case digest on succession

7/27/2019 Case Digest on Succession

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Case No. 8PASCO VS. HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 1655 4, 26 July 2010

Facts:

The heirs of Filomena De Guzman, herein respondents filed before the MTC a complaint for the sum

of money and damages against petitioners. They alleged in their complaint that petitioners obtained a

loan of 140, 000.00php from Filomena. Such loan was secured by a chattel mortgage on Lauros Isuzujeep in favor of Filomena. Upon Filomenas death, her heirs to collect from petitioners but despite

numerous demands, petitioners refused to pay them. This prompted respondents to file the collection

case against petitioner. They had authorized Cresencia, a co- heir, to be their attorney- in- fac

through a SPA.

During the pre- trial of the case before the MTC, the parties verbally agreed to settle the case. They

executed a compromise agreement which was approved by the MTC. Petitioners, however filed a

motion to set aside the compromise agreement alleging that the agreement was within a language no

understood by them and the terms and conditions not fully explained to them. They also questioned

MTCs jurisdiction alleging that the sum covered in the compromise agreement (588, 500.00)exceeded the jurisdiction limit of the MTC (200, 000.00). MTC denied the motion and granted

Cresencias power for the issuance of a writ of execution.

Petitioners applied for TRO/PI before the RTC which initially granted but later reconsidered and se

aside its decision. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA via an appeal but the CA dismissed the same

Thus, case is now before the SC.

Issue:

Do the heirs have an interest in the collection of the loan?

Ruling:

Yes. The heirs have an interest in the preservation of the estate and recovery of its properties, for a

the moment of Filomenas death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedents

liabilities. Article 777 provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment o

the death of the decedent. The proceeds of the loan however should be released only upon settlemen

of Filomenas death.


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Case No. 28

Blas et al vs Santos et al

FACTS:Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children. He alsohad grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899, Blasmarried Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and his former wife acquired

during the first marriage were not liquidated.

In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the other halfor payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maximaexecuted a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that shepromises that shell be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties shell be acquiring to theheirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose any of themdepending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees.

In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of herestate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage, together with

three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfillher promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties sheacquired from Simeon Blas.

The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas property precisely becauseMaxima promised that theyll be receiving properties upon her death.

ISSUE:Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.

HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it lacks thformality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually executed to avoid

litigation (partition of Simeon Blas estate) hence it is a compromise.

It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason thatthe conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or promisemade by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with herhusband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband.


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Case No. 50

Lolita Enrico vs Heirs of Spouses Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Medinaceli,

Represented by Vilma Articulo, G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts:

Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli was married on June 14, 1962 during their marriage they begot 7children, herein respondents, Edward, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.During his marriage with Trinidad, Eulogio lived, openly and publicly, together with one Lolita Enrico(petitioner) and their union begot 2 children .On May 1, 2004 Trinidad died. Subsequently Eulogio married Lolita on August 4, 2004. Eulogio diedon February 10, 2005.In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered intowithout the requisite marriage license. Respondents posited further that petitioners marriage withtheir father does not fall under the marriages that are exempt of the license requirement. . To furthertheir cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogiosserious illness which made its performance impossible.

As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only thcontracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of actionbased on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in Section 2, par.(a). On Motion for Reconsideration of RespondentRTC reversed its decision and reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Orderignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog. Petitioner filed for Motion for Reconsideration but wasdenied by the RTC. Petioner filed a Petiton for Certiorari in the Supreme Court.Issues:Which rule in Assailing Nullity , Voiding and Annulment of Marriage applies in the case at bar?Ruling:We grant the Petition. In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriagethe RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.We cannot apply the decision in the case ofNialfor the reason that the impugned marriage thereinwas solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court inNialrecognized that theapplicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code. WhileA.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extend to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Codwhich took effect on 3 August 1988.There is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling inNial,becausethey vary in scope and application.While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of voidmarriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory orintestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect theirsuccessional right, for, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage o

the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in aproceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Tria

Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging

the validity of the marriage of Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the

settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs


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Case No. 61

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981, BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), et.al.

FACTS:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. Hewas survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named BeatrizRosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equaportions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De laPaz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed twohandwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited fromher daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildrenin all).

Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress washer mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-thirdshare in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of theifather, Benito Legarda y De la Paz. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter ofthe testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate theproperties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that saidproperties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sistersand three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. Thamotion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

ISSUE:

Whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal.

WON the properties could be conveyed by will.

RULING:

1. In reserve troncal(1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from anascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendanor is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendantshould reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degreefrom the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the saidproperty came.

So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance ordonation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posteriortransmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant(causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which twotransmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property


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In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in thehands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when atthe time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of theprepositus FilomenaLegarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

2. We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteengrandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomenabecause the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44

Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservableproperties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.


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Case No. 72

Reyes vs. CA, 20 October 1997

FACTS:

On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament. The will consisted of twopages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, GloriaBorromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executorand in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.

Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of thewill before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petition was set for hearing and theorder was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week forthree consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition. On July21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely ManuelMila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased's natural children with Celsa Agape, namely

Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will andtestament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and bthat Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of theexecution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could nevermarry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was alreadymarried to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. ThusAsuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of publimorals.

On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an order declaring that it had Acquired jurisdiction over thepetition and, therefore, allowed the presentation of evidence. After the presentation of evidence and

submission of the respective memoranda, the trial court issued its decision on April 23, 1993. The triacourt declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It,however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never married tothe deceased Reyes and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the lower court may look into the intrinsic validity of the will.

RULING:

The lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of thewill. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not haveto be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes asone of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which neednot be inquired upon by the probate court.


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Case No. 83

Bellis vs Bellis, 20 SCRA 358

FACTS:Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom h

divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had threelegitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposingof his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimatechildren were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that theyhave been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to beapplied.

ISSUE:Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of thillegitimate children

HELD:The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Lawbeing the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimesThe parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., andthat under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsicvalidity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined undeTexas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedentin intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) theamount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the

capacity to succeed

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to theamount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall beregulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may hethe nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.


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Case No. 94

Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil 476

FACTS:

On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangans will executed July,1916.From this decision the opponents appealed.

The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at thebottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by threewitnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by thethree instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix andthe three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants contention,are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will was duly admitted to probate.

RULING:

YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator andthree witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidanceof substitution of any of said sheets which may change the disposition of the testatrix. But when thesedispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as in the instant case) signed at the bottom by the

testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymorenecessary as such will be purposeless.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on theupper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheeof the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheetonly, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, althoughunnumbered, cannot be hidden.

In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and issigned at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation

clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets befurther signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faithand fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordialends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the lawto restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already givenassures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands morerequisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testators last will, must be disregarded.


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Case No. 105

Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitionersvs.Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as Special Administrator

of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993

FACTS:

Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and testament before threeattesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer and a notary public. It was declare thereinthat, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real andpersonal properties to specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be related to Mateo. Not longafter, he himself filed a petition before the CFI seeking the probate of his last will and testament butthe scheduled hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition could finallybe heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the legatees named in the will, sought hiappointment as special administrator of the testators estate but due to his death, he was succeeded byWilliam Cabreara, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate court. In the course of the

hearing, herein petitioners claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, appeared as oppositorsand objected to the allowance of the testators will on the ground that on the alleged date of itsexecution, the testator was already in the poor state of health such that he could not have possiblyexecuted the same; and that the signature of the testator is not genuine. The probate court rendered adecision that such will is the Last Will and Testament of Mateo Caballero and that it was executed inaccordance with all the requisites of the law. Upon appeal to CA, the petitioners asserted that the wilin question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails tospecifically state the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in theirpresence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator andof one another. However, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court ruling and ruling that theattestation clause in the Last Will substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code. Due to

denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence this appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defectivesuch that whether or not it affects the validity of the will.

2. Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant toArticle 809 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certifythat the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. Iis a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and oncesigned by the witnesses, it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalitiesrequired by law has been observed. Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, thecomplete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state:

1. The number of pages used upon which the will is written;2. That the testator signed, or expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page thereof

in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and


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3. That the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all itspages, and that the said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in thepresence of the testator and of one another.

It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to thewill in the presence of the testator and of one another. Attestation and subscription differ inmeaning. Attestation is the act of sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestationclause herein assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in

the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were usedthe same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed theirrespective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then clearlylacking, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence ofthe testator and of one another.

The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which musnecessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probatePetitioners are correct in pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot becharacterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which wouldwarrant the application of the substantial compliance rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the CiviCode:

In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper pressure and influencedefects and imperfection in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not rendethe will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantiacompliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or thelanguage employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should it beproved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. Theseconsiderations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attestingwitnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In

such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the totaabsence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clauseof a will. That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausible wayby which it can be read into the questioned attestation clause statement, or an implication thereofthat the attesting witness did actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all ofits pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in thepresence of the testator and of one another.


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Case No. 116

FELIX AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS and GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO, substitutedby ERNESTO G. CASTILLO G.R. 122880, 12 April 2006, Tinga, J. (Third Division)

FACTS:A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will i

written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesseis fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgmentbut a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notariawill with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. Felix Azuela filed a petition with the triacourt for the probate of a notarial will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 andnotarized on the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. Theattestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses athe bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pageof the will though. Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She alsoargued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that thedecedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properlyacknowledged.

The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in accordance with lawand, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore the modern tendency in respect to the formalities inthe execution of a willwith the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his lastwishes. According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub-titlePatunay Ng Mga Saksi, comprised the attestation clause and the acknowledgement, and was asubstantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also held that the signing by thesubscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestationclause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the purpose o

identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courtsdecision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clausefailed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving ofprobate.Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the number opages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather thanmandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as the substantial compliance rule.

ISSUE:Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of the law and, hence, should badmitted to probate

HELD:The petition is DENIED.A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will i

written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesseis fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgmentbut a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notariawill with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.


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Case No. 127

Cruz v. Villasor54 SCRA 752

FACTS:

The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruzs last will and testament. His survivingspouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the allowance of the will alleging it was executed through fraud, deceitmisrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testatorhaving been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposingand that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Agapitaappealed the allowance of the will by certiorari.

ISSUE:

W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, thefirst requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the secondrequiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.).

HELD:

NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them (Atty. Teves) is at the same time theNotary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public

before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness sincehe cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means toavow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and beforemeans in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notarypublic himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himselfThis cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before theother to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtainwould be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, amongothers, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That functionwould defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It would plachim in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraudwould be thwarted.

Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as awitness to the executive of the document he has notarized. There are others holding that his signingmerely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon. But these authorities do not servethe purpose of the law in this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notariespublic and witnesses referred to in these cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attestingwitnesses, and not as acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as attestingwitness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of wilset aside.


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Case No. 138

Codoy v. Calugay312 SCRA 333

FACTS:

On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legateesof the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate ofthe said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.

Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was aforgery and that the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing onthe will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwritingof the deceased, it was improperly procured.

Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidenceThe first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the recordof the case bearing the signature of the deceasedThe second witness was election registrarwho was made to produce and identify the voters affidavitbut failed to as the same was already destroyed and no longer available.

The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceasedssignature and handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her varioustenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified thatthe deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased.

The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her latehusband, who said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he cannot be sure.

The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of thedeceased which appeared in the latters application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondentEvangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had becomefamiliar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.

Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appea

with the Court of Appeals which granted the probate.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare thesignature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.

2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of thedeceaseds holographic will.

HELD:


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1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistentwith the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, imandatory.

In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased andthe evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit willemploy means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.

2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in theholographic will was that of the deceased.

The election registrar was not able to produce the voters affidavit for verification as it was no longeavailable.

The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that

she saw the deceased sign a document or write a note.

The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of thesaid niece, who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue hermotive.

Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document.

The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in theholographic will.

(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)

A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when comparedwith other documents written by the testator.

The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.

The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith andfraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticityTherefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordiaends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law

to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.

However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of thetestator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declarethat the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that aleast one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that thewill and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three osuch witnesses shall be required.


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The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with theidea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, ismandatory.

Case No. 149TRILLANA vs. CRISOSTOMO

89 Phil. 710G.R. No. L-3378 August 22, 1951

FACTS:

The deceased, Damasa Crisostomo, allegedly made two wills: one will was made on August 16

1948 and the other will was executed on October 19, 1948. Trillana, the administrator of the estate

presented the subsequent will executed on October 19 for probate, and was granted by the court.

Crisostomo and others, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the deceased, filed a petition fo

relief of the judgment rendered by the probate court to disallow the subsequent will and allow the

former will executed on August 16, alleging that the proceedings during the probate of the subsequen

will was attended by fraud.

Contention of the Appellants( Crisostomo et al):

Appellants argue that they are interested parties and therefore may appeal in the present case

because in the event the will of October 19 is disallowed and that of August 16 is allowed, and th

legacies in the latter are declared invalid or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to th

appellants.

Contentiton of the Appellee (Trillana)

The will of August 16, 1948 was expressly and absolutely revoked by the will of October 19

1948, executed by the same executrix or deceased. The probate of the subsequent will was not

attended by fraud and the appellants show no proof of the alleged fraud committed in the probate o

the subsequent will.

ISSUE:

1. Whether a revoked will must be included in the probate of the subsequent will.2. Are the appellants parties in interest in the present case and therefore entitled to appeal the

decision of the lower court?

RULING:


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1. No, a revoked will may no longer be presented in the probate of the subsequent will.

If two wills are presented for allowance but one of them was a revoked will, it cannot be

included in the probate of the latter subsequent will, because it would be a waste of time to allow the

revoked will if the subsequent revoking will is allowed. The revoked will may be probated and allowed

only if the subsequent revoking will is disallowed.

2. No, the appellants are not considered as interested parties in the probate proceedings of the will o

the deceased Damasa Crisostomo, and therefore, are not entitled to appeal the decision of the lower

court.

In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest in

order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he

will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or

judgment: and not indirect or contingent.

The appellants in the present case merely allege in their petition for relief that they are

"nephews and nieces and therefore legal heirs of the deceased Damasa Crisostomo," without

specifying the degree of relationship they had to the latter. They contend that if the will made on

October 19, 1949, be disallowed, they will inherit the estate left by the testatrix. The interest claimed

by the appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and future events to (1

The disallowance of the will of October 19, 1948 (2) The allowance of the will of August 16, 1948, and

(3) invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948.


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Case No. 160

Gallanosa v. Arcangel, 83 SCRA 675

FACTS:

Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels ofand at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethedhis 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as whatoccurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro isTecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.

The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirsfiled an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground ofres judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will

recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939decree of probate.

Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled

RULING:No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution meansthat the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was notacting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordancewith the formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be setaside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment wasobtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from thediscovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.


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Case No. 171

G.R. No. L-41947 January 16, 1936

In re Will of the deceased Silvestra Baron. VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, petitioner-appellant, vs.FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO BARO

FACTS:

Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933. The death certificate recites that she was eighty-sixyears of age and died of heart failure. The petition further recites that she left an estate exceeding invalue the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932, that she died singlewithout forced heirs.

The will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The original of this will issigned "Silestra On" and the copy is signed "Silestra Baron" (t.s.n. pp. 170, 171). Both copies arewritten in the Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by VicenteDavid, Valeriano Silva and Zacarias Nuguid (known to the testator). The evidence shows that thesame morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she suffered a physical collapse of such aserious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced ageand the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself.

The subscribing witnesses stated that it was their belief that Silvestra understood the alleged

will which she signed, but all of them admitted that although they were in her house about two hour

not one of them exchanged a single word of conversation with Silvestra.

ISSUE:

WON the testator possessed testamentary capacity.

RULING:

The burden of proving sanity, which falls on the shoulders of the proponent of a will, wa

discharged by Vivencio Cuyugan when he put to the witness stand Attorney Quirino Abad Santos, the

drawer of the will, and attorneys Vicente T. David and Valeriano Silva, and the chief of police of San

Fernando, Pampanga, Zacarias Nuguid, the three witnesses who signed the will. They testifiedunanimously that when testatrix signed her will she was of sound mind, judging from her appearance

and the manner she signed it. "An attesting witness to a will may base an opinion of the testator's

mental capacity upon his appearance at the time of executing the will. (Brownlie vs. Brownlie, 93

A.L.R., 1041.) This testimony was sufficient to make and did make a prima facie case, (68 Corpus

Juris, 450), and the burden of going forward to show testamentary incapacity having shifted to the

contestants (68 Corpus Juris, 451). It was not therefore the duty of the proponent to call the doctor

and the nurse who attended Silvestra Baron when she collapsed to show that she was of sound mind

but of the contestants to show incapacity.


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While it is true that in the present case no physician testified as to the condition of SilvestraBaron's mind when she signed her will, we have however the testimony of three reputable attorneys tothe effect that judging from her appearance and the ways she acted when she signed her will she wasof sound mind. This was corroborated by the fact that when the next day Attorney Jose A. Narciso,upon learning that she had made a will, he tried to make her revoked said will which she refused. Thisin itself is an admission that she was of sound disposing mind. The very finding of the lower court thaSilvestra Baron was unduly influenced in the making of her will is an implied admission that shepossessed testamentary capacity.

The preponderance of evidence and the implied admission of the lower court show, therefore,the when Silvestra Baron made her will she was of sound disposing mind.


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Case No. 182

NERI v AKUTIN74 PHIL 185

MORAN; May 21, 1943

FACTS:

Testator Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his properties by universal title to

his children by his second marriage with preterition of his children by his first marriage. Eleuterio

Agripino, Agapita, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina are all Neris children by his first marriage. The tria

court annulled the institution of the heirs and declared total intestacy.

The children by the second marriage filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that:

1) there is no preterition as to the children of the first marriage have received their shares in the

property left by the testator

2) assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution

of heirs but simply the reduction of the bequest made to them.

The children by the second marriage anchor their argument on the concept of heir whose

A814 definition is deemed repealed by that of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is maintained that the

word "heredero" under the Civil Code, is not synonymous with the term "heir" under the Code of Civi

Procedure, and that the "heir" under the latter Code is no longer personally liable for the debts of the

deceased as was the "heredero" under the Civil Code

ISSUES

1. WON there is preterition

2. WON there should be annulment of the institution of the heirs and open the estate to total intestacy

HELD

1. YES, there is preterition. According to the courts findings, none of the children by the firs

marriage received their respective shares from the testators property. Even if clause 8 of the will is

invoked (said clause states that the children by his first marriage had already received their shares in

his property excluding what he had given them as aid during their financial troubles and the money

they had borrowed from him) the Court can rely only on the findings of the trial court that the

inventory indicates that the property of Neri has remained intact and that no portion has been given


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to the children of the first marriage.

Neri left his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage and did no

expressly disinherit his children by his first marriage but did not leave anything to them. This fits th

case of preterition according to A814, CC which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled

and intestate succession should be declared open.

2. YES

The word "heir" as used in A814 of the Civil Code may not have the meaning that it has unde

the Code of Civil Procedure, but this does prevent a bequest from being made by universal title as is in

substance the subject-matter of A814 of the Civil Code. It may also be true that heirs under th

Code of Civil Procedure may receive the bequest only after payment of debts left by the deceased and

not before as under the Civil Code, but this may have a bearing only upon the question as to when

succession becomes effective and can in no way destroy the fact that succession may still be by

universal or special title.

Since a bequest may still be made by universal title and with preterition of forced heirs, it

nullity as provided in article 814 still applies there being nothing inconsistent with it in the Code ofCivil Procedure. The basis for its nullity is the nature and effect of the bequest and not its possibl

name under the Code of Civil Procedure. In addition, Secs. 755 and 756 of the Code of Civil Procedure

affected A814 and A851 of the Civil Code. But these sections have been expressly repealed by Act No

2141, thus restoring force to A814 and A851.


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Case No. 193 RABADILLA vs. CA

G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

FACTS:

In the codicil of testatrix, Rabadilla was instituted as a devisee of a lot, containing the followingprovisions. Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year, to give to Belleza 100 piculs osugar until Belleza dies. Should Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give the lot shall have toobligation to still give yearly the sugar as specified to Belleza. In the event that the lot is sold, leased omortgaged, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearlysugar to Belleza. Should the command be not respected, Belleza shall immediately seize the lot andturn it over to the testatrix near descendants.

ISSUE:

WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.

HELD:

This is not a case of simple substitution. The codicil did not provide that shouldRabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix near descendants would

substitute him.Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. Here, the instituted heir is in fact

allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the neardescendants or the sister of the testatrix. Also, the near descendants right to inherit from thetestatrix is not definite. It will only pass to them if the obligation to deliver is not fulfilled. Moreovera fideicommissary substitution is void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the seconddegree. In this case, the near descendants are not at all related to Dr. Rabadilla.

This is also not a conditional institution. The testatrix did not make Rabadillasinheritance dependent on the performance of the said obligation. Since testamentary dispositions aregenerally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition

unless it clearly appears from the will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case odoubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.

The manner of institution is modal because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heirwithout affecting the efficacy of such institution. Amode imposes an obligation upon the heir orlegatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. In a conditional testamentarydisposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed thetestator. The condition suspends but does not obligate. The mode obligates but does not suspend.


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Case No. 204

VIZCONDE vs. CAGR # 118449, February 11, 1998

FACTS: Estrellita purchased form Rafael a 10,110 sq. m. lot located at Valenzuela, Bulacan for P100kShe sold the Valenzuela property for P3, 405, 612 and in June of the same year, she bought a houseand lot in BF Homes, Paraaque using a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela lotEstrellita and her 2 children, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed. Lauro was left as the sole heir but heentered into an extrajudicial settlement of his wifes estate with Rafael and Salud, her parents. Thissettlement provided 50% of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters toRafael while the other 50% was given to Lauro. The Paraaque property and the car were also givento Lauro with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs inthe said properties. Rafael died. In the intestate proceeding the Valenzuela lot allegedly was given byRafael to Estrellita and that the heirs legitime should come from collation of all properties distributedto his children by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon, Rafaels son, further claimed that the petitioneris one of Rafaels children by right of representation as Estrellitas widower.

ISSUE:

Can Lauro be considered a compulsory heir of Rafael?

HELD:

Petitioner is Rafaels son-in-law and not one of his compulsory heirs. With respect to Rafaels estatepetitioner, who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael, is considered a 3rd person. As such, hemay not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Secondly, the order of collation ispremature since the proceeding is still in its initiatory stage. There is nothing to

indicate that the legitime of any of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrantcollation. Further, collation of the Paraaque property, bought using the proceeds of the sale of theValenzuela property which Rafael transferred to Estrellita, has no statutory basis. The Order of theprobate court presupposes that the Paraaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael toEstrellita. However, Estrellita paid P900, 000 to Premier Homes, Inc. for said property. The collationis improper for collation covers only properties gratuitously given by decedent during his lifetime tohis compulsory heirs which do not obtain to the transfer of the Paraaque realty. Moreover, Rafaealready waived his right to said realty. Lastly, Estrellita died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafaewho inherited from her an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela lot. Thus, even assumingthat the latter property maybe collated, collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela lohas long been returned to Rafaels estate.


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Case No. 215

G.R. No. L-14474 October 31, 1960, ONESIMA D. BELEN, vs. BANK OF THEPHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA

FACTS:

Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944. On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz diedand the aforesaid codicil, together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila. The proceedings for the administration of theestate of Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administrationof the appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.

Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros Belen de Olsguera,married, with seven (7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single.

On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings No. 9226, contendingthat the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now bedivided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as the surviving children of thesaid deceased, to the exclusion, in other words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belende Olaguera. The court, in its order on May 23, 1958 denied, as initially pointed out Onesima'spetition.

ISSUE:

Do the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all living descendant (children andgrandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the descendants nearest in degree?

RULING:

Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest indegree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore divided equally between her and hersister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters, grand childrenof the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis, appellant invokes Article959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (reproducing nevarieter Article 751 of the Code of 1889):

A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall beunderstood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.

The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application to the case wherethe beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the lawassumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relativesclosest to him, because, as Manresa observes,


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la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar este favorecer a susparientes, habria de ajustarse mas a ligadas al mismo (testador) por los vinculos de lasanger y de la familia (6 Manresa, Comm., 7th Ed., p. 72).

But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest) obviously does not supplywhere the beneficiaries are relatives ofanother person (the legatee) and noot of the testator . There isno logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy,for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his

affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages allof them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.


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Case No. 226

Gonzales v. CAG.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

Guerrero, J. (Ponente)

Facts:Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the

deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said wilwas typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior tothe death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with thesignature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.

Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the

probate. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed andattested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.

Issue:Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will

RULING:

No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none othe disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputationin the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is

believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence beestablished on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency isdistinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does notrequire evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimonyin court.


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Case No. 237

G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYOvs. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO,CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, et. al

FACTS:

Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, ManilaShe was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on

December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard ofand her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last timeshe was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening hersuccession and distributing her estate among her heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of heaunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in SpecialProceeding No. 13-V of the same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but wassurvived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister o

decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamedFerraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, ArturoFerraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearestintestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.

The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of thedecedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent reasoning out that the formerare nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right ofrepresentation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent, and that othercollateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedentin accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE:

WON the auntis of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degree

removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right o

representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an

uncle or aunt

RULING:


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We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephewfrom the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belongdegrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (CiviCode, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do noinherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of thedeceased, as provided expressly by Article 975:

ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, theyshall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts

But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces othe de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.


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Case No. 248

G.R. No. L-55373 July 25, 1983

GLICERIA CARANDANG-COLLANTES and LUZ C.ARANDANG,vs.FELIX CAPUNO, et. al

FACTS:

A complaint for annulment of a DonationInter Vivos executed by the late Josefa Capuno onMarch 6, 1970, in favor of defendants-appellants (petitioners herein) namely, Gliceria Carandang-

Collantes and Luz Carandang, was filed by plaintiffs-appellees (private respondents herein) before theCourt of First Instance of Laguna on February 8, 1971 docketed as Civil Case No. SP-927. Four parcelof real property, including a residential house all situated in San Pablo, Laguna were donated underthe deed.

Private respondents, plaintiffs-appellees below, alleged in their complaint "4. That upon thedeath of Josefa Capuno on 8 April 1970, she left as her only heirs plaintiffs herein, Felix CapunoLydia Capuno, and Simeon Capuno, being her nephews by her deceased brother Silverio, and GerardoCapuno and Aniceto Capuno being also her nephews, by her deceased brother Juan Capuno; . . . 6That the thumbmark appearing on the instrument, allegedly that (of) the deceased Josefa Capunowas not hers, and granting arguendo, that it was, she did not intend to convey said properties to

defendants herein under said deed, her consent thereto having been secured either through undueinfluence or fraud; there being no relation between them . . ." They then prayed that the donationinter vivos be declared annulled and of no force and effect and they be declared true owners of thproperties entitled to the possession thereof and the reasonable value of the fruits realized therefromfrom 8 April 1970 up to the time of actual delivery with legal interest thereon until fully paid plusattorney's fees and costs of litigation.

ISSUE:

WON the thumbmark affixed to the deed of donation was authentic or genuine.

RULING:

Plaintiffs have not presented any proof in support of the alleged forgery or fictitiousness of the

thumbmark in question, neither by an expert or by comparison with the true thumbprint of the donor

Josefa Capuno. The testimony of Aniceto Capuno that his aunt, Josefa Capuno, had indicated to him

shortly before her death the division of the donated properties among the nephews and niece of

Josefa is no proof that Josefa did not execute the deed of donation in favor of the defendants. Neither

are the declarations of Albina and Lydia Capuno who claimed to be taking care of Josefa at the

hospital from February 13 to March 14, 1970 and were always with her, prove that the deed in

question was not executed by the donor. For these witnesses are parties to the case, biased and stand


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to benefit from the annulment of the deed. Their testimonies are inherently weak as against the

testimony of the notary public who notarized the document and declared that the document was

acknowledged before him and the thumbmark was that of the donor, Josefa Capuno.

Case No. 259

J.L.T. AGRO, INC. v. BALANSAG

Facts:Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena (Antonia), and after her deathwith Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian had two children with Antonia, namelyJosefaTeves Escao (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namelyMariaEvelyn Donio Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teve(MilagrosReyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).The present controversy involves a parcel of land known as Lot No. 63 othe Bais Cadastre, which was originallyregistered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian andAntonia. When Antonia died, the land wasamong the properties involved in an action for partitionand damages. Thereafter, the parties to the case enteredinto a Compromise Agreement which embodied the

partition of all the properties of Don Julian. The property was toremain undivided during the lifetime of DonJulian. The Compromise Agreement lays down the effect of theeve ntual death of Don Julian thain the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties now selected andadjudicated to DonJulian shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Don Julian and his four minor children.On 16November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of Assets with Assumptionof Liabilitiesin favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. Less than a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executedaninstrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with theSupplemental Deed. Thisinstrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. DonJulian died intestate.Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession overthe subject lot after theexecution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered into a yearlylease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. At the Register of Deeds whiletrying to register the deed of absolute sale,respondents discovered that the lot was already titled in the name opetitioner.

Issue : Whether Don Julian had validly transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime?

Held:Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in favor opetitioner,Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over the subject lot wouldonly pass to his heirsfrom the second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of thesubject lot, Don Julian retained theabsolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challengedby Milagros Donio and her childrenon the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of thcompromise agreement.The adjudication in favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage becam

automatically operative uponthe approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them theright to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 infavor of respondents. All things which are not outside thecommerce of men, including future things, may be theobject of a contract. All rights which are nointransmissible may also be the object of contracts. No contract may beentered into upon future inheritance except in caseexpressly authorized by law. Well-entrenched is the rule thatall things, even future ones, which are not outsidethe commerce of man may be the object of a contract. Theexception is that no contract may be enteredinto with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to theexception is the partition inter vivos referred tin Article 1080. The first paragraph of Article 1080, which providesthe exception to the exception and therefore aligns withthe general rule on future things, reads: ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an acinter vivos, or by will, such partition shall berespected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the


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compulsory heirs.. . . .The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly validpursuant to Article 1347. However,considering that it would become legally operative only upon the death of DonJulian, the right of his heirs from thesecond marriage to the properties adjudicated to him underthe compromise agreement was but a mereexpectancy. It was a bare hope of successionto the property of their father. Being the prospect of a futureacquisition, the interest by itsnature was inchoate. It had no attribute of property, and the interest to which itrelated was at the timnonexistent and might never exist.


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Case No. 270

[G.R. No. 137287. February 15, 2000]

REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO,petitioners, vs. THEHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES

VIADO, respondents. LEX

FACTS:

During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P. Viado owned several pieces ofproperty, among them a house and lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered byTransfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on 20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado

died three years later on 15 November 1985. Surviving them were their children -- Nilo Viado, LeahViado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado, married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. NiloViado and Leah Viado Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirsherein respondents --- his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.

Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property. Soon,however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondentAlicia Viado after the former had asked that the property be equally divided between the two familiesto make room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over theentire property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in question, filed a case for

partition before the Quezon City RTC (Branch 93). Jj sc

Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject property on twodocuments --- a deed of donation executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugalshare of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in whichJulian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitionerRebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the propertyinherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled and newTransfer Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo Viado.

ISSUE:

WON the late Nilo Viado employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to execute the

deed of donation.

RULING:

The issue raised boil down to the appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by boththe trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found


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the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-servingtestimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue influence inprocuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of extrajudicial settlementpetitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neitherhave petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficientjudgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration opetitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistakenbelief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to

accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession, could havemisunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.

The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date of their execution did noadversely affect their validity nor would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. Theregistration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of itcontents against all third persons.Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid andbinding.

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