Simulation Background

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In February 2013, Wikistrat ran a ten day simulation in which over 70 analysts collaboratively explored possible scenarios for ways in which Jordan’s nearly century-old Monarchy will surmount or succumb to the Arab Spring’s revolutionary wave. Wikistrat asked its strategic community to explore and flesh out a basic cause-and-effect scenario “model” that factored in the primary bottom-up drivers for change, the most relevant top-down state responses to those motivations, and the ways in which the two might combine to push Jordan down one of several future pathways. If the Arab Spring next surges into a Gulf monarchy, it will have crossed a geopolitical Rubicon of sorts – one with potentially game-changing global economic repercussions.

Conversely, Jordan’s continued stability amidst such continuing pressure for change could stand as the Arab Spring’s historical “high water mark.” The Arab Spring has raged for more than two years, and across this tumultuous time Jordan has remained surprisingly stable – even as protests erupt regularly. Several reasons explain Jordan’s stability. Despite lacking oil wealth, Jordan is a middle-income economy with powerful-but-responsive bureaucracies, including a respected military and an efficient police system. While King Abdullah II, crowned in 1999, hasn’t won his citizens’ hearts as his father once did, the anti-government protests have to date focused as much on economic reform as political change, suggesting genuine regime legitimacy. Still, with Syria’s autocratic regime in flames to its immediate north, it is hard to expect that the Arab Spring’s “one-damned-autocracy-after-another” dynamic will somehow stop dead at Jordan’s border.

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Overview of Master Narratives

The following chart has been generated by clustering over 25 scenarios created during the simulation. The scenarios were grouped into four main Master Narratives (MN), which are organized along two fundamental axes:

1. The X-axis addresses whether the Hashemite King remains in power or succumbs to internal and regional pressures and falls – or simply put, whether the status quo is maintained or varying degrees of change take place. In the “King Stays” scenarios, Wikistrat analysts explored several factors explaining reasons that Jordan’s regime appears to have held firm in light of the region’s convulsions in the throngs of the so-called Arab Spring. This axis then addresses the impetus for the King to hold on to power in either a status quo or changed regime resolution pathway, as well as the role of the Jordanian economy, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), disaffected youth, Bedouin/East Bankers and other internal voices of dissent in the regime’s shift.

2. The Y-axis addresses whether the Hashemite King stays up-to-date with regional and internal dynamics as an independent actor, or rather comes to depend on interference by external stabilizing players such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States. This axis addresses negative meddling by regional powers and their proxies (balanced out by the quality and quantity of external stabilizers), ways in which this affects the resolution pathway and the probable impetus for the King to relinquish power in a regime change resolution. Interplaying with the other axis here, Wikistrat analysts examined a variety of “King Falls” scenarios that would lead to an escalation and intensification of the situation in Jordan. Most analysts believe that intensification would be the result of less stabilizing intervention by regional and global actors that includes economic and military aid to the Kingdom.

Scenarios varied based on perceptions of quality, quantity and timing of active external intervention by global and regional stabilizing actors to include financial, military and political assistance. The perceptions are explored within the quadrants created by the intersection of the axes. This affects the direction and movement of the Y axis along the X axis in order to produce a concomitant resolution pathway:

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“KING STAYS” SCENARIOS

Wikistrat analysts believed the impetus for the king to hold on to power in either a status quo or changed regime resolution pathway depended on external intervention by stabilizing actors, including financial assistance. Though the region has convulsed in the throngs of the so-called Arab Spring for nearly two years, Jordan has remained remarkably stable despite regular protests. Wikistrat analysts explored several factors to explain why Jordan’s regime appears to have held firm. Despite a paucity of oil wealth, Jordan is a middle-income economy with powerful bureaucracies, a respected military and efficient law enforcement.

The Hashemite Monarchy Holds On

Abdullah enhances his legitimacy by emphasizing Jordan’s traditional roots as a monarchy, successfully arguing that the dissent inherent in the Arab Spring was aimed at unpopular republican regimes as opposed to traditional monarchies. He retains sufficient popular support by deflecting blame for unpopular policies on Parliament and elected officials, skillfully capitalizing on Jordan’s institutional flexibility. With assistance from internal and external allies, the king addresses the problems of governance, draconian media laws, economic difficulties and corruption.

Saudi Arabia and the GCC nations bankroll the King, but it is Abdullah who holds out and holds on, forcing the protesters to fold their cards. Through an enhanced reliance on buying the support of the population, Jordan more closely resembles a Gulf state monarchy.

In this narrative, Abdullah curtails protests at the expense of substantive democratic reforms, economic modernization and the welfare of the Jordanian-Palestinians. Reforms are more cosmetic than real. The King addresses the political and economic grievances of Jordanian-Palestinians by symbolically increasing parliamentary representation for towns and districts with Palestinian majorities, lifting some discriminatory economic and social policies, and targeting aid to poor communities. This undercuts the support for and the demands of, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Action Front and other engaged protesters. As a result, the King can placate his natural constituency, the Bedouins, reassuring them that any change will progress at a timetable amenable to them.

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The Monarchy Holds on in a Changed Regime

Wikistrat analysts also explored the plausibility of the monarchy holding onto power in a changed regime. Abdullah may skate by in 2013 on a weak but recovering economy and tumult on the Syrian border. Pro-reform and anti-corruption protests escalate, challenging the legitimacy of the Monarchy. King Abdullah pushes back hard, playing on ethnic and religious fears among protesters and opposition supporters. Palestinians are reminded of the brutal specter of the repression of Black September in 1970; Bedouins are warned that toppling the Monarchy could lead to the formation of a Palestinian state and a loss of privileges.The presence of Iranian proxies and Shi’a elements on its northern border bring the

Hashemites, Bedouins and MB-inspired Palestinians together.

The Monarchy survives, but its power diminishes as Jordan treads the forced path of a changed regime and becomes an Arabian constitutional monarchy. For this to occur, many in the Wiki community agree that there needs to be:

1. A continued process of decentralization of power, forced concession of parliamentary and executive power (lower house is freely elected, upper chamber represents Bedouin interests), national security reforms and effective anti-corruption measures. (However, the king retains the keys to the security apparatus.)

2. Use of traditional pre-Islamic tribal consensus-building structures (e.g., shura, a`yan), to build a more inclusive regime that provides for the primacy of Islam and better reflects Arab cultural norms.

3. A line drawn in the sand, external stabilizing actors (GCC, U.S., EU) to actively protect Jordan and the Gulf monarchies. They fund government subsidies of food and energy. The GCC, led by Saudi Arabia, helps to organize an accommodation between the King and the MB, while the West provides the political and economic cover to keep this arrangement from unraveling.

4. The eviction of Iranian proxy groups from Jordan’s northern border region to win Abdullah praise on the international scene and send his domestic popularity soaring.

5. Development of civil society structures among non-fundamentalist groups to create social support networks that diffuse grievances.

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“KING FALLS” SCENARIOS

Wikistrat analysts examined a variety of scenarios that would lead to an escalation and intensification of the situation in Jordan. Most analysts believed that intensification would be the result of a sharp decrease or poorly timed stabilizing intervention by regional and global actors.

The Hashemites Hold on Through New Monarch and Regime Change

In this type of scenario, the monarchy (barely) holds on but Abdullah does not. Pressures from the Muslim Brotherhood, compounded with the grievances of Syrian refugees, force Abdullah into a series of missteps that cost him his crown. Plagued with grave issues of morality and injured Arab pride (deficient classical Arabic and assimilation tendencies), protests escalate by calling for the reinstatement of Prince Hamzah as Crown Prince. The irresolute and soft-handed King Abdullah is publically marginalized.

Assuming command, Hamzah cleverly stitches together a governing coalition, using Iranian overreach as a pretext for uniting a myriad of protesters with divergent grievances against an external enemy. However, the initial fumbling of the previous regent results in a permanent devolution of executive and parliamentary power to the Muslim Brotherhood. The GCC states come through for the new regent (albeit poorly timed from Abdullah’s perspective) and provide enough financial flexibility for the regime to reach a new stasis.

By changing the nature of the regime and opening it up to true proportional representation, Hamza is forced to deal with Abdullah’s earlier posturing on Palestinians’ status in the kingdom. When in 2008, Abdullah started revoking the citizenship of Jordanian-Palestinians he was intentionally turning the Palestinian majority in Jordan into “stateless refugees” and aggressively pushed the so-called “right of return.” Hamzah, who increasingly and astutely shifts his support base to the Kingdom’s majority, reverses this discriminating policy, moulding Jordan’s parliamentary system to be truly representative of the Palestinian majority. As further assurance of a future Palestinian state and of Jordan’s peaceful intentions, Hamzah implements very strict anti-terrorism laws, barring anyone who has incited violence from running for office, thus ruling out the Islamists who run on violent rhetoric even before they have a chance to start. Such an act would be rewarded with Western economic aid that actually filters down to the average Jordanian, as opposed to the current situationin which U.S. aid money seems to support mainly the Hashemites’ lavish lifestyle. A peaceful Palestinian Jordan could become Hamza’s legacy.

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Farewell Sons of Hashim: Back in Black and the Ways of the Salaf

In this type of scenario, Wikistrat analysts saw Jordan’s internal destabilizing dynamics persisting and the failure of external stabilizers. The community sees the plausibility of the Muslim Brotherhood overthrowing the Hashemite Monarchy and notching the first kingdom on its belt if the spigot of external support dries up. The King’s insipid reforms do not placate the Brotherhood, which responds by expanding its grassroots efforts to organize protests while simultaneously conducting a covert campaign to expand its influence with the country’s Islamist and Salafi-Jihadi groups. In these scenarios the MB plays its hand well, consolidating its power among disparate protesters and troublemakers (Palestinians, Bedouins, Syrian refugees, and Iranian-

backed militias) with the promise of Sharia rule of law and the formation of a shadow government.

The MB advocates just enough democracy to obtain power but has no plan to govern democratically. Abdullah fails to respond, and the Gulf state funding stream is too little, too late. The MB plays fast and hard, outplaying Abdullah, the Gulf states, Israel, and the Western nations, all of whom wanted to draw a line in the sand at the Syrian border. Initially Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies support the Jordanian monarchy against what was perceived as an Iranian destabilization campaign carried out by Hezbollah and IRGC Quds operatives. Quickly, however, they shift their support to the MB and its military arm and alliances. An irresolute U.S. administration teeters between the need to protect its ally and interests and an internal public opinion that does not want another war in the Middle East. The U.S. decides to back Jordanian security forces, but again the help is too little, too late.

The Kingdom buckles under the new pressures as the region descends into chaos. Abdullah falls, either via assassination or exile. The Muslim Brotherhood shadow government assumes power, declaring the establishment of Dawlat al-Urdun al-Islamiyya, the Islamic state of Jordan.

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