social psychology as history

7/28/2019 Social Psychology as History

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Journal of Personality an d Social Psychology1973, Vol. 26, No. 2, 309-320

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY A S HISTORY

KENNETH J. G E R G E N*

SwarthmoreCollege

An analysis of theory and research in social psychology reveals that whilemethods of research are scientific in character, theoriesof social behaviorareprimari ly reflections of contemporary history.The disseminationof psycho-logical knowledgemodifies th e patterns of behavior upon whichth e knowledgeis based. It does so because of the prescriptive biasof psychologicaltheorizing,th e liberatingeffects of knowledge,and the resistance basedon comm on valuesof freedom and individuality. In addition, theoretical premisesare basedprimarily on acquired dispositions.As the culture changes, such dispositionsare altered, and the premises are often invalidated. Several modificationsinth e scope an d methods of social psychologyare derived from this analysis.

The field ofpsychology is typically definedas the science of human behavior, and socialpsychology as tha t branch of the sciencedeal ing wi th human in terac t ion . Apara-mount a im ofscienceis held to be the estab-l ishment of general laws through systematicobservation.For the social psychologist, suchgeneral laws are developed in order to de-scribe and explain social interaction.Thistraditional view of scientific law is repeated

in one form or another in almost all funda-menta l t rea tmentsof the field. In hisdiscus-sion of explanationin the behavioral sciences,DiRenzo (196 6) pointedout tha t a "com-plete explanation"in the behavioral sciences"is onetha t has assumed th e invariablestatusof law [p. 111." Krech, Crutchfield, an dBallachey (1962) statedtha t "whether w eare interestedin social psychologyas a basicscience or as an applied science,a set ofscientific principles is essential fp. 3]."Jones and Gerard (1967) echoed this view intheir statement, "Science seeksto u n d e r-stand the factors responsiblefor stable rela-tionships between events[p . 4 2 ] . " A s Mills(1969) put it, "social psychologists wanttodiscover causal relationshipsso that theycan establish basic principlesthat will ex-

11 am much indebtedto the followingpersons fo r

their thought fu l appraisal .of various phases of thisanalysis: Shel Feldman, M ary Gergen, Kenn eth

Hammond, Louise Kidder, George Levinger, PaulRosenblatt , Ralph Rosnow, M.Brewster Smith ,Siegfried Streufert ,Lloyd Strickland, Karl Weick, andLawrence Wrightsman.

Requests for reprints should be sent to the author,Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College,Swarthmore , Pennsylvania 19080.

plain the phenomena of social psychology[p. 412]."

This view of social psychology is, of course,a direct descendentfrom eighteenth centurythought . A t that t ime th e physical scienceshad produced marked increments in knowl-edge, and one could view with greatopti-mism th e possibility of applying th e scien-tific method to human behavior (Carr, 1963).If generalprinciplesof human behavior could

be established,it might be possible to reducesocial conflict, to do away with problems ofmental illness,and to create social conditionso f maximal benefi t to members of society.As others later hoped,it might evenbe pos-sible to t ransform such principles into mathe-matical form, to develop "a mathematics ofh u m a nbehavioras preciseas the mathemat icsof machines [Russell, 19S6,p. 142]."

The marked successof the natural sciencesin establishing general principles can impor-tantly be attr ibuted to the general stabilityof events in the world of n ature. The velocityof fal l ing bodies or the compounding ofchemical elements,for example, are highlystable events across time.They are eventsthat can be recreated in anylaboratory,SOyears ago, today,or 100 years from now.Because they are so stable, broad generaliza-tions can be established witha high degreeof confidence, explanationscan be empiricallytested, an d mathemat ica l t ransformat ionscanbe frui t ful ly developed. If events were un-stable, if the velocity of falling bodies or thecompoundingof chemicals werein continuousflux, the developm ent of the na tural sciences

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would be drastically impeded. General lawswould fail to emerge, and the recording ofnatural events would lend itself primarilytohistorical analysis.If natural events werecapricious, natural science would largelybereplaced by natural history.

It is the purpose of this paper to arguethat social psychology is primarily an his-torical inquiry. Unliketh e natural sciences,it deals withfacts that are largely nonrepeat-able and which fluctuate markedly over t ime.Principles of human interaction cannot read-ily be developed over time because the factson which they are based do not generallyremain stable. Knowledge cannot accumulate

in the usual scientific sense because suchknowledge does n ot generally transcendit shistorical boundaries. In the following dis-cussion tw o central linesof a rgumen twill bedeveloped in support of this thesis, the firstcentering on the impact of the science onsocial behavior and the second on historicalchange. After examining these arguments, wecan focus on alterationsin the scope and aimsof the fieldsuggested by this analysis.

I M P A C TO F S C I E N C EO N S O C I A LINTERACTION

As Back (1963) has shown, social sciencecan f rui tful ly be viewed as a protracted com-municat ionssystem. In the execution of re-search, th e scientist receives messages trans-mitted by the subject. In raw form, suchmessages generate only "noise" for the scien-tist. Scientific theories serve as decoding de-vices which convert noiseto usable in forma-t ion. Although Backhas used this model ina number of provocative ways,his analysisis terminated at the poin t of decoding.Thismodel mustbe extended beyondth e processof gathering and decoding messages. Thescientist's task is also that of communicator.If his theories prove to be useful decodingdevices, theyare communicatedto the popu-lace in order that they might also benefitfrom their utility. Science an d society

constitute a feedback loop.This type of feedback from scientist tosociety has become increasingly widespreadduring the past decade. Channels of com-munication have developedat a rapid rate.On the level of higher ed ucation, over eight

million students are annually confronted bycourse offerings in the field of psychology,an d within recent years, suchofferings havebecome unexcelled in popularity. The liberaleducation of today entails fa m iliarity withcentral ideas in psychology. T he mass mediahave also cometo realize th e vast publicinterest in psychology. T he news m ediacare-fully monitor professional meetingsas wellas journa lsof the profession. Magazine pub-lishers have found it profitableto feature theviews of psychologists on contemporary be-havior patterns, and specialty magazines de-voted almost exclusively to psychology nowboast readerships totaling over 600,000.

When we add to these trends the broadexpansion of the soft-coverbook market, th eincreasing governmental demandfor knowl-edge just i fy ing th e public underwri t ingofpsychological research,th e proliferationofencounter techniques, th e establishment ofbusiness enterprises huckstering psychologythrough games an d posters,and theincreasingreliance placed by major insti tutions (in-cluding business, government, mili tary,an dsocial) on the knowledgeof in-house behav-ioral scientists,one begins to sense th e pro-found degree to which th e psychologist isl inked in mutua l communica t ion wi ththesurroundingcul ture .

Most psychologists harborth e desire thatpsychological knowledge will havean impacton the society. Mostof us are gratified whensuch knowledgecan be utilized in beneficialways. Indeed, for many social psychologists,commitmentto the fieldimportant ly dependson th e belief in the social utilityof psycho-logical knowledge. However, it is not gen-erally assumedthat such utilizationwill alterth e character of causal relations in socialinteract ion.We do expect knowledgeof func-tion forms to be util izedin altering behavior,but w e do not expect the utilization toaffectth e subsequen t characterof the function formsthemselves.O ur expectationsin this case m aybe quite u n f o u n d e d .Not only may the appli-

cation of our principles alterth e data on whichthey are based, but the very developmentofth e principles m ay invalidate them. Threelines of argument are pertinent, the firststemmingfrom th e evaluative biasof psycho-logical research, the secondfrom the liber-


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at ing effects of knowledge ,and the third f romprevalent valuesin the cul ture .

Prescriptive Bias o f Psychological Theory

As scientists of human interaction, we areengaged in a peculiar duali ty. On the onehand, we va lue d ispass ionate comportment inscientific matters. We are well aware of thebiasing effects of s t rong va lue commitments .On the o the r hand , as socia l ized humanbeings,w e harbor numerous va lues aboutthena tu re of social relations.It is the rare socialpsychologist whose values do notinfluenceth e subjec t of his research, his methods of

observation, or the terms of description. Ingenerating knowledge about social interaction,w e also communicate our personal values.The recipient ofknowledge is thus providedwith dual messages: Messagesthat dispas-sionately describe w h a t appears to be, andthose which subt lyprescribe what is desirable.

This argument is most c lear ly ev ident inresearch on personal disposit ion s.Most of uswould feel insulted if characterizedas low in

self-esteem, high in approval seeking, cogni-tively undi fferen t ia ted , author i ta r ian , ana lcompulsive, f ield dependent, or close-minded.In part, our reac t ionsreflect our accul tura-tion ; one need not be a psychologistto resentsuch labels. But in part , such reactions arecreated by the conceptsuti l ized in descr ib ingan d explaining phen om ena. For exam ple , inthe preface ofThe Authoritarian Personality(Adorno , Frenk e l -Brunsw ik , Lev inson ,&Sanford, 1950) , readers a re in fo rmed that"In con t ra s t to the bigot of the older style,( the au tho r i t a r ian ) seemsto combine theideas an d skills of a highly industrializedsociety with irrationalor an t i - ra t iona lbeliefs[p. 3]." In discussing the Machiavell ianpersonality, Christiean d Gels ( 1 9 7 0 ) noted

Ini t ial ly our image of the high Mach was a negat iveone, as soc i a t ed wi t h shadowy and unsavor y m a-nipu la t ions .H o w e v e r . . . w e f o u n d ourselveshav i nga perverse adm irat ion for the high M achs ' abi l i ty

tooutd o o thers in exper imen ta l s i tua t ions [p .339].

In their prescriptive capacity such com-munications become agents of social change.On an elementary level, the student ofpsychology might well wishto excludefrom pub lic observation behaviors labeled

by respected scholars as author i ta r ian ,Machiavell ian, and so on. The communica -tion of knowledge may thus create homogene-ity with respect to behavioral indicatorsof

underlying disposit ions.On a more complexlevel, knowledge of personalitycorrelates m ayinduce behavior to insubstantiate the cor-relates. Not so strangely, much indiv idualdifference research places the professionalpsychologist in a highly positivelight. Thus,th e more s imilarth e subject is to the profes-sional in te rms of educat ion, socioeconomicbackground ,religion, race, sex,and personalvalues, the more advantageoushis position onpsychological tests. Increased education,fo rexample, favors cognitive differentiat ion(Witk in , D y k , Faterson, Goodenough, &Karp , 1 9 6 2 ) , low scores in authoritarianism(Christie &Jahoda, 1954) , open-mindedness(Rokeach , 1960), etc . Armed with thisin for-mation, those personsunf la t tered by the re-search might overcompensatein order todispel the in jur ious stereotype. For example,women w ho learn they are more persuasiblethan men (c f .Janis & Field, 1959) may

retaliate, and over t ime th e correlation isinvalidated or reversed .

While evaluative biasesare easily identif iedin personality research, theyare by no meansl imi ted to this area. M ost gen eral models ofsocial interaction also contain implicit valuej u d g m e n t s . For example, treatises on con-fo rmi ty of ten treat the confo rmer as asecond-class citizen,a social sheep w ho fore-goes personal con victionto agree with th eerroneous opin ions

ofothers. Thus, models

of social con fo rmi ty sensitize one to fac torsthat might lead him in to socially deplorab leactions. In effect, knowledge insulatesagainstthe fu tu re efficacy of these same factors.Re-search on a t t i tude changeof ten carries withit these same over tones . Knowing aboutatti-t u d e change flatters one into believing thathe has the power to change o thers ;by impli-cation, others are relegated to the statusof manipu landa . Thus, theories of att i tudechange m ay sensit ize on e in to gua rd ingagainst factors that could potentially inf lu-ence h im,In the same way, theoriesof aggres-sion typically condemnth e aggressor, modelsof interpersonal bargainingare disparagingofexploitation , an d m odels of m oral develop-


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havior of the subject. Naive subjects arethus required by common standardsof rigor.The implications of this simple methodologi-cal safeguardare of considerable significance.If subjects possess preliminary knowledgeasto theoretical premises, we can no longeradequately test our hypotheses. In the sameway, if the society is psychologically in -formed, theories about which it isinformedbecome difficult to test in an uncontamina tedway. Herein lies a f u n d a m e n t a l differencebetween the na tura l and the social sciences.In the former, the scientist cannot typicallycommunica te his knowledge to the subjectsof his study such that their behavioral dis-positions aremodified. In the social sciencessuch communica t ioncan have a vital impacton behavior.

A single examplem ay suffice here. It ap-pears that over a wide variety of conditions,decision-making groups come to make riskierdecisions throu gh gro up discussion (c f. Dion ,Baron , & Miller, 1970; Wallach, Kogan,&Bern, 1964). Investigators in this area arequite careful that experimental subjects are

not privy to their thinking on this matter. Ifknowledgeable,subjects might insulate them-selves from th e effects of group discussionorrespond appropriately in order to gain th eexperimenter 's favor. However, should therisky shift become common knowledge, naivesubjects wou ld become unobtainable . M em-bers of the culture might consis tent ly com-pensate for risky tendencies produced bygroup discussion until such behavior becamenormative.

As a general surmise, sophisticationas topsychological principles liberates onefromtheir behavioral implications. Establishedprinciples of behavior become inputs intoone's decision making.A s Winch (1958) haspointed out, "Since understanding somethinginvolves understanding i ts contradict ion,someone who, with understanding,performsX mu s t be capable of envisioningth e pos-sibility of do in g no t X [p. 891." Psycho-

logical principles also sensitize one toinflu-ences acting on him anddraw attention tocertain aspects of the environment and him-self. In doing so, one's patterns of behaviormay be strongly influenced.As May (1971)has stated more passionately, "Each of us

inherits from society a burden of tendencieswhich shapes us willy-nilly;but our capacityto be conscious of this fact saves us frombeing str ic t ly determined[p . 100]." In this

way, knowledge about nonverbal signalsofstress or relief (E ckman , 1965) enables us toavoid giving off these signals wheneverit isuseful to do so; knowing that persons introuble are less likely to be helped whenthere are l a rge numbers of bystanders(La tane & Barley, 1970) may increaseone'sdesire to offer his services under such condi-t ions; kno win g that m otivat ion al arousal caninfluence one's interpretationof events (cf.Jones & Gerard , 1967)m ay engender cautionwhen arousal is high. In each instance,knowledgeincreases alternativesto action,an dprevious pa t te rns of behavior are modifiedor dissolved.

Escape to Freedom

The historical invalidation of psychologicaltheory can be fur ther traced to com m onlyobserved sentiments within western culture.Of major importance is the general distress

people seem to feel at the d iminu t ionof theirresponse alternatives.A s Fromm (1941) sawit , normal development includesth e acquisi-tion of strong motives toward autonomy.Weinstein an d Platt (1969) discussed muchth e same sen t imentin terms of "man's wishto be free," an d linked this dispositiontothe developing social structu re.Brehm (1966 )used this same dispositionas the cornerstoneof his theory of psychological reactance.Theprevalence of this learned value has importantimplications for the long-term validity ofsocial psychological theory.

Valid theories about social behavior con-stitute significant implements of social con-trol. To the extent that an individual 'sbe-havior is predictable, he places himself in aposition of vulnerabi l i ty. Others can alterenvironmental conditions or their behaviortoward him to obtain maximal rewardsatmin ima l costs to themselves. In the same

w ay that a m ilitary strategist lays him selfopen to defeat when his actions become pre-dictable, an organizat ional official can betaken advantageof by his infer iorsan d wivesmanipulated by errant husbands when theirbehavior patterns are reliable. Knowledge


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thus becomes power in the hands of others.It follows that psychological principles posea potential threatto all those for whom theyare germ ane . Investments infreedom m aythus potentiate behavior designedto invali-date th e theory. We are satisfied with prin-ciples of at t i tude change unti lwe find thembeing used in information campaigns dedi-cated to changingour behavior.A t this point,w e m ay feel resentful an d react recalci-t rant ly. T he more potent the theory is inpredic t ing behavior, the broader its publicdissemination and the more prevalent andresounding the reaction. Thus, strong theo-ries may besubject to more rapid invalidationthan weak ones.

The common va lueof personal freedom isnot the only pervasive sentimentaffectingth e mortal i ty of social psychological theory.In western culturethere seems to be heavyvalue placed on uniqueness or individuality.Th e broad popularity of both Erikson(1968) and Allport (1965) can be traced inpart to their strong supportof this value,andrecent laboratory research (Fromkin, 1970,

1972) has demonstrated the strength of thisvalue in altering social behavior. Psycho-logical theory, in its nomothetic structure, isinsensit iveto un ique o ccurrences. Individualsare treated as exemplars of larger classes.Acommon reaction is that psychological theoryis dehumaniz ing ,and as Maslow (1968)hasnoted, patients harbor a strong resentment atbeing rubricated or labeled with conventionalclinical terms. Similarly, blacks,women, ac-tivists, suburbanites, educators, and theelderly have all reacted bitterly to explana-tions of their behavior. Thus,we may striveto invalidate theoriesthat ensnareus in theirimpersonal way.

Psychology of Enlightenment Effects

Thus far we have discussed three ways inwhich social psychology altersth e behavior itseeks to study. Before moving to a secondset of arguments for the historical depen-

dency of psychological theory,w e must dealwith an important meansof combatt ing th eeffects thus far described. T o preserve th etranshistorical validityof psychological prin-ciples, th e science couldbe removed from th epublic dom ain and scientific un der stan din g

reserved for a selected elite.This elite wou ld,of course, be co-opted by the state, as nogovernmen tcould risk the existenc e of a pri-vate establishment developing toolsof publiccontrol. For most of us, such a prospect isrepugnant, and our inclination instead is toseek a scientific solution to the prob lem ofhistorical dependency. Suchan answer is sug-gested by muchthat has been said. If peoplewho are psychologically enlightened react togeneral principles by contradict ing them,conforming to them, ignoring them,and soon , then it should be possible to establishth e condit ions under which these variousre-actions will occur. Basedon notions of psy-

chological reactance ( B r e h m , 1966) , self-fulfilling prophecies (Merton, 1948),an dexpectancy effects (Gergen & Taylor, 1969),we might construct a general theory of re-actions to theory. A psychology of enlighten-m e n t effects should enable us to predict andcontrol th e effects of knowledge.

Although a psychology of enlightenmenteffects seems a promisingad junc t to generaltheories, its u tility is seriously lim ited . Sucha psychology can itself be invested withvalue, increase our behavioral alternatives,and may beresented becauseof its threats tofeelings of autonomy. Thus, a theorythatpredicts reactionsto theory is also susceptibleto violation or vind ica t ion .A f requent occur-rence in parent-child relations illustratesth epoint. Parents are accustomed to usingdirect rewardsin order to influence the be-havior of their ch ildren . Over tim e, childrenbecome aware of the adult 's premisethat th e

reward will achieve the desired results andbecome obstinate. T he adu l t m ay then reactwith a naive psychologyof enlightenmenteffects and express disinterestin the child'scarrying out the activity, again with thein ten t of achieving th e desired ends. T hechild may respond appropriately but oftenenough will blur t out some variationof, "youare just saying you don' t care because youreally want me to do it." In Loevinger 's(1959) terms, " . . . a shif t in paren tman-ship is countered by ashift in childmanship[p . 149]." In the popular idiom , thisistermed reverse psychologyand is often re-sented. O f course, on e could counter withresearch on reactions to th e psychology of


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enl ightenmenteffects, but it is quickly seenthat this exchange of actions and reactionscould be extended indefinitely. A psychologyof enl igh tenmenteffects is subject to thesame historical limitations as other theoriesof social psychology.

P S Y C H O L O G I C A LTHEORY A N DC U L T U R A L C H A N G E

The argument against transhistorical lawsin social psychology does not solely rest on aconsiderationof the impact of scienceon so-ciety. A secondmajor l ine of thou ght deservesconsideration.If we scan the most p romi-nent l ines of researchduring the past decade,we soon realize tha t the observed regulari-ties, and thus themajor theoretical prin-ciples, are firmly wedded to historical cir-cumstances. The historical depen den cy ofpsychological principlesis most notable inareas of focal concern to the public. Socialpsychologists have been much concerned,forexample,with isolating predictorsof politicalactivism during thepast decade (cf.Mankoff& Flacks, 1971; Soloman& Fishman, 1964) .

However, as one scans this l i terature overtime, numerous inconsistenciesare found .Variables that successfullypredicted politicalactivism d uri n g the early stages of theVietnam war are dissimilar to those whichsuccessfully predicted activism duringlaterperiods. T he conclusion seems clearthat th efactors motivating activism changed overtime. Thus, any theory of political activismbuil t from early f indingswould be invalidatedby later f indings.Future researchon politicalactivism will undoubtedly find sti l l otherpredictors moreuseful.

Such alterations in functional relationshipare not in principle l imited to areas ofimmediate public concern. For example,Festinger's (1957) theory of social compari-son and the extensive line of deductive re-search (cf.Latan6, 1966) are based on thedual assumption that (a) people desire toevaluate themselves accurately, and(b ) inorder to do so they compare themselves withothers. There is scant reasonto suspectthatsuch dispositions are gen etically de term ine d,and we can easily imagine persons, and indeedsocieties, fo r which these assumptions wouldnot hold. M a n y of our social commentators

are critical of the common tendencyto searchout others' opinions in denningself and theyat tempt to change society through their criti-cism. In effect, th e entire line of research

appears to depend on a set of learned pro-pensities, propensitiesthat could be alteredby t ime and circumstance.

In the same way, cognitive dissonancetheory dep end s on the assumption that peoplec a n n o t tolerate contradictory cognitions.T hebasis of such intolerance doesnot seemgenetically given. There are certainly indi-viduals who feel qu ite otherwise about suchcontradictions.Early existentialist writers, forexample, celebrated th e inconsistent act.Again , we m ust con clude that the theory ispredictive becauseof the state of learned dis-positions existingat the time. Likewise,Schachter 's(19S9) workon affiliation is sub-ject to the arguments made in the case ofsocial comparison theory. Milgram's(1965)obediencephenomenonis certainly dependenton contemporary at t i tudes toward authori ty.In atti tud e chan ge research, com m un icatorcredibility is a potent factor becausew e

have learned to rely on authorities in ourculture, and the com m un icated message be-comes dissociated from it s source over time(Ke lman & Hovland, 1953) becauseit doesn ot prove useful to us at present to retain theassociation. In conformity research, peopleconform more to friends than nonf r iends(Back, 1951) partly because they havelearned tha t fr iends punish deviancein con-temporary society. Researchon causal attri-bution (c f. Jones, D avis,& Gergen, 1961;Kelley, 1971) dependson the culturally de-pendent tendencyto perceive man as thesource of his actions. This tendency canbe modified (Hallowell, 1958) and some(Skinner, 1971) have indeed arguedthat itshould be.

Perhaps th e primary guaranteethat socialpsychologywill never disappearvia reductionto physiology is that physiology cannot ac-count for thevaria t ions in human behaviorover time. People mayprefer bright shadeso f clothing todayan d grim shades tomorrow;they may va lue au tonomydur ing this eraand dependency duringth e next . To be sure,varying responses to the environment relyon variations in physiologicalfunct ion . How-


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ever, physiologycan never specifythe na tu reof th e stimulus inputsor the response con-text to which the individual is exposed. Itcan never accountfor the cont inuouslyshift-in g patterns of w h a t is considered th e goodor desirable in society, and thus a range ofprimary motivational sources for the indi-vidual. However, while social psychologyisthus insulated f rom physiological reduction-ism, its theories are not insulated fromhistorical change.

It is possible to in fe r from this latter setof a rgumen ts a c o m m i tm e n t to at least on etheory of transhistorical validity.It has beenargued that the stability in in terac t ion pa t-

te rns upon which most ofour theories restis dependent on learned dispositions of limiteddura t ion . This implicitly suggeststhe pos-sibility of a social learning theory transcend-in g historical circumstance. However, suchaconclusion is unwar ran ted .Let us consider,fo r example, an elementary theoryof rein-forcement .Few w o u ld d o u b tthat most peopleare responsive to the reward and p u n i s h m e n tcontingenciesin the i r env i ronmen t ,and it isdifficult to envisiona t ime in which this wouldnot be true. Such premises thus seem trans-historically valid , and a pr im ary task of thepsychologist might be that of isolating theprecise funct ion fo rms re la t ing pa t te rnsofreward and punishment to behavior.

This conclusion suffers on two impor tan tcounts . Many cr i t ics of re inforcement theoryhave charged that th e defini t ion of reward( a n d p u n i s h m e n t )is circular. Rewardis typi-cally defined as that which increases the fre-

quency o fresponding; response incrementisdefined as that which follows reward . Thus,the theory seems limitedto post hoc interpre-tation. Only when behavior changehas oc-curred can one specify th e reinforcer. T hemost significant rejoinder to this cri t icism liesin the fact that once r e w a r d s a n d p u n i sh m e n t shave been inductively established, they gainpredictive value.Thus, isolating social ap-proval as a posit ive reinforcerfo r h u m a nbehavior

w asin i t ia l ly dependent

onpost

hocobservation. However, once establishedas areinforcer,social approval proved asuccessfulmeans ofmodi fy ingbehavior on a predictivebasis (cf . Barron, Heckenmueller, &Schultz,1971; G ewirtz & Baer, 1958 ).

However, it is also apparent that re inforc-ers do not remain stable across t ime.For ex-ample, Reisman( 1 9 5 2 ) has cogently arguedthat social approval has far more rewardvalue in contemporary society thanit did acentury ago . And while na t ional pr ide mighthave been a potentre inforcer of late ado-lescent behaviorin the 1940's, for contempo-rary youth suchan appeal wouldprobably beaversive. In effect, the essential circularity inre in fo rcemen ttheory may a t any t ime be re-instigated. A s re in fo rcemen t value changes,so does th e predic t ive va l id i tyof the basicassumpt ion .

Reinforcementtheory faces additional his-

torical l imitations whenw e consider its moreprecise specification. Similarto most othertheor ies of human in terac t ion , the theory issubject to ideological investment.T he not ionthat behavior is wholly governedby externalcont ingencyis seen by m a n y as vulgarly de-mean ing . Knowledge of the theory also en -ables one to avoid be ing ensnaredby its pre-dictions. As behavior modification therapistsare aware, peoplewho are conversant wi thit stheoretical premisescan subver t its in tendedeffects with facili ty. Finally, because the the-ory has proved soeffective in altering thebehavior of lower organ isms , it becomespar t icu lar ly th rea ten ing to one 's inves tmentin autonomy. In fact , mostof us would resentanother ' s a t tempt to shape our behaviorthrough re in fo rcemen ttechniques and wouldbend ourselves to confound ing the offender 'sexpectations.In s u m , th e elaboration of re in-fo rcemen t theory is no less vulnerable to en-

l igh tenmen t effects than other theoriesofhuman in te rac t ion .

IMPLICATIONSFOR AN HISTORICAL SCIENCEO F SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

In light of the present a rguments ,th e con-tinued attempt to build general laws of socialbehavior seems m isdirected , and the associ-ated belief that kno wledge of social interac-tion can be accumula tedin a manner s imilar

to th e natural sciences appearsunjust i f ied.Inessence, the study of social psychology is pri-mari ly an h is to r ica l unde r tak ing .We are es-sentially engagedin a sys temat ic accountofcon tempora ry affairs. W e util ize scientificmethodology,but the results are not scien-


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tific principles in the traditional sense. In thefu ture , historiansm ay look back to such ac-counts to achieve a better un derstan din g oflife in the present era. However,th e psycholo-gists of the fu tu re are likely to find little ofvalue in contemporary knowledge.These ar-guments are not purely academicand a re no tlimited to asimple redefinitionof the science.Implied here aresignif icantalterat ions in theactivity of the field. Five such alterationsdeserve at tention.

Toward an Integration of the Pure andApplied

A pervasive prejudice against appliedre -

search exists among academic psychologists ,a pre judice tha t i s evident in the pure re-search focus of prestige journalsand in thedependencyof promotionand t e n u r e on con-t r ibut ions to pure as opposed to applied re -search. In part, thispre judice is based on theassumption that applied researchis of tran-sient value. While i t is l imited to solving im-mediate problems, pure researchis viewed ascontributing to basic ande n d u r i n gknowledge.From the present s tandpoint , such groundsfo r pre judiceare not mer i ted .T he knowledgethat pure research bendsitself to establish isalso transien t; gen eralization s in the pureresearch areado not generallyendure .To theextent that generalizationsfrom pure researchhave greater transhistorical validity, theymay be reflecting processes of peripheral in -terest or impor tanceto the funct ioningof so-ciety.

Social psychologists are trained in using

tools of conceptual analysisand scientificmethodology in explaining human interac-tion. However, given the sterility of perfect-ing general principles across time, these toolswould seem more productively usedin solvingproblems of immediate importance to the so-ciety. This is not to imply that such researchmust be parochial in scope. One major short-coming of much applied researchis that th eterms used to describe an d explain are oftenrelatively concretean d specific to the caseat hand. While the concrete behavioralactsstudied by academic psychologists are oftenmore trivial, the explanatory languageishighly generalan d thus more broadly heur-istic. Thus, the present arguments suggestan

intensive focus on contemporary social issues,based on the applicationof scientif ic m ethodsan d conceptual toolsof broad generali ty.

From Prediction to Sensitization

The central aim of psychology is tradi-t ionally viewed as the predict ion and controlof behavior. Fromth e present standpoint , thisaim is misleadingand provides littlejustifica-tion for research. Principlesof h u m a n be-havior may have l imited predict ive valueacross t ime,an d the i r very acknowledgmentcan render them impotentas tools of socialcontro l .How ever, predic t ionand control neednot serve as the cornerstones of the field.

Psychological theory can play an exceedinglyimportant roleas a sensit izingdevice. It canenlighten one as to therange of factors po-tential ly in f luencing behavior un der variouscondit ions. Research may also provide someestimate of the importanceof these factors ata given t ime. W hether i t be in the dom ain ofpublic policy or personal relationships, socialpsychology can sharpen one 's sensit ivi tytosubtle influences an d pinpoint assumpt ionsabout behaviorthat have n ot proved useful inthe past.

When counselis sought from th e socialpsychologist rega rdin g likely beh avio r in an yconcrete si tuation, the typical reaction isapology. It m u s t be explained that the fieldis n ot sufficientlywell developed at present sothat rel iable predict ions can be made. Fromth e present standpoint , such apologiesareinappropriate. The field can seldom yieldprinciples f rom which rel iable predict ionscan

be made. Behavior patternsare under con-stant m odification. However, wh atthe fieldcan and should provide is researchinformingth e inqu i re r of a n u mb e r of possible occur-rences, thus expanding his sensit ivi t ies andreadying him for m ore rapid accomm odationto environmenta l change.It can provide con-ceptual and methodological tools with whichmore d isce rn ing judgm entscan be made.

Developing Indicatorsof Psycho-SocialDispositions

Social psychologists evidence a continuousconcern w ith basic psychological processes,that is , processes influencinga wide an d variedrange of social behavior. Modeling the experi-


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mental psychologist's concern with basicprocesses of color vision, language acquisition,memory, and the like, social p sycho logistshave focused on such processes as cognitivedissonance, aspiration level,an d causal attri-bution. However, there is apro found differ-ence between th e processes typically studiedin the general experimental and social do-mains. In the former instance, the processesare often locked into the organism biologi-cally; they are not subject to en l igh tenmenteffects and are not dependent on culturalc ircumstance.In contrast, mostof the proc-esses falling in the social domain are de-pendent on acquired dispositions subject togross modificat ionover time.

In this light, it is a mistake to considerth e processes in social psychologyas basic inthe natural science sense. Rather, theym aylargely be considered th e psychological coun-terpart of cultural norms.In the same way asociologist is concerned with measuringpartypreferencesor patterns of mobility over time,the social psychologist might attendto thechanging patterns of psychological disposi-

t ions and their relationship to social behavior.If dissonance reduction is an impor t an tprocess, then we should be in a position tomeasure th e prevalence an d strength of sucha disposition withinth e society over timean dthe preferred modes of dissonance reduct ionexisting at any given time. If esteem en-hancement appears toinfluence social inter-action, then broad studiesof the cultureshould reveal th e extent of the disposition,its strength in various subcultures,and theforms of social behavior with whichit is mostlikely associatedat any given time. Althoughlaboratory experiments are well suited to theisolation o f particu lar dispositions, they arepoor indicatorsof the range an d significanceof th e processes in contemporary sociall i fe.Much neededare methodologies tappingth eprevalence, strength, an d form of psycho-social dispositions over time.In effect, a tech-nology of psychologically sen sitive socialin -

dicators (Bauer, 1969)is required.Research on Behavioral Stability

Social phenomena may vary considerablyin the extent to which they are subject tohistorical change. Certain phenomenamay be

closely tied to physiological givens. Schach-ter's (1970) researchon emotional states ap-pears to have a strong physiological basis,asdoes Hess's (1965) work on affect and pupil-lary constriction. Although learned disposi-tions can overcome the strength of somephysiological tendencies, such tendenciesshould tend to reassert themselves over time.Still other physiological propensities may beirreversible. Therem ay also be acquired dis-positions that aresufficiently powerful thatneither enl ightenmentnor historical changeislikely to have a majo r impact. People willgenerally avoid physicallypa in fu l stimuli,regardless of their sophistication or the cur-

rent norms.W e must th ink , then ,in termsofa continuum of historical durability, withphenomena highly susceptibleto historical in -fluence at one extreme and the more s tableprocesses at the other.

In this l ight, much neededare researchmethods enabling us to discern therelativedurabil i tyof social phenomena. Cross-culturalmethods could be employed in this capacity.Although cross-cultural replication is frought

with difficulty, similarity in a given funct ionform across widely div ergen t culture s w ouldstrongly attest to its durability across time.Content analytic techniques might alsobeemployed in exam ining accountsof earlier his-torical periods. Until now, such accounts haveprovided little except quotations indicatingthat some great thinker presageda pet hy-pothesis. We have yet to tap the vast quan -tities of informat ion regarding interactionpat terns in earlier periods. Although enhancedsophistication about behaviorpatterns acrossspace and t ime would furnish valuable in-sights regarding durability,difficult problemspresent themselves. Some beh aviorpatternsmay remain stable until closely scrutinized;others may simply becomedysfunct ionalovertime. Man's reliance on a concept of deity hasa long history and isfound in numerous cul-tures; however, manyare skeptical aboutthefu tu re of this reliance. Assessmentsof dura-

bility would thus have to accountfor poten-tial as well as actual stability in phenomena.While research into more durable disposi-

t ions is highly valuable,w e should not there-fore conclude that it is either more usefulordesirable than stu dy ing passing behavior pat-


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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGYA S HISTORY 319

terns. The major share of the variance insocial behavior is undoub ted ly due to his-torically dependent disposit ions, and thechallenge of capturing such processes"inflight" and during auspicious periodsof his-tory is immense.

Toward an Integrated Social History

It has been ma in ta inedthat social psycho-logical research is primarily the systematics tudy of con tempora ry h i s to ry.A s such , itseems myopicto mainta in d isc ip l inary de tach-m e n t from (a) the t rad i t ion al s tud y of his -tory an d (b) other historically bound sciences( inc luding sociology, political science, andeconomics) .The particular research strategiesand sensitivities of the historian could en-hance th e u n d e r s t a n d in gof social psychology,both past an d present. Part icu lar ly usefulwould be the historian 's sensit ivityto causalsequences across time. Most social psycho-logical researchfocuses on m inu te segmen tsofongoing processes.W e have concentra ted verylittle on the funct ion of these segm ents w ith intheir historical context.W e have l i t t le theory

dealing with the interrelation of events overextended periods of time. By the same token,historians couldbenefi t from the more rig-orous methodologies employedby the socialpsychologist as well as his particular sensi-tivity to psychological variables. How ever,thes tudy of history, both past an d present ,should be u n d e r t a k e nin the broadest possiblef ramework . Polit ical , econom ic, and insti tu-t ional factors are all necessary inputs tou n d e r s t a n d in gin an in tegra ted way.A concen-tration on psychology alone providesa dis-to r ted unde rs tand ingof our present condi t ion .

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(Received Apri l17, 1972)

social psychology as history

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