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Special Proceedings Cases

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TING vs. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRG.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007 CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.

The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.

On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1

The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioners application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioners application on the ground of res judicata.

After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioners application on the ground of res judicata. 31vvphi1.nt

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.

Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5 and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment pass[d] into extinction."6

Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata.7

The petition fails.

Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.

After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)

In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.10

The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration courts approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienzas application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.

Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of

the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special work order.11

There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)

As for petitioners claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,] the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison detre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.

Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

FRIANELA vs. BANAYADG.R. No. 169700 July 30, 2009 NACHURA, J.: Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F. Banayad, petitioner, who was named as devisee in the will, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, on June 3, 1991, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P[3] for the allowance of the November 18, 1985 holographic will of the decedent. Petitioner alleged that Moises died without issue and left to her the following properties, namely: (1) a parcel of land situated in Pasay City and described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9741; (2) images of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown; and (3) all personal belongings.[4] Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and counter-petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic wills of the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989 and another dated September 28, 1989.[5] After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29, 1995, rendered its Decision[6] declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as having revoked the November 18, 1985 will, allowing the former, and appointing respondent as administrator of Moisess estate.[7] On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 17, 2005 Decision,[8] modified the decision of the trial court and ruled that the September 27, 1989 holographic will had only revoked the November 18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of Moisess real property was concerned.[9] With the denial of her motion for reconsideration in the further assailed August 17, 2005 Resolution,[10] petitioner elevated the case before us via the instant petition.[11] The Court notes that the trial court focused all of its attention on the merits of the case without first determining whether it could have validly exercised jurisdiction to hear and decide Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P. On appeal, the appellate court also overlooked the issue on the jurisdictional competence of the trial court over the said case. This Court, after a meticulous review of the records, finds that the RTC of Pasay City had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P. The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[12] Jurisdiction is moreover determined by the allegations or averments in the complaint or petition.[13] In this case, at the time the petition for the allowance of Moisess holographic will was instituted, the then Sections 19 and 33[14] of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129[15] were in force, thus SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x x (4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00); x x x x SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the demand does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions; and x x x x The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate,[16] which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed. Significantly, in this case, the original petition docketed before the trial court contains only the following averments: x x x x 1. That Petitioner is of legal age, married, Filipino and residing at 2237 P. Burgos St., Pasay City who is named devisee in the Last Will and Testament of MOISES BANAYAD, deceased who died in Pasay City General Hospital on March 27, 1991 xerox copy of his death certificate is herewith attached as Annex A to form integral part hereof; 2. That the said Last Will and Testament is herewith (sic) attached as Annex B and made an integral part of this Petition, the original thereof will be presented to this Honorable Court at the time of probate; 3. That the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines and residing at 2237 P. Burgos St., Pasay City at the time of his death; 4. That the properties left by the decedent consist of real and personal properties particularly described herein below, which decedent all bequeathed to petitioner; A. A parcel of land described under TCT No. 9741 xerox copy of which is herewith (sic) attached as Annex C.B. Imahen ng Oracion del Huerto at Pieta, kasama and korona.C. All personal belongings.5. That the testator at the time of the execution of the said Will was of sound and disposing mind. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that:a. Upon proper notice and hearing, the above mentioned Will be admitted to probate;b. That letters testamentary or administration be issued to herein petitioner without bond; Petitioner prays for such other reliefs just and equitable in (sic) the premises. x x x x[17] Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moisess estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings.[18] The RTC therefore committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu proprio by the courts.[19] Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.[20] Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy[21] and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People[22] cannot be applied. First, because, as a general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government.[23] No injustice to the parties or to any third person will be wrought by the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instituted probate proceedings. Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has been made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa, the Court has emphasized that estoppel by laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu in Tijam. It is well to note the following factual setting of Tijam: On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month. After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs. After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief: "to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question" (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter-bond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered by the following assignment of errors: I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution against the herein bonding company-appellant.III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by the herein bonding company- appellant as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of execution. Not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly. Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from. On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees' action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us. x x x x[24] Clearly, then, in Tijam, the issue of lack of jurisdiction has only been raised during the execution stage, specifically when the matter of the trial courts denial of the suretys motion to quash the writ of execution has been brought to the appellate court for review. Here, the trial courts assumption of unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate proceedings has been discovered by the Court during the appeal stage of the main case, not during the execution stage of a final and executory decision. Thus, the exceptional rule laid down in Tijam cannot apply. Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void.[25] With the above disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss and resolve the other issues raised in the petition. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

GABATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 150206 March 13, 2009 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution[2] dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado. Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondents demands for them to vacate the same. In their answer, petitioners denied that respondents mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches. On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan. On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilos daughter). On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay P10,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as Attorneys fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.[4] Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273. On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants. SO ORDERED. Discounting petitioners argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that respondents claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence. The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale[5] executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan: x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x. To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 130[6] of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent. As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners possession of the disputed property could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an owner. Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that the CA committed the following reversible errors: FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN;

THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto GABATAN is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;

FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.[7] Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters. In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.[8] It is not our function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.[9] However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[10] Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. [11] In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the case. The respondents main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.[12] Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.[13] In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,[14] this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals[15] where the Court held: xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,[16] the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,[17] this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property. However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,[18] where the Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to wit: It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied) Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon. We GRANT the petition. After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan. Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint. Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Here, two conflicting birth certificates[19] of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated that her mothers maiden name was Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was respondents mothers full maiden name which was indicated as Hermogena Calarito in the handwritten birth certificate. In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise: The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit A for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit A for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the as is and where is rule. It has the impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950s. Her mothers maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit 1, the entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of latest vintage. The entry on the space for mothers maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiffs mother filiation with the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe that Exhibit A for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth.[20] Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the above-quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950s vintage[21] but this Court is unable to concur in the trial courts finding that Exhibit 1[22] was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial courts bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Municipal Form No. 102 (Revised, January 1945) which makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial courts finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation (Sgd.) also merely typewritten beside their names. The words A certified true copy: July 6, 1977 above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate. We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent (petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective offices,[23] and (b) the certified true copy of respondents handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate registered in their respective offices.[24] Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and respondents counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the original.[25] Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of respondents birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth certificate.[26] Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondents handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.[27] Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their respective offices copies of respondents birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between respondents Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative weight. Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondents filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondents mother was a certain Hermogena Clarito Gabatan. It does not prove that same Hermogena Clarito Gabatan is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.[28] It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan. However, respondents mothers (Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan. Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondents mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay. Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondents witnesses testimonies. The records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.[29] His testimony regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,[30] this Court is wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her (respondents) husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.[31] In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondents husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case. Aside from the testimonies of respondents witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale[32] (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners predecessor in interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.[33] The CA considered the same statement as a declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.[34] However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.[35] After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same. Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself.[36] Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,[37] we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument. In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office. There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this, respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessors office. Regarding the authentication of public documents, the Rules of Court[38] provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.[39] The attestation of the certifying officer must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.[40] To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was registered or exists in the records of the local assessors office. Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velezs certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessors office is not the official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in the rules. It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the assessors office.[41] To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan. Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to Hermogena Gabatan (respondents Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners. As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to respondents own testimony,[42] Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedents property from third parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.[43] However, that case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.[44] Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the present case.[45] She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because Rita was then already old.[46] We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy: Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its pristine purity.[47] All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent has her own self to blame. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON vs. RICAFORTEG.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsels failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1wphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

UY KIAO ENG vs. LEE,G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010 NACHURA, J.: Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarchs estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.[3] In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.[4] The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petitionthey did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.[5] The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence.[6] In its February 4, 2005 Order,[7] however, it granted the same on petitioners motion for reconsideration. Respondents motion for reconsideration of this latter order was denied on September 20, 2005.[8] Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court. On April 26, 2006, the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation or production and for the approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will.[9] Respondent moved for reconsideration. The appellate court, in the assailed August 23, 2006 Amended Decision,[10] granted the motion, set aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorneys fees. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion in the further assailed February 23, 2007 Resolution.[11] Left with no other recourse, petitioner brought the matter before this Court, contending in the main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.[12] The Court cannot sustain the CAs issuance of the writ. The first paragraph of Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.[13] Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.[14] This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.[15] The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution.[16] As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.[17] The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.[18] Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious.[19] As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.[20] On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.[21] Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations.[22] Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.[23] The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.[24] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.[25] To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.[26] Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.[27] In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.[28] Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles.[29] Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here the production of the original holographic will is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides: Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original holographic will. Thus SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will. SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.A person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it. SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos. SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.[30] There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

REPUBLIC vs. MARCOSG.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009 PERALTA, J.: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the March 13, 1997 Decision[2] and August 27, 1997 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450.The facts of the case are as follows:On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order[4] granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads: WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos to have been duly executed in accordance with law, the same is hereby ALLOWED AND ADMITTED TO PROBATE. Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued in solidum to Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II, named executors therein. Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons having an interest in the estate for them to lay their claim against the Estate or forever hold their peace. SO ORDERED.[5] On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[6] in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity. On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took his oath as named executor of the will on January 30, 1996. On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration[7] to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as Special Administratrix of the Marcos Estate. On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato. On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order[8] denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos, the penultimate portion of which reads: Under the Rules, a decedents testamentary privilege must be accorded utmost respect. Guided by this legal precept, therefore, in resolving the two (2) motions at hand, the Court is constrained to DENY both. Examining the arguments poised by the movants, the Court observed that these are but a mere rehash of issues already raised and passed upon by the Court. One has to review the previous orders issued by the Court in this case, e.g., the orders dated September 9, 1994, November 25, 1994, as well as October 3, 1995, to see that even as far back then, the Court has considered the matter of competency of the oppositors and of Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as having been settled. It cannot be overstressed that the assailed January 11, 1996 Orders of the Court was arrived at only after extensive consideration of every legal facet available on the question of validity of the Will. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration filed separately by petitioner Republic and oppositor Imelda R. Marcos are both DENIED. SO ORDERED.[9] On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to respondents. On February 5, 1997, the First Division of this Court issued a Resolution referring the petition to the CA, to wit: x x x x The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the Case, and this Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance.[10] (Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied) On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision,[11] dismissing the referred petition for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the pertinent portions of which reads: Consequently, for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the present petition should be dismissed in accordance with the same Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which expressly provides that: 4. Erroneous Appeals An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.[12] Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which was, however denied by the CA in a Resolution[14] dated August 27, 1997.Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit: Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

In the meantime, on October 9, 2002, the RTC, acting on the pending unresolved motions before it, issued an Order[16] which reads: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby appoints as joint special administrators of the estate of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the nominee of the Republic of the Philippines (the Undersecretary of the Department of Justice whom the Secretary of Justice will designate for this purpose) and Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Mr. Ferdinand R. Marcos II, to serve as such until an executor is finally appointed. SO ORDERED. The petition is without merit. When the assailed Orders granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents were issued by the RTC, petitioner sought to question them by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90,[17] which was then in effect, reads: 2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. Except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis and Underscoring Supplied) The pertinent portions of Section 17[18] of the Judiciary Act of 1948 read:The Supreme Court shall further have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question;(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto;(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue;(4) All other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved: Provided, however, That if, in addition to constitutional, tax or jurisdictional questions, the cases mentioned in the three next preceding paragraphs also involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the aggrieved party shall appeal to the Court of Appeals; and the final judgment or decision of the latter may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari; and(5) Final awards, judgments, decision or orders of the Commission on Elections, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Workmens Compensation Commission.A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in declaring that the issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case.[19] Moreover, the Courts pronouncement in Suarez v. Judge Villarama[20] is instructive:Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, in effect at the time of the antecedents, provides that an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals.[21]Also, in Southern Negros Development Bank v. Court of Appeals,[22] this Court ruled:It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of the decisions of trial courts to the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can blame no one but themselves (Jocson v. Baguio, 179 SCRA 550 [1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v. National Labor Union, 101 Phil. 409 [1957]).x x x xPursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, which provides that "[a]n appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed," the only course of action of the Court to which an erroneous appeal is made is to dismiss the same. There is no longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, November 12, 1990, First Division, Minute Resolution).[23] Based on the foregoing, petitioner cannot deny that the determination of whether or not respondents should be disqualified to act as executors is a question of fact. Hence, the proper remedy was to appeal to the CA, not to this Court. Petitioner is adamant, however, that notwithstanding the improper remedy, the CA should not have dismissed therein petition. Petitioner argues in the wise:However, as can be seen in the Resolution of February 5, 1997, (Annex H) this Honorable Court deemed it more proper to transmit the first Petition for Review to respondent appellate court for the reason that: This Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance. x x x It would appear then that even though this Honorable Court apparently considers the Republics petition as deserving to be given due course, it deemed it in the best interest of the parties concerned if the Court of Appeals would first take cognizance of said case, thereby preserving its stance as a court of last resort. Additionally, this Honorable Court itself plainly stated that the case under review is: .REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits. The latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the case[24]Petitioners arguments are misplaced. To stress, the February 5, 1997 Resolution reads: The special civil action for certiorari as well as all the other pleadings filed herein are REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem appropriate, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the Case, and this Court having been cited to no special and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance.[25] Based thereon, this Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that said resolution gave the CA discretion and latitude to decide the petition as it may deem proper. The resolution is clear that the petition was referred to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits or any other action as it may deem appropriate. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when the action it deemed appropriate was to dismiss the petition for having availed of an improper remedy. More importantly, the action of the CA was sanctioned under Section 4 of Supreme Court Circular 2-90 which provides that an appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.Moreover, petitioner mistakenly relies in Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[26] in which this Court made the following pronouncements:In the case at bar, there was no urgency or need for Oriental to resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari for when it learned of the case and the judgment against it on July 25, 1986, due to its receipt of a copy of the decision by default; no execution had as yet been ordered by the trial court. As aforementioned, Oriental had still the time and the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration, as was actually done. Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration in the first case, or at the latest upon the denial of its petition for relief from judgment, Oriental should have appealed. Oriental should have followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court forRules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to purpose that s