AGBAYANI,DORIS JOY N. SCARP and SPECPRO

24. Utulo v. Pasion (Gr. 45904)

FACTS: The respondent `s husband died intestate, leaving the respondent and their legitimate children as compulsory heirs; one of which died without leaving any heirs except her husband the petitioner.

The petitioner now contends that since he is entitled to the share of the intestate of the respondent`s husband he should be named as the administrator.

While the respondent contends that since her husband left no indebtedness and that all heirs are of age, there is no need for a judicial administration, but in the case the court shall name an administrator she has a better right than the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the case calls for a judicial administration.

HELD: No, since the Code of Civil procedure provides that although judicial administration is the general rule the same is not without exemption namely

1) When all the heirs are of lawful age2) There are no debts due from the estate

Thus at the present case said intestate proceedings is exempted from instituting a judicial administration.

25. Vda. De Reyes v. CA (Gr. 92436)

FACTS: The ascendant of the petitioner owned a parcel of land, which was transferred to the petitioners; the petitioners partitioned the said property amongst themselves albeit not deduced into writing.

One of the heirs sold his share of the property to the private respondent, the petitioners now claim that since the same was never validly partitioned and was extrajudicial settled the said sale was allegedly void.

ISSUE: WON the sale was valid.

HELD: Yes, since although not reduced into writing the said partition was valid;

The requirement that a partition should be deduced into writing and be made into a public document was merely for the constructive notice to others, thus does not affect it`s validity.

And for argument that said property was never partitioned the same may still be sold as an undivided claim/interest/share to the property.

Also discussed by the court is that an extrajudicial settlement does not create a right in favor of an heir. Since it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property.

And since at the present case the said property was sold the petitioner never had a right to speak of in the first place.

26. Sampilo v. CA (Gr. 10474)

FACTS: The private respondent uncle died, leaving only the latter`s wife, nephews and nieces as heirs.

Subsequently the private respondent`s wife executed an affidavit of self-adjudicating claiming that she is the sole heir, thus allowing her to sell the property of her husband to the petitioners.

Thus the private respondent is now claiming against the petitioners contending that said sale was void insofar as to the excess of the share of the inheritance by the seller , since there are other heirs aside from the seller.

While the petitioner contends that the cause of action of the private respondent has already prescribed as per the 2 years prescription rule in extrajudicial partition.

ISSUE: WON the cause of action has prescribed.

HELD: No, since the 2 year prescription rule in extrajudicial partition is only applicable to those heirs who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition.

Because extrajudicial settlement or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons.

27. G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner, vs.GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.

FACTS:A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria,

however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.3

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale4 was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.

Respondents argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot bind them for it was executed without their consent and participation.

ISSUE:WON said Settlement would bind the respondents who did not give their consent?

HELD:No. It would not bind them. The Supreme Court gave the following reason.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby.18 It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed19 as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

28. G.R. No. 161220               July 30, 2008

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents, vs.HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.

FACTS:On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate.

Subsequently, the respondents questioned the said Compromise Agreement for they did not give their consent and participation.

The petitioners claimed that they were constructively notified through publication.

ISSUE:WON the said agreement is binding to the heirs who did not consent to the Agreement?

HELD:No. Said agreement is not binding upon those heirs who did not give their consent to said agreement. The Supreme Court held as follows:

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.

29. G.R. No. 118680            March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.

FACTS: On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.

On March 11, 1983, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters.

Pedrosa assailed said Extrajudicial Settlement for the respondents did not get her consent and she did not participate in said proceedings.

The respondents, on the other hand said that Pedrosa is already estopped for the prescriptive period of two years had already passed based on Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S:WON the action of Pedrosa had already prescribed?

HELD:No. The action had not yet prescribed. The Supreme Court gave the following opinion:

Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 119 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.20

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.21

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

30. IN  THE MATTER OF  THE   INTESTATE             G.R. No. 155733     

ESTATES   OF  THE  DECEASED  JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA

FACTS: This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and JosefaDelgado. The claimants to the estates of Guillermo  heirs of Josefa , consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo , particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces,  his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo.  Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, andGorgonio, all surnamed Delgado.  Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life.  Before him was Ramon Osorio[12] with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA  AND JOSEFA DELGADO

 

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado[17] but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.  According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. .  They maintain that Guillermo  and Josefa  were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife for 50 years until the death of Josefa.

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children.  With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. 

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.  According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise.

The RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates. Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set aside the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:   Who should be issued letters of administration.

HELD: An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

 

Sec. 6.  When and to whom letters of administration granted.  – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

 

(a)   To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

 

(b)   If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

 

(c)   If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

 

 

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment  of  co-administrators,  specially  in  cases  where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

 

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgadovda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

31. RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F. MARQUEZ, respondents.

FACTS: Spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr.; (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.  Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal wherein they constructed their conjugal home.

Felicidad Marquez died intestate.  Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an “Affidavit of  Adjudication” vesting unto himself sole ownership to the property.

Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Jr. executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” covering the land as well as the house constructed thereon to three of his children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other children, petitioners herein.

From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land.  However, when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572 they immediately demanded that since they are also the children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their respective share over the land in question.  

Petitioners filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for “Reconveyance and Partition with Damages” before the trial court alleging that both the “Affidavit of Adjudication” and “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents.

Private respondents argued that petitioner’s action was already barred by the statute of limitations, since the same should have been filed within four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.

ISSUE: WON petitioners action for reconveyance had prescribed.

HELD:NO. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent herein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr.  Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr.

decided to adjudicate the entire property by executing an “Affidavit of Adjudication” claiming that he is the only sole and surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez.[10]

As such, when Rafael Marquez, Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established.[11]Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment.  They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribed in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.[13] For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued which was on June 16, 1982.  Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.

32. IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN GERONA, petitioners,vs.CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE GUZMANrespondents

FACTS: , Petitioners herein, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, which are now the respondents, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September 11, 1945;

On May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case.

Petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners.

Respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.

Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or

1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.

ISSUE:WON an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe?

HELD: Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property.

When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud. 

33. G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner, vs. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.D E C I S I O NQUISUMBING, J.: FACTS: Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. After hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will. Later, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a certification against forum-shopping. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not certificate of non-forum shopping is required? (2) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case? (2) Whether or not petitioner was denied due process? HELD: (1) Revised Circular No. 28-918 and Administrative Circular No. 04-949 of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to include a

certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition. (2) Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis supplied.)In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. (3) Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. – …If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs. In this case, petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without basis. Petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is conclusive only as to its due execution.11 The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.12 Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the properties forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts. 34. June 19, 1982G.R. No. L-57848RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS: Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the CFI-Quezon City for the probate of the holographic will of Clemencia Aseneta who instituted her and her husband as heirs. Later on, Bernardo Aseneta (herein private respondent), claiming to be the adopted child of the deceased and her sole heir instituted

intestate proceedings with the CFI-Rizal. The two cases were consolidated with the latter court. Bernardo filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null and void because he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy should ensue. In her opposition, Soledad averred that the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. The motion was granted. The motion for reconsideration by Soledad Maninang was denied for lack of merit. In the same order, the court appointed Bernardo Aseneta as administrator considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust.Soledad Maninang filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It was denied. Hence, this petition was filed. ISSUE: whether or not the dismissal of the court a quo of the testate case proper? HELD: No, it was not proper. Probate of a will is mandatory as required by law and public policy. Ordinarily, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic validity; but on the extrinsic validity which includes the capacity of the testator to make a will and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.However, when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic validity of the will may be passed upon like when on its face there is really preterition or invalid disinheritance making the will void. The probate might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Such would shorten the proceedings if the issues are decided as early as during the probate proceedings.In the instant case, there is still doubt to the alleged preterition or disinheritance of the private respondent cannot be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs further determination which can only be made if the will is allowed to be probated. 35. Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD, respondentG.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008 FACTS: Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such will become effective upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land. Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matilde’s death. Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido, alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the

formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has been filed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is valid?HELD: The donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother) is one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; andThat the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee. The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to become effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during the former’s lifetime. Further the statement, “anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated,” means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. The phrase, “anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor. The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioner’s mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.

36. RALLA v. UNTALAN, (G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989)

FACTS: The late Rosendo Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his own will in the then CFI of Albay, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 564. In his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (the petitioner herein), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro. In that same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella.

Petitioner’s Brother-in- law filed a petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1106, for the probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that the decedent owed him P5,000.00. Pablo then filed a manifestation stating that he had no objections to the probate; thereafter, he filed a "Motion to Intervene as Petitioner for the Probate of the Will." This motion was heard ex parte and granted

despite the written opposition of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. Likewise, the petition for probate was granted; Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed special administrator, over and above the objection of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. However, in taking possession of the properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo Ralla, Teodorico Almine also took possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered by the project of partition mentioned earlier. Consequently, the heirs of Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land. Private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of the 67 Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition. However, Judge Untalan ruled that the partition should be respected and upheld. Hence the 63 parcels should be excluded from the probate proceedings, and likewise the administration of Amine, Jr.

ISSUE: Whether or not there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated

HELD: The rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.

37. FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA ( October 12, 1967)

FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. Fernandez et. al., all surenamed Reyes, claiming to be the heirs intestate filed oppositions to the probate asked. The lower court found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time." The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal

HELD: It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montañano vs. Suesa, 14

Phil. 676; Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."

Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is without weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.

There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.

38. REMEDIOS NUGUID v. SALONGA PAZ NUGUID (L- 23445, June 23, 1966)

FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. Felix and Paz Nuguid entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void. The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may rule on the validity of the Will.

HELD: The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

39. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.

G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

FACTS: On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's (Annie sand) holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress,fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.This was opposed on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was indecedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent;and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.

The trial court having found that the holographic will in question was written entirely, dated and signed inthe handwriting of the testatrix with three (3) witnesses to have explicitly and categorically identified thehandwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting andsignature of the testatrix admitted the probate, however on appeal with CA this was reversed and thepetition for probate was dismissed on the ground that it fails to meet the requirements for its validity by not complying articles 813 and 814 of the NCC which read, as follows:

Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator mustauthenticate the same by his full signature.It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA was correct in disallowing the probate of the will based on the provisions of Art Art 813 and Art 814?

HELD: No.The Court said it is erroneous for the CA to say that the holographic will of Anne Sand was notexecuted in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law and held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will.

The Court cited: Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed inany of the following cases:

(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution;(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or ofsome other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrumentshould be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or ofsome other person;(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at thetime of affixing his signature thereto.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit aholographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with theformalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.

In the case of holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand ofthe testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and neednot be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of thedispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with theprovisions of Article 814. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

Only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of a holographic will.

Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte.

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.

40. JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R. INFANTE, MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners, vs.THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRAN CH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE, respondents.

G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988

FACTS: On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees.

On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era”, newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared thus, moved to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued an order admitting private respondents evidence ex-parte, allowed the latter to place Arturi Arceo as one of the testamentary witnesses, and appointed private respondent as executor.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will. Probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner’s contention: Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will and that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, said requirement of the law is mandatory and its omission constitutes a reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.

Court of Appeals’ contention: The requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and devisees is merely a matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy in some instances the requirements of due process,

ISSUE: Whether or not personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.

HELD: Yes. We grant the petition.

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

41. NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners, vs.HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.

G.R. No. 194366               October 10, 2012

FACTS:During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties located in Samal, Davao del Norte.

On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00.

On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.

In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.

RTC- rendered a decision ordering, among others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.

CA- declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the father or mother as the natural guardian of a minor under parental authority, has the power to dispose or encumber properties of the minor.

HELD: No.All the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.

While the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death11and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate.12

With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother.

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14

Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.

Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than what the sellercan legally transfer."20 On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

42. Alfonso vs. Andres ( July 29,2010)

FACTS: Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving.

stemmed from a complaint for accionpubliciana with damages filed by respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against Noli Alfonso and spouses Reynaldo and ErlindaFundialan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal.

RTC favored plaintiffs directed defendants to vacate the premises and solidarily pay sum of money

Defendants appealed to the CA

November 5, 2003, petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file appellants' brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice. The original 45-day period expired on December 21, 2003. But before then, on December 8, 2003, petitioners' former counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. Petitioners consented to the withdrawal.

CA granted Petitioners motions for extension of time 75 days from dec 21 2003 – march 5 2004 to find a new lawyer

 Petitioners themselves received a copy of this Resolution only on April 6, 2004.  By that time, the extension to file appellants' brief had already long expired

CA dismissed the petition because of expiration of reglementary period to file appellants brief

ISSUE: WON CA erred

HELD: (Rule 50 sec 1 e failure to file appellants brief)

NO the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise choices and not really due to poverty.  Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent them despite their poverty.  They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented to the withdrawal of their first lawyer.  But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late. 

  Petitioners beg us to disregard technicalities because they claim that on the merits their case is strong.  A study of the records fails to so convince us.

Petitioners theorize that publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Marcelino Alfonso is required before their father, Jose Alfonso (Jose) could validly transfer the subject property.

Significantly, the title of the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is subject to the claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs.

Disposition: Petition denied ca affirmed

43 Balada vs Rublico

FACTS: Cornelia bought properties of Corazon and epitacio (epitacio was her father)

(Corazon and Epitacio conveyed by way of absolute sale both their shares in the said lots in favor of Cornelia, Epitacio’s daughter, in exchange for the amount of P107,750.00.  Corazon’s thumbmark was imprinted at the bottom of the said deed, while Vicente, Epitacio’s son, signed in behalf of Epitacio by virtue of a power of attorney)

2 days later corazon died

Title over the said lots remained in the name of Julian (husband of Corazon before epitacio), but on July 20, 1987, more than two years after Corazon’s death, respondent Sergio (son of Corazon by an teofilo who died in world war 2) executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person which was given to him

Sergio sold the two lots to spouses Laureano and FelicidadYupano for P100,000.00.andyupanos wanted the tenants who were living in the lot in question to pay them instead to cornelia. The tenants filed an interpleader

 Makati RTC rendered a Decision declaring the Yupanos as the legal and lawful owners of the two lots.

August 3, 1990, a month before the promulgation of the decision, Cornelia filed a complaint for

annulment of sale, cancellation of title and damages

Cornelia argued that Sergio knew of the sale made by Corazon in her favor and was even given part of the

proceeds. Cornelia also averred that the Yupanos could not be considered as buyers in good faith,

because they only lived a block from the disputed properties and had knowledge that the two lots had

been sold to Cornelia prior to Corazon’s death.

RTC branch 133 affirmed Cornelia

CA reversed RTC 133

ISSUE: won CA erred

HELD: YES. Respondents also failed to refute the testimony of Atty. Francisco, who notarized the deed,

that he personally read to Corazon the contents of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute

Sale, and even translated its contents to Tagalog.

 

          And, most important of all is the fact that the subject deed is, on its face, unambiguous. When the

terms of a contract are lawful, clear and unambiguous, facial challenge cannot be allowed.  We should not

go beyond the provisions of a clear and unambiguous contract to determine the intent of the parties

thereto, because we will run the risk of substituting our own interpretation for the true intent of the

parties.

 

          It is immaterial that Cornelia’s signature does not appear on the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate

with Absolute Sale.  A contract of sale is perfected the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the

thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.[29]  The fact that it was Cornelia herself who

brought Atty. Francisco to Corazon’s house to notarize the deed shows that she had previously given her

consent to the sale of the two lots in her favor.  Her subsequent act of exercising dominion over the

subject properties further strengthens this assumption.

Dispo: CA reverse RTC reinstated

44. Tayco vs Heirs of Tayco (Dec. 13,2010)

FACTS: Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and ConsolacionTayco inherited the some lands from from their parents in Aklan. Sometime in September of 1972, petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister ConsolacionTayco executed a document called Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares,transferring their shares on the abovementioned properties to their sister Concepcion Tayco-Flores.  The said document was notarized and, on March 16, 1991, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and ConsolacionTayco executed the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land

   ConsolacionTayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-Flores died on January 14, 1997.  Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed a case for nullity of documents and partition with damages with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased  Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares and the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land are null and void; According to him, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was executed at that time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in need of money and wanted the properties to be mortgaged in a bank.  He claimed that the mortgage did not push through and that he requested his sister to cancel the said Deed, to which the latter ensured that the same document had no effect.he further claimed that without his knowledge and consent, her sisters Concepcion and Consolacion executed another document entitled  Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in order to have the tax declarations and certificates of title covering those three parcels of land transferred in the name of Concepcion. He also alleged that he came to know of the said facts only when he had the property surveyed for the purpose of partition and some of the heirs of Concepcion objected to the said survey.

RTC ruled in favor of Francisco

In reversing the trial court's findings, the CA reasoned out that the genuineness and due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement was not disputed and was duly signed by the parties and notarized.

ISSUE:CAN THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DIEGA REGALADO WITH CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF SHARES DIVEST CO-HEIR AND CO-OWNER  FRANCISCO TAYCO OF HIS SHARES IN THE THREE (3) PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION? DID CA ERR?

HELD: YES. WHAT is the validity of the document that contains the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased, DiegaRegalado.   The trial court ruled that it is null and void based on its assessment of the facts, while the CA adjudged it valid based on its examination of the said document.

  At the outset, the document, Exhibit A, was executed at Lezo, Aklan which is about ten kilometers from Kalibo where all the parties are residents.  Defendant had to hire a tricycle from Kalibo to bring the parties to Lezo.  Assuming that a certain Engr. Reynaldo Lopez was helping the defendants at that time in this transaction, he is also a resident of Kalibo, Aklan which is the center of Aklan where almost all the lawyers have their offices.  Engr. Lopez has also his office here.  Why would he still recommend the execution of this document particularly in Lezo and before that particular alleged Notary Public?  This sounds incredible.

CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court without providing any substantial evidence to support its own findings.

Dispo: CA set aside rtcaklan branch 9 upheld reinstated

45. LEE v TAMBAGO| A.C. No. 5281|12 February 2008

FACTS:Manuel L. Lee charged Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of their respective voter's affidavit.

In addition, the contested will was executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA).

Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regards to the provision of existing law and had complied with elementary formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply to harass him based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman that did not prosper.

However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to the Archives Division of NCAA. In resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP and the decision of which was affirmed with modification against the respondent and in favor of the complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the Ethics of Legal Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament?

HELD:YES. A notarial will, as the one in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. It should also be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The will in question was attested by only two witnesses. On this circumstance, the will must be considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance in their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.

Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will. Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.

46. ORTEGA v VALMONTE | GR. No. 157451 | 16 December 2005

FACTS:Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983.

The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to the notary public who notarized the testator’s will, after the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty.

Petitioner’s argument: At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. 2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

ISSUES:1. Whether or notPlacido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will.

2. Whether or not the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or trickery.

HELD: 1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have made. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to showotherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document,“because the law does not even require that a notarial will be executed andacknowledged on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental witnesses.

47. RABADILLA v CA | GR. No. 113725 | 29 June 2000

FACTS: Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, in a codicil (a supplement to a will; anappendix) of AlejaBelleza, was instituted devisee of Lot No.1392 with an area of 511,855 square meters with theobligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to herein privaterespondent every year during the latter's lifetime. The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not onlyon the instituted heir but also to his successors-in-interestand in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shallseize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's "near descendants."

Dr.Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children,one of whom is herein petitioner.

Private respondent, alleging failure of the heirs to complywith their obligation, filed a complaint with the RTC prayingfor the reconveyance of the subject property to the survivingheirs of the testatrix.

During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement wasconcluded between the parties wherein the lessee of theproperty assumed the delivery of 100 piculs of sugar toprivate respondent; however, only partial delivery was made.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, “While there may be the non-performanceof the command as mandated, exaction from them (thepetitioners), simply because they are the children of JorgeRabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, doesnot warrant the filing of the present complaint.”

The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr.Rabadilla is in the nature of a modal institution and acause of action in favor of private respondent arose whenpetitioner failed to comply with their obligation under thecodicil, and in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to theestate of testatrix. Thus, the present petition.

ISSUE:Whether there was a valid substitution of heirs when they are merely referred to as near defendants?

HELD:It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.

48. ALABAN v CA | GR.No. 156021 | 23 September 2005

FACTS: On November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition in Iloilo for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad ProvidoElevencionado (decedent). Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On May 2001, RTC rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.

On October 2001, Petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, and the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was

not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.

RTC issued and Order denying Petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious.

Petitioners sought annulment of RTC’s decision with the CA with a prayer for preliminary injunction – denied. Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings

HELD: Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.

The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

49. UY KIAO ENG VS NIXON LEE

FACTS: Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner UyKiaoEng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a petition for mandamus with damagesto compel petitioner to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any justifiable reason.

In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the suit.

RTC granted the demurrer to evidence. CA, reversed and ordered the production of the will and the payment of attorney’s fees.It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the holographic will.

ISSUE: w/n the remedy of mandamus can be availed of by the respondent

HELD: No.In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original holographic will. Thus—

SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having

jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.

SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.

SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will after the death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.[30]

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

50. BALTAZAR VS LAXA

FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament in the Pampangodialect. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin was read to Paciencia twice.

After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

The three instrumental witnesses attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof, in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondentLorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna LorellaLaxa andKatherine Ross Laxa.The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencia’snephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treatedPaciencia as his own mother. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981,Paciencia left for the United States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and hisfamily until her death on January 4, 1996.In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.More than four years after the death of Paciencia Lorenzo filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.On June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition.Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’sWill belong to NicomedaRegalaMangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.

Other petitioners then joined Antonio and opposed the issuance of letters of administration toLorenzo contending that Paciencia’s Will was null and void because ownership of the propertieshad not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death.

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC todeny the probate of Paciencia’s Will on the grounds that the Will was not executed and attested toin accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make aWill at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influenceof fear or threats.

Petitioners also dispute the authenticity of Paciencia’s Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with.

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.

ISSUES: 1. w/n the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently establishedto warrant its allowance for probate.

2. w/n all the witnesses and the notary public should be presented before the court if the will is contested

HELD:1. Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings.

This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laiddown by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the

Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states thecritical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presenceof one another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of thetestator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia inthe Will may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same aswell as the voluntary nature of said act.The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the willlies on the shoulders of the petitioners.We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.

Forgetfulness is notequivalent to being of unsound mind.It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of theestate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a will.In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencia’s relationship with Lorenzo andhis family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for andraised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married andalready has children, highlights the special bond between them.

2. the probate of Paciencia’s Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that “[a] testament may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.”

51. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE LOPEZ

FACTS: Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana, Marybeth and Victoria ascompulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.

Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law.

Richard presented the attesting witnesses and the notary public who notarized the will. The RTC and CA disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written.

ISSUE: w/n the probate of the will shall be allowed

HELD: no.The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the torm of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will andtestament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which theratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.

On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit:

x xx The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the willwas notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the ·attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.

52. PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS

FACTS: Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it, arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

RTC and CA allowed the probate of the will.

ISSUE: w/n a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed

HELD: Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of

the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.