temporary abandonment procedures

8/8/2019 Temporary Abandonment Procedures

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TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT PROCEDURES ± Depth of Displacement

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG, 123:24-124:4 (PM Session)Q. This was an unusually deep displacement of mud from the well, was it not?

A. It was deeper than normal due to the fact the lockdown sleeve needed weight below it to get setproperly.

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG, 124:12-21 (PM Session)Q. Well, the additional pressure, given the depth of this well, the displacement of mud with water in avolume much greater than is standard, is normal?

A. We were going to do a displacement at roughly 8,300 feet. It was a little bit -- well, it was deeper thannormal. We got MMS approval to set the plug deeper, purely so we could set the lockdown hanger properly and that's it.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG, 86:13-87:1Q. You testified earlier that one of the unusual aspects of the displacement here was down to 83 -- A. 67,that's true. Usually its 300 feet below the mud line, and 8367 is much further down than usual. Q. Whenyou say usual, it that what the rig was usually doing, the 300 below mud line and not a -- A. As a general,

yes, 300 feet below the mud line was a pretty typical displacement. Q. So that's another difference? A. Itis. It is.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG, 95:19-23Q. What did you understand the reason to be for the 8367 [foot displacement]?

A. I don't know. Q. You never understood that? A. No.

Ronnie Sepulvado ± 7/20/10, USCG, 147:13-148:6Q: How far below the mud line do you usually displace to sea water?

A: Normally 500 to 800 feet. You usually put the surface plug, the top of the surface plug is normally at500 feet below the wellhead.

Q: Have you ever gone below 3,000 feet below the mud line in displacing sea water? A: No, I haven't.Q: Have you ever known that to be done in any of the negative testing in which you have been involved?

A: No, ma'am.Q: Have you ever heard of it being done by BP in tests where you were not directly involved? A: No,ma'am.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 10:24-11:2Q. How many lockdown sleeves have you been involved with running before, sir?

A. This would have been my first one to set.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 14:15-16The timing of running a lockdown sleeve was not really a concern of ours.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 27:19-28:1Q. What's your experience running the Dril-Quip casing hanger in the lockdown sleeve? How many haveyou in your experience?

A. Well, in my past, I have been through quite a few casing jobs, but I have never ran the casing in thehangers as far as my responsibility goes.



Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 46:5-15Q. After displacement was completed, at some point later -- after that fact, after that event, then thelockdown sleeve was going to be set; is that correct?

A. That's correct.Q. Now, have you seen it done differently on other rigs; that is, that you set the lockdown sleeve first? A.In the mud, in the drilling mud. It would have been just another way of doing the same thing.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 49:15-21Q. In your past experience, have you commonly seen that plug, that cement plug, to be set at a muchshallower depth?

A. Yes, I have seen it set a more shallower depth, and I have also seen it where there's no lockdownsleeve.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 53:8-23; 54:7-24Q. Did that cause you any concerns with displacing the well before either one of the actuator ring or thelockdown sleeve are put into play?

A. Not concerned, no. -- safety. Not concerned as far as safety. It might have aggravated, you know, alittle bit because we were not going to do it with the mud when we knew we had everything clean and

swept out. But it was not a safety concern. It was just the possibility of maybe having to make anadditional trip to go in and jet and wash.Q. And that additional trip that you are referring to takes time. ... you have heard the expression "Time ismoney." I assume you have heard that before.

A. We all have.Q. And that is particularly true on a rig where BP is paying close to $1 million a day; isn't that right?

A. Yes, sir.Q. And so additional time to make an additional trip is a factor to consider. Do we want to extend the timeor not? That is one of those factors that businessmen look at when they make business decisions.

A. And that is all that was in my mind, because if we have a bad reading, then I would have to stand upand fight that battle, or my group would, you know, to have an additional trip run.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG, 60:7-22Q. But the displacement was somewhere around 8300 feet, right?

A. Yes.Q. A lot deeper than you had probably seen before, right?

A. Yes.Q. And also, this is the first time that you had seen a procedure that calls for displacement before settingdown the lockdown sleeve; right?

A. It stood out with me. But I have a little more interest in this one than I have before, and my concern is Idon't want -- anything to -- that might be -- that could possibly cause some sort of a problem with thesetting of a lockdown sleeve.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG, 65:13-22

A. I asked why couldn't we go ahead and do [the lockdown sleeve] in mud, and I can't even -- I can't tellyou who I was having the discussion with. But it wasn't going to happen. We were going to go through inthe sequence that we were given.Q. So whoever you were talking to just said this is the way it is going to be done, period.

A. Pretty much

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG, 74:25-75:16



Q.Mr. Skidmore, did you ever mention to someone on the back deck of the Bankston, the boat thatevacuated you,that at sometime prior to the blowout, that you had send an e-mail to tbe BP office askingfor a snakebite kit? You were overheard saying that. I want to ask you about that, what that means.

A. Oh, I hate it, but I did. ... this would just be in reference to just old sorry luck you might be having at thetime.

Michael Williams ± 4/21/10, P&R Transcript of Recorded Statement, 37:21-25 through 38:1-4I did seek out the driller, the off-tour driller, to ask him his opinion as to what he thought might havehappened. He said that he believed the only possible answer was the seal assembly failed, and with theriser displaced with just seawater and no mud weight, when the seal assembly failed, the well kicked,pushing the gas and the mud up through the water and onto the rig floor.

John Guide ± 10/7/10, USCG 207:9-22Q. Do you know how many times -- well, have you ever been involved in a well where the negative testwas conducted 3300 feet below the mud line?

A. Not to my recollection.Q. Are you aware of any other BP well having been negative tested below that mud line?

A. I'm not familiar with all the wells that we do drill.

Q. Are you familiar with any negative test anywhere on any well done that far below the mud line? A. I personally am not.

Greg Walz ± 10/7/10, USCG 143:11-18 (AM Session)Q So in this drilling prognosis that we have here, we have the lock-down sleeve and the lead impressiontool being run ahead of the cement plug and the temporary procedure, temporary abandonment, correct?

A Yes, sir. I believe this was a document that, to my knowledge, was a draft procedure.



TEMPORARY ABANDOMENT PROCEDURES ± Negative Testing, Bladder Effect

Paul Johnson ± 8/23/10, USCG, 50:1-10 (Vol. 11)Q. Have you ever heard of a term called "the bladder effect"?

A. Only in the testimony.Q. So before you read any of the testimony from these hearings, you had not heard of the bladder effectas a way to explain why one might find 1400 pounds of pressure on the drill pipe and none on the killline?

A. No, I haven't.



TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT PROCEDURES ± Negative Testing Generally

Christopher Haire ± 5/28/10, USCG, 6:19-25, 7:1-8 Around 5:00, we were requested by our cement unit for the negative test to monitor the well. After the firstattempt we were unsatisfied with it. I was directed to shut in from the well. At that point pressureincreased to 1,400 PSI. Around five minutes later I was instructed to, by the driller to open up from thewell and got about 15 barrels back and was instructed to shut in from the well again...Probably around7:00.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10. USCG 83:22-25I briefly explained to [Kaluza] how the rig had been conducting their negative tests, so he just wanted --Bob wasn't the regular company man on the Horizon.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG 87:2-8Q. So what was your understanding of why Mr. Kaluza was asking you how the rig does a negative test?Did you see any approved test from BP at all?

A. I didn't see an approved test from BP. I don't know what Mr. Kaluza's state of mind was, so I don'tknow why he was asking.

Michael Williams ± 4/21/10, P&R Transcript of Recorded Statement, 45:3-25 through 46:1 A. The only thing that I can think of is there was, during the pre tour meeting, confusion as to theprocedure that they were going to use for that particular operation they conducted on the well.Q. And what operation was it?

A. The setting of the seal assembly and displacing the riser and performing a negative test.Q. And when was that pretour meeting held?

A. At 11:00, 11 a.m.Q. And when you say "confusion," do you have any more details about it?

A. The OIM was explaining the procedure one way that he had gotten from BP, and the BP companyman, who was sitting directly beside me, said that that was not the correct procedure, hehad a different procedure; and the driller, Dewey Revette, was saying that we'll just kind of go with it as

we go with it.Q. And so --

A. "We'll get it worked out. Let's get up there and go to work."

Michael Williams ± 7/23/10, USCG, 231:2-10Q. Is that a safety issue if there is a negative pressure in the drill shack?

A. Yes, it is.Q. Why is it a safety issue?

A. Because the rig floor is considered an intrinsically safe area, but the drill shack is not. Anything insidethe drill shack can create a spark, which would ignite combustible gas.

Daun Winslow ± 8/24/10, USCG 148:20-149:1Q. Mr. Winslow, generally speaking, when a negative test is being performed for a Transocean customer and that customer's company man is present for the test, who decides whether or not the test has beenpassed?

A. The customer.

Daun Winslow ± 8/24/10, USCG 231:22-232:3



Q. You were asked very recently about a BP negative test. Were you ever aware that BP in any of thewells your rigs had been on with BP as the well site owner, have you ever seen a published negative testprotocol from BP?

A. No.

Randy Ezell ± 5/28/10, USCG 60:19-61:10 A. In our Transocean manual, I don't believe you can find a negative test. This was something that JimmyHarrell, as OIM, always insisted on.Q. That's what he said.

A. Did he? That's the way it was. He was that adamant about doing it. And we knew that he was notgoing to deviate from that. And he had some bad experiences on another rig, another time, years back,I'm not a hundred percent sure, but it taught him a lesson and he said that day he would always do anegative test. So maybe in some people's mind it could have been overkill, but it was standard procedurefor us to do that. It was something that we felt more comfortable with by doing it.

Randy Ezell ± 5/28/10, USCG 65:14-24Q. We have had a lot of discussion with the negative test. The first test wasn't up to the OIM's standards.What was the difference between the first and second test?

A. Well, I can't tell you anything about the second test, other than the toolpusher told me it was okay. Andthen also Don Vidrine told Jimmy that it was a good test, so I have no knowledge of that second test.

Jimmy Harrell ± 5/27/10, USCG, 30:15-35:22Q. In the course of conducting your negative test, how do you line up your valves? You said Mr. Vidrinewanted to do a second negative test. How did you conduct the first one?

A. You do it by bleeding off back to Halliburton up your drill pipe. You pump seawater into your tail pipeand all the way back up to above your annular with your spacer.Q. Okay. So then what did you do? You close your annular, keep your mud above your annular,seawater in the back side?

A. Yes. You hold the mud in the riser with the annular closed.Q. So it is not full, it is not completely to a seawater gradient at that point in time, correct? Because you

have seawater down the drill pipe, but you are holding it down on the back side. You have no commonback -- on the annular all the way back to the surface?

A. You have seawater in the drill pipe, and you have seawater in the kill line. Either one would be seeingthe same pressure as far as from that depth of 8367.Q. What did he want to do on the second test?

A. He just wanted to come up the kill line, you know. I guess to make sure everything wasn't plugged anduse one line.Q. If you did it the second time coming up the kill line on the back side, how did you do it the first test?

A. We done it up the drill pipe.Q. So you had the drill pipe, you had water in the drill pipe all the way down to 83 --

A. That's correct.Q. -- 67. And then you had it back up to the annular, correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And then you had your annular closed, and you had your choke and kill lines closed? A. (Witness nods head affirmatively.)Q. But then putting it up the choke line gave you a seawater gradient on the front side on your drill pipeand on the back side?

A. That's correct.Q. So the first test you did didn't give you a true seawater gradient because you were stopping it on theback side?

A. Well, it would. Still from that depth, I mean, seawater -- you got seawater, if it is going to flow, it willflow because you have seawater all in the drill pipe.



Jimmy Harrell ± 5/27/10, USCG 104:13-25Q. That night, were you aware of any test results at the well?

A. I was. Don Vidrine, the company man for BP, told me they had a good negative test for 30 minutes.Q. Are you aware of any other test results?

A. That is all he told me.Q. Were you aware of any others, sir?

A. I know the senior toolpusher told me he talked to the toolpusher on the drill floor before I got in theshower and said they had a good negative test.

Jimmy Harrell ± 5/27/10, USCG, 106:7-107:24 At that pre-tour meeting, I believe you testified there was a discussion between you and the companyman, Mr. Kaluza, about the necessity or desirability of conducting a certain test. Do you recall that?

A. Yeah, a negative test that I didn't see in the plan.Q. Is it correct that you wanted to have a negative test performed on the drill pipe?

A. I would not displace without a negative test being performed.Q. Did Mr. Kaluza agree you could perform such a test?

A. Yes. They didn't really have no problem with it. They just left it out of the plan, the forward plan.Q. Was the negative test that you and Transocean wanted to have performed at that 11:00 a.m. meeting

subsequently performed? A. Can you repeat that?Q. Sure.Was that test performed?

A. Yes.Q. Was that test a successful test in your judgment?

A. I thought it was. They wanted to do another. I reckon there's nothing wrong with doing a second test.Q. So the BP person, Mr. Kaluza, wanted a second test?

A. I didn't say that.Q. Who wanted that?

A. I think Don Vidrine wanted to.Q. Was that, at the time, then performed?

A. Yes, it was done.

Q. And was that test also successfully passed? A. Yes. He told me -- I did meet him. He said it was successful for 30 minutes.

Paul Johnson ± 8/23/10, USCG, 17:21-18:5 (Vol. II)Q. Do you know if there is mandatory pressure function testing on the BOP?

A. Yes. We have to do a function test every seven days, and that's all components on the BOP. Wepressure test the BOP every 14 days.Q. To your knowledge, had the BOP on the DEEPWATER HORIZON passed all of those tests leading upto the incident?

A. Yes, they had.

Brett Cocales ± 8/27/10, USCG 14:9-18 (AM Session)Q. And is it your understanding -- well, what is your understanding about how a well site leader knowshow to perform a negative test, the actual procedure for it?

A. They develop procedures on the rig, on the specifics, that this gives them the objectives, the depth todo it at, and they develop specific procedures on the nuts and bolts of how to actually do the negativetest.

Brett Cocales ± 8/27/10, USCG, 154:19-22, 155:25-156:6 (AM Session)On original procedure for well calling for negative test w/base oil:



A. My understanding of this is that if you are going to be setting the shallower plug, you would be doingthe negative test at the wellhead with your base oil. ...Q. So you are actually testing it --it would be a negative test, but it would not be to the same low pressureas with the base oil?

A. I believe you are correct, yes. The base oil would give you more of a negative test, that is correct.

John Guide, 7/22/10, USCG 161:3-162:2 (AM Session)Q You were asked a question about discussions, telephone conversations with the rig on April 20th. Ibelieve the question was specifically about the negative test, but were you involved in a telephone callwith the rig on the morning of April 20th?

A Yes, we had our 7:30 rig call.Q All right. And during that 7:30 call, was there any discussion about the negative test that wasanticipated to be performed that day?

A Yes, we did discuss a negative test.Q All right. What was discussed about the negative test?

A We were clarifying that the negative test -- I'm sorry. I said that wrong. It was brought up that thenegative test was permitted with the MMS to actually be conducted on the kill line, and that was really theonly discussion, was to make sure that we did run the kill line, so we would be in compliance with thepermit that we submitted to the MMS.

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG 165:12-25 (AM Session)Q All right. So at least in this instance, it was the guidance from shoreside BP personnel that instructedthe rig how to line up this test; is that correct?

A No, that's not actually correct.Q Well, perhaps you can help me understand then. Did I understand you to testify that in the morningmeeting on April 20th, you and others on the morning call had instructed the rig that based on the permit,the tests, the negative tests for this well had to be run through the kill line; is that correct?

A They were instructed that they had to monitor the test on the kill line.Q All right. And so that guidance, that is the guidance that came from BP personnel, correct?

A That is correct.

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG, 63:5-9 (PM Session)Q. Did Mr. Kaluza and Mr. Vidrine both approve the negative test that was performed during thetemporary abandonment procedure on this well?

A. Yes, they did.

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG 156:6-16 (PM Session)Q. So you do not believe that the procedure that was actually followed by your folks as set forth in, and Ithink it's an ops note by Mr. Morel on April 20 was, in fact, a deviation?

A. No, ma'am. If the negative test would have been done I'm assuming -- well, if the negative test wouldhave been done any higher up in the well than 8367 then whenever we did the displacement it would notbe giving an accurate negative test.

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG 157:14-23 (PM Session)Q. How does a well site leader know how the negative test should be performed?

A. He gets a procedure.Q. And who does he get the procedure from?

A. The engineers.Q. And the engineers, whose engineers?

A. BP's.



Lee Lambert ± 7/20/10, USCG 97:6-16Q. Did you participate in a task-specific think plan prior to doing negative test?

A. Yes. . . . To the best of my recollection, it was one of the MI mud engineers [that led the think plan] . . .

Lee Lambert ± 7/20/10, USCG, 98:12-20Q. . . . the performance of the negative test. What two different types of negative tests were discussed?What method did Transocean want to use and what method did BP want to use?

A. To the best of my recollection, Transocean wanted to monitor the test of the drill pipe. BP wanted tomonitor that kill line as per the APD.

Lee Lambert ± 7/20/10, 100:9-12I discussed [the results of the negative test] with Don Vidrine later in the living quarters, and he said thetest was good, and they would continue with the displacement.

Lee Lambert ± 7/20/10, USCG, 130:9-12Q. Can you describe the procedures that you observed before leaving the rig floor for the negative testthat you observed? What did you observe was actually done?

A. Displace the choke and kill lines with seawater, displace down the drill pipe with seawater and into theannulus above the stack, and close the annular.

Lee Lambert ± 7/20/10, USCG, 154:17-24Q. Did Mr. Vidrine indicate to you whether he viewed this negative test as having passed?

A. That was the short of the discussion, was that the negative test was good, and they were going tocontinue with the displacement.

Brian Morel ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021306Each rig does negative tests their own way.

Brian Morel ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021306Target was a hydrostatic pressure reduction of 2350 psi.

Brian Morel ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021307Ops note directs results of positive test should be sent to Houston but no similar requirement for negativetest.

Brian Morel ± 5/10/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021335Neg Test: Base oil - why changed to sea water - not enough for what wellbore would actually see if statement in procedure allows for this and an operations email was sent. Increase ___ to simulate onshoe under balance.

Brian Morel ± 5/10/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021345Once they got approval from MMS, did calculation that base oil in choke and kill lines would not giveenough differential pressure at shoe. The sea water to 8,367 would do this. Well Site Leader said we setbetter plugs in sea water.

Chris Pleasant ± 5/28/10, USCG, 98:4-8 During the negative test, they felt like they lost approximately 60 barrels of mud through the annular. Theyincreased the regulator pressure to 1900 and it stopped leaking.



Tommy Roth ± 6/17/10, Louisiana State Senate Hearing of Natural Resources Committee Our statement refers to . . . our crews were asked to participate within a portion of the negative test.During the negative test sea water is actually pumped into a number of the tubulars to be able to simulatea reduction in hydrostatic pressure that will take place once mud is unloaded from the well. Through thatsequence of establishing a sea water column in the well, a request was made to our crew to simply bleedfluid off. At the direction of the well owner, we bled pressure and fluid back to the tanks on the cementunit. We then closed the well in. We reported those findings to the well owner and he proceeded withadditional log work on the rig. But in no way were we in an ability to be able to confer either success or failure from that limited participation in the test.Q. Are you saying then, that the test was not sufficient or was inadequate to make a determination?

A. In being able to perform a negative test, again . . . a sea water . . . a column of sea water is pumpedinto the well and a differential pressure is established. Tubulars are actually sealed off throughperforming the negative test. And when a negative test is successfully performed, that differentialpressure can be released and there should be no flow of the well.Q. That was the case here?

A.We did not have enough information to be able to determine just what was the state of the fluidcolumns that had been established in the well. Flow would not be a positive indication of a good test.

Dan Ferguson / Tommy Roth ± 6/17/10, Louisiana State Senate Hearing of Natural ResourcesCommittee, 227-28 Tommy Roth:You know, Halliburton did not perform those tests.Sen. N. Gautreaux:Who performed those tests?Tommy Roth:Those tests were performed under the direction of BP. And as such, we weren¶t in a position to be ableto evaluate . . .Sen. N. Gautreau:Who was the subcontractor?Dan Ferguson:Transocean and BP performed those tests.

Sen. N. Gautreaux:Ok. Under their direction, ya¶all performed the test?Dan Ferguson:That¶s correct.Sen. N. Gautreaux:Based on their specs. Correct?Dan Ferguson:Yes.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020204; BP-HZN-CEC020201; BP-HZN-CEC020174Discussed with Wyman (toolpusher) he was comfortable with negative test procedure on annular; went

through procedure with Wymon.

Greg Walz ± 10/7/10, USCG 152:9-153:4 (AM Session)Q So that you're having a sea water gradient?

A And that was on the morning of the 20th. Because of this, I think here, there was conversation from therig, "Okay. Exactly how are we going to do the negative test," because there was this confusion, and thenbasically it was relayed to them through Mark. We discussed it. John Guide and I both concurred tobasically do it the way it was outlined on the "ops" note to clear up this confusion that was floating aroundon the procedure.



Q Okay. A And that basically -- And then I checked with Mr. Hafle after I saw the "ops" note from Mr. Morel toconfirm that we were in compliance -- that the rig was comfortable with everything and that we were incompliance with what we had submitted to the MMS.

Greg Walz ± 10/7/10, USCG 153:14-20 (AM Session) A I think we were in compliance. I mean, the tests that we performed was the most stringent tests of everything here. With the sea water down, the base water does not give us the equivalent differential, andwhat we did was the most stringent and proper thing to do.

Greg Walz ± 10/7/10, USCG 196:2-197:6 (AM Session)Q And you also testified that one of the reasons, if I understood you correctly, that you wanted to confirmthat the rig was okay with this "ops" note was that you had understood that there was some confusion onthe rig?

A In the morning call, the rig had voiced, "Okay. Exactly how do we want to do this?" They had knownabout the conversations that were going on, and it was raised to us, "Guys, can you give us" --"let usknow exactly to make sure we're all on the same page concerning how to go forward."Q Who on the rig expressed that request?

A I'm not sure which company man. It was in the morning call, whoever the company person was thatwas handling that there. I'm still new enough that people --that names and voices hadn't quite gottenthere. Q Without a name then, it was your understanding that on the morning of the 20th, the companyman, BP's company man on the rig was asking Houston to clarify how this negative test should be run; isthat correct?

A They were clarifying basically -- Yes, as far as how we wanted to do it, yes.

Greg Walz ± 10/7/10, USCG 20:17-21:7Q. I don't mean to put words in my mouth. If I misstate it, correct me. But I understood you to say thatthere was some discussion of some uncertainty in the procedures; is that right?

A. Yes. The morning call of the 20th, the well site leader on the morning call had requested him to clarifyexactly what the plans are around the negative testing. And Mr. Hafle was asked to follow up with the rig

and to make sure everybody was in agreement and on the plans forward and also checking regulatoryissues.Q. Now, you instructed Mr. Hafle to follow up on that, correct?

A. Yes, I did.

Dr. John Smith ± 7/23/10, USCG 34:14-22I don't know of any standard [negative test procedure that the industry follows].

Dr. John Smith ± 7/23/10, USCG, 53:17-25But all of the quantitative data tells us that that kill line has got substantial amounts of this heavy mud inthat are what is holding the pressure back. That we are not doing a test with a line filled with seawater.

We are doing a test with a line that's got this dense stuff in it, which is not what we really wanted to do.

Don Vidrine ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020336; BP-HZN-CEC020339; BP-HZN-CEC020342Transocean guys had dismissed it as anything serious and somewhat joked about [Don's] concern [withthe results of the pressure test]; Another interviewer's notes: "found it humorous that Don was concernedfor a long time; Kaluza convinced first, Don watched kill line then became convinced it was dead (another notetaker states, "[Don] monitored kill line-finally got comfortable since this line was zero.")



TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT PROCEDURES ± Negative Testing, Bladder Effect

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG 7:9-17 (PM Session)Q. Did Mr. Kaluza tell you whether Transocean's personnel had told him during the negative pressure testthat pressure on the drill pipe was something that they had previously seen which was common to them?

A. He said that they saw pressure on the drill pipe during negative tests in the past and it was notuncommon.

Lee Lambert ± 7/20/10, USCG 90:23-91:17Q. Who was leading the discussion on what bladder effect was?

A. Jason Anderson, a Transocean toolpusher.Q. And what was Mr. Anderson trying to describe the bladder effect to be?

A. That the heavier mud in the riser would push against the annular and transmit pressure into thewellbore, which, in turn, you would see up the drill pipe. . . . From my position, I think it is a validexplanation. It's the first I'd seen a negative test, so . . .Q. It was the first time you had ever heard of "bladder effect"?

A. Yes.

Lee Lambert ± 7/20/10, USCG 190:1-191:14Q. When you decided that you thought [Jason Anderson's Bladder Effect explanation] did not makesense, what new information had you learned and why then didn't it make sense?

A. Because the kill line and the drill pipe are opened up to the same annulus. So, in theory, you shouldsee the same pressure. . . . The only thing that does not make sense to me today is that the pressureseen on the drill pipe should also be seen on the kill line.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG 100:10-16Q. Did you hear something like a bladder effect or some strange explanation [for the 1400 psi negativepressure test result]?

A. I didn't hear that, no.Q. Have you ever heard of a bladder effect? A. No. I have not heard of a bladder effect.

Brian Morel ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021307They (on rig) knew about pressure on the drill pipe but observed no flow from kill line; not reported totown; toolpusher & driller said it was due to annular BOP affect.

Ronnie Sepulvado ± 7/20/10, USCG 150:12-14Q: Have you ever heard of something called a "bladder effect"?

A: Not before this happened.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI000139494

Jason Anderson said "Don and Bob, this happens all the time" [referring to what he referred to as thebladder effect, with respect to the pressure building up on the drillpipe].

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP-HZN-MBI000139504Jason Anderson said that annular element will compress the drill pipe. He said all company men do itdifferently but this [the bladder effect] happens every time annular puts pressure on fluid below.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI000139505



Driller (D Revette) said he had seen [the bladder effect] before as well.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00139527I believe there is the bladder effect, we didn't get a 2,350 psi negative test so didn't have full test.

Don Vidrine ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020334Kaluza was told by Sr. Toolpusher; they called in annular compression and said it was normal.

Don Vidrine ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC02036When [Don] arrived [at the Drill Floor] there was 1400 psi on DrillPipe. He said they shut the DrillPipeback in and it had come back up. He questioned this and was told by the team in the driller's doghousethat this was annular compression-he had heard about this but had not seen it before.



TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT PROCEDURES ± Negative Testing, Calls to Shore

Mark Hay ± 8/25/10, USCG 11:15-21 And we did a negative test. And probably about that time, 5:00, 5:30 is when me and Chris Pleasantmade the relief. And we was going to call town and talk to them about maybe possibly doing another negative test and that's when I left Chris there on the rig floor.

Mark Hay ± 8/25/10, USCG 103:2-14Q. It was your understanding from what the toolpusher told you that it was the BP man, Bob Kaluza, whowas going to call town to see about maybe doing another negative test?

A. That's correct.Q. What did you understand him to mean when he said the BP man was going to call town? What istown?

A. Call the main office in town, just to tell them what the results were. Whether the pods are negative, Idon't know, and wait on a decision.

Brian Morel ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021306If negative test unsuccessful the decision tree says contact John Guide; on that night Mark Hafle was

called but was unaware of drillpipe pressure; was told they had an issue that was resolved; he got theimpression there was a good negative test.

Brian Morel ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021317Regarding negative test: Minor Decision-Hand; Bigger-John Guide; on Apr 20, they did call Mark Haflebut was not told about pressure; "First one didn't look just right but second ok."

Chris Pleasant ± 5/28/10, USCG 101:5-8 After the negative test, Don told Bob to go call the office and tell them we are going to displace the well.Bob said okay.

Greg Walz ± 10/7/10, USCG 210:19 (AM Session)Q Did [Vidrine] ever tell you at any time on April 20th, April 21st, May 1st, any time, did he tell you that hehad a conversation with Don Vidrine in which they concluded that there had been a successful negativepressure test?

A The only conversation I had with Mark was immediately after I had received a call about the casualtywhen the event took place asking what was going on. I called Mark to see if he had heard anything, andin that conversation, he made a comment to me that he was talking to Don, and Don said, "Something isgoing on. I got to go," and that's all I knew. So there was something, he conferred with me that he hadhad one conversation, but I do not know what it was about.

Don Vidrine ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020335

Monitored flow 30 mins. Called Hafle to discuss.

Don Vidrine ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020336, BP-HZN-CEC020343Hafle called back while displacement +/- 9 pm; not sure why he called. Curious about how things going.

Another interviewer wrote, "Just before sheen test, Hafle calls to check __ tell Hafle negative test wassquirrly(?). Told Hafle no problems."



Don Vidrin ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020339, BP-HZN-CEC020347, BP-HZN-CEC0203521835-1950 Discussion. Called Hafle about ___ (not 1400). On the interview notes typewritten summary,it states, "I then went to call Hafle" without description of the call. Another interviewer wrote, "called Hafleto discuss surface plug, said still watching stripping(?) tank, dripping had stopped and everything lookedfine."

Don Vidrine ± 4/27/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020348I talked to Hafle about the 1400-said that if there had been a kick in the well we would have seen it.



TEMPORARY ABANDONMENT PROCEDURES ± Spacer Used in Displacement

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG 80:23-81:3 (AM Session)Q: Had you ever seen a 450-barrel spacer made up of LCM?

A: The spacer- The answer to that is "no," but I need to clarify, that this spacer that was already pre-mixed in the pits was not a particle-based LCM pill.

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG, 148:-18-149:2 (PM Session)Q. Did you know that these two materials were not designed for spacer applications?

A. Our drilling fluid contractor, M-I, ran pilot tests to insure that they would be adequate for a spacer. Andour in-house BP mud guys also checked to see if it was adequate to use in the spacer and they bothcame back and said it was adequate to use as a spacer.

Lee Lambert ± 5/17/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020226[From BP notes on 5/17/10]: "why using LCM as spacer - leftover heavy LCM fill instead of dumping it,used as spacer"

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/2010, USCG 46:19-47:22Q. Why was there such a large spacer?

A. The day I got to the rig I made the two LCM pills. And BP had wanted to use those instead of trying tobuild another spacer. And when we combined the two fluids we had a very large spacer. That was vettedthrough BP's environmental people. The drilling engineers were involved. Our fluid people were involvedand their fluid people were involved, and so that's why we used so mcuh.Q. I think you also in that same report indicated that it was 16 pounds per gallon?

A. That is correct.Q. Is it common to have a loss circulation material as a spacer?

A. Not common.Q. How common is it? A. It's an idea we had -- I say we, but the rig had kicked around that if we were inthat position. We were in different positions. We were in similar positions in different wells, we just never had the opportunity to use it.

Q. About how many wells had you used such a large spacer on before? Do you have a workingknowledge of a number?

A. I don't.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG, 68:22-23, 69:15-25Q. Was [the larger spacer] a joint idea between yourself and BP? «

A. As a joint decision, like I had a say in it?Q. Yes. A. Or M-I SWACO had a say in it. Ultimately that decision was BP's decision.Q. Ultimately it was their decision? A. Yes. Q. But you were involved in that decision? A. Yes.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG 90:6-91:2

Q. Who was it that didn't want to keep [both pre-mixed] pills? A. It's BP.Q. BP told you it did not want to keep the pills?

A. They didn't want to have to dispose of them, yes.Q. If you use the pills you testified before that if you used them downhole then you could have anexemption [under RCRA] as drilling fluid, right?

A. As an exempt waste, from what I understand.Q. What if you hadn't used them that way, what would the rig have had to do?

A. We would have had to -- I wouldn't know exactly where they would have to send it. I presume Newparkdoes disposal, so I imagine it was disposed.



Q. It would be hazardous waste disposal, right? A. Yes.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG 92:2-19Q. Are these two [pill] materials, the Form-A-Squeeze and Form-A-Set, are they specifically designed for application as spacers?

A. No. «Q. [] Did someone tell you that nonetheless it would be safe to use it for this application?

A. I remember seeing one email from the BP mud specialist saying it would be okay.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG 107:13-17I believe I sent an email and asked the [BP] environmental people if [the use of a larger pill] was going tobe okay. At the prompting of BP, I sent that email and I believe [John Lebleu of BP's] response was hedidn't see a problem with it.

Leo Lindner ± 7/19/10, USCG 128:18-129:2Q. You have testified, sir, if I understand correctly, that a Form-A-Set pill was combined with a Form-A-

Squeeze pill to make this spacer; is that correct? A. Correct.Q. Is that standard practice to combine those two different types of spacers?

A. It's not something we have ever done before.

Brian Morel ± 5/10/10, BP-HZN-MBI00021346Normally use WBM, couple ppg over mud weight; MI said no issues using LCM pill. Said they would washit up. Could also get rid of pill and dumped.

Ronnie Sepulvado ± 7/20/10, USCG 127:1-7I don't know where these pills got into the displacement from. Apparently, the mud engineer talked to their

people in town or BP or somebody, but he come in and said that they had been discussing, having somediscussions about using those two pills as spacers.

Ronnie Sepulvado ± 7/20/10, USCG 127:21-128:2[Leo Lindner] told me that, you know, we had those two 200-barrel pills that was in the pits that we weregoing to use for lost circulation pills, and he said we could use those as spacers when we did thedisplacement, and I told him, you know, I didn't have a problem with that.

Ronnie Sepulvado ± 7/20/10, USCG 128:9-24Q: And would you agree that Form-A-Set and Form-A-Squeeze are not specifically designed for use as aspacer?

A: I would kind of leave that up to the mud engineers « because they would know more about it than Iwould as using it as a spacer, and they're the ones who recommended ... using it as a spacer.Q: Did you question him about what the potential consequences could be of using those two pills madeup the way they were as a spacer?

A: No, I didn't.

Dr. John Smith ± 7/23/10, USCG 41:9-21[B]ecause this spacer that was suppose to separate the seawater from the synthetic based mud, all theevidence is it was not being displaced upward with the water very effectively, that a lot of it was falling



back down through the seawater. And so instead of the well actually -- the annulus -- well, the annulus of the well being filled from 8300 back to about 5000 feet sea floor with seawater, that space was filled witha mixture of this heavy mud and seawater that was actually more heavy mud than it was seawater.

Dr. John Smith ± 7/23/10, USCG 54:21-24Had you ever seen such a large spacer of about 454 barrels ever pumped before, sir? I don't think so.

Dr. John Smith ± 7/23/10, USCG 130:2-19, 131:18-133:2"A major departure from the approved procedure was pumping 454 barrels of 16 ppg LCM spacer. . . .You believe that the reading on the kill line may well have been influenced by the presence of the spacer,correct? . . .

A. Almost certainly.



TEMPORARAY ABANDONMENT PROCEDURE ± Timing

Shane Albers ± 7/22/10, USCG, 272:19-273:11Q. Sure. Does this procedure ... the marine riser should already be displaced with seawater, right?

A. Yes.Q. So that would indicate that BP planned to run the lockdown sleeve afterdisplacing the well to seawater,wouldn't it?

A. Yes.Q. Does this assume that there would already have been a successful negative pressure test beforestarting this procedure?

A. I'm unaware of any of the operations that take place prior to running the lead impression tool.

Shane Albers ± 7/22/10, USCG 269:3-17Q. In this interview on April 28, the notes also say, quote, Plan was to install lockdown sleeve on Sundaybut was delayed due to, quote, problems, close quote. Can you tell us what problems you were referringto that caused a delay of the lockdown sleeve?

A. I don't know the specific problems. I just know that the operations that had to be completed prior torunning the lead impression tool were taking longer than expected.Q. So do you not know or can you not recall what problems you may have mentioned in this interview?

Douglas Brown ± 5/26/10, USCG, 93:19-94:12« I recall a scrimmage taking place between the company man, the OIM, the toolpusher and driller concerning the events of the day. The driller was outlining what was going to take place. Whereupon, thecompany man stood up and said, "No, we have some changes to that." I really didn't pay attention to whathe was saying. They had to do with displacing the riser for later on that tour and the OIM, the driller andthe toolpusher had a disagreement with that. There was a -- I remember there was a slight argument thattook place and a difference of opinions, and the company man was basically saying, "Well, this is how it'sgoing to be," and the toolpusher and the OIM reluctantly agreed."

Douglas Brown ± 5/26/10, USCG 136:19-137:10

Q. Do you recall Jimmy Harrell after the interaction between the BP person and the OIM, do you recallJimmy Harrell as he was walking out saying anything?

A. Yes. He was ±Q. What did he say and how did he say it?

A. He pretty much grumbled in his manner about, "Well, I guess that's what we have those pincers for."Q. Repeat that.

A. "I guess that's what we have those pincers for."Q. Okay. Do you know what he was referring to or why he would have said that?

A. I'm assuming he was referring to the shear rams on the BOP.

Douglas Brown ± 6/8/10, Interview with ³Anderson Cooper 360´Brown: « The company man basically said we have changes to [the drilling plan]. We will be doing

something different. I recall it was something about displacing the riser with sea water for that tower. «Basically, [the company man] ended up saying, well, this is how it's going to be. And they startedreluctantly agreeing, and -- Cooper: You're saying the guy from BP won the argument basically? He said,this is how we're going to do it? Brown: Yes. That's what I remember, yes. He basically said, this is howit's going to be.

Brett Cocales ± 8/27/10, USCG 133:12-134:4 (AM Session)



Q. Well, the program that we saw in Exhibit 10, didn't that effectively have you doing the negative testbefore you displaced all the way down and then once you do displace all the way down, you monitor itagain for 30 minutes, isn't that right, according to Page 8 of Exhibit 10?

A. Yes, that's the way that particular procedure is written.Q. So that was a two-step procedure?

A. There is a change in what is going on is there is an approval to do a deeper plug to 3,000 feet, and if that approval is not -- was not given by the MMS, then the procedure that you are seeing would havebeen done to a shallower depth. So there was an option there and that was referenced in the operationsnote.

Truitt Crawford ± 4/21/10, Written Statement to USCG, 2I overheard upper management talking saying that BP was taking shortcuts by displacing the well withsaltwater instead of mud without sealing the well with cement plugs, this is why it blew out.

John Guide ± 7/22/10, USCG 122:15-123:14 (PM Session)Q. This is what I'm ultimately getting to and this is a narrow question. The lockdown sleeve which waspart of the TAplan submitted by BP on April 16 had Step No. 6 set, the nine and seven-eighths inchlockdown sleeve. Was there any reason why that lockdown sleeve could not have been the first step

taken in the TA procedure? A. It could have been. However, the reason the lockdown sleeve is set last is because it has two primaryfunctions. One of the functions is it is an internal seal for the future production equipment that is set onthe -- on top of the well. Therefore, you want to minimize any wire and/or pipe movement through itbecause you don't want to get scratches that can affect the seal. The second is that it does provide thecasing from thermally expanding during the production operation. The primary mechanism -- I'm sorry.The primary function of that lockdown hanger is to provide a sealing surface internally for production-based equipment at the end of the well when it's completed.

Merrick J. Kelley ± 8/27/10, USCG 83:23-84:15Q Okay. Now, are you aware, also, that in addition to the displacement being done before the lock-downsleeve, the [surface plug] cement job was going to be done before the lock-down sleeve as well? Are you

aware of that? . . . A Correct. I'm aware of that.Q So the sequence on the Macondo well was going to be displace down to . . . 8100 feet, then set theplug at that depth, and then run the lock-down sleeve; is that correct?

A Yes. Before we run the lock-down sleeve, we would have made another run of the lead impression tool,and then the lock-down sleeve.

Merrick J. Kelley ± 8/27/10, USCG 84:16-21Q Now, isn't it true, Mr. Kelley, that the lock-down sleeve could have been run first, and then the cement

job done, and then the displacement done? A That was one of the options that was stated in the procedure.

Merrick J. Kelley ± 8/27/10, USCG 107:13-108:4Q . . . do you defer the decision on when to run the lock-down sleeve to someone else other than your organization, meaning subsea BP? Does someone in the BP organization on the rig tell you when to runthe lock-down sleeve, before displacement, after displacement? Who makes that decision?

A The fluids that would be in the wellbore at that time we will give a recommendation on, but it will bemade by the drilling team, the wells team on the rig.Q Do you know who in the drilling team makes the decision?

A It's typically the wells team leader.



Brian Morel ± 5/10/10, BP-HZN-MBI00021335Discussion to set cement plug in mud? WSC on Horizon wanted sea water for better cement plug. Longstring versus open hole cement plug.

Brian Morel ± 5/10/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00021335Original plan - lock down, then set plug and then displace. But risk of stinger scratching lock down sleevecould be damage and ___ Hanger __ surface.

Ronnie Sepulvado ± 7/20/10, USCG, 78:9-15Normally we cemented the hole, open hole, put cement across liner laps, and sometimes we had bridgeplugs, sometimes they didn't set bridge plugs, then we set surface plugs, and then did negative testsbefore we displaced the riser with drilling mud with water.

Ronnie Sepulvado ± 7/20/10, USCG 197:25-198:11Q: So if you got a long string and you just pump cement on a production interval, you run a lock-downsleeve, you're in a safer position; is that correct?

A: Yes, you would probably be safer running a lock-down sleeve.Q: So why wouldn't you run the lock-down sleeve prior to doing the negative test?

A: Because I would have to be an engineer and try to figure out what difference it would make.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 53:8-23, 54:7-24Q. Did that cause you any concerns with displacing the well before either one of [the actuator ring or thelockdown sleeve] are put into play?

A. Not concerned Not. -- safety. Not concerned as far as safety. It might have aggravated, you know, alittle bit because we were not going to do it with the mud when we knew we had everything clean andswept out. But it was not a safety concern. It was just the possibility of maybe having to make anadditional trip to go in and jet and wash.Q. And that additional trip that you are referring to takes time. ... you have heard the expression "Time is

money." I assume you have heard that before. A. We all have.Q. And that is particularly true on a rig where BP is paying close to $1 million a day; isn't that right?

A. Yes, sir.Q. And so additional time to make an additional trip is a factor to consider. Do we want to extend the timeor not? That is one of those factors that businessmen look at when they make business decisions.

A. And that is all that was in my mind, because if we have a bad reading, then I would have to stand upand fight that battle, or my group would, you know, to have an additional trip run.

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 62:24-63:24Q. Did you have any concerns about the casing rising as a result of displacement possibly occuring?

A. You know, we have seen so many casing jobs over the years, when you get to that point, everybody

goes to the mind-set that we're through. This job is done.Q. Well, what do you mean by that? We're so close, that let's just get it over with or ± A. No, ma'am. What I mean by that is, when you run that last string of casing, and you have got itcemented, it's landed out and a test was done on it, then you say, this job, we are at the end of it.Everything is going to be okay. ... You are thinking ahead to your next job. You're moving on.Q. I see. So what you are telling me is that once you get that last bit of casing down, you think, Eureka, Iam on the home stretch, right?

A. You are.



Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 65:13-22 A. I asked why couldn't we go ahead and do [the lockdown sleeve] in mud, and I can't even -- I can't tellyou who I was having the discussion with. But it wasn't going to happen. We were going to go through inthe sequence that we were given.Q. So whoever you were talking to just said this is the way it is going to be done, period.

A. Pretty much

Ross Skidmore ± 7/20/10, USCG 74:25-75:16Q. Mr. Skidmore, did you ever mention to someone on the back deck of the Bankston, the boat thatevacuated you, that at sometime prior to the blowout, that you had send an e-mail to tbe BP office askingfor a snakebite kit? You were overheard saying that. I want to ask you about that, what that means.

A. Oh, I hate it, but I did. ... this would just be in reference to just old sorry luck you might be having at thetime.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020200; BP-HZN-CEC020185; BP-HZN-CEC020173-74; BP-HZN-MBI00139491The permit was modified for the surface cement plug. It was a different sequence. While running in thehole I was in the office and Mark Hafle called to ensure I had seen the modified APM. Brian Morel was

on the rig sleeping as he was on the cement job. Mark called to go through the ADP--said I should to talkto Brian so I went to wake up Brian. The team in town wanted to do something different--Mark was onvacation.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020200; BP-HZN-CEC020185; BP-HZN-CEC020173-74Team in town wanted to do displacement, negative test, but needed to follow APD. Bob asked clerk towake up Brian Morel. Brian had a procedure that didn't match APD. Town had decided to deviate. Briancame in and siad he would straighten this out with Mark Hafle. Mark had been on vacation and other team members wanted to do a different procedure.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020185Displacement, then negative test; rather than what APD says.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020200; BP; HZN-CEC020185 Anytime you get behind, they try to speed up. (Referring to deviation from original TA Procedure to dodisplacement and negative test together).

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-CEC020200; BP-HZN-CEC020185; BP-HZN-CEC020173-74They (the team in town) decided we could do the displacement and negative test together.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00139491 ___ want to do the displacment then do the negative test- not part of APD. I should talk to Brian. Went towake up Brian. The team in town wanted to do something different. Mark [had been] on vacation. We cando the displacement and the negative test together-don't know why-maybe trying to save time. At the endof the well sometimes they think about spending __.

Bob Kaluza ± 4/28/10, BP Interview Notes, BP-HZN-MBI00139498Safest way is to do this with SOBM in the hole. We were making assumptions that things would be ok.

temporary abandonment procedures

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