succession digest compilation (07.22.13).docx

7/27/2019 Succession Digest Compilation (07.22.13).docx

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AUSTRIA VS. REYES(1970/ CASTRO)Petitioners: RUBEN, CONSUELO, and LAURO AUSTRIARespondents: HON. ANDRES REYES (CFI Rizal Judge), CRUZ siblings

Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament.Although this was opposed by the petitioners Austrias (nephews and nieces) of Basilia. CFI allowed probate of the will.The bulk of Basilias estate was to pass on to the respondents (Cruzes), all of whom had been assumed and declaredby Basilia as her own legally adopted children.

More than 2 years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. Respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor

w/out bond in accordance with the provisions of the will, despite the opposition of Ruben Austria.

The Austrias filed a petition in intervention for partition alleging that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that theCruzes had not in fact been adopted in accordance with law, so they are mere strangers to Basilia and without any rightto succeed as heirs. The CFI allowed the intervention.

The parties debated the authenticity or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced by the Cruzes. The Austriasmoved that the documents be referred to the NBI for examination. While the NBI report seemed to bear out thegenuineness of the documents, the Austrias obtained a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-documentexaminer whose views said otherwise. The Austrias moved to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabularyfor further study. They also located former personnel of the court who appeared to have granted the adoption, andobtained written depositions from 2 of them denying any knowledge of the adoption.

The Austrias moved the CFI to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the Cruzes. Before thedate arrived, however, respondent Benita Cruz filed a motion asking, by way of alternative relief, to confine the Austrias'intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will.

CFI allowed delimitation and disregarded the matter of the genuineness of adoption. Austrias MR denied. Hence thispetition for certiorari, praying for the annulment of the order restricting the intervention to properties that were notincluded in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.

CFI: Since the Austrias are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. Their interest is confined to properties that have not been disposed of in the will, forto that extent intestate succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption becomes relevant.

Austrias: the entire estate should descend to us by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs inthe will. Art 850: The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless itappears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.

ISSUE: W/N such institution of heirs would retain efficacy if there exists proof that the adoption of such heirs by thedecedent is false -- YES.

RATIO:The will of the deceased read:

Austrias: the tenor of the language gives rise to the inference that the decedent was deceived into believing that shewas legally bound to bequeath 1/2 of her estate to the Cruzes as the their legitime. Had she known the adoption to bespurious, she would not have instituted the Cruzes at all the basis of the institution being solely her belief that theywere compulsory heirs. So proof of the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the

opening of the estate wide to intestacy.SC: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art 850, the following requisites must concur:1. the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;2. the cause must be shown to be false; and3. it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known thefalsity of the cause.

The Austrias suggest that from the use of the terms "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana"(legitime), the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the Cruzes was the decedents belief that under the lawshe could not do otherwise.

TheAustrias proposition is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. Onefact prevails, however: the decedent's will does not state in a specific manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Wecannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.

Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana ay ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente

adoptados) na sina Perfecto na pawang may apelyidong Cruz

Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa

kaparaanang sumusunod:

A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, na parepareho ang kaparti ng

bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati

() ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari -ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz.


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And even if she instituted the Cruzes solely because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the falseassumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.

Art850 is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution ofheirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testatorclearly would not have made the institution i f he had known the cause for it to be false.

Would the decedent have caused the revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken intreating these heirs as her legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless? The decedent'swill is mute on this point. But her disposition of the free portion of her estate which favored the Cruzes shows aperceptible inclination on her part to give the Cruzes more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give them.

Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives. Were we toexclude the Cruzes from the inheritance, then the Austrias would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy aresult which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of thetestator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed toprevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. A probate court has found, byfinal judgment, that the decedent was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free fromfalsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate actionbrought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

Dispositive: Petition DENIED.

AZNAR VS. DUNCAN

In the matter of the intestate estate of Edward Christensen, deceased. Adolfo c. Aznar, executor and appellee,v. Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan, (appellant) Maria Helen Christensen, (appellee)

1966 | Makalintal, J.

1. Edward (California citizen with domicile in the PH) died leaving a will in 1951. Will admitted to probate; Court declared Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (Helen)as a natural child of Edward; This declaration was appealed to SC which it affirmed in 1958;

2. In another incident with regard to the partition of the estate, the trial court approved the project submitted bythe executor which the court found valid under California law; Helen appealed this to SC which reversed the trial court in January 1964 saying that the validity of the

provisions of the will should be governed by PH law; so partit ion was remanded;3. October, 1964, CFI Davao approved the project of partition submitted by the executor;

The estate was divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (hereinafter Lucy; note thatin the will her last name was Daney, not Duncan) who was expressly recognized by deceased as hisdaughter (natural) and Helen who was judicially declared as also natural daughter after Edwards death;

Reason for equal sharing: since Helen had been preterited in the will, the institution of Lucy as heirwas annulled; hence, the properties passed to both of them as if Edward died intestate, saving only thelegacies left in favour of certain other persons whose legacies had been approved by the court;

4. Court cites provisions of the will relevant to the case; That Edward declares he has but one child: Lucy; That he had no living ascendants or descendants except Lucy; That Helen, although baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to him, nor had she been adopted;

that he bequeaths 3.6k pesos which was to be deposited in trust for Helen in PNB Davao and paid to bepaid to her 100 pesos per month until exhausted;

That he bequeaths all income interest from all his property to Lucy; but in case she dies with living issuefull ownership of the property shall pass; provided further, that when she dies without living issue, shewill be substituted with other heirs;

5. Helen contends: there was preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line which resulted in the annulment ofheir, pursuant to Article 854 of CC:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul

the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.6. Lucy contends: not a case of preterition; case is governed by Article 906 of CC which says: Any compulsoryheir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that thesame be fully satisfied. Also, since testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen but left to her a legacy although less

than her legitime, Helen was effectively disinherited with Article 918:

ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of which, ifcontradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institutionof heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devices and legacies and othertestamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitimate.

So, Helen is entitled only to her legitim, and not to a share equal with Lucy, as if the succession wereintestate.


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Issue:Should there be an annulment of heirs? No. Helen to receive her legitime. 906 applies. (1/4) of estate

(excluding the legacies).

Held and Ratio:Preterition defined:

- Manresa: Omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father,so, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part ofthe properties;

Question posed by Court:

-In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only to the completion of his legitime (instead of theannulment of the institution of heirs) is it necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by any title," asby legacy, be granted to him in his capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero?

- In other words, should he be recognized or referred to in the will as heir?

- Question important since Edward did not mention Helen as an heir but given a legacy;

Answer:

- Classical view(Roman law), answer is affirmative but later, as Manresa and Sanchez Roman says, it waschanged by Article 645 of Proyecto de Codigo de 1851 later copied in Article 906 of our Code;

- Manresa cites three SC of Spain decisions: in each one, the testator left to one who was a forced heir alegacy worth than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willedthe rest of the estate to other persons;

- It was held that Article 815 (906 of our Code, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs beannulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed;

At case:

- The solution is indeed in ore consonance with the express wishes of the testator, as in the present case;

- He refused to acknowledge Helen as his natural, and limited her share to a legacy of 3.6k pesos;

- The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to possess such status is no reason to assume thathad the judicial declaration come during his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergoneany change and that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone wasexpressly recognized by him;

Neri v Akutin does not apply:

- It referred to a will where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his secondmarriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left nothing to themor, at least, some of them;

- At case, testator did not entirely omit Helen, but left her a legacy 3.6k pesos;What Helen will receive:

- Estate concists of 399 shares of stocks in Christensen Plantation COmpanay and some cash;

- of such descend to Helen as her legitime;

- Since she became owner of her share at death of decedent, she is entitled to a corresponding portion of allthe fruits or increments thereof subsequently accruing;

- It includes stock dividends; Contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to theterms of the will cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right of ownership of Helen Garcia withrespect to her legitime;

Additional:

- Court notes the substitution of heirs depending on certain conditions (see will above); although it is not raisedas an issue and although no reference to it has been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant (this quotationis omitted in the resolution), court says there are limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution,particularly that which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that thelegitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.

REVERSED.

RESOLUTION:

- Lucy says they did refer to the matter of substitution of heirs;

- Justice Makalintal: oh yeah you did, but you did merely for the purpose of refuting the theory advanced by theappellees and not for the purpose of having the rights of said heirs defined in so far as, under the terms of thewill, they may affect the legitime of oppositor-appellant;

-So the issue could not be squarely raised since the substitute heirs were not parties;

- Anyways, the justice says that if the will is given full force and effect, it might affect the legitime of Helen.

ACAIN V IAC (1987)Paras, J.

Facts

petitioner Constantino Acain filed a petition for probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain, on the premisethat the latter died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sistersAnita, Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs

o the will was written in Bisaya, with a translation in English, instituting Segundo Acain (testatorsbrother and petitioners father)

o In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, housesthere in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his


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children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, allsurnamed Acain

Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio

the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and thelatter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for thepetitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) thewidow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited

LC denied the MTD. Respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminaryinjunction which was subsequently referred to the IAC, which granted the MTD

Issue: W/N there was preterition

Held: YES

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at thetime of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the deviseesand legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to theright of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either becausethey are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expresslydisinherited

Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend ordescend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse

is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not inthe direct line

however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoptionby the testator has not been questioned by petitioner

o Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives tothe adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter andmakes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totallyomitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow weredeprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited.Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entireinheritance, except the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,except insofar as the legitimes are concerned

No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left byuniversal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be,necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii theestate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate andan interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claimagainst the estate like a creditor

o Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legateeo At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However, intestacy having

resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator

the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the dueexecution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnitiesprescribed by law

o For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progresswhen on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisterswere instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondentshad been preterited would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright

Melencio-Herrera, Concurring

Requisites of preteritiono 1. The heir omitted is a forced heir (in the direct line);o 2. The ommission is by mistake or thru an oversight.o 3. The omission is complete so that the forced heir received nothing in the will

On the other hand, if the omission is intentional, the effect would be a defective disinheritance covered byArticle 918 of the Civil Code in which case the institution of heir is not wholly void but only insofar as itprejudices the legitime of the person disinherited. Stated otherwise. the nullity is partial unlike in truepreterition where the nullity is total

BALANAY VS. MARTINEZ ||J. AQUINO (1975)

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian.


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Petitioner: FELIX BALANAY, JR.,Respondents: HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B.ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN

FACTS:1. Leodegaria Julian died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at age 67. She was survived by her husband, Felix

Balanay, Sr., and by their 6 legitimate children (Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina Antonio, Beatriz Solamo, CarolinaManguiob, Delia Lanaban and Emilia Pabaonon)

2. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which iswritten in English. RELEVANT PORTIONS OF WILL:

"II. That I am the absolute owner of the southern half of the following conjugal properties which I acquired during mymarried life with my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr.,-- 9 lots"III. I am the absolute owner of the following paraphernal properties which I inherited from my deceased father, CecilioJulian"IV. It is my desire and I direct that in the interest of my family, my properties shall not be divided among my heirs duringthe lifetime of my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr. but should be kept intact. The respective legitimes of my husband and mychildren should be paid in cash out of the proceeds of sale of the produce and rents derived from said properties."V. After the death of my husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., my properties shall be divided and distributed in the manner asfollows:" (Here follows a partition of the nine conjugal lots and the two paraphernal lots. The testatrix divided among hersix children not only her two paraphernal lots, one of which she devised to Emilia Pabaonon and the other lot to FelixBalanay, Jr., but also the nine conjugal lots. She did not restrict the partition to her one-half conjugal share butincluded her husband's one-half share.3. Felix Balanay, Sr. (husband of deceased) and Avelina Antonio (daughter of deceased) opposed the probate of the

will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and allegedimproper partition of the conjugal estate. Claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which hehad received from the testatrix.

4.

Later, the husband withdrew his opposition and renounced his hereditary rights (opposed by daughterAvelina) This withdrawal was evidenced by:a. Affidavitb. An instrument captioned "Conformation of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights"- out of respect for

his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their 6 children. Heconfirmed a prior agreement between him and his wife that their conjugal properties would be partitioned inthe manner indicated in her will.

5. Lower court denied the opposition of Avelina, accepted the withdrawal of the opposition of Felix Sr. and set thehearing for probate of will -- 18, 1973 [THIS ORDER WAS THE ONE AFFIRMED BY SC]

6. Atty. Montaa (claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr./ and of the other children) filed a motionleave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will and to proceed by intestate estate proceeding. Alleged thatthe provisions of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of futurelegitimes and was VOID.

7. Lower court declared that the will was void and converted the testate proceeding into an intestateproceeding.

ISSUE: WON the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance orformal validity, and in declaring it void? NO

Court was correct to pass on the wills intrinsic validityThere were unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality and there and was motion to withdraw thepetition for probate. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.

Court was wrong to declare the will void and to convert the proceedings to an intestate proceedingIn June 18, the court gave effect to the husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rightswhich presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

Provisions of a will are divisibleThe invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions,unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid dispositionhad not been made (Art. 792, Civil Code).

Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated

from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, ordoing injustice to the beneficiaries.

STATEMENT #1: The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary tolaw because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and but That illegal declaration does notnullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.STATEMENT #2: The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirsduring her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary toarticle 1080 of the Civil Code:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shallbe respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturingenterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of theother children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash.


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The testatrix made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had renouncedhis hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children asenvisaged in article 1080 so she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash.

Her estate may remain undivided only for a period of 20 years. The provision that the estate should not be dividedduring her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless thereare compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugalpartnership [a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate] it should be subject to thelimitations that 1) a portion be adjudicated for his support and maintenance 2) or at least his legitime should be

respected.

The affidavits and conformity of her husband validated Part. V of the will General rule: testator can only dispose of her half of the conjugal share of the estate, other dispositions would be

INVALID. Art. 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if thetestator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging tothe testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."

Exception: this case -- the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to hertestamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid (assuming that the will may beprobated)

Preterition of husband (husband is not a compulsory heir by a direct line) does not produce intestacy

Nuguid case: testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically voidbecause it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line.Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirsin the directline, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall

annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Sincethe preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies anddevises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code)

This case: Preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, hesignified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.

HELD: admit will to probate

REMEDIOS NUGUID VS FELIX AND PAZ NUGUID1966; Sanchez, J.Remedios is the sister of the deceased. Felix and Paz are the deceaseds parents.FACTS:

- Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and

sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.- On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a

holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before herdeath. The will stated as follows:

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certainamount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die tomy beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I havesigned my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) IllegibleT/ ROSARIO NUGUID

- Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexedbe issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.

- The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of the parents anddeclared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs.

- Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that they are entitled toreceive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir soinstituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.

ISSUE: May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect to the freeportion of the will? NO. PRETERITION HAS EFFECT OF NULLIFYING THE WILL.RATIO:

- Preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that (T)hepreterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the timeof the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but thedevises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

- The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in thedirect ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by thetestament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clearcase of preterition of the pretirition of the parents, not an ineffective disinheritance.

- It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in thisposture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.


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- Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that she should thus beconsidered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the institu tion of devisees and legateesmust be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.

- Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance as the law alsorequires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in thewill. Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.

- Re: whether court may rule on intrinsic validity of the will - On the second issue, the case is for the probate ofthe will and the courts area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity of the will comes after the will has beenduly authenticated. However if the case is to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. Thepractical conditions: time, effort, expenses and added anxiety, induced us to a belief that we might as wellmeat head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.

ZONIA SOLANO VS. CA, GARCIANov. 29, 1983Melencio Herrera

Petition for review.

Bienvenido and Emetieria Garcia claims to be illegitimate children of Dr. Solano. They filed an action for recognitionagainst him. Solano denied paternity. During the suit, he dies

Zonia Solano was ordered substituted for the decedent as the only surviving heir in his Last Will and Testamentprobated prior to his death in the same court. She entered her formal appearance as substitute defendant and askedthat she be allowed to assume her duties as executriz with the least interference from the Garcias who were merepretenders to be illegitimate children of Solano.

Garcias: impugned the recognition of Zonia as an acknowledged natural child and to be declared as an

adulterous child of Solano

TC: Garcias and Zonia are illegitimate children under the class of Adulterous Children. The institution of Soniaas sole and universal heir is null and void and the 3 of them shall share equally the estate without prejudice tothe legacy given to Trinidad and the right of any creditors of the estate.

Zonia appealed to CA but CA affirmed in toto

RE: Illegitimacy of the 3 of them They are illegitimate children. The oral testimony and the documentary evidenceprove the ff facts:Solano married Pilar. Pilar died. On a world tour he met a French woman, Lilly Gorand, who became his second wife in1928. She left him in 1929. In 1930, Solano started having amorous relations with Juana Garcia, out of which affair wasborn the Garcias. Their birth certificates and baptismal certificates mention only the mother's name without the father'sname. The facts establish, however, that Solano during his lifetime recognized them as his children by acts of supportand provisions for their education.In 1935, he started living with Trinidad Tuagnon. Three children were born out of this relation but only Zonia is living. Inher Birth Certificate, her status was listed as "illegitimate"; her mother as Trinidad; her father as "P.N.C. " or "padre noconocido".During the Japanese occupation, Solano obtained a divorce from Lilly on Nov, 1943. In Dec, he and Trinidad executedan "Escritura de Reconocimiento de Unit Hija Natural", acknowledging Zonia as a "natural child" and giving her the rightto use the name Zonia Ana Solano y Tuagnon. The document was registered with the Local Civil Registrar on the samedate.In Jan 1969, Solano executed his "Ultima Voluntad y Testamento" instituting Zonia as his universal heir, except for5parcels of land given to Trinidad in usufruc.t Upon Solano's petition the Will was duly probated on March 10, 1969.

Zonia: TC had no jurisdiction1) to declare Zonia as an illegitimate child;2) to order the division of the estate in the same action despite the pendency of Special Proceedings3) to declare null and void the institution of heir

1. As raised by the parties in their own pleadings and pursuant to their evidence during the trial, the litigation wasconverted into a contest between them precisely as to their correct status as heirs and their respective rights. No errorwas committed in resolving the issue of Zonia's status.

2. This is a peculiar situation wherein Solano himself instituted the probate of his Will. That proceeding was not one tosettle the estate of a deceased person that would be deemed terminated only upon the final distribution of the residue ofthe hereditary estate. With the Will allowed to probate, the case would have terminated except that the parties, afterSolano's death, continued to file pleadings therein.Secondly, upon motion of the Garcias, and over the objection of Zonia, the TC ordered the impleading of the estate ofSolano and proceeded on that basis. In effect, the two cases were consolidated. The action for recognition and Spec.Procs. were pending before the same Court and Judge.Thirdly, it is settled that the allowance of a Will is conclusive only as to its due execution. A probate decree is notconcerned with the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the Will.


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Being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were pretended from the Last' Will and Testament; and that as a result ofsaid preterition, the institution of Zonia as sole heir is null and void pursuant to NCC 854

1.

The disposition in the Will giving the usufruct in favor of Trinidad over 5 parcels of land, is a legacy, recognizedin CC 563, and should be respected in so far as it is not inofficious.

Re: Effect of Preterition-Syllabus topic3. Contrary to the conclusions of the courts below, the Will is valid subject to a limitation . The pretention of theGarcias should annul the institution of Zonia as heir only insofar as the legitime of the omitted heirs isimpaired.The intention of the testator was to favor Zonia with certain portions of his property, which, under the law, he had a rightto dispose of by Will, so that the disposition in her favor should be upheld as to the one-half (1/2) portion of the property

that the testator could freely dispose of. Since the legitime of illegitimate children consists of one half (1/2) of thehereditary estate, the GARCIAS and ZONIA each have a right to participation therein in the proportion of one-third (1/3)each. ZONIA's hereditary share will, therefore, be 1/2 + (1/3 of 1/2) or 4/6 of the estate, while the GARCIAS willrespectively be entitled to 1/3 of 1/2 or 1/6 of the value of the estate.

The case of Nuguid vs. Nuguid, et al., reiterating Neri, et al. vs. Akutin, et al., held that where the institution of auniversal heir is null and void due to pretention, the Will is a complete nullity and intestate succession ensues. This isnot applicable because, only a one-sentence Will was involved with no other provision except the institution of the soleand universal heir. In contrast here, there is a specific bequest or legacy so that NCC 854, applies merelyannulling the "institution of heir".

**Zonia should now be held to be stopped from repudiating the jurisdiction of the TC and CA because she didnt bring itup before. SC cites Tijam v Sibonghanoy

TEEHANKEE, J ., concurring:The probate proceeding was not one for settlement of estate of a deceased but institutedby the testator himself, Dr. Meliton Solano under NCC 838. This was granted and this terminated the proceeding,although, the parties continued to file some pleadings after his death. But the issues between the parties as to their

status and hereditary shares in view of the probated will naming petitioner as sole heir were expressly tried in the actionfor recognition filed by Garcias against their father who was substituted by petitioner as defendant after his death. Ineffect, the two cases (assuming that the probate proceeding could be deemed as having continued notwithstanding itstermination with the allowance in vitam of Solano's will) which were pending before the same judge and branch of courtcould be said to have been consolidated. Finally, petitioner is now stopped, after getting an adverse verdict, fromrepudiating belatedly the jurisdiction of the trial and appellate courts to which she had submitted without question hercause.

J.L.T. AGRO, INC. V. BALANSAG (2005)Petitioner: JLT Agro, Inc.Respondents: Antonio Balansag and Hilaria CadaydayTinga, J.

Facts:

Don Julian L. Teves contracted two marriages:1. Antonia Baena children: Josefa Teves and Emilio Teves2.

Milagros Donio children: Maria Evelyn, Jose Catalino, Milagros and Pedro.

The subject of the controversy involves Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre originally registered under the nameof Don Julian and Antonia (1st wife) under an OCT.1. When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages

(Josefa Teves Escano v. Julian Teves, et al). Milagros participated as an intervenor. The case wassettled through a compromise agreement.

2. The CFI approved the compromise agreement and rendered a decision on the basis of it. It declared:i. Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his kids from his firstmarriageii. His kids from his f irst marriage were given other properties at Baisiii. While the remainder (including Lot 63) was retained by Don Julian.

3. [IMPT] Par. 13 of the Comp. Agreement provides that in the event of the death of Don Julian, theproperties adjudicated^ to Josefa and Emilio (excluding the properties comprised as Hacienda MedallaMilagrosa) shall be understood as including not only their share they inherited from their mother butalso their successional rights which would correspond to them the other half belonging to their father,Julian Teves. In other words, the propert ies now selected and adjud icated to Jul ian Teves (not

including his sh are in the Hacienda Medal la Milagrosa) shal l exclusively be adjudicatedto his 2nd

wife and his 4 minor children.

4. [THE TWIST] Later on, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of JLTAgro Inc. They also executed a Supplemental Deed of Assignment which transferred ownership over LotNo. 63, among others, in favor of JLT Agro.

5. Don Julian then died intestate.6. On the strength on the Supplemental Deed the registration of the Lot 63 in its name. A court then issued

an order cancelling the OCT and issued a TCT in the name of JLT.7. Meanwhile, Milagros and kids immediately took possession over Lot 63. In 1974, they leased it with Sps.

Antonio and Hilaria Balansag (respondents). Later on, Milagros and kids, after executing an extrajudicialpartition, sold it to respondents.

1The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of

the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as theyare not inofficious. ...


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8. At the Register of Deeds, the sps discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of the petitioner.Thus, they failed to register the deed. They then filed a complaint seeking the declaration of nullity andcancellation of the TCT in the name of JLT and transfer the tit le in their names.

9. RTC dismissed ruling that the with the use of the words shall be (x x x shall exclusively be x x x), theadjudication in favor of Milagros and kids was not final and operative, as the lot was still subject to futuredisposition by Don Julian during his lifet ime. Thus, at the time of Don Julians death, Lot 63 was nolonger a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to JLT. Consequently, the lot could not be aproper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros and kids, and not being the owners they could nothave sold it.

10. CA reversed. It ruled that:i. By the strength of the Compromise Agreement (esp. par. 13) incorporated in the CFI decision, the

future legitimes has already been determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julians 2 sets of he irs.They have already acquired full ownership of the properties adjudicated to them including Lot 63. Thedisposition of the CFI constitutes res judicata.ii. It also held that nobody in his right mind would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document(in this case, the Supplemental Deed) which covers practically all properties which the late Don hadreserved for Milagros and kids.iii. It also noticed that some blanks in the TCT were not filled up which indicates that the TCT is spuriousand of dubious origin.

11. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: W/N the Deed of Assignment, in assigning Lot 63 which was previously adjudicated in favor of Milagros and kids,is valid YES.

Ratio:1. JLT Agro argues that the CA erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and

reserved prior to Don Julian death (in this case, through par 13 of the Comp Agreement).

SC agrees with JLT Agro.

The SC classified the partition in par. 13 of the Compromise Agreement as a partition inter vivos. It is validpursuant to CC 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death ofDon Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under thecompromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. Being the prospect of a future acquisition, the interest byits nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which it related was at the timenonexistent and might never exist.

Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor of JLT Agro,Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to hisheirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julianretained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime.

2. [IMPT] JLT Agro also argues that the CA was wrong in holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, sinceit contains a preterition of Don Julians heirs from the 2

ndmarriage.

SC agrees with JLT Agro.

Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the directline, whether living at the time of the execution of the WILL or born after the death of the TESTATOR, shallannul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

IN THIS CASE, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of hisproperties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. He died INTESTATE. Thus, it ispremature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a willdepriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the secondmarriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death.

3. Though the SC found JLTs contentions as meritorious, the petition must fall.

The truth is that the replacement of the OCT in the name of Julian by the TCT is marred by a graveirregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal processestablished by law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles. Where, as in this case,the transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his name suchinstrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds

As JLT bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should have presented it to the Registerof Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name. Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing onOCT No. 5203 or on the succeeding TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had presented theSupplemental Deed. In fact, there is absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the originaland transfer certificates of title.

What the entry indicates in the OCT is that the owners duplicate of the OCT was lost, a petition for thereconstitution of the said owners duplicate was filed in court, and the court issued an order for thereconstitution of the owners duplicate and its replacement with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed,the court concerned (CFI, according to the entry) issued an order for the issuance of a new title (TCT)although the OCT on file with the Registry of Deeds had not been lost. Thus, the Register of Deedsexceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted owners copy of the original certificate of title but anew transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as the entryintimates, directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title even designating the very number of thenew transfer certificate of title itselfthe order would be patently unlawful. A court cannot legally order the


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cancellation and replacement of the original of the O.C.T. which has not been lost, as the petition forreconstitution is premised on the loss merely of the owners duplicate of the OCT.

JLT did not present the Supplemental Deed because it is evident in its provisions that the assignment is notsupported by any consideration. contract lacks consideration void ab initio

The Supplemental Deed cannot also be considered as a donation although the Supplemental Deedappears in a public document, the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in aseparate document is a glaring violation of the requirement to effectuate a valid donation (CC 749).

succession digest compilation (07.22.13).docx

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