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U S ARMYSPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL

FORT BRAGG . NORTH CAROLINA

THEANTI-BANDIT WAR


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FOREWORDIn tlu: con/using welter 0/ in le1'-

national problems engaging the altention of th e American public following World War 11, tht: cancer 0/expansionist Soviel Communism fa.sttned itself in many areas withoutaltracling particular attention. 11was not until this malignancyreached out to take control 0/ Greece- the birthplace of demonacy-lhalit was clearly isolated and labeled (J,Jsuch. Thus identified it met determined resistance, the re.fulling struggle focusing atlention 0/ the freewar/.d first on the local prob lem then the larger issue.Forced into the field of active international assistance by the finan.cial inability of the British to renoder further assistance to the GreeJu,the U.S. decided actively to come to(he support of the Greeks, thus taking the lead in developing a policyof containment. The influence 01this policy has been world--wide, bUIil has Come into open conflict withexpansionist C o m ~ u n i s m in onlythree areas - Greece, Korea andIndoChina.The AntiBandit War, the firsl in

stallment of which appears in thisedition Of th e GAZE'ITE, is the firstcomprehensive analysis of the firstof these three conflicts.Some 0/ the conclusions of thearticle are unexpected. Th e effects0/ U.S. assistance were perhaps more


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JUT reaching in Ihe politral, eCOILO'm-ie Q11d psychological fields than inst rictly mi litary malten. The military de feat 0/ the Communists washastened by two lolr/ble events. Th efirst was Ti t a's split with th e Comi7lform , which ilse lf might no t hatleb ee n possible had n ot American (U -sis/ance in Grcea rusured a friendlyflonh instead of what might haveothuwise been a segment of Cominform eJlci,-clemen/. The second waJthe appointm!'nl of Field MarshalPapagos as Commandu-in Chief ofth e Greek. Govermnel, l Forces.

T he stud y of this fi rs t contact b e-tween expo71sionist Sovit:t Communism an d lhe policy 0/ conUJinmw tis 0/ more than his/oritlzi inteTf!sl.I t is of immediate, currrnl 071d. con-linuing interest. Th e problems arising from the common frontier withexpansionist Communism are no tconfined to Greece where the pre lien tsettlement rna)' be transitory. Th eyexist along the etltire 20,OOO-miiefrontier of Stalin's former empire.At any poi"t along this front thepatt ern of Comm Imist aggression inGreece rna)' appear or re-appear inwhole or in part . The Ant i-Bandit

Wa r, whi ch wi ll be pu bl ish "ed-i" f n J ~;nstallmenls, lays b a r ~ th e a n a l o ~of this pattern and discloses th e magnilUde of th e effort required to d efeM it in Greece.

Port IIN AUCUST 1949" IN n ~ o SWIFT

b l ~ the Greek Goj:!rnment forces,265,000 strong, drove the; self-styled"Democra tic Aimy," a force of lesst ~ n 20,000 fi ghters, rom the soil ofGreece. Superfici ally this appeared(0 be no great feat of arms! Indeed,it seemed scarcely to merit a .secondthought save for the curious circum.stance that this comparat ively smailforce had withstood the Governmentfprces for th ree years. That the'" Democrat ic Army" had been ab leto do this and, in so do ing, preventthe euab lishm cnt of condi tions favorable to lhe recons truction ofGreece, warrants serious study in itsproper context: The probH:ms arising from the common f{onder ~ i t bCommunism exist today in I ~ a n ,Burma and Indo-China as well as inKorea, and the pattcrn of Communist aggrcssion in Greece, as distin c: tfrom thal employed . in Korea, may. '

By Col J. C. Murray

ftppearelsewhere in whole or in part.What fanon present when theGovernment achieved i ts eu y victories in Vitsi aDd GrammoJ in 1949were not present when the guerrillu

undertook. operations in 1946? Whatfactors present from 1946 to 1948had altered by 1949, and in whatrespecLS? Had changing circumstances altered the signi ficance 01constant facton in the situation? Inshort, what were the fa cton whichled to the defeat of ComrnuQist aggression in Greece in August HH:9?For the most part. answers to.thesequestions are to be found in event lin Greece during the yean 19o16-4?_However. me event! of that periodhave their roots in the GttmanItalian-Bu lgarian occupation and in theliberation. Then too. h a p p e n i n ~in Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulpriahad reperarssions in G ~ c e . Inaddition. Greeet was dear the vor'tex of the to ldwar politicS of thegreat powers and its affairs were inftuenctd thereby to a greatd extentperhap! than those of odler nation. Thus reference will be m a d ~in this ar ticle to trenda and ~ Y e r i uwhith He oU1side the .strict ~ P h

In partiAan warfare, th e Dwnerieal, strength of the guerrUI.fighten i . I. . . . . g D i f i ~ t than " he attii;'de of th . p o p ~


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~ Limits 01 ....war. Non:ovcr. althoupdab primarily wic.b c.bcupecu 01 c.bc war againstgucrril ... political _ onomcouQdentiom inevitably intrude .

THE OI/ECTlVES"Dotooc. .1ic A...,."

With the signing of the VarkiJain february 1945. [LAS,e field force of the Communist.National Liberationhad g:alhert"d strengthmonopolizing the cause of m i s t ~and husbandit (or the pOll-war struggle (oreat. But thi' did not signalize the

the struggle for ~ e r . Althoughwea.pons were surrendered unr the agreement, they wen! largelyunserviceable. The better weaponswere cached away for the nextround. Although m()$t of the memobers of ELAS returned to theirbOOla, 4.000 crossed the frontier tofind $3:nctuary with the satelliteneighbors. Others remained in themountains. potentlal nuclei (orfuture bands. These lI.'ere hardcore Communists or criminals ~ ' h ocould not expect to benefit by thepartial amnesty features of the Var

lisa paCLAs the facade of the National Liberation front. behind which theCreel Communist Party had orig.inaUy manhaJled its forces. fellaway. the party leaden. sought newcatalysts, They found them in continued economic disrrns. the inability of political iea.1ers to establish aneffective go\ 'ernment an d in extremesin the treatment of the oppositionby rightist groups,Having pre\'iously failed to gaincontrol o[ Greece by political maneuvering and outright revolution, theCommunists now sought to achieveit as a consequence of the incorporadon of Greece or parts of it In .1Communist federation of the B a l ~kans. Their purpose 'was to facilitate the imposition [rom without o(,,'hat they had failed to achieve {rom",iulin. They ha d only to create thevacuum into which external lorees,""hieh stood wailing. could fio"'.

Thus, \\-hen the bands began tore-form fof!o\\'ing the first post-warelection. the Communists sought to

praotrate c.bc_y .... diocroditc.bc ~ t prepuarory CO IIJelrIo..... bu t unsu


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growing political demaml for pro.(cetion of towns and public utilitlesfurther reduced the Army's potential(or offensh'e operations.The Go',emmcnt lorces. by 110\\engaged In lull-scale operatiomagainit \he bands. achjeved some

success: bu t the bandits 3,\'oidcd being brought to decisi,c action, TheAnny frontier posts had been forced{O conc("mrate, leaving large stretchesof the frontier unwatched. \Vhenguerrillas in the north were hardpressed (hey m e r e l ~ withdrew across1),;01; Thu fHO. \ t tUTl1ed out to fu adu d dl.lt ' /argdy to em immedlQte rt'11011h) /ht' ("mud SaHOl1! Spaial Commilluon th e 1:Io1A4I1$, ..nd rke L"r1.ir.-d Slatts COl'-ernmenl, The former on 29 Dectrober


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whereupon the trappedwere to be annihilated.After some months it \\'as recogthat this campaign was a fail

During its course the guerrillasstrength and influence. Aof operations planned for Iher months was cancelled. Fola new se

of operaJions was bt'gun in AprilA preliminary phase LO deansoudHentral Greece appeared towell, but the timetable lagged

d the guerrillas consistemly ea-planned encirdemenu.

campaign culminated in a batMountain area

011 29 June. There, 112-15,000 guerrillas defended themmonthsthe attack of 50,000 Govern.troops_ The guerriHas evenLU

into Albania, bu t imin the \\h.area lO the northeast. OperaagClinst this new position failed.guerri l la activity in

panicuJarly in theguerrillasthe initiative.By midwinter the guerrillas had(hemsehes in thearea bu t the Army, em25,000 men, ~ V C l s wrestinginiliative from 3,500 guerrillas

the Peloponne,e. Meanwhile,Army was preparing the 1 9 4 ~It opel1ed wilh another

operation in cenlral Greece .in 1948, this phase proceeded sucBy the en d of June it wasthe mop-lip stage and tlle conof troops for th e Gram-Vjtsi phase was started. Folio\\' diversion in the Grammos

an attack. was launched in theon 10 August. Within:sition had heen

Of a guen-illa garrison ofapI!>roximalcly 5,000 withdrewAlbania. In the Grammos operalaunched on 24 August, the 200miles of the :u'ea was occufive days. Four thousandwithdrew inlO Albania.NUMERICAL STRENGTHS

e "Democratic Army"Guerrilla manpower may be measin terms of three categories of

- those serVing with thein Grt."Cce, self-defense collaboand bandit reser\'es outside

EL..4S - nuclei for }Ulure bOn(hGreece. The rlTSt category indicatesthe immediate combat strength ofthe "DelllQ('!;lIic Army." The numbe r of collaborators gives a measureof the intelligence, security and administrative sen ces 'J"ai!ahlc: to thebClnds. The llumbers outside Greeceincluded wounded righters, recruiLSin training aUtI pt.:'fsonncl engaged intraining or logistical activities. Tothese may he added a numher ofolder men and ,,"omell and abductedchildren of no combat value_ Thisfigure provides :m index as to thenumber of replacements and reservesavailable to the bands. I t is, therefore, a Oleasure of their stayingpower.

Supplementing the three categories of penonnel Listed above wereundetermined hundrcd:s of Yugostan, Alhaniam and Bulgarians whoworked hehind the horders of thosecoulltries [0 ai d the guerrillas.Personnel with bands in Greece

The rebeh started operations in1946 with a strength of 2,500 fighters. By lhe end of the year it hadreached 8,000. In April 1947 it was14.250 alld ill November 18,000,when:: it began { n level off. Fromthis time ollll'ard the number ofguerrilla fighters, in spite of a onetime peak of :!ti,OOO, W,lS maint;linedso constantly betwc{'n 20,000 to 25.-

000 to raise the conjecture ma tthis may have been thc established Ipersonnel allowance for the bands inGreece.Since the guerrillas might logically

have sought (0 a u g m ~ O l their comba t strength' until they could over-.come the Government by sheer (orceof numbers, the suggestion that theymay have been working under amanpower ceiling arouses speculation as to 'why, if it was the case,did the guerrillas accept this ceilingrWas the decision based on political.opera tional or 10gisticaJ grounds? Onthe surface there would seem to beno objection on political grounds tounrimited expansion_ However, mostof the latler,day recruitS had had noprevious affiliation with the Communist Party. Though they might beindoctrinated in Communism theycould no t be exdoctrinated fromHellenism. Since the leaders at thistime were working for the partitionof Greece, they may have thought itunwise to admit too much nationalism to the bands. Greek n a t j o n a l ~ism was acceptable as a propagandaline bu t it could be permiued noreal voice in the guerrilla government.

Operationally there was surely arequirement for greater strength.Bu t was the requisite control mechanism present? Perhaps the decision't o limit the number of fighters was.dictated by the inability of the leaders to comrol Ihem in combat whenthe percentage of forced recruits inrelation to volunteeTS became tOOhigh. Possibly, too, the limitationwas based upon logistical considerations. Dependence upon the satellit es for logistical support was gTeat.The botlleneck may have been thenon-availability of equipment andsupplies, or it may have been in thelimited capaeity of the sometimes.tenuous supply line from sources inthe satellite sanctuary to users inGreece_ Whatever the reason, thenumber of fighters serving with theguerrillas remained in (he vicinityof 20,000 to 25,000, except duringthe initial build-up and again justprior 10 the collapse. At this lattertime the strength had fallen to less.than J8,000.CollaboratorsThe numerical strength of the"self defense" element of the guer-

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"rilla movement can only be e'!itimated. The value of the collaboraLOrlay in the fan that he was no t known- in daylight a peasant tilling hisfields. at night he might bear inteHi.gence (0 a guerrilla headquarters orplace Illines jn the highway. Somewere disco\'ercd; others never willbe. Their number was great. Themagnitude is indicated by lhe cap lUTe or surrender of 1,600 collaboralOrs in connection with the mili[;u)ddeat of a force of 3,600 guerrillasin lhe Peloponnese in early 1949.The ratio o[ collaborators to guerrillas was even higher on the mainland. particularl)' near lhe nonhcTItfrontiers where the guerrillas exn"(ised domination for long periods oflime an d where the price of sur"i\.:Il.in many instances, was cu llabor;nion.An indication of the potential [orcollaboration is available elsewhere.The three eleetions held since 1949show thitt at least 200,000 maJes ofvoting age \\Iere favorably disposedtoward, or susceptible to lhe influence of the Communists_ This doesnOt mean , of (o urse, that all wereactive eollaborationists, but it is a(actor olO be kept in mind in assessing the strength o( the guerrillas.Bandit reserve outside Greece

Many of those serving in the bandswhen warfare was renewed had en joyed the hospitality o( the northernneighbors prior to the call to action.The number crossing into the satellites {()lIowing the signing of theVarkisa agreement was about 4,000,and the numbers of bandits harbored in Alhania, Yugoslavia andBulgaria thereafter did not {all below this. A representative estimateof t.he numher of Greek rebels in IhesateJlites cluring the war is: Albania-4,500 cumbat f f e c t i v c : . ~ ano 6,500noneffeetiycs, including older menalld women, wounded fighters andchildren; Bulgari:-.- 2 , OOO to 2,500eombat cffeLti\'es and 2,500 noneffectives; and Yugoslavia - 4,000combat effectives an d perhaps 10.000non-effectiyes.Few of dlese reserves were commined during Lh e final b a l l l ( ' . ~ andthese Irom Albania ami Bulgariaonly. Tito's dosing of the Greek.Yugoslavia border in July 1949 quarantined 4,000 combat e f I e c l i H ~ s inYugoslavia and drove a wedge between the main strength of the gut.'rrillas in central Greece an d 2,000 to

2,500 guerrillas in Bulgaria and2.500 in east Nbcedoni:t and Thrace.The latter, havi!lg b "" t'n deprived ofthe protected eaSL-weH route northo( lhe frontier, could not move tothesuppol t of central Gn: t:tt as Govcrnmclu {orce.i controlled the regionbetween sea and fronti er in c.:emralMace dollia. Thus, lhe closing of theborder resulted ill an o'Hright lossto the guerrillns of -1 .000 fi gh te.rs nndisolated as many as 5,000 morc tromthe balan(c of tht: guerrilla forces.l'his was a per sonnel loss oC from 30to 35 percent.Sources of guerrilla manpower

Sometime ea.rly in tilt" war, possi .bly aher the (rontier incidents wereGilled to lhe: at l t;lllion of the UnitedXations in December 1946, a guerrilla policy decision mu st have beenreadied th'lt (;n..:\.:ks ollly would. beu ~ e d ill the war against GI"('ece. Th ehearings befo re the Un jlul NationsCommission produced cddcnceof the presence anulIlg th t gllerrillasof personnel of foreign nationality.There were occasional ~ i g h i n g s o[indiyidu,lls or sma iJ p:m it:s wearinglh .e uniforms of Yugosla ...ia, Bulgariaor Albania Greek. territory.Bu t the sense of the cv idence suppor ts lhe vi !"'\\' that in order to fur ther the concept of civil war therewas initially a d t!c.; ui on aga jnst employing in G reece the int el'll,niona}brigades or the Spanish civil war.

Later there were indications thatthis policy Hlay have heen revised.

There were rumors, for example, ofe n l i t m e n t for duty in Greece in thesatellites, in East Germany and evenin Western nalions, including lheUnited Stales. It sllch eniistlllentswere actually made, the war hadcom e to an end before they appearedon the field of battle.

The guerri lIa leaden , therefore.had only one major sourCe of manp o w l - e c ' . The earliest additions to the original 2,500 were theeasiest. Perhap 'i nOlhing was neededbeyond the establishment of a rallying point. T hey were ex-partisans,advenmrcrs anti ((iminal ., but theyincluded some simple cOUnl ry folkwh o had fallen viclim to COlllllluniupropaga nda. There were ah o citil.e ll S who had bee n the victim of UIlreasoning d i ~ c r i O ) i n a t j o n since tbe11)1-1 revolution. \feanti.me, a \'igorOilS c


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of the diss identS had already joinedup . The 1947 campaign o( theArmy, although far ho m successful,wa$ produ li ng siglJifi cant guerrillacasua lti es. I hei r dfect was dual.The guernl l as ll:qui red mo re person nel to maint ain lhei r st rengthjust as pOlemi :d recruits we re disCOli raged Com 1"1l1i\tillg. Mo reover,there was at Ihis tillL e increasi ng evidence of U,S. interest in Greecewhich tended to fill the va cuum ofdirection and objective crea ted bythe inefleclivenessof the Governmentand by lhe waning of the UnitedKingdom's effort in Greece. Ev idenceof U,S. intcreli l was not confined lOthe purposellil ulleran ces of Amer ican officiah. \ filil:ll"y equi pme nt andwar materials were beginning 10 beunloaded at the porLS to spread outover the land. This was a langu agethe pragma tic Gr eek could be n understand. A "wait and see" at titudedeveloped among potential volunteers.No longer able to main ta in theirstrength by volunteers, the guerrillasresorted 10 forced recruiting - amelhod of procurement based uponthreats, holding of families as hostages and recruiting raids duringwhich young men .and women ofcombat age were abducted , Thiseventuall y became the pri mary met hod of ob taining personnel. Of 18,-500 guerrillas in Greece just beforelhe final ba u les, as many as 11 ,000were forced recruits. Mor eover, theincreasing numbers of women suggest that even this method of recruiting could no longer providemale fighters to maint a in lhe.trength of the bands,Casualty rate in relationto recruiting rate

From 1946 (0 early 1949 lhe guerrillas suffered an average of approximately 1,500 casualties per monthand recruited at the rate of about2,000. From January to Ju ly. thesix months preceding the withdraw.al of the "Democratic Army" fromGreece. there we re significan tchan ges in both casual tv and recru iting rates. Th e f o n n rose to amonth ly average of 4,000 while thelatter declined to an av erage of1,000.

The se trends were resulting in agrowing shortage of guerrilla manpower, Evenlually they could haveled on ly to contraction of the guer.

'rilJa order of hau le. T he decl ine inrecruiting may have I II LI l cause orit may ha\ 'c be t H dft( l . Gu errillllSmay have been u n;!.!>l , to procuresufficient recnLi ls lO lilaintain theirst rength or guerrilla leaders mayhave reached a d e c i i ( ) n as to thefuture conduct of the war. If acause, the decline in recruiting musthave been a " 'eigllLY fa nor in induci ng the guerrilla leaders to s u ~ pend military operatiuns.Goyernment forces

Ground forces employed by theGovernment in military or pa"a-m ilita ry fun ctions during the anti-banditwar included the :\"alional Armv, theNational D Corps, the 'Gcn.darmerie and 3tmLu ci"iliam. -th estreng-ths of all components were ilicreased from time to rime ;)s th


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magnitude of the task of eliminatingthe guerrillas was more fully appreciated and as the means for maintaining larger forces became available.The National Army

When (he Government returned[0 Athens in OctOber 19+1, the onlyremnants of the pre war Army weretwO unil s; [he 3d Brigade of 2,000men and the "Sacred Squadron" of600 to 800 officers. The United Kingdom underLook to equip and train an('w Army. The objt:ctivc W 3i tomake it an efIec.:tive force of 100,000by 1948. Howc,-cr, by April 19'17 theneed' for employing the Arm y against. the bandits resulted in decisions torevise slrength upw;:ud to 120,000alld to shorten the planned trainingprogram.

In early H 8 it was in creased to132,000. A temporary increase of

15 ,000 ""


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\ \ " :b fo nn ed thc Gend:..tnne,"t: II . l . ~reduceel in :>In!ligt h an d confined I t lpolice wOlk. hs strength there:ifrcrwas mai ntain ed at aboul 25 ,OllO.Armcc4 civiliansDuring :md following lhe 19-1-1

re \"ohltion, riglHisl banels ,,creformed W cOlllh;ll EL\S trOOp s.Thev "ere no t well controlled an dwcn. somc lime.s guilty o[ excesseswhjl h hdpcd to s,,ell thc r:mk" ofth o!> !." oppmt 'd In the G on' llllllf:nl .

IlSCIIUCll l l r 'I"hen lighting hroke(Ju t 3(' :li n . Bri tish ;md later \lHcr i,COIr, ;'\dl"isors ohj(,(" led to a rmi ngfh js did !l 01 p ,'evenl l i l t>

f o n m H or civilian l l l pfiN Nlu ipping th !'ll \ 1 ilh ~I L,l prJnC -1\.ttl, lh l/! [Q ti le Go\-cn lnl c flt. E \ ( ~ l l t u l the RAme.rr were rorted 10 rt..ocognilrI Mot Ih; : ("omhilled dlort$ or lh eAnm :\: lIi(mOiI D r f c n ~ ' Corpo; ;Il U.I

(; el)(I:l IIIIC' i l 1IHlld Ilot IlllH e( 1 ,,11,h e \illagcs trom gucnilla atl;Ick.They Iherdore approved the distri ,hutioll 01 J i n e ~ LO rc rt :lin {i\ili;1l1

r o m p O l : ~Initially th e Ill!"t ) 1 " \ l I ~ d l oroI I I 'ilcd 3roups \n?re \1. ... 0 :md \I.\Y,T he former ,,as o lg;.lIIi /.ed 11\ local

political for dcfelhC of theirIn n \ \ " i ! l a I t, dt" l I l j l\ l ' l i ' p ro ,\ illcd by til" G' ) \ ( 'L l l l l l l n t . Thl" \ I .\\ "units \l" l;n: ci"ili :tlb rC(T lIill'tl by th e:\ rm} ' ror sc n 'ice ill the gCIICI"ai vi


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the Army in such operatioru wouldba.., left the civil coDlJlluruty withOUt diJ:t,ct prot


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TBB AlflI-BANDIT WARBy Col J .C. Mu:rray

PARr II


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the Anti-$,.nopt;,:

In }'J./ft, IUWIrl!; ptt:t'lou.sl) Illlled to gum (UU/H)t 01Greea by pol i lmt/ f fwl le lwt ' l lng and Qlflright uvolu-tlOI1, the {;ul1Il1um;sls suught tu nchu:lJf! It by inco;.pmMwg, Gru(f!, Qr pmlJ of ii, In a CommlmtSlrt'dt'm(lon of {ht' 8alkllus,

Th e frullpoign began 7J!ilh the murder uf iSQlalt'dof ' cia Is an d the [;c171mg OJ ' {/lrc-alcrtmg oj right-wingCllr;'(,IU 01 pr(lmint'lue. Xext catne atln("ks OIl nnatlviJiug,es and Ult fargel" Gendarmerie detachments.Tbt'll in 19-/; tlu' bandits vt'gan to lry to hold urlainnrea.) 10 proJect t l ldr supply routes and lhry playedIheh trump ("tlrd - l h e establishment of lhe "Pravis.fional DemU(Hlfic Government,"

The . J ~ l I d y of Ihis first mfact Ue!u.'un t'xpmuionislSm.,jet COU!'Ilttlllsm Im d lhe policy of conlninmentfhrmld be of immediafe, currtnt an d continuing l l ' I l ~ eM. The .\Ott-Bandit \Var lays bare tht: nnafomy 01this pattem of CommuniJt aggrtSJiol1 and discioJtJIht: mngllilude of the ellar! )'eqllirt:d ta defeat it. Inrlie finnl aim/pM. it (f)ok a period of thue years and2I'ij,OOO u:ell-eqllipped Govermnent tlOQPJ to ddeat tJ(m w of less than 20.000 gHerrilias. Part II tflesec


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Bandit WarWhen 8 wmnlJlDder fail. to tailor hi. tllctic. to th e fo""," at hi. clispooa!, he is

doomed to failure. The guerrinas found this out in th e mountAins of northern Greeee

Part IICOMPOSITION Of fORCESFROM THE START OF THE BANDIT

war LO iu end. the "DemocraticArmy" consisted almost exclusivelyo( light infantry. The guerrillas hada "cavalry brigade" and some antiaircraft and field artillery. Artillery.however. was of lillie value. Neitherthe guns nO f quantity 0' ammunitioll could be COllcentraleu Coremployment. Except in the Grammas and Viui areas, where it wasused both in defense and in slipponof guerrilla aHacks. anilkry wast"mployed only in delivering sporadic har;using fire on tOwns or viilages. I t contributed to the campaignof terrorism against the civ il popu lation. bu t iu military significancewas slight.The services of the "DemocraticArmy" were, for (he most part, es-tablished beyond the {ronlier wherethey were protected frum altack .They included training cemers,transient


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They 'I'erc excclk'm in a raid on anundefended localit) ur a night raidagainst a del ended locality pro\ idcdthey had huilt lip previously, as 'wastheir custom, a local superiority ofLorce. They ,,'ere at their worst in acia) light attack against a fortifiedposition or in an effort to defend byholding ground. They were incapablc of winning military d e < . : i 5 i o n ~ag


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ul lhe "Gon 'r aUll'lll ul Crcc("c . w at-CJuire a lerrilOl i:d ua.,e {;C) III 'parab le (0 YCllan in China or the" People's Republic" in Korea; or itma)' h a H rcllcl lcd gUl'l'lilla rClo g t!idon lhal Lhey cuu ld nol. (o !HillllC

r a ( j o n s without Sli PpliClo Iromacruss lhe horder. T o C t l . r c Ihelr

~ u p p l y 1i1)S the), must uch:ntl :t 11


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FOrlY Commando companies wereformed initi.lil),. SulHequcntly thesewerc organized into four groups offive companies each. The strengthof the group was OIhout 6 ~ 5 . In thesummer of 1949 the tour Commandogroups were placed under twO hrigade headquartcrs an d a fifth groupwas organi1ed.As had happened in the UK an din the U. S. the best fighters wereconcent rated in the Commandounits. They received better pay.equjpmen t, training. l i v i l l conditions and more publicity. Everything was done to se t them up aj aspecial c a t e ~ o r y o( pel"Sonnel. Thisthey beGUile, bu t the reason for itlay not ill this favoritism. The real$o urces of their esprit de corps weretheir im ense military aelivity and asuccession of mili tary vic tories.

Owing to their offensive spirit andthe widespread confidence they insp ired. the Commandos began togain a monopoly of the right to fightthe guerrillas. Other uniLS, recognizing thei r superiority, were cantent to let them do so. Command ers."ppreeialing their quality and thereadiness with which they undertook operations, began to use themin preference to other troops in operations of a ll kinds_ It became necessary [or the Commander-in-Chief,who regarded these troops as a k.i nelof stra tegic reserve, to state theirproper role. Commandos were to beused along the following lines:

l. In night raids to open gapsin defensive works for later explo itation by infantry.2. In deep raids into enemy-controlled territory_3. In penetr!ltions to atta ck. therear of enemy troops pinned downby fire, especially nea r the en d of thefight.4. As strategic reserv es to betransported to the point of employment by rapid me:dns such as aircrakExcep t (or an init ial reluctance toaccep t the idea of specia l unitS. theCommando concept wa s no t questioned in Greece. They were regarded as lightly anned. highly mobile and very effective.

Actu ally the Commandos were notlightly armed; they carried more firepower th an a c:orresponding numbel'o f infantl"'?rmen from a standard unit.Their mobility is qUe1tion:tb le sincethey h; followedby " r e v l t a l i ~ a t i o l \ " of an increasillg


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number of Deiense Corps units an dtheir redesignation as light-infantrylJaualions, As the Army becamemore "


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, ,II I ,'.ti II IIh 1111.. 11. '

10 1 .q p ppcd I II Ih , -0111',1. idll", ll" .. wi!.

.. , 1,al.lI It ' 1.I ,d b y ), 11( II' . l l l ,hck .", tl.(' t hle h. ,HI illliic;lliuli uf )!,t l( ' l r i l l ; \

I '. :lh n ::) pI.:LI 10 ;11111;1I1ICIII.Prohahh no more: ac.:CllralC (. . i l l l ; l I ~0 1 11K II Ilu hc: r:- ;lIld typ(' :


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Silcablc t o t " k ~ uf O ll!"h wcapuns ha db('('n ma d e :lv.nlahl, 1)\, [ill' sillt:llitcs.\\'1111 i'::'ICd ul three l!l i ,1-;:.11(" . :-\n ,\UPI"JI'lillg :lnllS wercI I rg ; I I lH \\'Ilh th e i ~ i o l L lIo\\,cvet,.1 lIlcdilllll 1II,lLhill C g-un I oIllP:JIlY urJ() \' i t kc r:; was uonnally al l ;'l"hcd:llJd t lu 'n ' W;IS ,lvai!alJk 101' l i l t l J p 'pon 01 (' ;11.. 11 divisloll :Jhout tw o batteries of ;milh.:ry ; t l l d a rel.:ullllaj),alii C s'lll:lt!! 1111.The :lIlilkq ' was OIg:lllized illiOeight IfxilllelllS. Illt,ulllain n : ~ i1llC. 1H I.:ull.sisterl of two Imlteries ul 3.7Jl\()Ulll a in huu-ill_cn . SUlUClilltCS at l:t(IH:d W: lS ;' h:tlll'I'Y uf 1,2 llHlrWI S,rile field reRiment (Ullsisted 01 ['.1'0

batteries or :!;j.pounde rs . 1n adc.L lion, there wcre two hilucrics of

Increases in armament underU. S. aid programU. S. llli lil:II'Y aid made it pu!>s ibleto le t lily StllllC 01 the short (OlUill l)sill arm ;! mc lH. bllt cil:ll!gc) G IOI C

~ J o w l y To l v l ' cUlIlplclely t eoeqllippnl lht.: Al"lIIy with U. S. wrap om would have n :quired marc f u n d ~lh ;1Il were availalJ h: an d e _ ~ 5 i t : I l t . : r lex u:n. . i\'c rClr:.linillg . Hri l i311 cql,i ?IIlent, hO\\ '( ' \ ' l .:I ', W ' I.$ by lat e wn d e tcriul'OJting i l l I ~ "al" :,ul"pluses i l t lh eU,K, wen.: heing e xhausted rapid ly,especially SIII :l 1I anllS an d cre \\' served e a p o l l This approachingexhallstion of Bri l ij h stocks ncceo.sil ;lled the gradual replacement o{

Tan.ks - no t prncI,iwl lo r guerrilla huntingmedium al'lillery ulilsi sting 01 tourJ.5s each .

T he annored reconnaissancei l " a d r o l l ~ , equipped \\'il h [he U. S,swut ca r anrl the Britishmade

Humber armored ca r, were OIKani1.etl into recollnaissance regim ellt s,of which there were three, T o complete the list of armament, it is o nlyne(CS3ary to add three small tankIInits equipp('


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long way towards increasing its sel(sufficiency and its effeCliveness inmounlain warCare.

By February 1948, the eontraclin g-qualllilies of British weapons dictated their concentration in certainunits. A d e c i ~ i o n was reached toreplace the .303s, the Bren guns andthe Vickers machine guns in threedivisions an d nine light infantrybaualions with the 1903 riRe, theBrowniIlg automa tic riRe and theM191 9A4 machine gun, respectively.The changeover was eHeeled in twoof the three divisions prior to thefinal battle.The advent of the U. S. light TIIJ'chine gun served to bring aboul areorganization of the machine gunestablishment, nOl only in the threedivisions (() be U. S.ecptipped hutthe five Britishequipped divisionsas well. The divisioTl machinl! gllOcompany was replaced by a four-gu nplatoon in each infantry battalion.This increased the machine guns inthe division from an emirel), inadequate 16 to 36, and placed th em organically at the level of theil' normalemployment .

To meet the need (or a directfireweapon suitable for anacking cov.ered emplacements, two new weap'om were introduced in July 1949 -the 2.36 roc ket lau nche r an d the75 mm recoi lless riAe. Rock'eLlauncher teams were organized onthe basis of nine per division. and amu Ie-transported recoilless riRe com pan y was formed. The laHer was tobe assigned to the highest commander in the battle area who cou ldre-assign its elements in accordancewith the tactical plan and the na lure of the enemy fortifications. Th eearly collapse of the guerrillas di dnot permit Cull evaluation of theusefulness of ch ese weapons.Armament of raiding forces

When the decision was reached tore-equip three divisions ""ith U . S.arms it was also decid("d to reequipthe Commando5 . Prior ( 0 that dalethey had been equ ipped with the

. ~ O S rine, a high ratio of Bren gunsan d su bmachi ne guns. bu t no ma o

chine guns. 111 this Cilse the 1\,.( I riHeralhe r lhan the Springfield replacedthe .303. Fiftyeight Browning au to-Lllati c rilles pe r group replaced a 1ikenumber of firen guns, and BreI!

on hand ill eX( 'C5S of th is number were re tained. Five 2.36 rocketI;Iu nchers \Vere issued . Machine gunswere issued for a group machinegun platoon. The conver5ion of theCommando units was accomplishedquirkly and all five groups were reoequipped prior to the final campaign .Arms for civilian components

The problem of arms for civilianswas always vexing. Fotlowing theliberadon, the Government had pe1milled the distinuion between officia l and unofficial mea ns of comballing guer rillas to berome haz y.\Vh t n the G o n : r n m e n t in November1946 requested arms for civilians innorth Greece, the United Kingdom ,s(il( smarting from the effcc:ts of cri.tic:islll (o ll owing- its support of theGreek. Government in 1944, flallyrefused. However, other arms were

and the question of resupplyof ammunition arose periodicallythereafler. At a later date an d withimproved organization o( the civilian components during th e re-settl(,"ment of refugees, .. iOS riRes of limited se rvlceab ility were issued forcivilian use.Armament of National Defense Corps,light infantry

The initial weapons a llowance forDefense Corps battal;ons includedriRes, Sten guns, 25 Bren guns an dtwelvc 2inch monars. As additiona lequipment became available theywere armed \\ilh four 8 1 010 martars and four Vi(kers machine gUf1S,an d the number or Bren guns wasincreascd to 36. The machi ne gUll

gi \'c n (0 the Nne ball,llion evenbefore the regular Army battalion .presum ably uecause of the stalic defensive role of the former and i:.sisolation.Adequacy of armlment

In view of the limited capabilitiesof artillery, particula rly prior to the

Y iui gll.erriUa ba.r ion-i'ormfltion or the mountain llOwilzerbatteries, an d in vi ew of the tailurctv develop fully the a ir suppor t po-tential, the conclusion is inesca pab leth a t the Army was 1l0t armed tomee t the gue rrilla s on the mostfavorable terms . Som e improvementsin infantry fi"epower were made inthe final yea r of lh e war; an increase

. in machine guns and their inco rpo ration in the infantry battalion, the,eequipment of lhe raiding forces toinclude machin e g'uns and !\ f 1 riResand the issuing of rocket I:wnchersand recoi ll ess riRes. These develop'men IS, however, c


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lr .y artillery Jound a target

Comparison of armaments andsummary

\ CfJ l l lPai i.i.o ll K . l W ~ the total!lumbers of gu errilla an d Governmen t weapons ha s no more slgnifi.Cl'HlCC lho'ln a cO lllpa r ison lxlweenwe Lot aJ pCl"lIonnel stl t,t 'glhs of th eTC"5pcctivl' n t : ~ . In the early stagesuf Ih e W ;J r Ih e g uerrilJ>t, man t9 r!llan, l\'

sws grece1

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