.”UrbanLandMarkets133-16

Pagano,Marco.1993."FinancialMarketsandGrowth:AnOverview."EuropeanEconomicReview37:613-622.Pande,RohiniandChristopherUdry.2005.“InstitutionsandDevelopment:AViewfromBelow.”IntheProceedingsofthe9thWorldCongressoftheEconometricSociety,editedbyR.Blundell,W.Newey,andT.Persson.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.Rojo,GuadalupeandErikWibbels.2014.“PoliticalNetworks,ClientelismandPublicGoods:EvidencefromSlumsinUdaipur,India.”WorkingPaper,DukeUniversity.Stokes,Susan,ThadDunning,MarceloNazarenoandValeriaBrusco.2013.Brokers,VotersandClientelism:ThePuzzleofDistributivePolitics.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.UN-HABITAT.2002.“TheGlobalCampaignonUrbanGovernance.”ConceptNote,Nairobi,Kenya.VanGelder,Jean-Louis.2009.“LegalTenureSecurity,PerceivedTenureSecurityandHousingImprovementinBuenosAires:AnAttempttowardsIntegration.”InternationalJournalofUrbanandRegionalResearch33:126-46.WorldBank.2011.“LandTenurePolicy:SecuringRightstoReducePovertyandPromoteRuralGrowth.”WashingtonDC:TheWorldBank.

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Figure1:GeotaggedSlumBoundaries,

4x5km(toppanel)and800x1400m(bottompanel)

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Figure2:

Note:Thefiguredisplaysthepredictedscoreontheassetindex(and95%confidenceintervals)simulatedfromModel5inTableA.2whenaslumisrecognizedornotandwhenahouseholdhastitleornot.

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Figure3:

Note:Thefigurepresentsthepredictedprobability(and95%confidenceintervals)ofusingaformalsavingsinstitutionassimulatedfromModel4inTableA.3.

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Figure4:

Note:Thetoppanelofthefigurepresentsthepredictedprobability(and95%confidenceintervals)offeelingveryinsecurewithregardstothethreatofevictionassimulatedfromModel3inTableA.4whenaslumisrecognizedandnotandwhenahouseholdhastitleandnot.Thebottompanelisirrelevant.

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Figure5:

Note:Theleftpanelofthefigurepresentsthepredictedprobabilityofaslumbeinglegallyrecognizedastheshareofitsresidentsparticipateinaneighborhoodorganization;theresultsaresimulatedoffModel1inAppendixA.5.Therightpanelpresentsthepredictedprobabilityofaslumbeinglegallyrecognizedwhenitsresidentshaveapoliticalrepresentativewhotheyturntointheeventofproblemswithlocalservices;theresultsaresimulatedoffModel3inAppendixA.5.

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Figure6:

Note:Thefigurepresentsthekerneldensityofslum-levelmeansto(orsharesof)householdrespondentstothefollowingquestions:Doyouthinkyourneighborhoodisaneffectivevotebank?(top-leftpanel);Canyougivemethenameofthefirstmostimportantleaderofyourneighborhood?(top-right,thisisthesharenamingthesameperson);Pleasetellmewhetheryouagreeordisagreewiththefollowingstatement:'Mostpeoplewholiveinthisneighborhoodcanbetrusted'(bottom-left,theshareresponding“stronglyagree”or“somewhatagree”);Supposethat10ofyourneighborswereinvitedtohelpincommunitywork,suchasacommunitywaterproject,cleaningofgutters,orweedingonthesideoftheroad.Howmanydoyouthinkwouldshowup?(bottom-right,themeanresponse,byslum).

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Figure7:LeadershipNetworksinSeveralSlums

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Figure8:

Note:Leadershipcentralityismeasuredastheaverageharmoniccloseness,i.e.themeanofthesumoftheinversedistancesofeachnodetoalltheothernodes.

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FigureX:SurveyExperimentalEvidenceonLeadershipNetworksandVoting

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AppendixA.1:TenureInsecurityinPictures—theCaseofPattandurAgraharaSettlement

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AppendixA.2:LegalRecognitionandPrivateTitleinBangaloreTheprocessofgettinganindividualpropertytitleiscomplexandpassesthroughmultiplestages,ateachofwhichitcangetderailedorsubstantiallydelayed.Sustainedpoliticalpressureisusuallynecessarytogofromonestagetothenext.Thisprocess,asitwasdescribedforusbyanexperiencedadministratorwhohasdealtwithslumsinKarnatakaformanyyears,typicallystartswiththeoccupationofavacantpieceoflandinacity,onwhichtheoccupantscarveoutplotsandbuildarudimentaryshack.Bluepolygonslumscorrespond,thus,totheveryfirststageofalongdrawn-outprocess,butsometimesthisprocessendsrightthere.Goingtothenextstageusuallyinvolvesacquiringvoteridentificationcards,establishingtheholderasabonafideresidentofBangalore.WiththehelpoftheirVoterIDs,individualsareabletoacquireelectricityconnectionsfortheirshacksandarationcard(whichestablishesanentitlementtobuycommoditiesatgovernment-subsidizedfair-priceshops).Afterasubstantialnumberofresidentsinaslumsettlementhavegarneredsuchpapers,officialdocumentationwhichtheycanattachtotheirclaimforbeingrecognizedasa“slum”andregisteredintheofficialrecord,thenextsteptowardobtainingapropertytitleistaken,mostoftenwiththehelpofalocalpoliticalentrepreneur,whomightbeanelectedofficialorapartyorganizer.ThisstepinvolvesthepresentationofapetitiontotheKarnatakaSlumDevelopmentBoard(KSDB),formerlytheKarnatakaStateClearanceBoard,whichischargedwiththeresponsibilityof“recognizing”thesesettlementsasslums,andforprovidingservicestosuchsettlementsasitrecognizes,thoughonoccasion,bowingtopoliticalpressure,theBoardhasbeenprovidingserviceseventonon-recognizedslums.TheprocessofgrantingofficialrecognitiontoasettlementthatpresentsapetitionisgovernedbytheprovisionsoftheKarnatakaSlumAreas(ImprovementandClearance)Actof1973.Anumberofstepsaremandated,whichinexpedientcasesgettelescopedandrushedthrough,butinothercases,aredealtwithatasnail’space.Pressureandinducementsofdifferentkindsplayalargepartinwhogetsrecognitionandwhen.Addingtothemessinessandconfusion,multipleagencies,includingthemunicipalcorporation(orBBMP)havealsobeeninvolvedingrantingrecognitiontoslums.Ifthelanduponwhichasettlementislocatedis“clear,”inthesensethatitdoesnotbelongtoadepartmentofthefederalgovernment(alargeamountofpubliclandinthecityisownedbythemilitaryandtherailwaysdepartment,alegacyofcolonialrule)anddoesnotformpartofanaturaldrainagechannel,situponahazardouswastesiteorbeenzonedfornon-residentialuse(althoughtheselasttwoobjectionscanbefinagled)–thenthenextstageoftheodysseyleadingtoeventualpropertytitlescanbeembarkedupon.KSDBofficialsconductapreliminarysurvey,roughlymappingtheboundariesofthesettlementandconductingacensusofthosewholivethere.Theyknowtheywillhavetoundertakeanothercensuslater,sothisfirstcensusisarough-and-readyaffair.Theysubmittheirreporttoseniorgovernmentofficials,uponwhosesatisfaction,thenextstageintheprocessisputinplace.AdraftnotificationissubsequentlyissuedundertherelatedprovisionoftheSlumAct.Objectionsareinvitedfromthepublic.Ifthelandonwhichthesettlementisbasedisthepropertyofaprivateowner,thepetitionforrecognitionoftendiesthere.

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Petitionswhichsucceedatthisstage,usuallyinvolvingsettlementsbasedon“clear”publiclands(orothersinwhichtheprivateownerbecomescomplicit)aretakentothenextstage.Thepreliminarynotificationissuedbythestategovernmentisreissuedasafinalnotification.Itisatthisstage,i.e.,aftergettingthefinalofficialnotification,thataslumbecomesofficiallyeligibleforreceivingbothmunicipalservicesandpropertytitlesfortheregisteredresidents(knownashakkupatrainthelocalparlance).Municipalservicescomemuchbeforetitlesaregivenout.Beforegrantingtitles,asecondsurveymustbecarriedout.Often,severalyearspassbeforesuchasurveygetstobeconducted.Evenafterward,onlyIDcardsareissued;gettingafulltitlecantakeanotherfewyears.Residentsofanotifiedslumwhodonothavetitlesenjoytheprotectionofknowingthattheycannotbeabruptlydislocated;notificationgivesthemarighttolivethere.Theyaresometimesissuedwith“possessioncertificates.”Butuntiltheygetafulltitle(thehakkupatra),theycannotsell,mortgageorotherwisetransfertheirproperties,atleastonformalpropertymarkets.2,487ofthehouseholdsinoursampleliveinslumsthathavebeenofficiallyrecognized,butonly40percenthaveahakkupatra.

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AppendixA.3:Assets Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Table5 Table6

Female-HeadedHH 0.128 -0.0705 -0.0312 -0.0623 -0.214* -0.166

(0.97) (-0.50) (-0.24) (-0.45) (-2.21) (-1.50)

Hindu 0.0195 0.351 -0.0721 0.294 0.0760 -0.0796

(0.08) (1.24) (-0.27) (1.11) (0.72) (-0.68)

Caste 1.090*** 1.772*** 0.970*** 1.704*** 0.501*** 0.411**

(4.18) (6.98) (4.02) (7.10) (5.21) (3.32)

Age

0.00648

0.00478

0.00164

(1.40)

(0.98)

(0.77)

YearsinHouse

0.0652***

0.0435***

0.00204

(7.98)

(4.13)

(0.58)

Title

1.117*** 1.324*** 0.434*** 0.315*

(4.07) (3.50) (3.53) (2.22)

SlumRecognized

3.349*** 3.972***

(11.51) (17.20)

_cons -0.272 -2.267*** -0.628 -2.447*** -2.782*** -2.916*** (-0.84) (-5.40) (-1.66) (-6.28) (-12.40) (-18.27)R-sq 0.048 0.265 0.121 0.321 0.608 0.761F 7.138 21.59 8.062 27.69 96.65 237.1N 3358 1897 3328 1877 3328 1877tstatisticsinparentheses

="*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001"

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AppendixA.3:UseofFormalSavings

Model1 Model2 Model3Model4(HLM)

Female-HeadedHH -0.145 -0.147 -0.143 -0.134

(-1.05) (-1.04) (-1.01) (-0.74)

Hindu 0.0597 0.0954 0.0269 0.0218

(0.33) (0.50) (0.13) (0.12)

Caste 0.185 0.177 0.0317 0.0228

(1.14) (1.08) (0.19) (0.14)

Age -0.00482 -0.00547 -0.00581 -0.00633

(-0.98) (-1.09) (-1.14) (-1.19)

YearsinHouse 0.00748 -0.00200 -0.00579 -0.00651

(1.86) (-0.48) (-1.37) (-1.34)

Title

0.561*** 0.397** 0.412**

(4.41) (3.24) (2.85)

SlumRecognized

0.591*** 0.609***

(4.00) (3.66)

_cons -0.582* -0.710* -0.878** -0.868**

(-2.17) (-2.46) (-2.83) (-3.13)

RandomEffect

-1.551** (-3.09)pseudoR-sq 0.004 0.014 0.023

AIC 1727.7 1690.2 1676.9 1677.5N 1318 1298 1298 1298

tstatisticsinparentheses=*p<0.05

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AppendixA.4:InsecurityinTenure Model1 Model2 Model3

Female-HeadedHH 0.0615 0.0771 0.0527

(0.34) (0.42) (0.29)

Hindu -0.0979 -0.0988 -0.0772

(-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.39)

Caste 0.0527 0.0397 0.125

(0.30) (0.22) (0.67)

Age 0.00638 0.00619 0.00659

(1.00) (0.96) (1.03)

YearsinHouse -0.00445 -0.00430 -0.000560

(-0.86) (-0.85) (-0.12)

Title

-0.00309 0.169

(-0.02) (1.34)

SlumRecognized

-1.038*** (-9.96)cut1

_cons -1.060*** -1.053*** -1.731***

(-4.07) (-3.79) (-6.66)

cut2 _cons -0.0535 -0.0576 -0.719**

(-0.21) (-0.22) (-2.67)

cut3 _cons 1.788*** 1.775*** 1.155***

(6.82) (6.30) (4.41)pseudoR-sq 0.001 0.001 0.015AIC 3269.8 3234.3 3191.9N 1221 1206 1206tstatisticsinparentheses

="*p<0.05 **p<0.01

Page 39: Property Rights from 157 Slums in Bangalore”...“Satellites, Slums and Social Networks: Evidence on the Origins and Consequences of Property Rights from 157 Slums in Bangalore”

AppendixA.5: Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4NeighborhoodOrganization 0.0321** 0.0258*

(2.89) (2.12)

PoliticalEngagement

1.179** 0.480

(2.71) (0.99)

SettlementAge

0.131**

0.135**

(2.98)

(3.07)

SettlementAge-squared

-0.00105**

-0.00109**

(-2.72)

(-2.82)

NumberofHouseholds

0.000112

0.0000588

(1.11)

(0.62)

PercentHindu

-0.00799

-0.00522

(-0.83)

(-0.56)

PercentGeneralandOBC

-0.0107

-0.0144

(-0.75)

(-1.02)

Constant -1.217*** -3.788** -1.705*** -3.999** (-5.53) (-2.62) (-4.44) (-2.77)pseudoR-sq 0.051 0.172 0.044 0.149AIC 185.9 171.0 187.2 175.2N 157 154 157 154tstatisticsinparentheses

="*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001"

Page 40: Property Rights from 157 Slums in Bangalore”...“Satellites, Slums and Social Networks: Evidence on the Origins and Consequences of Property Rights from 157 Slums in Bangalore”

AppendixA.6BalanceTestonSurveyExperimentalTreatment

Variables Control Treatment DifferenceAge 41.212 40.517 0.695

OwnHome 0.571 0.558 0.013Female 0.384 0.427 -0.043

FemaleHeadedHH 0.141 0.171 -0.03Hindu 0.778 0.817 -0.039

Assets(PC) 0.916 0.798 0.119Caste 0.359 0.323 0.036

YearsinHouse 16.778 16.274 0.504

Note:Noneofthedifferencesarestatisticallysignificant


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