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VOL. I, NO. 2 WINTER 2005

www.the-american-interest.comA Review of Policy, Politics & Culture

US $8.95 CAN $12.50€7.00 / ¥990

12 CHF 80 SEK

George W. Bush and theProtestant Deformation

James Kurth

The Twilight of Unipolarity

Coral Bell

THE FUTURE OF PREEMPTION

ALAN GREENSPAN’SINFLATED LEGACY

SEN. BILL FRIST ON A U.S. GLOBAL HEALTH CORPS

THE FUTURE OF PREEMPTION

ALAN GREENSPAN’SINFLATED LEGACY

SEN. BILL FRIST ON A U.S. GLOBAL HEALTH CORPS

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2 The American Interest

CONTENTSTHE AMERICAN INTEREST • VOLUME I, NUMBER 2 (WINTER 2005)

strategy and policy

4 The Protestant Deformationby James Kurth

The dominant Protestant worldview of American society shapes U.S.

foreign policy—and always has.

18 The Twilight of the Unipolar Worldby Coral Bell

The American moment is ending as power shifts to Asia and other

climes. A new global concert must be built.

30 The Future of Preemptionby Ivo Daalder & James Steinberg

Preemption against 21st-century threats is justified and necessary. It

may be time, therefore, to move beyond the UN Charter.

toolbox I

40 Creating a U.S. Global Health Corpsby Senator Bill Frist

money matters

44 The Amazing Bubble-Manby Peter Hartcher

Alan Greenspan leaves the Federal Reserve with the status of a near

deity. It is a status that is undeserved.

54 Debating the Future of the U.S. EconomyAllen Sinai & Philip Merrill

A respected economist and a successful businessman square off over

the U.S. economy.

68 Trade Talkby Daniel Drezner

Trade liberalization has become a hard sell in Washington. Only

strong presidential leadership will get U.S. policy back on track.

4

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theamericaninterest

Highlight

Winter 2005 3

toolbox II77 Making the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal Work

by Lawrence Korb & Peter Ogden

lighter fare82 Food for Thought

A Capital Guide to Breakfast by Martin Walker

Mr. Epstein Regrets by Joseph Epstein

The Lost Supper by Frank Moorhouse

94 For Amusement Onlyby Chris Rasmussen

No pop-culture artifact says “America” better than the pinball machine.

reviews105 America’s Critic...Right or Wrong

by Michael McDonald

Edmund Wilson was a man of immense erudition, and many quirks.

Few biographers can hope to do him justice; his most recent one hasn’t.

115 Retroview I: Garden or Wilderness?by Thomas Hughes

Leo Marx’s strikingly original account of how 19th-century Americans

tried to refashion the pastoral ideal still resonates.

121 Immigration, Civic Culture and Liberal Orderby Camille Pecastaing

A French-born observer examines two new books on immigration and

the challenges of American civic nationalism.

128 Retroview II: The Strange Journey of a Bad Idea by Neil McInnes

The Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt authored a political philosophy that

retains appeal in some surprising places.

letters & notes138 Letters from Robert Stavins, S. Fred Singer, Ian Parry, Senator Joseph

Lieberman and Roger Carstens

141 A Winter Note: Captive Audienceby Michelle High

A long-forgotten Korean War POW debacle sheds light on the perils

of military detention.

94

105


TRADE TALK– BY DANIEL DREZNER

American perceptions about inter-national trade have changed dra-matically in the past two decades.

Presidents can no longer craft positions onforeign economic policy in a vacuum.Trade now intersects with other highlypoliticized issues, ranging from the war onterror to environmental protection tobilateral relations with China. Old issuessuch as the trade deficit and new issuessuch as offshore outsourcing have made aliberal trade policy one of the most diffi-cult political sells inside the Beltway.

Indeed, shifts in domestic attitudes have cre-ated the least hospitable environment fortrade liberalization in recent memory.Unfortunately, this inhospitable environ-ment has arisen at a time when trade is morevital to the U.S. economy than ever. Thechallenge for this President and for thosewho succeed him will be to reinvigorate U.S.trade policies despite the current publicmood. In short, it is the challenge to lead.

The first thing any president must do to leadeffectively on economic issues is to persuadethe country that trade matters. This should

not be that hard, for trade manifestly doesmatter. In 1970 the sum of imports andexports accounted for less than 12 percent ofU.S. GDP; by 2004 that figure had doubledto 24 percent. Approximately one out ofevery five factory jobs in the United Statesdepends directly on trade. U.S. exportsaccounted for approximately 25 percent ofeconomic growth during the 1990s, support-ing an estimated 12 million jobs. U.S. farm-ers export the yield of one out of every threeacres of their crops. In 2003 the UnitedStates exported $180 billion in high-techgoods and more than $280 billion in com-mercial services. From agriculture to manu-facturing to technology to services, the U.S.economy needs international trade to thrive.

Researchers at the Institute for InternationalEconomics recently attempted to measure thecumulative payoff from trade liberalizationsince the end of World War II. Scott Bradford,Paul Grieco and Gary Hufbauer conservative-ly estimated that free trade generates econom-ic benefits ranging from $800 billion to $1.45trillion dollars per year in added output. Thistranslates into an added per capita benefit ofbetween $2,800 and $5,000—or, more con-

DANIEL DREZNER is assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago and author of U.S.

Trade Strategy: Choices and Consequences, to be published by the Council on Foreign Relations in December

2005. This article is adapted from a chapter of the book.

cretely, an addition of between $7,100 and$12,900 per American household. The gainsfrom future trade expansion have been esti-mated to range between $450 billion and $1.3trillion per year in additional national income,which would increase per capita annualincome between $1,500 and $2,000. Thereare few tools in the U.S. government’s policyarsenal that consistently yield rewards of thismagnitude.

Trade expansion brings several benefits tothe U.S. economy. It allows the UnitedStates to specialize in making the goods andservices in which it is most productive. Thebigger the market created by trade liberaliza-tion, the greater the benefits from specializa-tion. Trade also increases competition with-in economic sectors. Over the past decadeseconomists have repeatedly shown thatindustries exposed to trade are more produc-tive than sectors in which cross-border

exchange is limited or impossible. As avail-able markets expand, the rate of return fortechnological and organizational innova-tions increases. With freer trade, firms andentrepreneurs have a greater incentive totake risks and to invest in new inventionsand innovations.

These benefits also make it easier for theFederal Reserve to run a bullish monetarypolicy. An open market is a significant rea-son why the United States has been able inrecent years to sustain robust economicgrowth, dramatic increases in labor produc-tivity, low unemployment, modest inflationand historically low interest rates. The com-bination of these effects boosts the trajecto-ry of feasible economic growth without trig-gering inflation, which in turn has allowedthe Fed to pursue more expansionary mone-tary policies than would otherwise have beenpossible.

Winter 2005 69

Indian employees at a call center in Bangalore.

©Sherwin Crasto/Reuters–CORBIS


Trade is equally vital to American foreignpolicy. The regions of the world that haveembraced trade liberalization—NorthAmerica, Europe and East Asia—containpolitically stable regimes and, despite someproblems with radical Islamist minorities,make our best partners in the war on terror.The regions of the world with the most ten-uous connection to global markets—theMiddle East and Africa—are plagued byunstable regimes and remain hotbeds of ter-rorist and criminal activity. Trade is not a sil-ver bullet for U.S. foreign policy; manyother factors affect the rise of terrorism andpolitical instability. Nevertheless, trade is ahandmaiden to hope. It provides significantopportunity to individuals in poor coun-tries, offering a chance for a better life forthem and their children. Creating hopeamong people is a powerful long-termweapon in the war on terror.

Multiple economic analyses demonstrate thattrade promotes economic freedom and eco-nomic development. Trade will be essentialto advancing the Millennium DevelopmentGoals of halving global poverty by 2015.Exposure to the global economy correlatesstrongly with the spread of democracy, therule of law and the reduction of violence.

Over the long term, trade liberalization is awin-win proposition among countries andtherefore serves a useful purpose in pro-moting American interests and values.Most of the time, trade helps to reducefrictions between countries and serves asone of the most powerful tools of softpower at America’s disposal. Bilateral rela-tions have improved with every countrythat has signed a free-trade agreement(FTA) with the United States. If countriesperceive that the rules of the global eco-nomic game benefit all participants—andnot merely the United States—these coun-

tries will be more favorably disposedtoward the United States on other foreignpolicy dimensions.

Over the very long term, U.S.-led tradeexpansion can cement favorable percep-tions of the United States among risingpowers. Both the CIA and private sectoranalysts project that China and India willhave larger economies than most G-7members by 2050. Decades from now, itwould serve American interests if thesecountries looked upon the United States asa country that aided rather than impededtheir economic ascent. Trade liberalizationundertaken now serves as a down paymentfor good relations with rising great powersin the future.

our ambivalent Public

Despite these significant economicand diplomatic benefits, theAmerican public is increasingly

hostile to freer trade. Between 1999 and2004, public support for free trade droppedoff a precipice. The most dramatic shift inopinion came from Americans making morethan $100,000 a year: Support for promot-ing trade dropped from 57 percent to 28percent in this group. According to a July2004 poll jointly conducted by the PewResearch Center and the Council onForeign Relations, 84 percent of Americansthought that protecting the jobs ofAmerican workers should be a top priorityof American foreign policy. The samemonth, a poll conducted by the GermanMarshall Fund of the United States con-cluded that only 4 percent of Americans stillsupported NAFTA. Americans are also lessenthusiastic about further internationaltrade deals than are Europeans: 82 percentof the French and 83 percent of the British

want more international trade agreements,compared to just 54 percent of Americans.

Hostile attitudes toward trade liberalizationare even more concentrated when the focusturns to newer forms of trade, such as out-sourcing. In 2004 at least ten different sur-veys asked Americans how they felt aboutthe growing number of jobs being out-sourced overseas. The results were consis-tently and strongly negative. Depending onthe poll, between 61 and 85 percent ofrespondents agreed with the statement thatoutsourcing is bad for the American econo-my. Between 51 and 72 percent ofAmericans were even in favor of the govern-ment penalizing U.S. firms that engage inoutsourcing. In a Harris poll taken in Mayand June of 2004, 53 percent of Americanssaid U.S. companies engaging in outsourc-ing were “unpatriotic.” This hostilityremains consistent regardless of how respon-dents are categorized. A 2004 CFOMagazine survey of chief financial officersrevealed that 61 percent of them believedoutsourcing was bad for the economy, whilean April 2004 Gallup poll showed 66 per-cent of investors believed outsourcing washurting the investment climate in theUnited States.

Free traders assert that greater liberalizationwill always benefit the economy. The pollingdata reveal that most Americans do not buythe “always”, and instead believe in “fairtrade.” They believe that the expansion oftrade leads to an increase in economic inse-curity that outweighs any increase in nation-al income. A fair-trade doctrine recom-mends the use of safeguards, escape clausesand other legal protections to slow down theeconomic and social effects of import com-petition. Such views have become dominantin the United States over the past twodecades. But why?

The Iron Laws of TradePolitics

Three political facts of life havecaused many Americans to shifttheir support from free trade to fair

trade. First, during economic downturns orperiods of slack job growth, public suspicionof free-trade policies explodes into hostility.Inevitably, foreign countries become thescapegoat for business cycle fluctuations thathave little to do with trade. When presentedwith economic theories and statistical dataon the one hand showing that trade is goodfor the economy, and anecdotes of job lossesdue to import competition on the other,most Americans are swayed by the anec-dotes. There may be no discernible econom-ic correlation between trade and overallemployment, but many Americans believethere is one—a belief that policymakersignore at their peril.

Combine this with a massive trade deficitand the perception problem becomes evenmore acute. Most Americans think a largetrade deficit is bad for the economy, eventhough such deficits correlate positively withstrong economic growth. Indeed, the growthin the trade deficit since 1998 has beenaccompanied by strong GDP growth andexcellent productivity gains. Nevertheless,the U.S. trade deficit is projected to top $670billion this year—in absolute dollar terms,the largest trade deficit in world economichistory. In an uncertain economy, that num-ber will lead to greater public skepticismabout the merits of freer trade. To be sure,there are valid reasons to be concerned aboutthe size of the current account deficit, buteven those economists who voice such con-cerns do not recommend higher tariffs as theanswer.

The second reason American support for

Winter 2005 71


free trade has dropped is that it is particu-larly difficult to make the case for tradeexpansion during election cycles. Tradegenerates large, diffuse benefits but concen-trated—if smaller—costs. Those who bearthe costs are more likely to vote on theissue—and make campaign contributionsbased on it—than those who reap the ben-efits. In this situation, politicians willalways be tempted to engage in protection-ist rhetoric. The latest example of this camewhen politicians on both sides of the aisledemanded government action to halt out-sourcing. As election cycles continue tolengthen, this political temptation will onlyget stronger.

The third iron law of trade politics is thatboth advocates and opponents talk abouttrade in ways that simultaneously inflate itsimportance and frame the issue as a zero-sum proposition. Trade is both blamed andpraised for America’s various economicstrengths and ills, even though domesticfactors such as macroeconomic policy, stockmarket fluctuations and the pace of innova-tion are far more significant determinants ofAmerica’s overall economic performance.Politicians routinely address trade issues bydiscussing how changes in policy will affectthe trade deficit. The implicit understand-ing in their arguments is that it is better torun a trade surplus than a deficit, eventhough there is no economic data to sup-port that view. Debates about tradeinevitably revolve around the question ofjobs, even though trade has a minimal effecton aggregate employment levels.

We should be used to this by now. A decadeago, the political debate over NAFTA wasframed in terms of job creation and jobdestruction, despite the fact that every soberpolicy analysis concluded that NAFTAwould not significantly affect the employ-

ment picture in the United States one way orthe other. As a result, even politicians whoadvocate trade liberalization do so by focus-ing on increasing American exports anddownplaying imports. If politicians talkabout trade in a mercantilist, zero-sum way,Americans will be led to think about theissue this way as well.

New Constraints onTrade Politics

The next presidential election is threeyears away. The economy has creat-ed a net gain of nearly 2 million

new jobs in the past year, so the publicshould be more receptive to a discussion offree trade now than it was a year ago. Publicopinion polls, however, say otherwise. Partof the reason is that, in a world of high oilprices and frequent natural disasters, manyAmericans remain nervous about the state ofthe American economy. A bigger part of theproblem, however, is that new trade-relatedissues have made talking about trade policymore difficult than before. Even as the econ-omy continues to add jobs, there are soundreasons to believe that public antipathytoward trade liberalization will not abate. Ifanything, it will increase.

One new problem is that the percentage ofthe American economy exposed to interna-tional competition is on the rise. Over thenext decade, technological innovation willconvert what have been thought to be non-tradable sectors into tradable ones. Tradewill start to affect professions that have notchanged their practices all that much fordecades—fields such as accounting, medi-cine, education and law. This will increasethe number of Americans who perceivethemselves to be vulnerable to internationalcompetition and economic insecurity. This

insecurity is the driving force behind thegrowing hostility to free trade among theupper income brackets.

Another relatively new issue is the rise ofChina. Twenty years ago, there was a greatdeal of American hand-wringing at theprospect of Japan “overtaking” the U.S.economy. For realpolitik reasons, the currentfear of China’s economic rise will be worse.At least Japan was a stable democratic ally ofthe United States. China is neither demo-cratic nor an ally, and the jury is still outwith respect to its long-term stability.

Beijing has brought some of this enmity onitself. China’s central bank has increasinglyintervened in foreign exchange markets tomaintain the dollar’s strength against theyuan, even though China’s currency hasrisen in value compared to other major cur-rencies. In July 2005, China’s central bankannounced a slight devaluation against thedollar, with an intention to move to a man-aged float. However, Beijing has continuedto purchase dollars at an extraordinary rate,ensuring that the yuan will not appreciatesignificantly anytime soon. China’s interven-tions have exacerbated the U.S.-China tradedeficit: In 2004 the bilateral deficit was arecord $162 billion.

These practices—combined with China’shigh growth rate, the media firestorm overoutsourcing and a recent flurry of Chinesecorporate takeover efforts directed at U.S.firms—have created intense domestic pres-sures for some kind of retaliatory policy. InApril 2005, a bill was introduced in the U.S.Senate that threatens a 27.5 percent tariff onChinese goods unless Beijing revalues its cur-rency; the bill garnered a veto-proof majority.In May, the House of Representatives pro-posed a different piece of legislation to widenthe definition of exchange-rate manipulation

to include China as an offender. Many con-gressmen reacted negatively to the proposedtakeover of Unocal by the China NationalOffshore Oil Corporation, with the Housepassing a measure urging the President toblock the purchase on national securitygrounds. This congressional hostility helpedto scotch the proposed takeover.

China’s economic growth and aggressivetrade diplomacy also pose significant chal-lenges to the United States from a securityperspective. In 2004 China accounted for 31percent of global growth in the demand foroil. China’s energy diplomacy has led toambitious deals with authoritarian regimes

in Myanmar, Iran and Sudan, and has placedChina’s diplomacy in all three cases at log-gerheads with that of the United States.China’s growing interest in commercial rela-tions with other Pacific Rim countries con-trasts with U.S. regional policy, which prior-itizes the war on terror. At a fundamentallevel, even if the United States benefits fromthe bilateral trading relationship, Chinaappears to benefit more—and that couldclash with the stated National SecurityStrategy objective of “dissuad[ing] potentialadversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, thepower of the United States.”

The content of current trade negotiations hasalso made trade a tougher sell. World TradeOrganization negotiations have shifted muchof their focus away from tariff reduction toensuring that disparities in national regula-tions do not interfere with international

China’s energy diplomacy

has led to ambitious deals

with authoritarian regimes.

Winter 2005 73


trade. In large part this is due to the WTO’ssuccess at reducing border-level trade restric-tions. For most areas of merchandise trade(agricultural, textile and clothing productsexcepted), tariffs and quotas have been atnominal levels since completion of theUruguay Round in 1994. As for agricultureand textiles, liberalization of either sectorwill not be an easy sell. The end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement in January 2005 has led to“bra wars” between the developed world andChina, with the Bush Administration usingevery tool at its disposal to staunch the flowof textile imports. As for agriculture, the lackof progress in those negotiations now threat-ens to derail the upcoming WTO’sMinisterial Conference in Hong Kong.

Increasingly, trade negotiations inside andoutside the WTO have revolved aroundthe residual non-tariff barriers to trade—social and business regulations. The mostobvious examples include labor standards,environmental protection, consumerhealth and safety, antitrust, intellectualproperty rights and immigration controls.Because most regulatory policies were orig-inally devised as domestic policies, they aremore politically difficult to change thantariffs or quotas.

Some of these new trade negotiations willtouch third rails of American politics. Forexample, developing countries are pushing inthe WTO for greater liberalization in thetrade of “Mode 4” services, in which the per-son performing the service crosses a borderto do his or her job. The benefits of such lib-eralization for the United States economywould be significant; Microsoft chairmanBill Gates warned early this year that visarestrictions were limiting U.S. access to high-ly trained computer engineers from othercountries, undercutting America’s ability toinnovate. Despite the economic advantages,

however, such a move raises politically sensi-tive questions. One obvious concern wouldbe the effect this kind of liberalization wouldhave on homeland security. Another promi-nent concern would be the effect on U.S.immigration policies: Opponents wouldclaim that the liberalization of trade in serv-ices was back-door immigration.

The American public’s growing hostility tofreer trade has made congressional passageof trade agreements more difficult, and thisin turn has worsened the public image oftrade. The victory margins in congressionalvotes for trade legislation have narrowedover the years. In December 2001, theBush Administration secured TradePromotion Authority by a single vote in theHouse of Representatives. (Trade PromotionAuthority—which used to be called “fasttrack”—allows the president to submittrade deals for congressional approval via asimple up-or-down vote, preventing anypoison-pill amendments.) In July 2005, theCentral American Free Trade Agreementpassed by only two votes, and that wasafter significant White House lobbying ofwavering representatives. The smaller themargin of victory, the more leverage waver-ing representatives have to extract district-specific spending or trade-distorting meas-ures that undercut the original purpose ofthe trade deal. As a result, congressionalnegotiations over trade agreements havebegun to give off the same whiff of porkthat comes with transportation and agri-cultural bills.

What Can Be Done?

Can the public’s turn against freetrade perhaps be ignored? Politicalanalysts and trade experts alike

argue that the political significance of this

attitudinal shift remains an open question.Americans are skeptical about the benefits oftrade, but they are not particularly passion-ate about it. Polling data, purchasing behav-ior and experimental evidence all suggestthat American consumers talk like mercan-tilists but purchase goods like free traders. Itis difficult to point to specific members ofCongress who have lost their seats becausethey adopted an unpopular position ontrade policy.

That said, international trade is viewed asincreasingly salient by many Americans. Nowis not the time for a policy of trade expansionto lose political legitimacy. This is particular-ly true given the Bush Administration’s fullplate of trade issues for the next several years.At the top of the list is the Doha Round ofWTO talks. Thorny negotiations remain onthe liberalization of trade in services and thereduction of internal price supports and mar-ket restrictions for agricultural producers.The nominal deadline for these negotiationsis the Hong Kong Ministerial Conferencescheduled for December 2005. That deadlinewill not be met, but it cannot be extendedindefinitely, since other countries will want tosee the Doha Round completed well beforethe expiration of U.S. Trade PromotionAuthority in 2007.

At the regional level, efforts to advance theFree Trade Area of the Americas and theMiddle Eastern Free Trade Area Initiative arecontinuing, albeit at less than breakneckspeed. At the bilateral level, theAdministration has stepped up its use of free-trade agreements with favored allies. In thefirst term, FTAs were ratified with Singapore,Australia, Morocco and Chile. FTAs havebeen negotiated and signed with Bahrain andOman. Negotiations with Panama, Peru,Ecuador, Colombia, Thailand and the UnitedArab Emirates are ongoing.

Can public attitudes be changed? The pri-mary impediment to boosting public sup-port for trade liberalization is not one ofeconomics but of psychology. People feelthat their jobs and wages are threatened.Even if the probability of losing one’s jobfrom import competition or outsourcing issmall, the percentage of workers who knowsomeone who has lost his or her job becauseof trade is much larger. In this sense, publicperceptions about trade are akin to percep-tions about crime: Knowing a victim ofcrime often makes the problem appear to begreater than it actually is. While these fearsmay be exaggerated, they are nonethelessreal.

If the Bush Administration decides to fol-low through on its ambitious trade agenda,it will need new strategies to counteractshifts in public opinion. The good news isthat while the current political environ-ment is challenging, it is not hopeless.Polling strongly suggests that a healthymajority of Americans—including skepticsof freer trade—supports policies that pairliberalization with policies that reduce thedisruptions to groups that are negativelyaffected. These policies can take the formof expanded insurance opportunities,greater public investment in research anddevelopment, and retraining programs.The 2002 expansion of the TradeAdjustment Assistance program is a goodfirst step, but more steps are needed: awider use of wage insurance schemes,increased portability of health care cover-age and including service-sector workers inassistance programs.

psychology, not econom-

ics, holds down public

support for freer trade.

Winter 2005 75


Another useful tactic would be to link tradeto larger foreign policy priorities. One rea-son the United States was able to advancetrade liberalization during the Cold War wasthe bipartisan consensus that a liberal trad-ing system aided the cause of containment.Trade expansion can and should be present-ed as a critical element of the long-termgrand strategy of the United States to spreaddemocracy and defeat terrorism. Securityarguments resonate with a broad majority ofthe American public. According to newpolls, a large majority of Americans supportpromoting international trade with poor,democratic governments—a message consis-tent with President Bush’s second InauguralAddress. As with the Cold War, a communi-cations strategy that markets economicdiplomacy as “America’s first line of offense”would blunt the arguments of protectionistswhile promoting the virtues of trade liberal-ization. Greater presidential involvement inshifting public attitudes—including aggres-sive use of the bully pulpit—will be needed.

The alternative to blunting the shift in publicopinion is to go with the flow. While politi-cally expedient, adopting a more protection-

ist foreign economic policy will hurt the U.S.economy and ultimately undermine globalstability. If barriers are placed on trade, theeffect would be to preserve jobs in less com-petitive sectors of the economy and destroycurrent and future jobs in more competitivesectors. Trade protectionism would thereforelead to higher consumer prices, lower rates ofreturn for investors and reduced incentivesfor innovation in the United States. TheInternational Monetary Fund recentlywarned that trade protectionism in theUnited States would also magnify the nega-tive effects of any global economic shock.

Ignoring public attitudes about trade is dan-gerous in the long run, and following thepublic mood on trade would be an unfortu-nate abdication of leadership by the BushAdministration in the short run. If the firststep to recovery is recognizing that there is aproblem, then responsible policymakers inWashington need to appreciate the extent towhich the political terrain has shifted. Thenext step will be changing the Americanpublic’s mind—a difficult but achievabletask, if there is true leadership in the WhiteHouse.

On the Other hand...

Commerce produces money, money Luxury, and all three are incompatible with

Republicans.—John Adams

Commerce diminishes the spirit, both of patriotism and military defense, and

would eventually destroy America’s soul.–Thomas Paine

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