apec quo vadis

8/12/2019 APEC Quo Vadis

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APEC Quo Vadis?Author(s): David K. LinnanSource: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 824-834Published by: American Society of International LawStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2203943.

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824 THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 89statesthat could not accept being bound provisionally egarding ne specific spectwithout clearstatement f thegeneralrule.States nd entities orwhich heAgreement s not n forcemay ontinue oparticipateas membersof theAuthority n a provisional asis,under two conditions.First,ftheAgreement nters nto force before November16, 1996, these states are entitledtocontinuetheirparticipation pon notification o the depositary ntil November16,1996,oruntil t enters nto force ogetherwith heConvention or uch members.Onlythe Council oftheAuthorityan authorize furtherxtension. econd, f heAgreemententersntoforce fter ovember 5, 1996,the Councilupon request angrant ontinuedprovisionalmembershipn theAuthority ut not beyond November 16, 1998. UnderArticle , paragraph3 ofthe Agreement, heprovisional pplication hall terminate nNovember16, 1998, fthe Agreement as notalready ntered nto force n accordancewithArticle .

CONCLUDING REMARKSIfthe majority f ndustrialized tatesdoes notbecome party o both theConventionand theAgreementwithin he nextfouryears, he coexistenceof a dual regimewillpose a real threat.A practicewill nevertheless evelopin accordancewith he terms ftheAgreement, hichwillthen make t mpossible or tates oapplytheregime nPartXI of the Convention. The followingresultsmay thereforebe expected: (1) theAgreementwillhave achieved whatall industrialized ountrieshad envisaged, hat s,prevention f the implementationfthe Convention's eabed regime; 2) theregimeapplicabletopioneer nvestors, hichhad developedefficientlyndpragmaticallyithinthePreparatoryommission,willcontinuetodevelopwithin heAuthority;nd (3) thelatterregimewillthusbenefit rom heparticipation f other ndustrialized ountriesbelonging othegroupofpotential nvestors,uch as the UnitedStates,which, yvirtueoftheAgreement, ill egallybe able to become explorers fthedeep seabed.ANNICK DE MARFFY-MANTUANO*

* Senior Law of the Sea Officer,United Nations. The opinions expressed n this paper are those of theauthorand do notnecessarily eflect hose of theUnitedNations.

APEC Quo VADIS?Whatdo wemeanbyAsia-PacificconomicCooperation APEC)? In a worldof trade

law populated by nternational rganizations uch as the General Agreement n Tariffsand Trade/WorldTrade Organization GATT/WTO), heNorthAmericanFree TradeAgreement NAFTA) nd the European Union (EU), thetermAPEC suggests et notherinternational rganization. ut one would look in vainfor an international greementcreatingAPEC or for the usual organsthat an international rganization ossesses, l-though t has an active secretariat nd coordinatesproductionof a large quantity fresearchmaterials.All three Chinas (the People's Republic,Hong Kong and Taiwan)participate n its activities, practice hatwould be unacceptableto at least one of themifAPEC werea normal nternational rganization.ndeed, uncertaintybout the natureof Pacific conomic cooperationhas suggested t leastfourdistinctnstitutional odels:(1) an integrated upranational ommunity riginallymodeled on the European Eco-nomic Community a 1960sJapanese scholarly roposal);' (2) a looser organization

' See, .g.,Bernard K Gordon,Japanand the acific asin Proposal,oREA & WORLD AFF., ummer 1981, at268, 270; PeterDrysdale,An OrganizationorPacific rade,Aid andDevelopment:egionalArrangementsnd theResource rade, nMINERAL RESOURCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA 611, 613-14 (LawrenceKrause & Hugh Patrick

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1995] CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 825modeled on the Organisation orEconomic Co-operation nd Development, r OECD(a similar 970s scholarlyroposal)2 (3) a full-scaleegional rade rea within hemean-ing of GATT ArticleXXIV, ntended eemingly s an alternativeo GATT multilateralism(a 1980s onceptoriginally odeled on the Canada-United States ree Trade Agreementand later nvolving he possible xtension fNAFYAo includeAsian countries)3 and (4)an open economic area, also referred o as open regionalism the latestproposal).The last, as commonly nderstood, ejects ny formalregional trade area in favor ftrade iberalization crossthe region-with nuances ying n the treatment fnon-APECmembers nd reliance on continuing nilateral iberalization.4APEC's precursors njoyed relativelyong history,lbeit n inconclusive ne.5OfficialU.S. interestn Pacific conomic cooperationdates to congressional nquiriesn the ate1970s and 1980s;6 hese were colored by country-specificilateral radeconcerns, nd,in the 1980s,by deas forregionalfree trade area alternativesfthe UruguayRound ofGATT negotiationshould fail.Active nterest y othercountries tarted s early s the1960s with he exploration yJapanof tsrole inAsia,and continued n the 1970switheffortst commercial iplomacy yJapan ndAustralia,whichwererooted n concernsabout European protectionismnd relationswithmajor tradingpartners.7 evelopingcountries nitially ere drawn nto theprocess n theearly1980s, argely hrough apa-eds., 1978). Japaneseacademic economistspromoting egionaleconomic integration ame togethern theJapan EconomicResearchCenter founded n the early1960s. n 1965Professor ioushiKojima presentedconcrete proposal for a PacificFree Trade Area to include theUnited States,Japan, Canada, Australia ndNew Zealand. This interestwas then institutionalizedn a seriesof regional nternational onferences, hePacificTrade and DevelopmentConferences PAFTAD),which continueto thisday.2 The idea of an Organisation for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD) is usually credited to Sir JohnCrawford and Saburo Okita. See Saburo Okita, Pacific Regional Co-operation,n POLICYAND PRACTICE: EssAYS INHONOUR OF SIRJOHN CRAWFORD 122 (L. T. Evans &J. D. B. Miller eds., 1987). The OPTAD idea was pursuedin PAFTAD during the late 1970s, seenote 1 supra, nd eventually spawned PECC, seenote 8 infra,s its ownseminar series.3 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 2166, THE PROS AND CONS OF ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATIONS ONFREE TRADE AREA AGREEMENTS WITH TAIWAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND ASEAN, OR THE PACIFIC RIM REGIONIN GENERAL (1989); PETER DRYSDALE & Ross GARNAUT, A PACIFIC FREE TRADE AREA? (Australia-Japan ResearchCentre Pacific Econ. Paper No. 171,1989).4The exact meaning of open regionalism was an open question in the run-up to the Jakarta APECmeetings, although its leading academic statement may be found in Ippei Yamazawa, On Pacific EconomicIntegration,02 ECON. J. 1519 (1992) (claiming that Pacific economic integration has resulted from marketforces and investment, rather than any formal obligations or structures; thus, it is argued that APEC wouldbest support the existing mechanisms of integration rather than rely on formal obligations like the Treaty ofRome or NAFTA). The current discussion of open regionalism is commonly conducted in terms of disputesconcerning the 1994 EPG REPORT, infra ote 12. See,e.g.,AUSTRALIA-JAPANESEARCHCENTRE, AUSTRALIAN,INDONESIANANDJAPANESE PPROACHESTOWARDSAPEC 5-7 (1994); text at and notes 23-25 infra.5See, .g.,Hadi Soesastro, Pacific conomic ooperation:Historicalxplanation,n NDONESIAN PERSPECTIVESON APEC AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN ASIA PACIFIC 3 (Hadi Soesastro ed., 1994); Hadi Soesastro, Prospectsfor acific-Asianegional rade tructures,nPACIFIC-ASIANCONOMIC POLICIESAND REGIONAL NTERDEPENDENCE308 (Robert A. Scalapino et al. eds., 1988); MICHAEL W. OSBORNE & NICOLAS FOURT, PACIFIC BASIN ECONOMICCOOPERATION7-14 (OECD, 1983).6 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, AN AsIAN PACIFIC REGIONAL ECONOMICORGANIZATION: AN EXPLORATORY CONCEPT PAPER (1979) (prepared for the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-tions), also available as PETER DRYSDALE & HUGH PATRICK, EVALUATION OF A PROPOSED ASIAN-PACIFIC REGIONALECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (Australia-Japan Econ. Relations Research Project Paper No. 61, 1979); and sourcescited in note 3 supra. Of course, general U.S. interest reaches back to the beginning of the Cold War period,but it seems reasonable to draw the line for economic cooperation following the Vietnam War.7On a political level, the Japanese interest might date from 1960, when Diet member Morinosuke Kajimasuggested the creation- of a Marshall Plan-style Asia Development Fund (providing grants necessary for develop-ment). He seems to have been inspired by a combination of pan-Asian ideas and his conception of Japan'srole in the region. See MORINOSUKE KAJIMA, THE ROAD TO PAN-ASIA 1973); Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Japan andthe acific asinCommunity,981WORLD TODAY454. Early on, the pan-Pacific economic integrationistsentimentprevailed over the pan-Asian sentiment in Japan, but such basic issues are still recognizable today in ideas likethe proposal for an East Asian Economic Group, initially advanced by Prime Minister Matahir of Malaysia asan APEC alternative. Seenote 23 infra.



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826 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 89nese-Australianffortsin advancing quasi-privateroupknown s thePacific conomicCooperation Council, or PECC, which continues to play a role8). APEC itselfwaslaunched at a November 1989 ministerialmeeting n Canberra,Australia, argely s aforumgrouping the ASEAN ountrieswithPacific Rim industrialized ations (Japan,Australia, anada and the United States).9Looking forward,he question s: whatpathfor thefuture f APEC will emerge from he Osaka meetingof its political eaders inNovember1995?Will t evolve oward n OECD-style iscussion nd study orum, r willit serveas a more activevehicle for accelerating xpansionof the multilateral radingsystem nder the so-callednewtradeagenda?

APEC's DEVELOPMENT THROUGH ITS JAKARTAMEETINGSeveral seemingly nrelated characteristicsromotedAPEC's rapid rise. First,APECis technically forum or conomic cooperationbuthas shadow inks o broader Pacific

Basinsecurityssues whichpushesAPEC's development ollaterallys a post-Cold Warinstitution). econd, its birthduring the Uruguay Round bears witness o the initialcharacter f APEC as a freetradepressuregroupand incipient egionalalternativeincase traditional ATTmultilateral egotiations ailed).Third,by1991 APEC's member-ship included the threeChinese economies. Outside GATT's institutionaltrictures,APEC incorporated he developingworld's successstories newlyndustrializedcono-mies, r NIEs, and otherdynamic igh-growthsianeconomies, nWorldBankparlance)alongside tsperceivedfuture conomicgiant. Finally,APEC was promotedfrom co-nomicbureaucracy o high-level olitics through he device of the informal oliticalleadership meeting (commencingwith the 1993 Blake Island meetingconvened onPresidentClinton's nvitation,stablished s a pattern ortheforeseeablefuture ythe1994 Jakarta nd 1995 Osaka meetings).Currendly,PEC exists s a processof regular ntergovernmental eetings t fourlevels.The lowest unctional evel nvolves n ad hocworking roupstructureomposedoftwo ubstantiveommitteesTrade and Investment,nd Economic) plus tensubjectgroups,throughwhichoutsideworkmaybe commissioned r accepted,or individualcountriesmaybe asked towrite esearchorpolicypapersor runprojects uch as tradefairs.'0One step up, meetings f senior officialsSOMs) are held threeto fivetimes

xPriorto APEC's creation s an intergovernmentalorum, ECC's tripartitetructure f government,usi-ness and academicparticipants as oose enough to permit hestudynd discussion f ssuesunder thecoverof nongovernmentaltatusgovernmentfficials articipatedn their private apacity ).Forsmaller ountriessuch as members f the Association f SoutheastAsian Nations ASEAN), cademic participants re frequentlydrawnfrom hink ankswith lose connections o, fnotformal ponsorship f, theirnational governments.Given that mallcountriesmaynot have a substantial eparateforeign rade policy pparatuswithin overn-ment, he selfsame cademic participantsmaybe government olicy dvisers whichcasts PECC in a speciallightwhen consideringt as a sourceof private-sectornput). See also text t and notes 25, 27 infra.'The mechanism o this end was the so-called 1990 Kuching Consensusunder which,followingAPEC'sfoundingmeeting n Canberra, he ASEAN ountries etout theirbasis forparticipationn APEC: preservingthe dentityndcohesion ofASEAN ithout ilutingts ooperative elationswith tsdialogue partnersnd thirdcountries; asingAPEC on principles f equality, quity nd mutualbenefit,aking nto account differencesnstages f economicdevelopment nd sociopolitical ystems;voiding ormationf an inward-lookingconomicor tradingbloc, and seeking nstead to strengthenhe multilateral rading ystem; mployingAPEC as aconsultative orum on economic issues, rather than adoptingmandatory irectives orany participant oundertake r implement; acilitating utual cooperationto promoteAPEC members' common interestsnlargermultilateraloruihs; nd proceedinggradually nd pragmatically ithAPEC rather han seekingrapidinstitutionalization.'The committees rew ut ofworking roups, nd their road subject reasreflect he problemthatAPEChas grown ike Topsy without etting riorities. he 10 currentworking roupsconsistof Trade Promotion,Trade and Investment ata Review, nvestment nd Industrial cience and Technology,Human ResourcesDevelopment,Regional EnergyCooperation,Telecommunications,isheries,Marine Resource Conservation,TransportationndTourism.Outsidethe functional roups, he Budget nd Administrativeommittee njoysoversightver heAPEC Secretariat's udget nddisbursements,hich s mportants thefundingmechanism



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1995] CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 827annuallyto review nd directall working roups from he differentubstantivereas.Ministerialmeetings orforeign-affairsnd economicsofficialsinvolving he U.S. Secre-taries fState and Commerceas well as the Trade Representative)re held annually odirect nd evaluate the SOMs' workproduct; t the same time, pattern s developingof separatead hoc exploratorymeetings f ministers orsubstantive reas such as theenvironment nd finance seemingly special variety f policy-level orking roups).Finally,ince 1993 meetings fAPEC's political eadershaveaimed at providing irectionand further oals in capping theannual process. However,APEC's formal ntergovern-mental tructure reserves spectsof theolder mixedpublic-privateharacter f Pacificeconomic cooperationfora to the extentthat t formally ntegrates n existingone(PECC) down to the levelof a SOM observer.Mostrecently, PEC has commissionednongovernmentalommentary rom heso-calledEminentPersonsGroup (EPG) 12 andthe PacificBusinessForum PBF).13 BeyondPECC, PBF and theEPG, private-sectorndbusinesscommentaryind theirway nto the APEC process nformallyt theworkinggrouplevel.Given tsorganization,heAPEC process nvites yearlong ialogue nworking roupmeetings teeredfrom he SOM level (concentratingn issuesraisedbytheprioryear'sministerial nd political eaders' meetings). Policystatements ike theAPEC politicalleaders' finalcommuniquefortheir ndonesian meetingof November14-15, 1994(knownas the Bogor Declaration'4) and the related Sixth MinisterialMeetingJointStatement JakartaMinisters' tatement)'5 traddlethe priorand coming year's pro-cess.'6 The appropriate tarting ointforevaluation fAPEC's recentprogress s to go

forworking roup projects.APEC SECRETARIAT,SIA-PACIFICCONOMIC OOPERATION-7 (1994). In termsof organizing he workflow, ndividual ountries ypically orkup a variety f reports or uccessive onsider-ation by working roups and meetings f senior officials.Working roup projects lso include activityuchas organizing eminars, or xample on customs tandardization. he meetings f senior officials re also theinitial evel of consideration or commissioned utside policyreports uch as those of the Eminent PersonsGroup and the PacificBusinessForum, as well as the high-level uidance of political eaders' vision state-ments.The acknowledgedproblem withAPEC's organizational tructure ies in choosing priorities nder theopen-endedrubric of Pacific economic cooperation.It has been addressed thus far argelyby delegatingcontrol fmeeting gendas to thehost country or tsyear'sround oftalks, s well as,morerecently, raftingresponsibilityorthepolitical eaders' vision tatement to the United States n 1993, ndonesia in 1994 andJapan in 1995). However, this results n continuing mbiguity nder differing conomic perspectives ndinvites he injectionof the host country's iews nto the APEC process tself. his peculiar aspect representsa conscious choice and strengthn manyways.Nonetheless, t complicatesmatters o the extent he organiza-tional tiller wings round fromyear to year.More generally, roposals have been made to consolidateburgeoningworking roupsto impose order on theprocess, e.g.,APEC: A NewVision,Korea-CanadaJointPaper on the Future Structure f APEC, Agenda Item 9, FifthMinisterialMeeting (Nov. 1993), but nosignificantction has been taken.

12The EPG has thusfarproduced tworeports,A VISION FOR APEC: TOwARDSN ASIAPACIFICCONOMICCOMMUNITY (1993) [hereinafter 993EPG REPORT], andACHIEVING THE APEC VISION: FREE AND OPEN TRADEIN THE ASIA ACIFIC (1994) [hereinafter994 EPG REPORT]. The EPG's membership verlaps omewhatwithboththe academicand the business lements fPECC, seenote8 supra, hedifference rom heU.S. standpointbeing thatPECC appears to be continuingn its traditional tatus s a more consensualgroupfocused oneconomic ntegration, hileEPG has takenhigher-profileositionsnthe reaof,tradeiberalizationespeciallythroughts 1994 EPG Report).13 Thus far, he PBF has produced one report,A BUSINESS BLUEPRINT FOR APEC: STRATEGIES FOR GRowrHAND COMMON PROSPERITY (APEC 1994).14For the text, ee APEC 'Economic eaders' eclaration fCommon esolve ssuedBogor,ndonesia;November15, 1994, available nBNA, Daily Rep. forExecutives 19 (Nov. 16, 1994), 34 ILM 758 (1995).'5APEC MinisterialMeeting, oint tatement Nov. 11 12, 1994).'6APEC member economies represented nJakarta ncluded Australia,Brunei Darussalam, Canada, thePeople's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia,Japan, the Republic ofKorea, Malaysia,Mexico, NewZealand, Papua NewGuinea, the Philippines, ingapore,Taiwan(Chinese Taipei inAPEC parlance),Thailandand the United States. Chile was also represented, s it formallyoined APEC as partof the proceedings.Official bservernstitutions,ncluding he ASEAN ecretariat, ECC and the South PacificForum or SPF (as



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1995] CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 829on bringing he UruguayRound to a close. However, tstressed conomic interdepen-dence withinAPEC, with the correspondinggoal of reducing trade and investmentbarriers o permitfree movementof goods, services, apital and investment low.Beyond tressing PEC's market rientation, he eaders called for meeting f FinanceMinisters o be convened on issuesof macroeconomicpolicy nd development s wellas capital flows overlapping xport-led evelopment oncepts traditionallyinked toforeigndirect nvestment ithmarket-orientedevelopmentfunded throughprivatecapital n both portfolio nd direct nvestmentorm).2' Bywayof concreteprojects, heLeaders' Declaration dvanced the dea ofAPEC educationalcooperation,developmentof small and medium-sized nterprises SME) and formation f the PBF to enhanceprivate-sectornvolvementn theAPEC process.The Seattle Ministers' equestfor further articulars n trade liberalizationwouldseemtocast the 1994 EPG Report, irculated n late summer f 1994, n a special light.However, he 1994report's ontent,whilemoredetailed,differedignificantlyrom hatof itspredecessor n only two major respects.22irst, t adopted the much-publicized2020 deadline forfulltrade iberalization, hileallowing or multispeed iberalizationprocess (fasterfor ndustrialized ountriesthan forothers, pparendy distinguishingbothNIEs and developing ountries).Second, under its U.S. chairman's eadership, tadvanced an idea of trade iberalization hatwould permit ndividualAPEC membersto determinewhether o extend the benefits f APEC-motivatedrade iberalization onon-APEC member countries preserving oom forthe traditionalGATT patternofnegotiatedmutual concessions,which encountered harp oppositionfromproponentsofunilateral iberalization).Notwithstandingts imited urthermeasures, he 1994 EPG Reporttriggered ebateat boththeintergovernmentalASEAN) nd theprivate PECC) levels.Unusually, riorto theJakarta PEC meetings ubstantialigns fAPEC-related iscordbecameapparentwithinASEAN.A polite level of dissonance was alreadyvisible n connectionwiththetreatment fMalaysia'sproposal foran East Asian EconomicGroup (EAEG), coupledwith he EPG's embrace of a 2020 liberalization eadline.23n therun-up o the ASEANof developed-country ultinational nterprises oing business nAsia). Developingcountries' mbivalence sclearest n theparallelism etweenthesmall and medium-sized nterprise SME) initiative nd the dea thateach nation would be represented n the new PBF by one big and one small businessman despiteadmitting hrough he SME initiative hattheywere not deeply engaged in international rade).21The initialHonolulu APEC FinanceMinisters'meeting fMarch 1994 was recentlyucceeded by meetingon April 16, 1995, in Bali; alongside nvestment lows, he topic of currency xchangerates n the form fquestions bout recentyen ppreciation redominated. ee, .g.,KT. Arasu,APECMinisterseginTalks hadowedbyYen Turmoil, euters,Apr. 16, 1995,available nLEXIS, News Library, urnws ile.

22 The 1994 EPG REPORT, supranote 12, proposed thatAPEC adopt a comprehensive rogram t Jakartain the form f a long-term oal of freeand open trade and investmentn theregion,with mplementationof trade iberalization o begin by 2000 and be completed by 2020. Vigorouspursuit f trade facilitationndtechnical cooperation programswas advised.However, he report appeared to move backwards n certainareas, suchas by 1) proposing focuson antidumpingnd restrictiveractices,while delaying xaminationof broadercompetition olicy uestions oan indefinite uture;nd (2) specifyinghat gradual convergenceof environmental tandards s partof broader product harmonizationwas desirable,while suggesting hatAPEC press forbroad international cceptanceof the polluter pays principle (thoughcounseling againstits doption within PEC as potentially isadvantageousn international radeon costgrounds, bsentgeneralagreementbyothercountries).23 The East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) proposal, aterrepackaged s the EastAsian Economic Caucus(EAEC) withinAPEC, stemmed rom Malaysian roposal of the early1990s for group consisting f Asiancountries notably xcludingAPEC members uch as Australia,New Zealand and the United States). Theoriginal Malaysian non-paper forthe proposal included as its rationales cooperation in advancingtheUruguayRoundnegotiations,he need for cohesivevoice n tradematters,he usefulness fa counterweightto growing radegroupings utsideAsia,the need tomeetpolitical-economichallenges n Europe and theAmericas hreatening o divert nvestmentrom heASEAN region, nd the desire toease pressures y OECDcountries n ASEAN to move towards rematuremembershipn that rganisation, . . affinityithJapan ithin



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1995] CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 831that he APIC could undergo future efinementnd acknowledgmentfthe ncreasingimportance fcapital flowswithin he region.28nvestmentssues raised theirhead inanotherguise n connectionwith oncerns urrounding hort-termapital flows focus-ing on thedifference etweenportfolio nd direct nvestment;hese xist s a byproductoftheoverlapbetween inancial eregulationnddirect oreign nvestment,hichdriveslater-stagexport-led evelopment trategies). ommitments ere repeated n favor fcooperation on SME undertakings nd infrastructureevelopment the latter ommit-mentsnowphrased also in bilateralprojectterms, ntroducing inancing oncerns di-rectly). inally, possible direction orAPEC's 1995 Osaka meetingwasforeshadowedin reviewing rogresson- a long-running apanese policy paper examining inkagesamong energy sage,theenvironmentnd economicgrowth 3Es).The JakartaMinisters' tatement f November12, 1994, related that the meeting'spurposewas to support conomiccooperationon human resourcedevelopment, MEand infrastructuremprovements,s well as private- nd business-sectornvolvementmore generallyn theAPEC process (controversialrade iberalizationwas thus eft othe eaders'meeting).Beyond endorsingAPIC as adopted bytheSOM, it affirmedullimplementation f GATT byJanuary , 1995 (recalling hatU.S. congressional pprovalhad been delayed) and expressed trong upportfor theentry f non-GATTmembers(China) on the basis of substantive nd commerciallymeaningful ommitments. 29The Ministerspprovedfor the run-up o Osaka a 1995 workplan involving roblemstudy nd potentialdevelopment fproposalsat theSOM and working rouplevel,toinclude 3Es work, inksbetweenprivatizationnd trade iberalization, egionaltrends,foreign irect nvestment,nd industrialnd technical inkages,with tudy f theeffectsof exchangeratemovements n tradeand investment.he 1994 EPG Reportwas ac-cepted,but the PBF Report'sconcreteproposals seemed to find morereceptive udi-ence (affirmingong-standingroposals o create n ongoingbusiness ndprivate-sectoradvisory roupforAPEC).References o theBogorDeclaration are usually o its2020 deadline forfreeflows fgoods, services nd capital among APEC member economies (it is admittedlynlyadeclaration fpoliticalwill, ather han legalundertaking). owever, nder ndonesianpenmanship, heBogor Declarationwas a developmentdocumentas muchas one ontrade iberalizationcallingfor echnical ooperationon humanresourcedevelopment,technology ransfer,MEs and infrastructures well as environmentalssues, n thename ofdevelopment).Togetherwith conomic cooperation, t invokes he.pillars ofsustainable rowth, quitable development nd national tability,istinguishingmongdeveloping,NIE and developedeconomies.However,tsmultitrackiberalizationchemeprovides nlytwodates:a 2010 deadline for the full iberalization f developedecono-mies and a 2020 deadlineforthe full iberalization fdeveloping conomies.What s thesignificancef theBogorDeclaration'sthree ountry ategories s againsttwo liberalizationdeadlines? In essence, it fudged the NIEs' economic status (i.e.,whether hey hould stand alone as developed countries, r whether hey till houldreceive avored eveloping-countryreatment nder nternationalegimes).30Thistactic

28See OfficialaysU.S.Backed own n APEC InvestmentodeDispute, 1 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1803 (Nov.23, 1994).29Jakarta inisters' tatement,upranote 15, para. 18.30SeePressConference fthePresident, akartaHilton (Nov. 15, 1994). As regards eports hatChina andSouth Koreawerenotobligedto meetfreetradeobjectives ntil2020,PresidentClinton tated:

First f all,whetherChina and South Korea have to meet thisobjectiveby 2020 or 2010 depends upontheir wn rateofgrowth. hat is,therewasno definitionoday f ndustrialized ountries hat xcludedthem n2010. Indeed, I thinkmostofthepeople who were n thatroomtoday hought hat, iven outh



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832 THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW [Vol. 89permittedAPEC to reach apparent consensus in the face of a much broader issueinherent n GATT's specialprovision ordeveloping ountries:when thesuccessful astAsian economies graduate to undifferentiatedeveloped status.3'

The Bogor Declarationyieldeda furtherinkto GATT in desiring o strengthen heopen, multilateral radingystem oth byenhancing rade nd investmentiberalizationin the Asia-Pacific egionand by acceleratingmplementation f the UruguayRoundcommitmentslongsidea continuing ommitmento unilateral iberalization.tdid nottake formal osition n whether PEGinduced trade iberalization houldbe availablegenerally o non-APECmembers. nstead, n thenameofsupport ormultilateralrade,it (1) rejectedthe dea of an inward-lookingegionaltradebloc producing radediver-sionon a global basis an economic rather han legal concept32); 2) undertook pecialtreatmentornon-APECdevelopingcountries o that they ould benefit romAPEC'strade and investmentiberalization the avoidance of an express standon non-APECdevelopedcountrieswas significanto theextent etention f thetraditional eciprocalconcession pproach toGATT multilateraliberalization as understood s aimedchieflyatEurope); and (3) stressedGATTconsistencyavoiding nderlyingegal ssues oncern-ingmost-favored-nationreatmentnd traditionallyoose interpretationsfGATTArticleXXIV). Nonetheless, tug-of-waremained visiblewiththeU.S. position,whichsincetheJakartameetingshas found supportor tolerance n several ndustrializedAPECmembers,33hilecontinuing o encounter pparentoppositionfromAPEC EastAsianmember conomies.The Bogor Declarationcontained twomore itemsof overriding ignificance. irst,nsupport ftrade iberalization,t emphasizedtradefacilitationn a fashion hatrecalledthePBF Report.Trade facilitation roblems,however,may imply e nontariffarriersunder anothername,since their ocus ies nsuch mundane matterss customs ractice,product standards,nvestment rinciples nd administrativearriers o market ccess.APEC political eaderscalledupon ministers nd seniorofficials o submit radefacilita-tionproposals s a way oexpandcommercial ntercourse eyondthepromiseoffuturetrade iberalization. econd, in thename ofaccelerating he APEC process, heBogorDeclaration providedthat APEC economiesthat re readyto initiate nd implementa cooperative rrangementmayproceed to do so whilethosethat re notyetreadytoparticipatemay oin at a laterdate. 34This ambiguousprovisowas understood o apply

Korea's growth, heymightwellmeet that and, in fact,mightbe expectedto meet it before2010,andthat theChinese could meet t, dependingon whether hey're ble to sustain certain evelof growth.South Korea's decision to pursueOECD membership,ee, .g.,AlastairMacdonald,SouthKoreaAppliesoRichNations lubOECD, ReuterEur. Bus. Rep., Mar. 29, 1995,available n LEXIS,News Library, urnws ile,raisesthe ssue evenmore pointedly. ee lso Results f heAPEC Meetingn ndonesia, ed. News Serv.,Nov. 22, 1994,availablen LEXIS,News Library, urnws ile (discussingChina's accessionto GATI).3' Fromthe ASEAN erspective ithinAPEC, thisdeterminationinked o liberalization equirementsrgua-bly ppears to be a driving orce n terms ftheEAEG/EAEC.eenote 23 supra.32The GATTArticleXXIVstandards rather hatmembers n a preferentialrade rrangementre requiredonly to maintain n average evel of goods tariffsis-A-visonmembers hat s no higherthan t was beforethe arrangement. ATS ArticleV's analogous,but arguablymoregenerous, conomicintegration rovisionsfor erviceshave not attracted ttentionn APEC-related ebates,see, .g., ext t and note 25 supra, espitethe fact thatforsome-APECmembers iberalization f servicesmaybe as significants, or more so than,goods.The issue n practice s the extent o whichtradediversions emerging s an effect fregionalism. eeJEFFREYA.RANKEL,HANG-JINEI & ERNESTOTEIN, PEC ANDOTHERREGIONALCONOMIC RRANGEMENTSIN THE PACIFICCenter for PacificBasin Monetary& Econ. Studies,Fed. ReserveBank of San Francisco,Working aperNo. 94-04,1994).13 See, .g., pectrade enefitsoall not ractical:maclaren,inhua NewsAgency tem0314200,Mar. 14, 1995,available nLEXIS,News Library, urnws ile (Canada and Australia).34BogorDeclaration, upranote 14, para. 9.



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apec quo vadis

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