set 1 case digest

SET 1 CASE DIGEST Constitutional law 1Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Locus Standi

Title: OPOSA vs HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083

Facts:

This is a taxpayers’ class suit in petition for upholding the constitutional right of the Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology. The principal petitioners were all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents praying for the cancelation of timber license agreement.

The minors assert that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.", particularly invoking “intergenerational responsibility”. They prayed, that judgment be rendered to order honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and other persons acting on his behalf to: cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.

The respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Issue:

1. Do the petitioners have locus standi to file a suit against the respondents?

2. Is the suit filed a matter of political question?3. Would the granting of the relief prayed for would result in

the impairment of contracts?

Court Ruling:

Answer to issue # 1. Yes, they are upholding their rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.

“The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:


Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

****

“…Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.”

“This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.”

Answer to issue # 2

“The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Answer to issue # 3

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.

“Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:


Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.”***

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.


Topic: Self Executory Provision

Title: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 122156

Facts:

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under

Proclamation No. 50, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC.

Only two bidders participated Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, with a higher bid at P44.00 per share

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner sends a letter to GSIS to match the bid price of P44.00 per share and sent a managers check as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad but GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid petitioner filed for prohibition and mandamus. The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution, since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy they should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm.

One of the GSIS claims is that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation.

Issue:


Is GSIS correct when it says Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation?

Court Ruling:

“The second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.”

***

“On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium..”

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.


Topic: Self Executory Provisions

Title: KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, G.R. No. 118910

Facts:

This case is in relation to a case filed by KilosBayan against PCSO in an allegation that public funds are being misapplied or misappropriated in regards to the Equipment Lease agreement between PCSO and PGMC.

Petitioners insist on the ruling in the previous case that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes, lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration, association or joint venture with any other party because of the clause "except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)" in paragraph (B) of §1. Petitioners contend that the ruling is the law of this case because the parties are the same and the case involves the same issue, i.e., the meaning of this statutory provision.

Issues:


1. Do petitioners have valid grounds for motion to reconsideration by invoking the policies and principles of the Constitution?

2. Does Kilosbayan have legal standing to sue PCSO?

Court Ruling:

Answer to issue # 1.

“We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule concerning real party in interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.

The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:

Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency

and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

“As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).”

Answer on Issue # 2.

“It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of


contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement, cannot raise.”

“Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§ 15-16)”

“These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.”

***

Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.


Topic: Power of Judicial Review

Title: ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, G.R. No. 160261

Facts:

On June 2, 2003, Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.”

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

On October 23, 2003, second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.


Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Issues:

3. Does the court have judicial power of review over the impeachment proceedings?

4. Are the new rules of procedure in Impeachment Proceedings unconstitutional?

5. Is the 2nd impeachment filed against the Chief Justice Davide valid?

Court Ruling:

Answer to issue # 1. Yes, in the case at bar, court have judicial power of review over the impeachment proceedings.

“Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. This Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result

thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.”

Answer to Issue # 2. Yes, Sections 16 and 17 of of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional.

“Court held, Sections 16 and 17 of of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI. “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

***

“Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of


Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.”

Answer to issue # 3. No. The 2nd impeachment complaint is not valid.

“Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.”

***

“Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.”


Topic: Political Questions

Title: SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR, G.R. No. 134577

Facts:

Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.

Antecedent facts:

The Senate of the Philippines, on their first regular session of the eleventh Congress conducted an election of officers. Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was nominated to the position of Senate President by Sen. Blas Ople. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago.

By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. Also elected were Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.


On July 30, 1998, Sen. Franklin M. Drilon informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Did Sen. Fernan gravely abuse of discretion in recognizing Sen. Guingona as minority leader?

Court Ruling:

Answer to issue #1. Yes, the court assumed jurisdiction over the petition.

“In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for

reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President.

Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well."

Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:

Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.

. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to decide them.

. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.

Answer to issue # 2. No. There was no violation of the constitution.


“While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.”

***

“While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion.”

Answer to Question # 3.

“By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.”

“Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the

Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.”


Topic: Expanded Judicial Power of Review

Title: DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC vs REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, G.R. No. 97710

Facts:

Dr. Emigdio Bondoc filed a petition to annul the decision of the House of Representatives of to withdraw and rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in place of respondent Camasura, a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a member of HRET, and to be granted such other relief as may be just and equitable.

Antecedent facts:

On May 11, 1987 election, Marciano M. Pineda of LDP and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party were candidates for Representative of 4th District on Pampanga. Marciano M. Pineda was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Bondoc filed an election protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Recount has been made.


On October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by twenty-three (23) votes.The LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a recount which delayed the finalization of the decision of the case. The recount resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura (member of LDP Party) voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc (from Nationalista Party) the winner and his promulgation is scheduled on March 14, 1991.

March 13, 1991,Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informed the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. In effect, the scheduled promulgation of Bondoc has to be aborted this is because without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.

Issues:

4. Does the court have judicial power of review over Electoral Tribunal?

5. Did HRET violated the constitution?

Court Ruling:


“The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself"

***

“The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.”

***“Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. “

“As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the


ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.”

***

“Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.”

“Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, Membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.”


“The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative

office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members.”

***

“Therefore, Supreme Court held, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.”


Topic: Judicial Review

Title: ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, G.R. No. L-45081

Facts:


Jose A. Angara the petitioner, prayed for a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

On November 15, 1935, Jose Angara took an oath as member-elect of the National Assembly. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed the Resolution 8 confirming the election of Jose Angara.

On December 8, 1935, Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of Jose Angara and praying that he be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.

On December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provide -translated in English- “The Commission will not consider any protest that has not been filed on or before this date.”

ISSUE:

1.Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy?

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner

notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Court Ruling:

Answer to issue # 1 . Yes. Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy.“Court ruled they have jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

***

“The court will have to determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935.”


“Supreme Court held , that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and


qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.”

***:

“As per Section 17, Article 3 of the Philippine Constitution, Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

(Article 3 SECTION 17 Phil. Const). The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.

That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to

prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.”

***

“In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.”

***

“That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.”


Topic: Separation of Powers

Title: Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., G.R. No. 196231

Facts:


This is regarding the case filed against Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez for or Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office. The case against the Deputy Ombudsman ignited after the dreadful hostage crisis in Luneta Park, Manila when the axed Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza killed some HongKong nationals whom he held as hostages.

Antecedent facts:

A certain Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the Philippine National Police Internal Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila Police District Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery, grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury.

The criminal and administrative case was against Mendoza was dismissed. However, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO) found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal from the service. As per IIRC report, this have precipitated Mendoza to hostage-taking as his desperate resort.

Due to the hostage incident, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident. The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).

The IIRC found the Ombudsman and Gonzales accountable for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza.The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to promptly resolve

Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated pleas precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. The IIRC recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for further determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedingsAccordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.

On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and dismissed him from the service.21 According to the OP, "the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of [Mendoza’s] Motion for Reconsideration [‘that spanned for nine (9) long months’] xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office of the Ombudsman’s own Rules of Procedure.

Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.

Issue:

Was the action of the Office of the President to dismiss Gonzalez constitutional?

Court Ruling:

“In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,108 the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision


insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.”

***

“Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.”

***

“Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly labeled as “independent." The extent of the independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted with two significant

considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any allowable interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances.”

***

“The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.”

“That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not conform to the high standard required in determining whether a Deputy Ombudsman committed an impeachable offense) and that the President’s power of removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally inadequate when balanced with the constitutional principle of independence. The mere filing of an administrative case against the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their suspension and can interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term allowed under Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if removable by the President, can be reduced to the very same ineffective Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried to avoid by making these offices independent constitutional bodies.”

***


“Executive Department are subject to the prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.”


Topic: Separation of Powers

Title: JOSE O. VERA vs JOSE A. AVELINO, G.R. No. L-543

Facts:

This is a petition initiated by Jose O. Vega, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero when the Senate of the Philippines in session assembled, decided to defer the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, pending the hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections. They pray for an order annulling it, and compelling the respondent to permit them to occupy their seats, and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives.

Antecedent fact:

Commission on elections submitted to the President and the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the national elections held among other things, stated that, by reason of certain

specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.

Based on the report, the four Provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija, had the worst terrorism during and after the election, and that if the elections held in those provinces were annulled as demanded by the circumstances mentioned in the report of the Commission, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose Romero, would not and could not have been declared elected;

When the Senate convened , it approved a resolution referring to the report and ordering that, pending the termination of the protest lodged against their election, the herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero — who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commission on Elections — shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber.

As per Senate, it is essential, in order to maintain alive the respect for democratic institutions among our people, that no man or group of men be permitted to profit from the results of an election held under coercion, in violation of law, and contrary to the principle of freedom of choice which should underlie all elections under the Constitution;

Issue:

Does the court have jurisdiction over this case at bar?

Court Ruling:


The court has no jurisdiction.

“Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case, may this petition be entertained? The answer must naturally be in the negative. Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to suspension of the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.”

***

Needless to add, any order we may issue in this case should, according to the rules, be enforceable by contempt proceedings. If the respondents should disobey our order, can we punish them for contempt? If we do, are we not thereby destroying the independence, and the equal importance to which legislative bodies are entitled under the Constitution?

***. . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts

have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

set 1 case digest

Documents