safavid silk trade and russia

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RUDIMATTHEE

ANTI-OTTOMAN POLITICS AND TRANSIT RIGHTSTHE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY TRADE IN SILKBETWEEN SAFAVID IRANAND MUSCOVY

Introduction

Conceiving of Safavid Iran as the hub in a wheel of surrounding states, onequickly realizes the shallowness of our understanding of thewheel's various spokes.One, moreover, ismissing almost completely. Of the Safavids' dealings with thecountries thatwere closely connected with Iran through politics and trade, those withtheMuscovite state remain virtually unknown outside of Russian scholarship.

Long separated from Iran as itwas by unpacified nomadic peoples, Muscovy wasmore distant than either the Ottoman or theMughal Empire, the other two earlymodern states with similarities in political structure and economic policies. Thissituation began to change in the sixteenth century, when its southern expansionbrought Moscow within the orbit that Safavid Iran claimed as its own. Theinteraction that followed had nothing of the mutual animosity growing out of rivalinterpretations of a common religious heritage that marked the often bellicoseSafavid-Ottoman relations. Nor did the two states engage in the kind of culturalexchange that characterized the relationship between Safavids andMughals. Whatbrought Russia and Iran into contact instead were common material interests,political aswell as economic, thatwere intimately linked to the international politicalconfiguration and patterns of trade at the turn of the seventeenth century.The following discussion will take these common interests as the starting pointfrom which to examine the interaction between Iran and theMuscovite state from thelate sixteenth to the late seventeenth century, or the period spanned by the activeeconomic involvement of Shah 'Abbas I in Iran and Tsar Peter I in Russia,respectively. In this Iwill necessarily pay close attention to the ultimate rationaleof the Russo-Iranian axis, the Ottoman threat to both, but Iwill view their mutualdiplomatic courting through the prism of the study's main object, the relationship'scommercial dimension and, more particularly, the trade in silk.1 Attention to the

Cahiers du Monde russe, XXXV (4), octobre-d?cembre 1994, pp. 739-762.


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Safavid silk trade, which still awaits a comprehensive study, thus far has mostly beenfocused on the maritime Persian Gulf route which in the early seventeenth centurybegan to be used as an alternative outlet for the Iranian silk thatwas traditionallyexported via the land-based route through the Ottoman Empire. Much less wellknown in this shift from a latitudinal to a longitudinal axis is the latter's northerncomponent, the fluvial route which led from Iran via the Caspian Sea toAstrakhanand thence followed the Volga up to Nizhnii-Novgorod, from where goods wereusually carried overland toMoscow.2 It is this third outlet for Iranian silk which Iwill here explore in an attempt to establish the degree towhich itmanaged tobecomean alternative to the other itineraries in the course of the seventeenth century.Before doing so, however, an overview of its origins and early development is inorder.

L Early relationsTrade relations between Russia and theMiddle East, including Iran, go back to

pre-Islamic times. Hoards of coins and silver objects from the Sasanian period inIran testify to an early exchange of goods, but in the absence of written sources it isunfortunately impossible to elaborate on this trade.3 In early Islamic times mattersimprove with the various Muslim geographers who provide information oncommercial relations between "Rus" and the lands of Islam. In these early days adirect route to Iran, or rather two routes, existed which crossed the territory betweenthe Black and Caspian Seas. The first one was themaritime route that followed thewestern shores of the Caspian Sea until it reached the port towns of Gilan on thesouthern coast. The second one followed the same trajectory but turned into anoverland route beginning in Darband, traditionally a major gateway through the

Caucasus, from where it continued in the direction of Mesopotamia.4 Due to theunpacified state of Daghestan, the territory north of Darband, the first descriptions ofthe overland route along thewestern shores of the Caspian Sea only date from thetwelfth century, while the route itself began to be used with some regularity only inthe thirteenth.5Commercial centers and routes witnessed several shifts over time. Protracted

warfare between Arabs and Khazars was followed in the eighth century by the riseof Itil, the capital of theKhazar state, situated at themouth of theVolga near the latercity of Astrakhan, as a trade emporium. Together with the Bulgars, the Khazarsbecame the middlemen ina lively trade that linked the Baltic North to theArab East.6This Transcaucasian link functioned until the tenth century, when Rus raids intoShirvan and Tabaristan wrought havoc in the area around the Caspian Sea. At thesame time unrest in the Caucasus and renewed hostilities between Arabs andKhazars made the direct route between Iran along the Caspian route impracticableand forced travelers tomake huge detours via Khwarazm and the desert between theAral Sea and theVolga basin.7The Caucasian linkwithered after the destruction of Itil and Bulgar by the Rus inthe 960's and the fall of the Samanid state in eastern Iran in the same period. Kiev,the capital of a newly emerging state, replaced Itil and Bulgar as themost importanttrade center in the north-south link. As long as the Kievan state flourished, thepoint of gravity of Russian-Middle Eastern trade continued to be located in the


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southwest. However, the decline of Kiev in the twelfth century ? the city wassacked in 1169 ? and the emergence of the Vladimir-Suzdal' state caused a shifttoward the northeast and made the Volga route, with Suzdal' as its center, themaincommercial artery.8Economic weakness inmuch of theMiddle East prevented theVolga connectionfrom flourishing until the incorporation of Iran by the Khwarazmshahs in the earlythirteenth century. The latter restored commercial relations with Bulgar, but the

Mongol invasion preempted a long-term commercial revival.9 Subjugating theBulgar state as well as Iran, theMongols severely interrupted commercial exchange.However, under the successor states, the Ilkhans in Iran and the Golden Horde insouth Russia, trade links revived remarkably quickly. In Iran,Tabriz, and to a lesserextent Sultaniyeh, became thriving commercial centers, while inRussia Sarai, thecapital of theGolden Horde, and the Black Sea port city of Kaffa (modem Fedosiya)assumed a similar role.10 In both territories Italian, Genoese and Venetian,merchants managed to establish strongholds. Thus trade flourished until the midthirteenth century, when the devastation of the Black Death and the Timuridinvasions caused theGolden Horde inRussia to disintegrate and llkhanid rule in Iranto collapse.

Following theMongol period, itwas the rise of Moscow and its liberation fromthe "Tatar yoke" which were decisive for the revival of the diplomatic andcommercial links with the Islamic world. Muscovy established diplomaticrelations with the Porte before the end of the fifteenth century. Its commercial linkswith the Ottomans increased as well. At the same timeMuscovy became involvedin a tenuous triangular relationship with the khanates of Kazan to the northeast andCrimea to the southwest. For a long time, Kazan, the dominant commercial marketon the route to the Caspian Sea, and the Crimean khanate, vital in the links with theOttoman Empire, lived in peace with Muscovy. However, as soon as the rationalefor mutual good will, the Golden Horde, disappeared, the alliance broke up, to bereplaced with friendly relations between Moscow and Astrakhan.11More than a good rapport between Moscow and Astrakhan was required torevitalize the link with Iran which, following llkhanid rule, had lived through theturbulent episode of the Timurid occupation and warfare between various localdynasties. Another catalyst was the establishment of the Safavid dynasty in theearly 1500's, which ended a long period of dispersed power in Iran. Mutual interestbetween Safavid Iran and Russia can be traced to these early days and, morespecifically, to the reigns of Shah Ismail I (1502-1524) and Tsar Vasili III (15051533). The earliest diplomatic contact recorded in theRussian sources dates fromthis period and concerns a Safavid envoy who visited Moscow in 1521.12

Relations, including commercial ones, long remained intermittent, however. Inthe fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries few Russian merchantsventured south into a region thatwas unpacified and lacked themost basic facilitiesfor commercial traffic.13 On the Russian side Tatars acted as the mainintermediaries in the Russo-Iranian trade. The Italian traveler Contarini in the later1400's noted that a caravan leftAstrakhan forMoscow every year "accompanied bya great many Tartar merchants who [...] take with them silk manufactured inGesdi[YazdJ and fustian stuffs to exchange for furs, saddles, swords, bridles and otherthings which they require."14 On the part of Iran the first to engage in commercialtraffic with the north were probably the Armenians from the town of Julfa on the


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river Aras, who enjoyed a preeminent position in the commerce of northern Iran?

which mostly revolved around silk ? as of the early sixteenth century. They seemto have traded with Moscow long before Russia controlled the Caspian Sea route.15They may also have been instrumental in attempts to transport silk from Gilan toEurope via Russia when the Ottomans struck Iran with a commercial blockade in1514-1515.16 In the period prior to the extension of Safavid control over northernIran, they presumably relied on their political clout with local rulers. Thus in 1544the beglerbeg of Shirvan asked Ivan IV to renew existing privileges for Armenianmerchants in their tradewith Russia.17

The extension of Russian control over theVolga route, which preceded Safavidcontrol over the southern Caucasus, may be seen as a land-based variant of themaritime expansion undertaken by Europe at the turn of the sixteenth century.While the consequences for the Ottoman Empire and Iran of Europe's maritimeexploration are well known, however, the simultaneous advance by and throughRussia remains relatively obscure. Attempts to break the Iberian monopoly overthe sea route toAsia first took the form of efforts to establish an overland alternative,as seen in the endeavor by theGenoese Paolo Centurione in 1522 to open up a routefrom the Baltic Sea via theVolga and Astrakhan toCentral Asia and India.18 Theseefforts met with little success as long as the lands lying astride this fluvial routeremained unpacified. Pacification, in turn, had to wait until after the Russianannexation of the khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556), as a result of

which the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea were made accessible via the Volga route.Among the first to take advantage of improved communications and increased safetywere the English so-called Muscovy merchants who, faced with a Portuguese andSpanish monopoly of the southern, Atlantic and Indian Ocean routes and a strongVenetian presence on theLevant route, attempted touse the northern itinerary in theirquest for the riches of the Indies. Under the auspices of the newly incorporatedRussian Company, merchants such as Arthur Edwards, Anthony Jenkinson, andThomas Randolph led a number of commercial expeditions through Russia to Iran inthel560'sandl570's.19

The Russian annexation of Astrakhan proved to be of momentous importance forcommercial relations between the Slavic and theMuslim worlds. Incorporated intotheMuscovite realm and rebuilt, the town emerged as the principal crossroads wheremerchants from Russia, Iran, Central Asia and India met and exchanged theirwares.From Astrakhan Russian merchants began to venture further south. They not onlyparticipated in the exchange of silk and other wares in Shamakhi (Shamakha), thecapital of Shirvan and the southern terminus for most northern merchants, but theirpresence was noted in cities such as Tabriz, Ardabil, Qazvin, and Kashan as well.20The wares they brought with them consisted of leather skins, metal objects such asknives and nails, various furs, such as sable, fox, marten, and squirrel, wax, andtallow. Arms were very much in demand too, especially chain armors, arrows andspears. For their part, merchants from Iranmade theirway up to the cities of Kazanand Nizhnii-Novgorod, which developed into lively trade centers. Aside fromIranians, Russian cities were visited by merchants from Central Asia and India, sentby their governments with official merchandise. Moscow itself was not muchfrequented by foreign merchants in this early phase.21 In addition, Armenianmerchants must have been active in the north-south link, judging by the existence ofan Armenian caravanserai inMoscow in the late sixteenth century.22 Iran exported


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mostly precious cloth. The velvets, satins and taffetas woven inYazd, Kashan, andIsfahan thatwere taken toRussia often made up seventy or more percent of the totalvalue of goods transported in the late sixteenth century. Besides, Iran suppliedRussia with carpets, morocco, saffron, dyes, precious stones and steel arms.23Silk was among the items that were exchanged in this period. AnthonyJenkinson in 1558 observed thatAstrakhan was ameeting place of Tatar merchantswho brought "diners kindes of wares made of cotton wooll, with diuers kinds ofwrought silkes," and merchants from Shamakhi in Iran who carried "sowing silke,which is the coursest that they use in Russeland."24 Nonetheless, the silk supplyfrom Iran appears to have been fairly insignificant in the early and mid-sixteenthcentury and only began to expand when the emergence of a demand from westernEurope in the later part of the century opened up the possibility of reexport.25The Muscovite state soon followed private merchants in extending its ambit torelations with the lands beyond Astrakhan. Contacts that included trade issueswere established with the Central Asian khanates as well as with the Caucasianterritories thatwere subordinated to Iran. Thus Shirvan and Shamakhi in 1562 and1563 sent envoys toMoscow for trade talks.26 Ivan IV in 1567 dispatched twoagents with royal wares as far south as the Persian Gulf port of Hormuz.27 In thisdevelopment, as well as the construction of a number of fortresses along the Volgaroute in the 1580's, we see a growing official interest in trade relations coupled witha concern about commercial security on the part of Moscow. With the greater roleof trade inRussia's political dealings with Iran came an increase in state control overcommerce and its practitioners. In a process that recalls similar changes inrelations with the Ottoman Empire somewhat earlier, an original dominance ofprivate merchants after 1570 gave way to a gradual appropriation by the Russianstate of the exchange of goods.28 Whereas in the fifteenth and early sixteenthcenturies foreign merchants appear to have had full freedom to trade in cities all overRussia, foreign commercial activities became severely restricted in the latersixteenth century, and especially after the termination of the Livonian War. In amercantilistic effort to limit the activities of foreign merchants, Russia now onlyallowed them to operate in so-called gosti hostels. The importation of goods alsowas made subject to taxation, not just at the borders, but at various points en route aswell.29 Nor were merchants from the east permitted to buy Russian goods directlyfrom producers and manufacturers. Instead they were obliged to use Russian

merchants as intermediaries.30 Foreign merchants, moreover, generally paid two tothree times asmuch as Russians in tolls. Lastly, the exportation of awhole array ofwares became subject to state monopolization. The export of precious metals, goldand silver, was strictly forbidden. Other, so-called "protected goods" hadlimitations imposed on their export, the terms of which were to be determined by theRussian state. Arms and a number of metal wares fell in this category. The samewas true for sable fur and leather skins. Another example was wax, the export ofwhich may have become restricted in 1588 because of growing foreign demand.31Moscow's thrust into the Caucasus prepared theway for expanded political andcommercial dealings but did not immediately lead to a steady increase in traffic withthe southern neighbor. For the time being, the route alongside the Caspian littoralremained far from secure, devoid of facilities and infested with bandits as itwas.

As robberies were common, few Russian merchants headed south. And if they did,itwas invariably in the form of caravans protected by armed troops. The latter


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could reach up to 1,000 men. Even then, there was no guarantee that the caravanmight not be attacked.32 If anything, conditions worsened in the last third of thesixteenth century. The 1571 burning of Moscow by the Crimean Tatars, theuprising of the Volga Tatars a year later, and the lack of success the Russians had intheir wars with Sweden and Poland threw the north into turmoil. This unsettledstate was matched by troubles in the south which developed as a result of thecampaign theOttomans simultaneously waged against Astrakhan. When they tookAzerbaijan and the Caspian Sea littoral between the cities of Baku and Darband,travel between Moscow and Iran along the western side became impossible andtemporarily shifted to the eastern shore.In sum, the 1570's and 1580's were hardly propitious times for commercialexchange, as was discovered by the voivoda of Astrakhan who unsuccessfullyattempted to attract foreign merchants to his town in 1586.33 Things were soon tochange, however. Defeat in the Livonian War blocked the chances of a Russianoutlet via the Baltic. A succession crisis in the Crimean khanate was a seconddevelopment that forced Moscow to turn its attention to its southern and southeasternborders again. Before long the Russians built a new series of fortifications on theCaucasian frontier. Having forged a broad anti-Ottoman coalition, which includeda branch of the Crimean Tatars, Russia was now ready to establish closer relationswith Iran as well as with the Central Asian khanates.34

II. The reign of Shah 'Abbas IRenewed Russian interest in the lands to the south virtually coincided with theaccession of Shah 'Abbas I to the Safavid throne in 1587. Under Shah 'Abbas I

(r. 1587-1629) the Safavid state reached its apogee of political power and militarystrength. 'Abbas's expansionist policies also brought him into conflict with theOttomans. Itwas the threat from this common neighbor and the resulting antiOttoman interests shared by Moscow and Iranwhich provided the rationale for thecontacts the two states established. There was nothing new about these sharedinterests. Fear of the Ottomans went back as far as the fall of Constantinople in1453. The subsequent expansion of theOttoman Empire into southeastern Europeand the area north of the Black Sea had increased concern on the part of EuropeanandWest-Asian powers alike and was an early ground for Moscow to seek Muslimallies in an anti-Turkish coalition. Russian envoys visited Herat in 1464-1465,while Ivan III in the same period sent an envoy to Shamakhi.35 Simultaneouscontacts between Uzun Hasan, the ruler of the Iranian Aq-Qoyunlu dynasty, andMoscow were part of the same development. The subsequent emergence insouthern Russia of the Crimean Tatars as Ottoman proxies lent even more weight tothe shared concerns of Moscow and Qazvin.36The interest that the Safavids developed in their northern neighbor already beforeShah 'Abbas was principally motivated by a lack of success in their wars with theOttomans. The Ottoman attempt to seize Azerbaijan and Shirvan in the early1550's prompted Shah Tahmasp I (r. 1524-1576) to send amission toMoscow in1552-1553. But itwas especially the hapless peace of Amasya of 1555, followed

by Ottoman aggression against Astrakhan in the next decade, which made bothparties eager to intensify their diplomatic relations.37 Amasya cost Iran large parts


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of Azerbaijan and Mesopotamia. The Ottoman occupation of Astrakhan, in turn,eliminated Russian control over a vital commercial center and interrupted themostimportant trade route between the south and the north. Matters became even worseand a coalition between Russia and Iran more plausible in the 1580's, when theOttomans occupied parts of Georgia and Shirvan, including the city of Tiflis.

Through the first serious Safavid mission toMoscow, Shah Khodabandeh (r. 15781587) proposed a coalition and promised Darband and Baku to the Russiansfollowing the liberation of these cities. This mission, which was led by Hadi Beg(called Andi Beg in the Russian sources), appeared bold in its objectives butinaugurated a pattern in that it did not lead to any concrete results. Iran, itwouldturn out in subsequent encounters, was keen enough to court Russia as a potentialfuture ally, yet apprehensive enough of the Turks not to engage in a formal alliancewith third parties.The first Hadi Beg mission bore no concrete results but did lead to the regularand frequent exchange of envoys, beginning with the embassy of Grigorii BorisVasil'chikov to Qazvin in 1588. None of these missions led to any formalagreement due to Shah 'Abbas's reluctance to jeopardize his imminent peace accordwith the Ottomans by concluding an anti-Turkish coalition with Moscow. On theother hand, these contacts were not entirely fruitless, for the second Hadi Beg

mission, which was dispatched in 1589, did result in closer economic ties, or at leastlaid the groundwork for such ties in the form of written statements from theRussiansexpressing their desire for economic relations. The commitment to free trade forIranian merchants which the tsar articulated on this occasion was an especiallywelcome signal for the separate Gilan embassy accompanying the Iranian delegationwhose main concern was the unfair treatment of Gilani merchants inAstrakhan aswell as their free access to the Russian market.38

Shah 'Abbas's diplomatic maneuvers toward the north in these years aimed aboveall at securing Iran's position against theOttomans, but increasingly began to involvetrade relations as well. While the so-called Kaya mission sent toMoscow in 1591had a diplomatic mandate, through it 'Abbas also expressed his desire to establishcommercial links with Russia. The Russian acceptance of this proposal in fact wasthemission's only concrete result.39 InMay 1592, well before theKayamission had

returned from Russia, 'Abbas dispatched another mission. Led by Hajji Khosrow,its objectives included the establishment of toll-free trade for government goodscarried by Iranian merchants. The mission bore no political results, but itscommercial success ? the shah was given the right to trade toll-free inRussia ? morethan compensated for that. In a logical next step, 'Abbas did not wait for HajjiKhosrow to return and in 1593 sent yet another delegation. Its leader,Hajji Iskandar,became the first Safavid official merchant sent toRussia in the guise of a diplomaticenvoy.40 Hajji Iskandar, who carried a number of royal wares, failed to finalize theagreement when theRussians refused to agree to his demand of selling the goods hehad brought wholesale while being allowed the freedom to choose an assortment of

wares in his purchases. He is also said to have overestimated the value of hismerchandise and to have demanded toomany goods from theRussians in return.41This first failure to find common ground did not forestall further efforts. In1594 the shah sent a third embassy under the direction of Hadi Beg. The royalmerchants who accompanied thismission carried, among other things, ca. 200 kg. ofsilk, and bought a number of "protected" goods for the shah which included arms,


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metal wares and sable fur. In 1597 Moscow sent a mission to Iran, led byV V. Tiufiakin. This ill-fated mission ? all three of its successive leaders perishedbefore they had reached Iran? had a commercial dimension inasmuch as one of itstask was the signing of a commercial treaty. The same task, designed to normalizetrade relations between the two countries, seems to have been assigned to the fullfledged embassy which the new Tsar Boris Godunov dispatched under the directionof Zhirov and Zasekin in 1600.42

For the time being, political objectives continued to overshadow commercialconcerns, even as an asymmetry in these objectives began to mark the relationsbetween Iran andMoscow in the 1590's. Russia continued to be eager to draw Iraninto an anti-Ottoman alliance. Shah 'Abbas, however, at this point had differentpriorities. Having signed an agreement with the Ottomans in 1589-1590 that lefthis hands free in return for ceding large parts of the north, he did not seriously intendto resume hostilities and was thus in no position to adopt an active anti-Turkishstance. A war against the?zbegs and internal reforms, moreover, absorbed all hisenergy, as was discovered by the Zvenigorodskii mission which Moscow sent in1595 in response to the various delegations Iran had previously dispatched.'Abbas's political acumen, however, told him that, given the volatility of the politicalclimate, he could not afford to alienate the Russian by rebuffing them altogether.The solution which the Safavid ruler adopted was to leave theRussians in the beliefthat Iran was planning a war while simultaneously holding out an oft repeatedpromise that he was keen on concluding an anti-Ottoman treaty with Moscow.The real issue of diplomatic efforts, meanwhile, began to be Transcaucasia, thearea where Russian, Iranian and Ottoman spheres of influence converged andclashed. In the late 1500's Russia mounted a campaign intoDaghestan against theShamkhal of Tarkov and laid claims toDaghestan, Darband and Baku, all tributaryto the Safavid crown. When theRussians built a number of fortresses south of theriver Terek, Iranian fears about this foray into its northern flank grew into anxietyabout the possibility of amilitary union between Moscow and Georgia. Unlike the

Russians, who cautioned their envoys to be circumspect about the Caucasian issue,the Iranians evidently had little interest in keeping up appearances, as is seen in thesmall number of return missions sent by 'Abbas and the bad treatment suffered bythe various Russian missions that visited the Safavid court.43 Yet, in effect, Iranhad to move cautiously in its resistance toMoscow's claim on Daghestan, Darband,and Baku if itwanted tokeep the option of having a potential anti-Ottoman ally open.To encourage Moscow to stop further advancing into the Caucasus region thusbecame a cornerstone of 'Abbas's northern policy.44After 1598 the geopolitical balance between Russia and Iran changed in thelatter's favor. InRussia the period of turmoil known as theTime of Troubles ( 15981613) weakened the state and thereby its ability to function as a credible military

partner in the anti-Ottoman struggle. But the Time of Troubles period had itsmostdramatic repercussions on commercial relations, as Ottoman and Crimean Tatarthreats and the destruction caused by peasant rebellions temporarily led to theclosure of the route from Moscow to Astrakhan.45 Iran, meanwhile, havingconcluded the ?zbeg wars and a series of internal military and administrativereforms, entered a phase of considerable political and military strength.The result of these developments, a growing distance between the two states, wasexacerbated by the continuing Caucasian aspirations of both. While Shah 'Abbas


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in 1603-1604 launched a broad diplomatic initiative toward various west Europeanstates which seemed to hold a better promise for assistance against theOttoman foe,and simultaneously resumed hostilities with the latter, his apparent willingness tosolicit Russian help diminished, and what remained could hardly conceal the truenature of his intentions. Never intent on concluding an actual anti-Turkish treatywith Moscow, the Safavid rulermerely wanted to ensure thatRussia would not be adanger to his northern border.46 The Russians, for their part, grew ever morereluctant to assist Iran as they were making preparations for an offensive in theCaucasus. Indeed, while Shah 'Abbas was waiting for the right moment tomoveagainst the Ottomans, the Russians advanced their Caucasian claims by assistingAlexander, the ruler of the principality of Kakhet'i, in his struggle against the Turksand the Iranians. This prompted Iran to subjugate these regions in 1605.Powerless to intervene militarily, the Russians could do littlemore than dispatch amission to protest Iran's behavior and to try and regain the lost territory.Neither commercial nor diplomatic relations flourished in the following period,in which Georgia and Shirvan suffered just as much as the western parts ofAzerbaijan as a result of Shah 'Abbas's Caucasian campaigns and his wars againstthe Ottomans. The trading emporium of Shamakhi lay in ruins in 1607-1608,47and in the long run is said to have decreased in size as a result of theOttoman-Safavidwars.48 Nor were things quiet and stable on the Russian side. Faced withrebellion by Cossack marauders ? who held Astrakhan occupied for a period ? theMuscovite state was unable to continue its former relations with Iran until 1613.In that year the accession to the throne of Tsar Mikhail Romanov finally laidthe basis for the resumption of regular diplomatic contact between the two courts.A year later Russia sent a mission led by Tikhanov in an attempt to renewcommercial and diplomatic ties. The missions of 1615, 1616, and 1618-1620which followed all reflected Russia's continued weakness in the tsar's persistent

request for monetary assistance and in Russia's reluctance to broach the Georgianquestion with the Safavids. How much Moscow's clout had diminished with Shah'Abbas, who was evidently aware of the Russian impotence, is illustrated in therough and impolite treatment the various envoys from the north suffered at theSafavid court.49

If the poor reception Russian diplomats enjoyed in Isfahan reflected Moscow'sdeclining importance in Iran, 'Abbas had good reasons to limit his northern concernsto consolidating the safety of his Caucasian border. Iran's victory in thewar againstthe Turks in 1618 had obviated any direct plea for Russian assistance.Commercially things were changing as well. While he had earlier looked atRussiaas a possible alternative outlet for the silk that traditionally went through theOttoman Empire, 'Abbas now began to explore a third option, that of themaritimetrade route through the Persian Gulf, which had been suggested as early as 1608, asan alternative to the Anatolian and the Caspian trade routes. By engaging inrelations with the dominant powers of western Europe, the Safavid ruler expandedhis political bargaining power.50 The counterpart of this was a dilution of Russianinfluence in Iran. Neither commercially nor militarily were theRussians of any usein 'Abbas's Persian Gulf strategy. Itwas newcomers, beginning with the Englishand Dutch East India Companies, whose assistance the Safavid ruler now sought inhis feud with the Portuguese and the implementation of his commercial plans in thePersian Gulf.


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748 RUDIMATTHEE

If all this spelled the end to the idea of Russia as an officially sanctioned thirdoutlet for Iranian silk, none of itput a halt to the commercial exchange between thetwo countries. The Mohammad Kazem mission thatwent toMoscow in 1616, forexample, had a commercial dimension. Not only did it include a supply of silk, butit resulted inRussian steps toward greater protection of Iranian merchants in Iran.51Nor did the changed Iranian priorities deter the Russians from continuing theiractivity in the silk trade, either privately or in conjunction with diplomatic traffic.Numerous examples in the 1620's testify to this. A report from 1626 indicates thatRussian merchants would come down via the Caspian Sea to exchange their goodsfor silk in Gilan.52 In 1629, following the death of 'Abbas I and an ensuingrebellion inGilan, tenMuscovite merchants arrived in Isfahan after being robbed byrebels inGilan. Claiming that their total cargo had been 500 bales of silk, they werereimbursed after the defeat of the rebel leader Gharib Shah.53 In 1623, finally, atotal of over 2,000 kg. of silk was shipped from Astrakhan to various Russiancities.54

Most surviving information from the 1620's concerns the continuing exchangeof wares at the official level. Griaznom Selivanov, one of the merchants whoaccompanied the Korob'in mission of 1621-1623, carried 500 rubles worth of sablefur to Iran with the intent to purchase arms with the proceeds. Ivan Afanasevich,the other high-ranking merchant traveling with the mission, carried merchandisewith the aim of buying silk in Iran.55 Following the Korob'in mission, the Russianssent Fedot Kotov in 1623 as an official merchant (gost') with tsarist merchandiseand the task of surveying the route and of gathering information about Iran.56 Hewas followed in 1624 by a Russian ambassador who came to Iran in order toencourage the trade of silk via the Caspian route. Shah 'Abbas, however, who atthis point was intent on stimulating the Persian Gulf trade, rejected his proposals.Accompanying merchants were said to have bought ca. 150 bales of silk before theirreturn to Moscow.57 The Russian ambassador who arrived in Iran two years laterostensibly was charged with the same task. He, too, seems to have returnedunsuccessfully.58The low priority which 'Abbas accorded to relations with the Russians in thelatter part of his reign may have accounted for the fact that the status of traderelations and in particular that of privileges and procedures remained unresolved.That northern merchants suffered from this more than their Iranian counterparts issuggested by contemporary Russian sources which note the existence of an unequalsituation in the extent towhich residents of either state were able to operate freely inthe territory of the other. Russian merchants are said to have been routinelyharassed and obstructed in theirmovements by the local rulers of Gilan and Ardabil,while their wares were subjected to strict inspections by the same rulers. Yusuf

Khan, the ruler of Shamakhi, refused to grant legal protection of Russian merchantsvisiting his territory and even took Russian captives. Iranian merchantsaccompanying official embassies, on the other hand, tended to operate in the guiseof official merchants and routinely presented their wares as royal ones in order toenjoy the freedom from taxation granted to official merchandise. The breach ofconfidence this signified was acknowledged in 'Abbas's promise to the Russianenvoy Korob'in that henceforth themerchants sent by him would have sealed lettersproving their official status, which would entitle them tobe exempted from tolls andtaxes.59


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III. The period 1629-1667The death of Shah 'Abbas I in 1629 marked the beginning of considerable changein the relationship between the Safavid and the Romanov states. 'Abbas'ssuccessor, Shah Safi, tookmuch less interest in the silk trade than his grandfather had

done, and under him the royal export monopoly ? which had never been total ?quickly lapsed, giving greater latitude toprivate merchants. The pacification of thenorth by the Safavids and the regeneration of Iran's northern territory alsocontributed to a more propitious commercial climate. In the 1630's the Germantraveler Adam Olearius testified to the revival of Shamakhi by describing the townas a center of commerce with a great bazaar where all kinds of goods changed hands,and several caravanserais for foreign merchants.60 A decade later, the Turkishtraveler Evliya Celebi praised Shamakhi and mentioned the existence of 7,000 wellbuilt houses, seventy mosques, forty caravanserais "in each of which many thousandtomans of wares are deposited," and 1,200 shops.61If all of this seemed to signal opportunities for a commercial revival, war,disease, and rebellion in Iran's northern regions for the time being prevented anupsurge in the volume of trade exchanged between Iran and Russia. The 1630'ssaw renewed hostilities between Iran and the Ottomans and a lack of security in theCaspian sea region, which was made unsafe by Cossacks.62 Nor did the followingperiod witness much improvement. In the period from 1633 to 1637 a prolongedplague epidemic in northern Iran affected silk production and decimated the ranksof cultivators and merchants. In 1635-1636 a Russian merchant doing business inIran reportedly took back only 4,000 tomans of goods in return for the 6,500 worthof copper, furs, and cash that he had brought with him. His companions had almostall perished from the plague.63 Few Russian merchants were present in Iran in thisperiod, and the officially registered amounts of silk exported via the northern routeaccordingly were insignificant. Thus in 1634 nothing was transported, and in 1635out of a reported total of 1,073 bales exported that year only eighty went to Russia.The next year the plague made all traffic impossible.64 The border conflict of1647-1652 over Georgia and Daghestan, finally, once again brought commercialtraffic to a standstill. In 1650-1651 138 bales of Iranian silk lay in storage inAstrakhan for a lack of buyers.65 How little silk was shipped through Russia inthis period is illustrated in the report on the Russian trade thatwas written for theSwedish king in 1653. Its author, Johan de Rodes, estimated the volume of Iraniansilk that was transshipped through Arkhangelsk every three years to be 120 to150 bales.66

Natural adversity and warfare may have delayed a true expansion of commercialtraffic temporarily, but the real and long-term obstacle lay in simultaneous changesin the political sphere. The profound impact politics had on trade in Russia isvisible in reactions to the initiatives which various European powers took to openup transit trade through Russia and all the way to Iran. These initiatives allinvolved silk, a commodity which, used in the clothing of the rich, enjoyed agrowing popularity in baroque Europe. Not only themajor mercantile powers ofwestern Europe, England, Holland, France, Sweden, but even smaller ones such asHolstein and Courland, in the course of the seventeenth century equippedcommercial missions with the aim of opening up a transit route to the East.67


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The Russian reaction to these overtures was informed by a twofold motive.One was pressure on the part of its own merchants who felt threatened by this foreigncompetition and as of 1627 petitioned the state to restrict the right of foreigners totrade in Russia.68 In the other motive, Russia's perennial concern to find alliesagainst itsOttoman foe, we see the incongruity with the European countries, whichwere interested in trade relations, not political complications. Moscow made itsgranting of privileges to merchants from foreign countries conditional upon thewillingness of the latter to lend active support in this struggle. The Europeancountries, however, were motivated by an interest in getting Russia to granteconomic concessions rather than by a desire to engage in actual military treaties.

As a result, the numerous attempts to establish transit traffic all foundered. This isas true for the famous Holstein embassy of 1636 as it is for the various Dutchattempts to gain a foothold in the transit market. The two exceptions were Polandand Austria, both of which bordered on Ottoman territory. Their interest inapproaching Russia was in part commercial, in that they had an eye on Iranian silkand its transit through Russia, in part political, as they were intent on shifting the

military pressure from their own borders to those of Iran.69While incongruous objectives prevented the establishment of a direct linkbetween Western Europe and Iran via Moscow, similarly incompatible interestsbegan to mark Russo-lranian relations. No event was more momentous in thisregard than the peace of Zuhab

which the Safavids and the Ottomans concluded in1639. This formal accord removed the Turkish menace and thus definitivelyobviated the pressing need for outside alliances. From thatmoment until the end ofSafavid rule in the early eighteenth century Safavid rulers conducted an extremelycautious policy designed not to antagonize the Ottoman neighbor.These changing circumstances are reflected in diminishing diplomatic trafficbetween the Romanovs and the Safavids in the 1640's. The continuous interactionthat had marked the reign of Shah 'Abbas Ibegan to level off under Shah Safi, whenthe known number of Russian envoys is confined to the one who arrived in 1634 witha reported (and clearly exaggerated) dfl. 400,000 worth of cash and fur and Englishcloth, forwhich he wished to buy silk.70 The trendwas partly reversed under Sail'ssuccessor, Shah 'Abbas II (r. 1642-1666), when the Russians resumed their antiOttoman foreign policy. The accession of the new ruler was a natural occasion forthe sending of a congratulatory mission on the part of Moscow. However, it tookalmost five years for such amission to arrive in Isfahan.71 In response the Iraniansin 1648 sent a mission to Russia accompanied by a large amount of silk.72 TheRussians dispatched further embassies-cum trademissions north in 1651 and 1653,while in the latter year an Iranian envoy traveled toMoscow.73 All in all, in theperiod from 1647 to 1670Moscow sent three embassies and a total of six envoys toIsfahan. Iran, by contrast, is known to have reciprocated with only three missionsin the same period, the ones of 1648 and 1651, and themission of Hadi Khan Soltanin 1657. In the following period,

from 1670 to 1692, the imbalance continued.Russia continued to try and incorporate Iran in an anti-Turkish coalition, expeditingthree ambassadors and eleven envoys to Isfahan. Isfahan countered with thedispatch of one mission, in 1671, and waited twelve years before it responded to theChirkov mission of 1678-1679 by sending Mohammad Hosayn Khan Beg to

Moscow.74


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IV.The 1667 and 1673 treatiesTrade between Russia and Iran continued in the mid-seventeenth century but,

despite various, mostly Russian, initiatives in that direction, was still not subject toa formal "bilateral" agreement. Itwas only in the latter part of the century thatserious consideration was given to the regulation of commercial links between thetwo states. Mainly responsible for the serious attempts to enframe trade links in alegal context in the 1660's were the same political stimuli that had so longdetermined relations between the two states. Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iranwere interested in diverting a portion of the lucrative silk trade for the growingmarkets inEurope from the transit route through theOttoman Empire to the northernroute via Astrakhan. For Iran this had the advantage of lessening itsdependence onthe Ottomans, with whom tensions were again rising after a long period of peace.

Dwindling exports through the Persian Gulf made the Russian alternative seemattractive as well. Moscow had its eye on the revenue that expanded trade wouldchannel into the state treasury, but had broader aims as well. New Ottoman foraysin southeastern Europe sharpened Russia's anti-Turkish instincts and motivated theRomanovs to renew their attempts to include Safavid Iran in a strong anti-Turkishcoalition. The Russian attempt to isolate the Ottoman Empire politically as well ascommercially culminated in 1667 in the signing of the treaty of Androsovo withPoland, which gave the Poles transit rights through Russia in exchange forcooperation against the Ottomans. Similar incentives underlay Moscow'sovertures toward Iran.75

New Russian efforts to solidify political and commercial links with the Safavidsare reflected in the appearance in Iran of a number of ambassadors and envoys in the1650's and 1660's. In 1654 the Russian ambassador Lobanov-Rostovskii visitedIsfahan with a suite of 200 to 300 persons and as many camel loads of furs and othervaluable merchandise and gifts. His ostensible goal was to conclude a lasting peacewith the Safavids and to negotiate the conditions for silk trade between the twocountries.76 In 1664 F. I.Miloslavskii led a Russian embassy to Iran accompaniedby a suite of 350 people and some prominent merchants, who brought with themsables, cloth, gold, silver, and copper to a total value of 76,749 rubles.77 Thismission's principal aim was reportedly to secure free trade and to obtain permissionto build a factory on the Caspian Sea.78 The French travelers De Thevenot andChardin asserted that the mission was treated badly by Shah 'Abbas II.79 Aninitially friendly reception apparently turned sour after the Iranians discovered thatthe embassy was just a trading mission in diplomatic disguise. The Iranians alsoseem to have been appalled by the Russians' uncouthness. The mission's requestfor the cession of Georgia following the marriage between the tsar's son and thedaughter of the ruler of Georgia was rejected by the Safavid authorities, who alsorefused the proposal for free trade when they learned that the Russian intended tobuild a military fortress instead of a trading post on the Caspian shores. TheRussian ambassador died shortly after he received an audience from the shah, and thesecond envoy had to return in vain.80

Despite the failure of the 1664 mission as a diplomatic overture, it did serve as aprelude to a reopening of borders and marked the beginning of amore regulated andactive silk trade between Iran and Russia. The most forceful impetus behind thiswas semi-private in nature and came from the Armenian merchant community in


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Iran. Itwas not the convenience or the safety of theRussia route which caused achange in the Armenian attitude toward the northern trade route in the 1660's.True, the route was shorter than themaritime itinerary but, as Armenian merchantsnoted, itwas plagued by high tolls and poor security and therefore hardly preferableover the Ottoman route.81 Yet, similarly high tolls and a growing number ofrobberies in Ottoman territory as well as the threat of renewed war between theOttomans and the Safavids made the Julfans inclined to seek an alternative outlet fortheir silk trade.82 Trade with Russia also benefited from the negative effect of theTurco-Venetian conflict known as the Candia wars (1645-1669) on the commercebetween Iran and the Levant.83

The Armenians in 1659 sent a delegation representing the Julfa merchant housestoRussia and led by Zakhariya Shahrimanean with the aim of convincing the tsar ofthe advantage of closer trade links with Iran. While the precise standing of thismission remains obscure, it appears that its representatives behaved in Russia asquasi-official merchants, and were treated as such inMoscow. The richness of thegifts they presented to the tsar reflects the interest among the Julfans inRussia as atransit route but may also be interpreted as an attempt on the part of the Armeniansto emphasize the fact that they were not just royal merchants but operated as privateentrepreneurs as well.84

Strengthened in their motivation to turn toRussia by the outbreak in 1665 of anew round in the Turco-Venetian war, the Julfa Armenians, led by StefanRamadanskii and Grigorii Lusikents, in 1666 engaged in talks with Tsar AlexisMikhailovich. The 1666 mission resulted a year later in an agreement betweenRussia and the Julfans, who may have presented themselves as a regular tradingcompany in Moscow in order to gain status and legitimacy.85 The agreementallowed for toll-free trade by Russians in Safavid territory. In return, Armenianmerchants received permission to conduct their trade in all of Russia in addition toacquiring amonopoly of the transportation of silk toAstrakhan and beyond. Asidefrom transportation taxes, they were required to pay a 5 percent ad-valorem toll in

Astrakhan, Moscow, and Arkhangelsk.86The short-term consequences of this agreement were negligible as trade linkswere severely disrupted by the turmoil resulting from Cossack raids led by Sten'kaRazin in the period between 1666 and 1668. Many Armenian merchants who hadvested interests in the Ottoman trade also did not respond to the plan to redirect thetrade. The 1667 treaty thus remained a dead letter for some time. However,interest in the northern route did not disappear on the part of either the Safavids, theRussians, or the Armenian merchants. In 1670 English agents sent by the Russiancourt arrived in Isfahan to inquire about the possibility of having all Iranian silk sentvia Russia. The Iranians, who were not disinclined toward the idea, sent the onesurviving member of the mission back toMoscow with the task of enquiring aboutthe precise nature of the Russian requests.87This contact was followed up in 1672 when the Julfans sent Grigorii LusikentstoMoscow as head of an embassy charged with the confirmation or renewal of the1667 treaty. The outcome of thismission, a new treaty thatwas concluded in 1673,showed the effects of pressure exerted by Russian merchants who feared competitionin their lucrative transit trade which yielded them profits of up to 50 percent on silkbought inAstrakhan and sold inMoscow and Arkhangelsk. The Russians used thefrequent incidence of robberies and oppression of Russian merchants in Iran as a


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pretext to curtail the right of Armenians to carry transit goods through Russia.They were no longer allowed to transport merchandise beyond Astrakhan andMoscow. They could only carry silk in transit if it could not be sold inRussia, andsilk transshipped through Russia could only be sold to countries with which Russiawas at peace. They also needed special permission to leave Russian soil. Inreturn for the rights they did receive, the Armenian merchants promised that theywould henceforth transport Iranian silk only via Russia.88

V. The aftermathNot surprisingly, the 1673 treaty with its new restrictions on Armenian transittrade led to an immediate slump in the transit of silk. Thus only twenty-four puds

(ca. 390 kg.) appears to have been transported to Russia in 1673, followed by lessthan 100 (1,630 kg.) the next year.89Nevertheless, Moscow had not given up on its efforts tomaximize silk deliveriesfrom Iran. Clear proof of that is the fact that in 1675 the tsar created the post ofofficial silk factor, no doubt "in response to what was expected to be a massive

expansion of the silk trade [with Iran] ."90 A year later the Russians followed up onthis by agreeing to restore most of theArmenian transit rights. Once again politicalconsiderations contributed toMoscow's decision to revise its commercial policy.The context this time was a Dutch attempt to gain transit rights, but the realmotivation was Russia's renewed need for Iranian assistance in the face of Ottomanthreats and the loss of Poland as an ally. The Dutch sent an embassy led byKoenraad van Klenck as ambassador toMoscow. Tsar Alexis rejected the Dutchrequest for unrestricted trade inRussia with eastern merchants but, faced with fallingcommercial receipts, he did heed Van Klenk's solicitations by allowing the Dutch totrade with Armenians inArkhangelsk in return for the understanding that Russianmerchants and the state treasury would get a share in the turnover and the proceeds.Protest by Russian merchants did not prevail this time: the Armenian merchantsregained their transit rights, even if they were no longer unrestricted.91

Mutual Russo-Armenian interest in strengthening their cooperation did not endthere. In 1679 theArmenians, eager to inflate their trading capabilities, committedthemselves to an immediate annual export figure of 48,000 puds (ca. 762,500 kg. ormore than 8,000 bales) of Iranian silk.92 The Russians, in turn, in 1689 expressedtheir continuing support for the Armenian enterprise by prohibiting all Westernmerchants from engaging in transit trade that excluded Julfa Armenians. In theeast, Indian, Bukharan, and Iranian merchants, were prohibited from travelingbeyond Astrakhan. Here, too, the Armenians were exempted.93 Russia, at thispoint ruled by Tsar Peter I,was not only anxious to prevent theTurkish cities frombecoming exclusive entrep?ts for Iranian commerce, but also became increasinglyinterested in raw materials, as opposed to luxury goods, for its incipientmanufacturing industry.94While Moscow's inclusion of the Julfa merchant firms in its commercial effortssuggests a clear desire to support an expanding silk trade with Iran, thecorresponding role of the Iranian authorities is less clear. There are indications thatShah Solayman's grand vizier Shaykh 'Ali Khan in the 1670's conducted a policy ofprivileging Russian diplomatic and commercial representatives over those of the


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West European trading nations. Aside from a customary Safavid policy ofbalancing various foreign competitors, this policy may have been motivated by adesire to find an alternative outlet for Iran's silk to the Persian Gulf itinerary.Active support of trade links with Russia is further attested for the period of ShahSoltan Hosayn (r. 1694-1722). The Russian scholar Kukanova has argued that thisSafavid ruler was intent on opening up a transit route for Iranian silk in the earlyeighteenth century.95 Her colleague Bushev, on the other hand, contests this andclaims that the shah's only goal was to secure transport rights toEurope in case pricesoffered inRussia were too low.96 This is indeed what happened to themerchantswho accompanied Mohammad Hosayn Khan Beg in 1691 -1692. One of them, AgaKarim, who carried forty-five bales of

raw silk and a certain volume of manufacturedsilk from Tabriz and Shamakhi, requested and obtained the right to transship hiswares to Western Europe after the prices offered for them were not to hissatisfaction.97

The restoration of Armenian rights heralded the intensification of thecommercial exchange between Iran and Russia. Continuing Russian merchantopposition notwithstanding, Armenians began to travel to Arkhangelsk on theWhite Sea and as of 1686 followed the shorter route to Western Europe viaNovgorod.98 A shorter route and safer roads also helped make the Russian transitroute to Europe an attractive alternative to the route through Turkey, the easternstretch of which was increasingly beset with security problems in the late 1600S.The result of these various factors was a great expansion of trade via theCaspian andVolga itinerary in the last third of the seventeenth and the early years of theeighteenth century.99 The growing penetration of Russian and Indian merchants inAzerbaijan as well as the increasing presence of Armenian merchants in Russiancities on the trade route to theNorth bear witness to this.100 Armenian merchants,unhappy with the inconvenient outlet of Arkhangelsk, further explored alternativesto this northern route. In 1692 a delegation of Juif an merchants went from NewJulfa to the court of Sweden to open up the trade route through the Baltic ports.This contact and the embassy led by Philip of Zagly in 1696 resulted in aproclamation by the duke of Livonia, Courland, and Semgalen, establishing traderelations with Iran.101

The wares brought toRussia by Armenian merchants consisted of more than justraw silk; they included large quantities of Indian cloth, taffetas, morocco leather,embroidered silk manufactured in Isfahan and Kashan, and precious stones.102Silk, however, comprised the bulk of the Armenian trade, as the few available figuresillustrate. Grigorii Lusikents' above-mentioned proposal to Tsar Mikhailovich totransport each year 8,000 bales of silk toWestern Europe via Russia may have beenbased on exaggerated claims ? given an annual Iranian silk yield of at most10,000 bales ? but it nevertheless suggests the potential of Iranian silk exportsthrough Russia. The actual volume continued to be much lower, however, even ifit increased over time. Whereas in 1674, the year after restrictions on Armeniantraders were issued, less than 1,600 kg. of silk were imported from Iran,103Armenian merchants in 1676 moved 1,170 puds (ca. 19,000 kg. or 210 bales) ofIranian silk through Arkhangelsk, while in 1690 they transported 1,305 puds(ca. 21,000 kg. or 230 bales), and in 1691 1,107 (ca. 18,000 kg., or 200 bales; via

Novgorod), a volume that doubled to 2,232 puds (ca. 36,300 kg. or 400 bales) in1695.104


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Despite this incontrovertible expansion, the volume of silk involved should notbe overestimated, at least not when compared to the quantities that continued to betransported elsewhere. The Armenians naturally took advantage of theopportunities offered to them, but failed to live up to their earlier commitment totransport all their silk through Russia. The Russian and Iranian inability to alter thissituation became clear in 1692 when Moscow complained about the Armenianbehavior to the Safavid ambassador Mohammad Hosayn Khan Beg. With thecomplaint came a firm request for compliance with the arrangement. However, nochange was ever effected in the direction of the bulk of Armenian silk. In alllikelihood the Safavid authorities never pressed theArmenians to follow up on thearrangement. Itmay additionally be surmised that, even if the Safavid authoritieshad wished to persuade the Armenians to comply, they would not have been able todo so.105

In purely commercial tenus, it appears that the trade between Iran and Russiawas vital neither to Iran or Russia nor, for thatmatter, to the Armenians.106 Thelatter in particular were not really interested in completely redirecting their tradefrom the Levant route, where they enjoyed the advantage of free trade, to the Russianroute, where they continued to be faced with restrictions on their movements andactivities.107 The volume of silk transports via theVolga route continued to be highin the early eighteenth century, and may at times have been higher than the figuresgiven here,108 but the Russians never succeeded in their goal of diverting the bulkof the trade away from the Ottoman route. Whereas the annual volume of silktransported via the northern itinerary rarely exceeded 400 bales, the quantitiescarried via the Levant continued to average at least ten times that number.

ConclusionRelations between Iran and Russia go back to pre-Islamic times, but were

private, informal, and intermittent well beyond theMongol domination of bothrealms. It was only with the emergence of the state of Muscovy in Russia and theestablishment of Safavid rule in Iran that the proper conditions emerged for moreregularized and continuous political and commercial interaction. Both wereexpansionist states which gradually incorporated the vast territory that separatedthem. The annexation and pacification of these hitherto savage lands created theenvironment of security that was indispensable for regular commercial exchange.In addition, the centralizing tendencies of both these early modern states included adesire to control and regulate commerce. Their attitude toward commerce, fiscal innature inasmuch as itwas inspired by a need for revenue, but not wholly devoid ofmercantilist overtones, favored the managed expansion of commercial links. Allthis is manifest in the gradual shift in the sixteenth century from what began as apurely "private" commercial enterprise toward a heavy involvement of the state.The latterS appropriation of the exchange of goods extended as far as a

monopolization of certain politically sensitive and strategically important goods.Although the preponderance of extant sources on state-directed trade is bound tocreate a distorted picture, it is nevertheless quite likely that long-distance tradebetween Iran and Russia was often, if not mostly, conducted in conjunction with

diplomatic traffic. This appears particularly true for the reign of Shah 'Abbas I,


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whose energy inharnessing trade for the benefit of the royal treasury earned him thesobriquet of being the country's biggest merchant in the country by foreignobservers.109 Although silk seems to have played a minor role in the relations,which revolved mostly around the "restricted" wares coveted by both courts, raw silkand manufactured silk goods were not altogether absent from Iran's export list in thisperiod.It is clear that 'Abbas's interest in establishing trade relations with Russia wasshared by the Russian rulers. It is equally clear, however, that what really broughtthe two countries together and sustained their relationship was a common interest inkeeping the Ottoman Turks at bay. More than economic imperatives, itwas theinternational political constellation, taking its cue above all from theOttoman threatand the resulting fluctuation of the pattern of political and military alliances betweenstates, which determined the various stages in the official commercial relationsbetween Moscow and Isfahan. In fact, throughout the seventeenth centurydecisions and agreements were never motivated by purely commercialconsiderations. While Shah 'Abbas valued trade relations with his northernneighbor, political motives involving the Ottoman question and the dominance of theCaucasian lands continued to inform his relationship with Moscow ? a relationshipwhich he evidently considered a means rather than an end in his overall politicalstrategy. Moscow was similarly concerned with the Turkish threat and in itspolitical actions driven by its own Caucasian ambitions, but internal problemscaused it to operate from a weaker position. The inequality is reflected in thegreater eagerness of Moscow to continue diplomatic and commercial relations withits southern neighbor, which never seems to have been intent on concluding an actualanti-Turkish treaty with Moscow and could therefore afford to display a degree ofindifference bordering on arrogance toward the Russians.The weight of politics continued to bear on Russo-Iranian economic relationsthroughout the seventeenth century. This persisting element notwithstanding,various phases marking important changes can be discerned in the relationshipbetween Russia and Iran. Thus 'Abbas's death in 1629 loosened Safavid state controlover external trade and ended a phase of intense political maneuvering and alliancemaking that

had followed this ruler's search for themost advantageous commercialoutlet. The Ottoman-Safavid peace of 1639 further relaxed the political hold overrelations as it removed theOttoman issue as an urgent issue. Following these eventsIsfahan's interest incontinuing themomentum of diplomatic and commercial relationsbegan to fall even further behind thatof Moscow. All this is reflected in a diminishingfrequency of diplomatic traffic between the courts ofMoscow and Isfahan.As politics waned, the economic and the non-official importance of therelationship grew. The role of the very same private merchants who had dominatedtrade before the intrusion of the state, appears to have increased, as is evidenced inthe greater numbers of Russian merchants visiting Iran. Henceforth attempts toredirect trade flows involved joint efforts of state and private enterprise. A formal"bilateral" trade agreement, a long-standing desideratum of above all the Russians,was never concluded. Instead, the Russians in 1667 granted concessions to theJulfan Armenians who operated ambiguously as private merchants and as semiofficial representatives of the Safavid court. Russian mercantilism was clearlyvisible in thismove, which was temporarily rescinded under pressure from Russian

merchants, but reinstated inmodified and restricted form shortly thereafter.


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For theRussians the agreement signified managed trade and guaranteed income,and, increasingly in the period of Tsar Peter, a supply of rawmaterial for an emergingdomestic manufacturing industry. For their part the Iranian Armenians acquired analternative outlet for the silk they transported to European markets in greatquantities. Having the option of an alternative that lessened their dependence onthe Anatolian land route appears to have been more important to them than actuallyusing it to the full. Despite promises to that effect, they never redirected their entiresilk trade through Russia, nor do they seem to have been ever intent on doing so.The quantity of Iranian silk transported via theRussian transit trade greatly increasedfollowing the agreements of 1667 and 1673. The new figures compensated in partfor the falling volume shipped via the Persian Gulf, but never even remotely reachedthe volume that continued to be earned across Anatolia to the ports of the Levant.

University of Delaware, Newark, 1994.

1. For the diplomatic dimension of the relationship, see Rudi Matt li?e, "Anti-Osmaanse allianties enKaukasische belangen: diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen Safavidisch Iran en Moscovitisch Rusland(1550-1639)," Sharqiyy?t, 5 (1994): 1-21.2. The terms latitudinal and longitudinal are used by W.E.D. Allen, Problems of Turkish power in thesixteenth century (London, 1963): 39.3. Wilhelm Heyd, Geschichte des Levantehandels imMittelalter, 2 vols (Stuttgart, 1879), I: 65ff.;Elisabeth Bennigsen, "Contribution ? l'?tude du commerce des fourrures russes: la route de laVolga avantl'invasion mongole et le royaume des Bulghars," CMRS, XIX, 4 (1978): 385; and Maryta Esp?ronnier,"Les ?changes commerciaux entre lemonde musulman et les pays slaves d'apr?s les sources musulmanes

m?di?vales," Cahiers de Civilisation m?di?vale, 89 (1980): 18.4. Hans Wilhelm Haussig, Die Geschichte Zentralasiens und der Seidenstrasse in islamischer Zeit(Darmstadt, 1988): 25,170. Two other routes were used to reach the Byzantine Empire. One followedthe course of the Kuban river and reached Byzantine territory across the Caucasian passes into Georgia.The other was the coastal route along the Black Sea from Tamatarkha toTrabzon.5. Ibid.

6. W. Heyd, op.cit., I: 53-54, 69 ff.; H. A. Manandian, TJte ancient trade and cities of Armenia inrelation to the ancient world trade (Lisbon, 1965): 135.7. ?. Bennigsen, art. cit.: 388.8. P.P. Bushev, Istoriia posolstv i diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii russkogo i iranskogo gosudarstv v1586-1612 gg. (Moscow, 1976): 32.9. Janet Martin, "The land of darkness and the Golden Horde: The fur trade under theMongols XIIIXlVth centuries," CMRS, XIX, 4 (1978): 403.10. For this trade, see G.I. Bratianu, Recherches sur le commerce g?nois dans la mer Noire auxuf si?cle (Paris, 1929) and Robert-Henri Bautier, "Les relations ?conomiques des Occidentaux avec les

pays d'Orient auMoyen ?ge: points de vue et documents," inMichel Mollat, ed., Soci?t?s et compagniesde commerce en Orient et dam l'oc?an Indien (Paris, 1970) :280-286. Commercial activity in the capitalof the Golden Horde is described by John de Plano Carpini, Hie texts and versions of John de PlanoCarpini and William de Rubruquis, ed. C. Raymond Beazley (London, 1903): 153, 194. This last sourcealso notes the existence of traffic in silk from China and Iran to Russia.

11. For details, see J.Martin, "Muscovite relations with the Khanates of Kazan' and the Crimea (1460to 1521)," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 17 (1983): 435-453.12. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 36.13. See the observations of Ambrosio Contarini about the Volga route in the late fifteenth century, inTravels in Tana and Persia byJosafa B?rbaro and Ambrogio Contarini, trans.W. Thomas and S.A. Roy;ed. Lord Stanley of Alderley (London, 1873): 151-154; and Anthony Jenkinson's reference to the utter lackof victuals between Astrakhan and Kazan' about a century later, in Richard Hakluyt, The principal

navigations voyages traffiques & discoveries of theEnglish nation, 12 vols (Glasgow, 1903-1905), II: 478.


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14. A.Contarini, op. dr.: 151.15. E.S. Zevakin, "Persidskii vopros v russko-evropeiskikh otnosheniiakh XVII v.," Istoricheskie

zapiski, 8 (1940): 157.16. For this commercial blockade, see Halil Inalcik, "Osmanli Imperatorlugunun kurulu? ve inkisafidevrinde T?rkiye'nin iktisad? vaziyeti ?zerinde bir tektik m?nasebetiyle," Belleten, 15 (1951): 661-676;and Jean-Louis Bacqu?-Grammont, "?tudes safavides I, Notes sur le blocus du commerce iranien parSelim 1er," Turcica, 6 (1975): 66-88; and id., "Notes sur une saisie de soies d'Iran en 1518," ibid., 8(1976): 237-253.17. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 40.

18. See Hennann Kellenbenz, "Der nissische Transithandel mit dem Orient im 17. und zu Beginn des18. Jahrhunderts," Jahrb?cher?r Geschichte Osteuropas, N.S., 12 (1964-1965): 483.19. See T.S. Willan, Wie Muscovy merchants of 1555 (Manchester, 1959): 30-33, for the overallendeavor; and E. Delmar Morgan and C.H. Coote, eds, Early voyages and travels to Russia and Persia,2 vols (London, 1886).20. M.V. Fekliner, Torgovlia russkogo gosudarstva so stranami vostoka v XVIveke (Moscow, 1956):27; John Cartwright, in Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus posthumus or Purchas His pilgrimes, 20 vols(Glasgow, 1905-1907),VIII: 507.21. M.V. Fekhner, op. cit.: 45-46; H. Kellenbenz, "Marchands en Russie aux xvi^-xvin6 si?cles,"

part 1,CMRS, XI, 4 (1970): 585.22. See Varatan Gregorian, "Minorities in Isfahan: The Armenian community of Isfahan 1587-1722,"Iranian Studies, 1 (1974): 662.23. See M.V. Fekhner, op. cit.: 52ff., and 79-80 for the exchange of goods in both directions.24. See E. Delmar Morgan and C.H. Coote, eds, op. cit., I: 59; and R. Hakluyt, op. cit., II: 456.25. E. Delmar Morgan and C.H. Coote, eds, op. cit.: 79-80.26. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 42. See also E. Delmar-Morgan and C.H. Coote, eds, op. cit., II: 125-126.27. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 45.28. J. Martin, "Muscovite travelling merchants: The trade with the Muslim East (15th and 16th

centuries)," Central Asian Survey, 4 (1985): 29, 31, 34-35.29. M.V Fekhner, op. cit.: 102-104.30. Ibid.: 110.31. Ibid.: 61-62.32. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 61-62.33. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Les routes commerciales et militaires au Caucase du Nord auxxvie et xviie si?cles," Central Asian Survey, 4 (1985): 4.34. See Alexandre Bennigsen, "La pouss?e vers les mers chaudes et la barri?re du Caucase. Larivalit? ottomano-moscovite dans la seconde moiti? du xvie si?cle," Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 (1986):15-46. For the Russian contacts with the khanate of Bukhara, see M. lu. Iuldasev, K istorii torgovykh i

posol'skikh sviazei Srednei Azii s Rossiei v XVI-XVII w. (Tashkent, 1964): 47ff.35. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 35.36. Ibid.: 40. Qazvin was the Safavid capital in the second half of the sixteenth century.37. Ibid.: 43-44; A. Bennigsen, "L'exp?dition turque contre Astrakhan en 1569," CMRS, VIII, 3

(1967): 427-446; and H?l?ne Carr?re d'Encausse, "Les routes commerciales de l'Asie Centrale et lestentatives de reconqu?te d'Astrakhan," CMRS, XI, 3 (1970): 391-422.38. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 136ff., 149ff.

39. Ibid.: 111. Kaya probably does not refer to the name of the envoy who led the mission but ratherto his title. See W.E.D. Allen, ed., and Anthony Manog, trans., Russian embassies to the Georgian kings(1589-1605), 2 vols (London, 1970), II: 534.

40. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 202.4L Ibid.: 205-208; and id., "lranskii kuptsina kazim-Bek v Rossii, 1706-1709 gg.," in Iran (sbornik

statei) (Moscow, 1973): 167. The Iranian historian Mo'ezzi attributes Hajji Iskandar's inability to agreeto the difference in value to a lack of instructions from Shah *Abbas. See Najaf-qoli Hosayn Mo'ezzi,TSrikh-e rav?bet-e slyasl-ye Iran b?dony? (Tehran, 1326/1947-1948): 254.42. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 362ff. Information is lacking about the embassy's dealings in Iran or theresults achieved, but Bushev's hypothesis that the embassy may never have traveled beyond Astrakhanand was perhaps called back as itwas becoming clear that Shah 'Abbas was not going to sign a treaty afterall, has recently been proven wrong. Maria Szuppe, "Un marchand du roi de Pologne en Perse, 16011602," Moyen Orient et Oc?an Indien, 3 (1986): 90-91, demonstrates that the Zhirov-Zasekin embassydid reach Isfahan in 1601.

43. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 294-320.


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44. Ibid.: 217-229.45. Ibid.: 432-433; P.P. Bushev, art. cit.: 168.46. P.P. Bushev, op. cit.: 382-383.47. A chronicle of the Carmelites inPersia and the papal mission of the XVHth and XVIIIth centuries,2 vols (London, 1939)1: 114.48. Adam Olearius, Vermehrte Newe Beschreibung der Muscowitischen und Persischen Reyse

(Schleswig, 1656; repr. T?bingen, 1971): 443.49. P. P. Bushev, Istoriia posoVstv idiplomaticheskikh otnoshenii russkogo i iranskogo gosudarstv v1613-1621 gg. (Moscow, 1987): 44-45, 53.

50. P.P. Bushev, Istoriia posoVstv ...1586-1612, op. cit.: 339, 349.51. P.P. Bushev, Istoriia posoVstv ...1613-1621, op. cit.: 139.52. Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (hereafter ARA), VOC 852, Batavia to Persia, Aug. 14,1625,fol. 124; H. Dunlop, ed., Bronnen tot de Geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie inPerzi? 1611-1638(The Hague, 1930): 199.53. Ibid.: 306.

54. Paul Bushkovitch, Tlte merchants ofMoscow 1580-1650 (Cambridge, 1980): 96. The quantity isgiven as 4,440 ansyrs. The ansyr was a weight from Bukhara, which in the later seventeenth centuryequaled one pound.55. P. P. Bushev, "Posol'stvo V. G. Korob'ina i A. Kuvshinova v Iran v 1621-1624 gg.," in Iran:Ekonomika. Istoriia. Istoriograflia. Literatura (sbornik statei) (Moscow, 1976): 126-128.56. See Fedot Kotov, Khozhdenie kuptsa Fedota Kotova v Persiyu, ed. and trans. N.A. Kuznetsova(Moscow, 1958).

57. H.Dunlop, ed., op. cit.: 60.58. 7/vVy.: 191.59. See P.P.Bushev, "Iranskii kuptsina...," art. cit.: 169; id., Istoriia posoVstv ...1613-1621, op. cit.:

203-204; id., "Posol'stvo Korob'ina...," art. cit.: 146-150; F. Kotov, op. cit., introduction: 11.60. A.Olearius, op. cit.:. 444.61. Evliya Efendi, Narrative of travels inEurope, Asia, and Africa in the seventeenth century, trans.

Joseph von Hammer, 2 vols (London, 1834; repr. New York-London, 1968), II: 160.62. H.Dunlop, ed., op. cit.: 424.63. Ibid.: 566.64. Ibid.: 528, 547, 564, 587, 590, 599, 612.65. V. A. Baiburtian, Armianskaia koloniia novoi DzhuVfy v XVII veke: roV novoi DzhuVfy v irano

evropeicheskikh politicheskikh i ekonomicheskikh sviaziakh (Erevan, 1969): 93-94.66. "Beskrivning av handelsf?rhallandena iRyssland, avfattad av Johan de Rodes," doc. 19 in ArturAttman et al, eds, Ekonomiska f?rbindelser mellan Sverige och Ryssland under 1600-talet. Dokumentur svenskaarkiv (Stockholm, 1978): 114.67. See E.S. Zevakin, art. cit. and Heinz Mattiesen, "Die Versuche zur Erschliessung einesHandelsweges Danzig-Kurland-Moskau-Asien, besonders f?r Seide," Jahrb?cher f?r GeschichteOsteuropas , 3 (1938): 533-569.68. E.S. Zevakin, "Persidskii vopros," art. cit.: 132.69. Ibid.: 153, 155; H. Dunlop, ed., op. cit.: 614.70. Ibid. :505. This is presumably the same embassy that ismentioned for 1045/1635-1636 by Abu THasan Qazvini, Fav?'idal-sqfav?yah, ed. Maryam Mir Ahmadi (Tehran, 1387/1988): 56.71. AR A, VOC 1162, Isfahan to Heren XVII, 4 May 1647, fol. 181. The Fav? 'id al-sqfavtyah, op.cit.: 68 (which is not a contemporary source) implausibly claims that this mission was in Isfahan in

1052/1642, which was the year of 'Abbas II's accession.72. See William Foster, ed., The English factories in India 1646-1650 (Oxford, 1914): 223.73. See Comelis Speelman, Journaal der reis van den gezant der O.L Compagnie Joan Cunaeus naarPerzi? in 1651-1652, ed. A. Hotz (Amsterdam, 1908): 152; and India Office Records (London),E/3/24/228, 10 Apr. 1654, inW. Foster, ed., The English factories in India 1651-1654 (Oxford, 1915):271. Speelman inMarch 1652 noted the presence

at the new year's celebration in Isfahan of two Russianenvoys, who had come to Iran "to sell their commodities." During his stay inMazandaran in early 1654,the EIC agent John Spiller met a Russian ambassador who was "accompanied with 250 or 300 Russians,and had as many camels for carryage of his present and luggage." According to the same source, some ofthe merchandise the envoy had brought was sold inGilan, while the rest was transported to Isfahan. Thismust have concerned the Lobanov-Rostovskii mission, mentioned in ARA, VOC 1203, Gamron toBatavia, 16May 1654. Qazvini, Fav? 'id al-safavfyah, op. cit. :68, only mentions 1063/1653 as the yearin which a Russian envoy was in Iran.


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74. P.P. Bushev, "Piiteshestvie iranskogo posol'stva Mokhammeda Khosein Khan-Beka v Moskvu v1690-1692 gg," Strany i narody Vostoka, 18 (1976): 135, 136-146.75. E.S.Zevakin, art. cit.: . 143-144, 147; N.G. Kukanova, "Rol' annianskogo kupechestva v razvitiirussko-iranskoi torgovli v poslednei treti XVII v.," Kratkie soobshcheniia Institu?a narodov Azii, 30(1961): 23.

76. ARA, VOC 1203, Gamron to Batavia, 16May 1654; IOR, E/3/24/228,10 Apr. 1654, inW. Foster,ed., English factories... 1651-1654, op. cit.: 21 i.11. The goods and their value are noted by A. la. Shpakovskii, "Torgovlia moskovskoi Rusi s Perseiv XVI-XVII vv.," quoted inArtur Atmann, The Russian and Polish markets in international trade 15001650 (G?teborg, 1973): 190-191.78. ARA, VOC 1245, Gamron to Heren XVII, 9 Jan. 1665, fol. 366r.

79. Jean de Th?venot, Suite du Voyage de Levant (Paris, 1674): 202-204; Jean Chardin, Voyages duchevalier Chardin , en Perse, et autres lieux de l'Orient, ed. L. Langl?s, 10 vols and atlas (Paris, 1811),

X: 112ff. Chardin's claim that the bad treatment was the reason why, upon the shah's death, the tsarinstigated the Cossacks to invade Iran in 1667, may have been based on some mmor that circulated inIsfahan. The reputation of boorishness the Russians enjoyed among the Persians, mentioned by Chardin,must have been confirmed by the behavior of the envoys for, as the Dutch reported, the Russians refusedto dismount and had to be pulled off their horses when they were met by the shah. See ARA, VOC 1254,Gamron toHeren XVII, 9 Jan. 1665, fol. 366r quoted.

80. ARA, VOC 1245, Gamron toHeren XVII, 8Mar. 1665, fol. 468v. Earlier, theDutch reported thatthe diplomatic contact had resulted in the reopening of the borders between Iran and Russia. See ARA,VOC 1242, Gamron toHeren XVII, 20 June 1664, fol. 1090.

81. Parsamiian, Armiano-russkie otnosheniia v XVII veke (Erevan, 1953): 73, report in Armenian,quoted in Edmund M. Herzig, "The Armenian merchants of New Julfa, Isfahan: A study in pre-modernAsian trade," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1991: 103.

82. N.G.Kukanova, art. cit.: 23; E.S.Zevakin, art. cit.: 158.83. Maria Francesca Tiepolo, La Persia e la Repubblica di Venezia, (Tehran, 1973): XV84. N.G.Kukanova, art. cit.: 23-24. See also V.A.Baiburtian, op. cit.: 94-96; R. Gulbenkian,

"Philippe de Zagly, marchand arm?nien de Julfa et r?tablissement du commerce persan en Courlande en1696," Revue des ?tudes arm?niennes, new ser. 7 (1970): 361-399; and A.A.Rakhmani, Azerbaidzh?n v

kontse XVI iXVII vekov (Baku, 1981): 185; E.M. Herzig, op. cit.: 189-190, notes the ambiguity of theAnnenian position and suggests that their presentation of the so-called Diamond Throne may be seen asan effort to gain standing as private merchants. That they saw themselves as more than commercialrepresentatives of the Safavid niler is illustrated in their complaint in 1672 to the tsar that Iranianmerchants were in the habit of bribing the treasurer to have their wares classified as royal wares in orderto avoid having to pay tolls. See P.P. Bushev, "Iranskii kuptsina...," art. cit.: 169.85. E.M. Herzig, op. cit.: 192.86. See VA. Baiburtian, op. cit.: 99-100; K. K?vonian, "Marchands arm?niens au XVIIe si?cle. ?propos d'un livre arm?nien publi? ? Amsterdam en 1699," CMRS, XVI, 2 (1975): 213, 237.

87. ARA, VOC 1270, Gamron toHeren XVII, Apr. 24, 1670, fol. 693r-v.88. V.A.Baiburtian, op. cit.: 104-105; E.S. Zevakin, art. cit.: 159.89. VA. Baiburtian, op. cit.: 105.90. Samuel H. Baron, "Who were the gosti?" California Slavic Studies, 1 (1973): 14.91. V.A.Baiburtian, op. cit.: 107-108; E.S. Zevakin, art. cit.: 136, 160. The Dutch embassy is

described in Balthasar Coyet, Historisch Verhael of Beschryving van de Voyagie...van den HeereKoenraad van Klenk...aan Zyne Zaarsche Majesteyt van Moscovien... (Amsterdam, 1677).92. M. Kh. Geidarov, Remeslennoe proizvodsdvo v gorodakh Azerbaidzhana v XVII v. (Baku, 1967):49. The bales inwhich silk was packed and transported weighed approximately 200 lb. or 90 kg. each.93. K.A. Antonova et ai, eds, Russko-indiiskie otnosheniia v XVII v. (Moscow, 1958): 347 (doc. 242).

94. N. G. Kukanova, "Russkoe-iraaskie torgovye otnosheniia v kontse XVII-nachale XVIII v.,"Istoricheskie zapiski, 57 (1956): 232.95. Ibid.: 234.

96. P. P. Bushev, "Iranskoe posol'stvo Fazl Ali-Beka v Rossiiu (1711-1713 gg.)," Kratkiesoobshcheniia Instituto narodov Azii, 39 (1963): 42-43.97. P.P. Bushev, "Putesliestvie iranskogo posol'stva...," art. cit.: 166-169.98. E.S. Zevakin, art. cit.: 161.99. N.G. Kukanova, "Rol' annianskogo kupechestva...," art. cit.: 27-28.100. See A.A. Rakhmani, op. cit.: 179, and H.Kellenbenz, "Russische Transithandel...," art. cit.: 491.

A French missionary called late seventeenth-century Shamakhi a great commercial entrepot between Iran


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and Moscow, adding that the Indians, the greatest and richest merchants, numbered c. 200. See"M?moire de laprovince du Sirvan, en forme de Lettre adress?e au P?re Fleuriau," in Lettres ?difiantes etcurieuses ?crites des Missions ?trang?res. M?moires du Levant (Toulouse, new ed., 1810) 4: 27.101. See R. Gulbenkian, art. cit.

102. See Archives du minist?re des Affaires ?trang?res, Paris, A.E. Perse 5, "Memorandum on foreigntrade in Iran, 1718," fol. 188; and K.K?vonian, art. cit.: 205.103. VA. Baiburtian, op. cit.: 105.104. N.G. Kukanova, "Roi' annianskogo kupechestva...," art. cit.: 27; and id., Ocherki po istoriirussko-iranskikh torgovykh otnoshenii v XVII-pervoi polovine XIX veka (Saransk, 1977): 96.105. P.P. Bushev, "Puteshestvie iranskogo posol'stvo...," art. cit.: 162; VA. Baiburtian, op. cit.: 116119.106. Ibid.: 93-94.107. N.G.Kukanova, "Russkoe-iranskie torgovye otnosheniia...," art. cit.: 239.108. In 1712 Armenian merchants transported 2,660 puds (ca. 43,300 kg. or 475 bales) via Astrakhan.See N.G.Kukanova, Ocherki po istorii..., op cit.: 110.109. See R.W. Ferner, "An English view of Persian trade in 1618," Journal of the Economic and Social

History of theOrient, 19 (1976): 194; and Pietro delta Valle, Viaggi di Pietro della Valle, 2 vols (Brighton,1843), II: 41.

safavid silk trade and russia

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