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The Final Campaign:Marines in the Victory on Okinawaby Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret)

aybreak on 29 May1945 found the 1st Ma-rine Division begin-ning its fifth con-secutive week of

frontal assault as part of the U.S.Tenth Army's grinding offensiveagainst the Japanese defenses cen-tered on Shun Castle in southernOkinawa. Operation Iceberg, thecampaign to seize Okinawa, was nowtwo months old — and badly boggeddown. The exhilarating, fast-pacedopening of the campaign had beenreplaced by week after week of cost-ly, exhausting, attrition warfareagainst the Shun complex.

The 1st Marine Division, hemmedin between two other divisions withprecious little maneuver room, hadadvanced barely a thousand yards inthe past 18 days—an average of 55yards each bloody day. Their sectorfeatured one bristling, honeycombedridge line after another — sequentiallyKakazu, Dakeshi, and Wana (with itsmurderous, reverse slope canyon).Just beyond lay the long shoulder ofShun Ridge, the nerve center of theJapanese Thirty-second Army andthe outpost of dozens of the enemy'sforward artillery observers who had

On the Cover: LtCol Richard P Ross,commander of 1st Battalion, 1st Ma-rines, 1st Marine Division, braves sniperfire to place the division's colors on aparapet of Shun Castle on 30 May. Thisflag was first raised over Cape Glou-cester and then Peleliu. Department ofDefense Photo (USMC) 121832.At left: Two Marines, Davis P Har-graves with Thompson submachine gunand Gabriel Chavarria with BAR, of 2dBattalion, 1st Marines, advance onWana Ridge on 18 May 1945. Depart-ment of Defense Photo (USMC) 123170

made life so miserable for Americanassault forces all month long.

But on this rainy morning, this29th of May, things seemed some-how different, quieter. After days ofbitter fighting, American forces hadfinally overrun both outposts of theShun Line: Conical Hill on the east,captured by the 96th Infantry Divi-sion, and the Sugar Loaf complex inthe west, seized by the 6th MarineDivision. Shun no longer seemed in-vincible.

Company A of the 1st Battalion,5th Marines moved out warily, ex-pecting the usual firestorm ofJapanese artillery at any moment.There was none. The Marinesreached the crest of Shun Ridge withhardly a firefight. Astonished, thecompany commander looked west-ward along the ridge several hundredyards to the ruins of Shun Castle, themedieval fortress of the ancient Ryu-kyuan kings. Everyone in the TenthArmy expected the Japanese to de-fend Shun to the death—but theplace seemed lightly held. Spitefulsmall arms fire appeared to comefrom nothing more than a rearguard. Field radios buzzed with thisastounding news. Shun Castle itselflay beyond division and corpsboundaries, but it was there for thetaking. The assault Marines askedpermission to seize the prize.

Major General Pedro del Valle,commanding the 1st Marine Divi-sion, did not hesitate. By all rightsthe castle belonged to the neighbor-ing 77th Infantry Division and delValle knew his counterpart, ArmyMajor General Andrew D. Bruce,would be angry if the Marinessnatched the long-sought trophy be-

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fore his soldiers could arrive. But thiswas an unprecedented opportunity tograb the Tenth Army's main objec-tive. Del Valle gave the go-ahead.With that, Company A, 1/5, sweptwest along the ridge against light op-position and took possession of thebattered complex. Del Valle's staffhad to do some fancy footwork tokeep peace with their Army neigh-bors. Only then did they learn thatthe 77th Division had scheduled amajor bombardment of the castlethat morning. Frantic radio callsaverted the near-tragedy just in time.Results of the Marines' preemptiveaction incensed General Bruce.Recalled del Valle: "1 don't think a sin-gle Army division commander wouldtalk to me after that'

Notwithstanding this inter-serviceaggravation, the Americans hadachieved much this morning. For twomonths the Shun Heights hadprovided the Japanese with superbfields of observed fire that coveredthe port city of Naha and the entirefive-mile neck of southern Okinawa.Even now, as the Marines of A/i/sdeployed into a hasty defensive linewithin the Castle's rubble, they wereoblivious to the fact that a Japaneserear guard still occupied portions ofthe mammoth underground head-quarters complex directly under theirmuddy boondockers. They would beastounded to learn that the subterra-nean headquarters of the Thirty-second Army measured 1,287 feetlong and as much as 160 feet deep —all of it dug by pick and shovel.

The Japanese had in fact stolen amarch on the approaching TenthArmy. Most of their forces hadretreated southwards during the in-cessant rains, and would soon occupy

the third (and final) ring of their pre-pared, underground defenses, a ser-ies of fortified escarpments in theKiyamu Peninsula.

Seizing Shun Castle represented anundeniable milestone in the Okina-wa campaign, but it was a hollowvictory. Just as the flag-raising on IwoJima's Mount Suribachi signified onlythe end of the beginning of thatprolonged battle, the capture of Shundid not end the fighting. The brutalslugfest on Okinawa still had another24 days to run. And still the PlumRains fell, and the horrors, and thedying, continued.

The three-month-long battle ofOkinawa covered a 700-mile arcfrom Formosa to Kyushu and in-volved a million combatants—Americans, Japanese, British, and na-tive Okinawans. With a magnitudethat rivaled the Normandy invasionthe previous June, the battle ofOkinawa was the biggest and costli-est single operation of the PacificWar. For each of its 82 days of com-bat, the battle would claim an aver-age of 3,000 lives from theantagonists and the unfortunate non-combatants.

Imperial Japan by spring 1945 hasbeen characterized as a wounded

wild animal, enraged, cornered, anddesperate. Japanese leaders knew ful-ly well that Okinawa in U.S. handswould be transformed into a gigan-tic staging base —"the England of thePacific"— for the ultimate invasion ofthe sacred homeland. They were will-ing to sacrifice everything to avoidthe unspeakable disgrace of uncon-ditional surrender and foreign occu-pation.

Okinawa would therefore presentthe U.S. Navy with its greatest oper-ational challenge: protecting an enor-mous and vulnerable amphibioustask force tethered to the beachheadagainst the ungodliest of furies, the

Japanese kamikazes. Equally, Okina-wa would test whether U.S. amphibi-ous power projection had truly comeof age — whether Americans in thePacific Theater could plan and exe-cute a massive assault against a large,heavily defended land-mass, inte-grate the tactical capabilities of allservices, fend off every imaginableform of counterattack, and maintainoperational momentum ashore. Norwould Operation Iceberg be conduct-ed in a vacuum. Action preliminaryto the invasion would kick-off at thesame time that major campaigns inIwo Jima and the Philippines werestill being wrapped up, a reflectionof the great expansion of Americanmilitary power in the Pacific, yet afurther strain on Allied resources.

But as expansive and dramatic asthe Battle of Okinawa proved to be,both sides clearly saw the contest asa foretaste of even more desperatefighting to come with the inevitableinvasion of the Japanese home is-lands. Okinawa's proximity toJapan — well within medium bomberand fighter escort range — and itsmilitarily useful ports, airfields, an-chorages, and training areas — madethe skinny island an imperative ob-jective for the Americans, eclipsingtheir earlier plans for the seizure ofFormosa for that purpose.

Okinawa, the largest of the Ryu-kyuan Islands, sits at the apex of a

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 124370

A mass of rubble is all that is left of Shun Castle, its walls, the moat below them,and S hurl City beyond, after the 5th Marines had captured the area. The batteredtrees are part of a forest growth which in more peaceful times had surrounded it.

A well-armed Marine assault team, with a BAR and a flamethrower, moves outand heads for its objective across the rubble created by preliminary bombardment.


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triangle almost equidistant to strateg-ic areas. Kyushu is 350 miles to thenorth; Formosa 330 miles to thesouthwest; Shanghai 450 miles to thewest. As so many Pacific battlefields,Okinawa had a peaceful heritage.Although officially one of the ad-ministrative prefectures of Japan, andJapanese territory since being forci-bly seized in 1879, Okinawa prideditself on its distinctive differences, itslong Chinese legacy and Malay in-fluence, and a unique sense of com-munity.

The Japanese Imperial GeneralHeadquarters (IGHQ) in Tokyo didlittle to fortify or garrison Okinawain the opening years of the PacificWar. With the American seizure ofSaipan in mid-1944, however, IGHQbegan dispatching reinforcementsand fortification materials to criticalareas within the "Inner StrategicZone," including Iwo Jima, Peleliu,the Philippines, and Okinawa.

On Okinawa, IGHQ established anew field army, the Thirty-secondArmy, and endeavored to funneltrained components to it from else-where along Japan's great armedperimeter in China, Manchuria, orthe home islands. But American sub-marines exacted a deadly toll. On 29June 1944, the USS Sturgeon torpe-doed the transport Toyama Maruand sank her with the loss of 5,600troops of the 44th IndependentMixed Brigade, bound for Okinawa.It would take the Japanese thebalance of the year to find qualifiedreplacements.

By October 1944 the U.S. JointChiefs of Staff had recognized theparamount strategic value of theRyukyus and issued orders to Ad-miral Chester W. Nimitz, Com-mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet/Com-mander, Pacific Ocean Areas, to seizeOkinawa immediately after the IwoJima campaign. The JCS directed

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Nimitz to "seize, occupy, and defendOkinawa"— then transform the cap-tured island into an advance stagingbase for the invasion of Japan.

Nimitz turned once again to hismost veteran commanders to executethe demanding mission. AdmiralRaymond A. Spruance, victor ofMidway, the Gilberts, Marshalls,Marianas, and the Battle of thePhilippine Sea, would command theU.S. Fifth Fleet, arguably the mostpowerful armada of warships everassembled. Vice Admiral RichmondKelly Turner, gifted and irascibleveteran of the Solomons and CentralPacific landings, would again com-mand all amphibious forces underSpruance. But Turner's military coun-terpart would no longer be thefamiliar old war-horse, Marine Lieu-tenant General Holland M. Smith.Iwo Jima had proven to be Smith'slast fight. Now the expeditionaryforces had grown to the size of a field

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army with 182,000 assault troops.Army Lieutenant General SimonBolivar Buckner, Jr., the son of aConfederate general who foughtagainst U.S. Grant at Fort Donald-son in the American Civil War,would command the newly createdU.S Tenth Army.

General Buckner took pains to en-sure that the composition of theTenth Army staff reflected his com-mand's multiservice composition.Thirty-four Marine officers served onBuckner's staff, for example, includ-ing Brigadier General Oliver P.

Smith, USMC, as his Marine DeputyChief of Staff. As Smith laterremarked, "the Tenth Army becamein effect a joint task force underCINCPOA:'

Six veteran divisions — four Army,two Marine — would comprise Buck-ner's landing force, with a divisionfrom each service marked for reserveduty. Here was another indication ofthe growth of U.S. amphibious pow-er in the Pacific. Earlier, the Amen-

cans had forcibly landed one infantrydivision at Guadalcanal, two each inthe Gilberts, Marshalls, and Palaus,and three each at Saipan and Iwo. Byspring 1945, Spruance and Bucknercould count on eight experienced di-visions, above and beyond those stillcommitted at Iwo or Luzon.

Buckner's Tenth Army had threemajor operational components.Army Major General John R. Hodgecommanded the XXIV Corps, com-prised of the 7th, 77th, and 96th In-fantry Divisions, with the 27thInfantry Division in floating reserve,and the 81st Infantry Division in areareserve. Marine Major General RoyS. Geiger commanded the III Am-phibious Corps (IlIAC), comprisedof the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions,with the 2d Marine Division in float-ing reserve. Both corps had recentcampaign experience, the XXIV inLeyte, the IlIAC at Guam andPeleliu. The third major componentof Buckner's command was the Tac-tical Air Force, Tenth Army, corn-

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manded by Marine Major GeneralFrancis P. Mulcahy, who also com-manded the 2d Marine AircraftWing. His Fighter Command washeaded by Marine Brigadier Gener-al William J. Wallace.

The Marine components staged forIceberg in scattered locations. The 1stMarine Division, commanded byMajor General Pedro A. del Valle,had returned from Peleliu to "pitifulPavuvu" in the Russell Islands to pre-pare for the next campaign. The 1stDivision had also been the first todeploy to the Pacific and had execut-ed difficult amphibious campaigns atGuadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, andPeleliu. At least one-third of thetroops were veterans of two of thosebattles; another third had ex-perienced at least one. Tiny Pavuvuseverely limited work-up training,but a large-scale exercise in nearbyGuadalcanal enabled the division tointegrate its newcomers and return-ing veterans. General del Valle, a con-summate artillery officer, ensuredthat his troops conducted tank-infantry training under the protectiveumbrella of supporting howitzerfires.

The 6th Marine Division becamethe only division to be formed over-seas in the war when Major GeneralLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., activatedthe colors and assumed command inGuadalcanal in September 1944. Theunit may have been new, but hardlya greenhorn could be found in itsleadership ranks. Many formerMariner raiders with combat ex-perience in the Solomons comprisedthe heart of the 4th Marines. Theregiment had also landed at Emirauand Guam. The 22d Marines hadcombat experience at Eniwetok andGuam. And while the 29th Marinescomprised a relatively new infantryregiment, its 1st Battalion had playeda pivotal role in the Saipan cam-paign. General Shepherd used histime and the more expansive facili-ties on Guadalcanal to conductprogressive, work-up training, from

(Continued on page 7)


In early April, Tenth Army commander LtGen Simon B. Buckner, Jr., USA, left,and Marine MajGen Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps,met to discuss the progress of the campaign. Upon Buckner's death near the endof the operation, Geiger was given command of the army and a third star.

The Senior Marine Commandershe four senior Marine commanders at Okinawawere seasoned combat veterans and well versed injoint service operations — qualities that enhanced

Marine Corps contributions to the success of the U.S. TenthArmy.

Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC, commanded IIIAmphibious Corps. Geiger was 60, a native of Middleburg,Florida, and a graduate of both Florida State Normal andStetson University Law School. He enlisted in the Marinesin 1907 and became a naval aviator (the fifth Marine to beso designated) in 1917. Geiger flew combat missions inFrance in World War I in command of a squadron of theNorthern Bombing Group. At Guadalcanal in 1942 he com-manded the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and in 1943 he as-sumed command of I Marine Amphibious Corps (laterIlIAC) on Bougainville, and for the invasions of Guam, andthe Palaus. Geiger had a nose for combat; even on Okina-wa he conducted frequent visits to the front lines and com-bat outposts. On two occasions he "appropriated" anobservation plane to fly over the battlefield for a personalreconnaissance. With the death of General Buckner, Geigerassumed command of the Tenth Army, a singular and f it-ting attainment, and was immediately promoted to lieu-tenant general by the Marine Corps. Geiger subsequentlyrelieved General Holland M. Smith as Commanding Gener-al, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. In that capacity, he was oneof the very few Marines invited to attend the Japanese sur-render ceremony on board USS Missouri on 2 September1945 in Tokyo Bay. Geiger also served as an observer to

MajGen Roy S. Geiger

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the 1946 atomic bomb tests in Bikini Lagoon, and his som-ber evaluation of the vulnerability of future surface ship-to-shore assaults to atomic munitions spurred Marine Corpsdevelopment of the transport helicopter. General Geigerdied in 1947.

Major General Pedro A. del Valle, USMC, commandedthe 1st Marine Division. Del Valle was 51, a native of SanJuan, Puerto Rico, and a 1915 graduate of the Naval Acade-my. He commanded the Marine Detachment on board thebattleship Texas in the North Atlantic during World WarI. Subsequent years of sea duty and expeditionary cam-paigns in the Caribbean and Central America provided delValle a vision of how Marines might better serve the Navyand their country in war. In 1931 Brigadier General Ran-dolph C. Berkeley appointed then-Major del Valle to the"Landing Operations Text Board" in Quantico, the first or-ganizational step taken by the Marines (with Navy gun-fire experts) to develop a working doctrine for amphibiousassault. His provocative essay, "Ship-to-Shore in Amphibi-ous Operations," in the February 1932 Marine CorpsGazette, challenged his fellow officers to think seriously ofexecuting an opposed landing. A decade later, del Valle,a veteran artilleryman, commanded the 11th Marines withdistinction during the campaign for Guadalcanal. Morethan one surviving Japanese marveled at the "automatic ar-tillery" of the Marines. Del Valle then commanded corpsartillery for IlIAC at Guam before assuming command of"The Old Breed" for Okinawa. General del Valle died in1978.

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Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. MajGen Francis P Mulcahy

Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC, com-manded the 6th Marine Division. Shepherd was 49, a na-tive of Norfolk, Virginia, and a 1917 graduate of VirginiaMilitary Institute. He served with great distinction with the5th Marines in France in World War I, enduring threewounds and receiving the Navy Cross. Shepherd becameone of those rare infantry officers to hold command at ev-ery possible echelon, from rifle platoon to division. Earli-er in the Pacific War, he commanded the 9th Marines,served as Assistant Commander of the 1st Marine Divi-sion at Cape Gloucester, and commanded the 1st Provi-sional Marine Brigade at Guam. In September 1944 atGuadalcanal, he became the first commanding general ofthe newly formed 6th Marine Division and led it with greatvalor throughout Okinawa. After the war, he served asCommanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, duringthe first two years of the Korean War, and subsequentlybecame 20th Commandant of the Corps. General Shepherddied in 1990.

Major General Francis P. Mulcahy, USMC, commandedboth the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and the Tenth Army Tac-tical Air Force (TAF). Mulcahy was 51, a native of

Rochester, New York, and a graduate of Notre. DameUniversity. He was commissioned in 1917 and attendednaval flight school that same year. .Like Roy Geiger, Mul-cahy flew bombing missions in France during World WarI. He became one of the Marine Corps pioneers of closeair support to ground operations during the inter-war yearsof expeditionary campaigns in the Caribbean and CentralAmerica. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Har-bor, Mulcahy was serving as an observer with the BritishWestern Desert Air Force in North Africa. He deployed tothe Pacific in command of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing.In the closing months of the Guadalcanal campaign, Mul-cahy served with distinction in command of Allied AirForces in the Solomons. He volunteered for the TAF assign-ment, deployed ashore early to the freshly captured air-fields at Yontan and Kadena, and worked exhaustively tocoordinate the combat deployment of his joint-service avi-ators against the kamikaze threat to the fleet and in sup-port of the Tenth Army in its protracted inland campaign.For his heroic accomplishments in France in 1918, the Solo-mons in 1942-43, and at Okinawa, he received three Dis-tinguished Service Medals. General Mulcahy died in 1973.

(Continued from page 5)platoon to regimental level. Lookingahead to Okinawa, Shepherd empha-sized rapid troop deployments, large-scale operations, and combat in built-up areas.

The 2d Marine Division, com-manded by Major General LeRoy P.Hunt, had returned to Saipan aftercompleting the conquest of Tinian.

There the division absorbed up to8,000 replacements and endeavoredto train for a frustratingly varied ser-ies of mission assignments as, in ef-fect, a strategic reserve. The unitalready possessed an invaluable line-age in the Pacific War — Guadalcanal,Tarawa, Saipan, and Tinian — and itsmere presence in Ryukyus' waterswould constitute a formidable "am-

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phibious force-in-being" whichwould distract the Japanese onOkinawa. Yet the division would paya disproportionate price for itsbridesmaid's role in the comingcampaign.

The Marine divisions preparing toassault Okinawa experienced yetanother organizational change, thefourth of the war. Headquarters Ma-

Initial Infantry Commanders

W ithin III Amphibious Corps, the initial infantry commanders werethose who led their troops ashore in the initial assault on Okinawaduring Operation Iceberg. Eighty-two days of sustained combat

exacted a heavy toll in casualties and debilitation. Among the battalion com-manders, tor example, four were killed, nine were wounded. Only those com-manders indicated with an asterisk [*1 retained their commands to the endof the battle.

1st Marine Division

15t Marines: Col Kenneth B. Chappell11: LtCol James C. Murray, Jr.2 1: LtCol James C. Magee, Jr.'3.1: LtCol Stephen V. Sabol

5th vIarin.s: Col John H. Griebel5: LtCol Charles W. Shelburne'

2,'5: Ltcol William E. Benedict3.5: Maj John H. Gustaf son

7th Marines: Col Edward W. Snedeker*1:7: LtCol John J. Gormley'2.'?: LtCol Spencer S. Berger'3 '7: LtCol Edward H. Hurst

8th Marines: Col Clarence R. Wallace'1/8: LtCol Richard W. Hayward28: LtCol Harry A. Waidori'3/8: LtCol Paul E. Wallace'

oth Marine Division

4th Marines: Col Alan Shapley*

1.4; Maj Bernard 'V. Green2.. 4: LtCol Reynolds H. Hayden.3,4: LtCol Bri,mo A. Hochmuth'

Marines: Col Merlin F. SchneiderMajor Thomas J. MyersLtCol Horatio C. Woodhouse,UCoI Malcolm 0. Donohoo

29th Marines: Col Victor F. Bleasdak129: LLCoI Jean W. Moreau2 2D: LtCol William G. Robb'329; LtCol Erma A. Wright

22nd122:2/22: II.

Note: The 8th Marines entered combat on Okinawa in June attached to the 1st MarDiv

Department ol Defense i'hoto .L'MCi 123072

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rifle Corps (HQMC), constantlyreviewing the lessons learned in thewar to date, had just completed a ser-ies of revisions to the tables of or-ganization and equipment for thedivision and its components.Although the "C-Series" T/O wouldnot become official until a month af-ter the landing, the divisions had al-ready complied with most of thechanges. The overall size of each di-vision increased from 17,465 to

19,176. This growth reflected the ad-dition of an assault signal company,a rocket platoon (the "Buck RogersMen"), a war dog platoon, and —significantly—a 55-man assault pla-toon in each regimental headquart-ers. Artillery, motor transport, andservice units received slight increases.So did the machine gun platoons ineach rifle company. The most time-ly weapons change occurred with thereplacement of the 75mm "half-tracks" with the newly developedM-7 105mm self-propelled howitzer— four to each regiment. Purists inthe artillery regiments tended to sniffat these weapons, deployed by the in-fantry not as massed howitzers butrather as direct-fire, open-sights "siegeguns" against Okinawa's thousandsof fortified caves, but the riflemensoon swore by them.

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,backed up these last-minute changesby providing the quantities ofreplacements required, so that eachassault division actually landed atfull tables of organization (1/0)strength, plus the equivalent of tworeplacement drafts each. Sometimesthe skills required did not match therequirement, however. Some of theartillery regiments had to absorb aflood of radar technicians and an-tiaircraft artillery gunners from theold Defense Battalions at the last mo-ment. But by and large, the manpow-er and equipment shortfalls whichhad beset many early operations hadbeen overcome by the time of embar-kation for the Okinawa campaign.

Surprisingly for this late in thewar, operational intelligence proved

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less than satisfactory prior to theOkinawa landing. Where pre-assaultcombat intelligence had been superbin the earlier operations at Tarawa(the apogean neap tide notwithstand-ing) and Tinian, here at Okinawa,the landing force did not have ac-curate figures of the enemy's num-bers, weapons, and disposition, orintelligence of his abilities. Part of theproblem lay in the fact that cloudcover over the island most of the timeprevented accurate and completephoto-reconnaisance of the targetarea. In addition, the incredible dig-ging skills of the defending garrisonand the ingenuity of the Japanesecommander conspired to disguise theisland's defenses.

The island of Okinawa is 60 mileslong, but only the lower third con-tained the significant military objec-tives of airfields, ports, andanchorages. When Lieutenant Gener-al Mitsuru Ushijima assumed com-mand of the Thirty-second Army inAugust 1944, he quickly realized thisand decided to concentrate his forcesin the south. He also decided, regret-fully, to refrain from contesting thelikely American landings along thebroad beaches at Hagushi on thesouthwest coast. Doing so would for-feit the prize airfields of Yontan andKadena, but it would permit Ushiji-ma to conserve his forces and fightthe only kind of battle he thoughthad a chance for the Empire: adefense in depth, largely under-ground and thus protected from theoverwhelming American superiorityin supporting arms. This was the at-trition/cave warfare of the more re-cent defenses at Biak, Peleliu, andIwo Jima. Each had exacted a fright-ful cost on the American invaders.Ushijima sought to duplicate thisphilosophy in spades. He would goto ground, sting the Americans withmajor-caliber gunfire from his freshlyexcavated "fire-port" caves, bleedthem badly, bog down their momen-tum—and in so doing provide theImperial Army and Navy air armsthe opportunity to destroy the Fifth

Fleet by massed kamikaze attacks.To achieve this strategy, Ushijima

had upwards of 100,000 troops onthe island, including a generous num-ber of Okinawan conscripts, theHome Guard known as Boeitai. Healso had a disproportionate numberof artillery and heavy weapon unitsin his command. The Americans inthe Pacific would not encounter amore formidable concentration of150mm howitzers, 120mm mortars,320mm mortars, and 47mm antitankguns. Finally, Ushijima also had time.The American strategic decisions toassault the Philippines, Peleliu, andIwo Jima before Okinawa gave theJapanese garrison on Okinawa sevenmonths to develop its defensesaround the Shun epicenter. Ameri-cans had already seen what theJapanese could do in terms of fortify-ing a position within an incredibly

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short time. At Okinawa, theyachieved a masterpiece. Working en-tirely with hand tools — there was nota single bulldozer on the island — thegarrison dug miles of undergroundfighting positions, literally honey-combing southern Okinawa's ridgesand draws, and stocked each succes-sive position with reserves of ammu-nition, food, water, and medicalsupplies. The Americans expected aferocious defense of the Hagushibeaches and the airfields just beyond,followed by a general counterattack— then the battle would be over ex-cept for mop-up patrolling. Theycould not have been more misin-formed.

The U.S. plan of attack called foradvance seizure of the Kerama RettoIslands off the southwest coast, sever-al days of preliminary air and navalgunfire bombardment, a massive

The Japanese Forces

M arines and Army infantry faced strong opposi-tion from more than 100,000 troops of Lieu-tenant General Mitsuru Ushijima's Thirty-

second Army, although American intelligence initially es-timated Ushijima's strength at only 60,000 to 70,000. Mostof the Thirty-second Army's reinforcing organizations hadtraveled to Okinawa from previous posts in China, Man-churia, and Japan.

The first to arrive was the 9th Infantry Division, a crackveteran unit destined to be the backbone of Ushijima'sdefense forces. The next reinforcement was the 44th In-dependent Mixed Brigade which lost part of its strengthwhen one of the ships carrying the brigade to Okinawa wastorpedoed. Next, the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment wasflown directly to Okinawa and was added to the remnantsof the 44th. The next large unit to reach Okinawa was the24th Infantry Division, which came from Manchuria. Wellequipped and trained, it had not yet been blooded in bat-tle. Lieutenant General Takeo Fujioka's 62d Infantry Divi-sion was the final major infantry unit assigned to theThirty-second Army. It was a brigaded division, consist-ing of two brigades of four independent infantry battal-ions each. Two more of these battalions arrived onOkinawa in September 1944 and one was allocated to eachbrigade.

Because Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ), the jointArmy and Navy command in Tokyo, foresaw the battle ofOkinawa as one of fixed defenses, Ushijima was not as-signed any appreciably strong armored force other thanthe 27th Tank Regiment. In view of the hopeless situationin the Philippines and the inability to deliver supplies andreinforcements, IGHQ diverted large weapons shipments,if not troops, to Okinawa. The Thirty-second Army thuspossessed a heavier concentration of artillery under a sin-gle command than had been available to any other Japaneseorganization in the Pacific at any one time. The total ene-my artillery strength, less the 42d Field Artillery Regiment,which was organic to the 24th Division, was grouped wi-thin the 5th Artillery Command. In addition to the com-paratively weak 7th Heavy Artillery Regiment, MajorGeneral Kosuke Wada's command consisted of two indepen-dent artillery regiments, and the artillery elements of the44th Brigade and the 27th Tank Regiment. In addition, hehad the 1st and 2d Medium Artillery Regiments with 36

howitzers and the 100th Heavy Artillery Battalion witheight 150mm guns. Wada also had in his command the 1stIndependent Heavy Mortar Regiment, which fired the320mm spigot mortar earlier encountered by Marines onIwo Jima. Although the 1st and 2d Light Mortar Battal-ions were nominally part of Wada's organization, their 9681mm mortars were assigned in close support of the in-fantry and controlled by the defense sector commanders.

The reserve of potential infantry replacements variedfrom good, in the 23d and 26th Shipping Engineer Regi-ments, to poor, at best, in the assorted rear area serviceunits. The largest number of replacements, 7,000 men, wasprovided by the 10th Air Sector Command, which wascomprised of airfield maintenance and construction unitsat the Yontan, Kadena, and le Shima air strips. Anothersource of infantry replacements were the seven sea raidingsquadrons, three of which were based at Kerama Retto andthe remainder at Unten-Ko in the north of Okinawa. Eachof those squadrons had a hundred picked men, whose soleassignment was to destroy American amphibious invasionshipping during the course of landing operations by crash-ing explosives-laden suicide craft into the sides of attacktransports and cargo vessels.

Ushijima's naval component consisted of the OkinawaNaval Base Force, the 4th Surface Escort Unit, and vari-ous naval aviation activities all under the command of RearAdmiral Minoru Ota. In this combined command were ap-proximately 10,000 men, of whom only 35 percent wereregular naval personnel. The remainder were civilian em-ployees belonging to the different sub-units of the NavalBase Force. Part of Ota's command consisted of torpedoboat, suicide boat, and midget submarine squadrons at theUnten-Ko base on Motobu Peninsula.

Rounding out the Thirty-second Army was a nativeOkinawan home guard, whose members were calledBoeitai. These men were trained by the army and were tobe integrated into army units once the battle for Okinawawas joined. The Boeitai provided Ushijima with17,000-20,000 extra men. Added to this group were 1,700male Okinawan children, 14 years of age and older, whowere organized into volunteer youth groups called "Bloodand Iron for the Emperor Duty Units," or Tekketsu — Benis

M. Frank

four-division assault over theHagushi Beaches (the Marines of IlI-AC on the north, the soldiers ofXXIV Corps on the south). Mean-while, the 2d Marine Division witha separate naval task unit would en-deavor to duplicate opposite theMinatoga Beaches on Okinawa'ssoutheast coast its successful am-phibious feint off Tinian. Love-Day

(selected from the existing phoneticalphabet in order to avoid planningconfusion with "D-Day" beingplanned for Iwo Jima) would occuron 1 April 1945. Hardly a man failedto comment on the obvious irony: itwas April Fool's Day and EasterSunday—which would prevail?

The U.S. Fifth Fleet constituted anawesome sight as it sortied from

10

Ulithi Atoll and a dozen other portsand anchorages to steam towards theRyukyus. Those Marines who hadreturned to the Pacific from the origi-nal amphibious offensive at Guadal-canal some 31 months earliermarveled at the profusion of assaultships and landing craft. The new ves-sels covered the horizon, a mind-boggling sight.

L_La ipit1tv1o'e,,ient to Con HL

rifles: " 'Fattening us up for the kill;the boys say;' he reported. On boarda nearby LST, a platoon commanderrehearsed his troops in the use ofhome-made scaling ladders to sur-mount a concrete wall just beyondthe beaches. "Remember, don'tstop — get off that wall, or some-body's gonna get hurt:'

On 26 March, the 77th InfantryDivision kicked off the campaign byits skillful seizure of the Kerama Ret-to, a move which surprised theJapanese and produced great opera-tional dividends. Admiral Turnernow had a series of sheltered an-chorages to repair ships likely to bedamaged by Japanese air attacks —and already kamikazes were exact-ing a toll. The soldiers also dis-covered the main cache of Japanesesuicide boats, nearly 300 power boatsequipped with high-explosive ramsintended to sink the thin-skinnedtroop transports in their anchoragesoff the west coast of Okinawa. TheFleet Marine Force, Pacific, ForceReconnaissance Battalion, command-ed by Major James L. Jones, USMC,preceded each Army landing withstealthy scouting missions the preced-ing night. Jones' Marines also scout-ed the barren sand spits of KeiseShima and found them undefended.With that welcome news, the Armylanded a battery of 155mm "LongToms" on the small islets and soonadded their considerable firepower tothe naval bombardment of the south-west coast of Okinawa.

Meanwhile, Turner's minesweepershad their hands full clearing ap-proach lanes to the Hagushi Beaches.

Navy Underwater DemolitionTeams, augmented by Marines, blewup hundreds of man-made obstaclesin the shallows. And in a full weekof preliminary bombardment, thefire support ships delivered morethan 25,000 rounds of five-inch shellsor larger. The shelling produced morespectacle than destruction, however,because the invaders still believedGeneral Ushijima's forces would bearrayed around the beaches and air-fields. A bombardment of that scaleand duration would have saved manylives at Iwo Jima; at Okinawa thisprecious ordnance produced few tan-gible results.

A Japanese soldier observing thehuge armada bearing down onOkinawa wrote in his diary, "it's likea frog meeting a snake and waitingfor the snake to eat him:' Tensions ranhigh among the U.S. transports aswell. The 60mm mortar section ofCompany K, 3d Battalion, 5th Ma-rines, learned that casualty rates onL-Day could reach 80-85 percent."This was not conducive to a goodnight's sleep;' remarked Private FirstClass Eugene B. Sledge, a veteran ofthe Peleliu landing. On boardanother transport, combat cor-respondent Ernie Pyle sat down to alast hot meal with the enlisted Ma-

11

Operation Iceberg got off to a roar-ing start. The few Japanese still in thevicinity of the main assault at firstlight on L-Day, 1 April 1945, couldimmediately sense the wisdom ofGeneral Ushijima in conceding thelanding to the Americans. The enor-mous armada, assembled from portsall over the Pacific Ocean, had con-centrated on schedule off Okinawa'ssouthwest coast and stood coiled toproject its 182,000-man landing forceover the beach. This would be the ul-timate forcible entry, the epitome ofall the amphibious lessons learned sopainstakingly from the crude begin-nings at Guadalcanal and NorthAfrica.

Admiral Turner made his finalreview of weather conditions in theamphibious objective area. As at IwoJima, the amphibians would beblessed with good weather on thecritical first day of the landing. Skieswould be cloudy to clear, windsmoderate east to northeast, surfmoderate, temperature 75 degrees. At0406 Turner announced "Land theLanding Force;' the familiar phrasewhich marked the sequential count-down to the first assault waves hit-ting the beaches at H-Hour. Combattroops already manning the rails oftheir transports then witnessed anunforgettable display of navalpower — the sustained bombardmentby shells and rockets from hundredsof ships, alternating with formationsof attack aircraft streaking low overthe beaches, bombing and strafing atwill. Enemy return fire seemed scat-tered and ineffectual, even against

Thirty-second Army officers sit for a formal portrait on Okinawa in February 1945.Numbers identify: (1) RAdm Minoru Ota, Commanding Officer, Naval Base Force;(2) LtGen Mitsuru Ushijima, Commanding General, Thirty-second Army; (3) Maj-Gen Isamu Cho, Chief of Staff, Thirty-second Army; (4) Col Hitoshi Kanayama,Commanding Officer, 89th Regiment; (5) Col Kiuji Hon go, Commanding Officer,32d Regiment; (6) Col Hiromichi Yahara, Senior Staff Officer, Thirty-second Army.

• •

such a mass of lucrative targets as-sembled offshore. Turner confirmedH-Hour at 0830.

Now came the turn of the 2d Ma-rine Division and the ships of theDiversionary Force to decoy theJapanese with a feint landing on theopposite coast. The ersatz amphibi-ous force steamed into position,launched amphibian tractors andHiggins boats, loaded them conspic-uously with combat-equipped Ma-rines, then dispatched them towardsMinatoga Beach in seven waves. Pay-ing careful attention to the clock, thefourth wave commander crossed theline of departure exactly at 0830, thetime of the real H-Hour on the westcoast. The LVTs and boats thenturned sharply away and returned tothe transports, mission accom-plished.

There is little doubt that the diver-sionary landing (and a repeat perfor-mance the following day) achievedits purpose.. In fact, General Ushiji-ma retained major, front-line infan-try and artillery units in theMinatoga area for several weeksthereafter as a contingency against asecondary landing he fully anticipat-ed. The garrison also reported toIGHQ on L-Day morning that "ene-my landing attempt on east coastcompletely foiled with heavy lossesto enemy:'

But the successful deception cameat considerable cost. Japanesekarnikazes, convinced that this wasthe main landing, struck the smallforce that same morning, seriouslydamaging the troopship Hinsdaleand LST 844. The 3d Battalion, 2dMarines, and the 2d AmphibianTractor Battalion suffered nearly 50casualties; the two ships lost an equalnumber of sailors. Ironically, the di-vision expected to have the leastdamage or casualties in the L-Daybattle lost more men than any otherdivision in the Tenth Army that day.Complained division Operations

Officer Lieutenant Colonel SamuelC. Taxis: "We had asked for air coverfor the feint but were told the threatwould be 'incidental.'

On the southwest approaches, themain body experienced no such in-terference. An extensive coral reefprovided an offshore barrier to theHagushi beaches, but by 1945 reefsno longer posed a problem to thelanding force. Unlike Tarawa, wherethe reef dominated the tactical de-velopment of the battle, GeneralBuckner at Okinawa had more than1,400 LVTs to transport his assaultechelons from ship to shore without


Taking part in the prelanding bombardment of Okinawa was guns at preselected targets. As the troops landed, naval gun-the Idaho (BB 42), blasting away at the island with her 14-inch fire ships let loose with rolling barrages which cleared the way.

A flotilla of LSM-Rs delivers final suppressive fires before assault waves hit thebeach. Upon impact, they churned up the earth and caused considerable damage.

Photo by Capt Edward Steichen, USNR, in Marine Corps Historical Center

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hesitation. These long lines of LVTsnow extended nearly eight miles asthey churned across the line of depar-ture on the heels of 360 armored LVTAs, whose turret-mounted, snub-nosed 75mm howitzers blasted awayat the beach as they advanced the fi-nal 4,000 yards. Behind the LVTscame nearly 700 DUKWs, amphibi-ous trucks, bearing the first of thedirect support artillery battalions.The horizon behind the DUKWsseemed filled with lines of landingboats. These would pause at the reefto marry with outward bound LVTs.Soldiers and Marines alike had re-hearsed transfer line operations ex-haustively. There would be no breakin the assault's momentum this day.

The mouth of the Bishi Gawa(River) marked the boundary be-tween the XXIV Corps and IlIACalong the Hagushi beaches. The Ma-rines' tactical plan called for the twodivisions to land abreast, the 1st onthe right, the 6th on the left. Each di-vision in turn landed with two regi-ments abreast. The assault regiments,from north to south, were the 22d,4th, 7th, and 5th Marines. Reflect-ing years of practice, the first assaultwave touched down close to 0830,the designated H-Hour. The Marinesstormed out of their LVTs, swarmedover the berms and seawalls, and en-tered the great unknown. The forci-ble invasion of Okinawa had begun.Within the first hour the Tenth Armyhad put 16,000 combat troopsashore.

The assault troops experienced auniversal shock during the ship-to-shore movement. In spite of the direintelligence predictions and their owncombat experience, the troops foundthe landing to be a cakewalk—virtually unopposed. Private FirstClass Gene Sledge's mortar sectionwent in singing "Little Brown Jug" atthe top of its lungs. Corporal JamesL. Day, a rifle squad leader attachedto Company F, 2d Battalion, 22d Ma-rines, who had landed at Eniwetokand Guam earlier, couldn't believe hisgood luck: "1 didn't hear a single shot

13

Photo by Capt Edward Steichen, USNR, in Marine Corps Historical Center

Amphibious mastery at work: assault Marines in amphibian tractors (LVTs) churntowards the beach on L-Day beneath the protective heavy fire of a battleship.

rest

all morning — it was unbelievable!"Most veterans expected an eruptionof enemy fire any moment. Later inthe day General del Valle's LVT be-came stuck in a pothole enroute tothe beach, the vehicle becoming avery lucrative, immobile target. "Itwas the worst 20 minutes I ever spentin my life;' he said.

The morning continued to offerpleasant surprises to the invaders.They found no mines along thebeaches, discovered the main bridgeover the Bishi River still intact and —wonder of wonders — both airfieldsrelatively undefended. The 6th Ma-rine Division seized Yontan Airfieldby 1300; the 7th Infantry Divisionhad no problems securing nearbyKadena.

The rapid clearance of the immedi-ate beaches by the assault units leftplenty of room for follow-on forces,and the division commanders did nothesitate to accelerate the landing oftanks, artillery battalions, andreserves. The mammoth build-upproceeded with only a few glitches.Four artillery pieces went down whentheir DUKWs foundered along thereef. Several Sherman tanks ground-ed on the reef. And the 3d Battalion,

1st Marines, reached the transfer lineby 1800 but had to spend an uncom-fortable night in its boats when suffi-cient LVTs could not be mustered atthat hour for the final leg. Thesewere minor inconveniences. Incredi-bly, by day's end, the Tenth Armyhad 60,000 troops ashore, occupyingan expanded beachhead eight mileslong and two miles deep. This wasthe real measure of effectiveness ofthe Fifth Fleet's proven amphibiousproficiency.

The huge landing was not entire-

ly bloodless. Snipers wounded MajorJohn H. Gustaf son, commanding the3d Battalion, 5th Marines, late in theafternoon. Other men went down toenemy mortar and machine gun fire.But the losses of the entire TenthArmy, including the hard-luck 2dMarine Division, amounted to 28killed, 104 wounded, and 27 missingon L-Day. This represented barely 10percent of the casualties sustained bythe V Amphibious Corps the firstday on Iwo Jima.

Nor did the momentum of the as-


Armored amtracs of Company A, 1st Armored Amphibious zers and .50-caliber machine guns, and were used effectivelyBattalion, carry the assault wave of the 4th Marines, 6th Ma- later in the campaign when the Thirty-second Army attempt-rine Division, onto Red Beach. The LVTs mount 75mm howit- ed amphibious landings on Tenth Army flanks in April.

Assault troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, clamber over a seawall after landingon Blue Beach 2 on 1 April 1945, against no opposition at the beachhead.


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sault slow appreciably after the TenthArmy broke out of the beachhead.The 7th Infantry Division reachedthe East Coast on the second day. Onthe third day, the 1st Marine Divi-sion seized the Katchin Peninsula, ef-fectively cutting the island in two. Bythat date, IlIAC elements hadreached objectives thought originallyto require 11 days in the taking. Lieu-tenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak,

operations officer for the 6th MarineDivision, recalls General Shepherdtelling him, "Go ahead! Plow aheadas fast as you can. We've got thesefellows on the run:' "Well, hell;' saidKrulak, "we didn't have them on therun. They weren't there."

As the 6th Marine Division swungnorth and the 1st Marine Divisionmoved out to the west and north-west, their immediate problems

stemmed not from the Japanese butfrom a sluggish supply system, stillbeing processed over the beach. Thereef-side transfer line worked well fortroops but poorly for cargo. Navybeachmasters labored to construct anelaborate causeway to the reef, butin the meantime, the 1st Marine Di-vision demonstrated some of its am-phibious logistics know-how learned"on-the-job" at Peleliu. It mountedswinging cranes on powered cause-ways and secured the craft to the sea-ward side of the reef. Boats wouldpull alongside in deep water; thecrane would lift nets filled with com-bat cargo from the boats into theopen hatches of a DUKW or LVTwaiting on the shoreward side for thefinal run to the beach. This workedso well that the division had to di-vide its assets among the other divi-sions within the Tenth Army.

Beach congestion also slowed theprocess. Both Marine divisionsresorted to using their replacementdrafts as shore party teams. Their in-experience in this vital work, corn-


Other Marines were boated to the beachhead in LCVPs. Debarking from the Hig-gins boats, they waded through the quiet surf over the coral reef to reach shore.

Marines of the 6th Division have a peaceful "walk in the sun," Ishikawa on L-plus 3. Their idyllic traipse will end soon asas they head north down the hillside approaching the town of they near Mount Yae Take and well-defended enemy positions.


15

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bined with the constant call forgroups as replacements, causedproblems of traffic control, establish-ment of functional supply dumps,and pilferage. This was nothing new;other divisions in earlier operationshad encountered the same circum-stances. The rapidly advancing as-sault divisions had a critical need formotor transport and bulk fuel, butthese proved slow to land and distrib-ute. Okinawa's rudimentary roadnetwork further compounded theproblem. Colonel Edward W.Snedeker, commanding the 7th Ma-rines, summarized the situation af-ter the landing in this candid report:"The movement from the west coastlanding beaches of Okinawa acrossthe island was most difficult becauseof the rugged terrain crossed. It wasphysically exhausting for personnelwho had been on transports a longtime. It also presented initially an im-possible supply problem in theSeventh's zone of action because ofthe lack of roads."

General Mulcahy did not hesitateto move the command post of theTactical Air Force ashore as early as

L plus 1. Operating from crudequarters between Yontan and Kade-na, Mulcahy kept a close eye on theprogress the SeaBees and Marine andArmy engineers were making on re-pairing both captured airfields. Thefirst American aircraft, a Marine ob-servation plane, landed on 2 April.Two days later the fields were readyto accept fighters. By the eighth day,Mulcahy could accommodate medi-um bombers and announced to theFleet his assumption of control of allaircraft ashore. By then his fighterarm, the Air Defense Command, hadbeen established ashore nearby un-der the leadership of MarineBrigadier General William J. Wallace.With that, the graceful F4U Corsairsof Colonel John C. Munn's MarineAircraft Group (MAC) 31 andColonel Ward E. Dickey's MAG-33began flying in from their escort car-riers. Wallace immediately taskedthem to fly combat air patrols (CAP)over the fleet, already seriously em-battled by massed kamikaze attacks.Ironically, most of the Marine fight-er pilots' initial missions consisted ofCAP assignments, while the Navy

16

squadrons on board the escort car-riers picked up the close air supportjobs. Dawn of each new day wouldprovide the spectacle of Marine Cor-sairs taking off from land to fly CAPover the far-flung Fifth Fleet, passingNavy Hellcats from the fleet comingin take station in support of the Ma-rines fighting on the ground. Otherair units poured into the two airfieldsas well: air warning squadrons, nightfighters, torpedo bombers, and anArmy Air Forces fighter wing. Whileneither Yontan nor Kadena were ex-actly safe havens — each receivednightly artillery shelling and long-range bombing for the first fullmonth ashore — the two airfields re-mained in operation around theclock, an invaluable asset to bothAdmiral Spruance and GeneralBuckner.

While the 1st Marine Divisioncontinued to hunt down small bandsof enemy guerrillas and infiltratorsthroughout the center of the island,General Geiger unleased the 6th Ma-rine Division to sweep north. Thesewere heady days for GeneralShepherd's troops: riflemen clusteredtopside on tanks and self-propelledguns, streaming northward against afleeing foe. Not since Tinian had Ma-rifles enjoyed such exhilarating mo-bility. By 7 April the division hadseized Nago, the largest town innorthern Okinawa, and the U.S.Navy obligingly swept for mines andemployed underwater demolitionteams (UDT) to breach obstacles inorder to open the port for direct, sea-borne delivery of critical supplies tothe Marines. Corporal Day marveledat the rapidity of their advance so far."Hell, here we were in Nago. It wasnot tough at all. Up to that time Eoursquad] had not lost a man." The 22dMarines continued north throughbroken country, reaching Hedo Mis-aki at the far end of the island on Lplus 12, having covered 55 milesfrom the Hagushi landing beaches.

For the remainder of the 6th Ma-rine Division, the honeymoon wasabout to end. Just northwest of Nago

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 118304As invasion forces fanned out on Okinawa, the beaches were scenes of organizeddisorder as shore parties unloaded the beans and bullets needed by the assault troops.They also began unloading materiel which would be needed later in the campaign.

S

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the great bulbous nose of MotobuPeninsula juts out into the East ChinaSea. There, in a six-square-mile areaaround 1,200-foot Mount Yae Take,Colonel Takesiko Udo and hisKunigami Detachment ended theirdelaying tactics and assumed pre-pared defensive positions. Udo's forceconsisted of two rifle battalions, aregimental gun company and an an-titank company from the 44th In-dependent Mixed Brigade, in allabout two thousand seasonedtroops.

Yae Take proved to be a defender'sdream, broken into steep ravines andtangled with dense vegetation. TheJapanese sowed the approaches withmines and mounted 20mm dual-purpose machine-cannons and heav-ier weapons deep within caves. AsColonel Krulak recalled: "They werejust there—they weren't goinganywhere — they were going to fightto the death. They had a lot of navalguns that had come off disabledships, and they dug them way backin holes where their arc of fire wasnot more than 10 or 12 degrees." Oneof the artillery battalions of the 15thMarines had the misfortune to laytheir guns directly within the narrowarc of a hidden 150mm cannon."They lost two howitzers before you

could spell cat," said Krulak.The battle of Yae Take became the

6th Marine Division's first real fight,five days of difficult and deadly com-bat against an exceptionally deter-mined enemy. Both the 4th and 29th

Marines earned their spurs here, de-veloping teamwork and tactics thatwould put them in good stead dur-ing the long campaign ahead.

Part of General Shepherd's successin this battle stemmed from his desireto provide proven leaders in com-mand of his troops. On the 15th,Shepherd relieved Colonel Victor F.Bleasdale, a well-decorated WorldWar I Marine, to install Guadalcanalveteran Colonel William J. Whalingas commanding officer of the 29thMarines. When Japanese gunnerskilled Major Bernard W. Green, com-manding the 1st Battalion, 4th Ma-rines, Colonel Shapley assigned hisown executive officer, LieutenantColonel Fred D. Beans, a former Ma-rine raider, as his replacement. Thesavage fighting continued, with threebattalions attacking from the west,two from the east — protected againstfriendly fire by the steep pinnacle be-tween them. Logistic support to thefighting became so critical that every

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 117054Grinning troops of the 29th Marines hitch a ride on board an M-7 self-propelled105mm howitzer heading for Chuta in the drive towards Motobu Peninsula.

17

Main Japanese defericeIijrna

Foni lines at dates shown

Roads & Tracks

Miles

I6thM*R•1V.I

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man, from private to general, whoascended the mountain to the frontlines carried either a five-gallon watercan or a case of ammo. And all handscoming down the mountain had tohelp bear stretchers of wounded Ma-rines. On 15 April, one company ofthe 2d Battalion, 4th Marines,suffered 65 casualties, including threeconsecutive company commanders.On 16 April, two companies of the1st Battalion, 4th Marines, seized thetopographic crest. On the followingday, the 29th Marines received excep-tional fire support from the 14-inchguns of the old battleship Tennesseeand low-level, in-your-pocket bomb-ing from the Corsairs of MarineFighter Squadron 322.

Colonel Udo and his KunigamiDetachment died to the man at YaeTake. On 20 April General Shepherddeclared the Motobu Peninsula se-cured. His division had earned avaluable victory but the cost had notbeen cheap. The 6th Marine Divisionsuffered the loss of 207 killed and 757

wounded in the battle. The division'soverall performance impressedGeneral Oliver P. Smith, who record-ed in his journal:

The campaign in the northshould dispel the belief held bysome that Marines are beach-bound and are not capable ofrapid movement. Troops movedrapidly over rugged terrain,repaired roads and blownbridges, successively openednew unloading points, andreached the northern tip of theisland, some 55 miles from theoriginal landing beaches, in 14days. This was followed by amountain campaign of 7 daysduration to clear the MotobuPeninsula.

During the battle for MotobuPeninsula, the 77th Infantry Divisiononce again displayed its amphibiousprowess by landing on the island ofle Shima to seize its airfields. On 16April, Major Jones' force reconnais-

sance Marines again helped pave theway by seizing Minna Shima, a tinyislet about 6,000 yards off shore fromle Shima. Here the soldiers posi-tioned a 105mm battery to furthersupport operations ashore. The 77thneeded plenty of fire support. Near-ly 5,000 Japanese defended the is-land. The soldiers overwhelmedthem in six days of very hard fight-ing at a cost of 1,100 casualties. Oneof these was the popular war cor-respondent Ernie Pyle, who hadlanded with the Marines on L-Day.A Japanese Nambu gunner on le Shi-ma shot Pyle in the head, killing himinstantly. Soldiers and Marines alikegrieved over Pyle's death, just as theyhad six days earlier with the news ofPresident Franklin D. Roosevelt'spassing.

The 1st Marine Division fought adifferent campaign in April than theirsister division to the north. Theirdays were filled with processing refu-gees and their nights with patrols andambushes. Guerrillas and snipers ex-acted a small but steady toll. The 7thMarines became engaged in a hotfirefight near Hizaonna, but most ofthe action remained small-unit andnocturnal. The "Old Breed" Marineswelcomed the cycle of low intensity.After so many months in the tropics,they found Okinawa refreshinglycool and pastoral. The Marines grewconcerned about the welfare of thethousands of Okinawan refugeeswho straggled northwards from theheavy fighting. As Private First ClassEugene Sledge observed, "The mostpitiful things about the Okinawancivilians were that they were totallybewildered by the shock of our in-vasion, and they were scared to deathof us. Countless times they passed uson the way to the rear with fear, dis-may, and confusion on their faces."

Sledge and his companions in the5th Marines could tell by the soundof intense artillery fire to the souththat the XXIV Corps had collidedwith General Ushijima's outerdefenses. Within the first week thesoldiers of the 7th and 96th Divisions

Uncovered on Motobu Peninsula, hidden in a cave, was this Japanese 150mm gunwaiting to be used against 6th Marine Division troops advancing northwards.


18

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had answered the riddle of "where arethe Japs?" By the second week, bothGeneral Hodge and General Bucknerwere painfully aware of Ushijima's in-tentions and the range and depth ofhis defensive positions. In additionto their multitude of caves,minefields, and reverse-slope em-placements, the Japanese in the Shun

complex featured the greatest num-ber of large-caliber weapons theAmericans had ever faced in the Pa-cific. All major positions enjoyedmutually supporting fires from ad-jacent and interior hills and ridge-lines, themselves honeycombed withcaves and fighting holes. Maintain-ing rigid adherence to these intricate

networks of mutually supporting po-sitions required iron discipline on thepart of the Japanese troops. To theextent this discipline prevailed, theAmericans found themselves enter-ing killing zones of savage lethality.

In typical fighting along this front,the Japanese would contain and iso-late an American penetration (Armyor Marine) by grazing fire from sup-porting positions, then smother theexposed troops on top of the initialobjective with a rain of preregisteredheavy mortar shells until freshJapanese troops could swarm out oftheir reverse-slope tunnels in a coun-terattack. Often the Japanese shotdown more Americans during theirextraction from some fire-swepthilltop than they did in the initial ad-vance. These early U.S. assaults setthe pattern to be encountered for theduration of the campaign in thesouth.

General Buckner quickly commit-ted the 27th Infantry Division to thesouthern front. He also directedGeneral Geiger to loan his corps ar-tillery and the heretofore lightly com-mitted 11th Marines to beef up thefire support to XXIV Corps. Thistemporary assignment provided four155mm battalions, three 105mm bat-talions, and one residual 75mm packhowitzer battalion (1/11) to thegeneral bombardment underway ofUshijima's outer defenses. LieutenantColonel Frederick P. Henderson,USMC, took command of a provi-sional field artillery group comprisedof the Marine 155mm gun battalionsand an Army 8-inch howitzer bat-talion — the "Henderson Group"—which provided massive fire supportto all elements of the Tenth Army.

Readjusting the front lines of XXIVCorps to allow room for the 27th Di-vision took time; so did building upadequate units of fire for field ar-tillery battalions to support themammoth, three-division offensiveGeneral Buckner wanted. A week ofgeneral inactivity passed along thesouthern front, which inadvertentlyallowed the Japanese to make their


Shortly after the main landings on Okinawa, famed war correspondent Ernie Pyle,a Scripps-Howard coU,mnist who had been in the thick of the war in the Italiancampaign, shares a smoke with a Marine patrol. Later in Operation Iceberg hewas killed by machine gun fire on le Shima, a nearby island fortress.

Within a short time after they came ashore, Marines encountered native Okina-wans. This group of elderly civilians is escorted to the safety of a rear area by Ma-rine PFC John F Cassinelli, a veteran 1st Marine Division military policeman.


19

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own adjustments and preparationsfor the coming offensive. On 18April (L plus 17) Buckner moved thecommand post of the Tenth Armyashore. The offensive began the nextmorning, preceded by the ungodliestpreliminary bombardment of theground war, a virtual "typhoon ofsteel" delivered by 27 artillery batter-ies, 18 ships, and 650 aircraft. But theJapanese simply burrowed deeperinto their underground fortificationsand waited for the infernal pound-ing to cease and for American infan-try to advance into their well-designed killing traps.

The XXIV Corps executed the as-sault on 19 April with great valor,made some gains, then were thrownback with heavy casualties. TheJapanese also exacted a heavy toll ofU.S. tanks, especially those support-ing the 27th Infantry Division. In thefighting around Kakazu Ridge, theJapanese had separated the tanksfrom their supporting infantry byfire, then knocked off 22 of the 30Shermans with everything from47mm guns to hand-delivered satchelcharges.

The disastrous battle of 19 Aprilprovided an essential dose of realityto the Tenth Army. The so-called"walk in the sun" had ended. Over-coming the concentric Japanese

defenses around Shun was going torequire several divisions, massivefirepower, and time — perhaps a verylong time. Buckner needed immedi-ate help along the Machinato-Kakazu lines. His operations officerrequested General Geiger to providethe 1st Tank Battalion to the 27th Di-vision. Hearing this, General delValle became furious. "They can havemy division," he complained toGeiger, "but not piece-meal:' Del Vallehad other concerns. Marine Corpstankers and infantry trained togetheras teams. The 1st Marine Divisionhad perfected tank-infantry offensiveattacks in the crucible of'Peleliu.Committing the tanks to the Armywithout their trained infantry squadscould have proven disastrous.

Fortunately, Geiger and Oliver P.Smith made these points clear toGeneral Buckner. The Tenth Armycommander agreed to refrain frompiece-meal commitments of the Ma-rines. Instead, on 24 April, he re-quested Geiger to designate onedivision as Tenth Army Reserve andmake one regiment in that divisionready to move south in 12 hours.Geiger gave the mission to the 1stMarine Division; del Valle alerted the1st Marines to be ready to movesouth.

These decisions occurred while

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Buckner and his senior Marines werestill debating the possibility of open-ing a second front with an amphibi-ous landing on the MinatogaBeaches. But the continued bloodyfighting along the Shun frontreceived the forefront of Buckner's at-tention. As his casualties grew alarm-ingly, Buckner decided to concentrateall his resources on a single front. On27 April he assigned the 1st MarineDivision to XXIV Corps. During thenext three days the division movedsouth to relieve the shot-up 27th In-fantry Division on the western (right)flank of the lines. The 6th Marine Di-vision received a warning order toprepare for a similar displacement tothe south. The long battle for Okina-wa's southern highlands was shiftinginto high gear.

Meanwhile, throughout April andwith unprecedented ferocity, theJapanese kamikazes had punished theships of the Fifth Fleet supporting theoperation. So intense had the aerialbattles become that the westernbeaches, so beguilingly harmless onL-Day, became positively deadly eachnight with the steady rain of shellfragments from thousands of antiair-craft guns in the fleet. Ashore orafloat, there were no safe havens inthis protracted battle.

The Japanese strategy for defend-ing Okinawa made the most of thatnation's dwindling resources andrampant fanaticism. While GeneralUshijima bloodied the Americanlanding force in a protracted battleof attrition, the Japanese air armwould savage the Fifth Fleet tetheredto the island in support. The battlewould thus feature the unique com-bination of a near-passive grounddefense with a violent air offensivethat would employ suicide tactics onan unprecedented scale.

By the spring of 1945 the Ameri-cans knew well the Japanese propen-sity for individual suicide attacks,having experienced karnikazes in thePhilippines, antishipping swimmers


Two Marines help an aged Okinawan to safety in the rear of the lines, as a thirdMarine of the party carries the man's meager possessions. Only children, women,and the aged and infirm were found and protected by assaulting Marines as theypushed across the island during the first few days following the 1 April landing.

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The U.S. Army at Okinawawould be an injustice not to credit the U.S. Army for

its significant participation in the Okinawa campaign.In fact, the Army deployed as many combat troops,

sustained proportionate casualties, and fought with equalvalor as the Marines. The Army battles for Kakazu Ridge,Conical Hill, and the Yuza Dake Escarpment are as muchhallowed touchstones to that service as are Sugar Loaf andKunishi Ridge to the Marines. The Okinawa campaign stillserves as a model of joint-service cooperation, in spite ofisolated cases of "sibling rivalry:'

At one point in mid-1943, the Joint Chiefs of Staff couldidentify only three divisions in the Pacific with "amphibi-ous expertise": the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, veteransof Tulagi and Guadalcanal; and the 7th Infantry Division,fresh from the Aleutians. By the time these same unitsjoined with four other divisions to constitute the TenthArmy for Okinawa, the number of divisions with ex-perience in amphibious operations deployed in the Pacifichad expanded sevenfold. The three principal assault unitsin Major General John R. Hodge's XXIV Corps had freshexperience in "storm landings" in Leyte. That campaign wasthe first for the 96th Division, which acquitted itself well,and the third amphibious operation for the 7th Division,following Attu and Kwajalein. Leyte also saw the 77th Di-vision, veterans of the battle for Guam, execute a bold land-ing at Ormoc which surprised the Japanese defenders. Newto XXIV Corps was the 27th Division, a National Guardunit still regarded with acrimony by some Marines afterthe Saipan flail, but an outfit proud of its amphibious ex-periences in the Gilberts and Marianas. None of the Armydivisions had the luxury of extended preparations forOkinawa. General Douglas MacArthur did not release theXXIV Corps, understrength and underfed after 110 days'combat in Leyte, to the Tenth Army until seven weeks be-fore the Okinawa landing. The 27th Division had moretime but endured unsatisfactory training conditions in thejungles of Espiritu Santo.

Examples of full cooperation by Army units with Ma-rines abound in the Okinawa campaign. Army Air ForcesP-47 Thunderbolts flew long-range bombing and fightermissions for General Mulcahy's TAF. Army and MarineCorps artillery units routinely supported opposite servicesduring the protracted drive against the Shun Line. The Ma-rines gained a healthy respect for the Army's 8-inch howit-zers; often these heavy weapons provided the only meansof reducing a particularly well-fortified Japanese strong-

Marine Corps Historical Center

point. In addition, General Buckner attached the invalua-ble "Zippo Tanks" of the 713th Armored Flame ThrowerBattalion and 4.2-inch mortar batteries to both Marine di-visions. The 6th Marine Division also had the 708th Am-phibian Tank Battalion attached for the duration of thebattle. Each of these attached units received the Presiden-tial Unit Citation for service with their parent Marine di-visions.

On a less formal basis, the Army frequently lent logisti-cal support to the Marines as the campaign struggled souththrough the endless rains. Even the fourth revision of theMarine division's table of organization did not providesufficient transport assets to support such a protracted cam-paign executed at increasing distances from the force beach-head. A shortfall in amphibious cargo ships assigned to theMarines further reduced the number of organic tracked andwheeled logistics vehicles available. Often, the generosityof the supporting Army units spelled the difference ofwhether the Marines would eat that day. The best exam-pie of this helping spirit occurred on 4 June when elementsof the 96th Division provided rations to Lieutenant ColonelRichard P. Ross' 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, brightening whatthe battalion otherwise reported as "the most miserable dayspent on Okinawa."

Okinawa, in short, was too big and too tough for a sin-gle service to undertake. The 82-day campaign against atenacious, well-armed enemy required unusual teamworkand cooperation among all services.

in the waters near Iwo Jima, and "hu- struck the fleet on a nightly basis, the the counterattacks of 12-13 April and

man bullet" antitank demolitionists worst damage came from the concen- 3-4 May or the sacrificial sortie of the

at Peleliu. But IGHQ escalated these trated kikusui raids. The Japanese Ycimcito. The results proved costly to

tactics to an awesome level at Okina- launched ten separate kikusui attacks both sides.wa by introducing the kikusui(Floating Chrysanthemums) massedsuicide air strikes against the fleet.

during the battle—some of themnumbering up to 350 aircraft — andIGHQ coordinated many of these

Swarms of kamikazes bedeviledthe Fifth Fleet from the time the ad-vance force first steamed into Ryu-

While small groups of kamikcizes with other tactical surprises, such as kyuan waters throughout the course

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causing three returning CAP planesto crash. As the onslaught continued,Admiral Spruance observed frankly,"The suicide plane is a very effectiveweapon which we must not underes-timate." Spruance spoke from first-hand experience. Kcimikazes knockedhis first flagship, the heavy cruiser In-dianapolis, out of the battle early inthe campaign, then severely damagedhis replacement flagship, the battle-ship New Mexico, a few weeks later.

The Japanese attacking the U.S.fleet off Okinawa also introducedtheir newest weapon, the "Ohka"(cherry blossom) bomb (called by theAmericans "Baka," a derisive Japaneseterm meaning "foolish"). It was a


plus 5. The kamikazes were to make many such visits toOkinawa before the operation ended, causing much damage.

manned, solid-fuel rocket packed towards the target at an unheard-ofwith 4,400 pounds of explosives, 500 knots. One such weapon blewlaunched at ships from the belly of the destroyer Manert L. Abele out ofa twin-engined bomber. The Baka the water. Fortunately, most of thebombs became in effect the first an- Bakas missed their targets, the mis-tiship guided missiles, screaming siles proving too fast for inex-

A U.S. ship badly damaged by a kamikaze hit receives a survey inspection withinthe protected anchorage of Keramci Retto, where the Navy repaired its damaged fleet.


The amphibious task force under one of the first destructiveheavy kamikaze attacks off Okinawa's southwest coast on L

of the battle. Some intermediateNavy commanders spoke dismissive-ly of the threat— inexperienced pilotsin ramshackle planes launched withbarely enough fuel to reach Okina-Wa. Indeed, many of the 2,373kamikazes never made it to the ob-jective. But those Special Attack Unitpilots who survived the air and sur-face screens inflicted grievousdamage on the Fifth Fleet. By the endof the campaign, the fleet had suf-fered 34 ships and craft sunk, 368damaged, and more than 9,000casualties — the greatest, losses eversustained by the U.S. Navy in a sin-gle battle.

The situation at sea grew so criti-cal that on one occasion smoke fromburning ships and screening escortsoffshore blinded Yontan Airfield,

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- 302

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perienced pilots to control in theirfew seconds of glory.

The ultimate suicide attack was thefinal sortie of the superbattleshipYamato, the last of the world's greatdreadnoughts, whose feared18.1-inch guns could outrange thebiggest and newest U.S. battleships.IGHQ dispatched Yamato on her lastmission, a bizarre scheme, with noair cover and but a handful of sur-face escorts and only enough fuel fora one-way trip. She was to distractthe American carriers to allow asimultaneous kikusui attack againstthe remainder of the fleet. Achievingthis, Yamato would beach itselfdirectly on Okinawa's west coast, us-ing her big guns to shoot up the thin-skinned amphibious shipping and thelanding force ashore. The planproved absurd.

In earlier years of the war the sor-tie of this mammoth warship wouldhave caused consternation among thefleet protecting an amphibious

beachhead. Not now. Patrolling U.S.submarines gave Spruance earlywarning of Yamato's departure fromJapanese waters. "Shall I take themor will you?" asked Vice AdmiralMarc A. Mitscher, commanding thefast carriers of Task Force 58. Spru-ance knew his battleship forceyearned for a surface battle to avengetheir losses at Pearl Harbor, but thiswas no time for sentiment. "You takethem," he signaled. With that,Mitscher's Hellcats and Avengersroared aloft, intercepted Yamato ahundred miles from the beachhead,and sank her in short order withbombs and torpedoes. The cost: eightU.S. planes, 12 men.

Another bizarre Japanese suicidemission proved more effective, Onthe night of 24-25 May, a half-dozentransport planes loaded with Giret-su, Japanese commandos, ap-proached the U.S. airbase at Yontan.Alert antiaircraft gunners flamedfive. The surviving plane made a

wheels-up belly landing on the air-strip, discharging troops as she slidin sparks and flames along the sur-face. The commandos blew up eightU.S. planes, damaged twice as manymore, set fire to 70,000 gallons of avi-ation gasoline, and generally creat-ed havoc throughout the night.Jittery aviation and security troopsfired at shadows, injuring their ownmen more than the Japanese. It took12 hours to hunt down and kill thelast raider.

Admiral Spruance at sea andGeneral Mulcahy ashore exerted Her-culean efforts to reduce the effective-ness of these suicide strikes. The fastcarriers struck Japanese airfields inKyushu and Formosa time and again,but these numbered more than 100,and as usual the Japanese provedadept at camouflage. Small landingparties of soldiers and Marines seizedoutlying islands (see sidebar) to es-tablish early warning and fighterdirection outposts. And fighter

Japanese night raiders are met on 16 April with a spectacular tan airfield. In the foreground, silhouetted against the inter-network of antiaircraft fire by Marine defenders based at Yon- laced pattern of tracer bullets, are Corsairs of VMF-311.


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Marine Air at OkinawaII kinawa was the culmination of the develop-

ment of air support doctrine in the Pacific,"declared Colonel Vernon E. Megee, com-

mander of Landing Force Air Support Units during the cam-paign. "The procedures we used there were the result oflessons learned in all preceding campaigns, including thePhilippines." Indeed, Marine aviation at Okinawa operat-ed across the spectrum of missions, from supply drops tobombing an enemy battleship.

Altogether, some 700 Marine planes of one type oranother took part in the Okinawa campaign. About 450of these engaged in combat for more than half the battle.Most Marine air units served under the aegis of the TenthArmy's Tactical Air Force (TAF), commanded by MajorGeneral Francis P. Mulcahy, USMC (relieved on 8 June byMajor General Louis E. Woods, USMC). Outside of TAFwere the Marine fighter squadrons assigned to the fleet car-riers or escort carriers, plus long-range transports.

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commanding all Alliedforces for Operation Iceberg, deemed the Japanese air armto be the biggest threat to the success of the invasion. TheTenth Army's first objective, therefore, became that of seiz-ing Yontan and Kadena airfields to accommodate land-based lighter squadrons. The invaders achieved this on L-Day. The following day General Mulcahy moved ashoreand commenced TAF operations. Mulcahy's top priority re-mained that of maintaining air superiority over the objec-tive and the Fifth Fleet. In view of the unprecedentedkamikaze attacks unleashed by the Japanese against thetask force, this mission remained Mulcahy's preoccupationfor many weeks.

Both Marine and Army aviation units would compriseMulcahy's TAF. The force would grow to include a totalof 15 Marine fighter squadrons, 10 Army fighter squadrons,two Marine torpedo bomber squadrons, and 16 Army bom-ber squadrons. In the execution of the air superiority mis-sions, the Marine fighter squadrons flew Chance VoughtF4U Corsairs, and the Marine night fighter squadrons flewradar-equipped Grumman F6F Heilcats. Army lighter pi-lots flew the Republic P-47 Thunderbolts; their night fightersquadron was equipped with the Northrop P-61 BlackWidows.

The American pilots fought their air-to-air duels not justagainst one-way kamikazes; they also faced plenty of late-model Jacks and Franks. Altogether, TAF pilots shot down625 Japanese planes. Colonel Ward E. Dickey's Marine Air-craft Group 33 set the record with 214 kills; more than halfclaimed by the "Death Rattlers" of Major George F. Axtell'sMarine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMF) 323.

The necessity for TAF to protect the fleet caused someground commanders to worry that their own close air sup-port would be "short-sheeted:' But Navy (and some Ma-rine) squadrons from the escort carriers picked up the slack,flying more than 60 percent of the close air missions. Be-tween 1 April and 21 June, the combination of TAF and

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carrier pilots flew 14,244 air support sorties. Nearly 5,000of these supported the Marines of IlIAC. In the process,the supporting aviators dropped 152,000 gallons of napalmon enemy positions.

Air Liaison Parties accompanied the front-line divisionsand served to request close air support and direct (but notcontrol—the front was too narrow) aircraft to the target.Coordination of lower-echelon air requests became theprovince of three Marine Landing Force Air Support Con-trol Units, one representing Tenth Army to the fleet com-mander, the others each responsive to the Army XXIVCorps and IlIAC. This technique further refined the experi-ments Colonel Megee had begun at Iwo Jima. In most cases,close air support to the infantry proved exceptionally ef-fective. Some units reported prompt, safe delivery of ord-nance on target within 100 yards. In other instances therewere delays, accidents (although less than a dozen), or sit-uations where the lines were simply too intermingled forany air support — as during the 6th Marine Division's strug-gle for Oroku Peninsula.

Other Marine aviation units contributed significantly tothe victory in Okinawa. Marine Torpedo Bomber Squa-dron (VMTB) pilots flew their Grumman Avenger (TBF)"torpeckers" in "zero-zero" weather to drop 400,000 poundsof rations, medical supplies, and ammunition to forwardground units—greatly assisted by the skillful prepackag-ing of the IlIAC Air Delivery Section. And the fragile lit-tle Grasshoppers of the four Marine Observation Squadron(VMO) squadrons flew 3,486 missions of artillery spotting,photo reconnaissance, and medical evacuation. On.e seniorartillery officer described the \TMO pilots as "the unsungheroes of Marine aviation . . . often they would fly pastcave openings at the same level so they could look in andsee if there was a gun there:' Colonel Yahara complainedthat his artillery units knew from bitter experience that thepresence of an American Grasshopper overhead presagedquick retribution for any Japanese gun that fired,

Marine aviators at Okinawa served with a special elan.During one desperate dogfight, a Marine pilot radioed,"Come on up and help me, I've got a Frank and two Zekescornered!" Those were his last words, but his fighting spiritpersisted. Said one grateful destroyer skipper who had beenrescued from swarms of kamikazes by Marine Corsairs, "1am willing to take my ship to the shores of Japan if I couldhave these Marines with me:'

Departmenl of Defense Phot, (USMC) 126420

the final campaign final campaign... · pecting the usual firestorm of japanese artillery at any...

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