succession digest pool 3b

SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS

Based on the book of Jurado, Tolentino and Balane

SUBMITTED TO:ATTY. JIHAN EL R. EDDINGNOVEMBER 2013

[ ] LLB III-B, BATCH 2013-2014

LIMJUCO VS.ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTEG.R. No. L-770April 27, 1948

FACTS:

Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the estate of Fragante may extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission..

Supreme Court if of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

ABDURAJAK,PSAMIERA A.LLB III-B

[1]


CENTENERA VS. SOTTOG.R. No. L-49065

April 30, 1947

FACTS:

On June 20, 1940, Mariano Garchitorena file a motion praying that subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd., marked as Annex E, be approved and that it be decreed that certificates of title be issued in his name on lots 2,3, and 4 of the original plan Psu-66063 and upon lots 1,5,6,7, and 8 of the subdivision plan Psu-66063-Amd. The movant alleged that on May 14, 1931, a decision was rendered by the lower court granting Rita Garchitorena as heiress of her father Andres, title over four lots, the same described in her original application, subject to lien in favor of Mariano Garchitorena and other creditors, with the exclusion of about 500 hectares belonging to Ramon and Jose Alvarez, about 300 hectares of land of the public domain, a portion of 18 hectares belonging to Hermogenes P. Obias and another portion of 24 hectares of land of the public domain, with the exception of 4 hectares belonging to Januario Alvarez, all said portions being included in lot number 1. It is also alleged that after said judgment was modified by the Supreme Court and some steps have been taken as a result of said modification, lots 1,2,3 and 4 of land Psu-66063 were adjudicated to Mariano Garchitorena in consideration of the amount of P28,745.93 a deed of sale having been executed to said effect on September 8, 1935, which was approved by the lower court on April 26, 1940, and that Mariano Garchitorena bought the 500 hectares of Ramon and Jose Alvarez on April 27, 1939. Several persons appeared to oppose the motion, but only three of them came to appeal against the lower courts order dated June 28, 1941, decreeing the issuance of certificate of titles in favor of Mariano Garchitorena on lots 2,3, and 4 of the original plan Psu—66063-Amd., and on lots, 1,6,and 7 of the same subdivision plan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Land Court has jurisdiction over the issuance of the certificate of title of the said lots.

HELD:

The jurisdiction of the Land Court extends no further than the inscription of the land described in its final decree and the enforcement of that decree, and that, even though the land described in the petition be found by the court, as between the petitioner and the oppositor, to be the property of the opponent, such land can not be inscribed in his name, the Land Court having , as we have said , no jurisdiction or power to do so. It naturally and necessarily follows that the opponent, if he desires the land of which he claims ownership to be registered in accordance with law, must begin a new proceeding in the Land Court for that purpose.


[2]


BARRIOS VS DOLORG.R. No. 559

March 14, 1903

FACTS:

The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of the late Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, of one-half of a sugar estate and the stock thereon, which he claims to have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his contention as to the law of the case he attached to the complaint a public instrument which appears to have been executed by himself and Demonteverde, February 3, 1883, in which, according to the plaintiff, a stipulation is made for a contract of partnership for the operation of the said estate, and, furthermore, a community, of ownership is established with respect to the estate in favor of the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that this instrument has been recorded in the registry of property. Service of the complaint having been had on the defendants, Dona Maria Pascuala Dolor raised an incidental issue as previous question, praying that the instrument referred to be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had not been recorded in the registry of property, and that it be returned to the plaintiff without leaving in the record any transcript or copy thereof of extract therefrom, resting this contention upon rticle 389 of the Mortgage Law. This motion was granted by the judge by order of the 24 th of March, 1898, against which the plaintiff appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the defendants, as heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, can and should be regarded as third persons for the purposes of the Mortgage Law.

HELD:

The defendants are not third persons with respect to the contract entered into by their decedent, Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, in the instrument of February 3, 1883, and they therefore cannot avail themselves of the prohibition contained in article 389 of the Mortgage Law for the purpose of opposing the admission of this instrument as evidence in the case, because not recorded in the registry of property. This prohibition was established solely and exclusively in favor of those who, within the meaning of that law, are third persons. Were it otherwise, the position of the defendants would be superior to that of the person whom they derived their rights, because he, not being a third person, could not set up such an exception. This would certainly be most illogical from a legal point of view, in view of the fact that the heir is, above stated, a mere continuation of the civil personality of his decedent.


[3]


SUILIONG & CO. VS. CHIO-TAYSANG.R. No. L-4777

November 11, 1908

FACTS:

Avelina Caballero, deceased, owned during her lifetime a certain tract of land, which was was inscribed in her name in the land registry of the city of Manila. On March 27, 1903, she borrowed from Francisca Jose, the intervener and appellant in this action, 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, and turned over her title deeds to this tract of land to the lender as security for the loan, but no entry touching the transaction was noted in the land registry. Avelina Caballero died on the 5th day of June, 1903, and thereafter Silvina Chio-Taysn, the defendant in this action, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action, known, under the system of civil procedure in existence prior to the adoption of the present code, as an “action for the declaration of heirship” and on the 5th day of August 1903, following order declaring her to be the only and exclusive heir of Avelina Caballero, deceased.On March 9, 1904, the registrar of deeds of the city of Manila by virtue of order entered the inscriptions in the land registry whereby the said Silvina Chio-Taysan is made to appear as the owner of the land in question. On the 26th day of May 1904, the said Silvina Chio-Taysan borrowed the sum of P2,500 from the Fire and Marine Insurance and Loan Co.,of which the plaintiff is the lawfully appointed liquidator, and mortgaged the land in question as security for the payment of loan. Therefter the husband of Silvina Chio-Taysan instituted special proceedings under the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure, for the administration of the estate of Avelina Caballero, deceased. On the 16th day of October 1905, he was appointed administrator. On the 10th day of October, 1906, the plaintiff in this action filed its complaint against the defendant , Silvin Chio-Taysan, praying for judgment for the amount loaned her as above set out, and the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the land. The trial court enteree judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against both the defendant and the intervener in conformity with the prayer of the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether one or more heirs could be entitled to be recognized as the owner or owners of the property of the deceased in an action for declaration of heirship.

HELD:

A judgment in an action for the declaration of heirship in favor of one or more heirs could not entitle such persons to be recognized as the owner or owners of the property of the deceased on the same terms as such property was held by the deceased, for it passes to the heir, under the new civil code, burdened with all the debts of the deceased, his death having created a lien

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thereon for the benefit of the creditor; and indeed an examination of the proceedings prescribed in the new code of Civil Procedure for the administration and distribution of the estates of deceased persons leaves no room for doubt that those proceedings are exclusive of all other judicial proceedings looking to that end, and supersede the judicial proceeding for the declaration of heirship, as recognized in the old procedure, atleast so far as the proceedings served as a remedy whereby the right of specific persons to succeed to the rights and obligations of the deceased as his heirs might be judicially determined and enforced.


[5]


Pavia vs. De la Rosa8 Phil. 70

March 18, 1907

FACTS:

The plaintiffs prayed that a judgment be rendered in their favor and against the defendants for the sum of 15,000 pesos, Philippine Currency, as damages, together with costs of action, alleging in effect that by reason of the death of the testator, Pablo Linart e Iturralde, Francisco Granda e Iturralde was appointed executor under the will of the said deceased, in which will the minor Carmen Linart y Pavia was made the only universal heir, and that owing to the death of the executor Francisco Granda toward the end of December, 1893, there was substituted as executor Jose de la Rosa, who took possession of the personal property of the state, amounting to 10,673 pesos, Mexican Currency, as well as the property situated at No. 27 Calle Solana, Walled City, likewise the property of the testator; that during the month of April, 1904, the plaintiff, Rafaela Pavia, in her own behalf, and as guardian of Carmen Linart y Pavia, executed a power of attorney in behalf of the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa with the powers therein expressed, and the attorney having accepted such power proceeded to administer the aforesaid estate in a careless manner until the 20th of August, 1903, neglecting the interests of the plaintiffs and wasting the capital, and causing damages amounting to over 15,000 pesos, Philippine currency, owing to the fact of having retired or disposed of without any necessity the sum of 7,207 pesos Mexican currency, together with interest thereon amounting to 360.25 pesos, which amounts would have produced 12,321.90 pesos, Mexican currency, for the plaintiffs; that the executor and attorney De la Rosa neglected to appraise, count, and divide the estate of Linart, deceased, notwithstanding it was his duty to do so, and leased the aforesaid house No. 27 Calle Solana to his relatives from December, 1893, to August, 1903, at a much lower rental than could have been obtained, thereby causing the plaintiffs losses amounting to 6,570 pesos, Mexican Currency; that the aforesaid Jose de la Rosa died on the 14th of September, 1903, leaving the defendants Bibiana and Salud de la Rosa as his only heirs and representatives, Eusebio Canals being the husband of the said Bibiana.

ISSUE

WON the defendant Bibiana and Salud de laRosa are responsible for the personal acts of Josedela Rosa.

HELD:

No. It has not been shown that the estate or the intestate succession of the deceased, Jose de la Rosa, was ever opened or that an inventory has ever been presented in evidence, notwithstanding that at the time of the death of De la Rosa, the Code of Civil Procedure (Act

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No.190) was already in force, and that in accordance with its provisions the estate of the deceased should have been administered and liquidated.- In accordance with the provisions of the Act No.190 it is understood that estate or intestate succession of a deceased person is always accepted and received with benefit of inventory, and his heirs, even after having taken possession of the estate of the deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of said deceased with their own property, but solely with that property coming from the estate or intestate succession of said deceased.- The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of a testate or intestate succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate is to be administered, the appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of an inventory of the estate of the deceased, and the appointment of two or more commissioners for the purpose of appraising the property of the estate and deciding as to the claims against said estate

ALAWI II, MUHAIDIR U.LLB III-B

[7]


Montelibano vs. Cruz,35 Off. Gaz. 1083

April 30, 1964

FACTS:

Spouses Alejandro Montelibano and his wife Gliceria, who died, respectively, on August 14, 1927 and September 19, 1914, were survived by the children, Jose M. Alfredo M. Concepcion and Alejandro all surnamed Montelibano. On September 6, 1927, Jose M. Montelibano applied in Civil Case No. 4281 of the aforementioned court for letters of Administration of his deceased father Alejandro Montelibano. A similar petition was filed on November 12, 1927, with the same court and docketed therein as Case No. 4428, as regards the estate of Gliceria M. Montelibano. In due course, the inventories of the properties constituting the estates of the aforementioned deceased spouses was submitted on October 2, 1930. Subsequently, or on June 11, 1931, the corresponding petition for declaration of heirs of said spouses and project of partition of their respective estates was file. Said petition and project of partition were approved the court on July 21, 1931. Nothing appears to have be done in said cases until September 11, 1940, when the attention of the court was called to the payment of the corresponding inheritance taxes, whereupon both cases we declared closed on September 14, 1940.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petition for declaration of heirs is valid.

HELD:

Petitioners assail the accuracy or validity of these grounds, but a review of the record does not show that they have succeeded in their endeavor. What is more, during the period intervening from the issuance of the order of October 22, 1958, to that of April 11, 1962, petitioners had begun to introduce their evidence. Apparently, the nature thereof was not such as to impart to respondent judge the impression that petitioners' cause of action was sufficiently, meritorious to warrant a reconsideration of the first order. At any rate, the issue hinges on whether or not the other properties of respondent herein which are subject to the notice of lis pendens suffice to protect petitioners' alleged rights, should the same be eventually upheld judicially. Upon the records before us, we are not prepared to conclude that respondent Judge had abused his discretion, much less gravely, in resolving this question, in the affirmative.


[8]


LEDESMA vs. MCLACHLIN66 PHIL 547

November 23, 1938

FACTS:

Lorenzo Mclachlin is indebted to 3rd person. But Lorenzo before he was able to pay the debt, he died. But when he died, he had no property. Theoretically, there should have been succession between Lorenzo and Anna. So Anna should have inherited from Lorenzo. But because Lorenzo had no properties, Anna did not inherit anything from Lorenzo.

ISSUE:

Can the 3rd person claim from Anna?

HELD:

No. He cannot because Lorenzo did not transmit anything to Anna and the inheritance is only to the extent of the value. So, for example, Lorenzo had debts. The value of the inheritance should only be to the value of the debts. But there was no property left.So the value of the inheritance is zero. The debts cannot beenforced against Anna because Anna inherited nothing. ARTICLE 777. The rights to the succession aretransmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.


[9]


Uson vs. Del RosariG.R. No. L-4963

January 29, 1953

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Recovery of the ownership and possession

FACTS:

Five (5) parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death.

ISSUE:

WON Maria Urson has the right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death.

HELD:

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

[10]


The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.

AMIILBAHAR, NURULAIN K.LLB III-B

[11]


Baun vs. Heirs of BaunG.R. No. L-30750October 24, 1929

FACTS:

On May 31, 1928, the administrator of the estate filed a motion, requesting authority to sell personal and real properties of the estate, in order to pay its debts. The motion alleged (a) that the estate was indebted to the Asociacion Cooperativa del Credito Rural de Tarlac in the sum of P1,000, with interest at 10 per cent from February 11, 1925; (b) that it was also indebted to Manuel Urquico in the sum of P7,412.22, with interest at 12 per cent from November 1, 1927; and (c) that the estate was without sufficient funds to meet said obligations.

On June 1, 1928, the heirs of the estate, with the exception of Damiana Manankil, widow of the deceased, filed their written conformity to the proposed sale of the only real property of the estate described in the inventory, consisting of a parcel of land and the machinery and building thereon. They also stated that Genara Pineda offered P20,000 of said property and that they considered said offer as most advantegeous and beneficial to their interest. Said written conformity was assign by Alejandro Calma in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, and by Celedonia Baun, with the consent of her husband Lorenzo Mallari.

On June 15, 1928, the court appointed Jose Fausto, an attorney at law, as guardian ad litem of the minors Guillermo and Simeona Calma, heirs of Jacinto Baun, with special reference to the proposed sale of the real property of the estate.

Some time thereafter said guardian ad litem filed his report, recommending favorably the proposed sale of the land and the machinery and building thereon to Genara Pineda at the price offered by her.

On June 29, 1928, the court authorized the administrator of the estate to sell the property of the deceased in the form and manner most advantageous to the estate. The pertinent part of the order of the court said:" Por la presente queda autorizado el referido administrador para vender los vienes del aludido finado en la forma que crea procedente y ventajosa para los fines arriba indicados."

On July 6, 1928, Simplicio Baun, the administrator of the estate, filed a petition requesting approval by the court of the sale of said real property to Pedro Santos for the sum of P22,000. The administrator sold the property to said vendee, who gave a better price than that offered by Genara Pineda, which was for P20,000 only, as above stated.

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On July 7, 1928, the court approved said sale, and on July 10, 1928, ordered the vendee Pedro Santos to immediately deliver to the administrator of the estate the price of the property amounting to P22,000.ISSUE:

WON That the administrator sold the real property of the estate without having first sold the personal property;

WON that Damiana Manankil, the widow of the deceased, who was also an heir of the estate, did not give her conformity or consent to said sale;

WON that no notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell the property of the estate was served upon the heirs, either personal or by publication, as required by section 722, paragraph 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure; and (d) that no hearing was held on said application of the administrator.

HELD:

(1) that said real property was sold because the personal property of the deceased was insufficient to meet the obligation of the estate; (2) that the real property of the estate was sold upon the initiative and with the written consent of the heirs and consequently they are now estopped from attacking the validity of said sale; (3) that notice of the hearing of the application for authority to sell the property of the estate was not necessary inasmuch as the requirements of the law had been virtually satisfied by the written consent of the heirs to the sale; and (4) that the written consent of all of the heirs was not necessary because the law does not specifically require the consent in writing all of the heirs.

That the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, regulating the sale of the estate of the deceased and prescribing certain formalities, were not complied with in the sale of the real property in question, and consequently the sale is null and void.

In this jurisdiction, by virtue of the provisions of articles 657 and 661 of the Civil Code, the heirs succeeded to all the rights and obligations of the decedent "by the mere fact of his death." The

rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." In other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all the rights and obligations of the ancestor by the merefact of the death of the ancestor. From the death of the ancestor the heirs are the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the ancestor, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by the law.

The only law providing for the sale of the property which formerly belonged to the deceased and prescribing the formalities antecedent to said sale, is found in sections 714 and 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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in view of what precedes, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, the sale is hereby declared null and void; and the record is hereby remanded to the lower court with the direction that, after the citations of all the heirs including Catalina Tejeiro and all of the other creditors and Pedro Santos, and after giving them an opportunity to be heard, it issue such orders in harmony with this decision as will, in equity and justice, protect the interest of all parties concerned, to the end that the estate of Jacinto Baun may be finally settled and terminated. The appellants are also hereby ordered to deposit with the lower court such additional amount as may be found necessary to pay in full all the indebtedness and obligations of the estate, including the interest thereof; or, otherwise, the court shall proceed to sell the property of the estate for the purpose of paying said indebtedness. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.


[14]


Cuison vs. Villanueva90 Phil. 850;

FACTS:On February 14, 1939, Manuel Cuison filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the probate of a document marked exhibit "A", said to be the last will and testament of Leodegaria Villanueva who died on December 14, 1938. The heirs instituted in said will were Reynaldo Cuison, a nephew of the testatrix and six minor children — Maria Dolores, Hernando, Leonardo, Angel, Maria Jimena and Telma, all surnamed Macasa, said to be grandnephews and nieces. Petitioner Manuel Cuison was appointed administrator and he qualified as such.

On January 29, 1941, the lower court, presided over by Judge Sotero Rodas, dismissed the petition "por falta de gestion de solicitante." Upon motion of the petitioner the order of dismissal was reconsidered, the case reinstated and later, by order of November 28, 1941, the lower court denied the probate of the will and declared that the deceased Leodegaria Villanueva died intestate. Upon another motion for reconsideration filed by Manuel Cuison the order of denial of probate was reconsidered and Manuel Cuison was ordered to secure a transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the hearing of probate held on March 15, 1941. This order of reconsideration was dated December 6, 1941. One or two days later the Pacific war broke out.

On December 16, 1948, the oppositor Nicolas Villanueva, et al., move for the definite dismissal of the petition for probate. By order of January 10, 1949, Judge Jose Teodoro, then presiding over the trial court, definitely denied the petition for probate. On January 22, 1949, petitioner Manuel Cuison moved for the reconsideration of the order of denial of the petition for probate.

On August 16, 1949, Elisa, Ricardo, Josefina, Luis, Hermenigilda, all surnamed Cuison, for the first time, entered this case, claiming to be legitimate brothers and sisters of Reynaldo Cuison the nephew of the testatrix Leodegaria Villanueva instituted as one of the heirs in the will, exhibit "A". Further claiming that said Reynaldo Cuison died intestate on February 12, 1939, about two months after the death of the testatrix, they filed a petition for relief under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, from the order January 10, 1949 definitely denying probate of the will. The petitioners Elisa Cuison, et al., further claimed that Reynaldo Cuison, their brother, upon his death, left neither legitimate nor natural acknowledged children, consequently, his only heirs are the said petitioners and their brother Manuel Cuison. The petition for relief was based on the allegation that they had no actual knowledge of the order of January 10, 1949, denying the probate of the will, until the month of July, 1949; that up to the filing of the petition for relief, petitioners had never been direct or actual parties to the probate proceedings but they were constructive parties, since the proceedings were in rem and the order of the denial of probate would affect them as heirs of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison; that there non-appearance or participation in the probate proceedings may be regarded as

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excusable negligence; and that if they were given a chance, they would prove the validity and the due execution of the will in question and would present the instrumental witnesses. The trial court presided over by Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez, acting upon the petition, denied the same by order of February 18, 1950. However, instead of considering the merits of the petition for relief, Judge Enriquez based his order of denial on the ground that, pursuant to the provisions of Article 925 of the Civil Code, present petitioner have no right to represent their deceased brother, Reynaldo Cuison, in the inheritance of the testatrix Leodegaria Villanueva, consequently they have no interest in the will or the property involved and so have no personality to intervene in these proceedings by filing the petition for relief.

ISSUE:

The petition for probate was opposed by Nicolas Villanueva and others who claim to be relatives of the testatrix.

HELD:

The proceedings for the probate of a will, he should show an interest in said will or the property affected thereby (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil, 244). The lower court was equally right in holding that under Art. 925, paragraph 2, of the old Civil Code, the right of representation shall take place only infavor of children of brothers and sisters, which petitioners Elisa Cuison et al., are not. But said trial court erred in holding and assuming that petitioners Elisa Cuison et al., were invoking the right to represent their brother Reynaldo Cuison, for they were not. They seek to inherit the legacy of their brother provided for in the will for their own right and not in representation of their deceased brother. The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have had still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein, and had acquired the right to the legacy given by her to him, upon for death, for the reason that under Arts. 657 and 65l of the Civil Code the rights to the succession of a person transmitted from the moment of his death and an heir succeeds to all rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of the latter's death. It is a fact that the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive. He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death, he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al., the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy, which he received by virtue of the will. In other words, the herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee Reynaldo Cuison in said property.


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Enriquez vs. AbadiaG.R. No. L-7188August 9, 1954

Topic/Doctrine: Will and Testament

FACTS:

In September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died onJanuary 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filedopposition.

During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wroteout in longhand the will in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on The left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence. The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the hand writing of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form,said trial court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that when it was executed the civil code proscribes the execution of such wills.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity of the new Civil Code allowing the executionof holographic wills, the contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted to probate. This is because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code, the extrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the law existing at the time of the testator’s death nor the law at the time of its probate, but by the law existing at the time of the execution of the instrument. For the verysimple reason that although the will becomes operative only after the testator’s death, still hiswishes are given expression at the time of execution.


[17]


IBARLE v. POGR No.L-5064

February 27, 1953

Topics/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death.

FACTS:

Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE:

Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD:

The sale to defendant is valid. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share. On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

AMING, RHASDY P. LLB-III B

[18]


JAKOSALEM VS RAFOLSG.R. No. L-48372

July 24, 1924

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heir/s.

FACTS:

The land in question described in the appealed in the decision originally belonged to Juan Melgar. When he died judicial administration of his estate was commenced. During the pendency of the said administration, that is, on July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue in possession of the land as lessee of the purchaser. On December 12, 1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In 1921, she conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolasa Rafols, who, entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to the present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the herein plaintiff-appellant.

HELD:

Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heir/s. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-owership.It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was valid, but it would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her deceased father Juan Melgar. And as on December 12, 1920, upon the partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.

Upon the confirmation of the sale of December 12, 1920 in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance by Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols in 1921 could no longer be done. And even in the case of a double sale, where neither of the purchasers has registered the sale, the first in possession namely, Pedro Cui, should be referred. When the sale made in the latter's favor was confirmed on December 12, 1920, Susana Melgar was in possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be considered as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced in 1921 only, wherefore, it is subsequent to that of Pedro Cui.


[19]


LORENZO VS POSADASG.R. No. L-43082

June 18, 1937

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death.

FACTS:

Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. The will which was duly admitted to probate, provides among other things, that all properties of the testator shall pass to his nephew, Matthew Hanley. However, it also provides that all real estate shall be placed un-der the management of the executors for a period of ten years,after the expiration of which the properties shall be given to the said Matthew Hanley. Plaintiff Lorenzo was appointed as trustee. During plaintiff’s incumbency astrustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty and personalty, assessed against the estate an inheritance tax. The defendant prayed that the trustee be ordered to pay the Government the inheritance tax together with the penalties for delinquency in paying such tax. The trustee paid under protest and however, he demanded that he be refunded for the amount paid. The plaintiff contends that the inheritance tax should be based upon the value of the estate at the expiration of the period of ten years after which according to thetestator’s will, the property could be and was to be delivered tothe instituted heir, and not upon the value thereof at the timeof the death of the testator. The defendant overruled plaintiff’s protest and refused to refund the amount.

ISSUES:

1. When does the inheritance accrue?

2. Should the inheritance be computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of thetestator’s death or on its value 10 years later?

HELD:

1. Invoking the provision of Art. 657 (now Art. 777) of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, held: “Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes place, succession takes place in any event at the moment of the decedent’s death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of that date. The tax is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of a decedent, made effective by his death. It is in reality an excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed ,to receive, or take property by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.

[20]


2. Based of the value of the estate at the time of the testator’s death - If death is the generatingsource from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes its being and if,upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the estate as it stood at the time of thedecedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any subsequent increaseor decrease in value.A transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstandingthe postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, andthe tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of itsappreciation or depreciation.


[21]


Osorio vs. OsorioGR No.L- 16544March 30, 1921

Topic/Doctrine: THE DONATION CANNOT INCLUDE FUTURE PROPERTY

FACTS:

The plaintiff seeks to recover 610 shares of stock of "Ynchausti Steamship Co." and the dividends corresponding to them, which were included in the inventory of the properties of the deceased Da. Maria Petrona Reyes, whose estate is administered by the defendant. The facts was D. Antonio Osorio had formed with Ynchausti & Co., a joint account association for the exploitation of the shipping business, he being the owner of one-third of the company's capital. This capital amounted to P500,000, of which P166,666.66, that is, one-third belonged to D. Antonio Osorio. Upon his death, his heirs agreed to authorize the defendant Da. Tomasa Osorio, then administratrix of the estate of the deceased, to present a project of partition, and said administratrix inserted in the project with the consent of all the heirs, among the properties which belonged to the widow Da. Petrona Reyes, the sum of P94,000 as her part in the "share of the estate in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.," that is, a little over P166,666.66, which was the share in said business of the deceased Osorio during his lifetime. The project of partition was approved on May 10, 1915, with the consent of the heirs, by the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which had cognizance of the testamentary and administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased Osorio.

On February 28, 1914, the widow of D. Antonio Osorio, Da. Petrona Reyes, now also deceased, executed before the notary D. Florencio Gonzales Diez a document of gift in favor of her son D. Leonardo Osorio, the plaintiff, giving to him one-half of her share in the one-third part which belonged to her husband in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., a donation which was duly accepted by the donee D. Leonardo Osorio, who signed said document with the plaintiff. On that date, February 28, 1914, the estate of D. Antonio Osorio was not yet distributed among his heirs, and the donor Da. Petrona Reyes in order to correct the error in said document, wherein it was stated that said half was adjudicated to her as part of her conjugal property, when the partition was yet being effected, executed another document dated July 3, 1915, maintaining said donation in effect in the sense that she ceded and donated to her son D. Leonardo Osorio, for the same reasons stated in the document of February 28, 1914, all interest or participation in said shipping business of Ynchausti & Co., which was adjudicated to her in the division of the estate of D. Antonio Osorio, which division was approved by the Court of First Instance of Cavite on May 10, 1915.

After the death of D. Antonio Osorio and before the distribution of the estate, Ynchausti & Co. purchased the steamer Governor Forbes and recognized the heirs of D. Antonio Osorio as having an interest to the extent of one-third in the ownership and business of said steamer. It was agreed upon by all the interested parties that the share of Da. Petrona Reyes, widow of

[22]


Osorio, in the vessel Governor Forbes, at the time of the incorporation of "The Ynchausti Steamship Co." was P61,000, equivalent to 610 shares of stock of said corporation. Said sum was deposited with the Steamship Co. until the final settlement of the question that had arisen between the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes as to the ownership thereof for, while the plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the donation made in his favor by Da. Petrona Reyes, he is the owner of said shares and of their value which is P61,000; the defendant on the other hand contends that said shares are not included in the donation in question and belong to the heirs of Da. Petrona Reyes.

ISSUE:

Whether the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes in favor of the plaintiff was valid under the law on succession particularly the future inheritance/property.

HELD:

It is alleged that the donation made by Da. Petrona Reyes is void because she donated on February 28, 1914, a future property, such as the share in the business of the deceased Osorio, which was adjudicated to her on May 10, 1915, and because in 1914 she did not have the right to all or part of the share which her deceased husband had in the shipping business of Ynchausti & Co.

According to article 635 of the Civil Code, the donation cannot include future property. By future property is meant that of which the donor cannot dispose at the time of the donation. This court believe the concurring opinion of Manresa that the future properties, the donation of which is prohibited by said article, are those belonging to others, which, as such, cannot be the object of disposal by the donor; but the properties of an existing inheritance, as those of the case at bar, cannot be considered as another's property with relation to the heirs who through a fiction of law continue the personality of the owner.

AROLA, ALNASHRIP AKMADULLLB III-B

[23]


Tinsay vs. Yusay GR No.L- 23126March 17, 1925

Topic/Doctrine: PARTITION OF FUTURE INHERITANCE; ESTOPPEL

FACTS:

Juan Yusay died leaving a widow, Juana Servando. After his death his descendants made a partition by a private instrument of certain lands, community property of his marriage to Juana Servando. Though she took no part in the partition her interest in the land was nevertheless distributed among the descendants. On the strength of the partition the descendants, among them the appellants, went into possession of the respective portions allotted to them in said partition. Some years later the portions of the appellants were registered in their names in a cadastral proceeding. Upon the subsequent death of the widow, the appellants as heirs of the widow claimed a share of her interest in the land. Held: (a) That, B not being a party to the partition agreement, the agreement standing alone was ineffective as to her interest in the property partitioned; (b) that the partition of her interest among her heirs before her death constituted a partition of a future inheritance and was therefore invalid under the second paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if the appellants have accepted the benefit of the partition agreement to the prejudice of the other heirs and refuse to make restitution of the property received by them by virtue of said agreement, they are estopped from repudiating the agreement and from claiming an interest in the property allotted to the other heirs.

HELD:

Held: (a) That, Juana Servando not being a party to the partition agreement, the agreement standing alone was ineffective as to her interest in the property partitioned; (b) that the partition of her interest among her heirs before her death constituted a partition of a future inheritance and was therefore invalid under the second paragraph of article 1271 of the Civil Code; (c) that, nevertheless, if the appellants have accepted the benefit of the partition agreement to the prejudice of the other heirs and refuse to make restitution of the property received by them by virtue of said agreement, they are estopped from repudiating the agreement and from claiming an interest in the property allotted to the other heirs.


[24]


Arroyo vs. GeronaGR No.L- 36059

Date: March 31, 1933

Topic/Doctrine: EXPECTANT HEIRS AND PERSONS IN CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS; FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT

FACTS:

The appellant, a paternal uncle of a demented girl, qualified as her guardian and, being at the same time executor of the will of his own deceased mother (grandmother of the demented girl), submitted an inventory in the testacy of his mother, including therein as property of the latter the real estate which his ward had inherited from her own parents. The result of this trick of passing his ward's property through the estate of her grandmother was to make it appear that the greater part of such property had passed to the 'appellant under the will of the grandmother.

HELD:

That this device, coupled with the failure of the appellant to reveal to the other heirs of his ward the true state and value of the property pertaining to the latter, was a fraudulent contrivance sufficient to relieve such heirs from an agreement made by them with the appellant, subsequent to the death of the ward, with respect to the disposition of the property pertaining to her.


[25]


Tordilla vs. TordillaG.R No. 39547May 3, 1934

Topic/Doctrine: A certain value is stated in a deed of donation, that the value is different than its actual value at the time of donation.

FACTS:

Francisco Tordilla died intestate, leaving his wife, a legitimate son and Moises Tordilla a natural child and an appellant in the case at bar. One of the contentions of the appellant that where a certain value is in a deed of donation. The value cannot be questioned when properties are brought into collation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of the appellant is correct?

HELD:

This is incorrect, as Article 1045 of the Civil Code provides for the assessment of the property at its actual valuation at the time of donation. The recital in the deed cannot therefore be controlling.

BADEO, MICHAEL J.LLB III-B

[26]


Allison Gibbs vs. Government of the Philippines and Register of Deeds of Manila

G. R. No. L-35694December 23, 1933

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Principle of Lexreisitae

FACTS:

Allison Gibbs is a citizen of California and domiciled therein, that he and Eva Gibbs where married at Ohio, USA. She acquired 3 parcels of land in the city of Manila, she died survived by her husband Allison leaving him the properties in Manila. Allison contend that the law of California should determine then extent of the title, if any. While the oppositor and respondent relies on Article XI Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which imposes tax inheritance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of California shall apply to Allison?

HELD:

In accordance with the rule that real property is subject to Lexreisitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence of ante nuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place where the marriage was celebrated. Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands herein questioned must be determined in accordance with Lexreisitae.


[27]


Bacayo vs. BorromeoG.R. No. L- 19382August 31, 1965

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Laws of Succession, a decedent’s uncle and aunts may not succeed abintastado so long as the nephews and nieces of the decedent survived, willing and qualified to succeed.

FACTS:

Melodia Ferraris died without a surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse but survived by her aunt Filomena, nephews and nieces who were children of Melodia’s only brother who predeceased the decedent. These two classes of heirs sought to participate in the estate of Melodia. The trial court ruled that the nephews and nieces shall succeed by right of representation and excluded Filomena.

ISSUE:

Who should inherit the estate of the decedent?

HELD:

Our laws of succession, a decedent’s uncles and aunts may not succeed abintastado so long as the nephews and nieces are willing and qualified to succeed.


[28]


Michael C. Guy vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 163707

September 15, 2006

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Parents or Guardian may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.

FACTS:

Sima Wei died intestate and left 10 million pesos consists of real and personal properties. He was survived by his wife Shirley and five children. They prayed before the court to appoint the petitioner a special administrator of the estate. Michael contend that respondents had been paid, waived, abandoned or extinguished by reason that when Remedios, the mother of the natural child of Sima Wei, received a financial support for education as a condition the natural children shall repudiate their rights to the estate of Sima Wei. As a result, the estate of Sima Wei is free from any liabilities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parents or guardian of a minor can repudiate the inheritance of their ward?

HELD:

Under Article 1044 of the Civil Code second paragraph provides that parents or guardian s may repudiate the inheritance of their ward only by judicial authorization. In the case at bar, such requisite is absent therefore, there was no repudiation transpired and the natural children are entitled to their legitime.


[29]


Quison vs. Salud12 Phil. 109

November 21, 1908

Topic/Doctrine: General Provisions

FACTS:

Upon the merits of this case the only question is one of fact, namely, is the boundary line between the land formerly owned by Fidel Salud, the father of the defendant, and land owned by Claro Quison, father and uncle of the plaintiffs, the estero or River Nagsaulay, or is it, as found by the court below, a straight line of mango and bamboo trees to the south of the above-mentioned estero? The land in controversy is situated between this line of trees and the estero.

That Claro Quison owned land to the north of the estero, is undisputed, but the defendant claims that he [Quison] never owned any land south of the estero. A large amount of evidence, principally parol, was introduced upon this question, and after an examination thereof, we are satisfied that it clearly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below, and that it was proven at the trial that the land in question belongs to the heirs of Quison. Claro Quison died in 1902.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rights of succession were transmitted to the heirs after the decedent’s death, according to Article 777 of the Civil Code

HELD:

Yes. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellant that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that, without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as by the Code of Procedure, the title to property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of the administration and the property may be taken from the claims of the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent the immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.LLB-III B

[30]


ILUSTRE vs. FRONDOSAG.R. No. L-6077

November 16, 1910


FACTS:

Francisco Calzado died on the 9th or 10th of December, 1903 and appears from the record that at the time of his death he was the owner of certain property. The plaintiff alleges, and the fact is not denied, that he was appointed as administrator of the estate of the said Francisco Calzado. The record fails to show when he was appointed.

On the 31st of July, 1909, nearly six years after the death of the said Calzado, the plaintiff, as administrator, commenced the present action to recover the property and alleged that: that at the time of the death of Francisco Calzado he was the owner of the property described in the complaint; that at the time of the death of Francisco Calzado he had no relatives, descendants or ascendants, but nephews, who being of lawful age divided among themselves the property in question and sold to the defendant the said property; that at the time of the division of the estate among the heirs of the deceased and at the time the lands were sold, there were no debts against the estate of the said Francisco Calzado; that the plaintiff is not a creditor of the estate of the said deceased.

During the trial of the cause the defendant showed by oral and documentary proof that he was in possession of the land in question; that he had purchased the same from some of the nephews and heirs of the deceased Francisco Calzado; that he had purchased the interest of all the heirs except perhaps three. There was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause to show that any of the heirs of the deceased were minors or that there were any debts existing against the said estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs succeed immediately to all the property of the deceased

HELD:

Yes. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege.

[31]


The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.


[32]


BAUTISTA vs. Justices of the Special First Division of the Court of AppealsG.R. No. 79958

October 28, 1988


FACTS:

The parties submitted an Agreed Stipulation of Facts dated December 15, 1975: that both parties admit that the land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel Bautista, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista; both petitioners and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed-- private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition; that the parties admit that the private respondents, with the exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property and upon registration, certificates were issued to his name thereof; that Manolito Bautista executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, certificates were issued to private respondents; that the parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista; that the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property among the heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista; that all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel Bautista; and that the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.

The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as examined by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was supposed to be a partition without court intervention of the estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel Bautista, constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista appears to have waived his right or share in the property in favor of private respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property of the surviving husband can be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife; whether or not there was preterition

[33]


HELD:

Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition.

As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law. To include in an extrajudicial partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased would be to deprive the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property.

The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.


[34]


MALAHACAN vs. IGNACIOG.R. No. L-6207August 4, 1911

DOCTRINE: The fact that the hereditary estate is placed under administration will not affect the application of the rule stated in Art. 777 to the effect that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.FACTS:The action is brought by Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the defendants, the only heirs at law of the said deceased, to recover possession of the real estate of which the said Guillerma Martinez died seized, which said real estate the defendants had been occupying for some years before the commencement of this action. Under the provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real estate passes to the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma Martinez, having died seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession of the real estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased. ISSUE:

Whether or not that the said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate possession thereof.

HELD:

YES. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are coowners of an undivided estate and the law

[35]


offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.

DE LA CRUZ, FATIMA NICA Q.LLB-III B

BELTRAN vs.DORIANOG.R. No. L-9969

October 26, 1915

[36]


DOCTRINE: By the mere fact of the death of the husband, his children and heirs, together with their mother, by operation, of law succeeded him in the dominion, property and possession of the land and its improvements, for, from the moment Doroteo Guintu died, though survived by his widow, the rights to the succession of their deceased father were thereby transmitted to his children, since the latter, as his forced heirs, succeeded him in all his rights and obligations.

FACTS:

Modesta Beltran filed a complaint in which they allege that they were the owners in fee simple of a parcel of mangrove swamp land; that the defendants unlawfully took possession of and continue to occupy the said land of the plaintiff. It appears Feliciana Doriano, the widow of the late Francisco de la Rosa have declared that the said deceased, Francisco de la Rosa, husband and father of the deponents, left at his death property consisting mostly of mangrove swamp land which has not yet been judicially petitioned; but in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate, there was presented a proposed partition which had not yet been approved, and which set forth that there had been awarded to Maria de la Rosa, as her share of the estate, the mangrove swamp land situated, as specifically described in the deed of sale executed by her on the same date in behalf of Modesta Beltran and ratified before the notary Esteban Victorio. In the same proposed partition there was adjudicated to Feliciano de la Rosa, likewise as a part of his share in the estate, another parcel of mangrove swamp land, the description of which is given in the deed of sale executed in turn by him in behalf of the spouses Doroteo Guintu and Modesta Beltran. The heirs of the deceased De la Rosa agreed to recognize these sales as valid and effective as though the hereditary property had been judicially partitioned and the said lands legally adjudicated to the vendors who alienated them and they furthermore waived all the rights they might have therein. By virtue of the acquisition by the spouses Guintu and Beltran of the land, they entered into the possession of the property and took steps to improve it and increase the number of plants in order to secure the greatest benefit therefrom.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a co-heir is prohibited from selling his share.

HELD:

NO. There is no provisions of law whatever which prohibits a co-heir from selling his share of the estate, or legal portion, to a stranger, before the partition of the hereditary property is approved by the court, for article 1067 of the Civil Code prescribes: "If any of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of the co-heirs may subrogate themselves in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing him for the value of the purchase, provided they do so within the period of a month, to be counted from the time they were informed thereof." .Still more: section 762 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains among others the following provisions: "Such partition may be made although some of the original heirs or devisees have

[37]


conveyed their shares to other persons; and such shares shall be set to the persons holding the same as they would have been to the heirs or devisees."

In law, the rule governing property held by various co-owners in common is analogous to that which obtains where the estate of a deceased person is held pro indiviso by several co-participants, for, pursuant to article 450 of the Civil Code, "each one of the participants in a thing possessed in common is considered as having exclusively possessed the part which may be alloted to him on the distribution for the entire period during which there is no division." .

The provisions of this article appear to be confirmed by that contained in article 1068 of the Civil Code. Feliciano de la Rosa could, therefore, lawfully sell the said land in question as a part of his share of the estate, even before the approval of the proposed partition of the property, which his father, Francisco de la Rosa, left at his death and besides, apart from this, the sale made by him appears to have been expressly recognized by himself and his co-heirs as well as by his mother, Feliciana Doriano, in Exhibit B.

As the defendants legally alienated the land by absolute sale to the plaintiffs and received the price thereof, they can never justify the seizure, made with manifest bad faith, of the products of the said land which no longer belongs to them.


BONDAD vs. BONDADG.R. No. L-8092March 14, 1916

[38]


DOCTRINE: The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately.

FACTS:

Rufina Bondad had two brothers and two sisters, respectively named Venancio, Placido, Maria, and Paula. The last named died leaving four children: Eleno, Estanislao, Raymundo, and Pedro, all surnamed Emlano. Rufina Bondad brought suit against her said brothers sisters, and nephews to secure the partition of the property left to these defendants by their father or grandfather, respectively, Crisanto Bondad upon his death. She designates the lands to be divided. Documentary and parol evidence was introduced, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna decided the case by dismissing the complaint and absolving defendants therefrom, with the costs against the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a need for the intervention of an administrator in the absence of any outstanding debts.

HELD:

NO. It has been repeatedly shown in the record that there are no debts outstanding against either succession, and the complaint itself so states. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. Where there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right whatever to intervene in any way in the division of the estate among the heirs.

If, at the present time or in the future, some creditor should come forward with a claim, or if debts of either or both of the two intestate estates should appear, prescription after two years could not be set up against such creditors or against such debts, because the date from which the beginning of the two years should be counted, could not be determined. This is the risk that is incurred in a partition of these intestate estates and hence the need of making the partition in writing, that is, so that it would not prejudice any third person; but among themselves the heirs must abide by the terms upon which they have agreed.


LEGASTO vs. VERZOSAG.R. No. L-32344March 31, 1930

[39]


DOCTRINE: No contracts may be entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article 1056.Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein said article is found, without the authority of a testament containing an expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments, and especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the legal consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole or a part of their property.

FACTS:

Sabina Almadin executed a will devising certain parcels of land belonging to her, to her four nieces and daughters of her sister Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to each.Sabina Almadin partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and nieces, executing a deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three parcels of her land therein described. On the same day, Sabina Almadin executed a deed in favor of her niece Oliva Verzosa, assigning to her two parcels of land described in said instrument. Sabina Almadin executed a deedin favor of her niece Toribia Verzosa, assigning to her the four parcels of land therein described. Again on the said day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed to her niece Ruperta Palma assigning to her three parcels of land described therein. The assignees, Maria Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, took possession of their respective parcels thus ceded by Sabina Almadin, and have to this day been cultivating them as exclusive owners thereof. Sabina Almadin passed away and her sister, Catalina Almadin, presented by Attorney Federico Marino, propounded her will, mentioned above, for probate. The said will was not admitted to probate. 1 Vivencio Legasto, then, the special administrator appointed by said Court of First Instance of Laguna to take charge of Sabina Almadin's estate, filed the complaint which originated this case, claiming the delivery of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants and appellants herein, was valid enforceable.

HELD:

[40]


NO. Article 1056 of the Civil Code Provides:ART. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect to future inheritances except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the basis of a testemantary or legal succession and should be made a conformity with the fundamental rules thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than that they simply provide for the division of the estate during the lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in order to carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.

It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos in not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between the one who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect his death.

Sabina Almadin must have been aware of the necessity of a prior will, since before making the partition of her property among her nieces, the defendants herein, she executed a will giving to each of them the same parcels of land which she later transferred to them gratuitously.

And since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal requisites, consequently, the partition which she made of her estate among her nieces the defendants-appellants herein, during her lifetime is likewise null and void.


BALDEMOR vs. MALANGYAONG.R. No. L-8806

[41]


March 24, 1916

Topic: Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

To the petition the defendants duly answered, denying generally and specifically the facts stated in the complaint, and alleging: That they were the legitimate descendants of the said Benedicto Bonot, that they were all of lawful age, that they had, prior to the commencement of the present action, mutually made a division among themselves of the property in question, that there are no debts existing against the estate of the said Benedicto Bonot, and that the plaintiff is without authority to maintain said action in support of the allegation that the defendants had mutually divided the estate of their parent.After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, reached the conclusion that the plaintiff was without right to maintain the action in question and dismissed the complaint, absolving the defendants from any liability under the same, without costs, reserving to the defendant, Clara Falcon, the right to maintain an action against her co-heirs form any fraud which they may have committed against her interest. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court. There was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause, the case having been submitted to the lower court upon the pleadings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the special administrator may maintain an action for the purpose of taking possession of said property, thereby depriving the heirs of possession of the same.

HELD:

Section 596 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2331 provides that: Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, be agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court. Said section clearly gives the heirs the right to mutually partition their estate.

DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.LLB III-B

VELAZCO vs. VIZMANOSG.R. No. L-21244

[42]


February 7, 1924


FACTS:

Encarnacion Saenz de Vizmanos died intestate on November 16, 1921, leaving no heirs by force of law ( herederos forzosos). The appellee was appointed the administrator of the estate of the deceased and, in the administration proceedings, the Court of First Instance issued an order of distribution in which certain collateral relatives of the deceased in the fourth degree were declared heirs. The appellants herein are relatives in the sixth degree and claim participation in the inheritance, but were excluded there from in the order of the distribution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellants contention of claiming participation in the heritance is valid as they are in the sixth degree?

HELD:

There is no dispute as to the fact that the persons declared heirs are nearer to the deceased in relationship than are the appellants, but counsel for the latter argues strenuously that the former were not properly represented in the administration proceedings and that, therefore, the court had no jurisdiction over them and could not properly declare them heirs.

There is of course, no merit whatever in this contention. Under articles 657, 658, and 661 of the Civil Code, the title to the inheritance is transmitted to the heirs immediately upon the death of the predecessor and, upon sufficient proof that certain persons are the heirs of the deceased, it becomes the duty of the court to order the distribution of the estate to them in the due course of the administration proceedings no matter whether such persons have formally appeared in the proceedings or not.The order of distribution appealed from is in conformity with article 921 of the Civil Code and is hereby affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.


FULE vs. FULEG.R. No. 21859

[43]


September 30, 1924


FACTS:

Saturnino Fule died intestate. Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased, and prayed specially for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as such administrator. The petitioner further prayed that during the pendency of the petition for the appointment of an administrator, the said Cornelio Alcantara be then and there appointed as special administrator for said estate. The petitioner alleged that at the time of the death of Saturnino Fule, he was the owner of real and personal property located in the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, of the value of P50,000 with a rental value of about P8,000 and that, in addition to said real and personal property, he also left about P30,000 in cash. The lower court on the day of the presentation of the petition appointed Cornelio Alcantara as special administrator and required him to give a bond of P8,000. The special administrator presented in court an inventory of the alleged property of the deceased.

The petitioner answered the motion of the oppositors and opposed their petition for the revocation of the appointment of a special administrator. He alleged that the oppositors had been requested to make a partition of the property of the deceased; that no partition of the property of the deceased had been made during the lifetime of the deceased; that the property described in Exhibit A attached to the motion of the oppositors was the exclusive and absolute property of the petitioner, who had for more than forty years been in the quiet, public, and exclusive possession of the same, as owner; and prayed that the motion of the oppositors is denied.

ISSUE:

1. Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within the time required by law?

2. Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint and administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased?

HELD:

Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable judge, revoked the appointment of the special administrator and ordered him to render an account. On the same day, the Honorable Judge denied the appointment of an administrator, and suggested to the petitioner that within thirty days from that date he should amend his petition and present an ordinary action for the

[44]


partition of the property of the estate of the deceased, and in case he should fail to do so it would be understood that the petition for the appointment of an administrator is denied.Upon the second question, it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other co-owners in common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any other co-owners of undivided property. And even when there are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay the debts and divide the property among themselves according to their respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in case of a will, without probating the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each party with a complete equitable title to their particular share of the estate. The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exists in the division of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is maintainable where the estate is not in debt, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof. It is difficult to conceive of any one class or item of property susceptible of being held in common which may not be divided by the co-owners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the co-owners as well as of the whole.


REYES vs. BARRETTO-DATU

[45]


G.R. No. L-17818January 25, 1967

Topic: Effect of Inclusion of Intruder in Partition

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano died, he left his share of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa and Felisa and his nephews and nieces. Usufruct was reserved for his widow. The widow then prepared a project of partition which she signed in her own behalf, and as guardian of the minor Milagros. This was approved by CFI Manila. As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the originals and the issuance of new titles in her own name.

Upon the widow’s death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. Plaintiff then filed an action for the recovery of one-half portion of properties left for them under Bibiano’s will. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all theother properties willed and delivered to Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano, thereby directly attacking thevalidity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon. The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Saludacquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio. This was based on Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889: “A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir,without being so, has been included, shall be null and void.” CFI rejected plaintiff’s contention that since Bibiano was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Art 1456 of the new Civil Code establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirerin implied trust for the real owner.

ISSUE:

1. WON the partition between Salud and Milagros in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano is void.

2. WON there was preterition?

[46]


HELD:

1. NOThe agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles inthe name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of theheirs, long before the decree was attacked. The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief isreopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, insteadof an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, for another courtor judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffleproperties long ago distributed and disposed of. Art. 1081 has been misapplied. Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence,the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under said article.

2. NO.The fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime does not invalidate the institution of Salud as heir. There was no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir.


Dais vs CFI of Capiz

[47]


51 Phil 396


FACTS:

Serapion Dais died intestate. The court appointed a judicial administrator to do the transactions on the inheritance according to the orders of the court especially on the liquidation and partition processes. The Dais Heirs filed for a complaint to dismiss the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent. The Dais heirs wanted that their respective portions be delivered to them immediately because they contested that the they already acquired ownership from the moment the decedent died.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs after accepting inheritance can demand delivery of respective portions even there is an appointed administrator.

HELD:

No. Although the heirs acquired ownership over the inheritance from the moment of death of the decedent, they cannot compel the administrator to deliver to them their respective portions to which they are entitled. The judicial administrator, by virtue of his appointment, acquires the right to the possession of the estate subject to the orders of the court.

DONDOYANO, CINDY MAE F.LLB III-B

ARSENIO DE VERA for himself and as guardian ad litem of the minors ARTURO, TEOGINISA, DEOGRACIAS, SIMEON, GUILLERMO and VICTORIA surnamed DE VERA,

[48]


vs.CLEOTILDE GALAURAN

67 Phil 273April 10, 1939

Topic/Doctrine: Article 777, Effect of Judicial Settlement

FACTS:

Isabel Domingo Is survived by Arsenio de Vera and six minor heirs. During the lifetime of deceased wife and herein petitioner, they mortgaged their property to secured a loan from respondent CleotildeGaularan. According to petitioner, respondent illegally made them to sign a deed which made them believed to be of mortgage and which later turnedout to be a sale. Petitioner instituted an action against respondent before CFI of Rizal for the annulment of the sale. Respondent interposed a demurrer alleging that plaintiffs has no cause of action for they have not been declared legal heirs in a special proceeding. Lower court sustained demurrer and the action was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not plaintiffs may commence an action for the recovery of property without the necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status.

HELD:

Yes they may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the ancestor. If the deceased turned out to have debts, the creditors or the heirs themselves may initiate a special proceeding. The lower court should have granted this petition instead of sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action.

FALCATAN, GARYLLB III-B

Maria Lao vs. Dee Tim90 Phil. 868

[49]


Date:


FACTS:

Yap Siong died leaving a considerable amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An administrator was appointed to administer his estate. During the course of the administration and distribution of the estate there appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy wedlock in the Philippine and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage, and that they are therefore entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.

Respondent Dee Tim on the other hand claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she and Yap Siong were joined in holy wedlock in accordance with the laws of China and that the said Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.

Petitioners presented a great deal of proof and a number of documents to support their contention. Yap Siong admitted in a public document that Mari Lao was his wife. The respondent Dee Tim presented a great deal of proof also to show that she was the legitimate wife of Yap Siong, to support that contention she presented what she contended was a certificate of marriage, it was positive proof of her marriage and that it complied with the custom and practice in China with reference to marriage ceremonies. To support her contention she presented a number of witnesses

ISSUE:

Whether or not the estate of Yap Siong be divided equally between petitioners and respondents.

HELD:

When two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children, and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all parties will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved. A woman who is deceived by a man, who represents himself as a single man, and who marries him, she and her children are entitled to all the rights of legitimate wife and children.


FORTUNATA VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ, BENJAMIN RODRIGUEZ, MERCEDES RODRIGUEZ DE HALLARE, LUZ RODRIGUEZ DE CARLOS AND ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ

[50]


vs.HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and ABELARDO RODRIGUEZ

92 Phil. 273Date: November 24, 1952


FACTS:

Flaviano Rodriguez died leaving an estate with a value of P10,000; that the surviving heirs are the widow, Fortunata Vda. de Rodriguez, and six children who are the petitioners and respondent Abelardo Rodriguez all the heirs, who were then already of age, entered into a verbal agreement whereby they agreed not to make a liquidation of the estate but to place it under the administration of the widow with the understanding that each of the six children would be entitled to receive a portion of the income in equal shares from year to year for the needs of their families provided that they do not exceed the participation to which they are entitled. Eight years after the death of decedent ,respondent filed a petition for administration and the petitioners objected.

Respondents admitted the existence of a verbal agreement entered into between the heirs, wherein they agreed not to liquidate the estate and to place it under the administration of the widow in view of the unsettled conditions then prevailing at the time, but they contend that while that was the understanding the same was not carried out because in reality it was Benjamin Rodriguez, one of the petitioners herein, who took over the administration of the estate and in the discharge of his duties he failed and refused to give to respondent Abelardo Rodriguez his share in the income which he badly needed for the support of his family, for which reason he started the intestate proceedings which gave rise to the present petition for certiorari. Lower court after overruling appointed Abelardo Rodriguez as Administrator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an administrator in an estate with no debts and all the heirs entitled to the share are all of age can validly be appointed by the court.

HELD:

Yes, It appears that both parties submitted the names of the persons they wanted to be appointed as administrator and the court made its choice only after weighing the fitness and qualifications of the persons recommended. The petitioner in this case appears to be qualified to act as administrator of the estate of the deceased Flaviano Rodriguez and does not possess any of the disqualifications.


MORALES vs. YAÑEZG.R. No.L-9315.

[51]


March 24, 1956

Topic/Doctrine: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent

FACTS:

There is no question that said lands belonged to Eugeniano Saarenas who died intestate in 1937, leaving no ascendants nor descendants; that as his surviving nephews (by a sister)Defendant Proceso Yañez (and his sisters) took possession of said lots; and that Plaintiffsare illegitimate (adulterous) children of Eugeniano, born between 1910 and 1927. Plaintiffs’ action is founded on arts. 287 and 988 of the New Civil Code, giving illegitimate children the right to succeed, where decedent leaves no ascendants nor descendants. Defendant Yañez (and his sisters) claim the right to inherit under the Civil Code articles 946, 947, and 948 — the law in force at the time of Eugeniano’s death. Applying the Civil Code, the trial judge absolved the Defendant. He refused to apply the New Civil Code that grants for the first time successional rights to illegitimate children, in accordance with this Court’s decision in Uson vs. Del Rosario, (92 Phil., 530) promulgated January 29, 1953, the pertinent portions of which are: “But Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor Defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebrada and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June 1950, they are given the status and rights which the law accords to the latter (Article 2264 and Article 278, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Art. 2253, new Civil Code).

HELD:

“ART. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and bequests shall be respected; , their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code.”

FERNANDEZ, ELAINE JOY ALLB III-B

MARABILLES vs. QUITOG.R. No.L-10408.

[52]


October 18, 1956


FACTS:

Defendants, instead of answering the complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue, (2) that the complaint states no cause of action, and (3) that the action had prescribed. Defendants attached to their motion as Annex A Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1065 issued in the name of one Guadalupe Saralde on March 31, 1941 and Original Certificate of Title No. 1018 as Annex B issued in the name of Patricio Marabiles on February 19, 1954. This is a homestead patent granted under Act No. 2874. Plaintiffs filed a written opposition to the motion, to which Defendants replied, and thereafter the court issued on November 8, 1954 an order sustaining the motion. Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint with costs against the Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs appealed from this order to the Court of Appeals, the case was certified to us on the ground that the questions raised are purely of law. One of the grounds on which the lower court dismissed the complaint is that Plaintiffs do not have legal capacity to sue because it appears that the title of the land was issued in the name of Patricio Marabiles who already died and the complaint does not allege that Severina Marabiles and her child who now appears as Plaintiffs had been duly declared as his heirs to entitle them to bring the action. The court is of the impression that judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may have legal capacity to bring the action to recover a property belonging to the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not judicial declaration of heirship is necessary to assert the right of heirs to the property.

HELD:

The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased himself.


ADRIANO vs. OBLEADAG.R. No. L-39938

[53]


August 12, 1933


FACTS:

The petitioner, Carmen Adriano, is the deceased Mariano Lopez's surviving mother whom, under his will, he has instituted his heiress entitled to receive two thirds of his estate. After the deceased Mariano Lopez's will had been admitted to probate and the corresponding committee on claims and appraisal appointed, the herein respondents, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, presented before said committee their claim consisting in a credit amounting to P4,750 alleged to be the unpaid balance of a promissory note for P5,000 signed by the deceased Mariano Lopez and his wife, Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez, the herein respondent. Inasmuch as their claim was disallowed by the aforementioned committee on claims and appraisal, the creditor-claimants, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, appealed from the committee's advance resolution and filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila the corresponding action against Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, Mariano Lopez, for the recovery of the said sum of P4,750 representing the unpaid balance of the promissory note for P5,000, signed by the deceased Mariano Lopez and his wife Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez, one of the herein respondents. The promissory note in question was reproduced by the creditor-claimants in their complaint which was registered as civil case No. 44327. The defendant, Natalia Arevalo Vda.de Lopez, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, Mariano Lopez, filed an answer denying generally and specifically the acts alleged in the complaint. The petitioner, Carmen Adriano, as heiress, instituted by the deceased Mariano Lopez under his will, filed a motion in the court praying that she be permitted to intervene in the aforementioned civil case No. 44327, alleging that she had a legal interest in the case; that promissory note upon which the alleged creditor-claimants, Alfredo Obleada and Teodorica Mariano, base their claim is fictitious; that the said promissory note is without consideration, and that it was obtained through fraud, in connivance with the defendant, Natalia Arevalo Vda. de Lopez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner herein, being a heiress instituted by the deceased, Mariano Lopez, can intervene in the case, there being in fact a judicial administratrix to present the testamentary estate.

HELD:

Heirs; right to intervene in an action involving inheritance. — The heirs have the right to intervene in an action involving some of the property of the haereditas jacens of a decedent when they believe that the acts of the judicial administrator are prejudicial to their interest.


CUEVAS vs ABESAMISG.R. No. L-47431

[54]


December 19, 1940

Topic/Doctrine:

Effect of Judicial Settlement- Hence, even before there has been a judicial declaration of heirship, it is well established that an heir has a right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so. This is logical because of the principle that the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of his heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest.

FACTS:

Crescenciano Cuevas submitted for probate the last will and testament of her deceased natural father, Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed three parcels of land, one share of stock in the "Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par value of P100, and two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia Cuevas (alias Concordia Abesamis), Francisco Abesamis, Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under the conditions stated therein. However, Pedro Abesamis and twenty-five others entered their opposition to the distribution of the properties described in the will and had commenced an action for the partition of said properties. The will was admitted to probate and Concordia Cuevas was appointed executrix with a bond of P1,000. Pedro Abesamis and the other oppositors did institute civil case No. 4816 against the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis, Concordia Nuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for the partition, alleging that said properties belonged, in the first instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their common causante, who entrusted them to Crescenciano Abesamis with the understanding that they were not to be subdivided as long as the minor children of her other deceased son, Teodorico Abesamis, were living with the Crescenciano. A judgment was rendered adjudicating seven-eights (7/8) of the properties in favor of the plaintiffs and the other one-eight (1/8) for the defendants. The court ordered the commissioners of partition to declare as sole heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of Francisco and Isaias Abesamis.lawphil.net Concordia Cuevas presented to the probate court a partition plan adjudicating the three lots and the two carabaos in favor of the legatees mentioned in the will. This was rejected by the court for the reason that it was not in conformity with the inventory of the estate and the decision in civil case No. 4816. The executrix submitted an amended inventory and later another project of partition distributing the properties of the estate in accordance with the terms of the will, which were objected by the defendants, because these included their legitimate shares under the decision in civil case No. 4816. The opposition was upheld by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in not holding that the decision in civil case No. 4816 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring that the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is entitled only to one-eight (1/8) of the property described in the will, is a nullity and can not bind the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis.

[55]


HELD: Yes.The herein executrix-appellant was pronounced by the sole heiress of the deceased. As said defendants were declared in default and are, to be sure, bound by the decision in that case, we are of the opinion that the appellant cannot now be permitted to assail its virtuality not to regard it as totally ineffectual against the testate estate. In the absence of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate, there is no necessity of a previous declaration of status and the heir or heirs can sue and be sued in that capacity.

FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.LLB-IIIB

ARAYATA vs JOYAG.R. No. L-28067

[56]


March 10, 1928

Topic/Doctrine: Effect of Judicial Settlement- While it is very true that they acquire ownership therof from the moment of the death of their predecessor, yet upon the appointment of a judicial administrator, the latter, by virtue of his appointment, acquires a right to the possession of the estate, subject to the orders of the court, unless he consents to the heirs continuing in possession therof.

FACTS:

Cecilio Joya, during his lifetime, inherited from his deceased parents the right of lease to six lots of the friar lands. Cecilio Joya married the herein plaintiff, Basilia Arayata. When the Insular Government acquired the said land, Cecilio Joya continued his lease. While married to the herein plaintiff-appellant, Cecilio Joya purchase the lots he had been leasing, on installments, from the Government, under said Act No. 1120. As the number of lots which a purchaser could acquire under the law was limited, lots Nos. 1153 and 2352 were excluded and put up for sale. In order not to lose them, Cecilio Joya had Pedro Tiongco buy them, supplying him with the necessary funds. Subsequently, Pedro Tiongco transferred his right to said lots to Cecilio Joya by donation. At the time of his death, Cecilio Joya had not yet completed the payment of the price of the lots mentioned above to the Insular Government. All the lots in question except lot No. 547, are in the possession of the defendants, who enjoy their products. On May 10, 1920 lots Nos. 2352, 1086, 1153 and 1031, were transferred to Florentino Joya as administrator of the estate of the deceased Cecilio Joya. On May 26, 1919, Cecilio Joya died, and on June 9, 1919, his executor, the herein defendant Florentino Joya, presented said will for probate to the Court of First Instance of Cavite, which was probated after the proper proceedings. In March, 1920, in the course of the testamentary proceedings, the executor Florentino Joya presented an alleged agreement of partition by the legatees, which agreement was disapproved by the court in view of the herein plaintiff's opposition, who alleged that her signature had been obtained by fraud.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the herein plaintiff-appellant is entitled to the possession and the products of the friar lands acquired by the Insular Government

HELD:

Yes. We have seen that the legacies given by Cecilio Joya to the defendants were void. If the lands, which are the subject matter of said legacies and which are in the possession of the defendants, still belong to Cecilio Joya's estate, because no judicial partition has as yet been made of the property he left, which is subject, together with its fruits, to the payment of his debts, said defendants cannot invoke the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to possession in good faith insofar as the fruits are concerned; because even when the legacies are valid they acquired only when the latter judicially assigned to them in the final partition, and because, while said lands are under administration, the administrator is obliged to render an account of his management of the same and the products thereof.

FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.LLB-III B

MACROHON vs SAAVEDRA

[57]


G.R. No. L-27531 December 24, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: Kinds of Succession - There are three ways in which succession may be effected: by the will of man, by the law, or by both at the same time. In the first case the succession is called testamentary, because it is based on the last will and testament, which is the orderly manifestation of the testator's will; in the second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by operation of the law; and the third is called mixed, because it partakes of the character of both testamentary and legal succession.

FACTS:

Victoriana Saavedra died without descendants or ascendants, being at that time married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of them having executed a joint will, which joint will has been duly admitted to probate in this court. The only near relations of the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to inherit her estate are her brothers Juan and Segundo Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana Saavedra died intestate, or did not dispose of her property in said will. It was stated in the will that in case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, the properties be given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian jointly, and should either of the two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, all the said properties be given to the survivor. In case that Victoriana Saavedra should survive Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,Lot No. 838, Lot No. 817 and Lot No. 768 shall belong exclusively to Victoriana Saavedra. Should Victoriana Saavedra die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, Lot No. 817 be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra, widow, sister of Victoriana Saavedra, free of all liens and encumbrances. Lot No. 768 be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra and her heirs, on condition that she devote the products of the same to having masses said for the repose of the soul of Victoriana Saavedra. In case of the death of either of the two, the surviving spouse be appointed executor of this our last will and testament.This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the property in accordance with the terms of the joint will, to which Juan Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined insisting upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of Juan Saavedra and others be overruled.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the brother, sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were entitled to receive her share in the said sixteen parcels of land, given to the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint will.

HELD:

Yes. As we have said, the acquisition of right by the alleged legatees depends on the occurrence of the event constituting the condition, that is, the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham prior

[58]


to that of his wife; and this condition not having been complied with, the said Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian have not acquired any right, and therefore the testatrix's estate is to be divided among her heirs in accordance with the law.

FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.LLB-IIIB

LITONJUA v. MONTILLA

[59]


GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952

Topic/Doctrine: It is the estate left by the decedent, instead of his heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his obligations which survived after his death.

FACTS:

Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum of P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded to file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the deceased. The estate has not yet been properly probated.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner could succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's deceased parent?

HELD:

No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.

IJIN, MOHAMMAD IJIN E.LLB III-B

LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN

[60]


GR No.L-44837 November 23, 1938


FACTS:

Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs. Plaintiff Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE:

WON the plaintiff has the right to collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's estate?

HELD:

No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their father from whom they did not inherit anything.


GUINTO VS. MEDINA

[61]


50 Off. Gaz. 199(CA)


FACTS:

Leon Guinto filed an action for forcible entry against Santiago Medina. The trial court ruled in favor of Guinto.However, Guinto still appealed because the trial court dismissed his claim for damages. While the case was onappeal, Medina died. Medina was substituted by his heirs.

ISSUE:

WON the heirs of Medina are liable for damages to Guinto in excess of the inheritance they received?

HELD:

No.The heirs of Medina, having been merely substituted in his place at the time of his death, their liability for damages is only to the extent of the value of the property they might have received, if any, from him.


BONA vs. BRIONES

[62]


G.R. No. L-10806July 6, 1918

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills

FACTS:

Counsel for Monica Bona, the widow by the second marriage of the deceased Francisco Briones who died on August 14, 1913, applied for the probate of the will which the said deceased husband on September 16, 1911. The petition was granted on January 20, 1915.

The counsel of the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator, opposed the probate of the will alleging that the said will was executed before two witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence exercised upon the person of the testator who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and prayed that for that reason the said will be declared null and of no value.

On March 27, 1915, the judge rendered judgment, denied probate to the will. dated March 27, 1915, denying probate to the will. Counsel for Monica Bona appealed On March 31, 1915, the judge admitted the appeal, ordered the original records to be brought up, and reiterated his order of December 28, 1913, declaring Bona as a pauper, for the purposes of the appeal interposed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.

HELD:

Yes. It is indispensable to note that the will in question was executed by Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911, the order denying probate was rendered on March 27, 1915, both dated being prior to that of Act No. 2645 amending said section 618 and promulgated on February 24, 1916, which took effect only from July first of the last named year: so that, in order to explain whether or not the above-mentioned will was executed in accordance with the law then in force, the last named law cannot be applied and the will in question should be examined in accordance with, and under the rules of, the law in force at the time of its execution.

The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says:No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render

[63]


the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

A mere reading of the last four paragraphs or parts of the will shows in a clear manner that the said will in its form and contents expresses without shadow of doubt the will of the testator; and that in its execution the solemnities prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.

Moreso, it is not proper to just invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely because of some small defect in form which are not essential or of great importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente was also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he understood the contents of the will better than the two other attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness and he attested the execution of the will during its making until it was terminated and signed by the testator, by the witnesses, and by himself, even though he did it in the capacity of a notary.

The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section 618 cannot be required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document was executed in September, 1911, five years before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died on August 14, 1913, two years and some months before the enforcement of the said law; and so, the only law applicable to the present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No. 190, and in accordance with the provisions of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has been presented to the court many months before the amendatory act went into effect.

It is well-known that the principle that a new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs the rights arising from acts done under the rule of the former law; but if the right be declared for the first time by a subsequent law it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former laws, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.

The judgment appealed from should be reversed and it should be declared that the will has been executed in due form by Francisco Briones on September 16, 1911, and that the said will contains and expresses the last will and testamentary wishes of the deceased testator. Without any special ruling as to costs.So ordered.

JAAFAR, KAIZER A.LLB III-B

VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL

[64]


G.R. No. L-7188August 9, 1954


FACTS:

On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a holographic will. That time, holographic wills were not yet allowed. Abadia died on January 14, 1943. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in the will, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Thereafter, some cousins and nephews of the deceased filed an opposition.

On January 14, 1952, the Trial Court admitted to probate the holographic will of the deceased on the ground that, the same was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form.

The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed.

HELD:

No. The will should not be allowed. Although the New Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed, it is a fact, however, that at the time the will was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator.

Furthermore, Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." For the reason that, although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of

[65]


the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.

In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Will is denied probate. With costs.


TORRES vs LOPEZ

[66]


G.R. No. L-24569February 26, 1926

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent

FACTS:

In 1924, Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila Philippine Islands leaving a considerable estate. Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia and was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit.

After a prolonged trial judgment was rendered denying the legalization of the will. In the decision of the trial judge appeared, among others:

The topics suggested by the assignments of error – Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence – will be taken up separately and in order. An attempt will be made

under each subject first to make findings of fact quite separate and apart from those of the judge and second to make findings of law and the law by rendering judgment.

I. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

FACTS:

For a long time prior to October, 1923, Tomas Rodriguez was in feeble health. His breakdown was undoubtedly due to organic weakness, to advancing years and to an accident which occurred in 1921 (Exhibit 6). Ultimately, on August 10 1923, on his initiative, Tomas Rodriguez designated Vicente F. Lopez as the administrator of his property (Exhibit 7).

On October 22, 1923, Margarita Lopez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila to name a guardian for Tomas Rodriguez because of his age and pathological state. This petition was opposed by Attorney Gregorio Araneta acting on behalf of Tomas Rodriguez for the reason that while Rodriguez was far from strong on account of his years, he was yet capable of looking after his property with the assistance of his administrator, Vicente F. Lopez. The deposition of Tomas Rodriguez was taken and a perusal of the same shows that he was able to answer nearly all of the questions propounded intelligently). At the conclusion of the hearing, an order was declaring Tomas Rodriguez incapacitated to take care of himself and to manage his property and naming Vicente F. Lopez as his guardian. Tomas Rodriguez was taken to the Philippine General Hospital on November 27, 1923. There he was to remain sick in bed until his death. On the door of the patient’s room was placed a placard reading – “No visitors, except father, mother, sisters, and brothers.” (Ppermitted to visit

[67]


the patient only the following named persons: Santiago Lopez, Manuel Ramirez, Romana Lopez, Luz Lopez de Bueno, Remedio Lopez, Benita Lopez, Trinidad Vizcarra, Apolonia Lopez, Antonio Haman, and Gregorio Araneta ((Exhibit 9). The list did not include the names of Margarita Lopez and her husband Antonio Ventura. Indeed the last named persons experienced considerable difficulty in penetrating in to the room of Rodriguez.

Santiago Lopez states that on one occasion when he was visiting Tomas Rodriguez in the hospital , Rodriguez expressed to him a desire to make a will and suggested that the matter be taken up with Vicente F. Lopez (S. R., p. 550). This information Santiago Lopez communicated to Vicente F. Lopez, who then interviewed Maximino Mina, a practicing attorney in the City of Manila, for the purpose of securing him to prepare the will

As the witness stated, the will which was prepared by him is identical with that signed by the testator and the attesting witnesses with the single exception of the change of the date from December 31, 1923, to January 3, 1924. Two copies besides the original of the will were made. The will is brief and simple in terminology.

On the afternoon of January 3, 1924 there gathered in the quarters of Tomas Rodriguez in the Philippine General Hospital, Santiago Lopez and Dr. A. De Asis, attesting witness; and Dr. Elias Fernando Calderon, Dr. Elias Domingo and Dr. Florentino Herrera, physicians, there for purposes of observation. (Testimony of Elias Bonoan, S. R., p. 8 of Vl. Legarda, S. R. p. 34. ) Possibly also Mrs. Luz Lopez de Bueno and Mrs. Nena Lopez were present; at least they were hovering in the background.

Not even prior to demise of the deceased, the two actions in the Lopez family had prepared themselves for a fight over the estate. The Luz Lopez faction had secured the services of Doctor Domingo, the physician in charge of the Department of Insane of San Lazaro Hospital an Assistant Professor of Nervous and Mental Diseases in the University of the Philippines, as attending physician; as associated with him for purposes of investigation Dr. Fernando Calderon the Director of the Philippine General Hospital and Dr. Florentino Herrera, a physician in active practice in the City of Manila; and had arranged to have two members of the medical fraternity, Doctors De Asis and Bonoan as attesting witnesses. The Margarita Lopez faction had taken equal precautions by calling a witnesses in the guardship proceedings Dr. Sixto de los Angeles Professor and Chief of the Department of Legal Medicine in the University of the Philippines, and Dr. Samuel Tietze, with long experience in mental diseases; thereafter by continuing Doctors de Los Angeles and Tietze to examine Tomas Rodriguez and by associating with them Dr. William Burke, a well-known physician of the City of Manila. Skilled lawyers were available to aid and abet the medical experts. Out of such situations, do will contests arise.

An examination of the certificates made by the two sets of physicians and of their testimony shows that on most facts they concur. Their deductions from these facts disclose a substantial divergence of opinion. It is a hopeless task to try to reconcile the views of these distinguished gentlemen who honestly arrived at definite but contradictory conclusions. The best that we can do under the circumstances is to set forth the findings of the Calderon committed on the hand

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and of the De Los Angeles committee on the other.Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera examined Tomas Rodriguez individually and jointly before the date when the will was executed. All of them, as we have noticed were, present at the signing of the will to note the reactions of the testator

Doctor Calderon while on the witness-stand expressed a definite opinion as to the mentality of Tomas Rodriguez.

Tomas Rodriguez was likewise examined thoroughly by Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke. Doctor De los Angeles had been a witness in the gurardianship proceedings and had seen the patient of November 6 and 7, 1923. Doctor Tietze had also been a witness in the guardianship case and had visited the patient on November 9 and 12, 1923, and on January 15, 1924. Doctors Tietze and Burke together examined Rodriguez on January 17, 20, and 24, 1924. The three physicians conducted a joint examination result.

Another angle to the condition of the patient on or about January 3, 1924, is disclosed by the treatment record kept daily by the nurses, in which appear the nurse’s remarks.

On certain facts pertaining to the condition of Tomas Rodriguez there is no dispute. On January 3, 1924, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He was suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and senility. Physically he was a wreck.

As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, Doctors Calderon, Domingo and Herrera admit that he was senile. They, together with Doctors De los Angeles, Tietze, and Burke, further declare that his memory however for remote events was generally good. He was given to irrational exclamations symptomatic of a deceased mind.While, however, Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties of the patient are “sound, except that his memory is weak,” and that in executing the will the testator had full understanding of the act he was performing and full knowledge of the contents thereof, Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez was of unsound mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the simple type approaching the deteriorated stage.

The Code of Civil Procedure prescribes as a requisite to the allowance of a will that the testator be of “sound mind” A “sound mind” is a “disposing mind.” One of the grounds for disallowing a will is “If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable of the execution.” Predicated on these statutory provisions, this court has adopted the following definition of testamentary capacity: “‘Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.’’ The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of the execution of his will (Civil Code, art. 666).

[69]


On the issue of testamentary capacity, the evidence should be permitted to take a wide range in order that all facts may be brought out which will assist in determining the question. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a will concerning the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. The evidence of those present at the execution of the will and of the attending physician is also to be relied upon. The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document.

Counsel for the appellee make capital of the testator being under guardianship at the time he made his will. Citing section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and certain authorities, they insist that the effect of the judgment is conclusive with respect to the condition of the person. To this statement we cannot write down our conformity. The provisions of the cited section were taken from California, and there the Supreme court has never held what is now urged upon us by the appellee. The rule announced that in some states, by force of statute, the finding of insanity is conclusive as to the existence of insanity during the continuance of adjudication, is found to rest on local statutes, of which no counterpart is found in the Philippines. Even where the question of insanity is out in issue in the guardianship proceedings, the most that can be said for the finding is that it raises a presumption of incapacity to make a will but does not invaluable the testament if competency can be shown. The burden of providing sanity in such case is cast upon the proponents.

It is here claimed that the unsoundness of mind of the testator was the result of senile dementia. This is the form of mental decay of the aged upon which will are most often contested. A Newton, Paschal, a Cooley suffering under the variable weather of the mind, the flying vapors of incipient lunacy,” would have proved historic subjects for expert dispute. Had Shakespeare’s King Lear made a will, without any question it would have invited litigation and doubt.

ISSUE:

Did Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, possess sufficient mentality to make a will which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity and have the proponents of the will carried successfully the burden of proof and shown him to be of sound mind on that date?

II. UNDUE INFLUENCE

FACTS:

The will was attacked on the further ground of undue influence exercised by the persons benefited in the will in collaboration with others. The trial judge found this allegation to have been established and made it one of the bases of his decision

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Tomas Rodriguez voluntary named Vicente F. Lopez as his administrator. The latter subsequently became his guardian. There is every indication that of all his relatives Tomas Rodriguez reposed the most confidence in Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno. Again, it was Vicente F. Lopez, who, on the suggestion of Rodriguez secured Maximino Mina to prepare the will, and it was Luz Lopez de Bueno who appears to have gathered the witnesses and physicians for the execution of the will. This faction of the Lopez family was also a favor through the orders of Doctor Domingo as to who could be admitted to see the patient.The trial judge entertained the opinion that there existed “a preconceived plan on the part of the persons who surrounded Tomas Rodriguez” to secure his signature to the testament. The trial judge may be correct in this supposition. It is hard to believe, however, that men of the standing of Judge Mina, Doctors Calderon, Domingo, Herrera, and De Asis and Mr. Legarda would so demean themselves and so fully their characters and reputation as to participate in a scheme having for its purpose to delude and to betray an old man in his age, rather named was acting according to the best of his ability to assist in a legitimate act in a legitimate manner. Moreover, considering the attitude of Tomas Rodriguez toward Margarita Lopez and her husband and his apparent enmity toward them, it seems fairly evident that even if the will had been made in previous years when Rodriguez was more nearly in his prime, he would have prepared somewhat a similar document.

One of the grounds for disallowing a will is that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the art of the beneficiary or some other person for his benefit (Code of Civil Procedure, sec., 634[4]). Undue influence, as here mentioned in connection with the law of wills and as further mentioned in the Civil Code (art. 1265), may be defined as that which compelled the testator to do that which is against the will from fear the desire of peace or from other feeling which is unable to resist.

The theory of undue influence is totally rejected as not proved.

HELD:

Two of the subscribing witnesses to the will, one a physician clearly to the regular manner in which the will was executed and to the testator’s mental condition. The other subscribing witness, also, a physician on the contrary testified to a fact which, if substantiated, would require the court to disallow the will. The attending physician and three other eminent members of the medical fraternity, who were present at the execution of the will, expressed opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the testator. As against this we have the professional speculations of three other equally eminent members of the medical profession when the will was executed. The advantage on those facts is all with those who offer the will for probate.

The will was short. It could easily be understood by a person in physical distress. It was reasonable, that is, it was reasonable if we take into account the evident prejustice of the testator against the husband of Margarita Lopez.

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Tomas Rodriguez comprehended the nature of the transaction in which he was engaged. He had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him. While for some months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property he seem to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his income. Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was nearest in which the instrument distributed the property naming the objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence on giving all of his property to the two persons whom he specified.

On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms “testamentary capacity.” That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing the evidence for the oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious consideration which it deserves.

The judgment of the trial court is set aside and the will of Tomas Rodriguez is admitted to probate without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.


[72]


Jaboneta us. GustiloNo. 1641.

January 19, 1906

Topic/Doctrine:WILLS; PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND WITNESSES; VALIDITY.—The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.

FACTS:

Probate of the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied by the lower court because the latter was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

According to the testimony of Jena, he left the room seeing Javellana holding the pen in position to sign the last will and testament of the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta complied with the requirement of the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

HELD:

Yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.

We are of opinion that the statutory requisites as to the execution of the instrument were complied with, and that the lower court erred in denying probate to the will on the ground stated in the ruling appealed from.

JAJURIE, FATIMA BADRIA J.LLB-III B

[73]


Nera vs. RemandoNo. 5971.

February 27, 1911

Topic/Doctrine:The question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but whether at that moment existing conditions and the position of the parties, with relation to each other, were such that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.

FACTS:

The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

ISSUE:

Whether or not one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where the will was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures.

HELD:

A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree admitting the document to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased.

It is to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions.


[74]


Icasiano vs. IcasianoNo. L-18979

June 30, 1964

Topic/Doctrine:The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.

FACTS:

The late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely: attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy. The will was acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila. The records show that the original of the will which consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.

Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in the duplicate are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on the same occasion as the original,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a will invalidates the same.

HELD:

No. The inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses.


[75]


IN RE WILL OF LUCINA ANDRADAG.R. No. 16008

September 29, 1921

Doctrine: In relation to Article 805 of the Civil Code (Forms of Wills)

FACTS:

Lucina Andrada died on June 5, 1919, in the Municipality of Capiz, Province of Capiz; and soon thereafter a petition was presented to the Court of First Instance of Capiz by Lucila Arce to establish a document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased. Upon hearing the petition, his Honor, Judge Antonio Villareal, declared that the document in question had not been executed in conformity with the requirements and he therefore refused to admit the purported will to probate, and the petitioner appealed.

The attesting clause of the will in question is incorporated in the will itself, constituting the last paragraph thereof; and its defect consists in the fact that it does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, though it does state that the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses signed on every page, as is in fact obvious from an inspection of the instrument. Each of the pages moreover bears successively the Visayan words, "isa," "duha," "tatlo," "apat," "lima," which mean respectively "one," "two," "three," "four," "five," Visayan being the dialect in which the instrument is written.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the document in question had not been executed in conformity with the requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature.

HELD:

According to 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is required that each and every page of the will shall be numbered correlatively in letters and that the attesting clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used. Without deciding in this case whether the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the manner in which the pages are numbered, the court is unanimous upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal. The law plainly says that the attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, the evident purpose being to safeguard the document from the possibility of the interpolation of additional pages or the omission of some of the pages actually used. It is true that this point is also safeguarded by the other two requirements that the pages shall be consecutively lettered and that each page shall be singed on the left margin by the testator and the witnesses. In light of these requirements it is really difficult to see any practical necessity for the additional requirement that the attesting clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the last mentioned requirement affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material. It results that the trial judge did not err in refusing probate of the will, and the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.LLB-III B

[76]


Cagro v. Cagro et al.G.R. No. L-5826April 29, 1953

Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Art. 805 of the Civil Code (Forms of Will)

FACTS:

The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Samar which admitted to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on Feb. 14, 1949.The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on the left hand margin. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left hand margin conform substantially to law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:

Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their signatures.

An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation. Moreover, the signatures affixed on the left hand margin are not substantial conformance to the law. The said signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. The probate of the will is denied.

JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.LLB-IIIB

[77]


Cruz vs. VillasorG.R. No. L-32213

November 26, 1973

Topic/Doctrine: Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code (Forms of Wills)

FACTS:

Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing the probate of the last will of testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. The surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. The first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.

In which three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. As the third witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari which was given due course.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz was executed in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code?

HELD:

After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties. We are inclined to sustain that of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.

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Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement ( Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud . He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.

JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.LLB-IIIB

[79]


Cuevas v. AchacosoGR No. L-3497MAY 18, 1951

Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of a will

FACTS:

The attestation clause in this case was signed by the testator, but signed below his name by the witnesses. The clause was made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses.

ISSUE:


HELD:

Valid. It substantially complies with the statute. The apparent anomaly is not serious to invalidate the will, it appearing that right under the signature of the testator, there appear the signatures of the 3 witnesses.

JIMENEZ, MAY MARIE ANN A.LLB III-B

.

[80]


MERZA v. PORRASGR No. L-4888May 25, 1953

Topic/Doctrine: Codicil

FACTS:

Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B), disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were submitted to probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed by the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.

ISSUE:

Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to a supposed last will, be probated?

HELD:

Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents of Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition." However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it," and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.


[81]


Dichoso v. GorostizaGR No. L-35586

October 31, 1932

Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of the Will

FACTS:

The will of the deceased Caridad Alcantara de Gorostiza was denied probate in the trial court, for the reason that the attestation clause failed to state that the testatrix signed every page of the will as required by section 618, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the attestation clause is fatally defective as to annul the will.

HELD:

It was held that the attestation clause is legally sufficient for the will to be admitted to probate. Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the same statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can reasonably deduced that the attestation clause fulfils what the law expects of it.


[82]


GAN VS. YAPReference: G.R. No. L-12190

Date: August 30, 1958

Doctrine: In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself must be produced. Therefore, a lost holographic will cannot be probated

FACTS:

On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.

On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.

HELD:

NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct“ proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.

JOHASAN, WALDEMAR B.LLB III-B

[83]


AZAOLA VS. SINGSONReference: G.R. No. L-14003

Date: August 5, 1960

Doctrine: The three-witness provision in case of contested holographic wills is directory, not mandatory.

FACTS:

Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner submitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the testatrix’s handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the general power of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two residence certificates showing the testatrix’s signature were also exhibited for comparison purposes.

The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented "did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD:

Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the

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genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 cannot be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become impossibility.

This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.


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GONZALES VS. CAReference: G.R. No. L-37453

Date: May 25, 1979

Doctrine: Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and being reliable, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with.

FACTS:

Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel's will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel.

The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.

The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.

ISSUE:

1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered credible as required by Art. 805?

2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?

HELD:

1. YES. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda.de Aroyo v. El

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Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony."

2. NO. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.


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IGNACIA DIAZ vs. ANA DE LEONNo. 17714

May 31, 1922

Topic/Doctrine: WILLS; REVOCATION; "ANIMO REVOCANDI."—According to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction the destruction animo revocandi of a will constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.) The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed animo revocandi, cannot be declared the will and last testament of the testator.

FACTS:

The testator, shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed.

The petitioner denies such revocation, while the contestant affirms the same by alleging that the testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by executing another will expressly revoking the former.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now deceased, was revoked by him?

HELD:

We find that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased is not clothed with all the necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.

But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will with animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital where he was confined.

The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon. Judgment is affirmed with costs against the petitioner.

KINANG, JEZRILL C.LLB III-B

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JESUSA LACSON VDA. DE ARROYO vs. EL BEATERIO DEL SANTISSIMO ROSARIO DE MOLONo. L-22005May 3, 1968

Topic/Doctrine: Remedial law; Appeal; Findings of fact of Court of Appeals conclusive upon Supreme Court; Meaning of question of law.—The Supreme Court can review decisions of the Court of Appeals only on errors of law, its findings of fact being conclusive. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. If the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation, the question must be deemed factual—for the Court of Appeals to solve.

Same; Evidence; Who are competent to testify on land value; Competency and credibility of witness distinguished.—A witness who personally knows the land sought to be expro priated because he had possessed it as owner or had administered it or lived on it for a long time, or because he had bought and sold much land situated in the same municipality, or had engaged in farming and business and had therefore acquired experience and knowledge of the value of lands in the locality, is competent to testify on the value of said land. Professional appraisers and dealers engaged in the business of buying and selling similar property are also competent to testify as to value or are competent to express their judgment as to its value. Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony.

FACTS:

Appeal by certiorari taken by Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and other heirs of the late Ignacio Arroyo, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.—28555 affirming the one rendered by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Civil Case No. 4759 entitled “Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo, et al. vs. Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, et al.” holding “that the plaintiffs have failed to establish fair and reliable basis upon which the donation in question may be justly declared inofficious”, and, for this reason, dismissing the case, without costs.

“On July 2, 1924, the late Ignacio Arroyo partitioned his entire estate inter vivos among his three children, by executing with them a public instrument called ‘Convenio de Reparticion de Bienes y Adjudicacion de Herencia’. The three children also received therein their inheritance from their deceased mother Maria Pidal, the first wife of Ignacio Arroyo. The estate of Ignacio Arroyo was apportioned in four parts, with specified properties being given to each of the three children, and the remaining properties, likewise specified, being adjudicated to Ignacio Arroyo, or reserved for himself, as comprising- his one-third portion of free disposal.

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“On March 8, 1927 Jose Arroyo died leaving his widow Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and their children as his only heirs.

“On January 9, 1928, Ignacio Arroyo, in a public document called ‘Escritura de Donacion’, disposed of almost all of the properties adjudicated to him in the aforementioned ‘Convenio de Reparticion,’ in favor of Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, a religious corporation. This donation.with all the conditions thereof, was accepted by the donee on the same date and in the same instrument. Subsequent documents clarifying the properties subject matter of the donation, and modifying the conditions imposed thereby, were executed.

“On October 22. 1931 Ignacio Arroyo executed his last will and testament. The ‘Convenio de Reparticion’ aforementioned was reproduced in said will as an integral part thereof, following a statement therein regarding its execution, and regarding its being confirmed and reproduced therein so that its validity will never be questioned. The donation in favor of the Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, its acceptance and

“On January 8, 1935 Ignacio Arroyo died and his last will and testament was probated, without any opposition, by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on February 25, 1935.

“On January 20, 1936 Ricardo Carreon, as administrator of the intestate estate of Concepcion Gerona, filed an amended complaint against Lucio Lacson as executor of Ignacio Arroyo, Jose Arroyo, Jr. as administrator of the intestate estate of Jose Arroyo, the Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario do Molo and the Municipality of Iloilo seeking the recovery, inter alia, of one-half of the properties adjudicated to Jose Arroyo and Mariano Arroyo in the ‘Convenio de Reparticion’ And one-half of the properties donated to the Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo in the ‘Escritura de Donacion’. The court rendered judgment against the defendants, but cleared the Beaterio and the municipality of Iloilo from any liability, and refrained from disturbing the status of the properties donated to them, reserving the right of the plaintiff to claim from the executor of Ignacio Arroyo one-half of the value of these donated properties. The Arroyos appealed the decision to the Supreme Court but war destroyed the records of the case, so that a new trial was ordered. ‘Civil Case No. 9137 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo was then tried anew, but on November 3, 1949, the plaintiffs therein and Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Jose Arroyo entered into an agreement whereby the former renounced and waived in favor of the latter all their rights and interests on any and all the properties therein litigated in consideration of the sum of P65,000.00 and the assumption of the obligation to pay the attorney’s fees of’ the counsel of the plaintiffs in the sum of P40,000.00. Upon motion of both parties the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint in Civil Case No. 9137 on the same date.

“On March 13, 1958, Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo and her children, as the heirs of Jose Arroyo, filed the complaint in this case,’ seeking declaration of the donation made by Ignacio Arroyo to the Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo in 1928 as inofficious and to recover the excess thereof. After due trial, decision was rendered on August 29, 1960, dismissing the complaint for

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failure of the plaintiffs to establish fair and reasonable basis upon which the donation in question may be justly declared inofficious. The counterclaim was likewise dismissed.”After a careful consideration of the foregoing facts, the trial court held “that the plaintiffs have failed to establish fair and reasonable basis upon which the donation in question may be justly declared inofficious”. For its part, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court because, in its opinion, “the decision appealed from does not err in finding no fair and reasonable basis for declaring the Beaterio donation inofficious”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is sufficiency of plaintiffsappellants’ evidence as a fair and reasonable basis for resting a finding that the donation in question is inofficious”.

HELD:

A question of law has been declared as one not calling for the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the are to the effect that “For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.

The review should be confined to the facts and circumstances found by the Court of Appeals. That such facts and circumstances in this case do not sustain the theory of the appellant. Indeed it is seriously to be doubted whether we could reverse the conclusion of the appellate court to the effect that those facts and circumstances are not ‘enough evidence’ to show clearly and beyond doubt that the parties intended the contract to be a mortgage instead of a conditional conveyance. That conclusion is obviously ONE OF FACT, not a bit different from the verdict of a jury in a murder trial that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution has proved, or has not shock and similar injuries,’ and accordingly, ordered plaintiffs to pay .

In the light of the foregoing it is clear that petitioners now seek a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals not upon a question of law but upon one of fact—one which necessarily involves the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by them, it being their contention that such evidence, which the Court of Appeals precisely held to be insufficient to justify the granting of the relief sought, is, in fact, sufficient for that purpose. In other words, petitioners seek to have Us substitute our judgment in lieu of that of the Court of Appeals in the resolution of a question of fact.

But to avoid the necessarily fatal application of the well settled rule on the matter, petitioners’ lone assignment of error in the brief submitted to Us attempts to state the issue somewhat differently, saying that the Court of Appeals “gravely erred in not declaring the donation in question inofficious and in not ordering the return to petitioners of the excess thereof”. Re-stating the issue at page 2 of their brief they submit again that “the only question presented in this appeal is whether the conclusions of the

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What We said in Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General, 41 Phil. 160, 169, is simply to the effect that a witness who personally knows the land sought to be expropriated because he had possessed it as owner or had administered it or levied on it for a long time, or because he had bought and sold much land situated in the same municipality, or had been engaged in farming and business and had therefore acquired experience and knowledge of the value of lands in the locality, is competent to testify on the value of said land. To hold that a particular person is competent to testify upon a given matter does not mean that his testimony upon the same must be believed by the Court or must be deemed by the Court or must be deemed by the latter to be of sufficient probative value to establish the point which it was intended to prove. Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. A perusal of the decision subject of review clearly .shows that the Court of Appeals did not hold that witness Doromal was not a competent witness in relation to the value of the properties involved in the questioned donation; it simply declined to believe his testimony or to give it probative value sufficient to prove what petitioners were trying to establish. Had the Court of Appeals considered him not to be a competent witness upon that matter, it would have completely ignored or disregarded his testimony instead of weighing it or evaluating it; this, however, resulting in the Court arriving at the conclusion that such evidence did not have sufficient probative value to convince the Court.

As regards the Court of Appeals’ refusal to believe or to be bound by the testimony of petitioner Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo because “a sale between brothers can not be a reliable index of the fair market value of a property”, petitioners now contend that there is no evidence at all that the deceased Jose Arroyo (late husband of said petitioner) or the deceased Mariano Arroyo were trying to help one another when they executed the deed of conveyance involving one-half share of Haciendas “Manolita” and “Conchita” in favor of the former. This obviously raises the same question of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed any error in evaluating the testimony of the witness already named—a question purely of fact which We are not authorized to review.

KINANG, JEZRILL C.LLB III-C

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Rosario Guevara vs. Ernesto Guevara74 Phil. 479

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8. – Allowance & Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

This is an action commenced by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict legitimate as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Victoriano Guevara. Ernesto is a legitimate son of the decease. It appears that the deceased had left a will disposing of his properties in favor of the defendant and the rest of his relatives, the plaintiff among them. This will have not been probated. Rosario who has her father’s will, died and nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made there in her favor. But four years after her father’s death, she commenced this action. Wherein she presented the will, to prove that she has been acknowledged as a natural daughter by the deceased. Because the will has not been probated both Trial Court and Court of Appeals sustained the theory.

ISSUE:

Whether the procedure adopted by the plaintiff in accordance with law, invoicing the provisions of the different sections of Rule 76 (now Rule 75) of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

It cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent left a will and no debts and heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the Court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law.

LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.LLB III – B

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Ernesto Guevara vs. Rosario Guevara98 Phil. 249/G.R. No. L-48840

December 29, 1943

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8. – Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

This case is a sequel and aftermath of the aftermath of the case of Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479. A Motion to dismiss was filed by Ernesto on the ground, among others, that the petition for probate is barred by the Statute of Limitations considering that the testator died on Sept. 27, 1933, and that petition was filed 12 years after on Oct. 5, 1945. As a consequence, the lower court dismissed the petition. The petitioner thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the order of the Lower Court. The case thereafter was elevated to the Supreme Court for review by Certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the Statute of Limitations is applicable to the Probate of the Wills.

HELD:

The Court failed to notice, that its Doctrine, was destructive of the right of testamentary disposition and violative of the owner’s right to control his property within the legal limits. The appeal ordered in fact leaves wills at the mercy and whim of custodians and heirs interested in their suppression. The Lower Court would in effect abdicate the tutelary power that passed to the Republic from the former sovereigns, that ‘potestad suprema que en mi reside para velarpor un punctual cumplimento de las ultimas voluntades,’ asserted as one of the royal prerogatives in the ‘Real Cedula’ of March 18, 1776.

These decisions are of high persuasive value; they represent the trend of authority, and enable us to conclude that reason and precedent reject the applicability of the Statute of Limitations to probate proceedings because these are not exclusively established in the interest of the surviving heirs, but primarily for the protection of the testator’s expressed wishes that are entitled to respect as an effect of his ownership and right of disposition. If the probate of validly executed will is required by public policy, as declared by the Supreme Court in the previous case, the state could not have intended the statute of limitations to defeat the policy.


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Mercado vs. Santos66 Phil. 215/G.R. No. 45629

September 22, 1938

Topic/Doctrine: Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

The records show that the petitioner had presented a will purporting to the last will and testament of his deceased wife for probate. The will was admitted to probate without any opposition. Sixteen months after the allowance of the will, a complaint for forgery of the probated will was instituted by the brothers and sisters of the deceased against the petitioner. The latter moved to dismiss claiming that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and that the order of allowance is conclusive as to its due execution. The motion was overruled. Whereupon, the petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. As a result, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review by certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the probate of the will is a bar to the subsequent criminal prosecution of the petitioner for the alleged forgery of the said will.

HELD:

The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of probate, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the action of a court of first instance when that court refuses to grant relief. After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and unappealable, and after the period fixed by law has expired, the law as an expression of the legislative wisdom goes to further and the case ends there.

The court held that, that the criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which has been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.


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NERI v. AKUTINGR No.L-47799May 21, 1943

Topic/Doctrine: Institution of Heirs

FACTS:

This is a case where the testator AgripinoNeri in his will left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will shall be cancelled in view of the omission of heirs. Whether or not there was disinheritance.

HELD:

Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

LIM, EKEENA, O.LLB III-B

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Nuguid vs Nuguid17 SCRA 449

June 23, 1966

Topic/Doctrine: Effects of Preterition

FACTS:

Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.

HELD:

Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

LIM, EKEENA, O.LLB III-B

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CRISOLOGO vs SINGSONG.R. No. L-13876

February 28, 1962

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Testamentary Disposition

FACTS:

This involves a lot and improvements thereon. Complaint alleged that Singson owned half pro indiviso of said property and that Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the duly probated last will of Singson (original owner). Defendant's defense was that ConsolacionFlorentino was a mere usufructuary of and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question, and that therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson appealed. At the time of the execution of the will, the nearest living relatives of the original owner were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and DionisioSingson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.

ISSUE:

Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion vulgar or for sustitucion fideicomisaria?

HELD:

The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may not only designate heirs who’ll succeed him, but also substitutes in the event that said heirs don’t accept or are in no position to accept inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him.

Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular person with obligation, on part of latter, to deliver the same to another, totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular event. The particular testamentary clause provides for substitution of heir in this manner: upon death of ConsolacionFlorentino, whether before or after that of testatrix, property bequeathed to her shall be delivered or shall belong in equal parts to testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel, Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of ConsolacionFlorentino. If this created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result would be that ConsolacionFlorentino, upon death of testatrix, became owner of one undivided half of the property,but if it provided for sustitutionfideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over same half. In the former, she would be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.

As Manresa says, a careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being

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vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix. Her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix. In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution ConsolacionFlorentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

LIM, EKEENA O.LLB III-B

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Pecson vs. CoronelG.R. No. L-20374

October 11, 1923

Doctrine: Undue Influence

FACTS:

Dolores Coronel, a resident of Pampanga executed her last will and testament whereby having no forced heirs, willed to her nephew, Lorenzo Pecson, who is married to her niece Angela Coronel, her properties, both movable and immovable, in consideration of the good services he has rendered to the former. Further, Dolores also appointed Lorenzo Pecson executor of all that is willed and ordained in her will, without bond and in his default, she appointed as substitute executor her grandson Victor Pecson. As the testatrix does not know how to write her name, she requested Vicente J. Francisco to sign her name under her express direction in the presence of the witnesses and the witnesses do the same. The petitioner for the probate of the will is Lorenzo Pecson, and the opponents are Eriberto Coronel et al, blood relatives of the testatrix who contend that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not natural nor usual that she should completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an undue influence in appointing Lorenzo Pecson and not the blood relatives as the beneficiary of the estate of the testatrix.

HELD:

There was no undue influence in appointing Lorenzo Pecson as the beneficiary of the estate of the testatrix. The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided in the first paragraphof Article 763 (now Art. 842). As to Lorenzo Pecson, we do not find in the record sufficient proof to believe that he should have tried, through fraud or any undue influence, to frustrate the alleged intention of the testatrix to leave her estate to her blood relatives. Further, the preference given to Lorenzo Pecson is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by this appelle, although contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had been rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the administrator and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life.

LUYAO, RODELO D.LLB-IIIB

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Lajom vs. LeuterioG.R. No. L-13557

April 25, 1960

Doctrine: Preterition

FAC TS:

Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1933. Judicial proceedings of his testate estate were instituted in the Court of First Instance. An agreement of partition and distribution was executed by and between Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola, legitimate children of Maximo Viola and Juana Toura, whereby the properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were divided among themselves. Donato Lajom filed a complaint praying, among other things, that he be declared a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly recognized and acknowledged in accordance with the laws in force prior to the Civil Code, thereby being a co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola; that the agreement of partition and distribution executed in 1935 by these three legitimate children of Maximo Viola be declared null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is a victim of preterition.

HELD:

It is alleged that petitioner having been the victim of preterition, the institution of heirs made by the deceased Dr. Maximo Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby converted into an intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate. This contention is clearly untenable. There might have been merit therein if we were dealing with a special proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in consequence of said preterition, would thereby acquire the character of a proceeding for the settlement of an intestate estate, with jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased. But, Civil Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the court having jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties described in the pleadings, which admittedly do not include the aforementioned riceland.


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Aznar vs. DuncanG.R. No. L-24365

June 30, 1966

Doctrine: Preterition

FACTS:

Christensen died testatewherein he declared that he has no living descendant or ascendant except a natural daughter Lucy Duncan; that he is leaving the residue of his estate to said Lucy Duncan; and that he is bequeathing the amount of P3,600.00 to Helen Garcia to whom he is not related in any way. The will was admitted to probate. In the decision allowing the will the court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. Subsequently, in the partition proceedings, an order was issued approving a project of partition wherein the estate was divided equally between Lucy Duncan, whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his natural daughter, and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based on the proposition that Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will thus resulting in the annulment of the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir; hence the estate passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate. Lucy Duncan appealed on the sole question of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heirs should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover thelegitime of Helen Garcia to 1/4 of the entire estate. She contends that the case should be governed by Art. 906 of the Civil Code.Helen Garcia, on the other hand, contends that the case should be governed by Art. 854 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was preterition in the instant case.

HELD:

It is submitted that in this case there is no preterition within the meaning of Art. 854 of the Civil Code. It is true that there is a total omission of the acknowledged natural child in the testator’s will, and apparently the rule regarding preterition should, therefore, be applied. But then, we must consider the fact that a donation inter vivos is actually given to a compulsory heir as an advance on his inheritance. That is why in the partition of the estate of the donor upon the death of the latter, it must be collated and subsequently, it must be charged against the legitime of such compulsory heir. Consequently, there is no omission in this case which is complete and total in character. Hence, if there is an impairment of the legitime of the acknowledged natural child because the value of the property donated is less than the legitime to which he is entitled by operation of law, his remedy lies in the right granted in Art. 906 of the Civil Code. He can ask for the completion of his legitime.


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Gallanosa vs Arcangel83 SCRA 676|G.R. No. L-29300

June 21, 1978


FACTS:

FlorentinoHitosis executed a will in 1938 when he was eighty years old wherein he instituted as his only heirs his stepson Pedro Gallanosa and the latter’s wife Corazon Grecia. He died in 1939, survived by his brother Leon Hitosis and several nephews and nieces. A petition for probate was duly filed by the testamentary heirs. Opposition to the probate was registered by the legal heirs. After hearing, the probate court admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor. In 1943, a project of partition of sixty-one (61) parcels of land constituting the bulk of the testator’s estate was finally approved. There was no appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of partition and distribution. In 1952, the testator’s legal heirs instituted an action for the recovery of the 61 parcels of landon the ground of acquisitive prescription. The action was dismissed. Again, there was no appeal from the order of dismissal. In 1967, said legal heirs instituted another action in the same court against the testamentary heirs for the “annulment” of the will and the recovery of the 61 parcels of land, alleging that the Gallanosa spouses caused the execution of the will through fraud and deceit. Upon motion of defendants, the court dismissed the action. Plaintiffs fi led a motion for reconsideration. Respondent Judge granted it and set aside the order of dismissal. From this order of dismissal, defendants went up to the Supreme Court by certiorari. Petitioners (defendants) contend that private respondents (plaintiffs) do not have a cause of action for the “annulment” of the will and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of landby reason of res judicata and of prescription. On the other hand, private respondents contend that the will is void, and therefore their right of action is imprescriptible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondents have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of FlorentionHitosis and for the recovery of the parcels of land.

HELD:

Speaking through Justice Aquino, the Supreme Court held:

“It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from defendants’ motion to dismiss that plaintiffs’ 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a double-barrelled defense, and by prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile and the jus gentium as usucapio, longitemporispossesio and praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284).

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“Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the “annulment” of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentaryproceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly Sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249).

“The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act. 190; Sec. 1, Rule 76, now Sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par. of Art.838, Civil Code). “That means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p. 395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448).

MACROHON, JENIELYN, ALLB III-B

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MacamvsGatmaitan60 Phil 358| G.R. No. 40445

August 17, 1934


FACTS:

The records show that NicolasaMacam fi led a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a will and a codicil. Both will and codicil were executed by LeonardoMacam. The will was admitted to probate without any opposition, but with regard to the codicil, however, an opposition to its probate was fi led by Juana Gatmaitan. After hearing, the court ordered the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the codicil as well as of the opposition thereto on the ground that since the allowance of the will had already become fi nal and executory, it was too late to consider the codicil. Both parties appealed.

ISSUE:

W/N a probate of a will would be a final judgment prior to that of a codicil, thereof a bar to the probate of the codicil?

HELD:

The Supreme Court, speaking through JusticeVillareal, held:

“The fact that a will has been allowed without opposition and the order allowing the same has become final and executor is not a bar to the presentation of a codicil, provided it complies with all the necessary formalities for executing a will. “It is not necessary that the will and the codicil be probated together as the codicil may be concealed by an interested party and it may not be discovered until after the will has already been allowed; and they may be presented and probated one after the other, since the purpose of the probate proceeding is merely to determine whether or not the will and the codicil meet all thestatutory requirements for their extrinsic validity, leaving the validity of their provisions for further consideration. “The appeal taken by the petitioner NicolasaMacam is, therefore, well-founded and the court a quo erred in flatly denyingher petition for the probate of the codicil on the erroneousground that said codicil should have been presented at the sametime as the will.

“With respect to the opposition of the oppositor-appellantJuana Gatmaitan, the fact that she failed to file opposition tothe probate of the will does not prevent her from filing oppositionto the probate of the codicil thereof, inasmuch as the willmay satisfy all the external requisites necessary for its validity,but the codicil may, at the time of its execution, not be in conformitytherewith. If the testator had testamentary capacity atthe time of the execution of the will, and the will was executedin accordance with all the statutory requirements, opposition toits probate would not lie. On the contrary, if at the time of theexecution of the codicil, the testator lacked some of the subjectiverequisites legally capacitating him to execute the same, orall the statutory requirements were not complied with in theexecution thereof, opposition to its probate would lie.


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Cosovs Fernandez Deza42 Phil 585|G.R. No.L- 16763

December 22, 1921

Topic/Doctrine:Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testator’s will gives the tercio de libredisposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.

ISSUE:

W/N the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

HELD:“It is worthwhile to recall the basic principles on undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence of this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own


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CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantaravs.

MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila,

G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930

TOPIC/DOCTRINE:FIDEICOMMISSARY SUBSTITUTION

FACTS:

The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.

And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara.

The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.

ISSUE:

WON the deposited amount belong to the fideicommisary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara.

HELD:

This will certainly provide for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code). The testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution.

The disposition contained in clause IX of the will, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate. In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the second heir.

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It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution.

Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs.

MOLEJON, JAYSON T.LLB III-B

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ELENA MORENTEvs.

GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTAG.R. No. L-3891

December 19, 1907

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: MODAL INSTITUTION

FACST:

The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa.2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure followed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON the will of Consuelo contained modal institution

HELD:

Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will?

It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if

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he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such a lossWe are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we cannot say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. In order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will.

MOLEJON, JAYSON T.LLB III-B

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Santos vs. Buenaventura18 SCRA 47

Doctrine: Timely withdrawal of opposition to the probation of “no contest and forfeiture” will must not be penalized.

FACTS:

Decedent: Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas.Nearest kin: Brothers, a sister, nephews and nieces.Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee, is one of the nieces.

Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will.

After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositions, but before the latter could close their evidence, Flora filed a manifest action that she is withdrawing her opposition to the probate of the will.The will provides a “NO-CONTEST & FORFEITRURE” clause.

ISSUE:

Did Flora actuations amount to violation of no-contest and forfeiture clause of the will?

HELD:

No. Where after realizing her mistake in contesting the will – a mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts – appellant withdrew her opposition and join the appellee in the latter’s petition for the probate of the will, appellant must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. Such act of withdrawing before she rested her case contributed to the speedy probate of will.

OMBRA, JHEMHAR I.LLB III-B

[111]


Villaflor v. Villaflor4 SCRA 550

Doctrine: Intent of testator must govern.

FACTS:

Don Nicolas Villaflor of Zambales devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepumoceno, ½ of all his real and personal pproperties, giving the other half to his brother.It was provided in the will that clause for the provision for his brother would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with his wife.

Don Nicolas died without begetting any child.Thereafter, Dona Fausta died without having second marriage. Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administration of the estate of the widow Fausta contending that upon the widow’s death. Said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas.

ISSUE:

Is that the title to the properties became absolute vested in the widow upon her death.

HELD:

Yes. The intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all question raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith. Following the plain and literal meaning of the testator’s words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.


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Chua vs. CFI78 SCRA 412

Doctrine: There is reserve troncal if its four requisites concur.

FACTS:

In the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia, he sired 3 children, Ignacio, Lorenzo, & Manuel. When Fatricia died, Jose remarried with Consolaccion with whom he had a child named Juanito. Manuel died without leaving any issue. Then, Jose died intestate leaving his widow consolaccion and his son Juanito of the second marriage and sons Ignacio & Lorenzo of his first marriage.

Lower court ordered that 1/2 portion of the disputed lot and the sum of p8,000 in favor of Consolaccion, the other half lot in favor of Juanito. P3,000 in favor of Lorenzo and P1500 in favor of Ignacio.

Thereafter, Juanito died intestate without issue. His mother Consolaccion succeeded him pro-indiviso share of said lot.

ISSUE:

WON there is reserve troncal?

HELD:

Yes. The requisites for reserve troncal are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito of the second marriage died intestate. He died without leaving any issue. His pro-indiviso of 1/2 share was acquired by his mother by operation of law. When his mother died, Juanito who died intestate had relatives within 3rd civil degree. These relatives are Ignacio, Dominador and Remidios, the supposed legitimate child of Lorenzo who are the petitioner herein.


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EDROSO v SABLANSeptember 13 1913

Topic/Doctrine: RESERVA TRONCAL

FACTS:

Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on Sept. 22, 1882.In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15,1902, unmarried and without issue, and by his decease the two parcels of land inPagsanjan, Laguna, passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso.Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership.-Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan [uncles german of Pedro] appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming either (1) that the registration be denied OR (2) that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel.-The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the applicant appealed through a bill of exceptions. Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

ISSUE:

WON the lands which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved

HELD:

YES.-The hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title]. He who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives-Art. 811, OCC provides: “The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded.”-Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he acquired without a valuable consideration – that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.-If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only that he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.[Art. 809, OCC.] In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,

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because it is what by operation of law would fall to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is that in article 811 of the Civil Code says.-Proof of testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. In this case, the interested party has not proved that either of the lots became Marcelina’sinheritance through the free disposal of her son. Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code. Article 968: "Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a second marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she may have acquired from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer w/out a valuable consideration."-From principles of jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of Spain, it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendants who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that articles 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance, under article 977, are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.-Article 199 of amended Mortgage Law: "The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be required by the persons who should legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding articles (relative to the right reserved by article968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."-The lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the exercise of this right of action by the persons in whose favor the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, and enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limit is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained. “What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?”-The person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.-On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee simple

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which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within the third-degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their right has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as it may even become absolute should that person die."-No act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendant from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein. “Can the heir of the property required by law to be reserved himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited?”-YES when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made agree thereto and provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land is recorded, as the law provides.

OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B. LLB III-B

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SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA,vs.MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO,

G.R. No. L-13386October 27, 1920

FACTS:

Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva, married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born. Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.

Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.

Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.

On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question, particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code. The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.

The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.

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2. Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant?

HELD:

Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came.

The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then, upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo, was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must fail.

under said article 811 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (But in said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives? Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to maintain the affirmative.

Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.

Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in the right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as they do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Cataluña concede the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties

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(bienes troncales); only to the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. — This is one of the most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.

It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article intends to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established.

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express provision of the foregoing article (943).

OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B.LLB III-B

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Celedonia Solivio vs CA and JavellanaG.R. No. 83484,

February 12, 1990

Topic/Doctrine: RESERVA TRONCAL

FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr. Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:

"4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to

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the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other." (p. 234, Record; italics supplied.)

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated. On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17, 1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).

Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva. On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.

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ISSUES:

1. Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and 2. Whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation," and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.

HELD:

I. The question of jurisdiction On the question of reserva troncal — We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows: "ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came."The persons involved in reserva troncal are: "1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) — the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants. "2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios) — relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came. "3. The propositus — the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law." (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891. Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide: "ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

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"ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. "The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that: "Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate ‘without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,’ and is entitled to one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate." (p. 57, Rollo)"The Foundation has a Special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award. "Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multipurpose Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious, civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst others. Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.

OPAY, EMMAE ROSE B.LLB III-B

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Encarnacion Florentino et al vs. Mercedes Florentino et al40 Phil. 480

November 15, 1919

Topic/Doctrine: Reserva Troncal

FACTS:

In 1908, Severina Foz de Leon died leaving by will her entire estate including the property, which is the subject matter of this litigation, to her only daughter and compulsory heir, Mercedes Florentino. The records show that she inherited the property in question from her deceased son Apolinio Florentino III, who, in turn, had inherited it from his deceased father Apolinio Florentino II. The right instituted heir, Mercedes Florentino, to the property is now contested by the children and grandchildren of Apolinio Florentino II by a previous marriage with the provision of Art. 811 ( now Art. 891) of the Civil Code and that they, together with Mercedes Florentino, are entitled to the property as reservatorios.

ISSUE:

W/N the property is reservable and that the right of representation is applicable.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held: “Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative over the property which the reservista should return to him, excludes that of the ones more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the same as a reservatorio of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 ( now Art. 891) is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable preoperty came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatorios, since the law does not recognize them as such. Nevertheless, there is right of representation on the part of reservatorios who are within the third degree, as the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. These reservatorios have the right to represent their ascendants who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with Article 811 of the Civil Code (now Art. 891).”

ROJAS, RAE-ANN THEA, G.LLB III-B

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Dionisia Padura et al vs. Baldovino et al104 Phil. 1065

Date: December 27, 1958


FACTS:

Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime. With his first wife, he had one child. Manuel, and with his second wife, Benita, he had two children, Fortunato and Candelaria. Agustin died in 1908, leaving all his properties to Benita and the three children. Four parcels of land were adjudicated to Fortunato. Shortly thereafter, Fortunato died without a will. Not having any issue, the four parcels of land passed to his mother, Benita. In 1934, Candelaria also died, leaving as her only heirs four legitimate children, petitioners herein. In 1940, Manuel also died, leaving his only heirs seven legitimate children, oppositors herein. In 1952, Benita died. The children of Manuel and Candelaria were declared to be the rightful reservatorios. Subsequently, the children of Candelaria filed the instant petition seeking to have the reservable properties partitioned, such that ½ of the same be adjudicated to them on the basis that they inherit by right of representation. The children of Manuel filed their opposition, maintaining that they (the 11 reservatorios) should all deemed as inheriting in their own right, as a consequence of which, they should all inherit in equal shares.

ISSUE:

How shall the reservable properties be divided among the eleven reservatorios?

HELD:

The reservatorios nephews of the full blood are entitled to a share twice as large as that of the others in conformity with Arts. 1006 and 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated by the relatives of the inheritance ascendant (reservista). The stated purpose of the reserve is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no call for applying Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective shares of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (propositus), excluding those reservatorios of more remote degree. And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (propositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs. Florentino).

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Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative. In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatorios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstances that the reserve being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil Code’s hostility to successional reserves and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserve viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).

Even during the reservista’s lifetime, the reservatorios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right; and for this purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive. This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservista, who may dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatorios existing. The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant-propositus, of whom the reservatorios are the heirsmortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista. Had the nephews of whole and half blood succeeded the propositus directly, those of full blood would undoubtedly receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood. Why then should the latter receive equal shares simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent (causante), the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary.


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Teodoro Delos Reyes vs. Maximo Paterno34 Phil. 420

March 27, 1916


FACTS:

The records show that the reservista registered the property in question as free property under the Land Registration Act without any opposition on the part of the reservatorios. After this death, six years late, the plaintiff, commenced this action for the recovery of the property on the ground that he is entitled to the ownership and possession thereof in accordance with the provision of Art. 811 (now Art. 891) of the Civil Code. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that his failure to present any opposition to the registration within a period of one year after the decree of registration had been entered has the effect of extinguishing his right to the property. Subsequently, his counsel presented a motion for rehearing wherein he invoked the doctrine in the case of Edroso vs. Sablan.

ISSUE:

W/N the right to the property has extinguished when the reservista registered the property.

HELD:

YES. In the case of Edroso vs. Sablan, the persons holding the reservable rights presented their opposition to the registration of the land in question during the pendency of the action in the Court of Land Registration. In the present case, the land in question was registered in the month of September, 1909. No objection was presented to the registration of the property. No question is now raised that the proceedings for in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Moreover, the plaintiff presented no claim whatever for a period of six years.


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BONIFACIA MATEO vs. GERVACIO LAGUA29 SCRA 864

October 30, 1969 FACTS:

Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donor’s name.

In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. At first, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in 1926 he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stopped giving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent null and void and ordered cancelled by the ROD, and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacio and Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, the CA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by 494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious and herein petitioners were ordered to reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being inofficious.

HELD:

Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial court’s order of dismissal sustained.

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Before the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents. Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

RUBIO, CAMILLE ANNE M.LLB III-B

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Parish Priest of Roman Catholic vs Rigor89 SCRA 493

FACTS:

This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.

The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).

The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parish priest of Victoria could administer the rice lands in the absence of the qualified devisee?

HELD:

It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao. To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-114, Record on Appeal).

Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.

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Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in 1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84, Appellant's brief).

Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.

Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.

What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.

It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet

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entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).


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Rodriguez vs Ravilan17 PHIL 63

G.R. No. 5343September 16, 1910

FACTS:

The property of the said four children, which remained undivided, consists of one parcel of agricultural land in the pueblo of Mandaue, of an area such as is usually sown with a ganta of seed corn, bounded on the north by property of Damasa Manlili, on the south by that of Telesfora Barte, on the east by that of Maria Mendoza, and on the west by that of Feliciana Barte; another parcel of agricultural land in the barrio of Banilad of the same pueblo, of an area usually covered in sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street that leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio Cortes, and on the east and west by that of Dionisio Cortes and Lucio Ceniza, respectively; another parcel of land, situated in the same barrio and of and an area required for the sowing of 2 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street leading to Talamban, on the south by the land Dionisio Cortes, on the east by an alley, and on the west by the property of Marcelo Oano.

That said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from these lands, other lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of Libog and pueblo of Bogo, of an area usually sown with 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by property of Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo Nuñez, and Feliciano Cortes, respectively; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area sufficient for 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the property of Benito Cabajug, on the south by the lands of Mariano Cabajug, on the east by those of Amadeo Elorde, and on the west by that of Mariano Mendoza; another parcel in the same barrio, of sufficient area for 10 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by the lands of Ciriaco Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano Cortes, and Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Mariano Cabajug, and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively; another parcel in the said barrio, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Damiano Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another parcel of an area sown by 4 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Mariano Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon, Ciriaco Dajuna, and Anacleto Lambojon, respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of Tabayho of the aforesaid pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa, Vicente Odian, and Meliton Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of Jose Arfon and Santiago Ortelano, respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of Dughoy, Tabugon, of an area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago Ortelan, and Donato Mendoza; eleven plow carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four head of cattle, acquired by the

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community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against Laureano Soliano, secured by a mortgage on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the pueblo of Bogo, and three carabaos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore pray that a partition of the property, both real and personal, be decreed and also of the profits that may have accrued thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and usufruct enjoyed by the defendant?

HELD:

Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers and sisters were unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and are therefore their only heirs, it should at least have been shown that a lawful partition was made among their nine children, of the property left by both spouses at their death, and that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and said to be possessed by the said four brothers and sisters associated together, were awarded to the same. Such a partition, were it made, should appear in an authentic document, which was not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the Civil Code provides "A division legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property which may have been awarded to him."

Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it had been shown that the Mandaue lands had been awarded by partition to the four brothers and sisters aforementioned, there would have beenprima facie proof that they were and certainly are the owners thereof.


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Pavia vs. Iturralde5 PHIL 176

October 27, 1905

FACTS:

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant. Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased. What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right of representation in the collateral line can extend to grandnieces?

HELD:

As a matter of law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is not an error to consider that the word "children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion. We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

SALA, Reeny B.LLLB III-B

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ROSALES v. ROSALES148 SCRA 69

February 27, 1987

FACTS:

- Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2 children Magna and Antonio. Another child, Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox, and his widow Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated gross value of about P30,000.

- In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate: Fortunato (husband), 1/4; Magna (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4; and Antonio (son), 1/4.

- Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.

HELD:

NO.A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law.Intestate or legal heirs are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the CC or by the right of representation provided for in Art 981 of the same law.

- The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There is no provision which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.

- Irenea argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Art 887. The provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

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- By the same token, the provision of Art 999 does not support Irenea's claim. The estate contemplated in the article is the estate of the deceased spouse. The subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of Irenea. It is from the estate of Petra that Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Art 981.

- Art 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

- Irenea also contends that at the time of the death of her husband, he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox who succeeded from Petra by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father Carterio.


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Sarita vs. CandiaG.R. No. L-7768 November 14, 1912

FACTS:

The spouses Apolinario Cedeño and Roberto Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece of land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees. Apolinario Cedeño died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in 1909. Andres Candia was holding and cultivating the said land, but that as stated in the complainant, he did so merely under a lease and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually; that, from May, 1909, he refused to pay the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land, appropriated the land and claimed ownership thereof; and that he also took possession of four mares, twelve carabaos, and several pieces of furniture which were in the house erected on the said land — a house worth 50 pesos —which he also seized and claimed as his property. Andres Candia, a nephew of Roberta Montesa as the son of her sister said Apolonio Cedeño, otherwise known as Isidario Cedeño, was a cabeza de barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga, who, in order to pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under his charge, on the 24th of June, 1881, sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarosa, who held it in quiet and peaceable possession for twenty-four years and at his death such possession was continued by his sons, Sinforoso and Vicente Villarosa, from whom witness, Andres Candia, acquired the property by purchase.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parties are entitled to the estate by way of order of succession?

HELD:

First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house, according to Exhibit D, there was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the plaintiffs to confide the suit to the attorney who has conducted it, has absolutely no such right, because he cannot represent his grandfather Domingo, since, as aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of representation can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, but not in favor of the grandson of a brother, such as is the said Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeño who, in turn, was the daughter of Domingo Cedeño.

Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeño, does exist, it could only be exercised by Cristeta Cedeño, the children of Macario Cedeño, and those of Domingo Cedeño, but not by Manuel Sarita, because in inheritances the nearer relative excludes the more remote, excepting the right of representation in proper cases (Civil Code, art 921); from which it is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta Cedeño, the children of Macario Cedeño and those of Domingo Cedeño, to exercise such a hereditary right, it should have been noticed that the personality of these

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parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeño, of a more remote degree. Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in the eyes of the law no meaning whatever could be given to the document, Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, wherein it is made to appear that the widow of Apolinario Cedeño, Roberta Montesa implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she be allowed to continue in her possession of the land and the house of the family; inasmuch as, as coowner of such property, she was entitled to one-half of it and, besides, had a right of usufruct to one-half of the other half of the same, pursuant to the provisions of articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code, and until she was satisfied for her part of usufruct, this half of the other half remained liable for the payment of such part of usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.)

Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved that at the death of such alleged predecessor in interest in the inheritance, the land in question was not owned by him, it having been transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion established by the trial judge. Therefore, the action for the recovery of possession, derived from such alleged inheritance, cannot exist.

SALA, Reeny B.LLB III-B

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Prasnick vs RPG.R. No. L-8639March 23, 1956

Topic/Doctrine: Adoption of Acknowledge Natural Children

FACTS:

Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their marriage was dissolved by virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12, 1947 by the Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country, Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and out of this relation four children were born who are the minors he is now seeking to adopt. He claims that it is his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted Philippine citizenship for which he has already applied and in the meantime he wants to adopt them in order that no one of his relatives abroad could share in his inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his former wife and acknowledged said minors as his natural children.

The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article 335 of the new Civil Code which provides that a person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt and considering that Petitioner has acknowledged the minors in question as his children, he contends that he is disqualified from adopting them under that article.

ISSUE:

Whether person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt.

HELD:

We believe that the Solicitor General has not made a correct interpretation of that article for he is confusing the children of the person adopting with the minors to be adopted. A cursory reading of said article would reveal that the prohibition merely refers to the adoption of a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural child and it does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has acknowledged them as his natural children.

It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child is unnecessary because there already exists between the father and the child the relation of paternity and filiation which is precisely the purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through legal fiction. But it should be borne in mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the great advantage of the latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status. And this view is in keeping with the modern trend of adoption statutes which have been adopted precisely to encourage adoption (In re Havagord’s Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378). Under this modern trend, adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish the relation of paternity and filiation but one which may give the child a legitimate status. It is in this sense that adoption is now defined as “a juridical act which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation”.

SALI, EL-SHAL S.LLB III-B

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LLORENTE VS. RODRIGUEZ ET AL. 10 PHIL 585, No. 3339

March 26, 1908

Topic/Doctrine:Right of Representation

FACTS:

Martina Avalle, widow of Llorente, had during her marriage four legitimate children named Jacinta, Julio, Martin, and Francisco, all with the surname of Llorente y Avalle. In the will executed by her, she instituted as her sole and general heirs, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late Francisco, named Soledad and Adela Llorente. Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, leaving several legitimate children with the surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa Llorente.

Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in the proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the said Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that they were the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter Jacinta Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess because of her death before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children.

HELD:

From the fact that a natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it cannot be indirect by representing them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner, because he does not appear among the legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head.

If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her, and in what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, would have participated, in conjunction with her legitimate children, from the day in which the succession became operative, because she would then appear by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother the legal quota that pertained to her; but, not because she has said right, would she also be entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is no legal provision establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and that she should have the right to inherit from her who would be called her natural grandmother, representing her natural mother, is quite another thing. The latter right is not recognized by the law in force.

SALI, EL-SHAL SLLB III-B

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Oyao vs. Oyao,94 Phil. 204, No. L-6340

December 29, 1953

Topic/Doctrine: Natural children have no right to represent their natural father or mother in the succession of the legitimate ascendants of the latter.

FACTS:

This is an action to recover a piece of land alleged to have been inherited by plaintiffs from their maternal grandfather, Aniceto Oyao, and to have been usurped by defendant. Defendant denies the alleged usurpation and claims ownership of the land, one-half of it as an inheritance from his deceased father, Abundio Oyao, brother of Aniceto Oyao, to whom it had been donated by the latter, and the other half by purchase from Aniceto Oyao himself.

There is no question that the disputed property formerly belonged to Aniceto Oyao, who died intestate. Aniceto had two legitimate children, Simeona and Eulalia, both of whom died before him but were survived by their recognized natural children, the plaintiffs herein, who now lay claim to his hereditary estate in representation of their deceased mothers and dispute the validity of the donation in favor of Abundio Oyao and the sale in favor of defendant. Being of the opinion that plaintiffs, as mere natural children could not represent their respective mothers in the inheritance of their grandfather Aniceto Oyao.

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiff’s has the right of claim to the hereditary estate, as natural children in representation of their deceased mothers.

HELD:

There can be no question on the proposition that natural children have not the right to represent their natural father or mother in the succession of the legitimate ascendants of the latter. This has been made clear in the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez et al., 10 Phil. 585.

In that case Rosa Llorente, a natural daughter of one of the legitimate children of the deceased Martina Avalle, tried to intervene in the settlement of the estate of the said deceased in representation of her father, a legitimate son of said Martina Avalle, who had predeceased the latter. But Rosa Llorente was not allowed to intervene because, as a natural child of one of Martina Avalle's legitimate children, she had no right to the inheritance. Plaintiffs in the present case are in that same position. Their claim to their grandfather's inheritance is, therefore, without legal basis.

SALI, EL-SHAL SLLB III-B

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Grey Vs FabieGR. No. L-45160

May 28, 1939

FACTS:

After the death of Rosario Fabie y Grey, her alleged will was presented to the court for probate. It was assailed by Serafin Fabie and Jose Fabie, the court, held that, they could not inherit intestate from Rosario Fabie , had no interest in the will in question, hence, they have no right to impugn it, whereupon, it ordered the continuation of the probate proceedings without the intervention of the said oppositors.

The oppositors contend that they do not attempt to succeed their cousin by their own right but by the right of representation. If Ramon Fabie were living, so they say, he would undeniably be entitled to succeed his niece Rosario Fabie y Grey, in which case, upon the death of Ramon Fabie, his natural children, the herein oppositors would succeed him, because Ramon Fabie had no legitimate children. They cited article 924 and 925 of the Civil Code to support their contentions.

After trial, the court probated the said will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, and appointed the petitioner, Jose Grey, executor upon filing a bond for P10,000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the oppositors-appellants are entitled to inherit from their natural cousin Rosario Fabie y Grey

HELD:

No, they are not entitled to inherit even through the right of representation because they don’t have such right. The oppositors-appellants are not children of brothers or sisters of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, but of the latter's uncle, Ramon Fabie, hence, it is unnecessary to state that the right of representation does not lie in this case. From this it inevitably follows that the oppositors have no interest whatsoever in the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey, wherefore, they are not entitled to intervene in the proceedings for the probate of the said will.

SAN JUAN, ANGELITA T.LLB III-B

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Director of Lands Vs AguasGR. No. L-42737August 11, 1936

FACTS:

This appeal was taken by Teodoro Santos, Amado L. Santos, Mercedes Santos and Bartola Santos from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in cadastral case No. 4, G. L. R, O. Cadastral Record No. 127, ordering the cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 4811 of the deceased Lucina Guesa to the land designated as lot No. 2450-B of the cadastral case in question, and the issuance of another certificate in favor of the appellee Cayetano Guesa. The appellants' petition, which was denied by the court, sought the issuance of the new certificate in their name, alleging that they were the ones favored by the reservation to which the land described in said certificate of title was subject.

The land in question had belong to Isidro Santos. He donated it to Tomas Santos upon whose death, which took place on April 29, 1927, the property was inherited by the latter's legitimate son, Romeo Santos. Upon the death of Romeo Santos on April 23, 1928, it passed to his legitimate mother Lucina Guesa to whom transfer certificate of title No. 4811 was issued with the notation that the property was subject to the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code. Lucina Guesa died on April 14, 1933, and was succeeded by her legitimate father Cayetano Guesa as sole heir. Tomas Santos was an adulterous son, and the appellants and petitioners are the legitimate children of Isidro Santos. Therefore, the appellants are not legitimate relatives of Romeo Santos, although, with relation to him, they are within the third degree and belong to the same line.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reservation established by article 811 of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as made in favor of all the relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-mentioned, without distinction between legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural children

HELD:

The provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relatives. Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the ascendant, without attaching the qualification

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of legitimate, and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.

Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, — and as we will see also article 812, — continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the natural parents and children in the testamentary succession is wholly included in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other descendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which article 811 occupies in the Code is proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the text of articles 938, which states that the provision of article 811 applies to intestate succession which is just established in favor of the legitimate direct ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that provision.


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Anuran Vs AquinoGR. No. L-12397

April 02, 1918

FACTS:

The plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, is the widow of Ambrosio Aquino, to whose estate the property described in the complaint belongs. The defendant, Ana Aquino, is the natural child of a sister of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, that on the death of Ambrosio Aquino, one Norberto Capiña was appointed administrator of his intestate estate, at the instance of Ana Aquino, acting collusion with the administrator fraudulently represented to the court that Ambrosio Aquino, had died intestate, leaving no heirs other than Ana Aquino, a daughter of his deceased sister. At the time when these representations were made, both Ana Aquino and the administrator well knew that the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, was the surviving spouse of Ambrosio Aquino, and that Ana Aquino was not a legitimate but a natural daughter of the deceased sister of Ambrosio Aquino. Without notice to the widow, Ana Aquino, acting in collusion with the administrator appointed at her instance, fraudulently procured the entry of an order in the administration proceedings dated March 12, 1912, authorizing and approving the delivery by the administrator of all property of the estate to the alleged sole heir, Ana Aquino, the defendant in this suit, and that the motion of the administrator on which this order was based was supported by the affidavit of Ana Aquino, setting forth the false and misleading statement of the alleged facts as hereinbefore indicated.

The widow, Florencia Anuran, who was not a party of record in the administration proceedings, did not discover that this order had been entered until about the 14th day of February, 1914, when she promptly entered her appearance in the administration proceedings and moved that the order be set aside, and that she be declared the sole heir of the deceased, who, as she alleged, had died without leaving either ascendants, or descendants, or collateral relatives entitled to share in the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiff, Florencia Anuran, the widow of Ambrosio Aquino be declared the sole heir of the deceased

HELD:

Yes, In the light of the facts presented, there is not and cannot be any substantial question as to the right of the widow to take the estate of her deceased husband as his sole heir under the provisions of articles 943 and 952 of the Civil Code. These articles are as follows:

A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

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In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children, whether of the whole blood or not, of the same surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.


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Diaz vs Pamuti GR L-66574

Feb. 21, 1990

FACTS:

Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisa’s mother Juliana werethe only legitimate children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla; Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa and anotherchild who died during infancy; Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo; Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona; Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976; Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and sixminor natural children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and twominor children with Felixberta. 1976 – Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona. Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their minor childrenfile for opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part orintervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona. 1980 – Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from further takingpart or intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona. Felisa’s motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to theIntermediate Appellate Court declaring her as the sole heir of Simona.

ISSUE:

Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo) Felisa?

HELD:

The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the successionof the latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simon because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil CodeArt 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner fromthe illegitimate child. Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate.

Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely asuccession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimatechildren and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. Theymay have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for thepurposes of Art. 992.

An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimatechildren and relatives of his father and mother.

SING, MARC ERIC W.LLB III-B

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SANTILLON vs. MIRANDA.G.R. No. L-19281

June 30, 1965

Topic/Doctrine: Legitime

FACTS:

Santillon died without testament in leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales. On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a “Motion to Declare Share of Heirs” and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro’s inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

ISSUE:

How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?

HELD:

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower “gets only one-fourth.” She or he may get one-half – if the testator so wishes. So, the law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her only child shall get more than his or her survivor).

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator’s desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

SORRONDA, NIÑA MAY T.LLB III-B

[149]


RE: MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO 79 SCRA 364A.M. No. 190

October 18, 1977


FACTS:

This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney of the Supreme court .Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato. The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government Service System. Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal age.

ISSUE:

What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS:

1. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO

A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY

P19,535.025

B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TEAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT:

(1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE 6,752.72

(2) AS A LEGAL HEIR P1,688.18

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P27,975.93

2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II

A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY

P39,070.05

B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT

3,376.36

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TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P42,446.41

3. MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA:

A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY

P9,767.51

B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT

844.10

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P10,611.61

4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR. TO BE PAID THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, ANGELINA CRESPO):

A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY

P9,767.51

B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT

844.10

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P10,611.61


[151]


Vda. De Consuegra vs GSIS37 SCRA 315, 325

Topic/Doctrine: Heirs

FACTS:

Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman of the Office of the District Engineer in Surigao Del Norte.When he was still alive, he contracted two marriages:o First – Rosario Diaz; 2 children = Jose Consuegra Jr. and Pedro but both predeceased himo 2nd – Basilia Berdin; 7 children. (this was contracted in GF while the first marriage subsisted)Being a GSIS member when he died, the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by the GSIS to Berdin and her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy.Since he was in the gov’t service for 22.5028 years, he was entitled to retirement insurance benefits, for which no beneficiary was designated.Both families filed their claims with the GSIS, which ruled that the legal heirs were Diaz who is entitled to one-half or 8/16 of the retirement benefits and Berdin and her children were entitled to the remaining half, each to receive an equal share of 1/16. Berdin went to CFI on appeal. CFI affirmed GSIS decision.

ISSUE:

To whom should the retirement insurance benefits be paid?

HELD:

Both families are entitled to half of the retirement benefits.The beneficiary named in the life insurance does NOT automatically become the beneficiary in the retirement insurance. When Consuegra, during the early part of 1943, or before 1943, designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance, he could NOT have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came about only when CA 186 was amended by RA 660 on June 18, 1951.

Sec. 11(b) clearly indicates that there is need for the employee to file an application for retirement insurance benefits when he becomes a GSIS member and to state his beneficiary. The life insurance and the retirement insurance are two separate and distinct systems of benefits paid out from 2 separate and distinct funds.

In case of failure to name a beneficiary in an insurance policy, the proceeds will accrue to the estate of the insured. And when there exists two marriages, each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate.


[152]


Del Rosario vs. ConananG.R. No. L-37903March 30, 1977

Topic/Doctrine: Share of Surviving Spouse Concurring With Legitimate Ascendants and Illegitimate Children (Article 1000 in relation to Article 343)

FACTS:

On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court subject of which is the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal.

The oppositor admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late Felix L. Del Rosario. The latter admits that oppositor Dorotea Otera del Rosario, is the legitimate surviving wife of the deceased Felix Del Rosario. Petitioner also admits that Marilou Del Rosario, is the legally adopted child of the late Felix and Dorotea Otera del Rosario. They are the only surviving nearest relatives of Felix(deceased). A petition for summary settlement is allowed under the provision of the rules of court, the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of which does not exceed P10, 000.00. In the instant petition, however, clearly alleges that the value of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix amounts to P33,000.00 which is obviously over and above the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The action taken by the petitioner construed as one filed under an intestate proceeding as the requirements provided by law for the same has not been complied with.

The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the instant case where it does not exclude the surviving parent of the deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession, where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance.

The respondents countered petitioner’s record on appeal violates the material data rule in that it does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed with the lower court in disregard of the requirement of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on appeal must contain such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time. Further, the petitioner not being included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of or have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1, Rule 69 in relation to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, such action must be commenced or instituted by the party in interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the legitimate mother is included as intestate heir to be considered as

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Co-owner with the surviving spouse and adopted child of Felix Del Rosario (deceased) over the properties sought to be partitioned

HELD:

YES. As provided under Article 343 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 1000 should apply in resolving their hereditary rights. Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in the term “illegitimate children”. Consequently, the respective charges of the surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads: “Art. 1000.—If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the other fourth.”Thus, Dorotea Otera del Rosario, the legitimate surviving wife, shall be entitled to ¼, Marilou Del Rosario, the legally adopted child gets ¼ , and the legitimate mother ½ . The adopted child in such case gets the rights of an acknowledged natural child (Articles 343, 341, and 1000 of the Civil Code), not of a legitimate child, otherwise the legitimate ascendant (the mother) would be excluded. The presence of adopted child does not exclude the legitimate parent or ascendant.

TANJUSAY, MARIA KATRINA S.LLB III-B

[154]


GSIS vs. CustodioG.R. No. L-26170January 27, 1969

Topic/Doctrine: Share of Brothers and Sisters Concurring With Nephews and Nieces(Article 1005)

FACTS:

The late Simeon Custodio who during his lifetime was a member of the Retirement Insurance Fund administered by plaintiff GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), died intestate at Tanay, Rizal, on February 16, 1957. He was survived by his only sister, SUSANA CUSTODIO and his nephews and nieces, namely, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, MACARIO C., ADRIANO, CELESTINA, LUISA and DAVID, all surnamed CUSTODIO. After Simeon’s death, there was found among his personal belongings an undated and unsigned application form for Retirement accomplished by said SIMEON CUSTODIO wherein his sister, SUSANA CUSTODIO was named the beneficiary, although said application form was never submitted to the GSIS.

On July 7, 1957, at the residence of Leon K. Tongohan, son-in-law of Susana Custodio, at Tanay, Rizal, SUSANA, ROMUALDO, JULIAN, MACARIO A., MOISES, ADRIANO, and CELESTINA, all surnamed CUSTODIO, and JULIA TONGOHAN 'executed a document entitled 'Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs' which provides, among other things that “For any amount due the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO, holder of GSIS policy No. 73557, our Aunt Susana Custodio, as the decedent's only living sister, is hereby recognized by the aforementioned heirs as the sole and only beneficiary of the decedent SIMEON CUSTODIO, and giving unto our Aunt Susana Custodio, the right to file, sign and receive whatever retirement pay under Republic Act 660, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 728 and 1123, and other amendments thereof.”

The Custodio heirs wrote a letter to the Manager of the Government Service Insurance System stating, among other things, that they 'inadvertently signed on July 7, 1957, without properly having understood, a document whereby it was made to appear therein that the aforementioned persons are waiving their claims on the benefits legally accruing to the aforementioned deceased'. Appellee Susana Custodio made clear her non-opposition to the division of the estate where Macario C., Luisa and David would share per stirpes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-signatory intestate heirs of late Simeon Custodio be considered as having recognized Susana Custodio (sister) as the only beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money?

[155]


HELD:

NO. The intestate heirs, Macario C., Luisa and David Custodio, who did not sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement, cannot be considered as having recognized Susana Custodio as the only beneficiary of Simeon's retirement money. There is no evidence, the case having been submitted for decision below solely on a stipulation of facts, that these non-signatory heirs had agreed, or accepted other benefits under the deed of partition, as appellee now claims. Susana Custodio did not oppose their separate motion for reconsideration and, actually, even prayed that said motion be granted (Record on Appeal, page 56), although the court denied it just the same. These three (3) heirs should inherit per stirpes, in accordance with Article 1005 of the Civil Code. As Macario C. Custodio (as distinguished from Macario A., who signed the agreement) is the only child of Crispin, said Macario C. inherits by representation the onefourth (1/4) share pertaining to his father, while Luisa and David Custodio, being two (2) of six (6) children of Jacinto, are each entitled to a sixth of one-fourth (1/6 x 1/4) equivalent to 1/24 of the hereditary mass.


[156]


PADURA vs BALDOVINOG.R. No. L-11960

December 27, 1958

Topic/Doctrine: Full Blood Concurring With Half Blood

FACTS:

During the lifetime of Agustin Padura, he contracted two marriages, one with Gervacia Landig, to whom he had one child, Manuel Padura, and second with Benita Garin to whom he had two children, Fortunato and Candelaria Padura. Agustin died on April 26, 1908, leaving a last will and testament, duly probated, wherein he bequeathed his properties among his three (3) children and his surviving spouse, Benita Garin.

Fortunato was adjudicated four parcels of land. He died unmarried on May 28, 1908, without having executed a will and not having any issue, the parcels of land were inherited exclusively by his mother Benita. Benita was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, subject to the condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.

On Aug 26, 1934, Candelaria died, leaving as her heirs her four(4) legitimate children: Cristeta, Melania, Anicia, and Pablo Baldovino (Oppositors-appellants). On Oct 6, 1940, Manuel also died, survived by his legitimate children Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino Padura (Petitioners-appellees). Upon the death of Benita (the reservista) on Oct 15, 1952, the heirs took possession of the reservable properties.

The CFI Laguna declared the children of Manuel and Candelaria to be the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties (the original reservees, Candelaria and Manuel, having predeceased the reservista).

The Baldovino heirs (children of Candelaria) filed a petition seeking to have the properties partitioned, such that one-half be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherited by right of representation from their respective parents, the original reservees. Padura heirs opposed, maintaining that they should all be deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they claim, each should have an equal share. In essence, the Baldovino heirs, who are whole blood relatives of the reservista, were contending that they should get more than their half-blood relatives, the Padura heirs. They anchor their claim on Articles 1006 and 1008 of the Civil Code. The CFI (now RTC) of Laguna declared all the reservees, without distinction, co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:Whether or not the the reserved properties should be apportioned among the heirs

equally?

[157]


HELD:

NO. As to the rule between brothers and sisters of the full blood survive with brothers and sisters of half blood. The former shall be entitled a share double that of the latter (Article 1006). The rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative. On ther hand, the children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes (Article 1008). Thus the Baldovino heirs shall get more than their half-blood relatives, the Padura heirs.

In other words, reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned but within that group. The nephews of the whole blood should take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half blood.The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista). The purpose of the reserva troncal is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree, there is no call for applying Art 891 in this case to the respective share of each in the reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of interstate succession.

In the same case of Florentino vs Florentino (as restated in the case) where upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all the reservatorios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree... And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews. Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply.


[158]


BICOMONG v ALMANZA80 SCRA 421

November 29, 1977

FACTS:

The subject matter is the half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in 5 parcels of land w/c she inherited from SilvestraGlorioso.

There are 3 sets of plaintiffs: the Bicomongs. The Tolentinos, and Francisca Bagsic, for their shares in the properties of Maura Bagsic.

When Maura Bagsic died, the properties passed on to CristetaAlmanza, who also died without division of the properties.

Trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Almanzas appealed to CA. It was contended that since Maura died ahead of Felipa, Felipa succeeded to Maura’s estate, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. They said the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones.The plaintiffs claim that Felipa died ahead of Maura. CA certified case to SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maura is succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of nephews and nieces of half-blood.

HELD:

NO. In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, collateral relatives succeed to the entire estate of deceased. Since Maura died intestate and her husband and her ascendants died ahead of her, she is succeeded by surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the children of her brother and sisters of half blood, in accordance with Art 975 of New Civil Code.

The nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. The contention that Maura should be succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half-blood is erroneous. As it was shown, Felipa predeceased her sister Maura.

TINGKAHAN, MARVEEN BAZAR S.LLB III-B

[159]


ALVIAR VS ALVIAR, ET AL.G.R. No. L-22402

June 30, 1969

TOPIC/DOCTRINE:Collateral Relatives

FACTS:

Clemente Alviar and Belen Alviar were legitimate children of Florentino Alviar and Bibiana Carillo. Sometime after the latter's deatH, Florentino Alviar married Flora Erasga, who begot him five (5) children, namely; Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa, Zenaida and Castor, all surnamed Alviar. Belen Alviar died intestate. She was single and had been survived by her brother Clemente Alviar, and five (5) half brothers and sisters. Belen's estate consisted of two (2) parcels of agricultural land and a residential lot.

The six brothers and sisters executed a deed of extrajudicial partition adjudicating to Clemente Alviar the two parcels of agricultural land, and to the five (5) half brothers and sisters of the deceased the residential lot. In pursuance of said deed, the parties took possession of their respective shares. Moreover, Clemente Alviar titles to said Lots 2 and 3. The residential land in Pasay City was, in turn, partitioned among his aforesaid half brothers and sisters and subdivided into lots Nos. 223-D-1 and 223-D-2. The first was allotted to Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, who secured thereto TCT No. 8495 in their names, whereas the second was covered by TCT No. 8496 in the name of Cesareo Alviar, his sister Fabiana having renounced her share therein in his favor. Their brother Castor had, likewise, waived his share in said residential land.

Over five years later, Clemente commenced the present action, against his half brother and sisters, Cesareo, Fabiana, Luisa and Zenaida Alviar, and their mother, and his step-mother, Flora Erasga, to annul the deed of extrajudicial partition, upon the ground that, acting in bad faith and conspiring, confederating and conniving with each other, as well as "taking advantage of plaintiff's lack of education, illiteracy and ignorance, and knowing fully well that" the "children by second marriage of Florentino Alviar had no rights, participation and interest over" the 3 lots left by Belen Alviar, the defendants had "misled" the plaintiff "into signing" said deed. Inasmuch as Clemente Alviar died soon thereafter, his widow, Paulina Pamulaklakin and their children, Ramon and Norma Alviar, substituted him as plaintiff in this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, as a full brother of Belen Alviar, the degree of relationship to her of the deceased Clemente Alviar was nearer than that of their half brothers and sisters, the children of their father by second marriage.

The lower court decided this question in the negative and correctly. Indeed, "proximity of relationship HELD:is determined by the number of generations" and "each generation forms a degree." In relation to Belen Alviar, her full brother, Clemente Alviar, is, therefore, in the same degree of relationship as their half brothers and sisters, the aforementioned defendants, for all of them constitute the first generation of descendants of their common father, Florentino Alviar. In fact, this rationalization is rendered

[160]


superfluous, apart from being confirmed, by the explicit language of Arts. 1003, 1004 and 1006 of our Civil Code, reading:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

ART. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.

These provisions, particularly the last, leave no room for doubt that brothers and sisters of full blood do not exclude those of half blood, for, otherwise, there would be no occasion for the concurrence of both classes and the application of said Art. 1006.

More important than this, however, is the fact that Clemente Alviar had entered into a contract with his half brothers and sisters for the extrajudicial partition of the properties of the deceased Belen Alviar and that there is nothing in the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties to warrant the annulment or rescission of said agreement. The validity thereof thus being indubitable, there is absolutely no reason why the same should be disturbed.


[161]


Celedonia Solivio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al.,G.R. No. 83484

February 12, 1990

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Collateral Relatives

FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr. Salustia and her sister, Celedonia brought up Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.

Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.

[162]


ISSUE:Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them.

HELD:

The Court heldthat the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother ora sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Art. 891.


[163]


In re Estate of Lao Sayco21 Phil 815

Topic/Doctrine: Escheat

FACTS:

Lao Sayco died. The administrator of his estate requested that the property of the decedent be delivered to his nephew (allegedly his sole heir). Notices were sent to interested parties to establish the right of the alleged heir, and the notice of the date of the hearing was made thru publication for three weeks prior to the date set. The municipality of Mambajao entered its opposition, claiming that the property of the decedent should be delivered to it because the decedent had no legal heirs. The lower court ruled in favor of Mambajao. The administrator appealed the judgment.

ISSUE:

W/N the municipality of Mambajao was entitled to the property left by the decedent.

HELD:

No, for failure of Mambajao to comply with procedural requirements. In order that the property which belonged to the decedent Lao Sayco may be decreed to have reverted to the Senate, pursuant to the provisions of section 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is indispensable that the requirements contained in the above-quoted section of the said code should have been complied with. The municipality of Mambajao merely prayed for an order of reversion and for the adjudication in behalf of the municipality of the property aforementioned; it did not comply with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required proofs in regard to the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be the subject of an investigation. It does not appear that there was an inquisition provided by law, for the record is not accompanied by any certified copy of the investigatory of the real andpersonal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a statement of the places where the realty is located. Neither is it shown to have ascertained whether the deceased Chinaman executed any will during his lifetime, or whether the deceased Chinaman executed any will during his lifetime, or whether he left in Mambajao or in any other place any relative entitled to inherit from him. Moreover, the notice summoning the persons who believed they were entitled to his property should have been published for at least six consecutive weeks, and not for three as was directed in the order.

TORRES, ROMEL GLLB-IIIB

[164]


City of Manila vs. Archdiocese of Manila 36 Phil 815

Topic/Doctrine: Escheat

FACTS:

The City of Manila wants certain properties being administered by the Roman Catholic Church to be declared escheated. It claims that the original owner of said properties, a certain Ana Sarmiento, has died sometime in 1668 intestate with no heirs to succeed. The Archbishop contends that the church has rightfully and legally succeeded to the possession and administration of said property that it had been managing for more than 200 years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said properties should be escheated.

HELD:

No. It was shown that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. Evidence presented has shown a genuine will and codicils. It was further shown that the heir named therein, her nephew, has religiously complied with the terms of said will. Therefore, the properties cannot be escheated in favor of the government.


[165]


Municipality of San Pedro vs. Colegio de San José65 Phil 318

Topic/Doctrine:Escheat

FACTS:

The Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the CFI a petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of Escheat. Colegio de San Jose, claiming to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda, assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petition does not allege sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the remedy prayed for. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of the hacienda under a contract legally entered with Coelegio de San Jose, also intervened in the case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the appearance and intervention of CdSJ and Carlos Young but such objection was overruled. Furthermore the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San Pedro.

ISSUE:

W/N the petition for escheats should be dismissed?

HELD:

YES. According to Sec. 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Sec 1 of Rule 91), Sec. 751 (now Sec 3 of Rule 91) provides that after the publications and trial, if the court finds that the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property situated in the country and has not left any heir or other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of debts and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall adjudicate the personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his last residence and the real property to the municipality/ies where they are situated.

When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for and even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no ground for the court to proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested party should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground the petition may be dismissed unconditionally.

In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property respectively.

The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, temporal property of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by the order of the King of Spain. From the moment it was confiscated, it became the property of the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident that the Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any person which may legally claim it (2nd requirement lacking).


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Manuel Torres and Luz Lopez de Bueno vs. Margarita LopezG.R. No. L-24569

February 26, 1926

Topic/Doctrine: Right of Accretion

FACTS:

This case concerns the probate of the alleged will of the late Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez. Tomas Rodriguez died in the City of Manila and leaving a considerable estate. Shortly thereafter Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased. In the said will, the testator instituted as his only heirs his cousin, and the latter’s daughter. But the cousin was incapacitated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the share of the cousin should go to the testator’s legal heirs, or should it go to the co-heir, namely, the cousin’s daughter.

HELD:

The co-heir gets the share by accretion. It follows therefore that the instate heirs cannot claim by intestacy said share, for accretion is preferred over intestacy. As has been stated by the Supreme Court, intestate succession to vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.

TUBO, MARK JOSEPH G.LLB III-B

[167]


In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier.SULPICIO RESURRECCIONvs.AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-42539October 23, 1936

Topic/Doctrine: Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy

FACTS:

Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpicio Resurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The testatrix died and her will was probated. The court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died before the testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the fund of the estate.

Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this amount to the funds of the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Gil Javier be represented for his share in the legacy.

HELD:

No. The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or any part thereof in favor of any person qualified to acquire it. Upon being instituted as legatee by the testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the subject of a right. Consequently, his institution as a legatee had absolutely no legal effect and his heirs are not now entitled to claim the amount of legacy. They cannot even claim under the principle of representation because this takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as the legatee died before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his heirs.

TUBO, MARK JOSEPH, G.LLB III-B

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In the matter of the will of the deceased Eugenio Zuñiga del Rosario. VICENTE REYES VILLAVICENCIOvs. SANTIAGO QUINIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-45248April 18, 1939

Topic/Doctrine: Disposition of Property for Prayers and Pious Works

FACTS:

Eugenio Zuñiga del Rosario died, leaving a will executed with all the legal formalities, which was probated, over the opposition of some relatives.

The third clause of the said will translated from Tagalog into Spanish, reads as follows:“TERCERO: Declaro que tengo bienes inmuebles, muebles, semovientes, casa y camarin que he heredado de mis padres y hermanos y, no teniendo yo heredero forzoso como ya he dicho mas arriba, he dispuesto que mis citados bienes sean destinados solamente para la paz y felicidad de mi alma y de las de mis padres y hermanos, y tambien para el beneficio de la iglesia, en la manera siguiente: x x x”

Subsequently, Santiago Quinio and twenty-eight relatives of the testatrix within the fifth degree in the collateral line, filed a motion with the conformity of the Bishop of Lipa wherein they asked that they be declared heirs of said testatrix charged with the duty to comply with its provisions and contended that after the deduction of the amounts for the alms and masses provided for by the testatrix in her will, there will still be a sizable balance left out of her properties, which, in the absence of any disposition made by the said testatrix, must pass by operation of law to her legal or intestate heirs. The executor Vicente Reyes Villavicencio opposed the foregoing petition and the court denied the latter. The movants appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the relatives of the deceased are entitled to succeed as to the remaining properties

HELD:

No. Such contention on the part of the appellants is based on something entirely inconsistent with what the testatrix has ordered in the third clause of her will. The testatrix in said clause had disposed of her proportions in accordance with the provision of Article 747 (now Art. 1029) of the Civil Code, a disposition absolutely within her right, having no forced heirs.

The collateral relatives of the deceased, not being forced heirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the remainder of her properties, which does not exist, or as to the naked ownership of the same. The provisions of the will disposing her properties for masses and pious works, the validity of which is not questioned herein, should be complied with because the testatrix, not having forced heirs, may dispose of her properties as she did in her will, for masses and pious works for the benefit of her soul and those of her relatives.

TUBO, MARK JOSEPH, G.LLB III-B

[169]


ALMEIDA VS. CARILLOG.R. No. L-45320January 26, 1939


FACTS:

Macario Carillo died in the City of Manila on May 17, 1931, leaving as next of kin, his widow, Rosenda Almeida, the appellee, and his three children by his first marriage, Corazon Edelmira Carillo, Romulo Carrillo and Gracia Carrillo, the appellants. With the consent of all the relatives, the appellee caused the remains of the deceased to be buried in the private lot of the Intengan family in the North Cementery, Manila, to be transferred later after a period of three years but not more than five, upon paying P100 for the use of the lot. Later on, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, the intestate proceedings of the decedent were commenced, special proceedings No. 39632, and in the project of partition submitted by all the co-heirs, and approved by the court. Sometime in January, 1963, the appellee built a mausoleum in Binan, Province of Laguna, for the remains of her late husband. Shortly before the expiration of the period of five years for the exhumation of said remains, the appellants secured the consent of the appellee to have the remains of the deceased transferred to the Ermita Church in Manila.Such transfer would only be a temporary and that it would be easier to transfer the remains from that place to mausoleum, which she had built in Binan, the appellee gave her consent. Having been informed by her lawyer that she should not have given her consent, she withdrew it, and inasmuch as the appellants were about to remove and transfer the remains, the appellee moved the court to enjoin the appellants from removing the remains to the Ermita Church. The motion ws duly herd and thereafter the court made permanent the preliminary injunction which had been issued, and ordered the ppellants to abstain from removing the remains of the deceased and transferring them to another place. Thereupon, the appeal was perfected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not they have a better right than the appellee to disinter the remains of the deceased and transfer them to the place they had chosen.

HELD:

The Court held that the appellees right, as the widow, is preferred, as may be gathered from the spirit of section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code and from some American cases. We hold that the court correctly decided the case and did not commit any of the assigned errors. In this jurisdiction there is no express law which determines the preference, among the next of kin of a deceased, with regard to the disposition of his remains. Under the terms of said agreement, the appellee has a better right than the appellants, and the latter cannot object to the transfer of the remains of the deceased by the appellee to the mausoleum she built in Binan, Laguna. In this jurisdiction there is no law that expressly dteremines the right care, possession and disposition of the remains of the deceased. Section 1103 of the Revised

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Administratice Code of 1917, quoted by the court, provides that the obligation to bury the remains of a deceased, falls, firstly, on the surviving spouse; if the deceased was not married, the obligation falls upon the closest next of kin; and if he dies with no surviving relative, the burial is the concern of the authorities of the municipality where he died.

ABDURAJAK, PSAMIERA A.LLB III-B

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ARANETA VS. MONTELIBANOG.R. No. 4177

September 15, 1909


FACTS:

On the 10th day of February, 1895, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Occidental Negros against the defendant, for the purpose of compelling the defendant (1) to execute and deliver a deed in favor of the plaintiff, for a certain parcel of land situated in the sitio of Malisburg, barrio of Tansa, in the municipality of Saravia, in the Province of Occidental Negros; (2) to deliver the possession of the said property in question is found in the complaint filed in said cause.No further steps were taken in the prosecution of said cause until the 25 th of April, 1907, when the defendant filed a demurrer to said complaint, which demurrer was overruled by the court upon 30 th day of April 1907. The original action was commenced by Felix Araneta having died and Agaton Araneta having been appointed as administrator of the said estate, he presented a motion in the Court of First Instance to be substituted as plaintiff in said cause for Felix Araneta, which motion was granted. On the Ist day May, 1907, the defendant, Braulio Montelibano, filed his answer. Upon the issues thus presented the plaintiff went to trial. The letters do not show whether a demand was made for the payment of the P6,000 in question or not. During the trial of the cause, the defendant offered proof. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause. From the judgment of the lower court the plaintiff appealed, making several assignments of error, all of which relate to the sufficiency of the proof to sustain the plaintiffs claim. There was no proof whatever offered by the plaintiff showing that the original indebtedness had not been paid.

ISSUE:

Whether an action can be brought against an administrator or tutor for the purpose of the compelling him to carry out a contract for the conveyance of land under the circumstances existing in this case.

HELD:

Under the provisions of article 661 of the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the right of succession, are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased. The heirs are more than the continuation of the juridical personality of their predecessor in interest. The heirs having succeeded to whatever interest their ancestry had in the land and contract in question, they may, by virtue of articles 1279 and 1280 of the Civil Code, be compelled in a proper action to execute the public instrument required under the contract between their ancestor and Araneta. All of the heirs were not made parties defendant in the present action. A part of them can not be required to execute the document prayed for by the plaintiff. They must all be made parties defendant. They are all equally interested. Of course when they are all made parties they will be permitted to show, providing they have evidence to justify it, that Leon Lopez was, by the consent of the said Araneta, substituted for their ancestor in the contract which the representatives of the said Araneta are now attempting to enforce. That is a question of defense.

[172]


Whether Leon Lopez, being actually in possession should be made a party defendant in the present action, we do not decide. Therefore all of the heirs of the said Aniceto Montelibano were not made parties in the present action, the judgment of the lower court is hereby revoked and the cause is hereby remanded to the lower court, with permission on the part of the plaintiff to amend his complaint.


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JAYME VS. GAMBOAG.R. No. L-47820

November 28, 1942


FACTS:

Fortunato E. Jayme claims the right to inherit from the deceased Antonio Jayme as the latters legally acknowledged natural son. His claim is contested by the window and the legitimate children and grandchildren of the deceased, who deny the status of acknowledged natural child asserted by him. It is not disputed that Fortunato E. Jayme is the son of Antonio Jayme and Efigenia Enriquez, who appeared to have known each other with intimacy in Manila. Antonio brought her to his home town, Bacolod, where not long after her arrival she gave birth on April 17, 1883, to a child that was baptized on the 21 st

of the same month as Fortunato Enriquez, “Lucio Jayme, a younger brother of Antonio, acted as the godfather of the child. He had been commissioned by Antonio to arranged for the baptism. At the age of five or six years, when he began to remember things, Fortunato came to know Antonio Jayme as his father, for the latter used to visit him two or three times a week in the house where he live with his ,mother. In 1889 Fortunato and his mother moved from Bacolod to Pilr, Capiz where he stayed until 1899. In that year her mother sent her back to Bacolod for education. The father supported the child until the latter went to Manila in the early part of the American Occupation. He departed with the consent of his father. In short time Fortunato secured employment as a room boy in Malacanan of one Major Kinley. Eight monts later Major Kinley took Fortunato to the United States after Fortunto had obtained the consent of his father. He stayed in the United States from 1901 to 1910 as a self- supporting student. After Fortunatos return to the Philippines in the yer 1910 until Antonio Jaymes death, which occurred on October 19, 1937, he continued to be recognized and treated as a son not only by ntonio Jayme but also by the latter’s legitimate children. After hearing the evidence Judge Soter Rods, in an order dated July 10, 1939, declared Fortunato Jayme an acknowledged natural son of the deceased Antonio Jayme, with the right to inherit from him. But upon motion for new trial filed by counsel for the oppositors, the same judge on September 21, 1939, modified the said order by holding that although Fortunto Jayme is a legally acknowledges son of the deceased Antonio Jayme, he is not entitled to inherit from the latter because “his rights as a natural acknowledged son of the decedent cannot be enforced.” From that order both parties appealed-the oppositors attacking it insofar as it declares that the claimant is a legally acknowledged natural son of the deceased, and the claimant insofar as it declares that he is not entitled to inherit.

ISSUE:

Whether Rule 1 or Rule 12 should be applied.

HELD:

Both reasons an authority sustain the contention of the claimant that rule 12 of the transitory provisions is the one applicable. The circumstance that the claimant and the first two legitimate children of the deceased were born before the present Civil Code went into effect constitutes no legal obstacle against the exercise by the claimant of the right recognized by said Code. The decedent died long after it entered into effect. Both the claimant and the oppositors base their right to inherit upon the provisions of the Civil Code. The claimant and the oppositors acquired no vested right to the decedent’s

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inheritance until the moment of his death. That is another reason why rule 1 of the transitory provisions is not applicable. Article 657 and 661 of the Civil Code read as follows Art. 657. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death, Art. 661. Heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by mere fact of his death. Rule 12 of the transitory provisions expressly ordains that the inheritance of those who die after the Civil Code was in force ‘’shall be allotted and divided in accordance with this code’; even if a decedent made will under the prior legislation and the testamentary dispositions should be harmonized with the latter; “the legitimes, betterments, and legacies shall be respected, but their amounts should be reduced when it is not possible in any other manner to give each participant in the inheritance the share pertaining to him according to this code”. We find inescapable the application herein of rule 12 invoked by the claimant-appellant.


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QUISON VS. SALUDG.R. No. L-4314

November 21, 1908


FACTS:

Claro Quison owned land to the north of the estero, is undisputed, but the defendant claims that he never owned any land south of the estero. A large amount of evidence, principally parol, was introduced upon this question, and after an examination thereof, we are satisfied that it clearly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below, and that it was proven at the trial that the land in question belongs to the heirs of Quison. The defendant relied to a great extent upon the record of an action brought by Claro Quison in 1887 against one Perdeguera. Quison alleged in his complaint in that action that the defendant therein had in unlawfully possessed himself of a portion of his, the then plaintiff’s land. In executing this judgment the officers of the law apparently gave Quison possession of the land. The defendant also claims that Fidel Salud was given judicial possession of the property here in controversy in 1895. The plaintiffs asked leave to present a supplementary complaint against Higina Salud. The court ordered the dismissal of the action so far as the defendant Fidel Salud and Gregorio De Villa were concerned. The plaintiff’s then presented a complaint against Higina Salud as the only defendant. She is the only one who appealed from the judgment. Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the next of kin and heirs, but it is said by the appellant that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any proceeding have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that, without such settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action.

ISSUE:

Whether, as to the land itself, it being the separate property of the wife, the husband of Lorenza Quison could have any interest or right therein.

HELD:

It is very clear that as to the rents and profits of the land he does necessarily have such an interest or right. The most that can be said in favor of the plaintiffs is that these lands were bienes parafernales. In regard to the rents of such lands, articles 1385 and 1401 of the Civil Code shall be followed. Therefore that the husband of Lorenza Quison was necessary party to this action. The court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name or any party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined, without regards to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.


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Riera vs. PalmaroliG.R. No. 14851

September 13, 1919

FACTS:

On April 19, 1918, the respondent Vicente Palmaroli, Consul General for Spain in the Philippine Islands, produced in the Court of First Instance in the city of Manila a document dated on March 16, 1918, purporting to be the will of Juan Pons y Coll, and asked that it be admitted to probate. Publication was accordingly made, and on May 20, 1918, order was entered admitting the will to probate.

Owing to the great distance between Palma de Mallorca and the city of Manila and to the lack of adequate means of communication between the two places – a difficulty then greatly exaggerated by conditions incident to the European War – the petitioner received no information of the probate proceedings until after November 14, 1918. She had, however, received information of the fact of her husband’s death on or before June 19, 1918, for upon that date an attorney employed by her in Palma de Mallorca addressed a letter to Wolfson & Wolfson, attorneys in the city of Manila, requesting them to look after the interests of the petitioner in the estate of her deceased husband.

The present application was thereupon made to the Supreme Court on December 21, 1918, under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as already stated.

Issue:

Whether or not admitting the wills to probate will prosper.

Held:

In the course of the preceding discussion we have, for the purpose of explaining the situation more clearly, permitted ourselves to refer to at least one detail not stated in the petition, as where we state that the will purports to disinherit the petitioner. This fact, however, if not admitted, is incontrovertible and apparent from the copy of the will exhibited with the answer. Moreover, the point that no decisive influence on the decision. Our opinion therefore is to be taken as an expression of our opinion upon the legal sufficiency of the petition exclusively upon the statements contained therein.

As will be discovered from the opinion, the inability of this court to grant relief in the case before us is really due to the fact that the remedy conceded in section 513 admitting wills to probate. The defect from which the petition suffers is therefore not curable by amendment and cannot be aided by the taking of proof. The request for an order allowing proof to be submitted must therefore be denied, and judgment absolute will be entered dismissing the petition with costs.

Alawi, Muhaidir IILLB III-B

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CASTANEDA vs. ALEMANY3 PHIL 426

March 19, 1904

FACTS:

The appellant contends that the court erred inholding that all legal formalities had been complied with in the execution of the will of Dona Juana as the proof shows that the said will was not written by the testatrix.

ISSUE:

WON the will is valid.

HELD:

The mechanical act of drafting the will can be left to a third person. What is important is the testator signs the will or he let another person to sign but under his direction. ARTICLE 785. The duration or efficacy of the designation of heirs, devisees or legatees, or the determination of the portions which they are to take, when referred to by name, cannot be left to the discretion of a third person. ARTICLE 786. The testator may entrust to a third person the distribution of specific property or sums of money that he may leave in general to specified classes or causes, and also the designation of the persons, institutions or establishments to which such property or sums are to be given or applied. ARTICLE 787. The testator may not make a testamentary disposition in such manner that another person has to determine whether or not it is to be operative. ARTICLE 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.


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Rivera vs. Dizon33 SCRA 554

June 30, 1970

FACTS:

The testatrix distributed her properties to her heirs. It turns out that some of the heirs were prejudiced of their legitime because the property actually given to them were not approximate to their correct legitime. So these heirs wanted that to complete their rightful share certain other properties should be given to them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property were given to the correct legitimes.

RULING:

But it is very clear in the will of the testatrix that she wanted to give certain properties to certain persons and those dispositions or those persons should be respected. If the legitime or the rightful shares of the other heirs are prejudiced, then that should be completed by the delivery of cash in accordance with the wishes of the testator.


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Benedicto vs. Javella10 Phil 198

FACTS:

The testator was a Visayan who lived in San Juan, Rizal. He executed his will in Manila in the Spanish language. It was contended that the language requirement of the law on wills ahs not been complied with in this case. There was no expression in the body of the will itself or in its attestation clause that the testator knew Spanish, the language in which it is written.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there were a specific language in the will required by law.

HELD:

Where there is want of expression in the body of the will itself or in the attestation clause that the testator knew the language in which the will was written, proof thereof may be established by evidence aliunde. Although the lack of such evidence may be cured by presumption of knowledge of the language or dialect used in the will, no such presumption can arise where, as in the case at bar, the will was executed in Spanish, while the testator was a Visayan residing in SanJuan, Rizal at the time of his death.


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In re Estate of Calderon 26 Phil 333G.R. No. L-7856

December 26, 1913

FACTS:

Tthis case were made by the attorneys for Basilisa Salteras, Potenciana de la Cruz and Benigno Calderon, the latter as the natural guardian of the minors Maria and Josefa Calderon, and also by counsel for Mauro Sulat, Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Benigno Calderon, and Calixto Salteras, from the order of December 6, 1911, which directed that the administrator be authorized to make a conveyance of the property, classed as urban, consisting of a house and lot situated on Calle Anloague, Binondo, and designated, under the old numeration, as No. 29, and under the new, as No. 173, to Petronila Eugenio, in accordance with the petition of Ramon Fabie, who is made a party by the order.

ISSUE:

WON A testator cannot prohibit the contest of his will in the cases in which there exists nullity specified by law

HELD :

The testator's will, as recorded in the above clause 12, is so clear and definite that, in order duly to comply therewith, it needs but be determined who are the persons that must be considered as the legatees on account of their having served and cared for the testator's widow until her death.

From a due examination of the evidence, taken at trial on the petition of the appellants, who appeared and claimed a share in the aforementioned estate and legacy, it is concluded that those entitled thereto are Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Filomena Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa Salteras, Candida Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria and Josefa Calderon, and Petronila Eugenio, and so the trial judge also held in his order of September 23, 1911, except with respect to the little girls Maria and Josefa Calderon, whom he considered to be too young to have been able to serve the widow Maria Cristina Calderon as domestics; but the record shows that these children, as the widow's protegees, lived in her house until her death and, sometimes the one and sometimes the other, used to accompany her, even when she went to church, and that, although they were minors, they could have rendered the widow assistance and services sufficient and proportionate to their respective ages; and we are of the opinion that, from the testator's intention as expressed in his will, it is undeniable that the assistance and services rendered to the widow, required as a condition for meriting the legacy in question, were sufficient to the needs and conveniences of the testator's widow in respect many chores in the house, and enough to fill the requirements of a woman sickly and infirm in her already advanced age. The company of obliging and obedient little girls is usually more agreeable and useful to elderly and sick persons than that of adults.

With the report of the testator's brother, Ramon Fabie, the testator's will is not legally fulfilled, and it is not just that the other persons, besides Petronila Eugenio, who rendered services to and assisted the widow Maria Cristina Calderon should be deprived of the proportionate share of the legacy to which they are entitled.

Petronila Eugenio was already in the house serving the wife of the testator while the latter was still living, and had he seen that Petronila alone could serve and attend her during the widowhood of his

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wife and that the latter would not need other servants, he would have bequeathed the whole of the said house to Petronila; and if the deceased Miguel Fabie provided in his will that the property should be delivered to the person or persons who should render useful services to and assist his widow until her death, it was because he knew and was aware that there were other servants in the house, and evidently imposed this condition in order that those who were servants there might continue as such until his wife's death. Since some of them did do so, as proven by the record, the law must be fulfilled in accordance with the tenor of the last will of the testator.

For the foregoing reasons we reverse the order of December 6, 1911, and declare that Petronila Eugenio, Filomena Calderon, Encarnacion Gutierrez Calderon, Potenciana de la Cruz, Basilisa Salteras, Candida Reyes, Benita Garcia, Maria Calderon, and Josefa Calderon are entitled to receive pro rata the sale value of the property situated at No. 173, formerly No. 29, Calle Anloague, now Juan Luna. No special finding is made as to costs

Amilbahar,Nurulain LLL-IIIB

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Solla vs. AscuetaG.R. No. 24955

September 4, 1926

FACTS:Dona Maria Solla’s will read: "I desire and hereby name Leandro Serrano, my grandson and I desire him to comply with the obligation to give or to deliver to the parish priest of this town a sufficient sum of money necessary for a yearly novena and for an ordinary requiem mass for the 1st to 8th days thereof and on the9th or last day, a solemn requiem mass with a vigil and a largebier (a stand on which a corpse or coffin is placed before burial),- for these masses are for the repose of my soul and those of my parents, husband, children, and other relatives. I repeat and insist that my heir shall execute and comply with this request without fail. And at the hour of his death, he will insist that his heirs comply with all that I have here ordered". In the earlier part of the will, Dona Maria ordered the distribution of legacies to her brothers, nephew, protégées and servant.Leandro Serrano’s will on the other hand read: "I command my executor to put all of my property in order. I order my son Simeonnot to forget annually all the souls of the relatives of my grandmother and also of mine and to have a mass said on the 1stand 9th days of the yearly novena and that he erect a 1st classbier. I sincerely desire that the property of my deceased grandmother, Capitana Maria (Solla) be disposed of in conformity with all the provisions of her will and of mine". Leandro named his son Simeon Serrano, as executor of his will and that he directed him to put all of his property in order and to separate.ISSUE: WON the facts proven by the documentary evidence, and in accordance with law, with the costs against defeated party.HELD: It clearly appearing that it was Mari Solla’s intention, in ordering her universal heir Leandro Serrano in her will at the hour of his death, to insist upon the compliance of her orders by his heirs, that the latter should comply with her pious orders and that she did not mean her orders concerning her legacies, the compliance of which she had entrusted to Leandro Serrano, we are authorized to restrict the application of the words “all that I have here ordered” used by the said Maria Solla and the words “all her orders” used by Leandro Serrano in their respective wills limiting them to the pious orders and substituting the phrase “in regard to the annual masses” after the words used by both testators, respectively.The trial court, therefore, committed an error in interpreting the order to Leandro Serrano mentioned in his will as applicable to the provisions of Maria Solla’s will relative to the legacies and not to pious bequests exclusively.As to the remaining assignments of error, they being merely corollaries of the fifth and sixth, the points raised therein are impliedly decided in our disposition of said two assignments last mentioned.With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants, the two assignments of error made therein are without merit in view of the foregoing considerations and the conclusions we have arrived at with regard to the assignments of error made by the defendants-appellants.In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from must be, as hereby, reversed in all its parts and the complaint dismissed, without special findings as to costs.

Amilbahar,Nurulain LLL-IIIB

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BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZG.R. No. L-39247

June 27, 1975

Topic/Doctrines: Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).

FACTS:Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate children. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mother’s notarial will, which was written in English. In that will, Leodegaria declared that it was her desire her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets.Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will.There after, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument waiving and renouncing his right in Leodegaria’s estate in favor of their 6 children.Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void; that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and; that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. She prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared. The probate court declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of party's arguments.

ISSUE:Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

HELD:The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formalvalidity had been established. But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding.The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565). To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a

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testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762). As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

AMING, RHASDY P. LLB-IIIB

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BONA VS BRIONESG.R. No. L-10806

July 6, 1918

Topics/Doctrines: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made (Art. 795, NCC).

FACTS:On September 16, 1911, Francisco Briones executed a will in the presence of three witnesses, one of whom is the notary public, who also drafted the will and certifies the will of the testator and the signatures of the testator as well as the witnesses. He died on August 14, 1913. Monica Bona, his widow by the second marriage applied for the probate of the will and present evidence that the will was executed with solemnities prescribed by law at that time. Hospicio, Gregoria, and Carmen, all surnamed Briones, the legitimate children by the first marriage of the testator, by a pleading dated March 5, 1915, opposed the probate of the will presented by the widow of the deceased Briones, alleging that the said will was executed before two witnesses only and under unlawful and undue pressure or influence exercised upon the person of the testator who thus signed through fraud and deceit; and he prayed that for that reason the said will be declared null and of no value, with costs against the petitioners.

ISSUE:The whole issue discussed by the parties and submitted for the decision of this court resolves itself as to whether or not in the execution of the will in question the solemnities prescribed by section 618 of Act No. 190 have been observed.

HELD:The oft-repeated section 618 of Act No. 190 says: "No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided". Even though Domingo de la Fuente drafted the will and intervened in its preparation as a notary, by the order and under the express direction of the testator, it is nevertheless true that he did it as a witness to the execution of the said will with positive and concrete acts, while the two other witnesses Gregorio Bustilla and Sixto Barrameda merely attested all that appeared in the second of the four paragraphs mentioned; for in its they certify that the foregoing testament contains the last will of the testator Francisco Briones; that the latter told them that before and at the time that he dictated his will, there was no inducement nor threat by anybody; and that as he did not know how to write the Spanish language, said testator requested Domingo de la Fuente to write the will, and he did it as it is now drafted, certifying also, that the testator Briones signed his will voluntarily with his own hand, in the presence of the declarants who, as witnesses, signed the instrument on the date expressed. Domingo de la Fuente on his part declared that the two said witnesses formally swore before him on the certification which precedes the said will and, according to this testimony as shown in the records and the testimony of the above-mentioned witnesses, the said Domingo de la Fuente wrote and drafted the said will Exhibit A by the order and under the direction of the testator Francisco Briones, who signed in the presence of the witnesses, Bustilla and Barrameda and of Notary Domingo de la Fuente, all of whom immediately signed also in the presence of the testator, each doing it in the presence of each other. So that, although it is not shown expressly that Domingo de la Fuente was an attesting witness to the will, yet it cannot be denied that it

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was he who wrote it by the order and under the direction of the testator; that he was a witness to its execution from the first to its last line; and that he was perfectly aware of the fact that all that he had written in the document Exhibit A expresses the genuine and true will of the testator. He saw and was present when the latter signed his will, as also when the two witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda affixed their signatures; said witnesses also saw and were present when Domingo de la Fuente signed at the end of the said document.

This is a case in which the judicial criterion should be inspired in the sense that it is not defeated, and if the wish of the testator is so manifest and express as in the instant case, it is not proper nor just to invalidate the will of Francisco Briones merely because of some small defect in form which is not essential nor of great importance, such as the failure to state therein that Domingo de la Fuente was also a witness to the said will when he signed it twice. As a matter of act, he understood the contents of the will better than the two other attesting witnesses, for he really was a witness and he attested the execution of the will during its making until it was terminated and signed by the testator, by the witnesses, and by himself, even though he did it in the capacity of a notary.

The last paragraph of section 618 of Act No. 190 supplies a legal basis to support the validity of the will in question with the conditions for its probate because, notwithstanding the existence of such defect merely in the form and not in the substance, the certification of authenticity and the very text of the will show in a clear and indubitable manner that the will Exhibit A contains the last will of the testator, and that it was signed by the latter and attested as being true and legitimate not only the two witnesses Bustilla and Barrameda but also by the one who wrote it, Domingo de la Fuente, who was also a truthful and reliable witness, even though he be called a notary public.

The requisites established by Act No. 2645, which amended the oft-repeated section 618 cannot be required in the probate of the will here, inasmuch as this document was executed in September, 1911, five years before said amendatory law began to take effect (July 1, 1916), while the testator died on August 14, 1913, two years and some months before the enforcement of the said law; and so, the only law applicable to the present case is the provision contained in section 618 of Act No. 190, and in accordance with the provisions of this section, the said will should be probated; for it has been presented to the court many months before the amendatory act went into effect.


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In Re Will of RiosaG.R. No. L-14074

November 7, 1918

Topics/Doctrines: The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made (Art. 795, NCC).

FACTS:The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator, controls. Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library, in which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.

ISSUE:Whether or not the will is valid?

HELD:This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a will made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the provisions of this law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not published].) The court has further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as to will executed by a testator whose death took place prior to the operative date of Act No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil., 276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this law. The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death. (Taylor vs. Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209)

This court, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of

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his property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until a future time. The will of Jose Riosa is valid and section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the applicable law.


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IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHNSONG.R. No. L-12767

November 16, 1918

Topics/Doctrines: Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands ( sec. 636, Act No. 190)

FACTS:Emil H. Johnson was born in Sweden in 1877; in 1893, he emigrated to the United States and lived in Chicago, Illinois. In 1898, at Chicago, he married Rosalie Ackeson, and immediately afterwards left for the Philippine Islands as a US Army soldier. A daughter, Ebba Ingeborg, was born a few months after their marriage. After Johnson was discharged as a soldier from the service of the United States he continued to live in the Philippines. In 1902, Rosalie Johnson was granted a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. In 1903, Emil Johnson procured a certificate of naturalization at Chicago, after which he visited family in Sweden. When this visit was concluded, the deceased returned to Manila. In Manila he had 3 children with Alejandra Ibañez: Mercedes, Encarnacion, and Victor. Emil Johnson also had 2 children with Simeona Ibañez: Eleonor and Alberto. He died in Manila, leaving a holographic will. This will, signed by himself and 2 witnesses only, instead of the 3 required witnesses, was not executed in conformity with Philippine law. A petition was presented in the CFI of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be probated here. The hearing on said application was set, and three weeks publication of notice was ordered. In the hearing, witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to probate. Victor Johnson was appointed sole administrator of the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine court had jurisdiction?

HELD:YES. The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and to allow the will to be probated."The proceeding as to the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short." (Citing In re Davis) Whether the order of probate can be set aside in this proceeding on the other ground stated in the petition, namely,

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that the testator was not a resident of the State of Illinois and that the will was not made in conformity with the laws of that State. - NO

The CFI found that the testator was a citizen of the State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.Section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

Will made here by alien. A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands.


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PCIB vs. EscolinGR No.L- 27860 & L-27896

September 30, 1975

Topic/Doctrine: Nationality Principle

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death and not said law at any other time.


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Amata vs. TablizoGR No.L- 23483

December 18, 1925

Topic/Doctrine: MENTAL CAPACITY TO MAKE A WILL

FACTS:

This is a proceeding commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay by a petition filed by Antonio Amata and Felipe Almojuela, praying for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Pedro Tablizo, and the issuance of letters of administration to the petitioners. Juana Tablizo and others opposed the probate of the will applied for on the following grounds: “(1) That it was not signed by the witnesses, nor executed by the deceased Pedro Tablizo, as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure; (2) that the deceased Pedro Tablizo was not habitually of sound mind, but on the contrary, was unconscious at the time of the execution of said document; (3) that said document was not signed by the testator freely and voluntarily, nor did he intend it to be his will on the date when it was executed; and (4) that said document was maliciously and fraudulently prepared by the two beneficiaries Antonio Amata and Felipe Almojuela, causing a date to appear thereon which is not the true date of its execution.” And they prayed that the petition be denied, and it be held that Pedro Tablizo died intestate, and Tomas Tablizo be appointed special administrator of the estate left by said deceased.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by the petitioners, as well as the opponents, the court below entered an order declaring that the deceased Pedro Tablizo was unconscious when the document Exhibit A was executed, and that said document did not contain the last will of the testator, and denying the probate thereof as the last will and testament of said deceased; and declaring, further, that Pedro Tablizo died intestate.

From this order the petitioners took an appeal in due time and form, assigning the following supposed errors as committed by the trial court, to wit: (1) Its declaration that it entertains a reasonable suspicion that the document Exhibit A, the testament of the deceased Pedro Tablizo, does not contain the will of the testator; (2) its refusal to admit the will Exhibit A to probate and its finding that Pedro Tablizo died intestate; and (3) it failure to render judgment against the opponents for the costs of the action.

The opponents, who are all brothers and sisters and children of brothers and sisters of the testator, attempted to prove that the will was clandestinely prepared by Antonio Amata and Felipe Almojuela and signed on the midnight of June 19, 1924, Pedro Tablizo then lying down on his bed, weakened by old age and his sickness, lying down with his mouth upward and open, the eyes closed and the feet and arms extended, being unable to move, see, speak or know those surrounding him, it being necessary that Antonio Amata should, as he did, place the pen in his fingers, hold him by the arm and guide him while signing the will upon a pillow.

ISSUE:

(1) When was the will made and signed?;

(2) Who drew and signed it?; and

(3) Was the mind of the testator perfectly sound when he made and signed the will?

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HELD:

As to the first question, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the testator dictated to Felipe Almojuela the rough draft of his will, the latter having typewritten it clean, and finished the drawing thereof at midnight. Notwithstanding the distrust with which the trial judge received the testimony of the petitioners, as they had intervened in the preparation of the will, and are the ones most benefited, he could not help giving credit to their testimony and that of their witnesses upon the date when the will was made and signed, that is, from 3 o’clock in the evening of the third day up to 1 o’clock in the morning of the 4th June, 1924. In view of the fact that the testator did not die until June 20, 1924, in order to make credible the theory that the testator was unconscious when his will was executed and signed.

Turning now to the second question, the very witness for the opponents, Father Cecilio Penilla, testified that at 10 o’clock approximately in the night of June 4, 1924, the date when the will was signed, and on the 12th day of the same month and year, the testator had sent for him in order to confess and on both occasions he intelligently and intelligibly talked with him, relating his spiritual life coherently and clearly although he was lying down on his bed and could not move or stand up without assistance. It is a fact also uncontroverted that on June 9, 1924, he ordered a carabao sold, designating it by its name Tibayong. On the 10th day of the same month, he received the visit of Father Andres Tablizo and Mariano Surtida with whom he has been conversing. All these prior, coetaneous and subsequent circumstances show that Pedro Tablizo was perfectly of sound mind at the time of making his last will.

With regard to the third question, the court have already seen that the will was made on June 3, 1924, and signed immediately thereafter at an early hour in the morning of the 4th day of the same month and year. The date of the execution of the will is important in the determination of the mental condition of the testator. If the opponents and their witnesses testified falsely upon this essential point, under the rule falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, they are not entitled to any credit upon the other essential points of their testimony, unless corroborated by other witnesses whose credibility is beyond suspicion. On the other hand, the testimony of the petitioners and their witnesses upon the making if the will is so clear, positive and consistent, and the succession of facts upon which they testified and their incidents is so natural, that it cannot but convince any one who should read it without bias. If, as above stated, the petitioners and their witnesses are entitled to a greater credit that the opponents and their witnesses, and if, as above seen, the testator was in perfectly sound mental condition, there can be no doubt that it was the testator who signed his signature on the will placed upon a book of music. The testimony of the opponents and their witnesses is improbable that the will was signed upon a pillow. A pillow being soft, as it is, cannot serve as a support for writing purposes.

For the foregoing reasons, the court are of their opinion that the order appealed from must be, as is hereby, revoked with the costs against the appellees, and it is ordered that the will of Pedro Tablizo be admitted to probate. So ordered.


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Garcia vs. Garcia, de BartolomeGR No.L- 43367

September 9, 1936

Topic/Doctrine: Credibility of the subscribing witness

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila allowing the probate of the will of Paulina Vazquez Viuda de Garcia. The will was executed on June 12, 1934. The testatrix died on June 27, 1934. Testamentary proceedings were commenced on July 25, 1934, in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the probate of this will, the petitioners being Marieta, Luisa and Purifi-cacion Garcia who are among the forced heirs instituted in the will and who are also named as the universal heirs for the residue of the estate left undisposed in the will.

The probate of the will was contested on August 29, 1934 by the oppositor-appellant called to the stand two witnesses to substantiate her averments. Asuncion Bartolome, a daughter of the oppositor-appellant and who was living with the deceased at the time, testified that in the afternoon of June 12, 1934, she did not see the deceased execute any will; neither did she remember having seen any of the instrumental witnesses in the house at the time. Luz Lopez corroborated Asuncion Bartolome by declaring that in the afternoon of the said date, she went to the house of the testatrix to borrow some money and that during her stay she did not see "a algunos hombres allí".

These two witnesses for the appellant were, however, contradicted by the proponent Luisa Garcia who was present when the will was signed. Luisa Garcia testified further that Asuncion Bartolome was on June 12, 1934, confined in bed suffering from cough and lung trouble and therefore could not have witnessed the execution of the will, and that Luz Lopez was never in the house of the testatrix in the afternoon of said day. Of Luz Lopez the trial judge observes that "era demasiado locuaz, habiendo, además, incurrido en serias contradicciones".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonies of the subscribing/attesting witnesses are credible?

HELD:

The court held that the subscribing witnesses are much relied upon to establish due execution of the will; nor can the testimony of persons accidentally present, who had nothing to do with the transaction, be entitled to equal consideration. Though strangers personally to the testator, their concurring testimony alone may well establish the due execution in which they participated; and even in a conflict of evidence great weight is given to their several statements. By signing a will as witnesses, the persons who thus sign impliedly certify to the truth of the facts which admit to probate, including the sufficiency of execution, the capacity of the testator, the absence of undue influence and the like.

The judgment of the lower court admitting the last will and testament (Exhibit A) of Paulina Vazquez Viuda de Garcia to probate is hereby affirmed, with costs against the oppositor-appellant. So ordered.


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Neyra vs. NeyraGR No.L- 8075

March 25, 1946

Topic/Doctrine: Test of SIGNING BY THUMBMARK; PRESENCE OF ATTESTING WITNESSES

FACTS:

That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second marriage; that after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties. In the first case, filed on March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon Street, Manila, which was finally decided in favor of the defendants, in the court of first instance, and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943.

In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942) the two sisters became reconciled. only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2,1942, when Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of her last will and -testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, November 3, 1942, Attorney Panis read said document of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumb mark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protegé, as witnesses. Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents, at the request of Encarnacion Neyra.

The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, who are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while three of the attesting witnesses are professional men of irreproachable character, who had known and seen and actually talked to the testatrix.

Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, substantially corroborated the testimony of the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of November 3, 1942. Teodora Neyra, Presentacion

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Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however, that when the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.

ISSUE:

Is the contentions of the petitioners are tenable?

HELD:

The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time E. N. thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other, at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it. all in this case, (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature.

The petition for reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead since November 4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals for Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-affirmed, without costs. So ordered.


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Bugnao vs. UbagG.R.No. 4445

September 18, 1909

Topic: Testamentary capacity.

Facts:

Before Domingo Ubag died, he allegedly executed a will while he was not of sound mind by making his wife the sole heir of the said will. The appellant contend that the testator was so sick that he was unable to speak and understand, or make himself understood and that he was incapacitated to make a will.

Issue:

When a person can be considered of sound mind and capable of executing a will?

Held:

To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise. It is sufficient that a testator knows and appreciate the nature and effects of the act he is engaged.

Badeo, Michael J.LLB III-B

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Bagtas vs. PaguioG.R.No.L- 6801March 14, 1912

Topic: Testamentary Capacity

Facts:

Pioquinto Pagiuo executed a will; the wife was propounded as executrix and opposed by the son and grandchildren by a former marriage on the ground that the will was executed while the testator was suffering from debility of the body and poor memory which allegedly lacks testamentary capacity.

Issue:

Whether or not physical debility or poor memory constitutes incapacity to execute a will?

Held:

Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains, failure of memory is not sufficient to create incapacity.


[199]


Galvez vs. GalvezG.R. No. L-6650

December 5, 1913

Topic: Testamentary Capacity

Facts:

Victor Galvez executed a will that he affix his signature by directing Lorenzo Galvez at his request in his presence.

Issue:

Whether or not directing another person to affix testator’s signature affects the testamentary capacity?

Held:

The formalities prescribed under the law where complied with as observed the writing transpired under his direction and presence with the required number of witnesses, this requisites must concur to comply with the statutory requirements in the affixing or writing of wills.


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Lopez vs. TorresG.R. No. L-25966

November 1, 1926

Topic: No Testamentary provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of a guardian before final accounts of the latter have been approved.

Facts:

Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will, instituting his cousin Vicente and daughter Luz. Prior to the execution of the will Tomas was judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and Vicente served as guardian.

Issue:

Whether or not Vicente as guardian is disqualified to inherit from Tomas?

Held:

Vicente was not only a general incapacity on his part, but special incapacity due to accidental relation of guardian and ward relation existing between the parties.


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ABQUILAN vs. ABQUILAN49 Phil 450

October 13, 1926

Topic/ Doctrine: Testamentary Capacity and Intent

FACTS

This appeal has been brought to reverse an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Occidental Negros, refusing to legalize an instrument (Exhibit A) purporting to be the last will and testament of Isidra Abquilan, deceased. It appears that the deceased left no forced heirs, and her only heirs, in case of intestacy, are her brother, Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and Feliciana Abquilan, a sister.

Upon hearing the cause the trial court found that the document propounded as the will of the deceased is apocryphal, that the purported signatures of the deceased to the supposed will are forgeries, and that the instrument in question was not executed by the deceased. He therefore denied probate, and the proponent appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid; whether or not the testatrix was capable of executing a will

HELD:

The supposed testatrix was not in a condition such as to enable her to have participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from paralysis to celebral hemorrhage in such degree as completely to incapacitate her for intelligent participation in the act of making a will. A careful comparison of the name of the testatrix as signed in two places to the Exhibit A, with many of her authentic signatures leads to the conclusion that the signatures to the supposed will were made by some other person. Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato and Alejandro Genito completely demonstrate in our opinion that no will at all was made on November 6, the date attributed to the questioned document, and that, instead an attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate another will, which failed of completion because of the refusal of Alejandro Genito to be party to the making of a will in which the testatrix took no part. The instrument before us was undoubtedly fabricated later, probably on November 7, at a time when the condition of the deceased was such as to make rational participation on her part in the act of making a will impossible.ch

BUNDA, JILL CARMEN D.LLB-3B

[202]


LIM vs. CHINCO55 Phil 891

March 31, 1931


FACTS:

This is a contest over the probate of a paper writing purporting to be the will of Victorina Villaranda y Diaz, who died on June 9, 1929. The deceased left no descendants or ascendants, and the document produced as her will purports to leave her estate, consisting of properties valued at P50,000, more or less, chiefly to three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of the surname of Lim. This instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the instrument as executrix. Opposition was made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the deceased.

The purported will was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a practicing attorney of Manila, whose wife appears to be related to the chief beneficiaries named in the will. In the end three persons served as witnesses, all of whom were in friendly relations with the lawyer, and two relatives of his wife. The intended testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the document, and it was signed for her by the attorney.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time the paper referred to was signed.

HELD:

The deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a comatose condition and incapable of performing any conscious and valid act. The testimony of the witnesses is convincing to the effect that the patient was in a continuous state of coma during the entire period of her stay in the hospital, she did not have sufficient command of her faculties to enable her to do any valid act. Doctor Lim, the physician from Manila, testified that the patient was not suffering from cerebral hemorrhage but from uræmic trouble, and that, after the first attack, the patient was much relieved and her mind so far cleared up. The attorney testified that he was able to communicate with the deceased when the will was made, and that he read the instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her whether it expressed her wishes. He says that she made signs that enabled him to understand that she concurred in what was written. But it is clear, even upon the statement of this witness, that the patient was unable to utter intelligent speech. The paper offered for probate was properly disallowed.


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HERNAEZ vs. HERNAEZ1 Phil 689

February 10, 1903


FACTS:

The subject of this action is the will executed by Doña Juana Espinosa, widow of Don Pedro Hernaez, before a notary public, and three witnesses, and with the aid of an interpreter, the testatrix not understanding Spanish. The action brought is for the annulment of the will upon the ground: (1) of the incapacity of the testatrix; (2) the incapacity of the notary, attesting witnesses, and the interpreter; and (3) a substantial formal defect in the will.

The incapacity of the testatrix according to the complaint is alleged to consist in this: That on the 5th of December, 1894, she was over 80 years of age and was so ill that three days before she had received the sacraments and extreme unction, and that two days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude, and gave contradictory orders, as a result of her senile debility. The incapacity of the notary is that he did not understand the Visayan dialect, the language of the testatrix. The incapacity of the attesting witnesses is supposed to consist in their not having a perfect knowledge of Spanish, and the incapacity of the interpreter in that he was an amanuensis of the notary and was the person who wrote out the will. The substantial formal defect of the will is supposed to consist in the fact that two physicians were not present to certify to the sanity of the testatrix at the time of its execution, and the absence of two interpreters to translate the will, because it was executed in a foreign language.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid

HELD:

Yes, the will is valid and efficacious. It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the documents presented with the complaint can the conclusion be reached that the testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties. The fact that on old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some days before making her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by proof could no lead the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the contrary is conclusively proven. The notary in compliance with the requirements of article 695 of the Civil Code certifies that in his judgment the testatrix had the necessary legal capacity and the use of the necessary mental faculties for the purposes of the execution of the will.

It has at no time been regarded as a ground for the annulment of a public instrument executed before a notary public by a native of these Islands, ignorant of Spanish, that the notary was not acquainted with the dialect of the party executing the same. If this officer, upon whom the law imposes the obligation of drawing the instrument in the official language, that is, Castilian, does not know the dialect he can avail himself of an interpreter in accordance with the provisions of the law itself; hence the fact that the notary who legalized the will in question did not know the Visayan dialect spoken by the testatrix is by no means an argument in favor of the nullity of this public instrument, nor has it been for the nullity of

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any one of the long series of instruments executed before Spanish notaries, and even Filipino notaries, unacquainted with the dialect or dialects of the locality in which they performed their duties or the special dialect of the party.

With respect to the attesting witnesses it has been fully proven by the manner in which they testified at the trial, "without the necessity of an interpreter," as to those called as witnesses and by conclusive evidence as to the deceased attesting witness whose signature and competency have been completely established, that they knew the dialect of the testatrix in accordance with section 5, article 681, of the Civil Code, and also understood Spanish. As alleged, but not proven, their knowledge of the latter language may not have been perfect, but this does not make them incompetent, nor is it a ground for annulment. Finally, the prohibition of article 681, section 8, is not applicable to the interpreter, of whose services the notary availed himself for the execution, drafting and legalization of the will, for the simple reason that it does not refer to the interpreter but the witnesses, and there is nothing to authorize the extensive interpretation attempted to be made of its precepts.

The presence of two physicians, as required in the case covered by article 665, was not necessary. "This precept refers clearly and expressly to the conditions which must be complied with in order that a demented person may make a will by availing himself of a lucid interval, and is entirely distinct from the cases governed by article 685 when the testator has not been declared demented." (Judgment of June 10, 1897.)

Nor was it necessary that two interpreters be present as required by article 648 of the Civil Code. This is a requisite for the execution of a will in a foreign language, and neither by the letter nor by the purpose of this article could it be required with regard to the will in question. Not by the letter, because neither the testatrix nor the notary expressed themselves in a foreign language. Neither the Castilian spoken by the notary nor the Visayan spoken by the testatrix are foreign languages.


[205]


AVELINO vs. DE LA CRUZ21 Phil 521

February 21, 1912


FACTS

The present is an appeal from an order of the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, in which he had legalized the will of the said Pascual de la Cruz, deceased.

The contention of the opponent is that at the time of the making of the will the said Pascual de la Cruz was blind and had been for a number of years, and was incompetent to make the will in question.

Against this contention of the opponent, all of the witnesses who signed the will were called as witnesses, and each declared that the deceased was of sound mind at the time said will was made and fully understood its contents and signed the same in their presence and that they each signed the will in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decedent’s will is valid

HELD:

Yes, it is valid. The appellant attempted to show that the deceased was incompetent to make his will because he was blind at the time the same was executed and had been for several years theretofore. There is absolutely no proof to show that the deceased was incapacitated at the time he executed his will. No presumption of incapacity can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The only requirement of the law as to the capacity to make a will is that the person shall be of age and of sound mind and memory. (Sec. 614, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.) Section 620 of the same code prohibits blind persons from acting as witnesses in the execution of wills, but no limitation is placed upon the testamentary capacity, except age and soundness of mind.


[206]


CUYUGAN vs. BARONG.R. No. L-41947January 16, 1936

DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity and intentThe doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will

subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover, where from the day of execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that he had not executed the will in question.

Facts:

Silvestra Baron died of heart failureand was eighty-six years of age. She left an estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will. She died single without forced heirs.The will appointed VivencioCuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The original of this will is signed "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra Baron" Both copies are written in the Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David, Valeriano Silva and ZacariasNuguid (known to the testator).The oppositorsGuillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substance first, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to the said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Silvestra Baron, a woman of advanced years and in a critical state of health, possesses testamentary capacity to make a will.

HELD:

NO.The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself. Silvestra had an attack and was in a serious condition and requested that a doctor be sent immediately. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving, VivencioCuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses, entered the house prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by the proponent. EpifaniaSampang, testified that when she reached the house she found her

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grandaunt lying in bed, very pale and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only groaned; that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip swollen.

There is no evidence that Silvestra Baron took any active part in the preparation of the alleged will except that when she was asked if she wished to include her sister Faustina in the will she said "Yes" in Pampanga. There is no affirmative evidence that she understood the document when it was read to her. Standing at her bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the chief beneficiary, VivencioCuyugan, and yet so far as this record shows, not a word was exchanged between any of them and the suffering old woman. We don't know what drug the doctor administered but it is clear to us from the evidence that in her dazed physical and mental condition she had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could not even sign her name to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was noted by one of the astute subscribing witnesses, he suggested that they have her sign another copy which was done.She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the record that before her death she had denied to several persons that she made any will.This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life.

De La Cruz, Fatima Nica Q.LLB-3B

[208]


SAMSON vs.CORRALES TAN, ET ALG.R. No. L-23729

December 5, 1925

TOPIC:Unless the acknowledgment is made in a will or other public document, it must be made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register.

FACTS:

Flaviana Samson was legally married to the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan, that she and her children Arsenia, Gregoria, Santiago, Dativa, Aurelio, and Amancio Corrales Tan y Samson, are his legal heirs, and the appellant Vicente Corrales Tan, while a natural child of said Mariano Corrales Tan, has not been legally acknowledged as such and is therefor not entitled to a share in the inheritance beyond the amount bequeathed to him in the will of the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not upon the facts found Vicente Corrales Tan can be considered an acknowledged natural child of the deceased.

HELD:

The court below found that before his marriage to Flaviana Samson, Mariano Corrales Tan was living with a woman by the name of Prudencia Santos and with her had a child, the herein appellant, that in his certificate of baptism, it is stated that he was the natural child of Mariano Corrales Tan and Prudencia de los Santos; that in another document of the same date on file in the archives of the parish church where the child was baptized, Mariano Corrales Tan, in the presence of two witnesses, recognized Vicente Corrales Tan Quintin as his natural child had with Florentina de los Santos.

Vicente Corrales became of age long before the death of his father. Hence, paragraph 1 of article 137 above quoted is not applicable to his case and, in order to establish his status as an acknowledged natural child, he must show that he was so acknowledged during the life of the deceased. According to article 131, such acknowledgment "must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document." The record of birth mentioned in article 131 is that provided for in article 326 of the same Code and as the application of that article to the Philippine Islands was suspended by decree of the Governor-General dated December 29, 1889, and was never put into effect, it follows that form of acknowledgment did not exist in this country in the year 1894. Whether entries in the civil register provided for in section 2214 of the Administrative Code will meet the requirements of article 131, we need not here decide.But it is argued that article 327 of the Civil Code is applicable to the present case. That article reads:

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The records of the registry shall be evidence of civil status and no other evidence thereof shall be admitted, unless such records have never existed or the books of the registry have disappeared, or the question arises in the course of litigation.

In our opinion that article only lays down a rule of evidence and has no bearing on the formalities for a valid acknowledgment of a natural child; as we have seen, article 131 requires that unless the acknowledgment is made in a will or other public document, it must be made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register.The fact that a person in the will of the deceased is named as one of the legatees is an implied acknowledgment. There is, of course no merit in this suggestion; legatees are as often as not unrelated to the testator.

It is also suggested that Exhibit B is a public document and, therefore, in itself a sufficient acknowledgment. Assuming without conceding that it is a public document, it would nevertheless not constitute an acknowledgment unless duly approved by a court.

De La Cruz, Fatima Nica Q.LLB-3B

[210]


ACOP vs. PIRASO52 Phil 660

January 16, 1929

DOCTRINE:

The will must be executed in a language or dialectknown to the testator.If the testator resides in ascertain locality, it can be presumed that he knows the language or dialect in said locality.Naturally,it is useless to avail of this presumption if the willis not written in the dialect of the locality. Moreover, the presumption is only prima facie, and therefore, the contrary may be proved. Thus, it may be shown, for example, by proof in court that the testator was reallyignorant of the language of the community or locality, or of the language in which the will had been written.

FACTS:

The CFI of Benguet denied the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso because the will sought to be probated was written in English. Evidence showed that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect. Proponent-appellant SixtoAcop alleged that the lower court erred in not holding that the testator did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up in said dialect.

ISSUE:

Should the will be probated?

HELD:

NO.The will is not valid. The testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary. The decedent‘s alleged will, being written in English, a language unknown to the decedent, cannot be probated because it is prohibited by the law, which clearly requires that the will be written in the language or dialect known the testator. Nor can the presumption in favor of a will established by the SC in the case of Abangan vs. Abanganto the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary. First, it was not proven that English is the language of Baguio where the deceased lived and where the will was drawn. The record contains positive proof that the testator knew no other language other than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano. He did not know the English language in which the will was written.

De La Cruz, Fatima NicaLLB-3B

[211]


PERRY vs. ELIOG.R. No. L-9089January 5, 1915

DOCTRINE:"If a party writes or prepares a will under which he takes a benefit, that is a circumstance which ought generally to excite the suspicion of the court, and calls upon it to be vigilant and zealous in examining the evidence in support of the instrument, in favor of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion is removed, and it is judicially satisfied that the paper propounded does express the true will of the deceased

FACTS:

Upon the deceased of SoteraBarrientos, a resident of the municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis, 68 years of age, the wife of Samuel Perry in her third marriage, in the said municipality on August 31, 1912, two documents were presented in the Court of First Instance of the said province, each of which, according to those who respectively presented them, was the last will and testament of the said deceased.

The first document was filed on September 4, 1912, that is, four days after the death of the testatrix, by Vicente Elio, son of her first husband, and her brother-in-law; and the second on December 20 of the same year, 1912, by Samuel Perry, her surviving husband. Perry opposed probate of the first document, and Elio, in turn, that of the second. By agreement of both parties the two petitions were heard jointly, in order that the evidence introduced to support the one might be used to impeach the other. Likewise the court, on February 1, 1913, made one single order in both cases, whereby, after giving due weight to the evidence introduced and setting forth the findings of fact and of law that he deemed pertinent with respect to each of the said petitions and to the documents to which they respectively referred, he held that the said two wills were true and authentic, but that the one executed on September 21, 1910, had been revoked by the one subsequently executed on August 26, 1912. He therefore denied the probate of the first, that is, of the one executed in favor of Samuel Perry, and ordered that the second will, in favor of the other petitioner, Vicente Elio, be probated as the last will and testament of the said SoteraBarrientos, disallowing with costs the claim of the respondent Perry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deceased understood the terms and knew the effects of the document, the legalization of which as a will had been ordered by the court.

HELD:

NO.Based from the testimony obtained from this case, on the occasion to which the witnesses refer, that is, at the time they and Elio presented themselves at the house of SoteraBarrientos with the document prepared by Elio in order that it might be executed as her will, the weakness

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of the testatrix was so great that not only was she unable to sign the said instrument, all the means employed for that purpose having been in vain, but she had also lost the power of speech, for, according to Matayabas, what she said could no longer be understood, nor were the signs that she made well understood. According to Sabido, she was no longer able to talk; she merely made movements with her head, although, as all these witnesses testified, she gave it to be understood that the document that had been read to her was her will and expressed her wishes, because she replied to the questions which were put to her ascertain whether such it was, by saying yes; but, according to the witness Rivera, this reply was made with great effort.

De La Cruz, Fatima NicaLLB-3B

[213]


ABANGAN v ABANGAN46 Phil 476

Topic: WILLS- FORMS OF WILLS

FACTS:

On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponents appealed. The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.

HELD:

YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustration of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.


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GONZALEZ vs. LAURELG.R. No. L-19079January 15, 1923


FACTS:

By an order dated December 16, 1921, the Court of First Instance of Batangas allowed the document, to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia, thus granting the petition of Primitivo L. Gonzalez and overruling the opposition presented by Jovita Laurel.

Jovita Laurel now appeals to this court from that ruling of the court below, alleging that court erred:

1. The supposed will of the deceased Maria Tapia y Castillo, was executed with the solemnities prescribed by the law, notwithstanding that there was no proof of the dialect known by the said deceased and of the fact that it was the same in which said was written.

2. In not holding that the signatures of Maria Tapia appearing had been obtained through deceit, surprise, fraud, and in an illegal and improper manner.

3. It was obtained through unlawful pressure, influence and machinations of the applicant, Primitivo L. Gonzalez, one of the legatees, in connivance with Attorney Modesto Castillo.

4. In not finding that the deceased Maria Tapia was physically and mentally incapacitated at the time she is said to have executed.

5. A valid and authentic and allowing it to probate as the will and testament of the deceased Maria Tapia y Castillo.

The deceased Maria Tapia was a resident of the Province of Batangas, a Tagalog region, where said deceased had real properties for several years. It also appears that she requested Modesto Castillo to draw her will in Tagalog. From the record taken as a whole, a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect, which presumption is now conclusive for not having been overthrown nor rebutted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testatrix acted voluntarily and with full knowledge in executing and signing the will.

HELD:

The preponderance of evidence in this respect is that said document was executed and signed by Maria Tapia voluntarily and with full knowledge, without fraud, deceit, surprise, or undue influence or machinations of anybody, she being then mentally capacitated and free. Such is the fact established by the evidence, which we have carefully examined.

DELATADO, VANESSA JOY, R.

[215]


LLB III-BREYES vs. ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL

G.R. No. L-2862April 21, 1952


FACTS:

On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an opposition based on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish language in which it was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will. From this decision petitioner appealed to this Court.

ISSUE:1) Whether or not the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are genuine2) Whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was written 3) Whether or not the testatrix was of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will.

HELD:

1. To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These witnesses are: Cornelia Gonzales de Romero, Quintin Ulpindo and Consuelo B. de Catindig. These witnesses testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated on her bed but over a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she had signed it in the places where her signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of each other. The standards should, if possible, have been made by the same time as the suspected document. It is preferable that the standards embraced the time of the origin of the document, so that one part comes from the time after the origin. If possible less than five or six signatures should always be examined and preferably double that number.

2. Another ground on which the lower court base the disallowance of the will is the failure of the petitioner to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke the language in which the will in question appears to have been written. According to the lower court, the law requires that the will should be written in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been proven, the probate of the will must fail. And the wIll was disallowed.

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3. The remaining ground which the lower court has considered in disallowing the will is the fact that the deceased was not of sound and disposing mind when she signed the will, and it reached this conclusion, not because of any direct evidence on the matter, but simply because the deceased signed the will in a somewhat varied form. They do not reveal a condition of forgery or lack of genuineness. These differences or irregularities are common in the writings of old people and, far from showing lack of genuineness, are indicative of the age, sickness, or weak condition of the writer. A comparison of the three disputed signatures in the will readily give this impression.


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Testate Estate of PilapilGR No. L-47931June 27, 1941


FACTS:

The probate of the will was opposed on the ground that the will was not properly paged as it was numbered with letters. At the foot of the 1st page appears “pase ala 2” (pass on to the 2nd page). The bottom of the 2nd page also has the phrase “pase ala 3” (pass on the 3 rd page). The third page contains the will “is comprised of 2 articles, containing 16 dispositions and written in 3 pages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will must be duly admitted for probate.

HELD:

Yes, the will must be admitted for probate. The paging in this case was a sufficient compliance with the law. It is sufficient that the number of pages can be identified. Indeed, the will in this case, as stated in the 3rd page, contains no more, no less than 2 articles, containing 16 dispositions and written in 3 pages.


[218]


ANDALIS VS. PULGUERAS59 Phil 643

Date:


FACTS:

The alleged will of Victor Pulgueras was admitted to probate. The testimony of only one to the attesting witnesses was taken. The testimony was: a) that the 6 pages of the will were signed on the margin by the testator and two of the witnesses on January 4, 1931; b) the remaining three pages were signed by the testator and the three attesting witnesses on January 11, 1931, and that the third attesting witness then signed the first six pages.

ISSUE:

Was the will executed properly?

HELD:

Such an execution of the will was not in conformity with the law. Under our statute, the execution of a will is supposed to be one act and cannot be legally effective if the various participants sign on various days and in various combinations of those present.


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MAMERTO GILLESANIA, ET ALvs NICOLAS MENASALVAS, ET AL13 Phil 116


FACTS:

On the 27th day of June, 1903, GracianoFadrigon executed his last will and testament. On the 5th day of November, 1905, the said Fadrigon died. Later the said will was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Antique for probate. The probation of the will was opposed by some of the relatives of the deceased. The opposition seems to be based upon two grounds:

First. That the witnesses who signed the will did not all sign in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other as required by section 618 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions; and

Second. That the said testator was mentally incapable of making said will at the time the same was authorized and made.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will should be admitted to probate

HELD:

An examination of the evidence shows that each of the six persons who signed the said will were examined as witnesses and it appears, beyond peradventure of doubt, that five of the six witnesses signed the said will at the request of the testator, in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other. It is true that one of the witnesses, Mateo Mena, who was the first witness to sign the will, immediately left the room where the will was executed, and did not see the other witnesses sign the said will. We are of the opinion and so hold, that, when three of all the witnesses who signed the will, signed at the request of the testator and in his presence and in the presence of each other, the requirements of the law were thereby complied with. The mere fact that there six witnesses to the said will and that one of them did not see the others sign is not sufficient to invalidate the said will when the other requirements of the law are satisfied.


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YAP TUA vs YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA LLU27 Phil. 579


FACTS:

One Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to probate, as the last will and testament of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased. It appears that the said Tomasa died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said petition and attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez. Said petition, after due notice was given, was brought on for hearing. Timoteo Paez declared that he was 48 years of age; that he had known the said Tomasa; that she had died on the 11th day of August, 1909; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament; that he was present at the time of the execution of the same; that he had signed the will as a witness; that Anselmo and Severo had also signed said will as witnesses and that they had signed the will in the presence of the deceased. Pablo Agustin also declared as a witness and said that he was 40 years of age; that he knew Tomasa during her lifetime; that she died on the 11th day of August, 1909, in the city of Manila; that before her death she had executed a last will and testament; that he was present at the time said last will was executed; that there were also said will. The court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. Gabriel La O accepted said appointment, took the oath of office and entered upon the performance of his duties as guardian ad litem of said parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not decedent complied with the requirements in making a will.

HELD:

Yes. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will. Where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult for the courts to reach conclusions that are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity. Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909.


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In the matter of the estate of REMIGIA SAGUINSINvs.

RUFINA SAGUINSIN41 Phil. 875


FACTS:

There was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance an instrument which the petitioner calls the will of Remigia Saguinsin. It is a manuscript signed by the alleged testatrix and three witnesses on October 3, 1918, these three signature together with that of the alleged testatrix are written also on the left margin of the first page or folio and on the third page or second folio, but not on the second page or reverse side of the first page where, as is seen, the manuscript is continued, the second folio not containing anything but the date and the and of the manuscript.

Under these, conditions the instrument was impugned by a sister of the alleged testatrix and after the taking of the declaration of the authors of the signatures which appear three times and in different parts of the manuscript, the court declared that the document attached to the record could not be allowed as a will. Certain person who allege themselves to be legatees appealed jointly with the lawyer for the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the making of the will complied with the requirements prescribed by law.

HELD:

No, Two pages constitute one leaf. One page represents only one-half of one leaf. The English text requires that the signature which guarantees the genuineness of the testament shall be placed on the left hand margin of each page and that each page should be numbered by letter in the upper part This requirement is entirely lacking on the second page that is, on the reverse side of the first. The first folio and the reverse side, should have been stated, and the second page would then have been included in the citation. By the failure to comply with this requisite the law has been obviously violated. This failure to comply with the law also vitiates the will and invalidates it, as the second page is lacking in authenticity. It may very well be that it was subsequently added thereby substituting the will of the testatrix, a result for the prevention of which this manner of authenticity by affixing the signature on each page and not merely on each folio was provided for by law. This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed with the signature of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.


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AVERA vs. GARCIA.G.R. No. 15566

September 14, 1921

Topic/ Doctrines: Forms of Will

FACTS:

In proceedings in the court below, instituted by Eutiquia Avera for probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia, contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date appointed for the hearing, the proponent of the will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified - with details not necessary to be here specified - that the will was executed with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the will. When the proponent rested the attorney for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimony tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so debilitated as to be unable to comprehend what he was about. After the cause had been submitted for determination upon the proof thus presented, the trial judge found that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memory and that the will had been properly executed. He accordingly admitted the will to probate. law library

ISSUE:

a. whether or not a will can be admitted to probate, where opposition is made, upon the proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two;

b. whether or not the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.

HELD:

a. When the petitioners for probate of a will is contested the proponent should introduce all three of the attesting witnesses, if alive and within reach of the process of the court; and the execution of the will cannot be considered sufficiently proved by the testimony of only one, without satisfactory explanation of the failure to produce the other two.

b. A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirement of existing law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses appear in the right margin instead of the left.

Fernandez, Elaine JoyLLB III-B

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NAYVE vs. MOJALG.R. No. L-21755

December 29, 1924


FACTS:

This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased. The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the objections to the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding that the document in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law. From this judgment the opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court allowing the will to probate and overruling their opposition. The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only side of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the margin, left side of the reader.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid for: (a) not having been signed by the testator and the witnesses on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the document not being paged with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other.

HELD:

a. The rule laid down in that case is that the document contained the necessary signatures on each page, whereby each page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded against any possible alteration. In that case, the validity of the will was sustained, and consequently it was allowed to probate.

b. paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.

c. attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the will; but when, as in the case before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there can be no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will from being unduly increased or decreased.

d. The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is

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expressly stated in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the mere examination of the document, although it does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.


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MARTIR vs. MARTIRG.R. No. 46995June 21, 1940


FACTS:

On December 22, 1936, Hermogenes Martir filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros for the probate of the will of his deceased father, Hilarion Martir, the document being then identified as Exhibit AA. The said document appears to have been prepared by attorney and notary public, Esteban H. Korral, in the Visayan dialect, with one original and two carbon copies. On August 14, 1935, the will was signed by said testator and the three attesting witnesses: Valeriano Gatuslao, Dionisio Gonzaga, and Olimpio de la Rama. It was decided that one of the witnesses read the will to the testator, and for this purpose Dionisio Gonzaga was selected. This was done. After the reading to the document the testator wrote on the space immediately beneath the last paragraph of the instrument on page 3, the following: "Murcia, Occidental Negros - Agosto 14. 1935." This addition in the handwriting of the testator appears both in the original Exhibit AA and in the carbon copy Exhibit AA-1. The testator than proceeded to sign the original on the left margin of the four pages and at the foot of its body over his typewritten name and surname on page 3 thereof in the presence of the above-named attesting witnesses. Then the witnesses, one after another and in the presence of the testator and of each other. signed each and every one of the four pages on the left margin, Olimpio de la Rama also signing at the foot of the attestation clause on page 3, and Valeriano Gatuslao and Dionisio Gonzaga likewise affixed their signatures at the foot of the same clause, but, for lack of conveniently sufficient space on page 3, on the upper part of page 4. Below the signatures of the witnesses Gatuslao and Gonzaga on the upper part of page 4 there appears a "Nota" over the signature of the testator containing certain instruction to his children. Under this note appears the declaration signed by the oppositor Salvacion Angela expressing conformity to the conditions set forth above.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library. On January 26, 1937, an opposition was entered to the probate of this will by Salvacion Angela, daughter of the testator. The opposition was amended on February 12, 1937, alleging as principal grounds that the will was not executed and signed by the witnesses in accordance with law; that the signatures of the testator were obtained through deceit and fraud and that undue influence was used by the proponent Hermogenes Martir over the testator. After hearing, the trial court allowed the will to probate and, as stated, confirmed the appointment of Hermogenes Martir as executor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will is valid because: ( a) the first sheet is not numbered as required by law; ( b) Arabic numerals, instead of letters, were used in the pagination of the other sheets of the will.

HELD:

a. The first sheet of the will bears no number and the oppositor claims that this circumstance is fatal to its validity. The authenticity of this unnumbered page, however, is not questioned, nor the genuineness of the signatures of the testator of the witnesses on this sheet. There is no suggestion either that the

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deceased had executed another will either before or after the execution of the controverted will. The principal object of the requirement with reference to the numeration of the pages of the will is to forestall any attempt to suppress or substitute any of the pages thereof. In the absence of collusion or fraud and there being no question regarding the authenticity of the first page and the genuineness of the signatures appearing thereon, we hold that the mere fact that the first, sheet is unnumbered is not sufficient to justify the invalidation of the will.

b. The opposition to the attestation clause is based on two grounds: (1) the statement of the attestation clause that the will consists of four pages when it is written on sheet and (2) the said clause does not recite that the testator signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses. An examination, however, of Exhibit AA shows that the will really consists of four pages, the first page bearing no number and the other three pages correlatively numbered in Arabic numerals. The attestation clause as follows:“This will is composed of four pages and had been made and published by Hilarion Martir who was the testator therein named, and that will was signed at the foot and on the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of the said witnesses.” We are of the opinion that when the witnesses certified in the attestation clause that the same was signed in their presence, they could not probably refer to another person than the testator himself.


[227]


VILLAFLOR vs. TOBIASG.R. No. L-27440

December 24, 1927


FACT:

This is an appeal from the judgment denying a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one Gregoria Villaflor who died in the municipality of Santo Domingo, Province of Ilocos Sur on October 7, 1925. The petition was presented by Jose Villaflor, one of the testamentary heirs of the deceased. Pilar Villaflor, Deogracias Tobias, and several others whose names do not appear in the record, contested the will upon the following grounds: (1) That it was not signed by the alleged testatrix personally though she was able to do so at the time of the execution of the document; (2) that said testatrix did not authorize any one to sign the alleged will in her name; (3) that both before and after the execution of the document, Gregoria Villaflor signed various documents by thumb marks; (4) that although it is true that the testatrix requested that the will be prepared, she nevertheless refused to sign it because it was contrary to her desires and instructions; (5) that subsequent to the date upon which the alleged will was executed, Gregoria Villaflor on several occasions stated that it was not her testament; (6) that the alleged will was not executed or signed in conformity of the law.

ISSUE:


HELD:

That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page and not on the last page of the body of the document is, in our opinion, a matter of minor importance and is explained by the fact that if the clause had been written on the eight page of the will in direction continuation of the body thereof, there would have been sufficient space on that page for the signatures of the witnesses to the clause. It is also to be observed that all of the pages, including that upon which the attestation clause is written, bear the signatures of all the witnesses and that there is no question whatever as to the genuineness of said signatures. Held, that is these circumstances the writing of the attestation clause on a separate page did not invalidate the will and that the writing of the name of the testatrix by another person at her request was in sufficient compliance with the law.

Fernandez, Elaine Joy

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LLB III-B

NAYVE vs MOJALG.R. No. L-21755

December 29, 1924

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Wills- If the page of the will are numbered by Arabic numerals, there is sufficient compliance with the statutory requirement.

FACTS:

This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively, of the deceased. The Court of First Instance of Albay, which tried the case, overruled the objections to the will, and ordered the probate thereof, holding that the document in controversy was the last will and testament of Antonio Mojal, executed in accordance with law. From this judgment the opponents appeal, assigning error to the decree of the court allowing the will to probate and overruling their opposition.The will in question, Exhibit A, is composed of four sheets with written matter on only side of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4," successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of the reader, but the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page, the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the margin, left side of the reader.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the fact that the sheets of the document are not paged with letters invalidate the will

HELD:

No. Where this court held that paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.

FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V. LLB III-B

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SAÑO vs QUINTANAG.R. No. L-24556

December 18, 1925

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will- Under the rule of strict interpretation, the contents of the attestation clause were mandatory, and noncompliance therewith invalidated the will.

FACTS:

The judgment appealed from allowed the probate of the will of the deceased Victoria Quintana executed on March 22, 1924. Without going into discussion of the points raised by the parties as to the formalities of this will we find a sufficient reason for reversing the judgment appealed from and denying the probate thereof. In the attestation clause there is no statement that the witnesses to the will have signed on the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of the testatrix. Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. 2645, provides that he attestation clause shall state the fact that the testator signed the will and all the pages thereof, or caused another persons to place his name thereon at his expressed direction in the presence of the three witnesses to the will, and that the latter signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure of the instrumental witnesses to state one or some of the essential facts, which according to law, must be stated in the attestation clause, would be fatal to the validity of the will

HELD:

Yes. In the case of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405), this court has held that the requirement that the attestation clause must contain the statement that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other is imperative and non-comfort in said case in support of this doctrine may be adduced for holding that the will is also null and void when in the attestation clause it does not appear that the witnesses to the will signed it and every page thereof on the left margin and in the presence of the testatrix. In order to insure the authenticity of a will, which is the object of the law, it is just as important, if not the most important, that the witnesses should sign in the presence of the testator and of each other.

FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V. LLB-IIIB

[230]


GUMBAN vs GORECHOG.R. No. L-26135

March 3, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will- Under the rule of strict interpretation, the contents of the attestation clause were mandatory, and noncompliance therewith invalidated the will.

FACTS:

This is an appeal by the widow, Inocencia Gorecho, and eighteen other opponents, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo probating the document presented by Petronilo Gumban as the last will and testament of the deceased Eustaquio Hagoriles. Among the errors assigned is included the finding of the trial court that the alleged will was prepared in conformity with the law, notwithstanding it did not contain an attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will. In the case of Saño vs. Quintana, supra, it was decided that an attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. The case of Uy Coque vs. Sioca, supra, was cited, but the case ofNayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, was not mentioned. In contrast, is the decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar,supra, wherein it was held that the attestation clause must state the fact that the testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. It was also held that the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate the will.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure to contain an attestation clause stating that the testator and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will invalidate the will

HELD:

Yes. The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law of the case is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same Code, as unamended. It is part provided in section 618, as amended, that"No will. . .shall be valid. . .unless. . . ." It is further provided in the same section that "The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." Codal section 634 provides that " The will shall be disallowed in either of the following cases: 1. If not executed and attested as in this Act provided." The law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention. It is not within the province of the courts to disregard the legislative purpose so emphatically and clearly expressed. We adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Saño vs. Quintana, supra, and, to the extent necessary, modify the decision in the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra.

FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V.

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LLB-IIIB

QUINTO vs MORATAG.R. No. L-31732

February 19, 1930

Topic/Doctrine: Forms of Will - Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, "A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the statutes."

FACTS:

The application for probate was filed on October 26, 1928 by Carmen Quinto, executrix of said will. It was a joint and mutual will of Gregorio Pueblo and his said wife Carmen Quinto and contained a provision that the surviving spouse shall take charge of the properties therein described and that they shall pass to the heirs and legatees at the time of the death of the surviving spouse. To said application an opposition was filed by Mateo Pueblo, a brother of the deceased, on the following grounds: (1) That the attestation clause of said will does not state the number of pages of which the will is composed, and (2) that the attestation clause does not state that each and every page of the will was signed by the testators in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter signed the same in the presence of the testators and in the presence of each other. Upon the issue thus raised, and after hearing the evidence, the court rendered a judgment denying the petition on the ground that the attestation clause did not state that the witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testators, or that both the testators and the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of each other. From the judgment the petitioner appealed .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court committed an error in denying the application of the petitioner for the probate of the will of the deceased Gregorio Pueblo

HELD:

No. In the case of Saño vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that "an attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such defect annuls the will." This doctrine was restated and reaffirmed in the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30).

FLORENDO, KATHERINE GAY V. LLB-IIIB

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Diaz v. De LeonG.R. No. 17714May 31, 1922

Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will

FACTS:

Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.

ISSUE:

WON there was a valid revocation of the will?

HELD:

Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.


[233]


TIMBOL VS. MANALOG.R. No. L-2696

May 5, 1906

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Dispositions

FACTS:

On the 17th of May, 1898, Adolfo Garcia Feijoo, a resident attorney and notary public, by request of the party interested was called to the house of Sixto Timbolfor the purpose of taking the acknowledgment of Cesarea Manalo y Manalo, the mother of the plaintiff, Sixto Timbol, to her last will and testament which contained wherein she named the said Sixto Timbol as one of her heirs. Timbol was also appointed as executor of the said will, without bond, and given full power to do all things necessary in connection with the execution of its provisions, the testatrix declaring that any prior or subsequent will executed by her which did not comply with the legal requirements should be considered null and void. The will in question was attested by the witnesses Eugenio Ayuyao, Ignacio Sugay, and Pablo Torres. Sugay interpreted the will into Pampango and Torres signed the will at the request of the testatrix who could not write.Counsel for Januaria, Alejandra, Lino Lacson, and Sinforoso Manalo objected to its being admitted to probate, alleging that the will was not executed in accordance of the law.

ISSUE:

WON the said will was executed in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code?

HELD:

Yes. The will in question seems to have been executed in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code — that is, in the presence of a notary public and in the presence of three competent witnesses, residents of the same place, who saw the testatrix, witnessed the execution of the will, and understood everything she said to the notary public in regard to her last will. The will further contains the place, year, month, day, and hour of its execution and it recited therein that after being drawn up it was read to the testatrix in the presence of the witnesses, by one of whom it was interpreted to her; that one of the witnesses signed for the testatrix because she was unable to sign her name; that the will was executed at one time, without interruption; that the notary was acquainted with the testatrix; that she has legal capacity to execute the same, she being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties, and that all the other solemnities required by law in the execution of wills were complied with.


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LIPANA VS. CFIG.R. No. 47174June 28, 1940

Topic/Doctrine: Testamentary Disposition

FACTS:

One Eliodora Lipana filed in the respondent court an application for the probate of a will supposedly executed by the deceased, Manuela Lipana, a carbon copy of which was attached to the application. Natividad Lipana filed an opposition, and her "oposicion supletoria" she claimed that evidence was unnecessary upon the facts alleged in the application, the copy of the will attached thereto showing, in itself, that the will had not been executed in accordance with law. The respondent court, after inspecting the copy of the will but without a hearing, dismissed the application on the ground that such copy could not be admitted to probate, it not having been signed by the testatrix and the attesting witnesses at the end thereof and on the left margin of each page. It is against this order of dismissal that the petition for certiorari has been filed with this court.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction?

HELD:

Yes. There can be no doubt that the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in rendering a judgment upon the merits of the case without a previous hearing. The pronouncement made by the respondent court that the will had not been executed in accordance with law, is founded undoubtedly on the erroneous assumption that the probate of the carbon copy of the will was being applied for, It is apparent from the application that what is sought to be admitted to probate is the original of the will. Such copy was attached to the application merely to corroborate the allegation as to the existence of its original and not to establish a full compliance with the requirements of the law as to the execution of the will. Such requirements are alleged in the application to have been complied with and may proved at the hearing.


[235]


Gago vs. MamuyacG.R. No. L-26317January 29, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: Revocation of a will

FACTS:

Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

ISSUE:

WON there was a valid revocation of the will

HELD:

Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.


[236]


BALUYUT vs. PAÑOG.R. No. L-42088

May 7, 1976

Topic/Doctrine: Section 4-Executors and Administrators

FACTS:

Sotero Baluyut died in Manila on January 6, 1975 at the age of eighty-six. On February 20 of the same year, his nephew, Alfredo G. Baluyut, filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City a verified petition for letters of administration. He alleged that the deceased was survived by his widow, Encarnacion Lopez, who was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Alfredo surmised that the decedent had executed a will. He prayed that he be appointed regular administrator and in the meantime as special administrator.

On February 24, 1975, the lower court appointed Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator with a bond of P100,000.

The deceased’s surviving spouse alleged that she was unaware that her deceased husband executed a will and characterized as libelous the allegation of Alfredo Baluyut as to her mental incapacity. She prayed that she be named administratrix and that the appointment of Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrator be set aside.

On March 24, 1975, the lower court cancelled Baluyut's appointment as special administrator and its order noted that after asking Mrs. Baluyut a series of questions while on the witness stand, it found that she "is healthy and mentally qualified".

Alfredo G. Baluyut moved for the reconsideration of that order. On March 31, 1975 appointed Baluyut and Jose Espino as special administrators.

On November 12, 1975 Mrs. Baluyut filed an urgent motion praying that she be appointed administratrix. which was opposed by Alfredo G. Baluyut

Alfredo G. Baluyut opposed the urgent motion. He alleged that Espino was not a natural child of Sotero Baluyut because Espino's parents were the spouses Elino Espino and Josefa de Guzman. Alfredo further alleged that Mrs. Baluyut was declared an incompetent by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City in its order of September 25, 1975 in Special Proceeding No. QC-00939 for the guardianship of Mrs. Baluyut. That proceeding was instituted by her sisters, Cristeta Lopez Vda. de Cuesta and Guadalupe Lopez-Viray.

At the hearing of Mrs. Baluyut's urgent motion on November 17, 1975 no oral and documentary evidence was presented. The lower court merely examined Mrs. Baluyut.

On November 27, 1975, the appointments of Espino and Alfredo G. Baluyut as special administrators was terminated and Mrs. Baluyut was then appointed as regular administratrix with a bond of P20,000. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE:

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The issue is whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court has held that, while the probate court correctly assumed that Mrs. Baluyut as surviving spouse enjoys preference in the granting of letters of administration (Sec. 6[a), Rule 78, Rules of Court), it does not follow that she should be named administratrix without conducting a full-dress hearing on her competency to discharge that trust.

Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered him unfit for that position.

Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a chance to contest the petition.

The court did not give Alfredo G. Baluyut a chance to contest her qualifications. He had squarely raised the issue as to her competency. The probate court assumed that Alfredo G. Baluyut had no interest in the decedent's estate.

Moreover, it is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy (Art. 838, Civil Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249).

Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in the interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs. Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

The lower court departed from the usual course of probate procedure in summarily appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix on the assumption that Alfredo G. Baluyut was not an interested party. That irregularity became more pronounced after Alfredo G. Baluyut's revelation that the decedent had executed a will. He anticipated that development when he articulated in his petition his belief that Sotero Baluyut executed wills which should be delivered to the court for probate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of November 27, 1975 appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix is set aside. The letters of administration granted to her are cancelled. The probate court is directed to conduct further proceedings in consonance with the guidelines delineated in this decision. Costs against respondent Mrs. Baluyut.

JAAFAR, KAIZERLLB III-B

[238]


MANG-OY VS CAG.R.144 SCRA 35

SEPTEMBER 12, 1986

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 8-Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his first wife. Upon her death, he took himself a second wife but without issues. However she had adopted 2 children according to the practice of Igorots. On September 4, 1937, Old Tumpao executed what he called “last will and testament which were read to and thumb mark affixed by all of the beneficiaries who at the time were already occupying the portions respectively allotted to them. After the death of Old Tumpao, the parties remained to be in possession of the lots assign to them which was in accordance of the wishes of old Tumpao which was also agreed upon by the parties in a public document.

On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an extra-judicial partition in which they divided the property of Old Tumpao among the three of them only. Petitioners sued for reconveyance , sustained by trial court but reversed by CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the “ will and testament” of Old Tumpao be duly allowed even without being proved in the court

RULING:

In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed in court.

However the document maybe sustained by art 1056 of the Old Civil Code which was the law in force at the time the document was made. The law says: “If the testator should make a partition of his properties by an act inter vivors, or by will such partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.”

Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or donation inter vivos, which is a consequence of its special nature. Thus, the last will and testament of Old Tumpao is sustained by the provision of Art 1056, Old Civil Code, which became a binding law when the beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and confirmed with the disposition made by Old Tumpao.


[239]


MANINANG v CA114 SCRA 478June 19, 1982

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 3-Forms of Wills

FACTS:

Clemencia Aseneta, single, died and left a holographic will saying that all her real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all her personal properties shall be inherited by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family she have lived with.- Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the CFI.- Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.- The two cases were ordered consolidated.- Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.- The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case. MR denied. Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before CA.

ISSUE:

WON the Courta quoa quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case.

HELD:

YES. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.- The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.- Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.- By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable

[240]



Cayetano v. LeonidasG.R. No. L-54919

May 30, 1984

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 3-Forms of Wills GENERAL RULE: Limited jurisdiction of the probate court EXCEPTION: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will

be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.

FACTS:

Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving Hermogenes Campos (father) and her sisters, Nenita Paguia, Remedios Lopez, and Marieta Medina as the surviving heirs. As the only compulsory heir is Hermogenes, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication, adjudicating unto himself the entire estate of Adoracion.

Later that same year, Nenita filed a petition for reprobate of a will, alleging among others that Adoracion was an American citizen and that the will was executed in teh US. Adoracion died in Manila while temporarily residing in Malate.

While this case was still pending, Hermogenes died and left a will, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix. Hence, this case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the will was valid

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over probate proceedings

HELD:

As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issues.

In this case, it was sufficiently established that Adoracion was an American citizen and the law which governs her will is the law of Pennsylvania, USA, which is the national law of the decedent.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, the national law of the decedent must apply.

[241]


As to the issue of jurisdiction:

The settlement of estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, USA and not a usual resident of Cavite.

Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.


[242]


De Guzman vs. AngelesNo. L-78590. June 20, 1988

Topic/Doctrine:Before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated.

Facts:

On March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro Manila. At the time of his death, the decedent was a resident of Makati, Metro Manila. He left personal and real properties as part of his estate. These properties were acquired after the marriage of the private respondent to the decedent and therefore are included in their conjugal partnership. His estate has a probable net value which may be provisionally assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less. The possible creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable. and existing claims against the firm — C. SANTOS Construction are also listed. The compulsory heirs of the decedent are the surviving spouse and their two (2) minor children namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman 11 years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years old. A diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent left a last will and testament, none has been found and according to the best knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died intestate and the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the decedent, is most qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of administration.

The private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) — vehicles registered under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent must have the possession of said vehicles in order to preserve the assets of her late husband.

The private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Her as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman." When the motion was set, no notice of the order was given to the petitioner. The lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be appointed as special administratrix.

The petitioner contends that the order is a patent nullity, the respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks, as mandated by the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

[243]


[244]


Held:

Before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of the properties left by a deceased person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the petition after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.

Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to annulment.

In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.

Jajurie, Fatima BadriaLLB III-B

[245]


Salazar vs CFINo. 45642.

September 25, 1937

Topic/Doctrine:A Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when it is shown by evidence before it: (1) That a person has died leaving a will; (2) in the case of a resident of this country, that he died in the province where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction; (3) in the case of a nonresident, that he has left a estate in the province where the court is situated and (4) that the testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to the court and is in the possession thereof.

Facts:The petitioner instituted special proceeding No. 3109 in the court of First Instance of Laguna and, in the petition filed by him, prayed for the probate of the will allegedly made on May 13, 1924, by his deceased mother Damiana Capistrano, who died in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, on December 21, 1936. The petition was opposed by the respondent Sabina Rivera, who filed a pleading entitled "Opposition and Counter-Petition." In her pleading the respondent, after opposing the probate of said will for the reasons stated therein, prayed for the probate of the will of the deceased alleged made on May 11, 1930, copy of which was attached thereto, and for the issuance, to that effect, of the order setting the hearing thereof and directing such publications as required by law. The court denied the motion for publication and ordered the respondent to institute another proceeding and apply separately for the probate of the alleged will. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and the court, on March 31, 19937, issued an order setting aside the former one and directing that the will presented by the respondent be set for hearing, that the publications required by law be made and that said will be heard jointly with the will presented by the petitioner in the same proceeding instituted by the latter. Sometime later, the court ordered that the expenses for the publications made in the newspapers be defrayed by the respondent. The petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration which were denied and, finally, instituted this certiorari proceeding. In order that the hearing and publications ordered by the court may be carried out, the respondent, on July 20, 1937, deposited P24 and filed the original of the will the probate of which had been sought by her.

Issue:Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the counter-petition for the probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing of said will to be held in the same proceeding jointly with the first will.

Held:According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that the court has acquired jurisdiction to probate the second will, presented by the respondent, in view of the presence of all the jurisdictional facts. The respondent's counter-petition should, in this case, be considered as a petition for the probate of the second will, the original of which was filed by her

[246]


on July 20, 1937. The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to be rendered by him in connection with the probate of the second will and for the successive proceedings to be conducted and orders to be issued, in accordance with section 788, as amended, is not jurisdictional in the sense that its omission does not deprive the court of its authority to proceed with the probate of a will, as expressly provided for by section 630. It is the inevitable duty of the court, when a will' is presented to it, to appoint hearing for its allowance and to cause notices thereof to be given by publication. The duty imposed by said section is imperative and non-compliance therewith would be a mockery at the law and at the last will of the testator.


[247]


United States vs GuimcoNo. 12184.

September 27, 1917

Topic/Doctrine:A court cannot make a valid order committing a person to jail for failure to produce the will of a deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure except when acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons.

Facts:

The testator, Joaquin Cruz, having executed his will, confided it to the keeping of Chiu Guimco, one of the executors named therein. After the death of the testator this Chiu Guimco failed to present the instrument to the court within the time provided by law; and a criminal prosecution was thereupon instituted against him under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice and make the order in question under section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the course so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.

Chiu Guimco appealed to this Court to reverse the judgment of the Court of First Instance.

Issue:

Whether or not a court may make an order committing a person to jail for failure to produce the will of a deceased person, pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Held:

No. It is in the opinion of this court that this provision can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require that there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under this section appropriate.

The proceedings in this case, under section 628 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, is an ordinary criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that section (628) is a special statutory offense and is properly prosecuted upon complaint or information as other criminal offenses created by law. The fact that this penal provision is contained in the Code of Civil Procedure does not make the proceeding to enforce the penalty a civil proceeding in any sense. The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is evidently a totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628; and it is in our opinion not permissible in a prosecution under the last mentioned section to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed in section 629.


[248]


De Aranz vs. GalingNo. L-77047

May 28, 1988

Topic/Doctrine:Civil Law; Wills and Succession; The requirement of the law for the allowance of will was not satisfied by mere publication of notice of hearing; Notice of hearing to the designated heirs, legatees and devisees, required.

Facts:private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees the probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the probate court. On appeal, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will. Petitioners allege that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is mandatory and its omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion

Issue:Whether or not personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will

Held:Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and

[249]


devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator, But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.


[250]


Paras Vs NarcisoG.R. No. 10959

November 2, 1916

Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

FACTS:

An appeal denying probate of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased named Mariano Magsino, on the ground that the signature thereto was forged; and that the instrument had been prepared and signed by the witnesses after the death of the alleged testator. The alleged error in the admission of certain testimony as to the handwriting of the deceased, the appellant’s assignment of errors deals exclusively with alleged errors of the trial court in accepting as true or declining to believe the testimony of certain witnesses. The trial judge saw and heard these witnesses testify, and there is nothing in the record which would justify us in disturbing his findings as to the respective credibility or lack of credibility of the various witnesses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not certain witnesses who testified as to the genuineness of certain signatures of the deceased were properly qualified as handwriting experts.

HELD:

The genuineness of the signatures in question was duly established in the manner and form prescribed in section 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and, indeed, these signatures appear to have been admitted in evidence as genuine signatures of the deceased without objection by the appellant. In like manner the other matters testified to by the alleged handwriting experts appear to have been established by other evidence in the record, and it is quite clear from the opinion filed by the trial judge that he relied rather on his own opinion, after comparison of the undoubtedly genuine signature of the deceased with the signature attached to the alleged will as authorized in the section of the Code of Civil Procedure just mentioned, rather than upon the statements of the alleged experts. It is to be observed further that the judgment of the court below, denying probate to the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of Mariano Magsino, deceased, was based on the evidence introduced at the hearing on the probate proceedings. That evidence, as we have said, fully sustains the findings of the probate judge that this instrument is not the last will and testament of the deceased.

JAUHARI, SITTI BERKIS E.LLB-3B

[251]


Asinas Vs CFI G.R. No. L-29038

March 10, 1928


FACTS:

An application for the probate of what purports to be the will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas, a resident of the municipality of Looc of the Province of Romblon was filed in the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Opposition was entered to said application by the respondent Felisa Asinas, alleging that she is an acknowledged natural daughter of Mauricio Asinas, and by Justo Asinas, brother of said deceased. In view of the fact that the petitioner Catalina Asinas denied Felisa Asinas' right to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of said alleged will.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in authorizing Felisa Asinas to intervene in the proceeding for the probate of the alleged will of the deceased Mauricio Asinas and the administration of his estate.

HELD:

The Court of First Instance does not exceed its probate jurisdiction in authorizing one claiming to be an acknowledged natural child of a decedent to intervene in the probate of the alleged will of said decedent, upon presentation of prima facie evidence of such civil status. Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in requiring the publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, for three consecutive weeks, of the date fixed by the competent court for the probate of a will, in order to afford all those interested an opportunity to appear and oppose said probate, does not specify who are the interested parties who may appear, nor what proof they must submit to show such interest. A person alleging an interest in opposing the probate of a will as an acknowledged natural daughter need not conclusively prove the existence of such a civil status, or that such status has been judicially declared; it is sufficient that there be prima facie evidence to that effect.


[252]


Rodelas v. AmparoG.R. No. L-58509

December 7, 1982


FACTS:

Petitioner-appellant filed a petition with the CFI-Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes, Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. With the several grounds of their opposition that the appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator. That the alleged copy of the will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect. That the original must be presented and not the copy thereof and lastly the deceased did not leave any will. The appellees also moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the will.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of photostatic copy.

HELD:

Yes. A photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam V. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeograped or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.


[253]


Limpin vs Yalung G.R. No. L-19077 January 23, 1923

Topic/Doctrine: In relation to Allowance and Disallowance of Wils

FACTS:

The first error assigned by the appellant to the order of probate of the alleged will of Genoveva Yalung, which is the subject-matter of this proceeding is made to consist, among other things, in that all the witnesses who attested said will were not called to testify. That is really the fact.

HELD:

Of course three attesting witnesses, only two testified at the hearing of the case, Cirilo Lacsamana not having done so, notwithstanding that said will was contested. It is a rule well settled and adopted by the courts and applied by this court in the case of Cabang vs. Delfinado (34 Phil., 291), that "the attesting witnesses required by statute must be called to prove a contested will or a showing must be made that they cannot be had." The applicant has not shown that the witness Cirilo Lacsamana could not be found, nor is there any circumstance whatever in the record satisfactorily accounting for the proponent's omission to introduce his testimony as evidence. We deem it unnecessary to examine the other points raised by the appellant, the one above indicated being sufficient for the purposes of this decision. The order appealed from is reversed, and it is ordered that the record be remanded to the court of origin for the holding of a new trial whereat the applicant shall have opportunity to complete her evidence, and the opponent to rebut what may be offered, it being understood that the evidence already introduced by both parties shall subsist, without special pronouncement as to costs.


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ESCUIN v ESCUIN11 PHIL 332

September 24, 1908

Topic/Doctrine: PRETERITION

FACTS:

On the 19th of January, 1899, Emilio Antonio Escuin de los Santos executed a will before a notary public of Sevilla, Spain, stating therein that he was a native of Cavite, the son Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, the latter being deceased; thathe was married about six months previously to Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon, and thathe had no lawful descendants; the testator, however, stated in clause three of his will,that in case he has a duly registered successor, his child would be his sole anduniversal heir; but that if, as would probably be the case, there should be no suchheir, then in clause four he named his said father Francisco Escuin, and his wife Maria Teresa Ponce de Leon and his universal heirs, they to divide the estate in equal sharesbetween them.- The testator died on the 20th of January, 1899- Upon the will having been admitted to probate, commissioners were appointed toconsider claims against the estate- On the 10th and 12th of July 1907, the attorney for the widow, Ponce de Leon, andthe attorneys who represented the guardian to the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac,a p p e a l e d t o t h e C o u r t o f F i r s t I n s t a n c e f r o m t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e a f o r e s a i d commissioners.- I t a p p e a r s i n t h e p r o p o s e d p a r t i t i o n t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e administrator by whom it was signed in the result of the proceedings, the property leftby the estator, in accordance with the accounts passed upon by the court, amountedto P8,268.02- From said sum the following must be deducted the credit alluded to be admitted bythe commissioners, 10% remuneration due to the administrator, all legal expensespaid and approved. Deducting the abovementioned amounts, there remains abalance of P5,014.81.- The partition and adjudication was proceeded with of the sum of P5,014.81 intothree shares of P1,671.60 to each one of the parties in interest, that is, the naturalson, Emilio Escuin y Batac, in full control as general heir; the widow, Teresa Ponce deLeon, as legatee of one-half of the two-thirds of the funds of free disposition; and thesaid widow the usufruct of the other half of the aforesaid two-thirds of free disposition,the bare ownership of the last third held in usufruct by the widow being adjudicated toFrancisco Escuin, as legatee taking into account the provisions of article 817 of theCivil Code upon making the division.- The representative of the minor natural child of the testator objected in writing tothe partition proposed by the administrator, and for the reasons he set forth asked t h a t t h e s a m e b e d i s a p p r o v e d , a n d t h a t i n l i e u t h e r e o f t h e e n t i r e e s t a t e b e adjudicated to Emilio Escuin y Batac, the said minor.- It was also presented that in a certified proceeding, plaintiff asked on the 12th of January, 1905, that an allowance be granted to him for subsistence for account of the estate of the late testator, Emilio Escuin de los Santos, and that the same be paid him monthly in advance; that judgment be entered declaring that the minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is a natural child of the testator; that the said minor, as the only natural son of the same is his general heir; that it be held that the said testator had died without either lawful ascendants or descendants; that the designation of heirs made under his a b o v e -m e n t i o n e d w i l l b e d e c l a r e d n u l l a n d v o i d ; a n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s b e sentenced to pay the costs in case they did not conform to the complaint, with any further remedy that the court might consider just and equitable.- The administrator, Ricardo Summers, in answer to the complaint denied all and every one of the facts alleged in all and every one of its paragraphs.- The court below found that Escuin y Batac was the recognized natural child of the late Emilio Escuin

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de los Santos, had by Julia Batac; that the testator was also the natural son of the defendant Francisco Escuin and Eugenia de los Santos, and was recognized by his father; and that the plaintiff minor, Emilio Escuin y Batac, is one of the heirs of the late testator.- By an order of the lower court, the judge expressed an opinion that a natural child is only entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary property, the clause in the will being annulled only in so far as the amount to be divided should be reduced, taking into account the share due to the natural son and the right of the father and the widow of the testator, each to one-half of the remainder of the property of the estate.

ISSUE:

1. WON there was preterition

2. WON the testator could be considered to have died intestate

HELD:

1. YES There is preterition to 1/3 of the estate, which amount constitutes the legal portion of a natural child; and for the reason that mino9r was ignored in the will, the designationof heirs made therein was, as a matter of fact annulled by force of law, insofar as thelegal portion of the said minor was thereby impaired. Legacies, and betterments shallbe valid, insofar as they are not illegal, for the reason that a testator cannot deprivethe heirs of their legal portions, express in the cases expressly indicated by law.

2. NO. Notwithstanding the fact that the said designation of heirs was annulled and that thelaw recognizes the title of the minor, Escuin y Batac, to one-third of the property of hisnatural father, as his lawful and general heir, it is not proper to assert that the lateEmilio Escuin de los Santos died intestate in order to establish the conclusion that hissaid natural recognized child is entitled to succeed to the entire estate under theprovisions of article 939 of the Civil Code, inasmuch in accordance with the law acitizen may die partly testate and partly intestate (art. 764, Civil Code). It is clear andunquestionable that it was the wish of the testator to favor his natural father and hiswife with certain portions of his property which, under the law, he had the right to dispose of by will, as he has done, provided the legal portion of his general heir wasnot thereby impaired, the two former persons being considered as legatees under thewill.

Jimenez, May Marie AnnLLB-3B

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Tolentino v FranciscoG.R. No. L-35993

December 19, 1932

Topic/Doctrine: Formalities of a Will

FACTS:

A petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, for the purpose of procuring probate of the will of Gregorio Tolentino. Opposition was made to the probate of the will by Ciriaco Francisco, Natalia Francisco, and Gervasia Francisco. the trial court overruled the opposition, declared the will to have been properly executed, and allowed the probate thereof. From this order the three opponents appealed.

Gregorio Tolentino was had been married to Benita Francisco (predeceased), The pair had no children. Tolentino contemplated leaving his property mainly to these kin of his wife, he had kept a will indicating this desire. However, strained relations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will. To this end, Tolentino went to an attorney Repide and informed him that he wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. Tolentino stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide’s office, with Repide himself as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two witnesses Tolentino requested that two attorneys attached to the office. Tolentino returned to him the draft of the will with certain corrections. Among the changes thus made was the suppression of the names of Monzon, Sunico, and Repide as attesting witnesses, these names being substituted by the names of Jose Syyap, Agustin Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. Tolentino further stated to his attorney that he had arranged with the three intending witnesses to meet at five o’clock in the afternoon of the next day, for the purpose of executing the will.

It is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the consecutive pages of a will, on the typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to the testator himself. Arriving at the place, the three entered the office of Legarda. Tolentino asked Legarda to permit the will to be signed in his office, and to this request Legarda acceded.

Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saying that it was his last will and testament, done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this had been completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will. He then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign the original will and each of its pages by writing his name “G. Tolentino” in the proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed their own respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the act of attestation were present together, and all fully advertent to the solemnity that engaged their attention.

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ISSUE: whether or not the will is valid.

HELD:

Yes. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will rests. (Fernandez vs. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380.) It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law. The order appealed from will therefore be affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.


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NABLE JOSE vs USONG.R. No. L-8927

March 10, 1914

Topic/Doctrine: Codicil

FACTS:

The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the first and second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson.

first, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs."

the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, in each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the property. Among those mentioned specially are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the other and under exactly the same conditions.

The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive at the time the will was made; that the property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that each living sister should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each one- sixth to be divided among said children equally.

appellants asserted that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil above-quoted the property should be divided equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the same share that a sister receives.

ISSUE:

WON the appellants contention is correct.

HELD:

Yes. it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and nieces. the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which, it seems to us, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take under her will be name "so that they must take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."

We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall become the owners of her property on the death of her husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as well as of the sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and the nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us that the testatrix's intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she intended.

Jimenez, May Marie Ann

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LLB-3BACAIN vs IAC

G.R. No. 72706,October 27, 1987

Topic/Doctrine: Preterition

FACTS:

Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.

RULING:

Article 854 of the Civil Code:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prefudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited

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in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.


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Azuela vs. CAGR No. 122880April 12, 2006

Topic/Doctrine: Formal requisites of a Will

Facts:

Will was two pages long. The number of pages were also not stated in the attestation, only a blank was there. The will was not properly acknowledged. (“Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 Hunyo, dito sa Manila.”) The witnesses also did not sign under the attestation clause but on the left hand margin of the page.

Issue:

Is the will valid?

Held:

Invalid will.

Issue of number of pages: no substantial compliance in this case because no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere else in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

Issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause: the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. The attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. They should sign below it.

Issue of not properly acknowledged: contrary to Art 806. Acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. Moreover, will must be acknowledged and not merely subscribed and sworn to. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.


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AUSTRIA VS. HON. ANDRES REYESG.R. No. L-23079

February 27, 1970

Doctrine: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the CivilCode, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false;and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not havemade such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

FACTS:

Basilia Austria vda.de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whom were Basilia’s legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.

It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents as the latter's legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the terms, "sapilitangtagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitangmana" (legitime), the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby, “the statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners’ nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will.

HELD:

NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at other considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate, which largely favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding the respondents from the inheritance,

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considering that petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by final judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full expression to her will must be in order.


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REYES-BARRETO VS. BARRETO-DATUG.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967

Doctrine: If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in thewill, and the testamentary disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime,there is no preterition. There is no total omission, inasmuch as the heir receivedsomething from the inheritance. The remedy is for completion of legitime under Articles 906 and 907.

FACTS:

BibianoBarretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When BibianoBarretto died he left his share in a will to SaludBarretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and FelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered.

Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of SaludBarretto, the LC held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband BibianoBarretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to SaludBarretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of BibianoBarretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it.

HELD:

NO. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late BibianoBarretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not

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be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for BibianoBarretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of BibianoBarretto.

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total omission of a forced heir.


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RESURRECCION VS. JAVIERG.R. No. L-42539October 23, 1936

Doctrine: A legatee should be capacitated to inherit. A person who was already dead not only before the death of the testator but even before the will was madecannot be a legatee/devisee. Principle of representation takes place only in intestate inheritance.

FACTS:

On October 18, 1932, Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband SulpicioResurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The testatrix died on January 22, 1933, and her will was probated on March 8th of said year.

On October 12, 1933, the court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died in August, 1930, even before the testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the fund of the estate.

Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this amount to the funds of the estate.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Gil Francisco Javier is capacitated to be a legatee who was already dead not only before the death of the testatrix but even before the will was made.

2. Whether or not Gil Francisco Javier can be represented by his heirs and entitled to the amount of legacy.

HELD:

1. NO. The testatrix, having no forced heirs, may dispose by will of all her property or any part thereof in favor of any person qualified to acquire it (art. 763, Civil Code). Upon being instituted as legatee by the testatrix, Gil Francisco Javier lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not be the subject of a right (art. 32, Civil Code).

2. NO. Gil Francisco Javier’s institution as a legatee had absolutely no legal effect and his heirs are not now entitled to claim the amount of legacy. They cannot even claim under the principle of representation because this takes place only in intestate inheritance. Furthermore, as the legatee died before the testatrix, he could transmit nothing to his heirs (Art. 766, Civil Code).


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TESTATE ESTATE OF RAMIREZ VS. VDA. DE RAMIREZG.R. No. L-27952

February 15, 1982

Doctrine: Art. 863 of the Civil Code validate a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted." One degree means one generation. The second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir.

FACTS:

The principal beneficiaries of Jose are his widow, his 2 grandnephews and his companion Wanda.The widow is French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain.Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions. Jose, a Filipino, died in Spain with only his widow as compulsory heir. A project partition was submitted wherein one part shall go to the widow and the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez, the grandnephews. It was provided that 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of Wanda. The grandnephews opposed the project of partition and one of the grounds was that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree.

ISSUE:

Whether or not fideicommissary substitution is valid.

HELD:

The fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes are not related to Wanda. The second heir mustbe related to and be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child ora parent of the first heir. Therefore, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:1/2 thereof to his widow as her legitime and 1/2 of the estate which is the free portion goes to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez, the substitutes.


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NATIVIDAD VS. GABINOG.R. No. L-11386March 31, 1917

Doctrine:A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional obligations.

FACTS:

Tiburcio Salvador executed a notarial will and instituted his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion as sole heirs. However, clause six is as follows: “I bequeath to BasiliaGabino, the ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of a house and lot in CalleLavezares… If the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver the same to my grandson Emilio, upon payment of the latter to the former P4,000.00. Executor Emilio presented a project of partition wherein it was stated therein that the clause six should be interpreted as giving the right of usufruct only to Basilia, and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of P4,000 whenever Basilia should die, but that the ownership belongs to Emilio. Basilia, through counsel, opposed claiming ownership over the legacy. The trial judge decided ownership and dominion should be given to legatee Basilia, subject to reservation made in behalf of Lorenzo and Emilio.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a testator can validly imposed a condition on the legacy.

2. Whether or not the testator meant to bequeath to BasiliaGabino the mere usufruct of the property.

HELD:

1. YES. A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and 791.). In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to BasiliaGabino the ownership and dominion of the property therein specified as to its location and other circumstances, on condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the latter.

The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee BasiliaGabino, a perfectly legal condition according to article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said code. The moment the legatee

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Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver the property to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum of P4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these legacies being the voluntary reservation to BasiliaGabino of the ownership of the said house, and the second, the conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador.

2. NO. If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be understood that the testator meant to bequeath to BasiliaGabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable language employed in the said sixth clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or dominion of the said property — language which expresses without the slightest doubt his wishes which should be complied with literally, because it is constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last wills and testaments the testator's will is the law.


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MICIANO vs. BRIMONo. 22595.

November 1, 1924]

Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO LAW; NULLITY OF.—If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the testator’s order that his property be distributed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition is illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the institution unconditional.

Facts:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are: (1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) the denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the deceased’s business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased’s business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of article 10 of the Civil Code.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter. The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error, It is discretionary with the trial court. and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular.

There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force must be complied with.

Issue:

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Whether or not the court erred in approving the scheme of partition of the estate of Joseph G. Brimo?

Held:

No. The approval of the scheme of partition in respect was not erroneous. In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in the will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator’s will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code. And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator’s national law when, according to article 10 of the Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. Gomez vs. North Negros Sugar Co.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator’s national laws.

The orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

Kinang, JezrillLLB III-B

[272]


MACARIO MACROHON ONG HAM vs. JUAN SAAVEDRANo. 27531

December 24, 1927

Topic/Doctrine: SUCCESSION; MIXED SUCCESSION.—A person having executed a will may die partially intestate. The rule of indivisibility of the testator's will is not in force in this jurisdiction.

CONDITIONAL LEGACY; INTESTATE SUCCESSION.—The conditional legatee does not acquire the legacy, if the event on which it depends has not occurred, in which case the legacy will pass to the persons named to succeed the testator in accordance with the law, that is to say, legal or intestate succession will take place as to that legacy.

SUBSTITUTION.—When a will executed jointly by husband and wife provides that in case of the death of the husband before the wife certain relatives will inherit specified property, and if any of said relatives die before the husband the survivor will inherit all, the acquisition of the property by said relatives depends upon the husband's dying before the wife, the last part of said testamentary provision being a substitution of legatees in case some of them die before the husband.

Facts:

Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and executor of the joint last will and testament of Victoriana Saavedra and himself, presented said will for probate, which was ordered by the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in its decree of February 21, 1924.

This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution of the property in accordance with the terms of the joint will, to which Juan Saavedra and others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined insisting upon the approval of the scheme and asking that the opposition of Juan Saavedra and others be overruled.

On March 25, 1926, the parties submitted a statement of facts, which reads as follows:

"1. That Victoriana Saavedra died in the municipality and Province of Zamboanga, P. I., without descendants or ascendants, being at that time married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of them having executed a joint will, which joint will has been duly admitted to probate in this court.

"2. That the only near relations of the said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to inherit her estate are her brothers Juan and Segundo Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josef a Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana Saavedra died intestate, or did not dispose of her property in said will.

"3. That aside from the estate mentioned in the said last will and testament, duly probated by this Honorable Court, there exists another parcel of land, acquired by Ong Ham the year 1920, by purchase from Ong Tah, and adjudicated to the said Ong Ham in Expediente No. 6 (Cadastral).

"Lot No. 3057, with the improvements thereon in favor of the persons named below in the following proportions: Ong Ham, aged 65 years, married to Victoriana Saavedra, 19/20 parts; Crispulo Macoto Cruz, of legal age, 1/40 part; and Juan Mocoto, 1/40 part.

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"4. That the interested parties in this proceeding herewith submit to this Honorable Court the rights of the respective parties in this estate, in accordance with the terms of this joint last will and testament of the spouses, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and of Victoriana Saavedra, deceased.

"5. That the parties representing Macario Macrohon Ong Ham admit that he sold lots Nos. 34 and 35, of Expediente No. 8196, for the sum of P1,900, believing in good faith that he could sell the same for his personal uses.

"6. That the party representing Juan Saavedra, and the other relations heretofore named hereby withdraw their opposition which they have presented to the final account of the surviving spouse, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and conform to the same, and ask that the Court approve the said final account."

The lower court solving the question raised by the parties in their agreement of facts, held that one-half of the property described in the will, all of lot No. 3057, cadastral case No. 6; one-half of the cash balance of the final account to be rendered by the executor, and half of the proceeds of the sale of lots Nos. 34 and 35 of Proceeding No. 8196, belong to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; and as it appears from the will quoted, as well as from the agreement dated March 25, 1926, that Victoriana Saavedra left no legitimate ascendants or descendants at the time of her death, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, her widower, is, according to the provisions of article 837 of the Civil Code, entitled to the usufruct of one-half of the estate of the said Victoriana Saavedra, consisting of onehalf of the property described in the will, excluding lots Nos. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda Saavedra with the consent of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; of one-half of the cash balance of the executor's final account, and of half of the proceeds of the sale of lots Nos. 34 and 35 in proceeding No. 8196, and said estate is adjudicated as f ollows: one-half of the same belongs in usuf ruct to the widower Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and the naked ownership of this half as well as the full ownership of the other half is adjudicated to Victoriana Saavedra's heirs, named in the said agreement dated March 25, 1926, in the following manner: sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in f ull ownership, -to Juan Saavedra; sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, to Segunda Saavedra; and, sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership to Teofilo Saavedra, Manuela Saavedra, Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra and Josefa Saavedra, children of Mateo Saavedra, deceased brother of Victoriana Saavedra, in equal parts; and to Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, daughters of Petrona Saavedra, deceased sister of Victoriana Saavedra, sixteenths of the naked ownership of the one-half in usufruct and sixteenths of the other half in full ownership, in equal parts.

"As regards lots Nos. 817 and 768 of proceeding No. 7880, given to Segunda Saavedra, the court adjudicates the same to the said Segunda Saavedra, in accordance with the clauses on lines 99-111 of the will.

"Finally, the court orders that the executor, after paying the inheritance tax, distribute among Victoriana Saavedra's heirs named in the agreement of March 25, 1926, the part belonging to each of them as hereinabove stated, and after this delivery is made and the inheritance tax, if any, is paid, this proceeding is to be considered closed ipso facto."

Counsel for the executor appealed from this decision and assigns in his brief the following alleged errors as committed by the lower court:

"I. In holding in its auto, of November 26, 1926, that the deceased, Victoriana Saavedra, died partially intestate, and did not dispose of all her' property by the joint last will and testament executed by herself and her husband, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and in not finding that under the terms of the aforesaid

[274]


joint will the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, named therein, were entitled to receive her estate and participation in the sixteen parcels of land devised under the said joint will, by the said spouses.

"II. In holding that the brother and the sister of Victoriana Saavedra, by name, Juan Saavedra and Segunda Saavedra, and her nephews and nieces, by name, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuela Saavedra, Victoriano Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion Carpio and Macra Carpio, her next of kin were entitled to receive any part of her estate and participation in the said sixteen parcels of land, devised to the above named legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint last will and testament."

According to this, there are three ways in which succession may be effected: by the will of man, by the law, or by both at the same time. In the first case the succession is called testamentary, because it is based on the last will and testament, which is the orderly manifestation of the testator's will; in the second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by operation of the law; and the third is called mixed, because it partakes of the character of both testamentary and legal succession.

Commenting on the third mode of effecting succession, Mr. Manresa says: "The rule of indivisibility and incompatibility was transferred to our laws from pure Romanism, and it remained in them until the XV Century, when the law of the Ordenamiento previously cited repealed the maxim nemo pro parte testatus pro parte intestatus decedere potest. This same repeal is confirmed in paragraph 3 of the article under consideration (658), which prescribes that it may also be effected partly by the will of man and partly by operation of law, and in articles 764 and 912 above cited which call the legal heirs to the enjoyment of the part of the inheritance not disposed of by the testator in his will."

This is a refutation of the appellant's argument that no one who has executed a will can die partly intestate. That the rule of indivisibility of the testator's will invoked by the appellant does not hold good in this jurisdiction, is shown, moreover, by articles 764 and 912 of the Civil Code. According to the first of these articles, a will is valid even though it does not contain any institution of an heir, or if such institution does not include the entire estate, and even though the person instituted does not accept the inheritance or is disqualified to inherit; according to the second, one of the ways in which legal succession may take place is when the will does not institute an heir to all or part of the property, or does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator, in which case legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property which the testator has not disposed of.

Assuming that the joint will in question is valid, it follows that the deceased Victoriana Saavedra specified therein that parcels 187 and 768 in proceeding No. 7880 be delivered as a legacy to her sister Segunda Saavedra, the first parcel free of all liens and encumbrances, and the second on the condition that the legatee devote the products of the same to having masses said for the repose of the testatrix's soul. As to the remaining sixteen parcels, the testatrix disposed of her part in them conditionally, that is to say, in case her husband Macario Macrohon Ong Hamdied before she did, said parcels were to be awarded to her husband's nephews, or to either of them in case one should have died before the said Macario Macrohon Ong Ham. The condition imposed in the will as precedent to the vesting in the alleged legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of the right to the legacy, not having been complied with, the trial court found that the part of said property belonging to the testatrix should be partitioned among the persons called on to succeed her under the law. We are of the opinion that this finding is in accordance with the law, since, under article 791 of the Civil Code, conditions imposed upon heirs and legatees shall be governed by the rules established for conditional obligations in all matters not provided for by this section (articles 790 to 805). And, in accordance with article 1114 of the Code, in conditional obligations the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinction or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the occurrence of the event constituting the condition.

[275]


Another error assigned by the appellant consists in the trial court not having found that, under the terms of the joint will, the legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian were entitled to receive the testatrix's share in the sixteen parcels of land mentioned in said will.

The part of the will invoked by the appellant, states:

"In case of the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, we hereby order that the properties hereinafter described be jointly given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, and should either of the two die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, we order that all the said properties be given to the survivor."

The trial court, in interpreting this paragraph of the will in regard to legatees Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, reached the right conclusion, and rightly, in our opinion, that it provides for the substitution of legatees in case either of them should die before Macario Macrohon Ong Ham; and that the acquisition by these legatees of any right to the property described in the will depended on the condition that Macario Macrohon Ong Ham died before Victoriana Saavedra.

The appellant also assigns as error the holding of the trial court that the opponents, the brother, sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were entitled to receive her share in the said sixteen parcels of land, given to the legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint will. Such a contention is untenable. As we have said, the acquisition of right by the alleged legatees depends on the occurrence of the event constituting the condition, that is, the death of Macario Macrohon Ong Ham prior to that of his wife; and this condition not having been complied with, the' said Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian have not acquired any right, and therefore the testatrix's estate is to be divided among her heirs in accordance with the law.

To the sixteen parcels of land to which reference is here made, that is, those given to the nephews of the testator, should be added lot No. 838-A, proceeding No. 7880, certificate 1257, which the testatrix had reserved to herself (together with lots 817 and 768), in case she survived her husband Macario Macrohon Ong Ham.

One-half of these seventeen parcels of land belong to the widower, Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, and the trial court shall order the division of the other half, that is, the estate of the deceased Victoriana Saavedra, being onehalf of the conjugal property, between the widower and the opponents, as provided for in articles 945, 948 and 953 of the Civil Code. With this modification, the order appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. So ordered.


[276]


Madarcos vs. De la MercedG.R. No. 39975June 30, 1989

Topic/Doctrine: The term “legal heirs” is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law.—The term “legal heirs” is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioners considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.—Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.

Facts:

At issue in this petition for review on certiorari is the proper construction of the term “legal heirs” as used in section 119 of the Public Land

Petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain are the niece and nephew respectively of the spouses Benito Catain and Andrea Madarcos. Francisca is the daughter of the deceased brother (Joaquin) of Andrea Madarcos while Telesforo is the son of a deceased brother (Gregorio) of Benito Catain.

The Catain spouses died without issue and ab intestato. They left a tract of land situated in Salvacion, Roxas, Palawan, covered by Homestead Patent and Bureau of Lands No. H-27580 and described in Certificate of Title G-25 issued in the name of Benito Catain on September 28, 1925 by the Register of Deeds of Palawan.

The only heirs of the deceased homesteaders were their nephews and nieces. In their duly registered Affidavit of Adjudication, said heirs divided the above parcel of land into several lots. The rest of the lots were adjudicated to the other nephews and nieces of the deceased couple. On 1972, Francisca Madarcos sold her share of the inheritance to respondent Loreto Sta. Maria for a consideration by reason of which the latter was issued Transfer Certificate of Title by the Register of Deeds of Palawan. Subsequently, petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain demanded the reconveyance of Lot B pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.1 Respondent vendee Loreto Sta. Maria having refused; they instituted an action for repurchase with damages in the Court of First Instance of Palawan.

Respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioners had no legal capacity to sue because they are not the legal heirs contemplated in Section 119 of the Public Land Act. The trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the action in its order of August 30, 1974. That order is the subject of the present appeal.

Issue:

[277]


Whether or not the court erred in interpreting “legal heirs” to mean compulsory heirs as enumerated in Article 887 of the New Civil Code, thus excluding petitioners, who are collateral relatives of the grantees, from the operation of Section 119.

Held:

The term “legal heirs” is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law.2 Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.

As the decedents had left no will, the law supplanted their intention. Their estates were distributed by intestate succession. Under the rules of intestacy in the Civil Code, the following inherit successively and exclusively:

1. Legitimate children and their descendants (Art. 979);

2. Legitimate parents and ascendants (Art. 985);

3. Illegitimate children (Art. 988) and their descendants (Art. 990);

4. Surviving spouse (Art. 995) without prejudice to rights of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the deceased (Art. 1001);

5. Collateral relatives within the fifth degree (Art. 1010); and

6. The State (Art. 1011).

Since the Catain spouses were childless and were survived only by their nephews and nieces, the latter succeeded to the entire estate of the deceased. Article 975 states that “when children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.”

Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents. They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.

But even as both are decidedly legal heirs of the Catain spouses, only petitioner Francisca Madarcos can invoke the right of repurchase. The other petitioner, Telesforo Catain, cannot claim that prerogative as an heir of his deceased uncle because the homestead had already been partitioned and distributed among the nieces and nephews

The questioned dismissal order of the trial court dated August 30, 1974 in Civil Case No. 945 entitled ”Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain vs. Loreto Sta. Maria” is MODIFIED. Respondent Loreto Sta. Maria is hereby ordered to execute a deed of resale of Lot B, Psd 37486 in favor of petitioner Francisca Madarcos upon payment by the latter of the redemption price. The dismissal of the complaint as to the other petitioner, Telesforo Catain, is AFFIRMED. No costs.


[278]


Maria Uson vs. Maria del RosarioNo. L-4963

January 29, 1953

Topic/Doctrine: Descent and Distribution; Husband and Wife; Rights of Lawful Wife as Affected by the New Civil Code.—The right of ownership of the lawful wife of a decedent who had died before the new Civil Code took effect became vested in her upon his death, and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Art. 657, old Civil Code; Ilustre vs. Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased can not be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of the lawful wife over the lands in dispute. While article 2253 of the new Civil Code provides that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, yet this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.

Renunciation of Inheritance Made by Lawful Wife; Future Inheritance, Not Subject to Contract.—Although the lawful wife has expressly renounced her right to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death, such renunciation cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

Donations by Deceased; Essential Formalities of Donation.—Assignments, if any, made by the deceased of real property for which there was no material consideration, should be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Art. 633, old Civil Code). Assignments or donations which lack this essential formality have no valid effect.

Facts:This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in Labrador, Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson agakist Maria del Rosario and her four children who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.

Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.

Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death. After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.

Defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter.

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Issue:

Whether or not successional rights that were declared for the first time in the new code shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation?

Held:

No. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin."

There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson. As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.

The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced. The right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death based on Article 657, old Civil Code.

The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute. As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one. Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.


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PISALBON vs. BEJECG.R. No. 48430

January 30, 1943


FACTS:

Hipolito Manuel, who dies on April 26, 1926, left two widows and a homestead. The widows are Floretina Pisalbon and Placida Bejec, whom he married on June 23, 1903, and November 9, 1914, respectively. In his homestead application which was filed on September 3, 1917, and approved by the Director of Lands on August 23, 1918, Hipolito Manuel named Placida Bejec as his lawful wife; and in fact he and she were the ones who cleared and worked in the land from the date the homestead application was filed until the death of Hipolito Manuel on April 26, 1926. In view of the conflicting claims of the two widows, the Director of Lands, on August 23, 1934, ordered that the homestead patent be issued in favor of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel, and accordingly the register of deeds of Pangasinan subsequently issued original certificate of title No. 1749 in favor of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel. No child was born to the second marriage, but a daughter was born to the first, namely, Margarita Manuel, one of the original plaintiffs herein, who died on August 17, 1939, during the pendency of this action, leaving two children named Cristeta and Esmedia Ancheta. This action was instituted on June 28, 1938, by Florentina Pisalbon and her daughter Margarita Manuel, the latter assisted by her husband Pedro Ancheta, against Placida Bejec to recover from her the ownership and possession of the homestead above mentioned. Upon a stipulation of facts the substance of which has been set forth above, the trial court held that in view of the fact that Placida Bejec together with Hipolito Manuel cleared and worked the land in question, and considering that homesteads are granted to actual occupants of the public land, she is entitled to the homestead both in law and in equity, and dismissed plaintiffs' action with costs against the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

WON the doctrine laid down in Lao and Lao vs. Dee Tim (45 Phil,. 739),won their prayer "that the decision of the lower court be reversed and another entered in lieu thereof declaring that the plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to and own one half (½) pro indiviso of the land described in homestead patent title No. 1749 issued by the registered of deeds of Pangasinan in the name of the heirs of Hipolito Manuel.

HELD:

This Court, applying the Laws of the Partidas, held that where two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will be regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one half of the estate of the husband upon the distribution of his estate. Under that doctrine, the half of the homestead in question corresponding to Hipolito Manuel belongs to his heirs, Cristeta Ancheta and Esmedia

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Ancheta, the children of his now deceased legitimate daughter Margarita Manuel, subject to the usufruct of the two widows over one third thereof. (Article 834, Civil Code.) The right to usufruct of the defendant Placida Bejec may equitably be considered compensated by the legitimate claim of the plaintiffs for one-half share in the products of the homestead in question from June 28, 1938, the date of the filing of the complaint.


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RIOSA vs.ROCHAG.R. No. L-23770

February 18, 1926


FACTS:

Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir. It appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the line from which this property came. This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.

ISSUE:

WON that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reserves.

HELD:

As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give efficacy to a reservation by the widowed spouse mentioned in article 968 are applicable to the reserva troncal provided for in article 811. But as these two reservations vary in some respects, these rules may be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as the latter is similar to a reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal the property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so until the reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one when the property goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a second marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free of any encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect differently the transfer that may be made of the property. If the property is sold during the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to the purchaser unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is, when the duty to reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to

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the reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law provides that should the property be sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower contracts another marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a mortgage upon contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of those for whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not required by law when the sale is made after the reservation will follow the property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions of the Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being no need to secure the value of the property since it is liable for the efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value of the property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable are not applicable to the reserva troncal where the property goes to the ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case of reserva troncal might be analogous to a sale made by the widower after contacting a second marriage in the case of a reservation by the widowed spouse.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, it cannot modify the appealed judgment in so far as it is unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the registry the reservable character of the other parcels of land, the subject of this action, the questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided.

LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYNLLB III – B

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CONDE VS ABAYAGR L- 4275; 13 PHIL 249

MARCH 23, 1909


FACTS:

Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural children of the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as legitimate heir of the decedent's natural children.

ISSUE:

May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD:

The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.

But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.


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Del Val v Del ValG.R. No. L-9374

February 16, 1915


FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing the complaint with costs. The parties are siblings who were the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio del Val, who passed away intestate. An administrator was appointed for the estate of the deceased, and, after a partial administration, it was closed. During the lifetime of the deceased he took out insurance on his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it payable to Andres del Val as sole beneficiary. After his death, the defendant Andres collected the face of the policy. He paid the sum of P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate which the decedent had sold to third persons with a right to repurchase. The redemption of said premises was made by the attorney of the defendant in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the deceased vendor. Andres, on death of the deceased, took possession of most of his personal property and that he has also the balance on the insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.

Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the deceased and not to the defendant personally, hence they are entitled to a partition not only of the real and personal property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays a partition of all the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased, and that the defendant account for P21,634.80. They also wanted to divide this equally among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other property of deceased.

The defendant’s claim was that redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made in the name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his knowledge or consent. He also averred that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the insurance policy for the benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and is the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual property.

The trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action due to the argument that the action for partition failed to comply with the Civil Procedure Code sec. 183, in that it does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of which partition is demanded.'

ISSUE:

Can the proceeds of the policy be divided among the heirs?

HELD:

No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

The proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his individual and separate property. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and

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individual property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in America. The doctrine is embedded in the Code of Commerce where:

“The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of the contract, shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor of the former.”

The plaintiffs invoked Article 1035 of the Civil Code, where it reads:

“An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession must bring into the hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received from the deceased during the life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration, in order to compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of the division.”

They also invoked Article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are not betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."

The court didn’t agree because the contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life- insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That was under the Code of Commerce.

The plaintiffs claim that the property repurchased with the insurance proceeds belongs to the heirs in common and not to the defendant alone. This wasn’t agreed upon by the court unless the facts appeared that Andres acted as he did with the intention that the other heirs should enjoy with him the ownership of the estate.

LAGBAS, HJA. LORMALYN B.LLB III - B

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MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R.No. L-57848

June 19, 1982

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Disinheritance

FACTS:

Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the CFI-Quezon City for the probate of the holographic will of Clemencia Aseneta who instituted her and her husband as heirs. Later on, Bernardo Aseneta(herein private respondent), claiming to be the adopted child of the deceased and her sole heir instituted intestate proceedings with the CFI-Rizal. The two cases were consolidated with the latter court. Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null andvoid because he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy should ensue. In her opposition, Soledad averred that the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of andresolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by thedecedent. The motion was granted. The motion for reconsideration by Soledad Maninang wasdenied for lack of merit. In the same order, the court appointed Bernardo Aseneta as administrator considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust.Soledad Maninang filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It was denied. Hence, this petition was filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of the court a quo of the testate case is proper?

HELD:

No, it was not proper. Probate of a will is mandatory as required by law and public policy.Ordinarily, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic validity; but on the extrinsicvalidity which includes the capacity of the testator to make a will and the compliance with therequisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.However, when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic validity of the will may be passedupon like when on its face there is really preterition or invalid disinheritance making the will void.The probate might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Suchwould shorten the proceedings if the issues are decided as early as during the probate proceedings.In the instant case, there is still doubt to the alleged preterition or disinheritance of the privaterespondent cannot be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs further determination which canonly be made if the will is allowed to be probated.


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PECSON VS MEDIAVILLOG.R. No. 7890

September 29, 1914

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Disinheritance

FACTS:

The last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir (judge) found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition .

Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion averring:

That Rosario is and Joaquin was the grandchild of the testator, Florencio Pecson

That Rosario, was disinherited by Florencio, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him

Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo states:

I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, Rosario, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.

That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical attacks.

It also appears from the evidence that Teresa (daughter of Florencio, mother of Rosario) also died. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the testator.

The lower court found out that the evidence shows that Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him. But since she was 14 years old, and shortly afterwards became insane, she was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.

The court therefore decreed that clause 3 of the will is contrary to law and is set aside for being of no force or value whatever.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance.

HELD:

Yes. The Civil Code (Art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected

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by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited.

In the case, It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received some attentions from a young man – that she had received a letter from him – and that her grandfather, Florencio, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young man. It was upon that occasion when the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that after said event, she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time.

The lower court is correct in taking into consideration her tender years, that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.


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EDUARDA BENEDICTO, administratrix of the estate of Maximino Jalandoni vs.

JULIO JAVELLANA10 Phil. 197

February 21, 1908

Title/Doctrine: Legacies and Devises

FACTS:

The will of the testator provided, among other things: “On my entire estate I impose the obligation that out of the products thereof, all my debts shall be paid, the same being about 2,300 pesos which I owe Francisco Villanueva, without interest, and 2,550 pesos which I received on loan from Julio Javellana, with interest thereon at the rate of 10 percent per annum, provided, however, that one-half of the products which each parcel of land pertaining to the estate may yield this year shall be devoted to the payment of said debts, and should the said one-half not prove sufficient to meet the liabilities, two-thirds of the said products, or the total amount thereof, shall be applied; and provided, further, that in any case, the balance of such products shall remain in charge of the administrator for the settlement of such other charges as the estate may be subjected to.

“And further on Francisco and Sofia Jalandoni I particularly impose the obligation to pay Teodora Berola, for a period of ten years, an annuity of 300 pesos, Mexican currency, or the equivalent thereof in Philippine currency; said obligation becoming extinguished by the death of the said Teodora, in case of her demise before the expiration of the said period of ten years.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased was imposed upon the entire inheritance, or on any particular property or party in interest named in the will?

HELD:

Yes. The testator has imposed on his entire estate the obligation to pay his debts with the products of the same, and has prescribed the manner in which the same shall be done untill all obligations are extinguished.


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SANTOS VS MANARANGG.R. No. L-8235 March 19, 1914

Title/Doctrine: Legacies and Devises

FACTS:

Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal property which, by his last will and testament dated July 26, 1906, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this will reads as follows:

I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.

Among the debts, two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos. In his petition, asking that the committee be reconvened to consider his claims, plaintiff states that his failure to present the said claims to the committee was due to his belief that it was unnecessary to do so because of the fact that the testator, in his will, expressly recognized them and directed that they should be paid.

He alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim against the estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor, or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is an asset of the estate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testator intended to leave the plaintiff a legacy or a debt?

HELD:

The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law and once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner. Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt.

The testator left the total net assets of his estate, without reservation of any kind, to his children per capita. There is no indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy to

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any other person. These considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended to leave plaintiff any thing by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having been a simple debt, the present action was improperly instituted against the administratrix.

But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first instance, cannot be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must present their claims to the committee; otherwise their claims will be forever barred.


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Chingen vs Arguelles and wife, et al.G.R. No. 3314

January 3, 1907

Topic/Doctrine: Legacies and Devises

FACTS:

The object of the action brought by the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen was to recover one half of the jewels mentioned in his complaint and one half of the rent accruing from a certain property, which said property, as well as the jewels in question, were delivered as part of their legacies to the legatees, Carmen Reyes, Jose Reyes, and Pedro Reyes, under the will of the deceased Raymunda Reyes.

The plaintiff insists to recover the remainder of the property which belonged to him in usufruct under the law as the surviving spouse of the testatrix, citing to this end article 815 of the Civil Code.

The testatrix left no legitimate descendants or ascendants. Her surviving husband was therefore entitled to the usufruct of one half of the estate, where the surviving husband is also an heir under the will.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chingen is entitled to recover the remainder of the property in usufruct.

HELD:

No. It is absurd and contrary to all justices that the plaintiff should received his share as an heir under the will from one half of the estate and be further entitled to the usufruct of the other half to the prejudice of his coheir and the various legatees under the will. There is no law or article of the code which authorizes such an iniquitous privilege. In any event the portion of the estate subject to the usufruct must be claimed from the heir or heirs in due time, and in the manner and form prescribed by law. We are of the opinion that judgment should be affirmed, and the defendants are hereby absolved of the complaint of the plaintiff, Anselmo Chingen.


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Delos Santos vs. Dela CruzG.R. No. L-29192

February 22, 1971

Facts:

Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement over a certain portion of land with and that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate but in spite of demands the defendant refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his obligation while the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiff-appellee can inherit from decedent Pelagia de la Cruz

Held:

The plaintiff-appellee, Gertrudes de los Santos cannot inherit from the decedent as she is not an heir of the latter.Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation. Article 972 provides that the right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood. Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right. Article 962 further added that in every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

Luyao, Rodelo D.LLB-IIIB

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Linart y Pavia vs. UgarteG.R. No. L-2599

October 27, 1905

Facts:

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate, Maria Juana Ugarte yIturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant — that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased which was granted by the court. But later, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte yIturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir of the deceased — a fact which this new relative did not deny — be required to render an account of the property of the estate. The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria Juana Ugarte yIturralde. The court entered judgment declaring that the petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, and ordered the latter to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the same time, from disposing of any part thereof until such accounting had been made and the estate distributed. Maria Juana Ugarteexcepted to the judgment and has brought the case to this court.

Issue:

Whether or not grandniece is entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece is entitled to.

Held:

A grandniece is not entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece is entitled to. The court holds that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.


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Salao vs. SalaoG.R. No. L-26699March 16, 1976

Facts:

The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child, ValentinSalao. After the death of the spouses their estate was administered by their daughter Ambrosia and partitioned extrajudicially and the deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, ValentinSalao, in representation of his deceased father, Patricio. The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at SitioCalunuran, Lubao, Pampanga. Ambrosia Salao sold and redeem twice the Calunuranfishpond. Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his nephew, ValentinSalao, died and the intestate estate of ValentinSalao was partitioned extrajudicially between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and VictorinaSalao-Alcuriza. Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots and asdonee Benita Salao signed the deed of donation and to Juan S. Salao, Jr. At her old age, Ambrosia also donated the Calunuran fishpond.

Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond.

Held:Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the

Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail that donation. Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. ValentinSalao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).


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Intestate Estate of Pablo Luce vsPabellonGR No. L-1367Aug 16, 1949

Topic/Doctrine:Order of Intestate Succession - Ascending Direct Line

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon holding that upon the death of Pablo Luce, "all his properties were inherited by his legitimate daughter Cristeta Luce who survived him for at least half an hour, she having died about half an hour after" the death of her father.The maternal grandparents are claiming inheritance from their grandchild Cristeta Luce while the appellants are claiming the inheritance by right of representation.

ISSUE:

W/N a right of representation accrues to the appellants

HELD:

Reliance is placed on article 925 of the Civil Code providing that the right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line but never in the ascending, and that in the collateral line it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters, whether they may be of the whole or half blood. It is intimated that because the oppositors-appellees are not in the direct descending line, but are only maternal grandparents of Cristeta Luce, they cannot inherit by representation. Aside from the fact that the trial court correctly withheld any adjudications as to the estate of Cristeta Luce, because it is not included in the intestate proceedings instituted by the petitioner-appellant, said oppositors-appellees are claiming inheritance from their grandchild Cristeta Luce in their own rights as ascendants, and not merely by right of presentation, it appearing that the said Cristeta Luce did not leave any legitimate children or ascendants.


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Uson vs. Del RosarioGR No. L-4963Jan 29, 1953

Topic/Doctrine:Order of Intestate Succession - Illegitimate Children

FACTS:

Maria USON (petitioner) is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who died in 1945. Nebreda left 5 parcels of land in Labrador Pangasinan, which lands are thesubject of an action for recovery of possession and ownership filed by USONagainst Maria DEL ROSARIO.DEL ROSARIO is the common law wife of Nebreda to whom he begotten four illegitimate children. USON contends that DEL ROSARIO deprived her of the possession andenjoyment of the lands in question. The latter, meanwhile, argues that Uson andNebreda executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate ashusband and wife. USON was given an alimony in consideration of which shegave up her rights to inherit any property from Nebreda. DEL ROSARIO contends that the 4 illegitimate children she had with Nebreda areentitled to successional rights by virtue of the new civil code promulgated on 1950.The CFI ruled in favor of USON.

ISSUE:

W/N the renouncement of inheritance executed before the decedent’s death is valid and enforceable

W/N the illegitimate children have the right to inherit from the decedent

HELD:

No. When Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land passed from themoment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old CivilCode). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed anddelivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. AlarasFrondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Usonover the lands in question became vested. The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over thelands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future propertythat her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separationthey had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simplereason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it berenounced.

No. The court ruled that while it is true that rights first declared in the newcivil code are to be given retroactive effect, the same is subject to the condition thatthe said rights will not prejudice vested or acquired rights. Hence, given thebackground of the case, the children cannot have successional rights since USON’srights would be prejudiced.


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Leonardo vs. CA120 SCRA 890|G.R. No. L-51263

February 28, 1983


FACTS:

Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and SilvestraCailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, PascualaCailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while SilvestraCailles died in 1949 without any issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself. Granting the Cresenciano is the son of Sotero, as found by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting.

ISSUE:

W/N an illegitimate child can inherit by right of representation from the legitimate relatives of his father

HELD:

No. An illegitimate child cannot inherit from his great grandparent for being an illegitimate child.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines states that:“An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.”


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Centeno vs. Centeno52 Phil 322|G.R. No. L-28265

November 5, 1928


FACTS:

Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo were husband and wife who brought no property to the marriage but acquired much property during their married life. Isaac Centeno died on October 7, 1905, and was survived by his wife Melchora Arroyo, and their three son, Valentin, Faustino and Antonio Centeno. Before his death, that is, on June 30, 1904, Isaac Centeno executed a will, one of the clauses of which contained the following provision: "I hereby named and institute as my sole and universal heirs my three sons Antonio, Valentin and Faustino Centeno or their heirs, if any, to one-half of the above-named property, provided, that the same be divided equally among my three said sons."

On October 30, 1907, Antonio Centeno died leaving a widow, Gabriela Fernadez, and a will executed on October 9, 1907, clauses 3 and 8 of which are as follows:

Third. I declare that I was married once, being still married to Dna. Gabriela Fernandez y Bribiesca, and during our union we had not a single child; I also declared that although I said I have no child, the God of pity has given me eight, who are my children by another woman, three of whom are called natural, who are Martina, Jose (alias Pepe), and TelesforoCenteno, because they were born even before I married my aforesaid wife, Dna. Gabriela the five are Sisenando, Antonina, Gregorio, Jose (alias Peping), and Gabriel Centeno, and are called illegitimate, because they were born after my marriage; nevertheless I acknowledge them all for I have had them since theit birth supporting and bringing all of them, up until now.

Eight. Of my portion from my deceased father Isaac CentenoPurugganan, and of my future portion from my mother Dna. Melchora Arroyo, I institute as my universal heirs my three children called natural, to have and to hold in fee simple during their lives, under God's blessing and my own.

Melchora Arroyo de Centeno died on December 8, 1909, leaving one son named ValentinCenteno, and a will executed on November 3, 1909, clause 3 of which provides:

(c) The third part shall be divided equally, neither more nor less, among my sons Antonio and Faustino Centeno, may they rest in peace, and ValentinCenteno. (Exhibit E of plaintiffs and Exhibit 5 of defendants.)

ISSUE:

1. Are the defendants entitled, as acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to inherit from his legitimate father Isaac Centeno?

2. Are said defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to the reservation of one-half of said hereditary portion which Melchora Arroyo inherited from her legitimate son Antonio Centeno which hereditary portion the latter had inherited from his likewise legitimate father Isaac Centeno?

3. Are the defendants entitled, as such acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, to represent their natural father Antonio Centeno in the inheritance of their natural grandmother Melchora Arroyo, legitimate mother of Antonio Centeno?

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HELD:

Articles 843 and 941 specifically provide that the portion corresponding to natural children in the hereditary estate of the parents who acknowledged them, is transmitted upon the death of these children to their legitimate or natural descendants. The latter's right, however, to represent their natural father in the hereditary estate of their grandfather is not admitted, because they are not called by law to participate in their grandfather's estate.

Hence,

(1) That the defendants, as acknowledged natural children and named heirs of Antonio Centeno in his will, are entitled to inherit the one-half of hereditary portion which their deceased natural father had inherited from his legitimate father by will; (2) that said defendants, though they are acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, are not entiltled to the reservation of the one-half which Melchora Arroyo received as her legitimate from the hereditary portion which her son had received from his father, Isaac Centeno also legitimate; (3) that the defendants, thought they are acknowledged natural children of Antonio Centeno, are not entitled to represent the latter in the inheritance of his legitimate mother Melchora Arroyo.


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ANSELMA DIAZ vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-66574

February 21, 1990

FACTS:

The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD:

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

Molejon, JaysonLLB III-B

[303]


TOMAS CORPUS vs RAFAEL CORPUSG.R. No. L-22469October 23, 1978

FACTS:

Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527.

Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.

Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners has cause of action for the recovery of hereditary share of Teodoro Yangco.

HELD:

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6).

The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child"


[304]


EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. L-44051

June 27, 1985

FACTS:

The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin.

ISSUE:

WON herein plaintiff can inherit from Lutgarda Capiao.

HELD:

The original complaint and the amended complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges in quintessence or in substance the following: 'That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao who was married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' (paragraph 5 of the amended complaint); That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any children and/or immediate forced heir and without any will therefore inestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extrajudicial partition.

The source of these properties in question deceased Lutgarda Leogarda is undoubtedly an illegitimate child. In fact, her surname is Capiao and not Taccad, retaining the surname or family name of her mother Julia Capiao Article 992 of the Civil Code, cited by the movant, the defendant, provides:

Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.'

Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit from an illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant case.


[305]


Intestate estate of Julia de la Peña vs. RUFINO SEVILLA, ET AL.G.R. No. L-21570August 30, 1924

FACTS:

This is an appeal from an order dated July 20, 1923, of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija denying the petition both of the petitioners and of the opponents for declaration of heirs and denying also the authority to sell certain property, which was applied for by the former. Both parties have appealed from this order, each assigning errors thereto.

This case is concerned with the inheritance of the deceased Julia de la Peña.

The evidence shows that this Julia de la Peña was daughter of Julio Sevilla and Catalina de la Peña, who were not married. The petitioners have introduced evidence to the effect that Julia de la Peña was an adulterous child because Julio Sevilla was married with Josefa Gutierrez who was alive at the time. The fact is that Julia de la Peña was a child of unmarried parents, and therefore she was not a legitimate child, nor does she appear to have been legitimated, and is, at most, an acknowledged natural child, supposing it not to have been proven that she was an adulterous child, as alleged by the petitioners.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners and opponents herein are entitled to hereditary estate of Julia

HELD:

Now, the persons entitled to succeed a natural child in an intestate succession are the father or mother who acknowledged it (art. 944, Civil Code), and in default of either, its natural brothers (art. 945, Civil Code). It was not proven nor it is contended that the petitioners or the opponents are parents or brothers of the deceased Julia de la Peña; and with the exception of the relatives mentioned in said articles 944 and 945 of the Civil Code, no other relative of the natural child has the right to succeed it, as is clearly provided by article 943 of the same Code.

It is, therefore, clear that neither the petitioners nor the opponents can be declared heirs of the deceased Julia de la Peña without a will.


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BERCILES v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEML-57257

March 05, 1984

Topic/Doctrine: “Premiums are presumed conjugal without proof of payment though exclusive funds” FACTS:GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural child and other private respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, mercy Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of Judge Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella and thus have rights to his retirement benefits This was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and their children.

ISSUE: WON GSIS was correct in upholding their status as a natural child and illegitimate children

HELD: NO, Art 287 pf NCC – illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to support and such sucsessional rights are granted in the code, but for this article to be applicable there must be admission or recognition of paternity of illegitimate child.No evidence of admission:1. There was no evidence that he intervened when his name was put in the birth certificate of Pascual Berciles, thus his part in the birth certificate is null and void2. Baptismal certificate has no weight as well3. Living together does not prove filiations4. Pictures are not proof of filiations Their mother was not recognized to be married to the deceasedRESULT: retirement benefits are distributed equally to the five recognized heirs from his marriage to Iluminda Ponce who is also an heir.

Art 966 of NCC – if a widow or widower and legit children or descendants are left, surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children

Art 980 of NCC – children of deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.


[307]


Delrosario v Delrosario2 Phil 321

Doctrine: Construction: In the interpretation and construction of testamentary provisions the intent of the testator controls.

Facts:

Testator Nicolas declares in his will the following:

Eight. The testator declares that the P5000 which he brought to his marriage he hereby bequeaths to his nephews Enrique and Ramon, natural children of his brother Clemente, notwithstanding the fact that they purport to be the issue of the marriage of Escolastico and Rosendo, successively.

Ninth. The testator declares that the said sum of P5000 is to be divided , P3000 to the first named and P2000 to the second named, the delivery of the sum is to be effected by the wife of the testator, provided that this young men behave themselves as they have done up to the present time, and do not cease to study until taking a degree of Bachelor Arts and then take a business course, if their health will permit, their support to paid out of the testamentary estate and they to live in the house of the widow.

Issue:

WON the description of the legatees make the legacy conditional?

Held:

No. where legatees are appointed out by name in the will the fact that they are referred to as natural sons of third person does not make the legacy conditional upon proof of such relationship but is descriptive merely.

Jhemahar Indasan Ombra III-B

[308]


Resureccion v Javier63 Phil 599

Doctrine: Incapacity to inherit from the deceased person.

Facts:

On Oct. 18 1932, Felisa Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpiccio universal heir and among other things, left a legacy of P2000 in favor of her brother, Gil.

The testator died on Jan 22, 1933 and her will was probated on March 4 of said year.

On Oct. 12, 1933, the court finding that Gil died on August 1930, even before the testatrix made her will, and ordered that the legacy of P2000 in his favor revert to the fund of the estate.

Gil’s children claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of P2000 in favor of their father.

Issue:

WON Gil’s children are entitled to such legacy?

Held:

Not. Gil, now deceased, upon being instituted a legatee by the testatrix, lacked civil personality, which is extinguished by death, and, therefore, lacked capacity to inherit by will on the ground that he could not been subject of the right.

Jhemhar Indasan OmbraIII-B

[309]


NEPOMUCENO v CA (GOMEZ)139 SCRA 206

October 9, 1985

FACTS

Martin Jugo died with last Will and Testament with all the formalities required bylaw. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Willthat the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had twolegitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged fromhis lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. Infact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J.Nepomucenowere married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. Thetestator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and hischildren Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to hereinpetitioner. The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of thedeceased Martin Jugo in the CFI Rizal and asked for the issuance to her of letterstestamentary. The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testatoradmitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until hisdeath on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an idle exercisebecause on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The case reached the CA and the respondent court set aside the decision of the CFI of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The CA declared the Will to be valid except thatthe devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028.

ISSUE

WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring thelast Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to passupon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

HELD

NO. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry islimited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probatecourt is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

Reasoning:

a.InNuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, nom a t t e r

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h o w v a l i d i t m a y a p p e a r e x t r i n s i c a l l y , w o u l d b e n u l l a n d v o i d . Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of thetestamentary provisions would be superfluous.b . T h e p r o h i b i t i o n i n A r t i c l e 7 3 9 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e i s a g a i n s t t h e m a k i n g o f a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is thedonation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that therecipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacybecausethe testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a personwith whom he had been living in concubinage.

OPAY, EMMAE ROSE ROSE B.LLB III-B

Villavicencio vs. Quino

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G.R. No. 45248.April 18, 1939

FACTS:

Considering theprovisions of the will of the deceased E. Z. del R. in their entirety, her collateral relatives, not being forcedheirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the remainder of her properties, which does not exist, as to the naked ownership thereof. Said testamentary provisions, whose validity is not here questioned, should be complied with because the testatrix, not having forced heirs, may dispose of her properties as she did in her will, formasses and pious works for the benefit of her soul and those of her relatives, as provided in article 741 of thecivil Code.EugeniaZuñiga del Rosario died in Batangas, , on December 19, 1934, leaving a will executed with all the legal formalities, which was probated on February 1, 1935, over the opposition of some relatives.Subsequently, Santiago Quino and twenty-eight relatives of the testatriz within the fifth degree in the collateral line, filed a motion with the conformity of the Bishop of lipa wherein, after stating how the said deceasedEugenia Zuñiga del Rosario has disposed in her will of her properties by way of masses and alms, etc., theyasked that they be declared heirs of said testarix charged with the duty to comply with its provisions, as towhich compliance, so they stated, they had already reached an understanding with the Bishop of Lipa wherebythe said movants, within ninety days from the adjudication to them of the properties constituting the inheritance,would deposit with the said Bishop the necessary amount to defray the masses for three years, and wouldlikewise deposit in any bank designated for the purpose an amount the interest of which would be sufficient tocover the other expenses for the annul masses and alms ordained in the will. The executor Vicente ReyesVillavicencio opposed the foregoing petition and the court denied the latter by its order of March 30, 1936. "The lower erred in not recognizing as proper and lawful under the circumstances, the compromise entered intoby and between the Bishop of Lipa and the herein oppositors-appellants, with regards to the matter by whichParagraph III of the will may be carried out and given effect, it being understood that the said mutualunderstanding will best promote and safeguards the manifest and premordial intention of the testatrix."cralawvirtua1awlibraryThe appellants contend that even after full compliance with the will of the testatriz, a substantial balance wouldstill remain after deducting the necessary expenses for masses and alms and the amount of the allowance forsupport of Eulalia del Rosario, and excluding the legacy left to UbaldoMagbuhat and Eugracioalegria. As tothat balance, the appellants contend that the deceased Eugenia Zuñigadel Rosario died partly intestate and thatthey are entitled to succeed her with respect to that part.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the will are valid.

HELD:

Such contention is based on something entirely inconsistent with what the testatrix ordered in the third clause ofher will. As will be seen, the appellants proceed on the false assumption that for every mass celebrated for thesoul of the testatrix and those of her parents, brothers and sisters, something or a determinate amount from thefruits of her properties had to be given. Proceeding on this assumption, it is possible that the fruits of saidproperties would leave an excess which the testatrix has not disposed of. However, as we have stated, such anassumption is untenable because the testatrix has not provided that a certain amount be taken the fruits of herproperties for the celebration of the masses ordered by her, but has said: "I have that may said properties bedevoted only for the peace and happiness of my

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soul and those of my parents, brothers and sisters, and also forthe benefit of the church, etc." ; and, continuing, she ordered "that the fruits of the lands and the income of thehouse and warehouse, be spent for masses. . . ." Hence, the testatrix has provided, not that something out of thefruits and income of her properties be paid for the masses which she has ordered to be celebrated for her souland those of her parents, brothers and sisters, but that all the fruits of the lands and all the income be spent formasses. For this purpose, and doubtless foreseeing that the income of her properties would be insufficient tocover the amount of the masses and of its other provisions, the testatrix has ordered in the sixth and nightparagraphs of her will that, if necessary, her properties be sold with leave of court. Considering the provisionsof the will of the deceased Eugenia Zuñiga del Rosario in their entirely, her collateral relatives not being forcedheirs, are not entitled to succeed her as to the remainder of her properties, which does not exist, or as to thenaked ownership thereof.Said testamentary provisions, whose validity is not here questioned, should complied with because the testatrix,not having forced heirs in the present case, may dispose of her properties for masses and pious works for thebenefit of her soul, as provided in article 747 of the Civil Code. The circumstances that the appellants had a n understanding with the Bishop of Lipa as to show they (not theexecutor) were to comply with the provisions made by the testatrix after they had been declared heirs and afterthe properties left by the deceased relative had been adjudicated to them, does not support their contentions inthe slightest, because the Bishop’s intervention in this case cannot validate any arrangement calculated to defeatthe testamentary provisions inasmuch as the testatrix did not leave anything to the Roman Catholic under theadministration or supervision of the Bishop.The appealed order is affirmed with hecosts of both instances to the appellants.

OPAY, EMMAE ROSE ROSE B. LLB III-B

CAYETANO v LEONIDAS

[313]


129 SCRA 524May 30, 1984

FACTSAdoracion Campos died, leaving her father, Hermogenes and her sisters, NenitaPaguia, Remedios Lopez and MarietaMedina as the surviving heirs.- As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby headjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of Adoracion- Eleven months after, NenitaPaguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of Adoracion, which was allegedlyexecuted in the US and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.- An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by Hermogenes alleging among other things, that he has everyreason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and thateven if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they wouldwork injustice and injury to him.- Hermogenes filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able toverify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.- Respondent judge issued an order admitting the Last Will and Testament of Adoracion and allowed probate in thePhilippines, and NenitaPaguia was appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.- Hermogenes filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that thewithdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means. He filed another motion entitled"Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.- Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also deniedthe motion to vacate for lack of merit.

ISSUEWON the provisions of the will are valid.

HELDNO. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due executionthereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been dulyauthenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.- Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should havedenied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.- Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. The law which governs AdoracionCampo'swill is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the

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national law of the decedent. It is a settled rule that as regards theintrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national lawof the decedent must apply.- The settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the CFI of Manila where she had an estatesince it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is estopped fromquestioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief.

OPAY, EMMAE ROSE ROSE B. LLB III-B

Pimentel vs. Palanco

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5 Phil 436, 439-440

FACTS:

Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.

HELD:

Article 854 of the Civil Code:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child and the widow were

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deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.

Opay Emmae Rose B. LLB III- B

[317]


TORRES vs. JAVIER34 Phil. 382;

March 24, 1916

FACTS:

Two women are claiming to be the legal wife of deceased Tan Po Pic.Marta Torres objected to the appointment of any except herself. Juan Cailles Tan Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman Yu Teng New, opposed the appointmentof Marta Torres.-The probate court being unable to determinewho, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased, appointed a disinterested third person(Juan L. Javier) to act as administrator.-This appeal is taken by Marta Torres from tha torder of appointment.

ISSUE:

WON the probate court may validly appoint adisinterested third person as the administrator of the estate

HELD:

YES, the court had a right in view of the controversy between the women to name adisinterested third person as administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settledin the administration proceedings at the propertime.-The probate court did not find as a fact thatthere was a wife in China. The court consideredthe facts and circumstances as they werepresented in the proceedings and upon the whole believed it for the best interest of all concernedto appoint as administrator a disinterested thirdperson, particularly in view of the fact that therewas likely to be litigation between Marta Torresand the Chinese wife as to which is in fact hislegal wife and entitled to an interest in the estateof the deceased Tan Po Pic.

Opay Emmae Rose B. LLB III- B

[318]


Valeriana Quion vs. Vicente Claridad et al.74 Phil. 100

January 30, 1943


FACTS:

In the intestate proceedings of a deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the latter knowingly concealed the fact that the said deceased left a second wife with whom he had two children, namely, herein appellees.

ISSUE:

W/N the appellees is entitled to recover one-half of decedent’s estate.

HELD:

YES. That the trial court, in a subsequent action brought by appellees to recover their legal participations in the deceased’s estate, correctly declared said appellees co-owners of the estate in question to the extent of one-half thereof, with right to its possession.


[319]


Ramirez vs. Gmur42 Phil. 855

August 5, 1918


FACTS:

Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, native of the Republic of Switzerland, but for many years a resident of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of Iloilo leaving a valuable estate of which he disposed by will. A few days after his demise the will was offered for probate in the CFI of Iloilo and upon publication of notice was duly allowed and established by the court. His widow, Doña Ana M. Ramirez was named as executrix in the will, and to her accordingly letters testamentary were issued. By the will everything was given to the widow with the exception of a piece of real property located in the City of Thun, Switzerland which was devised to the testator’s brothers and sisters. However, the children of Leona Castro which was the natural child of the deceased, claims that they’re entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased. There are two sets of children of Leona, the children by her first marriage and in the second marriage.

ISSUE:

W/N the claimants filed within the period as prescribed by law.

HELD:

Sec. 41 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure provides that ten years actual adverse possession by “occupancy, grant, descent, or otherwise shall vest title in the possessor” (now the applicable law, Art. 1040 of the New Civil Code). This would indicate that a decree of distribution under which one may be placed in possession of land acquired by descent, is not in itself conclusive, and that the action of revindication may be brought by the heir against the persons put in possession by decree of the probate court at any time within the period allowed by the general statute of limitations. The SC concludes that the children by first marriage presented its case in ample time and that the judgment entered in their favor was correct. As to the children by second marriage, are debarred from participation in the estate on other grounds.


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Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Anastacia Abadilla46 Phil. 642

December 10, 1924

Topic/Doctrine: Acceptance and Repudiation of the Inherictance

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment in cadastral land registration case in which case lots nos. 3464, 3464, and 3470 are claimed by the municipality of tayabas and the governor of the province on one side and by the Palads on the other. Lot no. 3470 is also claimed by Dorotea Lopez. The court below ordered the registration of all three lots in the name of the governor of tayabas in trust for a secondary school to be established in the municipality of tayabas. The claimants Palad and Lopez appealed.

ISSUE:

W/N the governor may receive a devise in trust without previous approval.

HELD:

YES. A provincial governor cannot be regarded as public establishment within the meaning of the Civil Code and may therefore accept and receive a testamentary devise in trust without the previous approval of the central government.


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Vda. De Tupas v. RTCG.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986

FACTS:

Among the assets listed in the will of the deceased were several lots, admittedly his private capital. However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned by him, he having donated them the year before to the Tupas Foundation, Inc. Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible.

HELD:

The fact that the donated property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos.

Since it is clear that the questioned donation is collationable and that, having been made to a stranger (to the donor) it is, by law chargeable to the freely disposable portion of the donor's estate, to be reduced insofar as inofficious.

If the value of the donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased.


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Buhay De Roma v. CA G.R. No. L-46903

July 23, 1987

Facts

Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She diedintestate. When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointedadministratrix and filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on theground that certain properties donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is notdisputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelariadonated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation “sa pamamagitanng pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli” which the TC interpreted as a prohibitionto collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. Onappeal, it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not anexpress prohibition to collate.

Issue:

Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.

Held:

The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, mustbring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have receivedfrom the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any othergratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of thelegitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor shouldhave so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unlessthe donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036) The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and that it merely described thedonation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarilyexempt the donated properties from collation as required under the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent donorwould have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donor’sintention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemptionshould be applied.-MJA


[323]


Lesaca vs Lesaca

FACTS:

Baldomaro J. Lesaca died in the City of Manila on November 8, 1946. He was survived by his second wife (Juana Felix), two minor children by the latter, two children by his marriage, and three acknowledged natural children by a third woman. In his will he named Juana F. Lesaca and Consuelo F. Lesaca, his children by his first marriage, coexecutrices. It appears that the deceased and his widow, Juana Felix, had lived together martially since 1924 but were not married until December 18, 1945; that is, less than a year before his death. Issues and Holdings.

ISSUE:

1.Whether the allowances for support granted by the court tolegitimate minor children of the deceased pending liquidation of his estate are subject to collation and deductible from their share of the inheritance?

Obviously, the answer should bethe affirmative.

2. Whether money received after marriage, as purchase price of land solda retrovendendo

before such marriage to one of the consorts, constitutes conjugal property or not.

HELD:

In our opinion the question calls for a negative answer.

Whether a standing crop of palay planted during covertures, and harvested after the death of the one of the consorts, constitutes fruits and income within the purview of Article 1401 of the Civil Code, and one-half of such crop should be delivered to the surviving spouse.

It should belong to the conjugal partnership


[324]


Adan vs. Casili76 Phil 279

March 18, 1946

FACTS:

The plaintiff Felix Adan commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against his sister Victoria Adan and the latter's husband, Agapito Casili, to secure the judicial partition of the estate left by their deceased mother, Simplicia Nepomuceno, alleged to consist of six parcels of land which are specifically described in the complaint. Parcels 1 and 3, however, were subsequently discarded, the first having been sold by the parties to the municipality of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, and the second being admittedly the property of Maria Adan, a half sister of the parties litigant. The remaining four parcels, referred to in the record as lots Nos. 2, 4, 5, and 6, are valued by both parties at P2,783.55.

The defendants interposed the following defense: That the four lots in question were ceded by the deceased Simplicia Nepomuceno to her daughter Victoria Adan as her share of the inheritance; and that the plaintiff has received more than his share consisting of money, livestock, palay, and real property, namely:

Expenses of the plaintiff as a student from 1918 to 1925 P8,000.00

Twelve carabaos received by the plaintiff from his mother, at P30 each 9;360.00

Three hundred cavans of palay, at P4.20 a cavan 1,260.00

Cash taken by the plaintiff from his mother in 1927 1,110.00

Two parcels of land bought by the plaintiff with money he received from his mother 1,220.00

ISSUE:

Whether or not record to disprove or impeach the testimony of the defendants to the effect that the plaintiff took and received from his mother during the latter's lifetime?

HELD:

We find no competent evidence in the record to disprove or impeach the testimony of the defendants to the effect that the plaintiff took and received from his mother during the latter's lifetime P1,110 in cash and 300 cavans of palay in the manner and under the circumstances narrated by the defendant spouses as witnesses in their own behalf. The 300 cavans of palay was taken by the plaintiff from the granary of his mother in 1927. The cash consisting of twenty-peso and five-peso bills and amounting in all to P1,110 was taken by the plaintiff from his mother's trunk on an occasion when she suffered a collapse and when the plaintiff took some money from the same trunk with which to pay for injections. As we have said, the plaintiff did not testify to deny the testimony of the defendants. It is admitted in the brief for the plaintiff and appellant that the latter took 300 cavans of palay from his mother's

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granary, but it is claimed that said palay belonged to him. In the absence of plaintiff's testimony to support such claim, there is no basis upon which to sustain it. It was also proved during the trial that the plaintiff took possession of twelve carabaos belonging to his mother and that the value of said animals was P30 a head.

It was also established during the trial that the plaintiff studied surveying in Manila and that during his studies his mother and sister sent him money for his support and expenses, amounting to approximately P500 a year. Although the defendants claim that his studies lasted from 1918 to 1925, we sustain the contention of the plaintiff and appellant in his brief that it took him only two years to finish the course of surveying, because it is a matter of common knowledge that surveying is a two-year course, and it is probable that the rest of the time was spent by him in acquiring a high-school education.

Under the article 1041 of the Civil Code, allowances for support, education, attendance in illnesses, even though unusually expensive, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary presents are not subject to collation. But article 1042 of the same Code provides that expenses which may have been incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional or artistic career shall not be brought to collation unless the parent so orders or they encroach upon the legitimate. It also provides that in cases in which it is proper to collate them, the money which the child would have spent if it had lived in the house and company of its parents shall be deducted there from. Since the career of surveyor is a professional one, and since the expenses incurred by plaintiff's mother in giving him that career encroached upon the legitimate, it is proper to collate one-half of the amount spent by her for him during the two years he studied surveying, the other half being considered as the amount which the plaintiff would have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his mother.


[326]


Guinging vs. AbutonG.R. No. L-23035October 13, 1925

FACTS:

In the course of the administration of the estate of Ignacio Abuton, it appeared that the deceased died testate on March 8, 1916, leaving two sets of children by two different wives, the first of whom was Dionisia Olarte, who died about twenty years ago, and by whom the deceased had twelve, children, three of whom died without issue. The second wife was Teodora Guinguing, to whom the testator was married on July 14, 1906, and by whom he had four children, all still living. . In this inventory he included only the lands which the testator had devised to the children of the second marriage, omitting other lands possessed by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the children of the first marriage as having been derived from their mother. Accordingly, on March 14, 1922, Teodoro Guinguing, in representation of herself and her four minor children, presented a motion in court, asking that the administrator be required to amend his inventory and to include therein all property pertaining to the conjugal partnership of Ignacio Abuton and Dionisia Olarte, including property actually in the hands of his children by her which (the motion alleged) had been delivered to said children as an advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force the first set of children to bring into collation the properties that had been received by them, in conformity with article 1035 of the Civil Code

ISSUE:

Whether or not the first set of children should bring into collation the property received by them?

HELD:

As we gather from the record, the crux of the controversy consists in the fact that among the properties remaining in possession of Ignacio Abuton at the time of his death was a piece of land covered by a composition title No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of Dionisia Olarte. At the same time that this title was issued, Agapito Abuton procured two other titles, Nos. 11651 and 11654, covering adjacent properties to be issued in his own name. From the circumstance that title No. 11658 was issued in the name of Dionisia Olarte the opponents appear to believe that this land was her particular property and should now vest exclusively in her heirs. This conclusion is erroneous. There is nothing to show that the land covered by title No. 11658 was not acquired by the spouses during their marriage, and the circumstance that the title was taken in the name of the wife does not defeat its presumed character as ganacial property. Therefore, in liquidating the ganacial property of the first marriage it was within the power of the surviving husband to assign other property to the first set of children as their participation in the estate of their mother and to retain in his own hands the property for which a composition title had been issued in the name of the wife. Upon the whole we are unable to discover any reversible error in the appealed order, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.


[327]


Hernaez vs. HernaezG.R. No. L-10027

November 13, 1915

FACTS:

The spouses, Pedro Hernaez and Juana Espinosa, died, leaving several legitimate descendants. Neither of their estates had been divided up to the date of the institution of this action, but were both under administration. Their son, Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa, sold all his interest in both his father's and mother's estate to his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa had thus parted with all his interest in the estates of his two parents, he executed a document of sale in favor of Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. . On the same date he executed another document of sale in which he purported to convey to Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana four-eighteenths of his interest in his mother's estate. Both of these sales were made with the connivance of his son, Vicente Hernaez y Tuason. On August 19, 1912, Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana sold his interest in the estate to Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos. By this transfer, the latter stood owner of all the interest of Domingo Hernaez y Espinosa in the estate of Pedro Hernaez, and five-eighteenths of his interest in the estate of Juana Espinosa as against Vicente Hernaez y Espinosa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not co-heirs heir may exercise this right of subrogation upon the payment to the purchaser of another heir's interest.

HELD:

Article 1067 of the Civil Code provides that the co-heir may exercise this right of subrogation upon the payment to the purchaser of another heir's interest, "el precio de la compra" (the purchase price). Obviously, if the interest had not been resold, the plaintiff, Rosendo Hernaez y Espinosa, would have had to pay only the price for which Uy-Cana acquired it. The purpose of the article cannot be evaded by a reconveyance of the interest to a third person at a higher price. Subsequent purchasers of the interest acquire it burdened with the right of subrogation of co-heirs at the price for which the heir who sold it parted with it. It is urged that the prices in some of the deeds of sale by which Alejandro Montelibano y Ramos purchased the interest of various heirs in the estates are fictitious. This is a question of fact upon which both parties adduced evidence, and we concur in the opinion of the trial court that there is no basis to the charge. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court is modified by substituting, as the price of subrogation of the interest originally purchased by Jose Montelibano Uy-Cana, the sum of P4,500, as set out in Exhibit 7, for the sum of P10,000, the consideration expressed in Exhibit 10. As modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.


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Guerrero vs. De la Cuesta59 PHIL 464

February 8, 1934

FACTS:

The herein plaintiffs and defendants are relatives, all being direct descendants of the spouses Hilarion de la Cuesta and Valentina Zumel both of whom died intestate, Hilarion in 1873 and Valentina in 1921. The original complaint in this case filed July 24, 1923 was for the partition of 199 parcels of land. The remaining 14 parcels described in the amended complaint, filed July 5, 1932, were not included in said agreement due to irreconcilable differences arising among the parties. In this amended complaint the plaintiffs pray that the remaining 14 parcels of land be divided among all the parties herein in the same proportion and manner adopted in the partition agreement above-mentioned. In the original decision of the trial court, which is dated August 24, 1932, it was held that the defendant Jose de la Cuesta, who had received, by way of gift from his mother Valentina Zumel, parcels 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the amended complaint, should collate said parcels, and not their value at the time of the gift, for the of the purpose of the partition among all of the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property to be collated should be valued at the time of its donation?

HELD:

Article 1045 of the Civil Code provides:

"The same things bestowed as a gift or given in dowry need not be brought to collation and division, but only their value at the time of the gift or dowry, even though they should not have been appraised at the time.

"Their subsequent increase or decrease in value and even their total loss or destruction, whether casual or intentional, shall be for the account and risk or for the benefit of the donee."

The above provisions of the Civil Code together with the commentaries of Manresa are very clear on the point: that the donee can in no case be compelled to collate the same things donated in view of the fact that what was really donated at the time was only their value. What Manresa really says is that in the French Civil Code the coheir may demand not only the fictitious but also the material collation of real property. But in this jurisdiction the project of the Civil Code in 1851 in its article 887 and finally embodied in article 1045 of the present Civil Code radically departed from this viewpoint and made it simpler in the sense that whether the property donated is real or personal there shall be only fictitious collation.


[329]


Beltran vs. Doriano32 PHIL 66

October 26, 1915

FACTS:

Counsel for Modesta Beltran and her minor children Ignacio, Jose and Eliodoro, surnamed Guintu, filed a written complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in which he alleged that his clients were the owners in fee simple of a parcel of mangrove swamp land. The defendants unlawfully took possession of and continue to occupy the said land of the plaintiff, cutting nipa thereon, in violation of plaintiffs' rights and causing the latter damages to the extent of P500. Feliciano de la Rosa, the husband of Rosario Lim, sold outright and in perpetuity a parcel of mangrove swamp land to Doroteo Guintu and his wife Modesta Beltran. Feliciana Doriano, the widow of the late Francisco de la Rosa, their children Maria de la Rosa (accompanied by her husband, Leonardo Fernandez) and Feliciano de la Rosa, both of legal age, and Eugenio Fernandez, guardian of the minor Ramon de la Rosa, have declared that the said deceased, Francisco de la Rosa, husband and father of the deponents, left at his death property consisting mostly of mangrove swamp land which has not yet been judicially petitioned. By virtue of the acquisition by the spouses Guintu and Beltran of the land referred to in the notarial instrument Exhibit A, they entered into the possession of the property and took steps to improve it and increase the number of plants in order to secure the greatest benefit therefrom.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a co-heir can dispose his share even before partition which make the petitioner the lawful owner of the land in dispute.

HELD: There is no provisions of law whatever which prohibits a co-heir from selling his share of the estate, or legal portion, to a stranger, before the partition of the hereditary property is approved by the court, for article 1067 of the Civil Code prescribes: "If any of the heirs should sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the division, all or any of the co-heirs may subrogate themselves in the place of the purchaser, reimbursing him for the value of the purchase, provided they do so within the period of a month, to be counted from the time they were informed thereof." In law, the rule governing property held by various co-owners in common is analogous to that which obtains where the estate of a deceased person is held pro indiviso by several co-participants, for, pursuant to article 450 of the Civil Code, "each one of the participants in a thing possessed in common is considered as having exclusively possessed the part which may be alloted to him on the distribution for the entire period during which there is no division."


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Wenceslao vs. Calimon46 Phil. 906

December 20, 1923

Topic/Doctrine : Legal Redemption

FACTS:

This is a case of a legal redemption sanctioned by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, to the effect that the defendant should resell to the plaintiffs a four-fifth part of a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Baluarte, municipality of Bulacan, described in the complaint.

Three principal questions are raised by the appellant in his brief, the first relating to the period of nine days for the redemption, the second to the price of the repurchase, and the third to the capacity of the redeemers.

ISSUE:

Whether the offer to redeem made by UrbanoWenceslao on behalf of his children, the herein plaintiffs, is valid.

HELD:

As to the offer to redeem made by UrbanoWenceslao on behalf of his children, the herein plaintiffs, we think it is valid. He is the natural guardian of his children whom he represents in court and out of court. Such an offer was not an act of administration of property but of representation of his children in their rights.


[331]


Marcelino vs. Antonio70 Phil. 388

June 29, 1940

FACTS:

Después de legalizado el testamento de la finada Arcadia (Leocadia) Santos por el Juzgado de PrimeraInstancia de Ilocos Norte, susherederosFelisa Antonio y otros, presentaron, dos mocionespidiendo en una de ellasque se ordenase a los albaceas o administradores:1. To submit an inventory of the property, real and personal, comprised in the estate of the deceased Leocadia;2. To separate from said inventory the property, real and personal, pertaining to the conjugal partnership of Leocadia Santos and Modesto Marcelino; 3. To render an accounting of said conjugal partnership from 1905, death of Modesto Marcelino, to date, and liquidate the same;

4. To designate a day in court whereby petitioners may present evidence on the existence of a conjugal partnership, the properties of which have been illegally included and disposed in the will of Leocadia Santos; to the facts of non-liquidation, but of disposal;5. And for such other remedies as this Honorable Court may grant in the premises.

En la otramoción se pedíaque se declarasenulo el testamento de la finada en cuanto a cualquierlegado o interésdado en dichaúltimavoluntad a Calixta Peralta, hija de Casimiro Peralta, uno de los testigosdeltestamento.

En el memorándumpresentado con fecha 31 de octubre de 1938 por el abogado de lasemocionantes, pedíantambién la partición de la herenciadejadapor la finadaLeocadia Santos excluyendociertaspropiedadesque no le perene-cian. El Juzgadososteniendo la oposición de MaximinoMarcelino y Calixta Peralta, desestimolasmocionesporsuorden de 31 de enero de 1939, sobre el fundamento de que en ellas se suscitabancuestionesquedebíanventilarse en acciónordinariaporseparado. Las emocionantesapelaron de dichaorden.

ISSUE:

En cuanto a la otramoción, en que se solicita se declare nulo el testamento en relación con el legadohecho a favor de Calixta Peralta, y en cuanto al memorándum de lasemocionantesrespecto a la exclusión de ciertaspropiedades del inventario de la testamentaria, la ordenapeladatampocopuedesostenerse.

HELD:

Después de pagadastodaslasdeudas de unatestamentaria o intestado, el tribunal tienejurisdicciónparaproceder a la partición y distribución de la herencia entre los interesados. En el ejercicio de esajurisdicción, el tribunal puederespetar o no la distribuciónhecha en el testamento,

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segúnqueesadistribucióneste o no de acuerdo con lasdisposiciones de la ley. La facultad, portanto, de determinar la legalidad o ilegalidad de lasdisposicionestestamentarias, esinherente a la jurisdiccióndel tribunal al proceder a unadistribuciónjusta y legal de la herencia. Porotra parte, declararqueunaacciónindependiente y separadaesnecesariaaese fin, esir contra la tendencia general de la jurisprudencia de evitarmultiplicidad de pleitos, yes, además, costoso, dilatorio y nada practico.En cuanto a la exclusión del inventario de ciertaspropiedades, sibienescierto, comoregla general, que el tribunal, en esasactuaciones, no tienefacultadparadecidircuestionessobretítulo de propiedad, yahemosdeclarado, sin embargo, quepuedehacerlo, de un modo provisional, cuando el propósitoessolamenteparadeterminarsideben o no excluirse del inventarioalgunaspropiedades en particular.


[333]


Guidote vs. Bank of the P.I 67 Phil 391

FACTS:

The intestate proceedings are pending, the judicial administratrix thereof filed a project of partition suggesting that the properties to be partitioned be adjudicated to the heirs of the deceased ValentinGuidote named Mauricio, Eugenia, Anita, Concepcion, Raymunda, Catalina, Pacita, Josefina, Caridad, and Jose, all surnamed Guidote, in the proportions indicated in said project, but declaring them subject to the mortgage which the said deceased had executed in favor of Vicente A. Rufino, Mercedes P. Vda. de Rufino, and Ernesto D. Rufino, with the exception of the land situated in Ibayo-Tanag of the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, which is uneffected by any lien.

One month after filing the said project of partition, that is on August 12, 1937, the Bank of the Philippine Islands appeared in the case to oppose the approval thereof on the ground that it has an unpaid credit amounting to P20,000.

ISSUE:

WON BPI can rightfully represent guidote?

HELD:

The unpaid credits was agreed by both as unpaid, While these credits, and possibly other indebtedness and obligations of the intestate, have not been paid, the project of partition filed by the administratrix cannot be approved, and still less can the properties to be partitioned be delivered to the heirs, unless the latter give the security required by section 745 of Act No. 190 which reads as follows:

SEC. 745.Parties interested may have order. — Such order may be made on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate; but the heirs, devices, or legatees, shall not be entitled to an order for their share, until the payment of the debts and allowances mentioned in the preceding section, and the several expenses there mentioned have been made or provided for, unless they give a bond with such surety or sureties as the court directs, to secure the payment of such debts, expenses, or allowances, or any part thereof as remain unpaid or unprovided for, and to indemnify the executor or administrator against the same.

Sing, Marc EricLLB III-B

[334]


Estate of Manuela Perez 62 Phil 641

FACTS:

Flora Castillo, one of the heirs of the deceased Manuela Perez, appealed from the order of the court of March 26, 1934, approving the amended project of partition presented by the attorney for the administrator on December 29, 1933.

These testamentary proceedings have been pending settlement and distribution in court, due to incidents brought about by the only two heirs, daughters of the deceased testatrix. Various projects of partition were presented but all of them were opposed by the co-heir Flora Castillo. In order to arrive at a definite solution, her sister Jovita, on November 7, 1933, filed a petition offering to pay all the lawful obligations of the estate on condition that she be awarded the parcel of land in Talahiban and two-thirds (2/3) of the land in Laiya, as provided in the probated will. The proposition was approved without opposition in an order of November 15, 1933, and in which administrator presented them with plans. Which constitutes the net legitime to be prorated between the two heirs. In accordance therewith, each of them should receive properties worth P819.485. To carry out the distribution provided in the will and give each heir her share of the estate, adjudication was made as follows: To Flora Castillo, 16 hectares, 38 ares and 97 centares of the land in Laiya, on the eastern part thereof, from north to south, the value of which, at P50 a hectare, is P819.485; and to Jovita Castillo, 23 hectares, 61 ares and 3 centares of the land in Laiya, on the western part thereof, from north to South, the value of which, at P50 a hectare, is P1,180.515, and the entire parcel of land in Talahiban with an area of 40 hectares, 82 centares, the value of which at P200 a hectare, is P8,165.46.

ISSUE:

WON mortgage is valid?

HELD:

Yes. Because the appellant had consented to it and hold that the estate should now make payment thereof and, consequently, the item of P2,000 was correctly entered in the liabilities. The assessed valuation of the land is reasonable and there is nothing of record justifying otherwise.

The provisions of the will have been taken into consideration and the shares adjudicated to each of the heirs, with the exception of the betterments, constitute the legitime corresponding to each of them.


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Javelosa vs. Barrios 66 Phil 107

FACTS:

The subject land, with an area of 2,061 square meters, situated in Jaro, Iloilo City, was originally owned by petitioner Gregorio Javelosa. Sometime in the 70’s, petitioner , mortgaged said land to Jesus Jalbuena to secure several loans. Petitioner failed to pay his loans and Jalbuena, as mortgagee, foreclosed on the land and purchased it as highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.

In the early part of December 1986, the mortgagee divided the subject land among his married daughters (private respondents herein). On December 27, 1986, the mortgagee died. He was substituted by his heirs, private respondents, in the pending RTC case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale. On January 19, 1987, title to the subject lot was issued in the names of private respondents.

On June 1, 1993, private respondents, as registered owners, sent a letter to petitioner-mortgagor demanding that he vacate the subject premises within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Despite receipt of the demand letter on June 4, 1993, petitioner-mortgagor refused to vacate said lot. Thus, on August 6, 1993, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cities, Iloilo City, and sought to eject petitioner from the premises.

ISSUE:

WON complaint is valid?

HELD:

It held that the complaint was filed out of time for under Section 1, rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and unlawful detainer case must be filed within one year from the time title was issued in private respondents’ name. From January 19, 1987, and not from the last demand to vacate made by private respondents (plaintiffs therein). Thus, the ejectment case initiated on August 6, 1993 was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period and that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer.


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Cu Unjieng vs. Tiaoqui 64 Phil 566

FACTS:

Tiaoqui, during his lifetime, instituted civil case against Cu Unjieng for the recovery of money. Upon posting of a bond, the Court ordered attachment of the property of the latter. Yioaqui died during the pendency of the case. Cu Unjiengs set up counterclaim for the lossses they suffered and damages because of the attachment.

In the meantime, the instestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Tioaqui followed their ordinary course, no claims were presented against the deceased. The court ordered the final accounting of the estate, the administrators asked for extension, in view of the fact that the balancing of the business would be made in a few months and that certain credits and properties were under pending litigation.

After a few more motions to extend, the finall accounting was finally delivered to the court, estate taxes were paid and the properties delivered to the heirs. The instestate proceeding was ordered closed.

The administrators filed a motion to reopen the intestate proceedings because of the pending litigation with the Cu Unjiengs. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for the annulment of the delivery of the properties in favor of the heirs.

ISSUE:

W/N Cu Unjiengs were entitled to have the deed of delivery cancelled despite their failure to file their claim in the intestate proceeding

HELD:

NO. Probate court alone had acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the settlement, payment of debts and distribution of the estate of the deceased, to the exclusion of all other courts, it cannot be denied that if the defendants-appellants wanted some remedy from said court for the protection of their rights, they should timely apply to it and ask for the retention of properties sufficient to pay for the counterclaim in case it should prosper.

The administrators were also in duty bound to inform the probate court of the existence of the counterclaim, which duty was partly complied with by them when they reiteratedly informed the court that it was not possible to present a final account or project of partition on the ground that there were pending litigations, and when they applied for the reopening of the intestate proceedings and for authority to continue the pending suit. Cu Unjiengs were not relieved thereof by the conduct that might have been observed by the administrators, which conduct, on the other hand, cannot be considered improper.

[337]


The court was not informed of said counterclaim, it understood that the inheritance was ready for distribution, it appearing from the report of the committee that there were no debts to be paid and it being inferable form the record that the expenses of administration, including the inheritance tax, had already been paid. Appellants have available the remedy afforded by section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure under which they may, after having obtained favorable judgment, ask that the heirs contribute in proportion to the value of the properties received by them, to pay their counterclaim.

Moreover the attachment obtained by Tioaqui was nominal, being the fifth attachment, it seems unnecessary to adopt so drastic a measure as to result in depriving the heirs of their possession of the properties received by them by order of the court


[338]


Del Val v Del Val G.R. No. L-9374

February 16, 1915

Fatcs:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing the complaint with costs.

The parties are siblings who were the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio del Val, who passed away intestate. An administrator was appointed for the estate of the deceased, and, after a partial administration, it was closed. During the lifetime of the deceased he took out insurance on his life for the sum of P40,000 and made it payable to Andres del Val as sole beneficiary. After his death, the defendant Andres collected the face of the policy. He paid the sum of P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate which the decedent had sold to third persons with a right to repurchase. The redemption of said premises was made by the attorney of the defendant in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the deceased vendor. Andres, on death of the deceased, took possession of most of his personal property and that he has also the balance on the insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.

Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the estate of the deceased and not to the defendant personally, hence they are entitled to a partition not only of the real and personal property, but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays a partition of all the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased, and that the defendant account for P21,634.80. They also wanted to divide this equally among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other property of deceased.

The defendant’s claim was that redemption of the real estate sold by his father was made in the name of the plaintiffs and himself instead of in his name alone without his knowledge or consent. He also averred that it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the insurance policy for the benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and is the sole owner thereof and that it is his individual property

The trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed the action due to the argument that the action for partition failed to comply with the Civil Procedure Code sec. 183, in that it does not 'contain an adequate description of the real property of which partition is demanded.'

Issue:

Can the proceeds of the policy be divided among the heirs?

Held:

No.The proceeds of the life-insurance policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his individual and separate property. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, the doctrine is embedded in the Code of Commerce where:

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“The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person insured, in fulfillment of the contract, shall be the property of the latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or creditors of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance in favor of the former.”The plaintiffs invoked Article 1035 of the Civil Code, where it reads:“An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character to a succession must bring into the hereditary estate the property or securities he may have received from the deceased during the life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good consideration, in order to compute it in fixing the legal portions and in the account of the division.”They also invoked Article 819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are not betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."The court didn’t agree because the contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life- insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That was under the Code of Commerce.The plaintiffs claim that the property repurchased with the insurance proceeds belongs to the heirs in common and not to the defendant alone. This wasn’t agreed upon by the court unless the facts appeared that Andres acted as he did with the intention that the other heirs should enjoy with him the ownership of the estate.


[340]


SANTIESTEBAN vs SANTIESTEBAN G.R. No. L-45217

June 30, 1939

Topic/Doctrine: Probate Proceeding,

FACTS:

On February 3, 1932, there was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Rizal the intestate of the deceased Benita Lambengco who died on January 29th of the same year. On May 3rd, Ambrosio Santiesteban, surviving spouse of the deceased, was named judicial administrator. As the deceased left no unpaid debts or other obligations, her heirs Ambrosio Santiesteban, husband of the deceased, Perfecto Guadalupe, Rosa and Clara, surnamed Santiesteban, who are her children, executed an extrajudicial partition on September 13 and 14, 1932, which was approved by the court on October 18th of the same year. In the deed of the partition, the widower received the best portion of the inheritance, including therein eight parcels of land which the spouses, in life, had acquired by purchase from the spouses Baltazar Raymundo and Agapita San Juan. Ambrosio Santiesteban conveyed the eight parcels of land to his daughter, Guadalupe, and the latter, in turn, applied for the registration thereof under Act No. 496; which application, however, was opposed by Macondray & Co., Inc., on the allegation that it was the owner of the lands by virtue of an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the original owners thereof. On February 27, 1935, the court adjudicated the lands in the registration case to the oppositor Macondray & Co., Inc.

On September 10, 1934, more than two years after the closure of the intestate, Ambrosio Santiesteban conveyed the eight parcels of land to his daughter, Guadalupe, and the latter, in turn, applied for the registration thereof under Act No. 496; which application, however, was opposed by Macondray & Co., Inc., and that it was necessary to reopen the intestate and to appoint a new administrator, to which position she proposed Mariano de la Paz. The petition was vigorously opposed by Rosa Santiesteban and the heirs of the deceased Perfecto Santiesteban argue that this last order, having become final, was not subject to modification or reversal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case which became final may reopened modified and reversed?

HELD:

We find no merit in the assignment of error because the order of November 12, 1934, did not finally determine the action and was interlocutory in nature (section 123, Code of Civil Procedure). By said order the court did not determine or adjudicate any right or controversy and it had no other object than to open the way for the hearing and resolution of the rights to alleged damages which one of the parties claimed to have suffered.

SORRONDA, NIÑA MAY TILDELLB III-B

[341]


BORJA vs. ENCARNACION,G.R. No. L-4681

July 31, 1951

Topic/Doctrine: Probate Proceeding,

FACTS:It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, the commissioners appointed by the court submitted on February 8, 1944, a project of partition, in which the land in question, which is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was included as property of the estate and assigned to one Miguel B. Dayco, one of Marcelo de Borja's heirs. Over the objection of the petitioners, surviving children of Quintin de Borja who was one of Marcelo's children, the proposed partition was approved in February, 1946, and the order of approval on appeal was affirmed by this Court in 1949. Although the administratrix of Quintin de Borja's estate was the party named in the partition in behalf of the estate, the proceeding for the reason that they had been declared their father's sole heirs in the settlement of their father's estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself the duly appointed administratrix of the last named intestate estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action to recover property may be included in the intestate proceeding?

RULING:The probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity if requiring the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and litigate an entirely different action. There can be no question of the share to be delivered the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to deliver that possession to the person entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, for denying the same power to the probate court to be exercised within the same estate proceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of 'any other person,' especially when 'such other person' is one of the heirs themselves who are already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate proceeding."

The partition here had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the petitioners had received the property assigned to them or their father's estateA party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him.

The court had only the partition to examine, to see if the questioned land was included therein. The inclusion being shown, and there being no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition.

SORRONDA, NIÑA MAY TILDELLB III-B

[342]


Bautista vs. Grino-AquinoG.R. No. 79958

October 28, 1988

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Extrajudicial Partition of Property

FACTS

The parties admit that the land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel Bautista under T.C.T No. 2210 and the latter inherited the land from his father, Mariano Bautista. On Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed the said deed. Both parties admit that upon registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, was cancelled and in lieu thereof, T.C.T.-T-14182 was issued. They also admit that the private respondents executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito Bautista of that property. Subsequently, a Deed of Sale, T.C.T. T-14182 was cancelled and the T.C.T. No. T-14186 was issued to Manolito Bautista. On August 7, 1969, the latter executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the other private respondents and upon registration of said Deed of Sale, T.C.T. Nos. T-15665, T-15666, T-15667, T-15668, T-15669, T-15670, T-15671, were issued to private respondents, parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista married to his second wife Emiliana Tamayo. It was allegedly declared that spouses Bautista had only a child, Evangeline Bautista. December 22, 1966, the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition and among the heirs of the late Juliana Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista. The latter denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property.

On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel Bautista. The NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic. The petitioners instituted an action in the CFI of Rizal to declare the deed of extra-judicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates of Title to be declared null an void. However the latter court dismissed the petition. Then petitioners seek a review of said decision alleging the following: (1) The findings of facts of public respondents are manifestly absurd and mistaken; (2) The public respondents authorized the Extrajudicial partition of future inheritance in clear violation of Article 1347 of the New Civil Code; (3) The public respondents authorized the preterition of petitioner Evangeline Bautista in violation of the Law on Succession.

ISSUE

Whether or not the property of the surviving husband (Manuel Bautista) be the subject of an extrajudicial partition of the estate of the deceased wife (Juliana Nojadera)?

HELD

NO. The deed of extrajudicial partition is void ab initio for including in the partition property which does not pertain to the estate of the deceased wife and which deprives the lawful owner thereof of his property without due process of law. Only property of the estate of the decedent which is transmitted by succession can be the lawful subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. In this case, the said partition

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obviously prejudices the right of Manuel Bautista as exclusive owner of the property. Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of an extrajudicial partition. Thus, all subsequent transactions involving the property between and among the private respondents are also null and void. Likewise, the said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.

The findings of facts of both the trial court and the respondent Appellate Court that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Deed of Extrajudicial Partition is authentic, as examined by the NBI, can no longer be questioned in this proceeding. Nevertheless, even granting that the signature of Manuel Baustista in the questioned Extrajudicial Deed of Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts renders the document fatally defective.

Tanjusay, Maria Katrina S. LLB III-B

Ralla vs. Untalan

[344]


G.R. No. 63253-54April 27, 1989

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: “There can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated”

FACTS

On January 27, 1959, Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his own will in the CFI (now RTC) of Albay. In his will, he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (the petitioner herein who, upon his death during the pendency of this petition, was substituted by his heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro Ralla. In the same year, the latter filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella. In a special proceeding, Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosend, for its probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him. This motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. (The latter court agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo of 149 parcels of land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro Ralla, who was being deprived of his successional rights over the said properties.) The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by this Court. On the scheduled hearing on November 3, 1966, the petitioner Pablo reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the subject will. Cosequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who shoud share equally upon the division of the latter’s estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. On December 18, 1967, the brothers entered into a project of partition whereby sixty-three parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escarella, were amicably divided between the two of them and was approved on December 19, 1967 by Judge Ezekiel Grageda. Eleven years later, or on February 28, 1978, Joaquin Chancoco, brother-in-law of the petitioner Pablo filed a petition for the probate of the same will of Rosendo on the ground that the decedent owed him P5,000.00. Pablo then filed a manifestation stating that he had no objections to the probate. Subsequently, he filed a Motion to Intervene as Petitioner for the Probate of the Will. This motion was heard ex parte and granted despite the written opposition of the heirs of Pedro. Likewise, the petition for probate was granted. Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner was appointed special administrator, again, over and above the objection of the heirs of Pedro. However, in taking possession of the properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo Ralla, Teodorico Almine also took possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered by the project of partition. Consequently, the heirs of Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land. Then respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan ruled that the sixty-three parcels of land should be included in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla and that said proceedings which were ordered consolidated by this Court should proceed as probate proceedings. About two years later, the private respondents filed a Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of 67 Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition. Judge Untalan reconsidered his earlier Order that The Project of Partition should, therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence, the sixty-three (63) parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the probate proceedings and, likewise from the administration of Special Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr. The petitioner Pablo filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order but the same was denied by respondent Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes.

[345]


ISSUE

Whether or not the sixty-three (63) parcels of land should be excluded in the Project of Partition from the probate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla?

HELD

YES. The rule that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. Thus, the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had fully been carried out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it. Likewise: Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioners’ knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition . . . They can not attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case. In fine, the partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and binding upon the petitioner and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs, especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their respective shares in the inheritance from their mother, the late Paz Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them and embodied in the document of partition. Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla.


Evangelista vs. Bonilla

[346]


G.R. No. L-852 March 19, 1949

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Nature and Effect of Judicial Partition in Probate Proceeding

FACTS

Casimiro Evangelista is a registered owner of a parcel of land (homestead) as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 4905 of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, consisting of 7.0652 hectares, more or less situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. He was married to Leonida Mari, (plaintiff) on February 7, 1920 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and during their marriage and while living together as spouses, they begot two children, Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista. Casimiro died intestate on or about 1938 at Platero, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. The property in litigation was acquired on January 23, 1935, as per original certificate of title No. 4905, homestead patent. On January 10, 1944, Deogracias alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro Evangelista, executed a declaration of heirship known as Doc. No. 9, Page 30, Book No. 18, of Notary Public, Carlos M. Ferrer, herein incorporated and made a part of these agreement of facts as Exhibit A for the sum of P2,400. Deogracias Evangelista sold on the same date, January 10, 1944, the property in question to the defendant spouses, Isaac Bonilla and Silvina Ordanez, in Doc. 10, Page No. 31, Book No. 18, series of 1544, of Notary Public, Carlos M. Ferrer incorporated and attached herein as Exhibit B, as part of this agreement. The certificate of marriage of Casimiro Evangelista and Leonida Mari is attached as Exhibit C and made a part of the agreement. After the said sale, on January 10, 1944, original certificate of title No. 4905 was cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 19991 was issued in the spouses Isaac Bonilla and Silvina Ordanez. Thereafter, the defendant spouses assumed possession of the land, and the harvest for the year 1944-1945 was seventeen cavanes, (17). At present the land was planted with palay (1 hectare), sugar cane (1/3 hectare), and camoting kahoy, (1/3 hectare included in the 1/3 planted with sugar cane), now still in the possession of the defendant. The defendant begun to live in Platero, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija on March 1938, and that the plaintiffs lived in Platero, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija since the year 1920 up to the present time. However, the defendant spouse did not know that Leonida Mari is the mother of Deogracias Evangelista at the time when he bought the land since Deogracias was living with his grandfather, Matias Evangelista, and that Caridad Evangelista was living with her mother, Leonida Mari. The plaintiff, Caridad, who was Deogracias’ sister and co-owner brought an action to recover her combined 3/4 share in a parcel of land sold to defendant spouses by Deogracias Evangelista.

ISSUE

Whether or not Deogracias Evangelista has exceeded on his right to convey more than his own share of the subject property to defendant spouses Bonilla?

HELD

YES. A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the partitioners had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership, and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may

[347]


still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reinvindication in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. Broad perspectives of public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been had.Good faith affords protection only to purchasers for value from the registered owner. Deogracias Evangelista, defendants' grantor, is not a registered owner. The land was and still is registered in the name of Casimiro Evangelista. In no way does the certificate of title state that Deogracias owned the land. Consequently defendants cannot summon to their aid the theory of indefeasibility of Torrens title. There is nothing in the certificate and in the circumstances of the transaction which warrant them (in supposing that they needed not looked beyond the title. If anything, it should have put them on their guard, cautioned them to ascertain and verify that the vendor was the only heir of his father, that there was no debt, and that the latter was the sole owner of the parcel of land.


DIMAYUGA v CA

[348]


129 SCRA 110April 30, 1984

FACTS:

Genaro Dimayuga is married to SegundaGayapanao in 1915 acquired a Torrens title for that homestead in 1928. Segunda died intestate in 1940, survived by her son, Manuel, and her husband, Genaro. During their marriage, Genaro had a mistress named EmerencianaPanganiban by whom he begot five children, named Filomeno, Pacita, Adelaida, Remedios and Socorro. A sixth child, NeliaDimayuga, was born in 1944 or after Segunda's death Emerenciana cultivated a homestead adjoining the thirteen-hectare homestead in question. So, it was not surprising that she became the paramour of Genaro.

Genaro, 56, married Emerenciana, 37, on February 26, 1947. That marriage legitimated Nelia, who had been a duly acknowledged natural child, but it did not improve the status of her brother and four sisters who were adulterous or spurious children. On September 16, 1948, or about a month before Genaro's death a "partition of real property" was executed in English. It was duly notarized. It was signed by Genaro, Manuel, Filomeno and Pacita and thumbmarked by Emerenciana, in representation of her minor children Adelaida, Remedios, Socorro and Nelia, though Emerenciana had not been appointed judicial guardian of their property.

In that partition, which the petitioners also regard as a donation, Genaro treated the homestead as his sole property and not conjugal, which it actually was. Manuel was even as share five and one-half hectares of the homestead (southern portion adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead). The six illegitimate children were given seven and seven-tenth hectares (northern portion also adjoining Emerenciana's separate homestead). The partition was not registered.

Nineteen years later, or on May 28, 1970, Manuel having been advised that the entire homestead was inherited by him from his parents and freed from his father's moral ascendancy, executed an affidavit of adjudication which he registered. He obtained a Torrens title for the thirteen-hectare homestead. About two months later, the six illegitimate children filed a complaint for the annulment of Manuel's title and for the division of the homestead equally among Genaro's seven children including Manuel. The trial court annulled Manuel's title, decreed that about one-half of the homestead should be divided equally among the six illegitimate children and ordered Manuel to pay them P2,500 as moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Manuel appealed to the Court of Appeals which adjudicated to him three-fourth of the homestead and the other one-fourth to Nelia. The six illegitimate children appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Manuel should be awarded three-fourth of the homestead and only one-fourth to Nelia.

HELD:

Yes. No portion of the homestead, a registered land, may be acquired by prescription. "No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession."

Article 1056 of the old Civil Code provides that "if the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand insofar, as it does not prejudice the legitime

[349]


of the forced heirs." Article 1056 was construed to mean that a person who makes an inter vivos partition must first execute a will. If the will is void, the partition is void.With more reason would the partition be void if there was no will. The 1948 partition was not in conformity with law. It assumed that Genaro was the owner of the entire homestead which is wrong. One-half of the homestead, subject to the husband's usufructuarylegitime, was inherited in 1940 by Manuel upon the death of his mother who was married to Genaro for twenty-five years. Genaro could dispose by an act inter vivos only one-half of the homestead. In that one-half portion, Manuel and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced heirs, had a two-third legitime.

In "donating" the said one-half portion to his six illegitimate children, Genaro deprived Manuel of his legitime in his estate or, in effect, made him renounce his future inheritance. The 1951 affidavit cannot be construed as a repudiation of his inheritance in his father's estate because the document does not have that tenor. For this reason, Manuel is not estopped to ignore that partition. The rule in Alforque vs. Veloso, 65 Phil. 272, cited by the petitioners, does not apply to Manuel. The facts in the Alforque case are radically different from the facts of the instant homestead case. The five illegitimate children (the sixth child Nelia was legitimated) have no rights whatsoever to the said homestead. As already said, they were adulterous or spurious children.

As such, they are not entitled to successional rights but only to support (Art. 139, old Civil Code)

Manuel and Nelia, as Genaro's legal and forced heirs, are entitled to inherit Genaro's one-half portion. It cannot be said that the five adulterous children have no resources whatsoever. Their mother, Emerenciana, has a homestead adjoining Genaro's homestead in question.

Fajardo vs. Fajardo

There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an act inter vivos, or by will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed. If the partition was made by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in writing in a public instrument, because it was a conveyance of real estate. If by last will and testament, the legal requisites should have been observed.


Legasto vs VersozaG.R. No. L-32344

[350]


March 31, 1930

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Partition

FACTS:

Sabina Almadin executed a will, devising certain parcels of land belonging to her, to her four nieces, Maria Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, daughters of her sister Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to each.

Sabina partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and nieces, executing a deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three parcels of her land therein described. Maria Verzosa and Sabina Almadin appeared before the deputy provincial assessor and municipal secretary, and made two sworn statements, wherein the former stated that she had purchased the parcels of land from Sabina, and the latter in turn declared that she had sold them to Maria Verzosa.

On the same day, Sabina executed a deed in favor of her niece Oliva Verzosa, assigning to her two parcels of land described in said instrument. Sabina also executed a deed in favor of her niece Toribia Verzosa, assigning to her the four parcels of land. Again on the said day, Sabina executed a deed to her niece Ruperta Palma assigning to her three parcels of land.

Sabina Almadin passed away, her sister Catalina Almadin, propounded her will for probate. Said will was not admitted to probate. Vivencio Legasto, then, the special administrator appointed the court filed the complaint which originated this case, claiming the delivery of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces was valid enforceable.

HELD:

A testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.


Fajardo vs Fajardo

[351]


G.R. No. L-32195 August 19, 1930

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Partition

FACTS:

Appellant and appellee are brother and sister, and the sole heirs of the decedent spouses whose succession now engages our attention. While the appellant alleges that his father had long before death divided his estate between his children, the parties herein, the latter entering upon the possession and enjoyment thereof, the appellee denies any such partition.

The evidence shows that the appellant took possession of certain lands belonging to his deceased father before the latter's death, paying the land tax and appropriating the fruits thereof for his own personal use. While the appellee, too, now holds certain land from the same predecessor, it has not been shown that such tenure dates back to her father's lifetime. And both she and her husband have testified that they took possession thereof only after her father's death. The record does not bear out the allegation that the late Magdaleno Fajardo divided his estate between his two children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition made is enforceable.

HELD:

No. It does not appear that if such a partition was made, it was made in accordance with law and is therefore enforceable. There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an act inter vivos, or by will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed. Manresa thus comments on articles 1056 et seq. of the Civil Code:

A testator may therefore partition his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will; that is, following the proper formalities of one, or the other of these acts. (Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, vol VII, p. 694, 5th edition.)

If the partition was made by an act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in writing in a public instrument (article 1280, Civil Code) because it was a conveyance of real estate. If by last will and testament, the legal requisites should have been observed. Neither appears in the record to have been done.

No application can therefore be made of the doctrines laid down in Fule vs. Fule (46 Phil., 317); Fule vs. Fule (52 Phil., 750); and Garcia vs. Tolentino (25 Phil., 102), where, neither the existence nor the formalities of the partition being in issue, the court was under the necessity of holding that the partition was enforceable.


BALANAY vs MARTINEZ

[352]


64 SCRA 452June 27, 1975

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Partition and Distribution of the Estate

FACTS:

-Leodegaria Julian died leaving her husband Felix Sr., and six legitimate children, Felix, Jr. Avelina, Beatriz, Carolina, Delia, and Emilia.

-She left a notarial will and in paragraph 5 of the will she said that after the death of Felix Sr. her land and all conjugal lands should be divided in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned of in the will her husband’s one-half share of the conjugal assets.

-Felix Sr and Avelina opposed.

-Subsequently, Felix Sr withdrew and he conformed and renounced his hereditary rights. However, Avelina continued on with her opposition.

-The lower court declared the will as void and converted the testate proceeding to an intestate proceeding.

-Felix, Jr. appealed.

ISSUES:

1. WON the will should first be determined to be intrinsically valid prior to the determination of its allowance or formal validity

2. WON the declaration that the will was void is proper

3. WON the renunciation of Felix, Sr. of his hereditary rights is valid

4. WIN Felix, Sr. will was intrinsically void because it preterited him

HELD:

1. Yes, it was correct in passing upon the question of intrinsic validity first. The court was of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will (i.e. paragraph 5), which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate. It was correct to pass upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal validity is established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical consideration demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

2. No, it was not proper. The invalidity of one of the several dispositions does not affect the validity of the other dispositions. Except if the other dispositions is dependent on the first invalid disposition that has been made. The valid parts should be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.

3. Yes, it was valid. Art. 793 of the Civil Code states that Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly

[353]


appear by the will that such was his intention and Art. 930 The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect. The partition then has become valid.

4. No, Felix, Sr.’s case In the case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife’s will and renounced his hereditary rights. Thus it is different from the Nuguid case because where the testatrix as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Art. 854 of the Civil Code provides, “The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.” Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister as testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted.

Moreover, testacy is preferable to intestacy. Doubts are resolved in favor of intestacy. As far as legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions in the will should be followed.


Delos Santos vs Santa Teresa44 Phil 811

[354]


January 8, 1918

TOPIC/DOCTRINE: Partition and Distribution of the Estate

FACTS:

Gregorio Santa Teresa, the predecessor in interest of the parties herein, died about thirty years ago, leaving the plaintiffs and the defendant as his heirs. That said predecessor in interest, Gregorio Santa Teresa, left no other property than that described in paragraph 3 of the complaint. Since the death of the deceased, Gregorio Santa Teresa, the defendant Fernando Santa Teresa had always been in quiet and peaceful possession of said property. That since the death of the deceased Gregorio Santa Teresa, the defendant had been paying the land tax of the lands described in the complaint and enjoying them as sole owner thereof, said enjoyment not having been interrupted at any time by any other person claiming any interest therein. Both parties allege that the trial court erred in not taking into consideration, in deciding the case, the provisions of article 1965 of the Civil Code, according to which "as between coheirs, coowners, or proprietors of adjacent estates, the action to demand the partition of the inheritance, of the thing held in common, or the survey of the adjacent properties does not prescribe." and in not granting the motion for new trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for partition between the co-heir has prescribed.

HELD:

No. As long as the co-ownership exists, there is a right on the part of every co-heir to demand the partition of the estate. Even if the estate is held only by one co-owner, but he holds it in the common interest, any other co-owner will always have a right to ask for partition. But if the co-heir having possession of the hereditary property holds the same in his own name, under claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by prescription if his possession meets all the requirements of the law; and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heirs or co-owners lose their right to demand partition.


Garcia vs. Calaliman

[355]


172 SCRA 201

Topic/Doctrine: COLLATION

FACTS:

Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land. On his death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces, grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers, Pedro, Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos. In 1954, the heirs, Juanit Bertomo et al signed a document entitled, "Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Sale. On December 17, 1954 another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia et al, also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo their shares, rights, interest and participation in the same parcel of land. The Deed of Sale was registered in the Register of Deeds. The Petitioners came to know that their co-heirs were selling the property when one of the heirs, Juanito Bertomo, asked Petitioner Paz Garcia to sign a document. On December 26, 1954 Francisco Garcia wrote the respondents giving them notice of his desire to exercise the right of legal redemption and that he would resort to court action if denied the right. The respondents did not reply. Hence, Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds and there found two documents of sale regarding the same parcel of land. In 1955, Francisco Garcia and the other heirs (Petitioners) filed a case for legal redemption claiming that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088 of NCC had already elapsed.

ISSUE:

WON, the 30-day period prescribed in article 1088 of the new civil code for a co-heir to exercise his right of legal redemption, had already elapsed?

HELD:

The issue had been squarely settled in the case of Castillo v. Samonte, where the SC observed: "Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by registration. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the said notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or information was sufficient. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided f or any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption.

TORRES, ROMEL GLLB III-B

Castillo vs Samonte

[356]


L-13146, January 30, 1960

Topic/Doctrine :Section 6. Sub-section 1 (Partition)

FACTS:

Romualda Meneses was, during her lifetime, the owner of the unregistered residential land. Upon her demise, she left as compulsary heirs the plaintiff herein and his brothers and sister. Said property remained undivided, as the heirs did not partition the inherited estate either judicially or extrajudicially. On July 13, 1953, one of the heirs, Gregorio Castillo, without giving any notice in writing to his co-heirs, including plaintiff herein, sold for P1,000.00 his undivided interest in the property to defendant who, on July 16, 1953, succeeded in registering the deed of sale the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Sometime in September, 1956, when the place was surveyed cadastrally, plaintiff learned for the first time about the sale he offered to redeem the property from defendant, but the latter refused to resell the same to him. Plaintiff, therefore, filed a complaint in the above-mentioned court praying the defendant be ordered to resell the property to him. the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to reconvey or transfer the portion of the property in question to the plaintiff herein, upon the payment by the latter to the former of the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), which is the consideration of the sale made by Gregorio Castillo in favor of the defendant.

ISSUE:

WON, plaintiff’s right to redeem the property subject of the controversy is tenable as a compulsory heir?

HELD:

Yes. An action seeks to assert a fundamental, primary right of which the plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived, or to redress a wrong which has been inflicted; legal redemption is in the nature of a mere privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has been trust. In conformity with the above ruling and, since in the instant case, it does not appear that defendant had acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing plaintiff's offer to redeem the property in question, or that there are in the text of their appealed decision reasonable or equitable reasons for allowing the award of attorney's fees to plaintiff, we are constrained to disallow the same.


Gerona et al vs. De Guzman11 SCRA 153

[357]



FACTS:

Petitioner Gerona heirs are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman. Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife Teodora de la Cruz. After the death of Teodora, Marcelo married Camila Ramos. Their children are herein respondents de Guzman heirs. Marcelo died sometime in September 1945 and respondents executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his estate. They fraudulently stipulated therein that they were the only surviving heirs of Marcelo although knowing that petitioners were also his forced heirs. They were able to cause the transfer the certificates of 7 parcels of land each in their names. The petitioners discovered the fraud only the year before the institution of the case. Petitioners seek to annul the extra-judicial settlement as well as have their shares in the said properties reconveyed to them.

ISSUE:

WON Placida de Guzman was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo as she was an illegitimate child and that the action of the Petitioners is barred by the statute of limitations.

HELD:

The rule holds true only when the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates from the time the adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. The defendants excluded the petitioners from the estate of Marcelo when they executed the deed of extra-judicial settlement claiming that they are the sole heirs thus setting up an adverse title to the estate. An action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations and the action may only be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar, the discovery was made on June 25, 1948 when the deed was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the names of the respondents exclusively. Plaintiff’s complaint was not filed until November 4, 1958 or more than 10 years after. Ignacio Gerona as well as Maria Concepcion attained the age of majority in 1948 thus had 4 years from date of discovery within which to file an action. Francisco and Delfin attained the age of majority in1952 and 1954, thus had 2 years after removal of legal incapacity” within which to commence their action.


Santos vs. Mendoza69 Phil 155

[358]



FACTS:

Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue. She had a niece named Marciana who is the mother of herein defendant, Maximo. Gertrudes, who is Pelagias grandniece, and several co-heir s including Maximo, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition Agreement purposely for the distribution of Pelagia’s estate. They agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots of Maximo, in addition to his share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement. Due to Maximos failure to comply with his obligation, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance. In Maximos answer, he stated that Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her ,for the reason that she was not an heir of Pelagia and was included in the agreement by mistake. The lower court held that Maximo, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was stopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from Pelagia, hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. Maximo filed a Motion for New Trial but was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Gertrudes de los Santos, a grand niece of the decedent, is an heir of the latter and therefore entitle for representation?

HELD:

Plaintiff -appellee being a mere grand niece of Pelagia de la Cruz, could not inherit from the latter by right of representation. In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree´ to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily plaintiff -pellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance

TORRES, ROMEL G LLB III-B

Broce vs Dela Vina20 Phil 423

[359]


Topic/Doctrine :Section 6. Sub-section 1 (Subrogation)

FACTS:

The record in this case discloses that Placida Agraviador, the grandmother of the plaintiff Eusebia Broce, died intestate February 14, 1907; that the time of her death she was a widow; that she was the mother of nine children, including the defendants Ignacio Damaso Apurado, Zacarias Apurado, and Filomeno Apurado and also Hipoita Apurado, who died before her mother; that the latter was the mother of several children, including Eusebia Broce, one of the plaintiffs in this action, now married to her co-plaintiff, Silverio Vicente; that a tract of land containing some 45 hectares, situated at a place called Tiboco, in the jurisdiction of San Carlos in the Province of Occidental Negros, and fully described in the complaint, constitutes a part of the intestate estate left by Placida Agraviador, deceased; that this intestate estate has never divided between the heirs, judicially or extra judicially, and that up to the time of the trial it had not been made the subject of judicial administration; that on the 24th day of November, 1909, the defendants, Ignacio Damaso Apurado, Zacarias Apurado and Filomeno Apurado, sons of Placida Agraviador, each sold his interest in this land, which was claimed to be a one-sixth part thereof, to the defendant Pedro de la Vina for the sum of P800.

ISSUE:

WON, Plaintiff's claim of a right to be subrogated in place of the defendant as the purchaser of the interests of some of her coheirs in the intestate estate of her grandmother.

HELD:

Plaintiff's claim of a right to be subrogated in place of the defendant as the purchaser of the interests of some of her coheirs in the intestate estate of her grandmother is based upon this article, and the real contention of the defendant in this court is that she failed to exercise her rights of subrogation within the period of a month from the time when she was informed of the sale of the interests of her coheirs to the defendant; indeed, defendants claim that these sales were made with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs. There is nothing in the record, however, which sustains or even tends to sustain defendant's contention. The sales were made on the 24th day of November, 1909, and an attempt was made to prove that Silverio Vicente, the co-plaintiff and husband of the plaintiff Eusebia Broce, had knowledge of the sales before the end of that month or early in the month of December. This is denied by the husband and we think it is quite clearly established that if he knew anything whatever in regard to the transaction, his information was based wholly on current rumor, and was so indefinite and uncertain that it could not have imposed upon him any obligation to exercise or to decline to exercise a right of subrogation under the provisions of the above cited article of the Civil Code, even had he himself been the directly interested party. There is no proof whatever in the record as to the time when Eusebia Broce, herself, had notice of the sales of the shares of her coheirs to the defendant De la Vina.


CARMEN ZAMORA GONZAGA Y PILAR vs. PEDRO MARTINEZ, ET AL.G.R. No. L-3196

[360]


January 6, 1908

Topic/Doctrine: Effects of Partition

FACTS: Francisco Martinez sold and delivered to the plaintiff in this action an undivided one-half interest in the real estate set out in the complaint for the sum of $3,000. In the contract of sale, the vendor reserved the right to repurchase the said real estate within a term of twelve months from the date thereof. In the same contract the purchaser agreed to rent the said real estate to the vendor for the sum of 30 pesos per month. The said contract was inscribed in the registry of property of the City of Manila. The right of repurchase was never exercised, and the proper consolidation entry was entered in the said registry of property in the City of Manila. The said defendant, Pedro Martinez, and the above-mentioned Francisco Martinez are respectively son and husband of one Germana Ilustre, who died, the said Pedro Martinez and Francisco Martinez being her only heirs, each being entitled to an undivided one-half of her estate, of which the property in question constituted a part. In the course of the administration of the estate of Germana Ilustre, the said Pedro Martinez and Francisco Martinez executed a partition agreement of the said real estate. This partition agreement was approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and in accordance with its terms all of the real estate in question in this action was allotted to the defendant Pedro Martinez. The rental value of the said property since the date of the consolidation entry, is 120 pesos per month.

Upon these facts the trial court held that the sale by Francisco Martinez of his one-half undivided interest in the property in question clothed the purchaser with title thereto which was not affected by the partition agreement that was afterwards entered into between Francisco Martinez, and Pedro Martinez, and judgment was rendered in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. From this judgment the defendant appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale was valid.

HELD: Yes. The precise question involved in the contention of the appellants was decided in the case of Montano Lopez vs. Martinez Ilustre (5 Phil. Rep., 567). The syllabus of the opinion of the court in that case is as follows:

M. and the defendant were owners as tenants in common of twenty-eight separate tracts of land. M. sold to the plaintiff his undivided one-half interest in two of these tracts by contracts with pacto de retro. Before the right to repurchase had expired M. and the defendant made a voluntary partition between themselves of the twenty-eight tracts, by which partition the two tracts in which the plaintiff was interested fell to the defendant. M. did not exercise his right of repurchase. Held, That the partition between M. and the defendant did not affect the plaintiff, and that he was the owner of an undivided one-half of the two lots in question.


GENEROSA TEVES DE JAKOSALEM vs. NICOLASA RAFOLS, ET ALS.G.R. No. L-48372

[361]


July 24, 1942

Topic/Doctrine: Effects of Partition

FACTS:

The land in question described in the appealed in the decision originally belonged to Juan Melgar. The latter died at the judicial administration of his estate which was commenced in 1915 and came to a close on 1924, only. During the pendency of the said administration, Susana Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar, sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue in possession of the land as lessee of the purchaser. The partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. She conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolasa Rafols, who, entered upon the portion thus conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to the present. Pedro Cui brought an action to recover said half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other defendants, and while that case was pending, Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land conveyed to him by Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other half but express acknowlegment of the other defendants. The plaintiff appealed from that part of the judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale while in custodial legis is valid.

HELD:

Yes. The land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis, does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in the lands under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration.

Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason states upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate while it remains undivided." And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez vs, Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, said that the sale was valid, but that effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

[362]


It results therefore that the sale made by Susana Melgar in favor of Pedro Cui was valid, but it would be effective only as to the portion to be adjudicated to the vendor upon the partition of the property left by her deceased father Juan Melgar. And upon the partition of said property, the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar, the sale of the whole land which the latter made in favor of Pedro Cui was entirely confirmed.

Upon the confirmation of the sale in favor of Pedro Cui, the conveyance by Susana Melgar in favor of Nicolasa Rafols could no longer be done. And even in the case of a double sale, where neither of the purchasers has registered the sale, the first in possession namely, Pedro Cui, should be referred. When the sale made in the latter's favor was confirmed, Susana Melgar was in possession of the land as lessee, and this possession should be considered as that of Pedro Cui. The possession of Nicolas Rafols commenced only subsequent to that of Pedro Cui.


PILAR SALUNGA, ET AL. vs. EMILIANO C. EVANGELISTA, ET AL.G.R. No. L-53142October 2, 1911

[363]


Topic/Doctrine: Rescission and Nullity of Partition

FACTS:

The object sought by the complaint filed in this suit is the annulment of the partition of an estate, agreed upon and signed and recorded in a public instrument of the same year. The estate is shown to have been left by Santiago Evangelista, who, during his lifetime, contracted three marriages; with Eusebia Sangco, Antonia Alonso, and Pilar Salunga. The first marriage did not last long because the wife died and there was no issue. The second marriage lasted six years and they have eight children. By the third marriage, they have five children. Twelve years after the partition have been made, a complaint was filed attacking it as null and void by Pilar Salunga.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition is null and void as alleged by Pilar Salunga.

HELD:

The Supreme Court, adopting opinions contained in the judgment of the trial court, held: “… that it was a legal doctrine that contracts could not be set aside by the will of but one of the contracting parties, and that no one may go counter to his own acts; that on the hypothesis that the said instruments did contain some defect, the same would be ascribable to the mother herself, who is the person who ought to have seen that they were executed in conformity with all the required formalities; and there existed no legal provision whereby, on account of the failure to apply for judicial approval of the transactions effected, an annulment might be obtained of the settlement and partition of the estate wherein a minor is interested”.


TORRES vs ENCARNACIONGR No. L-4681

[364]


July 31, 1951

Topic/Doctrine: Subsection I - Relationship

FACTS:

The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal under Special Proceeding No. R-2414. It pertains to a certain parcel of land, which is in the possession of the petitioners and which they assert exclusive ownership. They contend that the administrator’s remedy to recover the property is through an action of law and not by motion in the interstate proceeding.

A court appointed commissioners submitted on February 8, 1944 a project of partition, the land in question, which is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was included as property of the estate and assigned to Miguel B. Dayco, one of the heirs of the decedent – Marcelo de Borja. On February, 1946 the partition was approved over the objection of the surviving children of Quintin de Borja – one of Marcelo’s children and affirmed by the Court in 1949. It should be noted that one of these children was herself the duly appointed administratrix of her father’s estate.

As the administrator refused to turn over their father’s share, on technical grounds, however, when elevated the case to the High Court on certiorari as respondents to the petition, the probate’s court action was otherwise defended and their non-execution was long overdue. Hence, this petition to determine the rightful owner of the question parcel of land.

ISSUE:

-Whether or not the parcel of land is in the possession of the Administratrix of the estate of Marcelo de Borja;

-Whether or not the partition, which includes the parcel of land is in custodia legis.

HELD:

Yes. The parcel of land which is in the possession of the Administratrix of the estate of Marcelo de Borja as contained in an order of the probate court through a partition on the share of their father.

Yes. The question parcel of land was indeed in under control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition

The petition is denied with costs against the petitioners.

CUALBAR, MA. ISABELLLB III-B

SANSON vs ARANETAReference: GR No. 43482

[365]


Date: July 28, 1937

Topic/Doctrine: Section 5 - Collation

FACTS:

On August 23, 1932, an action was brought by the plaintiff for the rescission of the agreement of partition entered by him and the defendants on June 10, 1927 to terminate the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Roque Sanson in a Civil Case No. 1055 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

In the decision, the defendant Isabel Araneta, wife of the decedent was ordered to file within thirty days a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties, furniture, jewelry, credits and actions left by the deceased with the respective value thereof and to present within the period a project of partition of said properties among the heirs. However, she failed to comply with the requirement so that the plaintiff asked for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the custody and administration of the properties in question, which was granted by the court with the appointment of Sabas Gustilo - his father-in-law of the plaintiff. In the brief filed by the plaintiff among the errors committed by the lower court was the appointment of the provincial sheriff of Iloilo as judicial receiver vice, the plaintiff’s father-in-law; approving the amended inventory presented by the defendant – failing to include all other properties of the deceased subject to partition and to bring to collation a part of the properties turned over to them as inheritance.

On February 25, 1935 allegedly approved by the court, an agreement was entered into by the parties to sell all the properties left by the deceased at public auction for the purpose of distributing the proceeds thereof among themselves, however the court’s appealed order on March 15, 1935 failed to order the sale as earlier agreed upon.

The court in its decision approving amendments to the inventory presented by the defendant; as a consequence a rescission of the portion of the agreement was ordered. The same decision was affirmed by this Court, which an appeal was brought by the plaintiff.

ISSUE:

- Whether or not all properties left by the deceased subject to the partition were all properly included and accounted for;

- Whether or not in the partition of the properties of the deceased it is necessary to sell them at public action.

HELD:

Yes. All properties left by the deceased which are subject to the partition were all properly included and accounted for as court have chosen to believe the explanation and inventory presented by the defendant as the same court ordered the defendant to submit an amended inventory of all other properties, income and fruits from the time each and every one of the parties.

No. As stated in the court’s order that it is not necessary that the properties of the deceased be sold at public auction as the parties have agreed upon, doing so would openly disregard the orders of the deceased contained in his probated will.

[366]


In a decision of the court provides that when partition takes place the necessary collation and compensation should be made so that the most equitable and just possible, in conformity with the provisions of the deceased. Let the costs be taxed against the appellees.


Africa vs AfricaGR No. 15031

September 29, 1920

[367]


Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 2 – Effects of Partition

FACTS:

An action for the partition of the property of an inheritance worth more than P30,000. A complaint was filed on February 1, 1918 at the Court of First Instance of Batangas. As allege the petitioners and defendants are descendants in a direct line of the spouses Galo Africa and Valentina Macarandang, who died on April 25, 1889 and June 17, 1896, respectively. The said properties in question came from said spouses and since their death they have been administered by their sons – the defendants Benito and Lino Africa. The plaintiffs petitioned that the defendants be ordered to render a true and proper accounting of their administration and the court’s direction make a just and equitable distribution of the aforementioned properties among the heirs and pay the costs.In a decision made by the Court on July 23, 1918, declaring the properties in question still undivided and ordered the defendant Benito Africa to render accounting of the properties left by Galo Africa and Valentina Macarandang; file an inventory within 45 days after the decision became final and among other directives from the court. From the decision of the lower court the defendants appealed its decision.

ISSUE:

- Whether or not there has been a partition made on the subject property by the spouses Galo Africa and Valentina Macarandang;- Whether or not heirs who have been in possession and enjoyment of the hereditary properties are susceptible to prescriptibility of the ownership of the properties.

HELD:

Yes. The Court is of the opinion that a partition has already been made by the spouses Galo Africa and Valentina Macarandang and its delivery to their successors in interest, effected nearly a quarter of a century ago.Yes. The heirs have already been in the possession and enjoyment of the question properties, as exclusive owners, for more than twenty-years and any right that the plaintiff might have had to these properties has prescribed.The Plaintiffs complaint seems to be anchored on the injustice due to the disproportionate and unequal distribution of the estate made by their common predecessors in interest, so that their action should have been for the rescission of the partition, however, the action would still prescribed on account of the length of time lapsed.The Court in its decision concluded and opined that the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby reversed, without finding as to costs.


ALFORQUE vs VELOSOGR No. 43607

[368]


February 16, 1938

Topic/Doctrine: Action to Rescind Partition; Prescription Of Action; Prescription of Ownership

FACTS:

The properties which originally belong to the deceased Rafael Veloso and had passed on to his wife Josefa Garces and upon her death had passed on to the later heirs, is the subject matter of the litigation. The couple contracted marriage on January 16, 1892 and the union borne nine legitimate children and had a natural child whom he later acknowledge as such namely Arsenio Veloso or Arsenio dela Cerna. Before his death on October 6, 1897, Rafael Veloso executed an open will under the then existing laws, instituted his wife and legitimate children and his acknowledged natural child. On August 20, 1906, a deed of partition was executed to divide the properties left by the deceased without judicial intervention as provided in his will.

On July 1927, Josefa Garces died and left a will duly probated by the court. A competent court confirmed the appointment of an executor which she made in favor of Gabino Veloso, one of her son who survived her. The plaintiffs commenced an action in the CFI that the said properties be declared those of Rafael Veloso and should automatically passed and partitioned among his heirs correspondingly the defendants contended the allegation otherwise that the widow is the sole and only owner of the questioned properties; she had become the owner by prescription; that other defendants have expressly renounced and acknowledge the widow as the sole owner. However, the lower court decided the case in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants to convey portion of the question properties, should they failed to agree the court will appoint three commissioners to make the partition.

The defendants appealed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:

-Whether or not the ownership of the properties in question in the possession of the widow were conveyed in usufruct only;

-Whether or not the properties, which were partitioned on August 20, 1906 between the heirs of the decedent and the widow Josefa Garces were not conjugal properties but the private property of the former;

-Whether or not Josefa Garces has effectively took possession and ownership thru prescription the properties in question.

HELD:

No. The ownership of the properties in question could not have been conveyed to the widow - Josefa Garces because while it may not have been stated in the agreement it is an established fact that the one-half of the conjugal properties acquired during their marriage she is by law entitled to.

No. Facts and evidence shows that the properties which were partitioned on August 20, 1906 were considered conjugal properties as they were acquired during the marriage of the decedent – Rafael Veloso and Josefa Garces.

[369]


Yes. Josefa Garces has effectively took possession and ownership of the properties in question thru prescription because for more than twenty-four years she exercises acts of ownership over the same, publicly, peacefully and uninterruptedly, the same as the heirs, which have exercise similar acts with respect to their adjudicated partitioned properties.

Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the defendants are absolved from the complaint of the plaintiffs and appellees, with costs of both instances to the latter. So ordered.


DE TORRES vs DE TORRESG.R. No. 9234

September 19, 1914

[370]


Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 1 - Relationship

FACTS:

An appeal was raised through the counsel of the defendants from the decision made on 8 January 1913 written by Judge Herbert D. Gale, which held that the agreement of partition executed between the plaintiff and the defendants on 10 January 1912, was null and void and sentenced the defendants to deliver and return to the plaintiff the particular four parcels of land in the agreement and to pay her the costs of the suit, including the fees of the receiver for the deposit.

On January 10, 1912 executed an instrument of partition by virtue of the property left by her father divided among her paternal uncle-defendant-appellant and the sons of her father’s sister making her believe that the appellants enjoy the same right as hers to the inheritance of the decedent, for the reason that the plaintiff was not a daughter of his father. However, the allegation was proved that the plaintiff was born a natural daughter of Sulpicio de Torres, who was single at the time of her birth and her mother who was also single and subsequently married, by reason thereof the plaintiff came to enjoy the same rights that pertained to her parents two other legitimate children born in wedlock however, died in infancy.

Since she was recognized by her father and he had no other legitimate descendant or ascendant, this other descendants or ascendants, however does not apply to the present case because it pertains to a natural daughter legitimized by a subsequent marriage.

ISSUE:

- Whether or not the agreement of partition executed between the plaintiff and the defendants was valid;

- Whether or not the plaintiff is solely entitled to succeed and inherit the estate of her late father Sulpicio de Torres.

HELD:

No. The agreement of partition executed was declared null and void. The earlier judgment was affirmed by the Higher Court declaring the agreement executed by the plaintiff null and void and sentenced the defendants-appellants to deliver and return to the plaintiff the four parcels of land concerned in the agreement and to pay her the costs of the suit including the fees of the receiver for the deposit.

Yes. The plaintiff is solely entitled to succeed and inherit the estate as provided for under Article 939 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the provision of Article 921 of the Civil Code prescribes that “ in inheritance the relative nearest in degree excludes the most remote excepting the right of representation in proper cases” and in the case at bar the right of representation cannot be invoked by the defendants. Article 1081 of the same Code provides that “a division made with a person who was believed to be an heir without being so shall be void.” The plaintiff being ignorant and not so well informed as the defendants was erroneously believed that the defendants were entitled when in fact while she is living she alone is entitled under the law to succeed to the estate of Sulpicio de Torres, to the exclusion of all her other relatives in remote degree.

[371]


It is held that the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been refuted, and this latter being in accord with justice and in harmony with the merits of the case.


CENTENO vs CENTENOGR No. 28265

November 5, 1928

[372]


Topic/Doctrine: Subsection 2 – Right of Representation

FACTS:

In an appeal filed by the plaintiffs in behalf of herself Natividad Centeno and as an administratrix of the estate of her deceased father Isaac Centeno and the intervenors. The dispositive portion provides that ‘the agreement of partition in question is hereby upheld, with the adjudications to the parties thereto, and therefore the partition prayed for in this civil case by plaintiffs and intervenors respecting the realty described in the sixth paragraph of the original complaint is denied. The other petition filed that said partition be held void and of no effect in so far as it refers only to the said portion adjudicated to defendants was also denied.

The action instituted by the plaintiffs and the intervenors, respectively, is for the recovery of property through the annulment of the partition and to have another partition. In the course of the proceeding, it was to determine who should inherit and share to the action for recovery of the property and partition of an inheritance, once the court has declared that the property belongs to the parties in common and pro indiviso.

ISSUE:

- Whether or not that the defendants are entitled to inherit the properties sought to be recovered and are subject of the agreement of partition;

- Whether or not the parties in the possession and acquired ownership over the undivided conjugal properties left by the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo declared by the lower court to be pro indiviso;

- Whether or not the plaintiffs and intervenors are entitled to inherit the undivided conjugal property which belongs to Melchora Arroyo equivalent to one-half.

HELD:

Yes. The defendants are entitled to inherit the properties subject of the action for recovery and agreement for partition as they are acknowledge natural children of the estates of spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora Arroyo and the heirs are legitimate brother and children of the deceased son of the former.

Yes. The parties that are in possession of the properties have acquired ownership and title thereto by prescription, which are included in the inventory on the undivided conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.

Yes. The plaintiffs and intervenors are the only ones entitled to inherit the one-half of the undivided portion of the conjugal properties of Melchora Arroyo.

The Court in its decision with the sole modification of ordering the partition of the conjugal property left by the deceased spouses Isaac Centeno and Melchora declared by the lower court

[373]


to be pro indiviso, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.


Reyes v. Barretto-Datu19 SCRA 85; GR No. L-17818,

January 25, 1967

[374]


Topic/Doctrine: Capacity to Succeed By Will or By Intestacy

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the estate was distributed and the shares delivered.

Upon the death of Maria Gerardo died, it was discovered that she executed two wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower Court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.

Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE:

- Whether or not the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it.

HELD:

NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and despite the fact that Salud does not happened to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since here there was no preterition, or total commission of a forced heir.


GARCIA vs. TOLENTINOG.R. No. L-8560

[375]


August 20, 1913

Topic/Doctrine: Rescission and Nullity of Partition, Art. 1098

FACTS:

Twelve years after Eulalia Flores’ death, it was brought to the cognizance of the courts that she had died intestate so that judicial administration was requested of the property left by her. Further, it was demanded that the possession of some of it be taken away from certain grandchildren of the deceased who had been holding the same quietly and peaceably during all the length of time. Antonino Garcia is the administrator named, and it is he who presented a complaint on the date last named.

The decedent had five children, two of whom survived her: Irene Tolentino and Bonifacio Tolentino. By another son, named Alejandro, she had three grandchildren, one of these is named Eulogio, who was a witness in the case and, together with his aunt, Irene Tolentino, appears to be the principal plaintiff. By still another son, Lucio, she also had a granddaughter, named Gregoria; and, finally, from the son already mentioned, Bonifacio Tolentino, who subsequently died, three years afterwards it appears, there descended the grandchildren, six in number, who are the herein defendants.

The object of the suit is to obtain a judicial declaration that the fourteen parcels of land alleged to be in the possession of the Bonifacio’s descendants belong to the decedent’s intestate estate and must be returned thereto, doubtless in order that such land may be the subject of division through special intestate proceedings. The defendants deny holding all the parcels of lands specified in the complaint, and those that they have they claim to hold through a division already made and as an inheritance from their father and predecessors in interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition can be validly rescinded.

HELD:

“Without need of examining the testimony of the defendants nor the documentary evidence adduced by them, and merely from a perusal of the testimony given by the plaintiffs, Eulogio Tolentino and Irene Tolentino being classed as such, it is very evident that a division was made of the property that belonged to Eulalia Flores and that what the real plaintiffs seek, through special intestate proceedings, is a rescission of the division made, because in it they received property of less value than that which the defendant's predecessor in interest had awarded to himself, whereby they claim to have been injured. The action prosecuted is really a rescissory one of division, and not an action for partition of inheritance.

[376]


In order that an action for rescission of partition made may lie, the lesion must exceed the fourth part of the value of the property awarded and the action must be brought within four years counting from the time the division was made.

Such are the real grounds upon which the plaintiff's claim was denied, and it is also upon them that the judgment appealed from has been affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.”

VILLANUEVA, JHULIE ANN L.LLB III-B

[377]


GEMORA vs. YAP TICOG.R. No. L-29757

December 29, 1928


FACTS:

Catalina de la Cruz and her deceased husband Susano Gemora, acquired as conjugal property the lands which are the subject matter of the complaint. The plaintiffs are children of said spouses. When Susano died, proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were had, in the course of which Catalina alleged that she was the owner of one-half of the property left by her husband as being her half of the conjugal property. Catalina owed a large sum of money to defendant F. M. Yap Tico & Co., Ltd. Then she made a simulated sale of her portion of the conjugal property to her brother-in-law, Jose Gemora, and the latter resold said property.

In the course of the aforesaid intestate proceedings of Susano Gemora, the court adjudicated to the herein plaintiffs, children of Catalina de la Cruz, all the property of the estate without awarding to said Catalina her half of the conjugal property. Although Catalina de la Cruz had previously claimed in such proceedings that half of the conjugal property, she did not appeal from the said order of the court depriving her of her aforesaid portion of the marriage property. The lots in question were also adjudicated to the plaintiffs in the proper cadastral proceeding.

The plaintiffs allege that said land belongs to them. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the land claimed in the complaint does not belong to the plaintiffs in its entirety, because one-half thereof belongs to said Catalina as her share in the conjugal property. However, it appeared that sometime later, plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the latter would sue Catalina for the collection of her debt; that she would not answer the complaint and would allow judgment be default to be rendered against her so that the property described in the complaint would be attached and sold at auction; that if defendants, purchased such properties at the auction, it would return to the herein plaintiffs one-half of lots, executing a sale to that effect in favor of said plaintiffs for the price of P8,000; that any other person bought said property would pay the present plaintiffs P5,000. Yet, plaintiffs retained possession and ownership of lands in question.

ISSUE:

Whether, as the plaintiffs allege, they are the owners of the whole of these lots for having been adjudicated to them by the court, both in the intestate proceedings of their deceased father Susano Gemora, and in the cadastral proceeding.

HELD:

[378]


The adjudication to the herein plaintiffs of the whole estate of the deceased Susano Gemora is void, for, according to the evidence of record, the same was procured by fraud, inasmuch as in the proceedings in which the order of said court was issued there appears the allegation of the surviving spouse that one-half of said estate belongs to her as her share of the conjugal property. That the property in question is conjugal property has been sufficiently and satisfactorily proven as in the record. And such a judicial adjudication procured by fraud may be assailed and vacated in a collateral proceeding such as is the present one.

With respect to the adjudication of the title to said lots made in the cadastral proceeding, considering all the circumstances of the case, the possession by the plaintiffs of one-half of said property pertaining to the widow Catalina de la Cruz, and the registration of said half in favor of the herein plaintiffs, should be understood to be in the nature of a trust for the said Catalina de la Cruz. “A receiver, trustee, attorney, agent, or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons, is utterly disabled from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management.”


GERONA vs. DE GUZMAN

[379]


G.R. No. L-19060May 29, 1964


FACTS:

The petitioners herein are Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona. They alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died, was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died after Placida; that subsequently, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the latter prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/8th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to petitioners their aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title secured by respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates of title in the name of both the petitioners and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to render accounts of the income of said properties and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and sentencing respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees. In their answer, respondents maintained, among others, that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations. On the other hand, petitioners maintained that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action has already prescribed.

HELD:

[380]


Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases; from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. It is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations. Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world.


TOMIAS vs. TOMIASG.R. No. L-3004

[381]


May 30, 1951


FACTS:

Eustaquio Tomias died intestate leaving 7 children named Leon, Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Toribia (alleged to known also as Enrica), Agustina, and Josefa, all surnamed Tomias. Possessed of property at the time of his death, he was succeeded in the possession and enjoyment thereof by his 7 children. Two of these, however later died, Leon and Josefa. It is claimed that the latter was survived by a daughter named Josefa or Filomena Tomias. Leon, who had married twice, was survived by 4 children — Conrado Magdalena, Dolores, and Anicetas — the first two, by the first marriage, and the other two by the second marriage. It is claimed, however, that he has also had natural son named Filemon Tomias.

Conrado Tomias and Magdalena Tomias (two of the children of the deceased Leon Tomias), in conjunction with their cousin Josefa or Filomena Tomias (only daughter of the deceased Josefa Tomias), filed a complaint against their aunts Benita, Monica, Bernabela, Enrica, and Agustina, alleging that their deceased grandfather Eustaquio Tomias was the absolute owner of the 15 parcels of land (in Occidental Negros) and that since the death of Leon Tomias the defendants had continued in possession of said land and had been refusing to divide it among the heirs and to give plaintiffs their share of the products. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed for partition and accounting, to which the trial court granted. But some 5 months thereafter the defendants, together with Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural son Leon Tomias, sought to annul it by filing an action for that purpose on the grounds (1) that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case because some of the parcels of land partitioned among the heirs did not belong to the deceased Eustaquio Tomias but to other persons not made parties to the suit, and (2) that not all of the heirs were represented in the suit because Filemon Tomias, an alleged natural child of Leon Tomias, had not been made a party therein.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition may be validly annulled.

HELD:

In affirming the decision of lower court, the Court held:

1. The judgment in the partition case may not be voided on the mere allegation that some of the parcels of land partitioned were the property of persons not made parties to the suit when none of those persons has come to the court to protest.

[382]


2. There is no showing that Toribia Tomias has been prejudiced by the adjudication of one-seventh of the inheritance to Enrica Tomias, the court having found that Toribia and Enrica are one and the same person. There is no claim that Toribia is entitled to more.

3. The claim of Filemon Tomias for a share in the inheritance as an alleged natural son of Leon Tomias does not call for the annulment of the decision in the partition case. That claim should be asserted in separate action against the four legitimate children of Leon Tomias to whom the latter's share in the inheritance was adjudicated in the partition.


[383]


VDA. DE LOPEZ vs. LOPEZG.R. No. L-23915

September 28, 1970


FACTS:

On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased, filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and her legitimate children with the deceased. In an order dated March 30, 1964 the lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributees. Trial court denied the petition to reopen the intestate proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether it should have been an independent action against the individual distributees to annul the partition and recover appellants' shares in the estate.

HELD:

Taking up the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the appellants' motion, it must be remembered that in Benedicto vs. Javellana (10 Phil. 197) this Court held that demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in interest to a testate or intestate succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the same special proceedings, and not in a separate action, and the judge who has jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance, and who, when the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the interested parties, shall take cognizance of all such questions.

In the Court’s opinion the court that approved the partition and the agreement in ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is alleged, the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed in the course of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that the probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even, as in this case within a reasonable time thereafter.

[384]


The order of the trial court sought to be reviewed cites the case of Tomias, et al. vs. Tomias, et al., 89 Phil. 216. That case is not here applicable, since it involved the annulment of the decision in ordinary action for partition, which had already become final. The alleged natural child's remedy, said the court, was to file a separate action against the children to whom the estate had been adjudicated.


[385]


GATMAITAN vs. MEDINAG.R. No. L-14400August 05, 1960


FACTS:

On March 10, 1956, Felicisimo Gatmaitan filed a petition, seeking his appointment as administrator of the property of his wife, Veronica Medina, who died intestate. On April 2, 1956, Gorgonio Medina and Dominica Medina, as heirs of the deceased (she being their full-blooded sister), filed an opposition, praying that Gorgonio Medina, or a neutral third party, or Felicisimo Gatmaitan and Gorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as administrator or administrators of the estate. In an order dated July 18, 1956, the court appointed Felicisimo Gatmaitan as administrator of the estate.

On April 2, 1957, the heirs of the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion for Partial Partition and Distribution," stating that the estate had no debts and the heirs were all of legal age; that some of them were necessitous and in need of cash; and praying that the share corresponding to each of the heirs in the palay produce for the agricultural year 1956-1957, as well as the cash deposit in the different banks, be ordered partially distributed among the heirs pending the final distribution of the estate. The court heard counsel for administrator Gatmaitan and for the heirs or oppositors, but without receiving any evidence whatsoever, promulgated on April 5, 1957 the order subject-matter of the instant appeal, which grants partial partition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not partial distribution of estate is valid pending finality of the estate proceedings.

HELD:

The Court believed that the lower court erred in rendering the order appealed from. A partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious — courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance.


[386]


VIADO vs. CAG.R. No. 137287

February 15, 2000


FACTS:

During their lifetime, spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and lot located Isarog Street, Quezon City. Virginia died on 1982. Julian died three years later. Surviving them were their children -- Nilo Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo and Leah died on 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado. Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca and respondent Alicia after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for partition. Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on two documents --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian, Leah, petitioner Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia. Both instruments were registered by virtue of which old TCT was cancelled and new one was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado. Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce deceased Julian to execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not preterition justifies partition of estate.

HELD:

The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the Transfer Certificate of Title. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the

[387]


value of the share pertaining to her. The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding.

When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs --- her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement. In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties in this case, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies.


[388]


CHAVEZ v. IACG.R. No. L-68282

November 08, 1990


FACTS:

Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6 children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale were therefor executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later decision overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE:

Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will supercede that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD:

Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.

It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.


[389]


THE CITY OF MANILAvs.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA and THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF MARIA CONCEPCION SARMIENTO

G.R. No. L-10033 August 30, 1917

FACTS:

This case was lodged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the aim to declare escheated to the city of Manila certain property situated in and around said city. The theory of the Plaintiff is that, a certain Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without leaving "her or person entitled to the same with the basis of Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that case such property under the procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752, may declared escheated.

But after a careful examination of evidence, it was proven that That Ana Sarmiento resided, with her husband, in the city of Manila sometime prior to the 17th day of November, 1668; that on said date she made a will; that on the 23d day of November, 1668, she added a codicil to said will, that on the 19th day of May, 1669, she made another will making a part thereof the said codicil of November 23d, 1668; that said will contained provisions for the establishment of a "Capellania de Misas;" that the first chaplain of said capellaniashould be her nephew Pedro del Castillo; that said will contained a provision for the administration of said property in relation with the said "Capellania de Misas" succeeding administration should continue perpetually; that said Ana Sarmiento died about the year 1672; that for more than two hundred years the intervener, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, through his various agencies, has administered said property; that the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila has rightfully and legally succeeded in accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento.

ISSUE:

Whether or not deceased Ana Sarmiento died without a will?

HELD:

This what the Supreme Court held in their decision, which was based in the preponderance of evidence, the proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. The will provides for the administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the same. She did not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate. It further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her property.

[390]


In view of the facts, therefore, the property in question cannot be declared escheated as of the property of Ana Sarmiento. If by any chance the property may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the fact that persons subsequent to Ana Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir or person by law entitled to the same.

ABDULLA , SHEHERASZADE K.LLB III-B

[391]


In re Will of the deceased Felisa Javier. SULPICIO RESURRECCIONvs.

AGUSTIN JAVIER, ET AL.G.R. No. L-42539

October 23, 1936

FACTS:

Felisa Francisco Javier made a will instituting her husband Sulpicio Resurreccion as her universal heir and, among other things, left a legacy of P2,000 in favor of her brother Gil Francisco Javier. The court, finding that Gil Francisco Javier died in August, 1930, even before the testatrix made her will, ordered that the legacy of P2,000 in his favor revert to the fund of the estate. Gil Francisco Javier's children and heirs, claiming that they are entitled to receive the legacy of P2,000 in favor of their father, appeal from the court's resolution ordering the reversion of this amount to the funds of the estate. The only witness who testified to this effect was Agustin Javier, Gil's brother, who alleged that he was in the house of the testatrix in May, 1931, and in a conversation with her he informed her that their brother Gil had already died, leaving a widow and children. But against this testimony was presented that of Sulpicio Resurreccion.

ISSUE:

What is the effect of a legacy made in favor of a person who was already dead not only before the death of the testatrix but even before the will was made?

HELD:

Furthermore, if the testatrix, in making her will, knew that Gil was already dead and that he had left children, it cannot be explained why she left the legacy to Gil and not to his children, if such was her intention, particularly because, according to the evidence for the appellants, she knew one of said children named Jose.

Consequently, in either case, whether the testatrix knew that Gil was already dead or she was ignorant thereof, as she had left the legacy in favor of Gil, there is no reason to admit that it was, nevertheless, her intention to leave it to his children. Appealed judgment is affirmed. SO ORDERED


[392]


In re estate of the deceased Chinaman BERNARDO RAFANAN LAO SAYCO, alias SAYA. LAY CHUYTING, appellant.

G.R. No. L-4824 February 13, 1912

FACTS:

This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama, administrator of the estate of the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, aliasSaya, and guardian of the minor Lay Chuyting, from the judgment rendered in these special proceedings.

the municipal council of Mambajao appeared in the said proceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan died in that pueblo without leaving any known legitimate successor, the real and personal property left by the said decedent within the district of the property left by the said decedent within the district of the aforementioned municipality be awarded to the latter, pursuant to the provisions of section 571 (sic) of Act No. 190.

On the other hand, the administrator, Lao Chiaman, filed a written petition wherein he alleged that there were no longer any debts to pay any debts to pay and therefore requested that, upon the approval of his final account, his administration be closed, and, as the guardian of the Chiaman Lay Chuyting, requested that the property referred to be delivered to the latter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan, and opposed the claim of municipality of Mambajao.

In view of the dispositions of witnesses presented at the trial, the court , rendered judgment ordering that the property left by the decedent, Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, known by the name of Saya, be assigned to the municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis, to be administered by its municipal council and placed at the disposal of the school in the same manner as other property intended for the same use.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property left by the decedent will be given to the municipality of Mambajao since he died intestate and no known legal heirs?

HELD:

Section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the case, reads as follows: When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippine Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the president and municipal council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant of these Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, file a petition with the Court of

[393]


First Instance of the province for an inquisition in the premises; the court shall thereupon appoint a time and place of hearing and deciding on such petition, and cause a notice thereof to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the province of which the deceased was last an inhabitant, if within the Philippine Islands, and if not in some newspaper of general circulation in the province in which he had estate. The notice shall recite the substance of the facts and request set forth in the petition, the time and place at which persons claiming the estate may appear and be heard before the court, and shall be published at least six weeks successively, the last of which publications shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed by the court to make inquisition.

From the record of these proceedings it does not appear that there was made, at the request of counsel for the president and the municipal council of Mambajao, the inquisition provided by law. In order that the property which belonged to the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, situated in these Islands, may be decreed to have reverted to the Senate, pursuant to the provisions of section 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is indispensable that the requirements contained in the above-quoted section of the said code should have been complied with by making the inquisition with regard to the matters specified, at the instance of the interested municipality. Furthermore, the person who lays claim to the property left by the decedent at death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his identity and rights. For the reasons aforestated, it is proper, in our opinion, to reverse the judgment appealed from, and we dismiss those proceedings, without prejudice to any rights that may pertain to the parties with respect to the property in question. No express finding is made of the costs. SO ORDERED.


[394]


In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee,

vs.MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.

G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926

FACTS:

This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition and in the character of universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.

Tomas Rodriguez executed a will and he declared Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno as his universal heir.

Vicente F. Lopez died before the testator, at the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.

Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent.

ISSUE:Whether or not intestate succession will govern in the transfer of estate of decedent since the instituted heir was disqualified to succeed?

HELD:

The SC held that the kind of succession took place in this case was “Accretion”, which was defined by Article 982 of the Civil Code. It further reiterated that the conflict bewtween the two provisions of the law which are Art. 982 and Article 912. Art. 982 says, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it.Article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed.As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly

[395]


subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.

The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.SO ORDERED.


[396]


THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., applicants-appellants, vs.

COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL.,oppositors-appellees.G.R. No. L-45460

February 25, 1938

FACTS:

This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners in behalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat as enunciated in Articles 750 and 751.

Colegio De San Jose, Inc.,et. Al opposed this claim.Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa. Lower court declared escheat on the properties left by a decedent, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Municipal Council of San Pedro Laguan is the rightful claimant of the said property under controversy, since the owner thereof died intestate without any known heir?

HELD:

The hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to be escheated and adjudicated to the municipality of San Pedro, has already passed to the ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot claim that the same be escheated to the said municipality, because it is no longer the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any heirs or person who may legality claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which a petition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was confiscated by the Kingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became the property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under the Treaty of Paris, alleged in the petition. If the municipality of San Pedro believes that it has some other right to the hacienda, distinct from the escheat relied upon in its petition which gave rise to this proceeding, it should bring the proper action, but it cannot avail itself successfully of the remedy provided by section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We, therefore, hold that the court did not commit the error assigned in ruling that the petition does not allege sufficient facts justifying the escheat of the hacienda in favor of the municipality of San Pedro and in finally dismissing the same. Having reached this conclusion we do not believe it necessary to go into further considerations regarding the personality of the municipality of San Pedro and the court's lack of jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order and resolution are affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the petitioners and appellants. SO ORDERED.


[397]


G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,

vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA,

respondents.

FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.who died a bachelor, without descendants, only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner CeledoniaSolivio, (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to SalustiaSolivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties. Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. So, Celedonia file a petition to Reopen/Reconsider the order, and in this Special proceeding she stated the ff: That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner CeledoniaSolivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for each other.

RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the foundation Esteban wished.

On the other hand, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion that she’d be included as one of the heirs of decedent. Bu the motion was denied; she then filed a case against Celedoniafor partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

[398]


ISSUE:

Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reservatroncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them

HELD:

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reservatroncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reservatroncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

The persons involved in reservatroncal are: 1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants. 2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees(reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property came. 3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, SalustiaSolivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, CeledoniaSolivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reservatroncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891. Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

[399]


The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that: Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate.SO ORDERED.


[400]


MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their

mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.G.R. No. 163707

September 15, 2006

FACTS:

Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and KamilleOanes Wei, represented by their mother RemediosOanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

Private respondents opposed this claim.

ISSUE:Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights?

HELD:

Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14

In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x xx against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the document did not

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specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.17

In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.


[402]




EMILIANA BAUTISTA, as Heir of the late MANUEL BAUTISTA and EVANGELINE BAUTISTA, petitioners,

vs.HON. JUSTICES CAROLINA C. GRINO-AQUINO, MANUEL T. REYES, AND JAIME M. LANTIN in

their capacity as Justices of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals, HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch III, Pasay City, MANOLITO BAUTISTA, BENJAMIN DE GUZMAN, BETTY N. BAUTISTA alias BEATRIZ

BAUTISTA, NELIA N. BAUTISTA, GLORIA N. BAUTISTA, CLARITA N. BAUTISTA and ROSALINA BAUTISTA, respondents.

G.R. No. 79958 October 28, 1988

FACTS:

Petitioners instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal to declare the deed of extrajudicial partition, deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificates Title Nos. 14182, 14186 and 15665 all of Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and Tax Declaration No. 5147, null and void.

The land in question was registered in the name of petitioner Manuel Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista. Both petitioners and private respondents admit that on Dec. 22, 1966, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was executed. Private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition;

Parties admit that petitioner Manuel Bautista married his second wife Emiliana Tamayo, it was admitted that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo, had only a child, Evangeline Bautista, and the property in question was the subject matter of extrajudicial partition of property.

Manuel Bautista denied participation in the Extrajudicial Partition of Property. On August 1, 1974, all the parties agreed to submit to the NBI the questioned signature of Manuel Bautista; That the NBI concluded that the questioned document was authentic.

The trial court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a preterition on the Evangeline Bautista as a child of the deceased?

HELD:

The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage. It is

[403]


difficult to believe that Manuel Bautista would wittingly overlook and ignore the right of her daughter Evangeline to share in the said property. It is not surprising that he denied signing the said document. Moreover, private respondents knew Evangeline Bautista who is their half-sister to be a compulsory heir. The court finds that her preterition was attended with bad faith hence the said partition must be rescinded.

Decision of CA is reversed. SO ORDERED.


[404]


G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, plaintiffs-

appellees, vs.

DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reservatroncal,which was submitted for judgement.

Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.

Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late BalbinoTioco (who had a sister by the name of RomanaTioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.RomanaTioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece ToribiaTioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs).ToribiaTioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her husband, EustacioDizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.

BalbinoTioco died intestate, owning 3 parcel of land and survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon.

Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, EustacioDizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reservatroncal.

Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reservatroncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by EustacioDizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

[405]


the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant DalisayTongko-Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions.

ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios

HELD:

Had the reversionary property passed directly from thepraepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant DalisayTongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.


[406]


JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

FACTS:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix AlejaBelleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee to most of the properties of the decedent with the condition that she will subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year.

However, there was no compliance. Lower court dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity. Appealed CA but they were not satisfied since the settlement on Art. 882 was not satisfied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Simple substitution exists?

HELD:

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, 12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.


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succession digest pool 3b

Documents

estate of fragante

public service commission

public domain

intestate estate

public service act

estate of pedro fraganteg

hectares of land

said plant