THE FALL OF NORTH KOREAA Wikistrat Crowdsourced Simulation

July 2016

North Korea remains the last truly totalitarian regime andclosed state on earth. However, it is unlikely to be able toremain as such indefinitely.

During June 2016, Wikistrat ran an 11-day multistagecrowdsourced simulation to explore the various pathwaysby which North Korea could collapse, assess which of thepathways are the most plausible/likely, and “game out” theways in which other actors are likely to respond.

More than 70 analysts participated in the simulation –including PhDs, former military and diplomatic personnel,and other expert members of our Asia-Pacific, Russia,North America and Military desks.

SIMULATION BACKGROUND

KEY INSIGHTS

China is the pivotal power in any scenario of a North Korean collapse. Securing North Korean WMD is a task likely best left to the Chinese –

though it will be a test of diplomacy and transparency, as Washington,Tokyo and Seoul will have to be convinced that the threat has beeneliminated.

The death of Kim Jong-un is a likely catalyst for major change within NorthKorea; however, the direction of that change will not be determined by thisvariable alone.

Should the Kim regime falter, South Korea is prepared to take Pyongyang(unilaterally if necessary) before China can respond.

Unilateral South Korean action is possible and would be tremendouslydestabilizing.

Japan is at a strategic disadvantage in any scenario dealing with thecollapse of North Korea and will be forced to depend on its relationshipwith the U.S. to exert any leverage over the situation.

Russia may have the most to gain from instability on the Korean Peninsula.Attempts to capitalize on the situation would endanger relations with Chinaand the United States. However, Moscow is uniquely positioned to expandits regional influence, given its comparatively fewer restraints and lack ofsecurity commitments.

METHODOLOGY

Phase I: Backcasting the FallIn this five-day phase, analysts were asked to tell theretrospective story of North Korea’s fall via thecollaborative generation of scenarios.

Phase II: Scenario Plausibility VotingAnalysts were then asked to choose the highest-qualityscenarios from the previous phase based on plausibilityand likelihood.

Phase III: Wargaming the ScenariosFor the remainder of the exercise, analysts were dividedinto five teams (the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan andRussia), each of which gamed out the responses of theiractor to the top four scenarios chosen in Phase II.

In this phase, analysts were asked to “backcast” thefall of the Pyongyang regime, exploring what led toits demise and the early warning signs that, inretrospect, would have foretold the fall.

In an accompanying voting exercise, almost 65percent of analysts predicted that the fall of theregime would occur five to ten years from now.

While the projected cause of the collapse was lessclearly agreed upon, analysts appeared to be fairlyevenly split between military, economic and politicalcauses. Interestingly, access to information andtechnology only accounted for two percent of theprojected causes.

24%

33%26%

15%2%

PRIMARY CAUSE OF COLLAPSE

Military Economic Political Social Information/Technology

PHASE I: BACKCASTING THE FALL

2016 to 2020

2021 to 2025

2026 to 2030

2031 to 2035

Beyond 2035

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

DATE OF COLLAPSE

Analysts developed 40 scenarios that told the story of North Korea’s fall. These scenarios were then classifiedaccording to the “cause” provided in the entry. (Note: Some entries included more than one cause.)

CAUSES LISTED IN PHASE I SCENARIOS

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Economic Near-Collapse

Popular Uprising

Famine and Starvation Undermines Regime

Kim Assassinated

Kim Dies – Other

Military Near-Collapse

Preemptive Foreign Military Intervention

Unforeseen but Major Accident

Semi-Normalization of Relations

Externally-Backed Coup

Foreign Intervention – Other

Internal Coup

Kim Dies of Poor Health

Retaliatory Foreign Military Intervention

NUMBER OF SCENARIOS WITH THIS CAUSE

PHASE II: SCENARIO PLAUSIBILITY VOTING

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

Like

lihood

Plausibility

LIKELIHOOD AND PLAUSIBILITY RANKING

Selected for

Phase III

During Phase II, analysts wereasked to rank each entrydeveloped in Phase I according toplausibility (i.e., could it happen?)and likelihood (i.e., will it happen?).

The four highest-ranked scenarioswere selected to explore in PhaseIII because of a methodologicaldecision to examine thosesituations external actors weremost likely to face.

85%

15%

Yes

No

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

Does Kim Jong-un preside over the country at the time of the fall?For Phase III, analysts were divided

into five teams (the U.S., China, SouthKorea, Japan and Russia), each ofwhich gamed out the response of theiractor to the top four scenarios ofNorth Korea’s fall.

PHASE III: WARGAMING THE SCENARIOS

The scenarios voted as the most plausible/likely inPhase II had variation among two major variables:Military Cohesion and Popular Engagement.

Each scenario contained its own risks andopportunities for the selected external actors (U.S.,South Korea, Japan, Russia and China).

Yet in all of them, China was strengthened, Japan wassidelined, Russia looked for ways to exploit thesituation, and the U.S. was forced to restrain SouthKorea from taking aggressive action.

PHASE III SCENARIOS

Situation: Disease sweeps a population deprived of foodand medical aid. Entire military units defect as soldiers andofficers at all levels fall ill. The Kim family retreats to acompound in the mountains, and refugees (many of themalso sickened) flood out across the Chinese, Russian andSouth Korean borders.

Risks: Naval confrontation develops between China andJapan and/or the U.S. as all countries deploy maritimeforces to manage the crisis, deal with refugees and ensureNorth Korea remains non-belligerent.

Opportunities: The crisis may generate multinationalsupport for regime change and international cooperation tosecure WMD.

SCENARIO I:

COLLAPSE OF THE NORTH KOREAN STATE

EARLY WARNING SIGNS

NGOs begin to withdraw.Inefficiencies of healthcare system become magnified.Unrest grows within lower ranks of the military over inadequate rations.Kim Jong-un’s behavior becomes increasingly erratic.China’s statements regarding North Korea become increasingly negative and bellicose.Environmental degradation escalates malnutrition and decreases access to food.North Korean efforts to procure more food from fisheries violate Chinese fishing rights. Illegal immigration into/through China drastically increases as the food crisis worsens.

SCENARIO II:

POPULAR REVOLUTION

EARLY WARNING SIGNS

Humanitarian organizations start withdrawing from North Korea altogether.Reports abound of widespread food shortages and people roaming in search of sustenance.A noticeable absence of government-sponsored rallies indicates the regime fears large public gatherings.There is an increase in the number of troops on the streets and in the countryside, but also reports that troops appear to be searching for food and/or going AWOL.South Korean troops along the DMZ begin to hear shouts from across the line to send food.Western intelligence picks up reports of growing concern with the senior military and upper echelons of the government.

Situation: A massive demonstration for food in Pyongyangerupts in violence. Troops ordered to put it down refuse onthe grounds that they have been fed inadequate rations.The small military force that does mobilize is attacked withhomemade weapons. Many hundreds of civilians are killed,along with dozens of soldiers.

Risks: Outbreak of a large-scale humanitarian crisis. SouthKorea mobilizes to prevent a spillover of the situation. Theregime loses control over its WMD.

Opportunities: Restoration of stability takes place via a pro-China coup, forcing the situation towards Scenario III.

SCENARIO III:

PRO-CHINA COUP

EARLY WARNING SIGNS

There is a decrease in public appearances of Kim Jong-un and an increase in appearances of his trusted lieutenants. An increasing number of arrests and executions take place in the upper echelons of the ruling party and the military of those with residual ties to Jang Sung-thaek and other known moderates.We see a third reappearance of the language of the “main tree” of direct leadership and the “cutting of side branches” which preceded Jang Sung-thaek’s arrest and execution.North Korea becomes increasingly belligerent, reflecting the growing strength of military hardliners over moderates despite adverse economic impacts.Intelligence is received that Chinese envoys have been in direct contact with some members of Kim's senior leadership.

Situation: A coup takes place within North Korea. Pro-Chinese forces within the government and the militaryarrest Kim and other high-profile leaders and have themkilled. The country is now under the control of a new pro-Chinese provisional government.

Risks: South Korea attempts to undermine the rule of thenew regime.

Opportunities: This was the least volatile of all scenarios,with the most cooperation and the most plausiblecontainment of WMDs.

EARLY WARNING SIGNS

Kim Jong-un’s poor health illuminates problems with the lack of a succession plan.North Korean military morale and discipline remain high. Kim sycophants and family members continue to hold certain key positions within the political-military leadership, but their influence is not seen by experts as reaching down into the junior officer corps. The military is viewed as maintaining a degree of autonomy from the regime.We see indications of a growing dissident movement in cities with increasing arrests prior to Kim’s death.

SCENARIO IV:

FALLING INTO CIVIL WAR

Situation: Kim Jong-un dies of a heart attack. His sister andwife attempt to hold the country together, but are unable todo so. Pro- and anti-family forces actively fight throughoutthe country.

Risks: South Korea invites Russian intervention to balancewhat they see as the risk of Chinese expansionism. TheU.S., hesitant to back South Korean unilateralism, withholdsintelligence. South Korea reacts aggressively out ofsecurity fears.

Opportunities: China is likely to step in and secure WMDs.The backing of anti-family forces could result in regimechange.

America must prioritize the relative importance of theKorean peninsula as opposed to its interests in thebroader Asia-Pacific – particularly as it pertains to itsrelationships with China and Russia.

– Dr. Robert Pauly, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS:

UNITED STATES

There would be enormous pressure on the U.S. to secure/seize WMD unilaterally or (ideally) with extensive South Korean assistance.

The U.S. would have little incentive to contest Chinese primacy, provided the WMD issue was resolved.

Chinese and U.S. interests converge in regards to securing WMD and general stabilization efforts, but cooperation will still be difficult and fraught with a degree of mistrust.

Korea remains a long- rather than short-term concern and not one Washington will likely be pushed into by South Korean assertiveness.

A (North Korean) regime under a tight leash to Beijingwill presumably be a rational one, one more open tobusiness, and one very unlikely to take aggressivemilitary action.

– Dr. Mark A. Nelson, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

The pivotal power with interest in any North Korean collapsewould be China.

In all scenarios, China’s key policy objectives remained thesame: Keep the Korean peninsula divided, maintain stability inNorth Korea (to prevent the U.S. or South Korea intervening),and ensure the North Korean regime remains more or lessunder Chinese tutelage.

Chinese efforts to secure WMD will need to be done either incooperation with the U.S. or carried out in such a way thatWashington, Tokyo and Seoul are convinced the threat hasbeen eliminated.

Any coup attempt backed by Beijing would need secure supportfrom within the inner circles of the regime itself – and also beable to quickly purge rival elements and their patronagenetworks to ensure they cannot mount a counteroffensive oreven launch retaliatory strikes against China, South Korea orJapan.

STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS:

CHINA

South Korea has the most to gain and lose in the outcome ofany North Korean existential crisis.

The idea of reunification dominates much of South Koreanstrategy. While dealing with an acute crisis will be the priority,Seoul will not ignore the opportunity to take proactive stepstoward unification.

Given shifting American relations with China, South Korea maynot be willing to work in tandem with the U.S. in the event of acrisis in North Korea that impacts Seoul’s security.

South Korea is prepared to take Pyongyang before China hasthe capacity to resuscitate the Kim regime.

Unilateral action by South Korea could have significantnegative impacts for its security and economic stability.

STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS:

SOUTH KOREA

The presence of U.S. ground troops is Seoul’sgreatest leverage in negotiations with China. WhenBeijing argues it cannot accept a unified KoreanPeninsula with U.S. troops on it, Seoul can counterwith: “Agree to unification and the rationale for U.S.troops is removed.”

– Dr. David Kearn, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

Two structural factors – geography (separation from theKorean Peninsula by sea) and history (historicaltensions/animosity, including colonialism) – have left very littlediplomatic room for Japan to maneuver.

Thus, any opportunity for Japan to act must be coordinatedwithin a multilateral approach lacking any overtpolitical/military posturing. Japan will have to “take a backseat”through most phases of such a crisis.

In the event of a civil war or even mass desertion of soldiers, itis unlikely that Japan would support a South Korean militaryintervention due to the risk of a new major war on the Koreanpeninsula.

The best way for Japan to exert influence over events would bethrough cooperation with South Korea or the United States.

Apart from the threat posed by Kim’s WMD andweaponization programs, China, Japan, South Koreaand the United States would all prefer the status quorather than the burden of dealing with an economically,socially and politically “primitive” North Korea.

– Jeffrey Itell, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS:

JAPAN

STRATEGIC TAKEAWAYS:

RUSSIA

Russia should not aim to compete with China where it cannot,but should make itself indispensable where it can.

There continues to be an undertone of competition betweenRussia and China. Any alliance between the two will be basedupon narrowly negotiated interests.

While it cannot afford to make unilateral advances into NorthKorea in the event of a sudden collapse, Russia has diplomaticleverage on China via offering or withholding support to Beijing-led action.

Russia may not have the lead in this region, but it also does nothave as much expected of it, giving it freedom of action.

Without a strong U.S. presence in South Korea andJapan, these U.S. allies will have to reach some level ofaccommodation with Russian and Chinese regionalinterests.

– Lynda Roades, Wikistrat Senior Analyst

Kim dies of a heart attackKim assassinatedMissile test sabotaged, Kim killedMissile test accident, Kim killedKim attempts assassination against Park, Kim killed in retaliatory airstrikePopular dissent supported by external information operations drives demand for increased access to information, combined with a failing economyChina withdraws economic and political supportChina expands control, turning North Korea into a puppet state and replacing Kim with a Beijing loyalistInformation and social media make their way into North KoreaSouth Korean commandos attempt infiltration, North Korea propaganda errors lead to coupKim dies, daughter inherits countryU.S. increases sanctions, naval patrols and pressures African nations not to do business with North KoreaU.S. invites North Korea to bilateral talks, dividing regimeKim goes missing, prompting speculation of foul play and possible coupNorth Korean military aggression prompts U.S. and South Korean retaliatory strikes and blockadeBodyguard sparks panic by random shooting behavior, others respond with live fire, Kim and high-ranking officials killed in crossfireNorth Korean military aggression across DMZ prompts U.S.-backed South Korea to bid to overthrow, China withholds support of North Korea

Palace coupKim normalizes relations with the SouthFamine leads to collapse of military, leaving Kim vulnerable; family fleesU.S. normalizes relations, dividing regimeRussia/China-backed coupEconomic and environmental collapse, rise of warlordsKim goes missing, Russian troops occupy North Korea and prop up friendly regime Russia/China competition results in overthrow of regime and imposition of pro-China military ruleSoldiers along DMZ give up en masse, North Korean leadership flees, South Korea takes controlStarvation pushes soldiers to brigandry, population turns against army and regimeContainment failure at bio-weapons lab leads to widespread infection, decimated populationNorth Korea hijacks plutonium-carrying ships, Japan and South Korea engage in preventative strike leading to regime downfallMutual hostilities lead to Second Korean WarU.S. authorizes preemptive strike with China on its sideKim provides WMD to jihadist group, but warhead explodes in mid-transit, killing Kim and senior leadershipStarvation from reduced aid leads soldiers to refuse orders to control population, senior officers lead coup

APPENDIX:

FULL LIST OF PHASE I CAUSES

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