Admin. LawDe Silva, Guevara, Sebastian

Form of Decision

• Section 14, Book VII, Administrative Code• In writing • shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law

on which it is based.

• Period to decide: The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them.

Publication

• Section 16 • Every agency shall publish and make available

for public inspection all decisions and final orders;

• Duty of records officer to prepare a compilation for the use by the public.

Authority to grant or impose• “Relief” includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance,

license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. Sec. 2(13) Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

• “Sanction” includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. Sec. 2(12) Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

Finality of decision

• Section 15• Decision shall become final and executory 15

days after the receipt of a copy by the party adversely affected UNLESS within that period, an administrative appeal or judicial review has been perfected.

• One motion for reconsideration is allowed.

Promulgation, Notice, Final decisions not reviewable

• Promulgation – delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.

• Notice – Parties to be notified personally or by mail.

• Final decisions not reviewable – non qieta movere.

Appeal in Contested Cases

• Section 19, 20, 21, 22• The decision of the agency shall become final and

executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected.

• One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period.

• No law allowing appeal= cannot appeal.

Administrative Review

• May be taken: - motu proprio; or

-by appeal of aggrieved party.

Finality of decisions of appellate agency

• Shall be final and executory 15 days after the receipt by the parties, UNLESS a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals within 15 days from receipt of the decision.

• Issue writ of execution of judgment.

Serrano v. PSC • The court ruled that the Public Service Commission’s denial of

Serrano’s application to operate a taxicab automobile service was incorrect. Quasi-judicial tribunals, including the Public Service Commission, should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. In Ang Tibay v. Court, the Court emphasized that an administrative tribunal possessed of quasi-judicial powers like the PSC is "free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements," but, it does not mean "that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirement of due process.”

Realty Exchange Venture Corporation v. Sendino

• The Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) challenged the authority of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to hear and decide the complaint filed by Sendino to compel the petitioner to continue with the sale of the house and lot with respondent as stipulated in their reservation agreement. The court held that HLURB has quasi-judicial functions, notwithstanding the absence of express grant by E.O. No. 90 which created it. The HLURB is the successor agency of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission's powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the power to "hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific performance." Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate.

DOH v. Camposano • The Health Secretary’s decision to dismiss the respondents was invalid.

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy. It is clear that administrative due process was not observed in this case. The decision of the Secretary should have contained a factual finding and legal assessment of the controversy to enable the respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desire.

Solid Homes Inc. v Laserna • The decision of the Office of the President, which merely adopted by

reference the Decision of the HLURB, without a recitation of the facts and law, on which it was based, is not against Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court ruled that the rights of parties in an administrative proceeding are not violated by the brevity of the decision rendered by the OP incorporating the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied such as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision.

• Section 14, Article VII of the Constitution applicable only to judicial proceedings.

III. Judicial Recourse

Primary Jurisdiction

• Definition– plaintiff should first seek relief in an administrative

proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court, even though the matter is properly presented to the court, which is within its jurisdiction.

• Suspension of Court Proceeding • Exceptions to application of doctrine.

Villaflor v CA • The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds

application in this case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior judicial determination, courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

Philippine Veterans Bank v CA • The court held that the Department of Agrarian Reform, not the Regional

Trial Courts, has jurisdiction over cases involving the determination of just compensation for the taking of lands under CARP. There is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s primary jurisdiction over “agrarian reform matters” and exclusive original jurisdiction over “all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,” which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the RTC’s “original and exclusive jurisdiction” over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to the landowner. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the court.

Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v CA • The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that it is the Bureau of Energy

Development (BED), not the civil courts, which has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc v The Province of Batangas

• The Court held that the Commission on Audit has the primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioner’s money claim against the Province of Batangas. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

• Definition– Recourse in the courts will not prosper until all

remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level. Within the administrative level, the law may provide for review of decisions by higher authorities.

– When a statute provides a system of administrative procedure for review, appeal, or reconsideration, the court will not entertain a case unless all the available administrative remedies have been used.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

• Effect of failure to exhaust remedies– does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.– Case may be dismissed for being premature and

for lack of cause of action.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

• Exceptions to application of doctrine– when public interest requires immediate court resolution;– where administrative act is a nullity;– where the administrative remedy is not adequate;– where judicial relief is required to prevent violence;– where agency acted with no jurisdiction;– where there is yet no administrative order;– where there is estoppel– where there is urgency or irreparable damage;– where qualified political agency doctrine applies (department secretaries are alter egos of the

President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter);– where issue is purely legal;– where administrative remedy is permissive;– where doctrine will result in nullification of claim;– in quo warranto cases;– where there is no law requiring remedies;– where agency has no jurisdiction.

Pascual v Provincial Board

• Pascual was• Mayor of Nueva Ecija• re-elected

3 administrative charges against

Pascual

• Maladministrative, Abuse of Authority, and Usurpartion of Judicial Function [CHARGE NO. 3}

• For accepting the criminal complaint filed in the court

As Justice of the Peace • Pascual filed motion to

dismiss • Wrongful acts alleged

were committed during his previous term in office

• Denied

Provincial Board

Pascual v Provincial Board • Pascual– Filed with SC to prohibit Provincial Board from taking cognizance of

CHARGE NO. 3• Denied

– Filed with CFI to inhibit the Board from hearing the case for lack of jurisdiction

• Provincial Board – Moved for dismissal• Ground: no cause of action

• CFI– Dismissed petition• Premature• Pascual should have first appealed to the Executive Secretary

Pascual v Provincial Board

• It was legally proper for petitioner-appellant to have come to court without first bringing his case to the Executive Secretary for review.

• Exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies– where the only question to be settled in the prohibition

proceedings is a purely legal one • whether or not a municipal mayor may be subjected to an

administrative investigation of a charge based on misconduct allegedly committed by him during his prior term.

Alzate v Aldana

R. A. No. 842

• Adjust salaries of Public School teachers• Adjustment of 4

grades for every five years of service

• One more grade for passing the examination for superintendent of Private School

Alzante

• Principal of High School in La Union

• Service for 24 years

• Salary was adjusted based only on years served as secondary principal (9 yrs. 8 mos. 15 days)

• Passing the test was also not considered.

• Appealed even before the ruling from the Bureau of Public School

• Filed mandamus proceeding in CFI

Alzate v Aldana

• The CFI of La Union is incorrect in dismissing the case for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

• Reason why petitioner filed: – urgency of preventing the automatic reversion as of

July 1, 1958, after the expiration of the fiscal year, of the sum appropriated in Republic Act No. 2042 for the adjustment of salary of public school officials and teachers pursuant to Republic Act No. 842.

Cipriano v Marcelino • The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be

disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage.

• To require the Cipriano to go all the way to the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of P949 would not only be oppressive but would be patently unreasonable.

• By the time her appeal shall have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total sum of her claim, would in all likelihood have been spent.

Paredes v CA

Public Respondent promulgated AO No 1 and 2Revising rules of practice before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT)

Increased fees payable to BPTTT and prohibited filing of multi-class applications

Petitioners, registered patent agentsFiled with CA to stop public respondents from enforcing the AOs and to declare certain provisions null and void

CA dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

Paredes v CA • Prohibition is not the proper remedy.

• Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.

• Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedies are available which is sufficient to afford redress.

Quasha v SEC

• The petitioners did not fail to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing their complaints with the court.

• In view of the limited time, and considering the issuance of the order denying injunctive relief only at the height of the Christmas holidays, petitioner properly filed directly with the Court without going through the prescribed procedure of filing before the SEC en banc within the 30-day reglementary period since such recourse would not be a plain, speed and adequate remedy.

Paat v CA

• A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings.

• Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

Republic v Sandiganbayan

PCGG issued separate sequestion orders against Sipalay Trading Corp. and Allied Banking Corp., allegedly part of Lucio Tan’s ill-gotten wealth2 separate petitions filed before the SCSC referred cases to Sandiganbayan

Petitions were jointly heardPCGG instead of submitting formal evidence in writing filed a Motion to Dismiss

Seven years after filing their original petition before the SC

PCGG argued that Sipalay and Allied should have first appealed before the Office of the President

PCGG Rules and Regulations

Republic v Sandiganbayan • The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the PCGG’s motion to

dismiss is proper. • Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies does not affect jurisdiction of the Court.

• The only effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it.

• PCGG is guilty of estoppel by laches.

Lopez v City of Manila• Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of

1991 requires the conduct of the general revision of real property. – not yet enforced in the City of Manila

• Memorandum Circular No. 04-95 from the Bureau of Local Government Finance– City Assessor began the process of general revision based on the updated fair market

values of the real properties.– enacted City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894• tax on the land owned by the petitioner was increased.• Filed for its nullity as it is “unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.”

– Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect thereafter, reducing by fifty percent (50%) the assessment levels .

• Case still proceeded– The trial court dismissed the case for failure of the petitioner to exhaust administrative

remedies

Lopez v City of Manila• As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against

the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.

• This case does not fall within the exceptions to the rule.

DAR v Apex Investment and Financing Corp

Pursuant to RA 6657, compulsory acquisition proceedings over several lots owned by respondent were initiated by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO).

Respondent denied having received the Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition. They learned of a lot having been placed under compulsory acquisition from “Balita.” They filed a Protest.

Only after more than one year from said Protest was it forwarded to the DAR. In the meantime, respondent’s title had been cancelled and a new one issued to another

Respondent filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA.

DAR v Apex Investment and Financing Corp

• In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that the aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process.

• Respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention.

Smart Communication, Inc. v NTC

National Telecommunications Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars on the billing of telecommunications services and on measures in minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone unit.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel) filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods.Jurisdiction belongs to the DTI• under the Consumer Acts of the Philippines.

Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention.

Smart Communication, Inc v NTC

• In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.

• The principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

Smart Communication, Inc v NTC

• In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held:

– The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.

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