17 Calalas vs. CA |MendozaGR 122039| 31 May 2000FACTSAt 10 a.m. of 23 August 1989, Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a collegefreshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took apassenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney wasfilled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor anextension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of thevehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepneystopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle,Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzutruck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the leftrear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained afracture of the distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of theunderlying skin. Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, andcase wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lastedfrom August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V.Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for aperiod of 3 months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.On 9 October 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas beforethe RTC of Dumaguete City (Branch 36), alleging violation of the contract ofcarriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as acommon carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaintagainst Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower court renderedjudgment, against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas ofliability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsiblefor the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case 3490), filed byCalalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of thesame court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for thedamage to his jeepney.On appeal to the Court of Appeals, and on 31 March 1991, the ruling of thelower court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of action was basedon a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed toexercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate courtdismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable fordamages to Sunga. The Court ordered Calalas tro pay Sunga (1) P50,000.00 asactual and compensatory damages; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (3)P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and (4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and (5)to pay the costs. Calalas motion for reconsideration was denied 11 September1995. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N The CA erred in reversing the TCs ruling?HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINO.The Supreme Court affirmed the 31 March 1991 decision and the 11 September 1995resolution of the Court of Appeals, with the modification that the award of moraldamages is deleted.1. Res Judicata does not applySunga is not bound by the ruling in Civil Case 3490, which found the driver and theowner of the truck liable for quasi-delict, as she was never a party to that case. Further,the issues in Civil Case 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue in CivilCase 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for thedamage caused to Calalas jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in the present case iswhether Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage. The principle of res judicata,therefore, does not apply.2. Distinction between culpa aquiliana or culpa extracontractual, and culpacontractualQuasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its sourcethe negligence of the tortfeasor. On the other hand, breach of contract or culpacontractual is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractualobligation. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because itis the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecutedmerely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this casethe common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.3. Common carriers presumed at fault unless they observed extraordinarydiligence; Burden of proofIn case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides thatcommon carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unlessthey prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Articles 1733 and1755 of the Code. The provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden ofproof.4. Doctrine of proximate cause applicable only in quasi-delict, not in breach ofcontractThe doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not inactions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to aperson where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, theobligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relationbetween the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and thefunction of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Herein, it is immaterialthat the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was thenegligence of the truck driver.5. Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 NCCInsofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Codeare those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safetyof passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury topassengers. Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that Common carriers, from thenature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observeextraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of thepassengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Suchextraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety ofthe passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756. On the other hand, Article1755 of the Civil Code provides that A common carrier is bound to carry thepassengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmostdiligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. Article1756 provides that In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers arepresumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that theyobserved extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.6. In violation of traffic rules; Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic)Herein, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about 2meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway ina diagonal angle. This is a violation of the RA 4136, as amended, or the LandTransportation and Traffic Code, which provides in Section 54 (Obstruction of Traffic)that No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impedethe passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or loading orunloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway. 7. In violation of traffic rules; Section 32(a) (Exceeding registered capacity)Herein,the driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of thejeepney, a violation of Section 32(a) of the same law. Section 32 [a] (Exceeding registeredcapacity) provides that No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow morepassengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity. The factthat Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed her in a peril greater than that towhich the other passengers were exposed.8. Driver of jeepney did not exercise utmost diligence of very cautious personsUpon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and itbecame the duty of Calalas to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in thecare of his passengers. The driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga safely as far as humancare and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,with due regard for all the circumstances as required by Article 1755. Not only wasCalalas unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for theinjury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent intransporting passengers.9. Taking of Extension seat cannot be considered an implied assumption ofriskSungas taking an extension seat did not amount to an implied assumption of risk.Otherwise, iIt is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies inour seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greaterrisk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry51 Vda. De Bataclan v. Mariano MedinaMontemayorG.R. No. 12106, October 22, 1957|FACTSShortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of publicconvenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by itsregular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including thedriver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and tothe right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another passengerapparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya, apparentlynot knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a woman named NataliaVillanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that samemorning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of thefront tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on theright side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the busthe best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengersseated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behindthem named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of thepassengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans frominside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they couldnot get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not thepassengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, madeany attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside thevehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. Afterhalf an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboowith a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumablyapproach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning andall but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It wouldappear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasolinetank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus andthe ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the menwho answered the call for help set it on fire.That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus wereremoved and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan.The widow instituted a suit to recover damages from Medina. The trial court ruled infavor of the widow of Bataclan. But the trial court contends that the overturning of thebus was not the proximate cause of bataclans death.ISSUES & ARGUMENTSWhether the overturning of the bus was the proximate cause of Bataclans death orthe fire that burned the busHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIin the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate tohold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason thatwhen the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking ofthe gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the menwith a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by thepassengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and thatbecause it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light withthem, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were notavailable; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approachthe vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words,the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence ofthe overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outsidehelp. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to thenegligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness,the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least,the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned buswas, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area inand around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over alarge area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver northe conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not tobring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of thecarrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733,1759 and 1763.

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. ANGEL BACANI ESGUERRA,G.R. No. L-40570 January 30, 1976FACTSQuick Version:Bumagyo. Natangay big and small banana plants on an elevatedground. Tumama sa electric wire ng Alcala Electric Plant. Naputol wire. Sinabihan sitao ng corp na ayusin. Bago pa man ma ayos, may pumuntang bata sa live wire.Nakuryente. PatayDetailed Version:A storm with strong rain hit the Alcala Pangasinan, from 2:00 o'clock in theafternoon and lasted up to about midnight of the same day. During the storm, thebanana plants standingon an elevated groundalong the road of said municipalityand near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fellon the electric wire.As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on theelectric post and the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants.On the following morning, at about 9:00 o'clock barrio captain Luciano Bueno ofSan Pedro Iii who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and so he warned thepeople in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also sawCipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place andnotified him right then and there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but thelatter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look forthe lineman to fix it.Sometime after the barrio captain and Cipriano Baldomero had left the place, asmall boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whosehouse is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the brokenline wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and hesubsequently died. It was only after the electrocution of Manuel Saynes that thebroken wire was fixed at about 10:00 o'clock on the same morning by the linemanof the electric plant.ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N the Alcala Electric Company can be liable for TORT.I am not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict ortort as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because theproximate cause of the boy's death electrocution could not be due to anynegligence on my part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm thatcaused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out theabsence of negligence on the part of his employee Cipriano Baldomerowho tried to have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of theparents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIAlcala Electric is LIABLE under TORTFirst, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall bananaplants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which wereabout 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting theelectric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinaryforesight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds theelectric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did noteven take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to theelectric line.Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were alreadyaware of the possible damage the storm of May 14, 1972, could have causedtheir electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they didnot cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act theycould have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had beencut.Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of theincident because even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he didnot have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life andproperty, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to preventanybody from approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premisesbecause what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviouslyforgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of the victim's death couldbe attributed to the parents' negligence in allowing a child of tender age to goout of the house alone, We could readily see that because of theaforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants' employeesresulting in a live wire lying on the premises without any visible warning of itslethal character, anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily aninnocent child, could have met the same fate that befell the victim. It may betrue, as the lower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of thevictim's parents in not properly taking care of the child, which enabled him toleave the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a nearby placecut wire was very near the house (where victim was living) where the fatal fallenwire electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent's liability, but we cannot agreewith petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence constituted the proximatecause of the victim's death becausethe real proximate cause was the fallen live wirewhich posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to theseries of negligence adverted to above committed by defendants' employees andwhich could have killed any other person who might by accident get intocontact with it. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave thehouse unattended due to the parents' negligence, he would not have died thatmorning where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff(parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and

PLDT vs. CARegaladoG.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989 | 178 SCRA 94FACTsThe Estebans jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, anexcavation undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduitsystem.Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of thedarkness and the lack of any warning light or signsThe Estebans allegedly sustained injuriesPLDT, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondentspouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should beheld responsible, Barte an independent contractor which undertook the construction LC ruled in favor of EstebansHowever, the CA found that that the relationship of Barte and PLDT should beviewed in the light of the contract between them and, under the independentcontractor rule, PLDT is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor. Still,CA affirmed LC decision.ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by the EstebansHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDIThe accident which befell the Estebans was due to the lack of diligence ofrespondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on thepart of petitioner PLDT The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for whichreason he ran into it.The jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour. At that speed, he could havebraked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeepwould not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by thetiremarks. The jeep must have been running quite fast.Plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a familyto avoid the accident.The negligence of Antonio Esteban wasnot only contributory to his injuries andthose of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident,as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recoverdamagesThe presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident;the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence ofexcavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence ofsaid excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations whichcaused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplainedsudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident moundFurthermore, Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accidentA person claiming damages for the negligence of another has theburden ofproving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The factsconstitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden inthe first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise hisaction must fa Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District Bautista AngeloL-7644 August 29, 1958 |FACTSMetropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara, Quezon CityIt charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its pools Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners, went to the pools along withhis 2 brothers He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his brothers that he would get something to drink. His brothers left him and went to the Deep poolAround 4pm that day, a bather reported that one person was swimming to longunder water Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Ongs lifelessbody. Applying first aid, the lifeguard tried to revive the boySoon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed bysanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from theclinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him theresuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy withcamphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr.Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abao continued theartificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied theresuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhaustedInvestigation was concluded and the cause of death is asphyxia by submersion inwater (pagkalunod)The parents of Ong bring this action for damages against Metropolitan, allegingnegligence on the selection and supervision of its employees and if not negligent,they had the last clear chance to revive Ong. It is to be noted that Metropolitan had complete safety measures in place: they had amale nurse, six lifeguards, ring buoys, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and aresuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic establishedfor the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous placecertain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibitsthe swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant. Although defendant doesnot maintain a full- time physician in the swimming pool compound, it has howevera nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the oxygenresuscitator if the need should ariseISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for its negligenceW/N the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked in this caseHOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDINo. Metropolitan is not negligent Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of itspatrons. It has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with aring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. Thebottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. Thereis on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulationsgoverning the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trainedas they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates ofproficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arrangedin such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of thebathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided withoxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in caseof emergency.The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from thebottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring himback to life. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspectorimmediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificialrespiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contentswere exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr.Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however came late becauseupon examining the body found him to be already dead. All of the foregoing showsthat appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restorelife to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his deathThe Last Clear Chance Doctrine is inapplicable in this caseThe record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. Theonly thing the record discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that hewas going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from that time onnobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. Thedoctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does notpreclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter,by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injuriousconsequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligenceSince it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it beingapparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of theregulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguardAbao responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it andimmediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had beenput into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room forthe application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability toappellee.334 Air France v. CAPadillaG.R. No. 76093 March 21, 1989| 171 SCRA 399FACTSPrivate respondent Morales, thru his agent, bought an airline ticket from petitionersManila ticketing office. The itinerary covered by the ticket included several citieswith certain segments thereof restricted by markings of non endorsable and validon AF (Air France) only.While in New York, respondent obtained medical certificates attesting to an earinfection which necessitated medical treatment. After a few more trips to other citiesin Europe, he requested to the petitioner (twice) to shorten his trip by deleting someof the cities in his itinerary so that he can go back to Manila and have his ear checked. Petitioner informed respondent that as a matter of procedure, confirmation of the Manila ticketing office must be secured before shortening of the route. His requestswere eventually denied. This prompted the respondent to buy an entirely new set oftickets to be able to go back home.Upon arriving in Manila, respondent sent a letter-complaint to petitioner thru itsManila ticketing office. The petitioner advised the respondent to surrender theunused flight coupons in order to have them refunded but the respondent kept thesaid coupons and instead, filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage anddamages.RTC held in favor of respondent. CA modified the judgment but it was still for therespondent.ISSUES & ARGUMENTSW/N there was really a breach of contract of carriage on the part of thepetitioner, as to justify the award to private respondent of actual, moral, andexemplary damages?HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDITHERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT. PETITIONER IS NOTLIABLE.International Air Transportation Association (IATA) Resolution No. 275 e, 2.,special note reads: "Where a fare is restricted and such restrictions are not clearlyevident from the required entries on the ticket, such restrictions may be written,stamped or reprinted in plain language in the Endorsement/Restrictions" box of theapplicable flight coupon(s); or attached thereto by use of an appropriate notice."Voluntary changes to tickets, while allowable, are also covered by (IATA)Resolution No. 1013, Art. II, which provides: "1. changes to the ticket requested bythe passenger will be subject to carriers regulations.Private respondent wanted a rerouting to Hamburg, Geneva, Rome, Hongkong andManila which shortened the original itinerary on the ticket issued by AF Manilathrough ASPAC, its general sales agent. Considering the original restrictions on theticket, it was not unreasonable for Air France to deny the request. Besides, arecurring ear infection was pleaded as reason necessitating urgent return to Manila.Assumingarguendo a worsening pain or discomfort, private respondent appears tohave still proceeded to four (4) other cities covering a period of at least six (6) daysand leaving open his date of departure from Hongkong to Manila. And, even if heclaimed to have undergone medical examination upon arrival in Manila, no medicalcertificate was presented. He failed to even remember his date of arrival in Manila.With a claim for a large amount of damages, the Court finds it unsual forrespondent, a lawyer, to easily forget vital information to substantiate his plea. It isalso essential before an award of damages that the claimant must satisfactorily proveduring the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causalconnection to defendant's acts.Air France employees in Hamburg informed private respondent that his tickets werepartly stamped "non-endorsable" and "valid on Air France only." Mere refusal toaccede to the passenger's wishes does not necessarily translate into damages in theabsence of bad faith. To our mind, respondent has failed to show wanton,malevolent or reckless misconduct imputable to petitioner in its refusal to re-route.Air France Manila acted upon the advise of its Manila ticketing office in denyingprivate respondent's request. There was no evident bad faith when it followed theadvise not to authorize rerouting. At worst, the situation can be considered a case ofinadvertence on the part of petitioners Manila ticketing office in not explaining thenon-endorsable character of the ticket. Of importance, however, is the fact thatprivate respondent is a lawyer, and the restriction box clearly indicated the non-endorsable character of the ticket. Omissions by ordinary passengers may becondoned but more is expected of members of the bar who cannot feign ignoranceof such limitations and restrictions. An award of moral and exemplary damagescannot be sustained under the circumstances, but petitioner has to refund theunused coupons in the Air France ticket to the private respondent.

Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988TORTS: What constitutes "Negligence"; "Contributory Negligence" defined

FACTS:

Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He went to Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and his companions went to the viewing deck to watch the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh bone in the process. He underwent a 3-hour operation and after recovery he filed a claim for damages against the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the airport.

ISSUE:Whether or not CAA was negligentHELD:

CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the floor area of the terrace."

But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found that the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport.

Responsibility of CAA

The SC held that pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to look to where the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA should have thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm to the public.

Contributory Negligence

Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.

The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-overn their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v. Smith, supra, p. 813]

The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction.

"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals330 SCRA 145Facts:Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN), and Crispin Lat are adjoining landowners. The land of Lat containing an area of 1.8 hectares is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen (15) hectares six (6) hectares of which are devoted to its piggery business. REMMANs land is one and a half (1) meters higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMANs waste disposal lagoon was already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lats plantation. He made several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March 1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lats plantation was already inundated with water containing pig manure, as a result of which the trees growing on the flooded portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages with preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMANs piggery farm.REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative defense that measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were already adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the adjoining estates.Issue:Whether or not REMMAN should be liable for the damages suffered by Lat.Held: During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where representatives of both parties were present, it was established that the waste water containing pig manure was continuously flowing from REMMANs piggery farm to Lats plantation. The water was ankle-deep and flooded one (1) hectare of Lats plantation. The overflow of the acidic, malodorous and polluted water continued from June 1984 to March 1985 thus destroying one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred an twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables. The negligence of REMMAN in maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons has been satisfactorily established. The extent of damages suffered by Lat remains unrebutted; in fact, has been proved.LUCIA EUROPA VS HUNTER GARMENTS MFG. PHIL. INC. (HUNTER)G.R. No. 72827. 18 July 1989.

Ponente: Paras, J.:

Facts: In 1973, petitioners daughter, Lucrecia Europa, was employed as sample maker by the private respondent (Hunter). Sometime in the course of her employment, Lucrecia got electrocuted by the high speed sewing machine which was assigned to her by Hunter.On 18 July 1980, petitioner filed an action for damages against Hunter based on quasi-delict. The Lower Court (LC) found for petitioner.

Issue: WON there was gross negligence on the part of private respondent as expressed in the judgment of the LC.

Ruling: Yes. Indemnity for death increased to P30,000.The SC held that in actions based on quasi-delicts, as in this case, all damages for natural and probable consequences of the act/omission complained of are recoverable (Art. 2202 NCC).As found by the LC, there were at least two incidents where high speed sewing machines of defendant corporation were grounded. These were brought to the attention of the management of Hunter but nothing was done. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Salvador confirmed that Lucrecia died from shock probably secondary to electrocution. The SC reiterated the LC and held that if the machines were frequently and regularly checked or properly maintained, the death of Lucrecia could not have come to pass.PLDT vs. CA Facts: On July, 30, 1968, respondent spouses Esteban had their jeep ran over a sand of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of warning light or signs. Respondent spouses suffered physical injuries and their jeeps windshield was shattered. PLDT alleged that the respondents were negligent and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Company which undertook said conduit system to be the one liable.The latter claimed to have complied with its contract and had installed necessary barricades.

Issue: WON PLDT and L.R. Barte and Co. are liable.

Ruling: Private Respondents negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the negligence he imputes on PLDT considering that he had the last clear chance, to avoid the injury. One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.Teh vs. Philippine Aerial Taxi58 Phil. 838 (source)Facts: Plaintiff was a passenger in one of the defendants planes to Iloilo.The plane was a hydroplane and had to land on sea. When thepontoon of the plane struck bottom and the plane stopped, the plaintiffunfastened the straps around him, climbed over the door to the lowerwing, went down the ladder to the pontoon and walked along thepontoon toward the propeller of the plane which was still turningaround. The purpose of the plaintiff in doing this was to disembark on abanca which was approaching the plane to take the passengersashore. The propeller first grazed plaintiffs forehead and, as he threwup his arm, it was caught by the revolving blades and so injured that ithad to be amputated. This action was brought by plaintiff to recoverdamages from the defendant for his injuries.Held: By sheer common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that apropeller, be it that of a ship or an airplane, is dangerous while inmotion and that to approach it is to run the risk of being caught andinjured thereby. He ought to know furthermore that inasmuch as the 106plane was on the water, he had to wait for a banca to take him ashore.Notwithstanding the shuts and warning signals given him from shoreby the representatives of the consignee firm, the plaintiff herein, notbeing a man of ordinary prudence hastily left the cabin of the plane,walked along one of the pontoons and directly into the revolvingpropeller, while the banca which was to take him ashore was still somedistance away and the pilot was instructing the boatman to keep it at asafe distance from the plane. Under such circumstances, it is notdifficult to understand that the plaintiff-appellant acted with recklessnegligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in motion, andwhen the banca was not yet in a position to take him. That the plaintiff-appellants negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident is soclear that it is not necessary to cite authoritative opinions to support theconclusion that the injury to his right arm and the subsequentamputation thereof were due entirely and exclusively to his ownimprudence and not to the slightest negligence attributable to thedefendant entirely or to its agents. Therefore, he alone should sufferthe consequences of his act.