case digest of succession part

8/10/2019 case digest of succession part

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G.R. No. L-353 August 31, 1946

PACIENCIA DE JESUS, ET AL.,petitioners,

vs.

IIGO S. DAZA, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL.,respondents.

Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.

La O and San Jose for respondents.

HILADO, J

:

Facts:

Petitioners pray for the writs of certiorariand mandamuswhereby they

would have this Court annul the order of the respondent judge dated January

29, 1946, entered in civil case No. 3174 of the Court of First Instance of

Batangas in the matter of the estate of the deceased Gavino de Jesus, which

order petitioners denominate "a writ of possession," and command the

respondent provincial sheriff of Batangas and the respondents Justina S. Vda.

de Manglapus and Gregorio Leynes to return to said petitioners the possession

of the two parcels of land covered by original certificates of title Nos. 1292 and

1344, issued by the Register of Deeds of Batangas and mentioned in theirpetition.

Among other things, it is alleged in the petition and admitted in the

respondents' answer that petitioners are some of the testamentary heirs of the

late Gavino de Jesus whose estate is the subject matter of the aforesaid

special proceeding No. 3174

in connection with this action for legal redemption, respondents in paragraph 4

of their answer, after admitting the institution of said action for legal

redemption, allege that on March 11, 1946, the Court of First Instance of

Batangas issued an order dismissing the amended and supplemental complaints

in said civil case No. 3960 (they attach a copy of the order of dismissal as

Appendix 1 of their answer), but petitioners in their reply aver that within the

period prescribed by law they had perfected an appeal from said order of

dismissal.


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From what appears in the allegations of the parties, as well as their appendices

and annexes, the said for legal redemption is still pending appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the heirs can claim Legal Redemption

Held:

Yes. The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with

the Court of First Instance of Batangas, thus commencing, civil case No. 3960

of said court, carries with it an implied but necessary admission on the part of

said petitioners that the sale to respondent Justina S. Vda. de Manglapus of

the shares of Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga in the oft-repeated estate,

particularly, the two parcels of land in question, was valid. The sale was duly

approved by the probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by

the probate court the purchaser stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the

purposes of the distribution of the estate, and Rule 91, section 1, confers upon

such purchaser, among other rights, the right to demand and recoverthe share

purchased by her not only from the executor or administrator, but also

from any other person having the same in his possession. It is evident that the

probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most

logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estateproceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power

and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the

necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and

expense of having to commence and litigate an entirely different action. There

can be no question that if the executor or administrator has the possession of

the share to be delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the

same estate proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person

entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying the same

power to the probate court to be exercised within the same estate proceedingif the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of "any other

person," especially when "such other person" is one of the heirs themselves who

are already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate

proceeding.


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The probate proceeding over the testate estate of the deceased Gavino de

Jesus was a proceeding in remAnd by the publication of the notice prescribed

by the Rules and by the fact that petitioners herein were and are among the

testamentary heirs of the decedent, they were and are subject to the

jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Batangas sitting as a probate

court when the said court's order of January 29, 1946, was entered and

thereafter. If, even the action for compulsory recognition of a natural child

may be instituted and decided within the proceeding for the settlement of the

estate of the ancestor (Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, 348), it would be

absurd were we to declare now that for the mere object of ordering the

delivery of possession of a portion of the inheritance which has already been

assigned to a certain person within the estate proceeding, the probate court

lacks jurisdiction to make the order within the same proceeding, but should

require the institution of an independent ordinary action.

We, therefore, conclude that, without prejudice to the final result of the legal

redemption case, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, with

costs to petitioners. So ordered.

G.R. No. 109972. April 29, 1996


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ZOSIMA VERDAD,

petitioner

,

vs

. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES, NAPOLEON

ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA

ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents

VITUG, J :

Facts:

The petitioner, Zosima Verdad, is the purchaser of a 248-square meter

residential lot (identified to be Lot No. 529, Ts-65 of the Butuan Cadastre,

located along Magallanes Street, now Marcos M. Calo St., Butuan

City). Private respondent, Socorro Cordero Vda. de Rosales, seeks to exercise

a right of legal redemption over the subject property and traces her title to the

late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956.

During her lifetime, Macaria contracted two marriages: the first with

Angel Burdeos and the second, following the latters death, with Canuto

Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son

Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos)

Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage,

namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales.

Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, some time

after Macarias death, died intestate without an issue.

In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos, namely,

his widow Manuela Legaspi Burdeos and children Felicidad and Ramon, Jr., sold

to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot supposedly for

the price of P55,460.00. In a duly notarized deed of sale, dated 14 November

1982, it would appear, however, that the lot was sold for only

P23,000.00. Petitioner explained that the second deed was intended merely tosave on the tax on capital gains.

Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 while she was at the City

Treasurers Office. On 31 March 1987, she sought the intervention of the

Lupong Tagapayapa of Barangay 9, Princess Urduja, for the redemption of the

property. She tendered the sum of P23,000.00 to Zosima. The latter refused


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to accept the amount for being much less than the lots current value of

P80,000.00. No settlement having been reached before the Lupong

Tagapayapa, private respondents, on 16 October 1987, initiated against

petitioner an action for Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction before

the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.

On 29 June 1990, following the reception of evidence, the trial court

handed down its decision holding, in fine, that private respondents right to

redeem the property had already lapsed.

Issue:

Whether or not Socorro Rosales can claim for the right of redemption being

not a co-heir

Held:

Yes. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere

relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law;[3]however,

Socorro s right tothe property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship

in Macarias estate but that she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales,

part of whose estate is a share in his mothers inheritance.

David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mothers death. When Macaria

died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among

them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. WhenDavid Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included

his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to

his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.

ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and

illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,

the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the

rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under

Article 1001.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the

widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance

and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.[4]
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Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David

Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended

from Macaria.

When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to

petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:

ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same

terms and conditions stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who

acquires a thing by purchase or dation in payment, or by any other transaction

whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case

the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third

person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner

shall pay only a reasonable one.

We hold that the right of redemption was timely exercised by private

respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the

Burdeos heirs (vendors) to the co-owners[5]required under Article 1623 of the

Civil Code

ART. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised

except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor,

or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded inthe Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that

he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

Hence, the thirty-day period of redemption had yet to commence when

private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of redemption on 31

March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City

Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987,

before the trial court.
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G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989

FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,

vs.

JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, Third Division,

respondents.

Jose Gaton for petitioners.

Ricardo Q. Castro for respondents.

PARAS,

J :

FACTS:

Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article

1088 forpetitioners to exercise the right to legal redemption had already

elapsed and thatthe requirement of Article 1088 that notice must be in writing

is deemed satisfiedbecause written notice would be superfluous, the

purpose of the law having beenfully served when petitioner Garcia went to the

Office of the Register of Deeds and was for himself, read and understood thecontents of the Deeds of Sale.

Issue:

Whether or not there is legal redemption and is there proper notice

HELD:

The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of sale

assufficient notice of sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act No. 496appliesonly to registered lands and has no application whatsoever to a

casewhere the property involved is unregistered land.If the intention of the law

had been to include verbal notice or nay other meansof information as

sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would havebeen no

necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 that the saidnotice be made in


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writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or informationwas sufficient. In

the interpretation of a related provision (Article 1623)

Written notice is indispensableactual knowledge of the sale acquired in some

other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled

to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to

the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is

not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative method

of notifications remains exclusive, thought the Code does not prescribed any

particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written

notification of redemption.

G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000

JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES

MAESTRADO-LAVIA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners , vs THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA,

JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents

DE LEON,

JR., J.:

Facts:

These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the

rights of the contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of

57.601 square meters, however, is still registered in the name of the deceased

spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died

intestate in 1943 and 1944, respectively. They were survived by the following

heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel Chaves,

Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.

To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiatedintestate proceedings[3]in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was

appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the

estates was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of partition.

Thus, they filed an action for partition[4]before the Court of First Instance of

Misamis Oriental. The court appointed Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo
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Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court rendered a decision

approving the project of partition. However, the records of said case are

missing and although respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to present a

copy of said decision.

This notwithstanding, the estate wasactually divided

in this wise: (1) Lot No.

3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of

coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a)

Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo Chaves-Roa;

and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, all located in

Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and consisting of an aggregate area of 14

hectares was distributed equally between petitioners (a) Josefa Chaves-

Maestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-Abaya. Scmis

At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. Hisshare was given to his only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of Salvadors

father. In 1956, the year the partition case was decided and effected, receiver

Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said heirs in accordance with

the above scheme. Subsequently, Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while

Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to

Angel and the other half to Amparo.

Issue:

Whether or not oral partition can be considered

Held:

Yes. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased

spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves Petitioners ownership over said lot was

acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses

heirs sometime before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by the

notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and

September 8, 1977,

supra.

It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the partition

of the decedents estate, was not presentedby either party thereto. The

existence of the oral partition together with the said quitclaims is the bone of

contention in this case. It appeared, however, that the actual partition of the

estate conformed to the alleged oral partition despite a contrary court order.


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Despite claims of private respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly

delivered to the petitioners, nothing was done to rectify it for a period of

twenty-seven (27) years from 1983. Ol-dmiso

We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of

partition entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can make

sense out of the actual partition of the properties of the estate despite claims

that a court order provided otherwise. Prior to the actual partition,

petitioners were not in possession of Lot No. 5872 but for some reason or

another, it was delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the actual partition of

the estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one among the heirs

questioned petitioners possession of or ownership over said Lot No. 5872.

Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition

among the said heirs and the distribution of the properties was consistent with

such oral agreement. In any event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify thesituation but no such move was done until 1983.

A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the

adverse claimant establishes a better right. In the instant case it is the

petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a

superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed

by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.

Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common

among those to whom it may belong. It may be effected extra-judicially by the

heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of deeds.

In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral

partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of

the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one

among the heirs disturbed this status quofor a period of twenty-seven (27)

years.

In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral

partition is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution ofthe estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one

among the heirs disturbed this status quofor a period of twenty-seven (27)

years.


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G.R. No. 134329. January 19, 2000

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO petitioners, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Facts:

ne Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino,

Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of

residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as

Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern

portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.

During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained

permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.

5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together

with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has

been living in that house since 1960.

Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial

partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed a private document which they,

however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his

other brothers were represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta,

both died without any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria;

Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higino was represented by

his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and

Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was

allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita,

succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.

On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father,

Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.

On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of

his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the

buyer.


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Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern

portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went

through a series of meetings with the barangay officials concerned for the purpose of

amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a valid extrajudicial Partition

Held:

The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and

spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.When they discussed and agreed on

the division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in furtherance

of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until it is

shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid Noshowing, however, has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto

Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary

acts.

The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador

Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of

never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the

subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said

partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was

a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of aparcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and

one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made

by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the

owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to

repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches

have equally set in.

G.R. No. 114151 September 17, 1998

MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY,and LICERIO P. NIQUE, respondents.


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ROMERO, J .:

Facts: The late spouses Alejandrino left their six children named Marcelino, Gregorio,

Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a lot in Cebu City. Upon the death of thespouses, the property should have been divided among their children, however, the

estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the procedures.

Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased portion of the lots from

her brothers, Gregorio's, Ciriaco's and Abundio's share. It turned out, however, that a

third party named Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased portions

of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino.

However, Laurencia (the alleged seller to Nique) later questioned the sale in an action

for quieting of title and damages. The trial court (Quieting of title case) ruled in favor

of Nique and declared him the owner of the lots. Laurencia appealed the decision to

the Court of Appeals but later withdrew the same.

Nique filed a motion for the segregation of the portion of the property that had beendeclared by the trial court (Quieting of title case) as his own by virtue of purchase.

The trial court segregated the property on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Settlement

between Mauricia and Laurencia.

Issue: Whether or not partition of the lot was validly made

Held: Yes.

1) Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long

as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to

exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.


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Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share. The

legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses

was upheld in the Quieting of title case which had become final and executory by

Laurencia's withdrawal of her appeal in the CA. When Nique filed a motion for the

segregation of the portions of the property that were adjudged in his favor, he was in

effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of theestate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially,

(2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration

proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the

testator.

2) Extrajudicial settlement between Mauricia and Laurentia became the basis for the

segregation of the property in favor of Nique However, evidence on the extrajudicial

settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it became the basis for the

order for segregation of the property sold to Nique. Mauricia does not deny the fact of

the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only questions

its validity on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the non-

publication thereof.

3) A partition is valid though not contained in a public instrument.

Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected

the intention of both Laurencia and Mauricia to physically divide the property. Both

of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of

them that needed to settle the estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is

no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited

property need not be embodied in a public document to be valid between the parties.

G.R. No. 49286 August 16, 1947

EUSEBIO QUIZON and FLORDELIZA QUIZON,petitioners,vs.MODESTO CASTILLO, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, ET AL.,respondents.

.

PERFECTO, J .:


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Facts:

Petitioners seek the annulment of two orders of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, issued onJuly 26 and August 18, 1944.

In the first one, the lower court, acting on a petition for the execution of the decision inspecial proceeding No. 3906, intestate of Gregorio Mayo Villapando, dated October 25,1943,declaring all the parties therein heirs of the deceased and dividing all the estate into three parts, oneto each of the three sets of heirs, ordered petitioners to deliver one-third of the estate to JosefaMayo Villapando, unless they should post a bond in the amount of P2,000 pending the decision ofthe Supreme Court on the appeal interposed against the lower court's decision of the petition. Theorder issued on August 18, 1944, amended the first one to the effect that petitioners should delivertwo-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo Villapando, and Amando, Ciriaco, David and Jose Morada,unless they should file a bond in the amount of P2,000, pending the decision of the Supreme Court.

Ten days before the decision became final, on May 9, Josefa Mayo filed a motion for execution uponthe ground that the appeal bond at P2,000 having been rejected, her share in the fruits of the estatewas left without guarantee. The petition was filed without notice to petitioners. On May 19,

petitioners filed their amended record on appeal as well as the appeal bond of P60. On May 24,Josefa Mayo filed a petition, also without notice to petitioners, praying that the hearing on theamended record on appeal be suspended until after her motion for execution be acted upon, and thelower court issued an order on the same day, setting for hearing the motion for execution sometimeafter June 15. On June 6, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the order of May 24, upon theground that the motion for execution should not have been acted upon as it was filed without noticein violation of section 2 of Rule 39, besides having been filed during the efficacy of the resolution ofJanuary 14, 1944, issued by the Supreme Court, suspending all proceedings in the intestate ofGregorio Mayo Villapando, case No. 3906, and that the amended record on appeal is the only validpleading then pending and should be acted upon before anything else.

On July 3, the respondent judge issued an order setting for July 18 the hearings on the motion forexecution, on the amended record on appeal and on the motion for reconsideration. On July 14,petitioners filed their opposition to the motion for execution alleging, among other reasons, that thelower court had no power or authority to order the execution during the time for perfecting the appealand that said decision, being declaratory in nature could not be executed.

Issue:

Whether or not the judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction

Held:

Yes. The facts in this case show that the respondent judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction when heissued the orders of July 26 and August 18, 1944. Said orders, purportedly to execute the decisionof October 25, 1943, provided for the delivery, at first, of one-third of the estate to Josefa Mayo andlater of two-thirds of the estate to Josefa Mayo and to the Morada brothers, unless petitioners shouldfile bond in the amount of P2,000. No law nor legal authority has been mentioned in respondent'sanswer in support of said orders and none can be cited. The decision of October 25, 1943, providedonly for the declaration of heirs and of the shares each set of heirs was entitled to. Nothing wasprovided in said decision as to the delivery of shares from one person to another. The orders of July26, and August 18, provided for the execution of something supposed to be executed by thedecision of October 25, 1943, which in fact is not provided therein.


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Besides, it was premature to order the delivery of shares to the heirs, when no project of partitionhas as yet been filed and approved.

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