agrarian law case digest matrix set 1

8/9/2019 Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1

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Agrarian Law Case Digest Matrix Set 1 Stef Macapagal

Title Facts Issue/s Ruling Doctrine

Association of SmallLandowners v. DAR Secretary

GR Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744,

and 79777

14 July 1989Cruz, J.

GR No. 79777:PD 27, EOs 228

& 229 Nicolas Manaay and his

wife own a 9-hectare riceland;

while Agustin Hermano, Jr.

owned 5. They both have fourtenants each on their respective

landholdings, who were declared

full owners of the said lands by

EO 228 as qualified farmers

under PD 27.

The Manaays and Hermano

question the constitutionality ofPD 27 and EOs 228 and 229.

GR No. 79310:PP 131, EO 229

Landowners and sugar plantersin the Victorias Mill District in

Negros, as well as PlantersCommittee, Inc. seek to prohibit

the implementation of PP 131

and EO 229 for being violative

of the constitutional provisions

on just compensation, due

process, and equal protection.

Subsequently, the National

Federation of Sugarcane Planters

(NASP), Manuel Barcelona, andPrudencio Serrano filed their

own petitions, which also

assailed the constitutionality ofthe abovementioned statutes.

GR No. 79744: EOs 228 & 229

Inocentes Pabico alleges that

the then DAR Secretary placed

his landholding under the

coverage of OLT, in violation of

due process and the requirement

for just compensation.

Certificates of Land Transfer

were subsequently issued to

W/N PD 27, PP 131, and EOs228 and 229 were validly

enacted.

W/N the CARP fund provision in

PP131 conforms to the

requi rements of a valid

appropriation.

W/N PP 131 and EO 229 should

be invalidated because they do

not provide for retention limits.

YES. The promulgation of PD27 by Pres. Marcos in the

exercise of his powers under

martial law has already been

sustained and there is no reasonto modify or reverse it on that

issue. As for the power of Pres.

Aquino to promulgate PP 131

and EOs 228 & 229, the same

was authorized by Sec. 6 of the

Transitory Provisions of the

1987 Constitution. Significantly,

the Congress she is alleged tohave undercut has not rejected

but in fact substantially affirmedthe challenged measures and has

specifically provided that theyshall be suppletory to RA 6657

whenever not inconsistent withits provisions.

NO. PP 131 is not an

appropriation measure even if it

does provide for the creation of

the said fund, for that is not its

principal purpose. An

appropriation law is one the

primary and specific purpose of

which is to authorize the releaseof public funds from the

treasury. The creation of the fund

is only incidental to the mainobjective of the proclamation,which is agrarian reform.

NO. This argument is no longer

tenable because RA 6657 does

provide for such limits now in

Section 6 of the law. As such,

landowners who were unable to

exercise their rights of retention

under PD 27 shall enjoy the

retention rights granted by RA

To the extent that the measuresunder challenge merely prescribe

retention limits for landowners,

there is an exercise of police

power for the regulation of private property in accordance

with the Constitution. But where,

to carry out such regulation, it

becomes necessary to deprive

such owners of whatever lands

they may own in excess of the

maximum area allowed, there is

definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for

which payment of justcompensation is imperative.

Title to all expropriated

properties shall be transferred tothe State only upon full payment

of compensation to their

respective owners.

Obiter: One of the basic

principles of the democraticsystem is that where the rights of

the individual are concerned, theend does not justify the means.

There is no question that noteven the strongest moral

conviction or the most urgent

public need, subject only to a fewnotable exceptions, will excuse

the bypassing of an individuals

rights. It is no exaggeration to

say that a person invoking a

right guaranteed under Art III of

the Constitution is a majority of

one even as against the rest of

the nation who would deny him

that right.

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tenants, who then refused to pay

lease rentals to him. He thenprotested the erroneous inclusion

of his small landholding underOLT and asked for the recall and

cancellation of the said CLTs,which was denied without

hearing. Although he filed an

MR, EOs 228 and 229 were

issued, rendering his MR moot

and academic because the said

EOs directly effected the transfer

of his land to his farmers-tenants.

GR No. 78742: PD 316 The

Association of SmallLandowners in the Philippines

invokes the right of retentiongranted by PD 27 to owners of

rice and corn lands not exceeding7 hectares as long as they are

cultivating or intend to cultivate

the same. Their respective lands

do not exceed the statutory limit

but are occupied by tenants who

are actually cultivating such

lands.

Because PD 316 provides that no

tenant-farmer in agricultural

lands primarily devoted to rice

and corn shall be ejected or

removed from his farmholdinguntil such time as the respectiverights of the tenant-farmers and

the landowner shall have beendetermined, they petitioned the

Court for a writ of mandamus to

compel the DAR Secretary to

issue the IRR, as they could not

eject their tenants and so are

unable to enjoy their right of

retention.

W/N the assailed statutes violatethe equal protection clause.

W/N the assailed statutes are

valid exercises of police power.

6657 under the conditions

therein prescribed.

NO. The petitioners have notshown that they belong to a

different class and entitled to adifferent treatment. The

argument that not only

landowners but also owners of

other properties must be made to

share the burden of

implementing land reform must

be rejected. There is a substantial

distinction between these two

classes of owners that is clearly

visible except to those who willnot see.

YES. The subject and purpose of

agrarian reform have been laiddown by the Constitution itself,

which satisfies the f irst

requirement of a lawful subject.

However, objection is raised to

the manner of fixing the just

compensation, which it is

claimed is entrusted to the

administrative authorities in

violation of judicial prerogatives.

However, there is no

arbitrariness in the provision, as

the determination of just

compensation by the DAR is not by any means final andconclusive upon the landowner

or any other interested party,because the law provides that the

determination made by the DAR

is only preliminary unless

accepted by all parties

concerned. Otherwise, the courts

will still have the right to review

with finality the said

determination.

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W/N the content and manner of just compensation provided for

in the CARP Law is violative ofthe Constitution.

W/N the CARP and EO 228

contravene a well-acceptedprinciple of eminent domain by

divesting the landowner of his

property even before actual

payment to him in full of just

compensation.

NO. Although the traditionalmedium for payment of just

compensation is money and noother, what is being dealt with

here is not the traditionalexercise of the power of eminent

domain. This is a revolutionary

kind of expropriation, which

involves not mere millions of

pesos. The initially intended

amount of P50B may not be

enough, and is in fact not even

fully available at this time. The

invalidation of the said section

will result in the nullification ofthe entire program.

NO. EO 228 categorically stated

that all qualified farmer- beneficiaries were deemed full

owners of the land they acquired

under PD 27, after proof of full-

fledged membership in the

farmers cooperatives and full

payment of just compensation.

The CARP Law, for its part,

conditions the transfer of

possession and ownership of the

land to the government on

receipt by the landowner of the

corresponding payment or the

deposit by the DAR of thecompensation in cash or LBPbonds with an accessible bank.

Until then, title also remains withthe landowner.

Sigre v. CA

GR Nos. 109568 and 113454

8 August 2002

Austria-Martinez, J.

Matias Yusay owned a parcel of

irrigated rice land in Iloilo, in

which Ernesto Sigre was a

tenant. Sigre previously had been

paying Yusay a lease rental of 16

cavans per crop, but stopped

paying in 1991-92. Instead, he

W/N PD 27 sanctions MC 6. YES. It was pursuant to PD 27

that MC 6 was issued by the

DAR. The Circular was meant to

remedy the situation where the

tenant-farmers lease rentals to

the landowner were not credited

in his favor against the

The power of subordinate

legislation allows administrative

bodies to implement the broad

policies laid down in a statute by

filling in the details. All that is

required is that the regulation

should be germane to the objects

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remitted the payments to the

LBP pursuant to DARsMemorandum Circular No. 6

(MC 6), which set the guidelinesin the payment of lease

rental/partial payment by farmer- beneficiaries under the land

transfer program of PD 27.

Lilia Gonzales, co-administratrix

of Yusays estate, filed a petition

for prohibition and mandamus

with the CA, seeking to prohibit

the LBP from accepting Sigres

leasehold rentals. According to

Gonzales, she had no notice thatDAR had already fixed the value

of the land. Her petition alsoassails the validity of MC 6 and

PD 27.

The CA then declared MC 6 null

and void, and directed the LBP

to return to Gonzales the lease

rentals paid by Sigre, and Sigre

to pay the rentals directly to

Gonzales.

W/N an irreconcilable conflict

exists between PD 816 and MC

6, such that PD 816 must prevail

over MC 6.

W/N PD 27 is unconstitutional

for setting limitations on the

judicial prerogative of

determining just compensation.

W/N RA 6657 superseded or

repealed PD 27.

determined purchase price of the

land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said

purchase price. Since the assailedCircular essentially sought to

accomplish the noble purpose ofPD 27, it is therefore valid.

NO. PD 816 provides that the

tenant-farmer shall pay lease

rentals to the landowner until the

value of the property has been

determined or agreed upon by

the landowner and the DAR. On

the other hand, MC 6 mandates

that the tenant-farmer shall payto the LBP the lease rental after

the value of the land has beendetermined. Thus, there is no

incompatibility between thesetwo. On the contrary, the two

supplement each other as they set

the guidelines for the payments

of lease rentals on the

agricultural property.

NO. Jurisprudence has upheld

the constitutionality of the said

decree. Moreover, the

determination of just

compensation under PD 27 is not

final or conclusive, because

unless both the landowner andthe tenant-farmer accept thevaluation by DAR, the parties

may bring the dispute to court inorder to determine the

appropriate amount of

compensation.

NO. According to EO 229, PD

27 as amended shall continue to

operate with respect to rice and

corn lands, covered thereunder.

and purposes of the law; that the

regulation be not in contradictionto but in conformity with the

standards prescribed by law.

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Whatever provisions of PD 27

that are not inconsistent with RA6657 shall be suppletory to the

latter, and all rights acquired bythe tenant-farmer under PD 27

are retained even with the

passage of RA 6657.

Office of the President v. CA and

Heirs of Jose Reyes

GR No. 131216

19 July 2001

Pardo, J.

Aurora Tinio-Reyes owned 24

hectares of land in Nueva Ecija,

which she bequeathed to her 9

children upon her death, one of

which was Jose.

When Jose tried to get a TCTover his lot, he was told that he

first needed a clearance from theDAR attesting to the non-

inclusion of his land in the OLT.However, the PARO ruled that

his land was covered under theOLT.

The DAR then issued 12 TCTs

in his favor after he appealed the

PARO Decision. However,

subsequently, the Secretary of

the Office of the President

affirmed the PARO as Auroras

will was not registered prior to

PD 27s effectivity, and thuscould not bind third persons.

When Jose appealed, the CA

reversed the Secretarys Order.

W/N Joses land should be

covered by the OLT under RA

6657 or PD 27.

NO. There is no doubt that the

original landholding of Aurora,

consisting of 24 hectares of

Riceland tenanted by farmers

was covered by PD 27. However,

the expropriation of the

landholding did not take place onthe effectivity of PD 27, as the

seizure only takes effect on the payment of just compensation;

and the DAR had not evendetermined the just

compensation for the taking ofthe landholding when it decreed

that the land was under the

coverage of RA 6657. Moreover,

when Aurora died and her

children inherited the land, they

only acquired 2.5 hectares each,

which is decidedly within the

retention area of 7 hectares under

PD 27, or 5 hectares under RA

6657.

Seizure only takes effect on the

payment of just compensation.

Corpuz v. Grospe

GR No. 135297

8 June 2000

Panganiban, J.

Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-

beneficiary under the OLT

Program of the DAR. Pursuant to

PD 27, he was issued a

certificate of land transfer over 2

parcels of agricultural land.

Corpuz then mortgaged the land

to the Grospes. In their mortgage

contract, Corpuz allowed the

spouses Grospe to use or

W/N the waiver of rights is

contrary to agrarian law.

YES. The sale or transfer of

rights over a property covered by

a Certificate of Land Transfer is

void except when the alienation

is made in favor of the

government or through

hereditary succession. This

ruling is intended to prevent a

reversion to the old feudal

system in which the landowners

reacquire vast tracts of land, thus

Voluntary surrender, as a mode

of extinguishment of tenancy

relations, does not require court

approval as long as i t is

convincingly and sufficiently

proved by competent evidence.

Obiter:

The farmers cooperatives wereestablished to provide a strong

social and economic

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cultivate the land during the

duration of the mortgage.

Corpuz subsequently instituted acomplaint which alleged that the

Grospes had entered the disputed

land by force and destroyed the

palay that he had planted on it.

However, according to the

Grospes, Corpuz had already

executed a Waiver of Rights

over the landholding in favor of

the spouses in consideration of

P54k.

Provincial Agrarian ReformAdjudicator Ernesto Tabara ruled

that Corpuz abandoned andsurrendered the landholding to

the Samahang Nayon of NuevaEcija. Said Samahang Nayon

even passed Resolution Nos. 16

and 27 recommending the

reallocation of said lots to the

Grospes, who were the most

qualified farmers-beneficiaries.

The DARAB and the CA both

affirmed the Decision.

W/N Corpuz had abandoned his

landholding.

W/N Corpuz had voluntarily

surrendered his landholding.

negating the governments

program of freeing the tenantfrom the bondage of the soil.

NO. Corpuz surrender of

possession did not amount to an

abandonment because there was

an obligation on the part of the

Grospes to return possession of

the landholding upon full

payment of the loan. There was

no clear, absolute, or irrevocable

intent to abandon.

YES. Corpuz intention to

surrender the landholding wasclear and unequivocal. He signed

his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions. His

voluntary surrender to theSamahang Nayon qualifies as a

surrender or transfer to the

government because such action

forms part of the mechanism for

the disposi tion and the

reallocation of farmholdings of

tenant-farmers who refuse to

become beneficiaries of PD 27.

organization to ensure that the

tenant-farmers will enjoy on a

lasting basis the benefits of

agrarian reform.

Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary

GR No. 868894 December 1990

Paras, J.

In 1988, RA 6657 was approved

by the President of thePhilippines. It includes the

raising of livestock, poultry, and

swine in its coverage.

In 1989, the Secretary of

Agrarian Reform promulgated

the IRR of Secs. 11, 13, and 39

of the said law.

Luz Farms, a corporation

engaged in the livestock and

poultry business, allegedly

stands to be adversely affected

by the enforcement of certain

W/N the CARL should include

the raising of livestock, poultryand swine in its coverage.

NO. It was never the intention of

the framers of the Constitution toinclude the livestock and poultry

industry in the coverage of the

agrarian reform program of thegovernment. The intention of theCommittee was to limit the

application of the word

agriculture. Thus, Section II of

RA 6657 which includes private

agricultural lands devoted to

commercial livestock, poultry,

and swine raising in the

definition of commercial farms

is invalid, to the extent that the

aforecited agro-industrial

Raising of livestock, poultry, and

swine are excluded from thecoverage of the CARL.

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sections of RA 6657, of the

Guidelines and ProceduresImplementing Production and

Profit Sharing under RA 6657,and of the IRR of Section 11. It

prays that the aforesaid statutes

be declared unconstitutional.

W/N the requirement in Sections

13 and 32 of RA 6657 directing

corporate farms to execute and

implement production-sharing

plans is unreasonable for being

confiscatory and violative of due

process, with respect to livestock

and poultry raisers.

Separate Opinion: Sarmiento, J.

W/N the assailed provisions

violate the equal protectionclause of the Constitution.

activities are made to be covered

by the agrarian reform programof the State.

YES. As there is no reason to

include livestock and poultry

lands in the coverage of agrarian

reform, there is no need to call

upon them to distribute from 3%

of their gross sales and 10% of

their net profits to their workers

as additional compensation.

NO. Substantial distinctions exist

between land directed purely tocultivation and harvesting of

fruits or crops and landexclusively used for livestock,

poultry and swine raising thatmake real differences:

1. There are no tenants

nor landlords in

livestock and poultry

businesses;

2. Livestock and poultry

do not sprout from

land;

3. Land is not a primary

resource;

4. Livestock and poultry

production are

industrial activities;5. Livestock and poultryfarmworkers are

covered by minimumwage law rather than

by tenancy law.

Natalia Realty v. DAR

GR No. 103302

12 August 1993

Bellosillo, J.

PP 1637 set aside several

hectares of land in Antipolo, San

Mateo, and Montalban as

townsite areas to absorb the

population overspill in the

metropolis which were

W/N the Natalia properties were

validly converted from

agricultural to residential land.

YES. Natalia and EDIC

complied with all the

requirements of law, even

securing prior approval from

DAR. As a matter of fact, there

was no need for Natalia and

Lands not devoted to agricultural

activity are outside the coverage

of CARL.

Agricultural land refers to

land devoted to agricultural

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designated as the Lungsod

Silangan Townsite, where Natalia Realtys properties were

situated. Estate Developers andInvestors Corporation (EDIC),

the developer of the Natalia

properties, was granted approval

to develop the said properties

into low-cost housing

subdivisions. The Natalia

properties then became the

Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

When the CARL came into

effect, the DAR issued a Notice

of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills

Subdivision. Natalia immediatelyregistered its objection to the

said Notice and requested theDAR Secretary to cancel the

same. However, members of the

Samahan ng Magsasaka sa

Bundok Antipolo (SAMBA)

filed a complaint against Natalia

and EDIC before the DAR

Regional Adjudicator to restrain

them from developing areas

under their cultivation. The RA

issued a writ of Preliminary

Injunction. Natalia and EDIC

appealed to the DARAB but the

latter merely remanded the caseto the RA. Natalia then requestedthe DAR Secretary to set aside

the Notice of Coverage. Neitherthe DAR Secretary nor the DAR

Director concerned took action

on the protest letters.

W/N the Natalia properties are

covered by the CARL.

EDIC to do so because the

Natalia properties were withinthe areas set aside for the

Lungsod Silangan Reservation.Since PP 1637 created the

townsite reservation for the

purpose of providing additional

housing to the burgeoning

population of Metro Manila, it in

effect converted for residential

use what were erstwhile

agricultural lands provided all

requisites were met.

NO. The undeveloped portions

of the Antipolo Hills Subdivisioncannot be considered as

agricultural lands. These lotswere intended for residential use.

They ceased to be agriculturallands upon approval of their

inclusion in the Lungsod

Silangan Reservation.

activity, and not classified as

mineral, forest, residential,commercial, or industrial land.

Morta v. Occidental

GR No. 123417

10 June 1999Pardo, J.

Jaime Morta and Purificacion

Padilla filed a suit against Jaime

Occidental, Atty. Mariano

Baranda, and Daniel Corral, for

allegedly gathering pili nuts,

W/N the cases are properly

cognizable by the DARAB.

NO. Since there is a dispute as to

who is the rightful owner of the

land, the issue is clearly outside

DARABs jurisdiction. Whatever

findings made by the DARAB

For DARAB to have jurisdiction

over a case, there must exist a

tenancy relationship between the

parties. In order for a tenancy

agreement to take hold over a

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anahaw leaves, and coconuts

from their respective land anddestroying their banana and

pineapple plants. Occidentalclaimed that he was a tenant of

the actual owner of the land,

Josefina Baraclan, and that

Morta and Padilla were not

actually the owners of the land in

question.

The trial court ruled in favor of

Morta and Padilla. Occidental, et

al. appealed, contending that the

case was cognizable by the DAR

Adjudicatory Board (DARAB).Thus, the RTC reversed the

lower court and ruled in favor ofOccidental, stating that the case

is a tenancy-related problemwhich falls under the exclusive

jurisdiction of DARAB. The CA

affirmed the RTC.

regarding the ownership of the

land are not conclusive to settlethe matter. At any rate, whoever

is declared to be the rightfulowner of the land, the case

cannot be considered tenancy-

related for it still fails to comply

with the other requirements.

Assuming arguendo that Josefina

is the owner, then the case is not

between the landowner and

tenant. If, however, Morta is the

landowner, Occidental cannot

claim that there is consent to a

landowner-tenant relationship

between him and Morta. Thus,for failure to comply with the

requisites, the issue involved isnot tenancy-related cognizable

by the DARAB.

Dissent:Davide, CJ.

It is a tenancy-related issue

because whether it is Josefina or

Morta who is the owner of the

land is no moment. It does not

affect Occidentals tenancy.

Tenancy attaches to the land. The

cases filed by Morta and Padilla

were a clever way to defeat the

agrarian law. While the cases

were ostensibly for damages,

they were, at bottom, a fight onissues incident to or arising froman agrarian relationship.

dispute, it would be essential to

establish all its indispensableelements, to wit:

1. That the parties are thelandowner and the

tenant or agricultural

lessee;

2. The subject matter of

the relationship is an

agricultural land;

3. That there is consent

between the parties to

the relationship;

4. That the purpose of the

relationship is to bring

about agriculturalproduction;

5. That there is personalcultivation on the part

of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

6. That the harvest is

shared between the

landowner and the

tenant or agricultural

lessee.

Limited jurisdiction of DAR:

1. Adjudication of all

matters involving

implementation of

agrarian reform;

2. Resolution of agrarianconflicts and land-tenure related

problems; and3. Approval and

disapproval of the

conversion,

restructuring, or

readjustment of

agricultural lands into

residential,

commercial, industrial,

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and other non-

agricultural uses.

Monsanto v. Zerna

GR No. 142591

7 December 2001

Panganiban, J.

Leonarda Monsanto owned a

parcel of land, wherein Jesus and

Teresita Zerna were overseers. In

1995, the Zernas harvested

coconuts from the plantation

without Monsantos consent, and

processed them into copra for the

purpose of confirming their

claim that they are tenants of the

land. It was alleged that the total

amount that they actually made

was P6,262.50; they depositedP5,162.50 with the Barangay

Secretary of the locality, keepingthe balance of P1,100.00 for their

labor.Monsanto instituted a criminal

case of qualified theft against theZernas, but the Zernas were

acquitted for lack of criminal

intent. The barangay captain of

the locality was ordered to return

to Monsanto the money that the

Zernas deposited. Monsanto filed

an MR for the return of the

P1,100.00.

The court then ruled that sincethe harvesting of the coconuts

and processing of the same into

copra were not with the consentof Monsanto, then they could notbe entitled to compensation for

their labor.

On appeal, the CA ruled that the

trial court had no jurisdiction to

order the Zernas to pay

Monsanto the P1,100.00.

Because the dispute involved an

agricultural tenancy relationship,

the matter fell within the primary

W/N an agrarian dispute existed

between the parties.

W/N the RTC was stripped of its

criminal jurisdiction when the

CA annulled the Order regarding

the remaining P1,100.00.

YES.

1. The subject of thedispute between them

was the taking ofcoconuts from the

property owned by

Monsanto;

2. The Zernas were the

overseers of the

property at the time of

the taking of thecoconuts, as can be

gleaned from theirKasabutan;

3. Monsanto allowed theZernas to plant

coconut, coffee,

jackfruit, and cacao asshown by the

Kasabutan;

4. A tenurial arrangement

exists among herein

parties as regards the

harvesting of the

agricultural products,

as shown by the

several remittancesmade by the Zernas to

Monsanto,substantiated by

receipts.

NO. There is no question that the

RTC had criminal jurisdiction to

try the Zernas for the crime of

qualified theft. However, the

resolution of the issue of who is

entitled to the P1,100.00 falls

squarely within the jurisdiction

of the DARAB, as i t is an

agrarian dispute.

The resolution of an agrarian

dispute is a matter beyond the

legal competence of regular

courts. The DARAB exercises

primary jurisdictionboth

original and appellateto

determine and adjudicate all

agrarian disputes, cases,

controversies, and matters or

incidents involving the

implementation of agrarian laws

and their implementing rules andregulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any

controversy relating to tenurialarrangementswhether

leasehold, tenancy, stewardshipor otherwiseover lands

devoted to agriculture, including

(1) disputes concerning farm

workers associations; or (2)

representation of persons in

negotiating, fixing, maintaining,

changing, or seeking to arrange

terms or conditions of such

tenurial arrangement.

A tenancy relationship may be

established either verbally or in

writing, expressly or impliedly.

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and exclusive jurisdiction of the

DARAB. It then annulled theRTC order requiring the return of

the P1,100.00.

Sanchez v. Marin

GR No. 171346

19 October 2007

Chico-Nazario, J.

David Felix owned a fishpond.

Jaime Sanchez was instituted as

a tenant on the said fishpond,

with a 50/50 sharing agreement.

After a few years, Felix sold and

transferred ownership of the

subject fishpond to the Marins.

As new owners of the fishpond,

they entered into a civil law

agreement with their mother,Zemaida, which was renewable

yearly.

Zenaida then made anarrangement with Sanchez

wherein Sanchez would receive aregular salary and a 20% share in

the net profit of the fishpond.

When her lease agreement with

her children expired, Zenaida

ordered Sanchez to vacate the

premises. Sanchez refused,

asserting that he was a tenant of

the fishpond and not a mere

contractual worker; hence, he

had the right to its peaceful possession and security of

tenure. He then asked the court

to declare him as a tenant of thesubject f ishpond, whichsubsequently did.

As Sanchez was already declared

as an agricultural tenant of the

fishpond, he filed a petition to

the Provincial Agrarian Reform

Adjudicator (PARAD) for the

fixing of leasehold rentals for his

use of the fishpond. However,

Zenaida countered this

W/N a fishpond is an agricultural

land.

W/N a tenurial arrangement

exists between Sanchez andZenaida Marin.

W/N the DARAB has

jurisdiction over the case.

NO. By virtue of Sec. 2, RA

7881, the operation of fishponds

is no longer considered an

agricultural activity, and a parcel

of land devoted to fishpond

operation is no longer an

agricultural land.

YES. Although the fishpond is

not covered by the CARL, it bears emphasis that Sanchez

status as a tenant in the subjectfishpond and his right to security

of tenure were already previouslysettled. Having been declared as

a tenant with the right to securityof tenure as provided by the law

enforced at the time of the filing

of the complaint, Sanchez has

acquired a vested right over the

subject fishpond. Therefore, even

i f fishponds were later

excluded/exempted from CARL

coverage, and despite the fact

that no CLOA has been issued to

Sanchez, the same cannot defeatthe aforesaid vested right already

granted and acquired by Sanchez

long before the passage of RA7881.

YES. The present case was

instituted as early as 1991 when

the law applicable was still RA

6657, and fishponds and prawn

farms were not yet

exempted/excluded from the

CARL coverage. At that time,

there was an agrarian dispute

between the parties. Prior to the

Fishponds are no longer

considered agricultural lands.

11


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application by filing a case with

the PARAD to eject Sanchez forfailure to pay the rent and for

failure to render an accounting.The PARAD consolidated the 2

cases and ruled in favor of

Sanchez.

Zenaida appealed to the

DARAB, which affirmed the

PARAD decision. The CA

reversed the ruling, stating that

the DARAB lacked jurisdiction

over the case. It stated that Sec. 2

of RA 7881, which amended

Sec. 10 of RA 6657, excluded private lands actually, directly,

and exclusively used for prawnfarms and fishponds from the

coverage of the CARL, so thatthe operation of a fishpond is no

longer considered an agricultural

activity. Since the cases are not

agrarian disputes, then the

DARAB could not have validly

acquired jurisdiction over the

case.

enactment of RA 7881 in 1995,

the case was already pendingappeal before the DARAB.

Hence, the aforesaidamendments cannot be made to

apply to divest the DARAB of its

jurisdiction of the case. Once

jurisdiction is acquired by the

court, it remains with it until the

full termination of the case.

Nuesa v. CA

GR No. 132048

6 March 2002Quisumbing, J.

When Verdillo was issued an

Order of Award by the DAR

Secretary over 2 parcels of land,it had a condition that Verdillo

should personally cultivate the

land, and pay at least the firstinstallment, within a period of 6months.

21 years later, Verdillo filed an

application with the DAR for the

purchase of the said lots claiming

that he had complied with the

conditions set forth in the Order

of Award. Restituto Rivera

protested this application,

claiming that it was he who had

W/N the DARAB has

jurisdiction over the case.

W/N the DARAB acted in grave

abuse of discretion.

NO. Verdillo and Rivera had no

tenurial, leasehold, or any

agrarian relations whatsoeverthat could have brought this

controversy between them within

the ambit of an agrariandispute. Consequently, theDARAB had no jurisdiction over

the controversy and should not

have taken cognizance of

Verdillos petition in the first

place.

YES. The revocation by the

Regional Director of DAR of the

earlier Order of Award by the

DAR Secretary falls under the

While it bears emphasizing that

findings of administrative

agencies, which have acquiredexpertise because thei r

jurisdiction is confined to

specific matters are accorded notonly respect but even finality bythe courts, care should be taken

that administrative actions are

not done without due regard to

the jurisdictional boundaries set

by the enabling law for each

agency.

The DAR is vested with the

primary jurisdiction to determine

and adjudicate agrarian reform

12


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been in possession of the land

and had been cultivating thesame. He also filed his own

application for the said parcels inopposition to that of Verdillo.

After the DARs investigation of

the conflicting claims, it found

that Verdillo violated the terms

of the Order of Award, and

cancelled the said Order. Hence,

Verdillo filed with the Provincial

Adjudication Board a petition for

the annulment of the said order.

Instead of filing an Answer to

the Petition, Rivera filed aMotion to Dismiss. However, the

DARAB Provincial Adjudicatorchose to resolve the case on the

merits, and ruled in favor ofVerdillo. The DARAB and the

CA affirmed this decision.

administrative functions of the

DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board

of adjudicators acted erroneouslyand with grave abuse of

discretion in taking cognizance

of the case, then overturning the

decision of the DAR Regional

Director and deciding the case on

the merits without giving Rivera

the opportunity to present his

case.

matters and shall have the

exclusive jurisdiction over allmatters involving the

implementation of the agrarianreform program. The DARAN

has primary original and

appellate jurisdiction to

determine and adjudicate all

agrarian disputes, cases,

controversies, and matters or

incidents involving the

implementation of the CARP and

other agrarian laws and their

IRRs.

An agrarian dispute is definedto include any controversy

relating to tenurial arrangements,whether leasehold, tenancy,

stewardship, or otherwise overlands devoted to agriculture,

including disputes concerning

farmworkers associations or

representation of persons in

negotiating, fixing, maintaining,

changing or seeking to arrange

terms or conditions of such

tenurial arrangements. It includes

any controversy relating to

compensation of lands acquired

under RA 6657 and other terms

and conditions of transfer andother agrarian reform

beneficiaries, whether thedisputants stand in the proximate

relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and

tenant, or lessor and lessee.

Almuete v. Andres

GR No. 122276

20 November 2001

Ynares-Santiago, J.

Since the National Resettlement

and Rehabilitation

Administration (NARRA)

awarded a parcel of land to

Rodrigo Almuete in 1957, he and

his family exercised exclusive

W/N the case is an agrarian

dispute and, as such, falls under

the DARABs jurisdiction.

NO. The action filed by Almuete

before the trial court was for

recovery of possession and

reconveyance of title. The issue

to be resolved was who between

Almuete and Andres has a better

The jurisdiction of the DARAB

is limited to cases involving a


parties.

Elements of a tenancy

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possession over it, cultivating it

and planting narra, fruit trees,rice, corn, and legumes thereon.

However, in 1979, an Agrarian

Reform Technologist represented

that Almuete could not be found

and that he had waived all his

rights as a NARRA settler. It was

also stated in the report that the

actual owner of the land was

Marcelo Andres, who was then

allowed to file his homestead

application.

After the issuance of an originalcertificate of title in favor of

Andres pursuant to hishomestead patent, he and 10

other armed persons entered thesubject property and took

possession of approximately half

of it.

Almuete quickly brought the

matter the DARs attention, and

learned of the cancellation of his

award and its subsequent titling

in favor of Andres. Almuete then

filed an action for reconveyance

and recovery of possession

against Andres, which wasgranted by the court.

Andres then filed a petition for

certiorari with the CA, assailingthe trial courts jurisdiction over

the nature as well as the subject

matter of the case. He argued

that since the subject property

was agricultural land covered by

a homestead patent, exclusive

jurisdiction was with the

DARAB, and not with the

right to the subject property

considering that both of them areawardees of the same property. It

was thus a controversy relatingto ownership of the farmland,

which is beyond the ambit of the

phrase agrarian dispute. No

juridical tie of landowner and

tenant was alleged between the

parties, let alone that which

would so characterize the

relationship as an agrarian

dispute. Consequently, the RTC

was competent to try and decide

the case. Its decision was, thus,

valid and can no longer bedisturbed, after having attained

finality. Nothing more can bedone with the decision except to

enforce it.

relationship:

1. The parties are thelandowner and the

tenant or agriculturallessee;

2. The subject matter of

the relationship is an

agricultural land;

3. There is consent

between the parties to

the relationship;

4. The purpose of the

relationship is to bring

about agricultural

production;

5. There is personalcultivation on the part

of the tenant or agricultural lessee;

6. The harvest is sharedbetween the landowner

and the tenant or

agricultural lessee.

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regular courts. The CA ruled in

Andres favor, and declared theruling of the RTC as null and

void for lack of jurisdiction.

Chico v. CA

GR No. 122704

5 January 1998

Vitug, J.

Pedro Chico claims to be the

lawful owner of a parcel of land,

which the Mananghayas were

occupying. He averred that he

needed the lots for his personal

use but because the

Mananghayas refused to vacate,

he was constrained to initiate the

case.

The Mananghayas assert that the

true owners of the property inquestion, Don Rafael and Doa

Salud Chico, were succeededupon their death by their son

Delfin Chico. They also claimthat they had long been in lawful

possession of the subject parcel

of land as tenants of the deceased

spouses and their son to whom

rentals had been paid.

The RTC ruled in favor of Pedro

and ordered the Mananghayas to

surrender its possession. The

Mananghayas then initiated a petition for certiorari with the

CA to annul the RTC decisionfor being void. They contend that

their tenancy relationship withthe original owners was an

agrarian dispute cognizable

exclusively by the DARAB. The

CA set aside the RTC decision

on the ground that the dispute

between the parties was an

agrarian reform matter.

W/N the dispute between the

parties is agrarian in nature.

NO. The records of the case fail

to show any juridical tie binding

between the parties or their

predecessors-in-interest, let alone

that which would so characterize

the relationship as an agrarian

dispute. Worse, the land subject

matter of the controversy was not

shown to be an agricultural land;

to the contrary, the land appearsto be located within a residential

area. Compounding the matter,no receipt, or any other evidence,

was presented by theMananghayas to prove their

claim that the harvest was sharedbetween the parties.

In order for a tenancy relation to

take serious hold over the

dispute, it would e essential to

first establish all its indispensable

elements. It is not enough that

these requisites are alleged; these

requisites must be shown in order

to divest the regular court of its

jurisdiction in proceedings

lawfully began before it.

Isidro v. CA

GR No. L-105586

15 December 1993

Natividad Gutierrez owns a

parcel of land, over which her

sister Aniceta was an overseer.

W/N the parties have a tenurial

arrangement.

NO. Based on the statutory

definitions of a tenant or lessee,

it is clear that there is no tenancy

Tenancy is not a purely factual

relationship dependent on what

the alleged tenant does upon the

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Padilla, J. Aniceta allowed Remigio Isidro

to occupy the swampy portion ofthe land, so that he would have

enough income to meet hisfamilys needs, with the

condition that he vacate the

property upon demand. Remigio

occupied the land without paying

any rental and converted the

same into a fishpond.

When Natividad demanded

Remigio to return the land, the

latter refused to vacate, claiming

that he had spent effort and

invested capital in converting thesame into a fishpond. Thus, a

complaint for unlawful detainerwas f iled by Natividad.

However, it was dismissed bythe trial court, stating that the

land is agricultural and is thus an

agrarian dispute under the

original and exclusive

jurisdiction of the courts of

agrarian relations. The RTC

affirmed the decision.

The CA then reversed the lower

courts, and ruled that there was

no tenurial arrangement between

the parties, and that Remigioonly possessed the property by

mere tolerance.

W/N the case falls under the

DARABs jurisdiction.

or agricultural/leasehold

relationship existing between theparties. There was no contract or

agreement entered into byRemigio with Natividad nor with

the overseer of the property, for

Remigio to cultivate the land for

a price certain or to share his

harvests. Remigio failed to

substantiate his claim that he was

paying rent for the use of the

land.

NO. A case involving an

agricultural land does not

automatically make such case anagrarian dispute upon which the

DARAB has jurisdiction. Thelaw provides for conditions or

requisites before the possessor ofthe land can qualify as an

agricultural lessee or tenant, and

the land being agricultural is

only one of them. The law states

that an agrarian dispute must be a

controversy relating to a tenurial

arrangement over lands devoted

to agriculture. In the absence of a

tenancy relationship, the

complaint for unlawful detainer

is properly within the jurisdiction

of the MTC.

land. It is also a legal

relationship. The intent of theparties, the understanding when

the farmer is installed, and theirwritten agreements, provided

these are complied with and are

not contrary to law, are even

more important.

Unless a person establishes his

status as a de jure tenant, he is

not entitled to security of tenure

nor is he covered by the Land

Reform Program of the

government under existing

tenancy laws.

An agricultural lessee is a personwho, by himself and with the aid

available from within hisimmediate farm household,

cultivates the land belonging to,

or possessed by, another with the

latters consent for the purposes

of production, for a price certain

in money or in produce or both.

An agricultural lessor, on the

other hand, is a natural or

juridical person who, either as

owner, c ivil law lessee,

usufructuary, or legal possessor

lets or grants to another thecultivation and use of his land for

a price certain.

Sintos v. CA

GR No. 96489

14 July 1995

Quiason, J.

From 1963 to 1983, Teofilo

Magarin, Aguido Ebasco,

Guillermo and Manuel Casinillo,

Sergio Corpus, Severino

Magarin, Rufina Mendoza,

Victoria Orilan, and Fausta

Salidaga had been cultivating

portions of a parcel of land

owned by Nicolas Sintos. They

agreed to pay him one-fourth of

W/N the tenants have a right to

disturbance compensation.

YES. There existed a landlord

and tenant relationship between

the parties. He allowed them to

cultivate the land and, in return,

received a share of the harvest.

Being tenants, they are entitled to


Where persons cultivated the

land and did not receive salaries

but a share in the produce or the

cash equivalent thereof, the

relationship created between

them and the landowner is one of

tenancy and not employment.

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their harvest as their shares.

Subsequently, Nicolas amendedthe sharing agreement by

requiring them to give him 10sacks of 50 kilos per sack, per

hectare, per harvest. Thereafter,

the said tenants paid him on the

basis of the new sharing scheme.

When the subject parcel of land

was identified by the Ministry of

Agrarian Reform as covered

under Operation Land Transfer,

Certificates of Land Transfer

were issued to the tenants.

Nicolas then asked for the

exclusion of his landholdingfrom the land reform program,

contending that the portionsoccupied by his tenants were part

of his land development project,

the Sintos Subdivision. After

investigation, the MAR

recommended the cancellation of

the CLTs in favor of the tenants

and instead recommended the

award to them of disturbance

compensation.

Although no agreement was

reached by the parties withrespect to the amount of

disturbance compensation, thetenants were ejected from their

landholding when Nicolas starteddumping sand and gravel on the

portions they were cultivating.

They then filed a case against

Nicolas for the payment of


The trial court ruled in favor of

the tenants, and ordered Nicolas

17


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to pay them disturbance

compensation. The CA affirmedthe trial court. Nicolas appealed,

contending that the respondentsdo not have a right to the

compensation because they were

not his tenants.

Philbancor v. CA

GR No. 129572

26 June 2000Pardo, J.

Vicente Hizon, Jr. is the owner

of agricultural lands which were

tenanted by Alfredo Pare, Pablo

Galang, and Amado Vie. Hizon

mortgaged the subject property

to Philbancor without his

tenants knowledge, and when hefailed to pay his obligations,

Philbancor was able to acquirethe property at a public auction.

The tenants allegedly only found

out about the mortgage sevenyears after the public auction,

when they were notified by

Philbancor to vacate the lots.

Thus, they filed a complaint for

maintenance of possession with

redemption and tenancy right of

pre-emption against Philbancor

and Hizon with the Provincial

Agrarian Reform Adjudication

Board (PARAB).

The PARAB ruled in favor of thetenants and ordered Philbancor

to execute the necessary Deed ofRedemption in favor of the

tenants.

The DARAB and the CA

affirmed the decision.

W/N the tenants could still

exercise their right of

redemption, five years after the

registration of the certificate of

sale with the Register of Deeds.

NO. Section 12 of RA 3844

provides that the right of

redemption may be exercised

wi thin 2 years from the

registration of the sale. The

redemption period had already

expired when the tenants filedthe complaint for redemption.

Nevertheless, the tenants maycontinue in possession and

enjoyment of the land in questionas legitimate tenants because the

right of tenancy attaches to thelandholding by operation of law.

The leasehold relation is not

extinguished by the alienation or

transfer of the legal possession of

the landholding.

The right of tenancy attaches to

the landholding by operation of

law. The leasehold relation is not

extinguished by the alienation or

transfer of the legal possession of

the landholding.

Heirs of Roman Soriano v. CA

GR No. 128177

15 August 2001

Ynares-Santiago, J.

A parcel of land originally

owned by Adriano Soriano

passed on to his heirs who leased

the same to the spouses de Vera

for 15 years beginning 1967

(until 1982). Roman, one

W/N the ruling in the land

registration case in favor of the

spouses Abalos becomes res

judicata with respect to the

security of tenure rights of the

heirs of Roman Soriano.

NO. What is in issue in the land

registration case was ownership.

The security of tenure case

before the DARAB involved the

issue of possession. It is

important to note that although

Security of tenure is a legal

concession to agricultural lessees

which they value as life itself and

deprivation of their landholdings

is tantamount to deprivation of

their only means of livelihood.

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Adrianos children, was to act as

caretaker of the property duringthe period of the lease. However,

in 1968, the de Vera spousesousted him from the property and

appointed Isidro and Vidal

Versoza as his substitutes.Because of this, Roman filed a

case for reinstatement and

reliquidation against the de Vera

spouses. On appeal to the CA, he

won. Prior to the execution of the

CAs decision in 1972, the de

Vera spouses and Roman entered

into a post-decisional agreement

wherein the spouses allowedRoman to sub-lease the property

as an agricultural tenant until thetermination of the lease in 1982.

The said agreement wasapproved by the agrarian court.

After executing an extrajudicial

settlement among themselves,

Adrianos heirs divided the

property into 2 lots. The first was

assigned to Lourdes, Candido,

and the heirs of Dionisia; the

other was assigned to Francisca,

Librada, Elocadio, and Roman.

In 1971, the first lot was sold by

its owners to the spouses Abalos,while the of the second lot was

sold to the same spouses byElocadio, Francisca, and Librada.

In 1976, the spouses Abalos filed

with the RTC of Pangasinan an

application for registration of

title over the lots they bought

from the heirs of Adriano (the

first one and the pro-indiviso

share of the second lot sold to

them). The application was

W/N the winning party in a land

registration case can effectivelyeject the possessor thereof,

whose security of tenure rightsare still pending determination

before the DARAB.

the spouses Abalos have been

declared titled owners of thesubject land, the exercise of their

rights of ownership are subject tolimitations that may be imposed

by law. The Tenancy Act

provides one such limitation.Agricultural lessees are entitled

to security of tenure and they

have the right to work on their

respective landholdings once the

leasehold relationship is

established.

NO. Romans status as tenant is

yet to be declared by DARAB.The prevailing party in a land

registration case cannot beplaced in possession of the area

while it is being occupied byonce claiming to be an

agricultural tenant, pending a

declaration that the latters

occupancy was unlawful. This is

because if Romans claim of

possession as a tenant of the said

property is proven, it will entitle

him and his heirs to protection

against dispossession.

The exercise of ownership yieldsto the exercise of the rights of an

agricultural tenant (as providedfor in The Tenancy Act).

Obiter: Possession and ownership are

distinct legal concepts. There is

ownership when a thing

pertaining to one person is

completely subjected to his willin a manner not prohibited by

law and consistent with therights of others. Ownership

confers certain rights to theowner, among which are the

right to enjoy the thing owned

and the right to exclude other

persons from possession thereof.On the other hand, possession is

defined as the holding of a thing

or the enjoyment of a right.

Literally, to possess means to

actually and physically occupy a

thing with or without right.

Possession may be had in two

ways: possession in the conceptof owner and possession of a

holder.

A judgment for ownership doesnot necessarily include

possession as a necessary

incident.

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granted by the RTC, and

affirmed both by the CA and SC.

In 1983, Roman, along withElocadio and Librada, filed a

case against the Abalos spouses

for annulment of documentand/or redemption, ownership,

and damages. It was denied by

the trial court.

In 1984, or 11 years after the

approval of the post-decisional

agreement between Roman and

the spouses de Vera, the Abalos

spouses filed with the agrariancourt a motion for execution of

the said post-decisionalagreement which allowed Roman

Soriano to sub-lease theproperty. The motion prayed that

the spouses Abalos be placed in

possession of the subject

property, jointly with Roman

Soriano, and to levy so much of

Romans property to answer for

the use and occupation of Roman

of 6/7 share of the property.

When Roman died in 1985, he

was substituted by his heirs.

It appears that in 1988, the land

registration courts decision waspartially executed by partitioning

the second lot into twoone partin favor of Roman and the other

in favor of the spouses Abalos.Romans heirs appealed to the

CA, which affirmed the partition

but reversed the order of the land

registration court directing the

issuance of a writ of possession

because of the pendency of the

case instituted by Roman against

the Abalos spouses.

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In 1993, the SC ultimatelydismissed Romans case of

annulment of document and/orredemption, ownership, and

damages against the Abalos

spouses; as well as the motionfor execution instituted by the

Abalos spouses. Romans heirs

then filed with the DARAB a

complaint against the Abalos

spouses for Security of Tenure

with prayer for Status Quo Order

and Preliminary Injunction. The

Abalos spouses, on the other

hand, in view of the SCsdisposition of the case, moved

for the issuance of an alias writof execution and/or writ of

possession to place them inpossession of the first and of

the second lot. The trial court

held this case in abeyance until

after DARAB resolves the

complaint filed by Romans

heirs. The Abalos spouses MR

was denied by the trial court, and

on appeal, the CA reversed the

RTC, ordering the issuance of

the writ of possession in favor of

the Abalos spouses.

Hernandez v. IACGR No. 74323

21 September 1990Medialdea, J.

The spouses Tolentino owned aparcel of coconut land. They had

persons living on the said land,who cleaned and cleared certain

portions of the plantation for the

purpose of improving the

harvest, were identified as

bantay or watchers over the

property and entitled to 1/6 share

in the harvest. Their houses were

built in a cluster inside the

property.

W/N the watchers could beconsidered as agricultural

tenants.

YES. The watchers have been incontinuous, uninterrupted

physical possession of theirrespect ive areas in the

landholding, which they have

cleaned and cleared for the

purpose of improving the

harvests; they have lived in the

landholding and constructed their

houses thereon; they were paid in

an amount equivalent to 1/6 of

the harvest during the ownership

of the Tolentino spouses, and

Where a person cultivates theland and does not receive salaries

but a share in the produce or thecash equivalent of his share in

lump, the relationship is one of

tenancy and not employment.

An important criterion in

determining whether the

relationship is one of share

tenancy is cultivation.

The definition of cultivation is

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Subsequently, SALES, Inc. was

able to acquire the land. Its possession was relinquished to

Wenceslao Hernandez under acivil law lease. The watchers

pay was reduced to 1/7 of the

harvest. However, from 1980 to1983, they were not paid their

shares.

SALES, Inc. averred that the

watchers had been ejected from

the land even before it acquired

the same; thus, they did not have

a right to a share of the harvests,

since they were not tenants. Italso claimed that under the lease

agreement, Hernandez wasforbidden to take any tenants,

and that these watchers wereonly subsequently hired as wage

laborers to do the picking,

gathering, and hauling of

cocounuts. The court ruled in

favor of the watchers, and

declared them as tenants of

SALES, Inc. and Wenceslao

Hernandez. The latter were also

ordered to pay the former their

unpaid shares in the harvest. The

CA affirmed.

then later, 1/7 during the period

of Wenceslaos lease. Theirstatus as tenants based on the

foregoing cannot be gainsaid.Where they cultivated the land

and did not receive salaries but a

share in the produce or the cashequivalent of his share in lump,

the relationship is one of tenancy

and not employment. The fact

that they have huts erected on the

landholdings shows they are

tenants.

not limited merely to the tilling,

plowing or harrowing of the land.It includes the promotion of

growth and the care of the plants,or husbanding the ground to

forward the products of the earth

by general industry.

It may be said that the caretaker

of an agricultural land can also

be considered the cultivator of

the land.

RA 3844 abolished and outlawed

share tenancy and put in its stead

the agricultural leasehold system.RA 6389 subsequently declared

that share tenancy was contraryto public policy. Although share

tenancy was statutorilyabolished, leasehold tenancy for

coconut and sugar lands has not

yet been implemented. The

policy makers of government are

still studying the feasibility of its

application and the consequences

of its implementation.

Nonetheless, this did not end the

rights of share tenants in these

types of lands. The eventual goal

of legislation of having strong

and independent farmers workingon lands which they own

remains.

Valencia v. CA

GR No. 122363

29 April 2003

Bellosillo, J.

When Victor Valencia acquired

two parcels of land, he entered

into civil law leases with

Glicerio Henson and Fr. Andres

Flores. Henson instituted

Crescenciano and Marciano Frias

to work on the property; while

Fr. Flores appointed the Friases,

plus some others, as farmhands.

However, in Fr. Flores lease

Can a contract of civil law lease

prohibit a civil law lessee from

employing a tenant on the land

subject matter of the lease

agreement?

YES. Sec. 6 of RA 3844 does not

automatically authorize a civil

law lessee to employ a tenant

without the consent of the

landowner. The lessee must be so

specifically authorized. A

different interpretation would be

most unfair to the hapless and

unsuspecting landowner who

entered into a civil law lease

The right to hire a tenant is

basically a personal right of a

landowner, except as may be

provided by law. Inherent in the

right of landholders to install a

tenant is their authority to do so;

otherwise, without such

authority, civil law lessees as

landholders cannot install a

tenant on the landholding.

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contract, there was a stipulation

that he was prohibited frominstalling a leasehold tenant

thereon. No such prohibitionexisted in Hensons contract.

When Fr. Flores lease periodexpired, Valencia ordered his

farmhands to vacate the lot. The

farmhands refused to do so, and

actually even secured CLTs over

the land in their names. Catalino

Mantac, one of the farmhands,

subsequently entered into a

leasehold contract undertaking to

have a profit-sharing agreementwith Valencia.

After 12 years, DAR investigated

the matter and found that theright of the farmhands to the land

ceased upon the termination of

the lease contracts, except as

regards to Mantac, with whom

Valencia entered into a tenancy

agreement. As such, it was

recommended that the CLTs

given to the other farmhands be

cancelled. However, the

Regional Office disregarded the

investigation report and ruled

that the farmhands had a right tocontinue on the land until

otherwise ordered by the court.On appeal to the Office of the

President, then Exec. Sec.Teofisto Guingona upheld the

ruling of the DAR, with the

modification that the area

acquired by Valencia as

homestead be excluded from the

coverage of PD 27.

Valencia then appealed to the

agreement in good faith only to

realize later on that he can nolonger regain possession of his

property due to the installation ofa tenant by the civil law lessee.

On the other hand, under the

express provision of Art. 1649 ofthe Civil Code, the lessee cannot

assign the lease without the

consent of the lessor, unless there

is a stipulation to the contrary. In

the case before us, not only is

there no stipulation to the

contrary; the lessee is expressly

prohibited from subleasing or

encumbering the land, whichincludes installing a leasehold

tenant thereon since the right todo so is an at tribute of

ownership.

Tenancy relationship has beenheld to be of a personal

character.

Deforciants cannot install lawful

tenants who are entitled tosecurity of tenure.

A contract of civil law lease can

prohibit a civil law lessee from

employing a tenant on the land

subject matter of the lease

agreement.

Essential requisites of a tenancyrelationship:

(1) The parties are thelandowner and the

tenant;(2) The subject is

agricultural land;

(3) There is consent;

(4) The purpose is

agricultural production;

(5) There is personal

cultivation; and

(6) There is sharing ofharvests between the

parties.

An allegation that an agricultural

tenant tilled the land in questiondoes not make the case an

agrarian dispute. Claims that oneis a tenant do not automatically

give rise to security of tenure.

The elements of tenancy must

first be proved in order to entitle

the claimant to security of tenure.

The principal factor in

determining whether a tenancy

relationship exists is intent.

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CA contending that the Exec.

Sec. erred in recognizing thefarmhands as tenants, and

disallowing him and his 7compulsory hei rs from

exercising their right of retention

under RA 6657. However, theCA dismissed the case.

Tenancy is not a purely factual

relationship dependent on whatthe alleged tenant does upon the

land. It is also a legalrelationship.

The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be

invoked only by tenants de jure,

not by those who are not true and

lawful tenants.

The act of subletting to third

persons extinguishes the

agricultural leasehold relations,

as this constitutes anabandonment of the landholding

due to absence of personalcultivation.

Obiter:

Social justice is for the

deserving, whether he be a

millionaire in his mansion or a

pauper in his hovel. It is never

justified to give preference to the

poor simply because they are

poor, or reject the rich simplybecause they are rich, for justice

must always be served for the poor and the r ich alike

according to the mandate of law.

Interpretare et concordare leges

legibus est optimus interpretandi

modus. Interpreting and

harmonizing laws with laws is

the best method of interpretation.

Caballes v. DAR

GR No. 78214

5 December 1988

Sarmiento, J.

Andrea Millenes allowed

Bienvenido Abajon to construct

a house on a portion of her

landholding, paying a monthly

rental of P2.00. Millenes

likewise allowed Abajon to plant

W/N Abajon is an agricultural

tenant.

NO. To invest Abajon with the

status of a tenant is preposterous.

He only occupied a miniscule

portion (60m2) of a 500m2 lot,

which cannot by any stretch of

imagination be considered as an

Essential requisites of a tenancy

relationship:

(7) The parties are the

landowner and the

tenant;

(8) The subject is

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a portion of the land, agreeing

that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a 50-50

basis.

When Millenes sold her land to

the spouses Arturo and YolandaCaballes, the spouses told

Abajon that they intended to

build a poultry close to his house

and persuaded him to transfer his

dwelling to another portion of

the landholding. Abajon refused

to leave, even after confrontation

before the Barangay Captain of

the locality.

Subsequently, Yolanda filed acriminal case against Abajon for

malicious mischief for harvestingbananas and jackfruit from their

property without her knowledge.

All the planting on the property

however, had been done by

Abajon. The trial court ordered

the referral of the case to the

Ministry of Agrarian Reform for

a preliminary determination of

the relationship between the

parties. The Ministry ruled that a

tenancy relationship existed

between the parties, and, as such,the case is not proper for hearing.

On appeal, the DAR (the new

MAR) reversed the findings anddeclared that the case was proper

for trial as the land involved was

residential. The new minister of

the DAR, however, set aside the

said order and declared that the

criminal case was not proper for

trial, as there was an existing


economic family-sized farm.

Planting camote, bananas, andcorn on such a size of land

cannot produce an incomesufficient to provide a modest

standard of living to meet the

farm familys basic needs. Thus,the order sought to be reviewed

is patently contrary to the

declared policy of RA 3844.

Moreover, there exists no


parties because Abajons status is

more of a caretaker who was

allowed by the owner out of

benevolence or compassion tolive in the premises and to have a

garden of some sort. Agricultural production as the primary

purpose being absent in thearrangement, it is clear that

Abajon was never a tenant of

Millenes.

agricultural land;

(9) There is consent;(10) The purpose is

agricultural production;(11) There is personal

cultivation; and

(12) There is sharing ofharvests.

Unless a person has established

his status as a de jure tenant, he

is not entitled to security of

tenure nor is he covered by the

Land Reform Program of the

Government under existing laws.

Tenancy status arises only if an

occupant of a parcel of land hasbeen given its possession for the

primary purpose of agriculturalproduction.

Obiter:

If justice can be meted out now,

why wait for it to drop gently

from heaven?

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parties.

26

agrarian law case digest matrix set 1

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