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The Value of Shake Shack

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Report detailing the valuation of Shake Shack shortly after they IPO

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  • The Value of Shake Shack

  • The Value of Shake Shack

    Shake Shack (Ticker: SHAK) is a fine-casual restaurant chain originally based in New York City. It

    started as a food cart inside Madison Square Park in 2004 by Danny Meyer. Since its beginnings in

    Madison Square Park it has grown to be recognized as an international brand with 63 locations across

    the globe with ambitious plans for future growth.

    At the end of 2014 SHAK filed an S-1 with the SEC to initiate its public offering. At the beginning

    of 2015 they raised $105 million at $21/share. Currently SHAK shares are trading at over $60/share.

    This IPO will be used to help the company achieve its long term goal of expanding locations to more

    than 450 restaurants globally, current short term expansion plans is to open 10 new locations next year

    and management has estimated that they will continue to grow at roughly this rate into the foreseeable

    future. They plan and achieving this goal through slower more calculated expansion to ensure location

    profitability and survivability.

    Product Offering

    Shake Shack started its menu from New York-style hamburgers and later expanded to

    hamburgers, hotdogs, fries and its namesake milkshakes. It later introduced local wine and bottled beer

    to its menu in 2004. Its common menu offerings are most comparable with Smash Burger, In-N-Out and

    Five Guys while its fine-casual feel is more reminiscent of Chipotle Mexican Grill and Panera Bread.

  • Much of the early growth and success of the business has been attributed to its fine-casual

    concept with a burger, shake and fries focused product offering along with tailor made offerings specific

    to regional preferences including wine and beer offerings. This regional variability is vital as the

    company operates and plans to expand in very culturally diverse markets. Currently they have locations

    in North America, Middle East, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

    The fine-casual concept is a hybrid of fine dining and fast-casual format focusing on high-quality

    all-natural, hormone and antibiotic-free ingredients which is similar to Chipotle Mexican Grill (Ticker:

    CMG) and Panera Bread (Ticker: PNRA). They then combined this with elements of the fast food format.

    All combined, customers receive high-quality food quickly at a price point between fast food and casual

    dining restaurants.

    Fast-Casual Industry Analysis:

    The restaurant industry of America is experiencing a tectonic shift, as quick service and full

    service restaurants, which had dominated the industry, are being squeezed out of the market by an

    emerging new restaurant subsector, fast casual dining. Fast casual restaurants, which combines full-

    service restaurants focus on healthy quality food and quick service restaurants focus on price and

    convenience, is being increasingly embraced by consumers. This is reflected by the fact that Americans

    are now spending more on dining out than home cooking, Americans are also eating less at traditional

    quick-service and full-service restaurants, as an Americans shift toward fast casual dining. Driving by the

  • shift in consumer preference, the fast casual dining subsector is projected to grow at twice the speed of

    the overall restaurant industry.

    Consumers shunning traditional fast food:

    Behind the rise of the fast casual dining is a shift in American consumer food preference toward

    real and natural food over processed food. In a survey conducted in 2014, 39% of Americans

    reported eating less processed food vs 10% who reported eating more compared to a few years ago.

    Instead, Americans are choosing healthier food options. In the same survey, 49% of Americans reported

    eating more fruits and vegetables, 26% reported eating leaner proteins, and 23% reported eating more

  • natural protein sources1.

    Americans are choosing more active lifestyle:

    A strong contributing factor to the shift toward healthier food options is that an increasing

    number of Americans are choosing to pursue a more active life style. In 2014, 38% of Americans

    reported exercising more vs 35% in 2004. This is contributing to the rise of fast casual restaurants as

    researches have indicated a clear correlation between exercising more and choosing to eat more natural

    food, as 52% of Americans reported that they incorporate natural food as part of their plans to

    lose/control their weight.

    Consumers are spending more on food and dining:

    1 Packaged Facts, What America Eats

  • The other contributing factor to fast casual restaurants rise is the median household income

    has stagnated at around $51,000 since the financial crisis2, and while the unemployment rate has

    continued to drop from a declining labor force participation rate, the total number of wage earning

    Americans remain virtually the same since the beginning of the recovery. Facing less optimal household

    financial conditions, the average American household is slashing spending on entertainment and

    luxuries, and instead choosing to splurge on food instead3, and fast casual restaurants with healthy but

    affordable dining options have become the ideal choice.

    Teens/Young adults a source for continuing growth:

    In a survey of more than 1,100 young adults4, more than 45% of interviewees reported dining

    out more in 2014 than last year and that fast casual styled restaurants is rising in popularity amongst the

    surveyed age group. While quick service remained as the most frequently visited restaurants, overall

    2 FRED Economic Data 3 Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey 4 Source: William Blair Teen/Young Adult Survey

    US Civilian Labor Force (000) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014Labor Force 153,650 153,961 155,553 155,047 156,129

    Partcipation Rate 64.3% 64.0% 63.7% 62.8% 62.9%

    Working Population 98,797 98,535 99,087 97,370 98,205

    Unemployed/Nonparticipating 54,853 55,426 56,466 57,677 57,924

    US Household Expenditure Analysis

    2013 Avg 2014 Avg YoY Ch

    Income 65,029 64,432 -0.9%

    Food 6,598 6,665 1.0%

    Housing 17,041 17,377 2.0%

    Apparel 1,706 1,674 -1.9%

    Transportation 8,999 9,104 1.2%

    Healthcare 3,520 3,919 11.3%

    Entertainment 2,586 2,560 -1.0%

  • frequency has declined from the previous year. In contrast, frequency to fast casual restaurants

    increased significantly, launching casual restaurants to the 2nd most frequently visited restaurants

    subsector for young adults. This has become a dependable source of growth for fast casual restaurants

    as casual dining becomes a part of the young American lifestyle.

    Shake Shack Company Outlook

    Revenue Growth

    Shake Shacks unique business concept has translated in impressive revenue growth. Such high

    growth is not a surprise as Shake Shack is comparatively still a small restaurant chain with a large

    amount of room for future growth.

    In 2010, Shake Shack had $19.5 million in revenues that grew to $119 million over the past five

    years ending in 2014. Thats a compound annual growth rate, or CAGR, of 41.8%. This is in line with 2014

    and 2013 revenue growth of 42.6% and 41.4% respectively year over year. This solid double digit growth

    is expected to continue at 28% over the next five years. The main sources of past and future revenue

    growth is and will continue to be the addition of domestic company-operated stores, domestic licensed

    stores, and international licensed stores.

    Domestic and international licensed locations was $6.5 million at the end of 2014 up from $1.5

    million at the end of 2012 and represented 5.4% and 2.5% of revenues respectively. This is from 32

    licensed locations compared to 31 company-owned and operated locations. By utilizing a blend of

    franchised and company-owned locations Shake Shack is well positioned to grow without a huge

    amount of capital investments.

  • The most important factor for future revenue growth in company-owned locations is same-store

    sales. Since 2013 same-store growth has declined from $4.6 million annually to $4.3 million and is

    expected to compress even further to $3.7 million in 2015 given the companys forecasted expansions

    and revenue expectations. This is concerning when compared to Chipotle and Panera that are both

    experiencing same-store sales growth.

    Revenue growth in future will continue to come from adding locations and not from same-store

    sales. Given that Shake Shack currently only has 63 locations there is tremendous amount of growth

    opportunity when compared to more established competitors with thousands of locations. It is also

    4,643 4,336

    3,708 3,416

    0

    500

    1,000

    1,500

    2,000

    2,500

    3,000

    3,500

    4,000

    4,500

    5,000

    2013 2014 2015e 2016e

    Average Unit Volume

    0

    20

    40

    60

    80

    100

    2012 2013 2014 2015e

    Store Growth

    Company-operated stores Domestic Licensed stores

    International Licensed stores

  • important that Shake Shack to grow at a sustainable pace and not to over extend themselves in the

    name of growth.

    Costs

    Shake Shacks three main costs are Food, Labor and Occupancy. When looked at from the

    perspective of company operated sales we can make a relevant comparison with Shake Shacks closest

    peers.

    The above graph shows the three major costs for Shake Shack for 2014 compared to Chipotle

    Mexican Grill (CMG) and Panera Bread (PNRA) as a percentage of sales.

    Food Shake Shack is 31.2% which is above Panera at 26.5% and below Chipotle at 34.6% which is

    unsurprisingly is right between its two closest peers.

    Labor Shake Shack is again in between both peers but closer to the top at 26.2% verse Panera at 26.5%

    and Chipotle at 34.6%.

    Occupancy Shake Shack has the highest occupancy cost by a large margin at 8.7% with Panera well

    below it at 6.3% and Chipotle even lower at 5.6%.

    0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0% 40.0%

    Food and paper costs

    Labor Costs

    Occupancy Costs

    Major Cost Comparison 2014

    CMG PNRA SHAK

  • As a whole Shake Shacks costs are right where we would expect them to be with the exception

    of occupancy costs. The occupancy costs are close enough that we dont expect them to be a significant

    concern due to the year over year trend.

    Year over year we can see that Shake Shacks costs have remained relatively flat with food costs

    growing moderately and occupancy costs declining moderately which is a good sign considering

    occupancy costs are much larger as a percentage of sales compared to peers and is reassuring that it is

    coming down to be more in line with peers.

    The rise in food costs is slightly concerning especially if this trend continues as it is difficult for

    management to control these costs. It can increase the menu prices, but that would only further lower

    its declining same-store sales.

    Multiples Valuation

    In order to ascertain a fair market value for Shake Shack, given the current market conditions

    and Shake Shacks respective place in the market, we used a group of comparable firms. We included

    fourteen firms, among them larger firms like Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG), McDonalds (MCD), and

    YUM! Brands (YUM), as well as smaller players in the industry like Chuys Holdings (CHUY), and Papa

    Murphys Holdings (FRSH). Concentrating on making a list of comparable firms that wholly represented

    0.0%

    5.0%

    10.0%

    15.0%

    20.0%

    25.0%

    30.0%

    35.0%

    Food and paper costs Labor and related expenses Occupancy and relatedexpenses

    SHAK Costs YoY

    2012 2013 2014

  • the fast-casual food services industry, we chose firms that we saw as being both qualitatively similar to

    Shake Shack, in their menus and customer bases, as well as technically and quantitatively similar from

    the standpoint of margins, capital structure considerations, and life cycle timelines.

    On the first item of this list, we saw each of these firms as being similar in their margin profiles,

    maintaining on average gross margins between low-20s and mid-30s, while seeing EBITDA margins

    between the mid-teens and mid-20s. On the capital structure considerations, while we put less

    emphasis on this measure, we see that Shake Shacks 3.6x total debt to EBITDA was in line with the

    comparative company list average of around 2.5x. Finally, likely the most important consideration we

    had outside of qualitative, business model considerations was that for the comparable firms position in

    their respective life cycles. A fairly new firm, Shake Shack was only founded in 2004 and has seen total

    revenues grow from $57 million in 2012 to over $118 million in fiscal year 2014 a growth of over 100%

    in two years. With that in mind, we looked that both the comparable firms last twelve months total

    revenue growth figures as well as the 3 year revenue compound annual growth rate (CAGR) numbers.

    Though ranging, the comparable firms mostly saw mid teen, double digit growth in revenue last year

    while seeing 3 year CAGRs in the low teens up to firms like Papa Murphys, Zoes, Chuys and Chipotle in

    the mid-20s and higher obviously showing these firms are far from steady state growth periods.

    With this in mind, we first compiled key statistics for each firm dealing with market

    capitalization, net debt, enterprise value and other key figures.

    Company Market Cap Net Debt TEV Sales EBITDA Net Income Total Equity

    Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG) 21,468 (758) 20,710 4,108 828 445 2,012

    Buffalo Wild Wings (BWLD) 3,380 (113) 3,267 1,516 238 94 574

    McDonald's (MCD) 90,990 12,917 103,907 27,441 9,612 4,758 12,853

    Panera Bread Co. (PNRA) 4,927 (96) 4,831 2,529 401 179 736

    Jack in the Box (JACK) 3,490 497 3,987 1,503 274 93 258

    Yum! Brands (YUM) 35,040 2,766 37,806 13,279 2,781 1,051 1,613

    Domino's Pizza (DPZ) 5,527 1,493 7,020 1,994 380 163 (1,219)

    Noodles & Company (NDLS) 579 26 604 404 45 11 140

    Zoe's Kitchen (ZOES) 652 (6) 646 172 6 (10) 121

    Chuy's Holdings (CHUY) 398 5 403 245 26 12 118

    Papa Murphy's Holdings (FRSH) 288 110 398 97 24 1 92

    The Habit Restaurants (HABT) 425 (47) 378 175 17 (0) 117

  • We found five different multiples for our comparable firms: price-to-sales, to-earnings, and to-

    book value, and enterprise value-to-sales and to-EBITDA, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation

    and amortization. Calculating these multiples and then applying them to Shake Shacks own figures from

    the previous twelve months, as reported on SHAKs 10-K, we found valuations of Shake Shack vastly

    lower than the current market price of $62. In fact, given comparable firms current levels of price to

    earnings, we found market prices for SHAK at closer to $9.50. When looking at both sales ratios though,

    price to sales as well as EV to sales, we found market a price for Shake Shack around $25 per share. The

    below chart illustrates this valuation technique, highlighting in red those stock prices representing

    valuations below 60% of the current market price.

    This multiples approach does leave us with one interesting discussion: should we use

    comparable firm multiples present in the market today or multiples closer to each firms post IPO

    multiples as in, the valuation multiples the market assigned these comparable firms two to three

    months after their own IPO, being the time period in which SHAK currently sits? However, while this

    Company Sales Earnings Book Value Sales EBITDA

    Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG) 5.2 x 48.2 x 10.7 x 5.0 x 25.0 x

    Buffalo Wild Wings (BWLD) 2.2 x 35.9 x 5.9 x 2.2 x 13.7 x

    McDonald's (MCD) 3.3 x 19.1 x 7.1 x 3.8 x 10.8 x

    Panera Bread Co. (PNRA) 1.9 x 27.5 x 6.7 x 1.9 x 12.0 x

    Jack in the Box (JACK) 2.3 x 37.7 x 13.5 x 2.7 x 14.6 x

    Yum! Brands (YUM) 2.6 x 33.3 x 21.7 x 2.8 x 13.6 x

    Domino's Pizza (DPZ) 2.8 x 34.0 x NM 3.5 x 18.5 x

    Noodles & Company (NDLS) 1.4 x 50.8 x 4.1 x 1.5 x 13.4 x

    Zoe's Kitchen (ZOES) 3.8 x NM 5.4 x 3.8 x 111.4 x

    Chuy's Holdings (CHUY) 1.6 x 34.6 x 3.4 x 1.6 x 15.4 x

    Papa Murphy's Holdings (FRSH) 3.0 x 240.4 x 3.1 x 4.1 x 17.0 x

    The Habit Restaurants (HABT) 2.4 x NM 3.6 x 2.2 x 21.7 x

    Max: 5.2 x 240.4 x 21.7 x 5.0 x 111.4 x

    Mean: 2.7 x 56.2 x 7.7 x 2.9 x 23.9 x

    Median: 2.5 x 35.3 x 5.9 x 2.8 x 15.0 x

    Min: 1.4 x 19.1 x 3.1 x 1.5 x 10.8 x

    51.35$ 41.86$ 22.70$ 47.08$ 81.61$

    26.78 9.78 8.10 26.26 15.59

    24.93 6.14 6.15 24.57 8.84

    14.09 3.33 3.29 12.25 5.70

    Price Enterprise Value

    Implied Valuation

    for Shake Shack:

  • approach may be more appropriate given SHAKs recent IPO, we knew that there would be plenty of

    arguments against it as well. For instance, many of these firms went through initial public offerings years

    ago, at times when interest rates may have been much higher than they are now or when the market

    itself was simply valuing firms at different valuation multiples. For these reasons, we saw it more fit to

    value Shake Shack with current market multiples from comparable firms, therefore hopefully arriving at

    a value for shares of Shake Shack more in line with todays market conditions. Had we used multiples

    from the time period of each firms respective IPO, we may have arrived at a bloated valuation given the

    undue and irrational exuberance that follows a new and growing firm offering shares to the market; on

    the other hand, we may have arrived at a lower valuation given the markets much higher interest rates

    and therefore each firms higher cost of capital at the respective IPO periods. Simply put, we want to

    find a valuation for Shake Shack that takes into account the markets outlook on the fast-casual food

    services industry right now as well as the overarching interest rate environment of today. For these

    reasons, we saw fit to use current market multiples to arrive at a fair and current market valuation for

    the firm.

    With this valuation tactic in mind we created a football field chart to visually represent that

    maximum and minimum values from each valuation multiple.

  • As shown, the TEV/ EBITDA multiple produced the most wide-ranging valuations, due in part to

    Zoes large 111x EBITDA valuation in this multiple juxtaposed with McDonalds lower multiple of only

    10.8x. However, given the characteristics of the business model and the focus on sales volume, perhaps

    at the expense of margins at times, we concluded that our two sales multiples were likely the most

    trustworthy in a valuation of this very recently offered stock. Therefore, using a sales multiple equal to

    2.7x, the average for our comparable firms, we arrive at a price per share for SHAK of $26 obviously far

    from the current price of $62 but still slightly north of the IPO price of $21. This $26 price also implies an

    enterprise value of just over 2.9x sales, in line with the average and median figures for the set of

    comparable firms.

    Key Take Away

    The current share price of $62 commanded by Shake Shack seems to be more a product of

    market hype than of actual valuation. This seems to be supported when looking at the current valuation

    through multiples analysis. SHAK is trading at roughly 900x current earnings. We believe this is an

    indicator that the company is currently overvalued.

    Shake Shacks same-store sales has declined year over year from 2012 to 2014 and the trend is

    expected to continue into the future. This is a concern as management continues to add additional

    locations it can be expected that they will earn less than existing stores.

    Management must be expecting future revenue growth to come from adding additional

    locations on both the company-owned and licensed segments. They have given guidance that 2015 will

    add ten company-operated locations domestically and 5 additional licensed stores international and

    that this pace will continue for the foreseeable future.

    Discounted Cash Flow Valuation and Pro-forma Projection

    The top line projections consist of 10 new stores per year and assumptions about same store

    growth. As previously stated, in the short run, there will be same-store declines. For 2015, the model

  • has a 10% decline in transaction volume and 5% decline in average ticket. These conservative

    assumptions still put us at the high end of management guidance for 2015 (159 mm to 163 mm) at 162.2

    mm. Food cost, labor costs, occupancy expense, and other operating expenses are classified as COGS.

    These respective categories account for a relatively constant percentage of COGS, which allows them to

    grow at the same rate as revenues. For the fast casual dining space, 30% gross margin is about average,

    so we model flat gross margins are project for the entire 10 year period.

    The figure above shows relatively flat margins operating margin and net income margin through

    the 10 year projection period, with a slight uptick at the end. In new stores, Shake Shack typically has a

    strong first year, and then faces a slump in the second year. In line with management guidance, we

    project 10 new stores per year for the entire 10 year period. Accordingly, we expect the same store

    second year slump to suppress margins, until they get to a more mature state late this decade. In

    general, management thinks they can grow to a total of 450 stores before they cannot absorb the 10

    new locations (2014 10K).

    For a flexible fund account, we opened a short term investment fund, which earns 1% annually.

    This fund peaks in 2015 with the additional cash from the IPO. Of the 112 mm proceeds, we allocated 36

    mm to pay down the revolver, 8.8 mm for a special dividend (In line with management guidance that

    they would issue a dividend for .273 for every dollar raised beyond 80 mm), with the residual going into

  • the newly created short term investment account. We modelled increasing Cap-ex requirements

    through the rest of the decade, driven by an annual 3% increase in store construction costs, and store

    refurbishments ramping up in 2020.

    As one can see from the Cash Flow Statement in the Appendix, the model does not explain the

    cash flows attributable to the IPO. This is an area for improvement, although this value does not have a

    large impact on the overall valuation. We modelled the cost of debt to be that of the newly issued

    revolver, which management states is 3.0% plus 3-month LIBOR rate. Overall we calculated WACC 4.4%

    Capital Structure

    D/V 0.04

    E/V 0.96

    D/E 0.04

    Beta 0.46

    Risk Free 1.92%

    EMRP 5.50%

    Ke 4.45%

    Kd 3.3%

    WACC 4.40%

    Given this capital structure, we discounted the projected cash flows by the WACC. We modelled 2%

    growth in perpetuity, for a target share price of $45.19. Below is a sensitivity table, which shows the

    firms value is very sensitive to the WACC. A 50 basis point jump in the WACC causes a larger effect than

    a 50 bps jump in growth. This effect is magnified as the growth in perpetuity gets higher.

    Sensitivity Table

    0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0%

    2.9% 51.51 65.43 89.31 139.72 316.15 -1271.71 -213.14 -116.90

    3.4% 40.55 49.30 62.67 85.58 133.96 303.27 -1220.50 -204.66

    3.9% 32.86 38.80 47.20 60.03 82.02 128.45 290.96 -1171.59

    4.4% 27.19 31.43 37.12 45.19 57.51 78.62 123.20 279.20

    4.9% 22.84 25.99 30.05 35.52 43.27 55.10 75.37 118.17

    5.4% 19.42 21.82 24.84 28.74 33.99 41.44 52.79 72.26

    5.9% 16.65 18.53 20.84 23.73 27.49 32.53 39.68 50.59

    6.4% 14.37 15.87 17.68 19.90 22.68 26.29 31.13 38.00

    6.9% 12.47 13.69 15.13 16.87 19.00 21.68 25.14 29.80

    7.4% 10.87 11.87 13.04 14.42 16.09 18.14 20.71 24.04

  • Residual Income Analysis

    Our residual income analysis used many of the same assumptions outlined in our DCF analysis.

    The main difference from the DCF is we used the required return on equity of 4.45% to establish the

    proper compensation for equity holders. This creates an initial residual income that is negative, but later

    becomes positive as the firms net income grows over time. Using this method we come up with a

    valuation of $36.85 per share for Shake Shack.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, we have utilized three different valuation techniques and have created a very

    wide range for share value with the lowest multiple valuation being $3.33 from a price to earnings

    multiple to a high of $45.19 from our DCF analysis. Taking into consideration the growth in the fast and

    fine casual dining segment and the relative small size and tremendous future growth opportunity of

    Shake Shack we feel most confident in our DCF analysis valuation of $45.19 per share. Currently SHAK is

    trading at $62 per share and we therefore believe the stock is overvalued from market excitement over

    their recent IPO.

    2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E

    Net Income 5,587 6,294 7,341 9,025 11,234 13,329 15,447 17,691 20,475 26,572

    Equity 139,004 145,298 152,639 161,664 172,898 186,227 201,675 219,366 239,841 266,414

    Required Return 6,182 6,462 6,788 7,190 7,689 8,282 8,969 9,756 10,666 11,848

    Residual Income (595) (168) 553 1,836 3,545 5,047 6,479 7,936 9,809 14,724

    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

    Present Value (569.9) (153.9) 485.5 1,542.6 2,851.6 3,887.5 4,777.5 5,602.9 6,630.4 9,529.5

    LT Growth 2%

    Re 4.45%

    PV of Forecast RI 34,584

    PV of Terminal RI 397,192

    BV of Equity 12,600

    Equity Value 444,376

    WASO 12,060

    Value per Share 36.85$