Cases n Ownership Part 1RULE 60 (REPLEVIN)2RULE 70 (FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER)3MANANTAN VS SOMERA5CASILANG VS. CASILANG-DIZON8QUIJANO VS AMANTE13ACCION PUBLICANAACCION REINVINDICATORIAIGLESIA NI CRISTO VS PONFERRADA16SUEAREZ VS EMBOY21GABRIEL VS CRISOLOGO25RULE 58 OF RULES OF COURT (INJUNCTION)28WRIT OF POSSESSION29

RULE 60ReplevinSection 1. Application. A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal property may, at the commencement of the action or at any time before answer, apply for an order for the delivery of such property to him, in the manner hereinafter provided. (1a)Section 2. Affidavit and bond. The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief ;(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and(d) The actual market value of the property.The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action. (2a)Section 3. Order. Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin, describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property into his custody. (3a)Section 4. Duty of the sheriff. Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open and take the property into his possession. After the sheriff has take possession of the property as herein provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping the same. (4a)Section 5. Return of property. If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately require the return of the property, but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the applicant, require the return thereof, by filing with the court where the action is pending a bond executed to the applicant, in double the value of the property as stated in the applicant's affidavit for the delivery thereof to the applicant, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum, to him as may be recovered against the adverse party, and by serving a copy of such bond on the applicant. (5a)Section 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant's bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party. (6a)Section 7. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. If the property taken is claimed by any person other than the party against whom the writ of replevin had been issued or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds therefor, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the property and a copy thereof upon the applicant, the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under replevin or deliver it to the applicant unless the applicant or his agent, on demand of said sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property under replevin as provided in section 2 hereof. In case of disagreement as to such value, the court shall determine the same. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping, of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond.The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant if such bond shall be filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the applicant from claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a result of the replevin, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the purpose. (7a)Section 8. Return of papers. The sheriff must file the order, with his proceedings indorsed, thereon, with the court within ten (10) days after taking the property mentioned therein. (8a)Section 9. Judgment. After trial of the issues the court shall determine who has the right of possession to and the value of the property and shall render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the party entitled to the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot be made, and also for such damages as either party may prove, with costs. (9a)Section 10. Judgment to include recovery against sureties. The amount, if any, to be awarded to any party upon any bond filed in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted under the same procedure as prescribed in section 20 of Rule 57. (10a)

RULE 70Forcible Entry and Unlawful DetainerSection 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the lesser shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)Section 3. Summary procedure. Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or when the law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided. (n)Section 4. Pleadings allowed. The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified. (3a, RSP)Section 5. Action on complaint. The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons. (n)Section 6. Answers. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded. (5 RSP)Section 7. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants. (6, RSP)Section 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. (7, RSP)If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant. (n)Section 9. Record of preliminary conference. Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof; 2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admission made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;4. A clear specification of material facts which remain converted; and5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case. (8, RSP)

Section 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them. (9, RSP)Section 11. Period for rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.

However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same.The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. (n)Section 12. Referral for conciliation. Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with. (18a, RSP)Section 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed:1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;2. Motion for a bill of particulars;3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;4. Petition for relief from judgment;5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;6. Memoranda;7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;9. Dilatory motions for postponement;10. Reply;11. Third-party complaints;12. Interventions. (19a, RSP)Section 14. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from the record. (20, RSP)Section 15. Preliminary injunction. The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (3a)Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (4a)Section 17. Judgment. If after trial court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. (6a)Section 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. (8a)Section 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that the defendant's appeal is frivolous or dilatory or that the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious. (9a)Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (10a)G.R. No. 145867 April 7, 2009ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANANTAN, herein represented by GILBERT MANANTAN, Petitioner, vs. ANICETO SOMERA, Respondent.CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:Before Us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse the Decision2 dated 10 May 2000 and Resolution3 dated 18 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55891.The facts gathered from the records are as follows:On 10 March 1998, Soledad Manantan filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch 1, a Complaint for ejectment and damages against respondent Aniceto Somera and a certain Presentacion Tavera (Tavera),4 docketed as Civil Case No. 10467.Manantan alleged in her Complaint that she was the owner of a 214- square meter parcel of land located in Fairview Subdivision, Baguio City (subject property), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54672, issued in her name by the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City. After causing a relocation survey of the subject property, she discovered that respondent and Tavera occupied certain portions thereof [disputed portions]. Manantan advised respondent and Tavera to vacate the disputed portions as soon as she would decide to sell the subject property to an interested buyer. Later, a prospective buyer approached Manantan about the subject property. However, upon learning that respondent and Tavera occupied some portions of the subject property, the prospective buyer decided not to proceed with the sale until after respondent and Tavera vacated the same. Manantan repeatedly requested respondent and Tavera to abandon the disputed portions of the subject property, but the two refused. Hence, Manantan hired the services of a lawyer who immediately sent a formal letter of demand to respondent and Tavera requesting them to leave the disputed portions. Respondent and Tavera, however, ignored the demand letter. Manantan submitted the matter before the barangay justice system of Fairview Subdivision, Baguio City, but the parties failed to reach a settlement. Upon issuance by the barangay secretary of a Certificate to File Action, Manantan instituted Civil Case No. 10467. In her Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467, Manantan prayed that respondent, Tavera, and all persons claiming rights under them, be ordered to vacate the portions of the subject property they were occupying; that respondent and Tavera be directed to pay her P600.00 and P400.00, respectively, every month, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the disputed portions of the subject property, computed from the filing of the Complaint until possession of the said portions has been restored to her; that respondent and Tavera be instructed to pay her P30,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.5Respondent and Tavera filed a Joint Answer to Manantans Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467. In their Joint Answer, respondent and Tavera averred that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 10467, because it was neither an action for forcible entry nor for unlawful detainer. The Complaint did not allege that Manantan was deprived of possession of the disputed portions by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, which would make a case for forcible entry. It also did not state that respondent and Tavera withheld possession of the disputed portions from Manantan after expiration or termination of the right to hold possession of the same by virtue of an express or implied contract, which would build a case for unlawful detainer. Respondent and Tavera argued that even if there was dispossession, it was evident from the face of the Complaint that it was not committed through any of the means enumerated under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and, thus, forcible entry or unlawful detainer could not be the proper remedy for Manantan.6Respondent claimed in the Joint Answer that he and his family had been using one of the disputed portions of the subject property as driveway since the latter part of 1970. The said portion was the only means by which he and his family could gain access to their residence. He even caused the improvement and cementing of the same a long time ago. Tavera also explained in the Joint Answer that she had been utilizing the other disputed portion of the subject property as an access road to her residence. Her tenement, which consisted of concrete and permanent structures, bore witness to the fact that her occupancy of the portion in dispute was continuous and uninterrupted.7Respondent and Tavera additionally asseverated in their Joint Answer that it would be unjust to prohibit them from using the disputed portions which serve as their only means of ingress or egress to or from their respective residences from or to the main road. Their use of said portions had been recognized by the Bayot family, Manantans predecessors-in-interest. It was only in 1997, after Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, that Manantan started to claim ownership even of the portions they had been using. Respondent and Tavera contended that they could not just relinquish their right to the disputed portions and yield to Manantans demand, considering that the latters claim was based merely on a relocation survey. "[J]ust to buy peace of mind and maintain cordial relations" with Mananatan, respondent and Tavera alleged that they "walked the proverbial mile and show[ed] their interest to pay" Manantan the equivalent amount of the disputed portions, but Manantan ignored their proposal and insisted that they buy the whole of the subject property. Respondent and Tavera alternatively argued in their Joint Answer that in case Manantan would be declared as the lawful owner of the subject property, the MTCC should not disregard the fact that they were "builders in good faith." As builders in good faith, they should be allowed to pay a reasonable price for the portions of the subject property on which their driveway/access road, and other improvements were situated. At the end of their Joint Answer, respondent and Tavera asked the MTCC to dismiss Manantans Complaint; or in case their driveway/access road and other improvements were found to be encroaching on Manantans property, to declare them builders in good faith who should be allowed to purchase the portions on which their driveway/access road and other improvements were located and to award them their counterclaims for moral damages and P35,000.00 attorneys fees.8After submission of the parties respective position papers and other pleadings, the MTCC rendered a Decision9 in Civil Case No. 10467 on 21 May 1999, favoring Manantan. The MTCC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case and that respondent and Tavera were not builders in good faith. It ordered respondent and Tavera to pay Manantan the amount of P600.00 and P400.00, respectively, per month, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the disputed portions of the subject property, counted from the date of the filing of the Complaint up to the time respondent and Tavera would actually vacate the same. It further ordered respondent and Tavera to jointly and severally pay Manantan the amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.Respondent and Tavera appealed the MTCC Decision before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, Branch 5. Their appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 4435-R. On 29 October 1999, the RTC promulgated its Decision10 affirming in toto the appealed MTCC Decision. Only respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals since Tavera opted not to appeal anymore. Respondents appeal before the Court of Appeals was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55891. During its pendency, Manantan died on 20 January 2000.11 Almost four months later, on 10 May 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision setting aside the Decisions of both the RTC and the MTCC and dismissing Manantans Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467. The appellate court held that Manantans Complaint before the MTCC failed to allege facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer. The allegations in the Complaint merely presented a controversy arising from a boundary dispute, in which case, the appropriate remedy available to Manantan should have been the plenary action for recovery of possession within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467.12The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing disquisition, the petition for review is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. The assailed Decision dated October 29, 1999 which was rendered by Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4435-R, affirming in toto the other assailed Decision dated May 21, 1999 rendered by the First Branch of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 10467, entitled "SOLEDAD MANANTAN v. ANICETO SOMERA and PRESENTACION TAVERA, and all persons claiming rights under them," are hereby both REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING said Civil Case No. 10467.Accordingly, let a writ of injunction issue permanently enjoining public respondent Judge Antonio M. Esteves and all persons acting in his behalf or orders to cease and desist from further enforcing the assailed decisions.Manantans counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 of the afore-mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals but it was denied by the same court in the Resolution dated 18 October 2000. Hence, herein petitioner, Gilbert Manantan, representing the Estate of the late Soledad Manantan, filed the instant Petition for Review14 before us raising the following issues:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BAGUIO CITY, BRANCH 1, HAD THE JURISDICTION OVER THE ACTION - EJECTMENT AND DAMAGES ENTITLED "SOLEDAD MANANTAN, PLAINTIFF, V. ANICETA SOMERA AND PRESENTACION TAVERA, AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, DEFENDANTS;II.WHETHER A PORTION OF PETITIONERS LAND ENCROACHED BY RESPONDENT CAN BE RECOVERED THROUGH AN ACTION [FOR] EJECTMENT. In the main, petitioner argues that the Complaint is in the nature of an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC had jurisdiction.15An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis ours.)Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property.16 This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.17In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, defendants possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.18A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted before the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court within one year from unlawful withholding of possession. Such one year period should be counted from the date of plaintiffs last demand on defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.19Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined by the allegations in the complaint.20 To vest the court with the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant from the land in an action for unlawful detainer, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing attributes of unlawful detainer cases, as this proceeding is summary in nature.21 The complaint must show on its face enough ground to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.22Thus, in order that a municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court may acquire jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the complaint specifically allege the facts constitutive of unlawful detainer.23 The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, an action for unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy and, thus, the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court has no jurisdiction over the case.24The pertinent allegations in Manantans Complaint before the MTCC are faithfully reproduced below:3. That [Manantan] is the owner in fee simple of that parcel of land, situated in Res. Section "K," Baguio City, with an area of 214 square meters, designated as Lot 7, Pcs-CAR-000062, and which may be more particularly described in and evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-54672 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Baguio;4. That when she caused the relocation survey of her said property above-mentioned, she discovered that the [herein respondent and Tavera] had occupied portions thereof, by reason of which she called their attention with a request that they vacate their respective areas as soon as she would have need of the same, or when she decides to sell the same to any interested buyer;5. That only recently, she wanted to sell her property above-mentioned to an interested buyer, but that upon knowing of the [respondent and Taveras] encroachments, the prospective buyer decided not to proceed with the sale until after the property shall have been first vacated by the [respondent and Tavera];6. That she asked the [respondent and Tavera] to vacate her property, but that they refused to do so, and that after making more demands which were all ignored by the [respondent and Tavera], [Manantan] was forced to consult her lawyer, who immediately wrote them a final formal demand to vacate her land, but to no avail;7. That [Manantan] also brought her problem to the attention of the Barangay Captain of Fairview Subdivision Barangay, by way of a letter, dated January 21 1998, copy of which is attached hereto and made part hereof as Annex "A," the same being self-explanatory;8. That despite efforts at the Barangay level of justice, no amicable settlement or compromise agreement was arrived at, as may be evidenced by a Certification to File Action, dated February 8, 1998, signed and issued by the Pangkat Secretary Shirley Pagkangan and duly attested by the Pangkat Chairman Rogelio Laygo, copy of which is hereto attached and made part hereof as Annex "B."25Noticeably, the Complaint does not allege facts showing compliance with the prescribed one year period to file an action for unlawful detainer. It does not state the material dates that would have established that it was filed within one year from the date of Manantans last demand upon respondent to vacate the disputed portion of land. Such allegations are jurisdictional and crucial, because if the complaint was filed beyond the prescribed one year period, then it cannot properly qualify as an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC can exercise jurisdiction. It may be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession, which should be brought before the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year has lapsed since defendant unlawfully withheld possession from plaintiff, the action will not be for illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. Accion reivindicatoria, meanwhile, is an action to recover ownership, as well as possession, which should also be brought before the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.26Further, it appears from the allegations in the Complaint that the respondent was already in possession of the disputed portion at the time Manantan bought the subject property from the Bayot family, and it was only after the conduct of a relocation survey, which supposedly showed that respondent was encroaching on the subject property, did Manantan begin asserting her claim of ownership over the portion occupied and used by respondent. Clearly, respondents possession of the disputed portion was not pursuant to any contract, express or implied, with Manantan, and, resultantly, respondents right of possession over the disputed portion is not subject to expiration or termination. At no point can it be said that respondents possession of the disputed portion ceased to be legal and became an unlawful withholding of the property from Manantan.271avvphi1Since the Complaint in Civil Case No. 10467 failed to satisfy on its face the jurisdictional requirements for an action for unlawful detainer, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the said Complaint and should have dismissed the same. There is no possible argument around the lack of jurisdiction of MTCC over Civil Case No. 10467. In Laresma v. Abellana,28 the Court pronounced:It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.Petitioner raises a second issue before us: whether petitioner Estate of the late Soledad Manantan can recover the portion of the subject property by an action for ejectment.29 It bears to stress that Manantans Complaint is dismissed herein for its defects, i.e., its failure to allege vital facts in an action for unlawful detainer over which the MTCC has jurisdiction. Since Civil Case No. 10467 is already dismissible upon this ground, it is no longer necessary to discuss whether petitioner availed itself of the proper remedy to recover the disputed portion of land from respondent. Resolving the second issue shall be a mere surplusage and obiter dictum. If petitioner seeks an answer to said issue as reference for its future action, suffice it to say that we do not render advisory opinions. The determination of the remedy to avail itself of must be done by petitioner with the guidance of its counsel, they being fully cognizant of the facts giving rise to the controversy and the evidence on hand. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 10 May 2000 and Resolution dated 18 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55891 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No cost. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180269 February 20, 2013JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR., substituted by his heirs, namely: FELICIDAD CUD lAMA T VDA. DE CASILANG, JOSE C. CASILANG, JR., RICARDO C. CASILANG, MARIA LOURDES C. CASILANG, CHRISTOPHER C. CASILANG, BEN C. CASILANG, DANTE C. CASILANG, GREGORIO C. CASILANG, HERALD C. CASILANG; and FELICIDAD Z. CASILANG, MARCELINA Z. CASILANG, JACINTA Z. CASILANG, BONIFACIO Z. CASILANG, LEONORA Z. CASILANG, and FLORA Z. CASILANG, Petitioners, vs.ROSARIO Z. CASILANG-DIZON, MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG, RODOLFO A. CASILANG, and ATTY. ALICIA B. FABIA, in her capacity as Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pangasinan and/or her duly authorized representative, Respondents.D E C I S I O NREYES, J.:Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619, which reversed and set aside the Decision2 dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D.Antecedent FactsThe late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca Zacarias (Francisca) had eight (8) children, namely: Felicidad Casilang (Felicidad), Ireneo Casilang (Ireneo), Marcelina Casilang (Marcelina), Jacinta Casilang (Jacinta), Bonifacio Casilang (Bonifacio), Leonora Casilang (Leonora), Jose Casilang (Jose) and Flora Casilang (Flora). Liborio died intestate on October 11, 1982 at the age of 83, followed not long after by his wife Francisca on December 25, 1982. Their son Bonifacio also died in 1986, survived by his child Bernabe Casilang (Bernabe), while son Ireneo died on June 11, 1992, survived by his four (4) children, namely: Mario Casilang (Mario), Angelo Casilang (Angelo), Rosario Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo Casilang (Rodolfo), herein respondents.The estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of three (3) parcels of land located in Barangay Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan, namely: (1) Lot No. 4676, with an area of 4,164 square meters; (2) Lot No. 4704, containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No. 4618, with 897 sq m.On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan a complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 847, to evict her uncle, petitioner Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot No. 4618 was owned by her father Ireneo, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555 issued in 1994 under her fathers name. On April 3, 1997, the respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim3 whereby they adjudicated Lot No. 4618 to themselves. In the same instrument, respondents Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo renounced their respective shares in Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario.In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the "lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual possession" of the said lot, and that he acquired the same "through intestate succession from his late father."4 For some reason, however, he and his lawyer, who was from the Public Attorneys Office, failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference, and Jose was declared in default; thus, the adverse judgment against him.5On February 18, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment finding Rosario to be the owner of Lot No. 4618, and ordering Jose to remove his house, vacate Lot No. 4618, and pay Rosario P500.00 in monthly rentals from the filing of the complaint until she was placed in possession, plus attorneys fees of P5,000.00, litigation expenses and costs. On March 23, 1998, the MTC issued a writ of execution; and on August 28, 1998, a Writ of Demolition6 was issued.On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of Liborio and Francisca,7 filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint,8 docketed as Civil Case No. 98-02371-D for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages" against the respondents. On June 10, 1998, the petitioners moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, which the RTC however denied on June 23, 1998.Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by Ireneos children over Lot No. 4618, as well as TD No. 555, and by necessary implication its derivatives, TD No. 15177 (for the lot) and TD No. 15176 (for the house), both of which were issued in 1998 in the name of Rosario Casilang-Dizon.9The petitioners alleged in their complaint that all eight (8) children of Liborio entered into a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to which Jose was allotted Lot No. 4618 as his share; that Ireneo never claimed ownership of Lot No. 4618, nor took possession of it, because his share was the southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 4676, containing an area of 1,308 sq m,10 of which he took exclusive possession during his lifetime; that Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he built his familys semi-concrete house just a few steps away from his parents old bamboo hut; that he took in and cared for his aged parents in his house until their deaths in 1982; that one of his children has also built a house on the lot.11 Jose, said to be the most educated of the Casilang siblings, worked as an insurance agent.12 The complete disposition of the intestate estate of Liborio per the parties verbal partition appears as follows:1. Lot No. 4676, with 4,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 534 in Liborios name,13 was verbally partitioned among Marcelina (236 sq m), Leonora (1,965 sq m), Flora (655 sq m), and Ireneo, represented by his children, the herein respondents-defendants (1,308 sq m), as shown in a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all the Casilang siblings and their representatives.2. Lot No. 4704, with 1,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 276 in Liborios name,14 was divided among Jacinta and Bonifacio, who died in 1986 and is now represented by his son Bernabe; and3. Lot No. 4618, containing 897 sq m, declared since 1994 under TD No. 555 in Ireneos name,15 is now the subject of the controversy below. Jose insists that he succeeded to it per verbal partition, and that he and his family have always occupied the same peacefully, adversely and exclusively even while their parents were alive.16For her part, Rosario alleged in her answer with counterclaim,17 which she filed on September 15, 1998, that:a) She is the actual and lawful owner of Lot No. 4618 with an area of 897 square meters, having acquired the same by way of a Deed of Extra judicial Partition with Quitclaim dated 3 April 1997 which was duly executed among herein Appellant ROSARIO and her brothers, namely, MARIO, ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG;b) Her ownership over subject property could be traced back to her late father IR[E]NEO which the latter inherited by way of intestate succession from his deceased father LIBORIO sometime in 1992; that the residential house described in herein Appellee JOSEs complaint is an illegal structure built by him in 1997 without her (ROSARIOs) knowledge and consent; that in fact, an ejectment suit was filed against Appellee JOSE with the Municipal Trial Court in Calasiao, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 847;c) The subject lot is never a portion of Appellee JOSEs share from the intestate of his deceased father, LIBORIO; that on the contrary, the lot is his deceased brother IR[E]NEOs share from the late LIBORIOs intestate estate; that in fact, the property has long been declared in the name of the late IRENEO as shown by Tax Declaration No. 555 long before his children ROSARIO DIZON, MARIO, ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG, executed the Deed of Partition dated 18 February 1998; that Appellee JOSE had actually consumed his shares which he inherited from his late father, and after a series of sales and dispositions of the same made by him, he now wants to take Appellants property;d) Appellee JOSE is never the rightful owner of the lot in question and has not shown any convincing proof of his supposed ownership; that the improvements introduced by him, specifically the structures he cited are the subject of a Writ of Demolition dated 28 August 1998 pursuant to the Order dated 17 August 1998 of the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan;e) No protestation or objection was ever made by Appellee JOSE in Civil Case No. 847 (Unlawful Detainer case) where he was the defendant; that the truth was that his possession of the subject property was upon the tolerance and benevolence of his late brother IRENEO during the latters lifetime and that Appellant ROSARIO;f) The RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff would just be doing her job if she and her deputies would implement the writ of execution/demolition issued by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan since it is its ministerial duty to do so;g) The Appellees have no cause of action; not having shown in their complaint the basis, the reason and the very core of their claim as to why the questioned document should be nullified.18 (Citation omitted)In their reply19 to Rosarios aforesaid answer, the petitioners asserted that the MTC committed a grave error in failing to consider a material fact-that Jose had long been in prior possession under a claim of title which he obtained by partition.At the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the parties entered into the following stipulations:1. That the late LIBORIO is the father of FELICIDAD, MARCELINA, JUANITA, LEONORA, FLORA and IRENEO, all surnamed CASILANG;2. That the late LIBORIO died in 1982; That the late LIBORIO and his family resided on Lot [No.] 4618 up to his death in 1982; That the house of the late LIBORIO is located on Lot [No.] 4618;3. That Plaintiff JOSE used to reside on the lot in question because there was a case for ejectment filed against him;4. That the house which was demolished is the family house of the late LIBORIO and FRANCISCA ZACARIAS with the qualification that it was given to the defendants;5. That the action involves members of the same family; and6. That no earnest efforts were made prior to the institution of the case in court.20Ruling of the RTCAfter a full trial on the merits, the RTC in its Decision21 dated April 21, 2003 decreed as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:1. Declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 null and void;2. Declaring plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject Lot No. 4618 and as such, entitled to the peaceful possession of the same;3. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00, and to pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.22The RTC affirmed Joses ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618 by virtue of the oral partition of the estate of Liborio by all the siblings. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim23 dated January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all the eight (8) Casilang siblings and their legal representativeswith Ireneo represented by his four (4) children, and Bonifacio by his son Bernabepetitioners Jose, Felicidad, Jacinta and Bernabe, acknowledged that they had already received their respective shares of inheritance in advance,"24 and therefore, renounced their claims over Lot No. 4676 in favor of co-heirs Marcelina, Leonora, Flora and Ireneo, as follows:We hereby RENOUNCED, WAIVED AND QUITCLAIM, all our rights, interests and participations over the WHOLE parcel of land [Lot No. 4676], left by the late, LIBORIO CASILANG, in favor of our coheirs, namely: MARCELINA Z. CASILANG-PARAYNO, LEONORA Z. CASILANG-SARMIENTO, FLORA Z. CASILANG, MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG, ROSARIO A. CASILANGDIZON AND RODOLFO A. CASILANG.25Thus, Jose expressly renounced his share in Lot No. 4676, which has an area of 4,164 sq m, because he had already received in advance his share in his fathers estate, Lot No. 4618 with 897 sq m:To the mind of the court, Jose Casilang could have not [sic] renounced and waived his rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his, while the other lot, Lot [No.] 470[4], was divided between sister Jacinta Casilang and brother Bonifacio Casilang[,] Sr., who was represented by his son. In the same [way] as testified to by plaintiffs Felicidad Casilang and Jacinta Casilang, they signed the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim wherein they waived and renounced their rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676 because they have already received their share, which is Lot [No.] 470[4].26The RTC found baseless the claim of Rosario that Lot No. 4618 was an inheritance of her father Ireneo considering that a tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership. The RTC even noted that the tax declaration of Ireneo started only in 1994, although he had been dead since 1992. "Such being the case, the heirs of Ir[e]neo Casilang has [sic] no basis in adjudicating unto themselves Lot No. 4618 and partitioning the same by executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim."27Appeal to the CAUndeterred, Rosario appealed to the CA averring that: (1) the lower court erred in declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 as null and void; and (2) the lower court erred in declaring Jose as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject Lot No. 4618.28In the now assailed decision, the CA reversed the RTC by relying mainly on the factual findings and conclusions of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847, viz:Per the records, the above described property was subject of Civil Case No. 847 decided by the MTC of Calasiao, First Judicial Region, Province of Pangasinan which rendered a judgment, supra, in favor of Appellant ROSARIO ordering herein Appellee JOSE and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the land of Appellant ROSARIO. It was found by the MTC that the latter is the owner of the subject parcel of land located at Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan; that the former owner of the land is the late IRENEO (who died on 11 June 1992), father of Appellant ROSARIO; that Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed by and among the heirs of the late IRENEO; that MAURO [sic], ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG waived and quitclaimed their respective shares over the subject property in favor of Appellant ROSARIO; that Appellee JOSE was allowed by the late IRENEO during his lifetime to occupy a portion of the land without a contract of lease and no rentals being paid by the former; that Appellant ROSARIO allowed Appellee JOSE to continue occupying the land after the Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed.29Moreover, noting that the decision in Civil Case No. 847 in favor of Rosario was issued on February 18, 1998 while the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D was filed on June 2, 1998, the CA concluded that the latter case was a mere afterthought:If the latter has really a strong and valid reason to question the validity of the Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim, supra, he could have done it soon after the said Deed was executed on 3 April 1997. However, curiously enough, it was only when the MTC ordered his eviction from the subject property that he decided to file the instant case against the Appellants.30Petition for Review in the Supreme CourtNow in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners maintain that:IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY [OF] THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND QUITCLAIM DATED APRIL 3, 1997, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY VIOLATED THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR. AS DIRECT COMPULSORY HEIR.31Our Ruling and DiscussionsThere is merit in the petition.Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in an ejectment suit, but only to resolve the issue of possession; its determination is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.32Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Summary Procedure governs the two forms of ejectment suit, the purpose being to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property. They are not processes to determine the actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession and its determination on the ownership issue is not conclusive.33 As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule 70:Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.It is apropos, then, to note that in contrast to Civil Case No. 847, which is an ejectment case, Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession;" it is an accion reinvindicatoria, or action to recover ownership, which necessarily includes recovery of possession34 as an incident thereof. Jose asserts his ownership over Lot No. 4618 under a partition agreement with his co-heirs, and seeks to invalidate Ireneos "claim" over Lot No. 4618 and to declare TD No. 555 void, and consequently, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim executed by Ireneos heirs.It is imperative to review the CAs factual conclusions since they are entirely contrary to those of the RTC, they have no citation of specific supporting evidence, and are premised on the supposed absence of evidence, particularly on the parties verbal partition, but are directly contradicted by the evidence on record.It must be noted that the factual findings of the MTC, which the CA adopted without question, were obtained through Summary Procedure and were based solely on the complaint and affidavits of Rosario, after Jose had been declared in default. But since a full trial was had in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the CA should have pointed out the specific errors and weaknesses in the RTCs factual conclusions before it could rule that Jose was unable to present "any evidentiary support" to establish his title, and that his continued possession of Lot No. 4618 was by mere tolerance of Rosario. At most, however, the CA only opined that it was conjectural for the RTC to conclude, that Jose had already received his inheritance when he renounced his share in Lot No. 4676. It then ruled that the RTC erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847-that Joses possession over subject property was by mere tolerance. Said the appellate court:Given the claim of the Appellee that Lot [No.] 4618 was orally given/assigned to him by his deceased father LIBORIO, or that his claim was corroborated by his sisters (his co-plaintiffs-Appellees), or that their claim is indubitably tied up with the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim over Lot No. 4676, still We cannot fully agree with the pronouncement of the court a quo that Appellee JOSE could not have renounced and waived his rights and interest over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his. Wanting any evidentiary support, We find this stance as conjectural being unsubstantiated by law or convincing evidence. At the most and taking the factual or legal circumstances as shown by the records, We hold that the court a quo erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847 ruling that herein Appellee JOSEs possession over subject property was by mere tolerance. Based as it is on mere tolerance, Appellee JOSEs possession therefore could not, in any way, ripen into ownership.35 (Citations omitted)By relying solely on the MTCs findings, the CA completely ignored the testimonial, documentary and circumstantial evidence of the petitioners, obtained by the RTC after a full trial on the merits. More importantly, the CA did not point to any evidence of Rosario that Ireneo had inherited Lot No. 4618 from Liborio. All it did was adopt the findings of the MTC.The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and unless the case falls under any of the well-defined exceptions, the Supreme Court will not delve once more into the findings of facts. In Sps. Sta. Maria v. CA,36 this Court stated:Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.37 (Citation omitted)In the instant case, the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are starkly contrasting. Moreover, we find that the CA decision falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) above, which warrants another review of its factual findings.The evidence supporting Rosarios claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 4618 is the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim, which she executed with her brothers Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo. There is no question that by itself, the said document would have fully conveyed to Rosario whatever rights her brothers might have in Lot No. 4618. But what needs to be established first is whether or not Ireneo did in fact own Lot No. 4618 through succession, as Rosario claims. And here now lies the very crux of the controversy.A review of the parties evidence shows that they entered into an oral partition, giving Lot No. 4618 to Jose as his share, whereas Rosario presented no proof whatsoever that her father inherited Lot No. 4618 from his father Liborio.Rosarios only proof of Ireneos ownership is TD No. 555, issued in his name, but she did not bother to explain why it was dated 1994, although Ireneo died on June 11, 1992. Liborios ownership of Lot No. 4618 is admitted by all the parties, but it must be asked whether in his lifetime Liborio did in fact transmit it to Ireneo, and if not, whether it was conveyed to him by Liborios heirs. It is imperative for Rosario to have presented proof of this transfer to Ireneo, in such a form as would have vested ownership in him. We find, instead, a preponderance of contrary evidence.1. In his testimony, Jose claimed that his parents bamboo house in Lot No. 4618 disintegrated from wear and tear; so he took them in to his semi-concrete house in the same lot, which was just a few steps away, and he cared for them until they died; shortly before Liborios death, and in the presence of all his siblings, his father Liborio assigned Lot No. 4618 to him as his inheritance; his house was demolished in 1998 as a result of the ejectment case filed against him; but his family continued to live thereat after reconstructing the house; Ireneo and his family did not live in Lot No. 4618; although Joses job as an insurance agent took him around Pangasinan, he always came home to his family in his house in Lot No. 4618, which he used as his permanent address; only Lot No. 4676 was included in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated January 8, 1998 because Lot No. 4618 had already been distributed to Jose, and Lot No. 4704 had already been assigned to Jacinta and Bonifacio as their share in their fathers estate.382. Joses testimony was corroborated by petitioners Felicidad,39 Jacinta,40 Leonora,41 and Flora,42 who all confirmed that their brother Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 from his childhood up to the present, that he took their aged parents into his house after their bamboo house was destroyed, and he attended to their needs until they died in 1982. The sisters were also one in saying that their father Liborio verbally willed Lot No. 4618 to Jose as his share in his estate, and that their actual partition affirmed their fathers dispositions. Jacinta claimed that she and Bonifacio have since taken possession of Lot No. 4704 pursuant to their partition, and have also declared their respective portions for tax purposes.43 Flora corroborated Jacinta on their taking possession of Lot No. 4704, as well as that Jose built his house on Lot No. 4618 next to his parents and they came to live with him in their old age. Flora affirmed that Exhibit "F" correctly reflects their verbal partition of Lot No. 4676, and that she was fully in accord with it. She added that Felicidad and Marcelina had since constructed their own houses on the portions of Lot No. 4676 assigned to them.44 Felicidad mentioned that in their partition, Ireneo was given a portion of Lot No. 4676, while Lot No. 4704 was divided between Jacinta and Bonifacio, and Jose alone got Lot No. 4618. Leonora confirmed that they were all present when their father made his above dispositions of his estate.3. Benjamin Lorenzo, a long-time neighbor of the Casilangs testified that Joses house stands on Lot No. 4618 and Ireneo did not live with his family on the said lot but was a tenant in another farm some distance away.454. For her part, Rosario merely asserted that her father Ireneo succeeded to Lot No. 4618 from Liborio, as shown in TD No. 555 (Exhibit "1"); that she and her brothers extra-judicially settled Ireneos estate, and that they each waived their shares in her favor; and, that she has been paying taxes on Lot No. 4618. Rosario admitted, however, that Jose has lived in the lot since he was a child, and he has reconstructed his house thereon after its court-ordered demolition.46 But Rosario on cross-examination backtracked by claiming that it was her father Ireneo and grandfather Liborio who built the old house in Lot No. 4618, where Ireneo resided until his death; he even planted various fruit trees. Yet, there is no mention whatsoever to this effect by any of the witnesses. Rosario also contradicted herself when she denied that Jose lived there because his job as insurance agent took him away often and yet admitted that Joses house stands there, which he reconstructed after it was ordered demolished by the MTC. Inexplicably, Rosario disclaimed knowledge of Ireneos share in Lot No. 4676, although she was a signatory, along with her brothers and all the petitioners, in the deed of partition of the said lot, whereby she got 1,308 sq m. Rosario also admitted that taxes were paid on the lot only beginning in 1997, not before.475. Benjamin Dizon, husband of Rosario, testified that Rosario was losing appetite and sleep because of the case filed by Jose; that Ireneo died in another farm; that Ireneo had a house in Lot No. 4618 but Jose took over the house after he died in 1992.48 Respondent Angelo, brother of Rosario, claimed that when he was 13 or 14 years old, he heard his grandfather tell his father Ireneo that he would inherit Lot No. 4618. On cross-examination, Angelo insisted that his father had always lived with his family in his grandfathers house in Lot No. 4618, that Jose did not live there but was given another lot, although he could not say which lot it was; he admitted that his grandmother lived with Jose when she died, and Ireneos share was in Lot No. 4676.496. On rebuttal, Jose recounted that after his four children were married, Ireneo lived as a tenant in another farm; that during a period of illness he lived in Manila for some time, and later resided in Cagayan with his two married sons; and lastly on his return, worked as a tenant of the Maningding family for about 10 years in Calasiao, staying in a hut one kilometer away. Jose also claimed that Ireneo had asked Liborio for a portion of Lot No. 4676, a lot which is bigger than Lot No. 4618 by several hundreds of square meters.507. On sur-rebuttal, Rosario claimed that her grandparents, father and mother lived in Lot No. 4618 when she was a child until she married and left in 1976; that her uncle Jose asked permission from Liborio to be allowed to stay there with his family. She admitted that Jose built his house in 1985, three years after Liborio died, but as if to correct herself, she also claimed that Jose built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in Lot No. 4618. (Contrarily, her aunt Leonora testified that Jose built his house in Lot No. 4618 while their parents were alive.)51 Moreover, if such was the case, Rosario did not explain why she filed Civil Case No. 847, if she thought her uncle built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in Lot No. 4618.52 Rosario also claimed that Ireneo always came home in the evenings to his father Liborios house from the Maningding farm, which he tenanted for 10 years, but obviously, by then Liborios house had long been gone. Again, confusedly, Rosario denied that she knew of her fathers share in Lot No. 4676.From the testimonies of the parties, we are convinced that the conclusion of the RTC is well-supported that there was indeed a verbal partition among the heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each of his eight children received his or her share of his estate, and that Joses share was Lot No. 4618.The parties verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by their taking possession of their respective shares.The validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In Vda. de Espina v. Abaya,53 this Court declared that an oral partition is valid:Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. "An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners."54In Maestrado v. CA,55 the Supreme Court upheld the partition after it found that it conformed to the alleged oral partition of the heirs, and that the oral partition was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the heirs subsequently.56 In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot,57 the Supreme Court elaborated on the validity of parol partition:On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce [sic] oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will [in] proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.58Joses possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well borne out by the records. It is also consistent with the claimed verbal partition with his siblings, and fully corroborated by his sisters Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified that they each had taken possession of their own shares and built their houses thereon.A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right.59 Moreover, under Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who possesses in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title, and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Similarly, Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that actual possession under a claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Thus, actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with an alleged partition are considered strong proof of an oral partition60 which the Court will not hesitate to uphold.Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not conclusive evidence of ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership,61 but when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, they can be the basis of claim of ownership through prescription.62 In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.63 We have seen that there is no proof that Liborio, or the Casilang siblings conveyed Lot No. 4618 to Ireneo. There is also no proof that Ireneo himself declared Lot No. 4618 for tax purposes, and even if he or his heirs did, this is not enough basis to claim ownership over the subject property. The Court notes that TO No. 555 was issued only in 1994, two years after Ireneo's death. Rosario even admitted that she began paying taxes only in 1997.64 More impmiantly, Ireneo never claimed Lot No. 4618 nor took possession of it in the concept of owner.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41 in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.BERSAMIN, J.:Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the possession is deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry without any allegation in the complaint that the entry of the defendant was by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.AntecedentsThe petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their father, the late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land registered in the latter's name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-188 of the Registry of Deeds in Cebu City with an area of 15,790 square meters, more or less.1 On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring 600 square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante (respondent), with the affected portion being described in the deed of absolute sale Eliseo executed in the following manner:A portion of a parcel of land located at the back of the Pleasant Homes Subdivision and also at the back of Don Bosco Seminary, Punta Princesa, Cebu City, to be taken from my share of the whole lot; the portion sold to Atty. Amante is only 600 square meters which is the area near the boundary facing the Pleasant Homes Subdivision, Cebu City.2On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of his share inthe property to the respondent, with their deed of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the approval of Eliseos siblings, and describing the portion subject of the sale as:That the portion covered under this transaction is Specifically located right at the back of the seminary facing Japer Memorial School and where the fence and house of Atty. Amante is located.3On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their fathers estate (consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves.4 Pursuant to the deed extrajudicial partition, OCT No. O-188 was cancelled, and on July 12, 1994 the Register of Deeds issued TransferCertificate of Title (TCT) No. 6555, TCT No. 6556, TCT No. 6557 and TCT No. 65585 to the petitioner, Gloria, Jose, and Eliseo, respectively. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo.6Due to the petitioners needing her portion that was then occupied by the respondent, she demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several demands, the last of which was by the letter dated November 4, 1994,7 the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file against him on February 14, 1995 a complaint for ejectment and damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City (MTCC), docketed as Civil Case No. R-34426.8 She alleged therein that she was the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6555, a portion of which was being occupied by the respondent, who had constructed a residential building thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her siblings had inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided, and was thus still co-owned by them; and that the respondents occupation had become illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands.The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had been by mere tolerance of Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact the owner and lawful possessor of the property, having bought it from Eliseo; that the petitioner and her siblings could not deny knowing about the sale in his favor because they could plainly see his house from the road; and that the deed of absolute sale itself stated that the sale to him was with their approval, and that they had already known that his house and fence were existing; that before he purchased the property, Eliseo informed him that he and his co-heirs had already orally partitioned the estate of their father, and that the portion being sold to him was Eliseos share; and that with his having already purchased the property before the petitioner acquired it under the deed of extrajudicial partition, she should respect his ownership and possession of it.9Judgment of the MTCCOn February 5, 1996, the MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner,10 ruling that the deeds of sale executed by Eliseo in favor of the respondent did not have the effect of conveying the disputed property to him inasmuch as at the time of the sale, the parcel of land left by their father, which included the disputed property, had not yet been partitioned, rendering Eliseo a mere co-owner of the undivided estate who had no right to dispose of a definite portion thereof; that as a co-owner, Eliseo effectively conveyed to the respondent only the portion that would ultimately be allotted to him once the property would be subdivided; that because the disputed property was adjudicated to the petitioner under the deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, she was its owner with the consequent right of possession; and that, as such, she had the right to demand that the respondent vacate the land.The MTCC disposed as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, and on the basis thereof, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the defendant; to:1) vacate from the portion, presently occupied by him and whereon his building stands, of that parcel of land locatedin Cebu City covered by TCT No. 6555 and registered in the nameof the plaintiff; and to remove and/or demolish the building and all the structures that may have been built on said portion;2) pay the plaintiff the rentalof P1,000.00 a month for the portion in litigation from November 21, 1994 until such time that the defendant shall have vacated, and have removed all structures from said portion, and have completely restored possession thereof to the plaintiff; and3) pay unto the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and the sum of P5,000.00 for litigation expenses; and4) to pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.11Decision of the RTCOn appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the judgment of the MTCC, and dismissed the complaint,12 holding that the summary proceeding for ejectment was not proper because the serious question of ownership of the disputed property was involved, viz:In the case at bar, by virtue of the deed of absolute sale executed by Eliseo Quijano, one of the co-heirs of Fe Quijano, in 1990 and 1991, the defendant Atty. Amante took possession of the portion in question and built his residential house thereat. Itwas only in 1992 that the heirs of Bibiano Quijano executed the deed of extrajudicial partition, and instead of giving to Eliseo Quijano the portion that he already sold to the defendant, the same was adjudicated toplaintiff, Fe Quijano to the great prejudice of the defendant herein who had been in possession of the portion in question since 1990 and which possession is notpossession de facto but possession de jure because it is based on 2 deeds of conveyances executed by Eliseo Quijano. There is, therefore, a serious question of ownership involved which cannot be determined in a summary proceeding for ejectment. Since the defendantis in possession of the portion in question where his residential house is built for several years, and before the extrajudicial partition, the possession of the defendant, to repeat, is one of possession de jure and the plaintiff cannot eject the defendant in a summary proceeding for ejectment involving only possession de facto. What the plaintiff should have done was to file an action publiciana or action reinvindicatoria before the appropriate court for recovery of possession and ownership. However, since there is a pending complaint for quieting of title filed by the defendant against the plaintiff herein before the Regional Trial Court, the matter of ownership should be finally resolved in said proceedings.13 Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied her motion on November 13, 1996.14Decision of the CAThe petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for review.On May 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,15 affirming the decision of the RTC, and dismissing the case for ejectment, but on the ground that the respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee holding the right of possession over the disputed property.The CA observed that the RTC correctly dismissed the ejectment case because a question of ownership over the disputed property was raised; that the rule that inferior courts could pass upon the issue of ownership to determine the question of possession was well settled; that the institution of a separate action for quieting of title by the respondent did not divest the MTCC of its authority to decide the ejectment case; that Eliseo, as a coowner, had no right to sell a definite portion of the undivided estate; that the deeds of sale Eliseo executed in favor of the respondent were valid only with respect to the alienation of Eliseos undivided share; that after the execution of the deeds of sale, the respondent became a co-owner along with Eliseo and his co-heirs, giving him the right toparticipate in the partition of the estate owned in common by them; that because the respondent was not given any notice of the project of partition or of the intention to effect the partition, the partition made by the petitioner and her co-heirs did not bind him; and that, as to him, the entire estate was still co-owned by the heirs, giving him the right to the co-possession of the estate, including the disputed portion.IssuesThe petitioner has come to the Court on appeal by certiorari,16 contending that the CA grossly erred in holding that the respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee with the right of possession over the disputed property.17The petitioner explains that the respondent, being a lawyer, knew that Eliseo could not validly transfer the ownership of the disputed property to him because the disputed property was then still a part of the undivided estate co-owned by all the heirs of the late Bibiano Quijano; that the respondents knowledge of the defect in Eliseos title and his failure to get the co-heirs consent to the sale in a registrable document tainted his acquisition with bad faith; that being a buyer in bad faith, the respondent necessarily became a possessor and builder in bad faith; that she was not aware of the sale to the respondent, and it was her ignorance of the sale that led her to believe that the respondent was occupying the disputed property by the mere tolerance of Eliseo; thatthe partition was clearly done in good faith; and that she was entitled to the possession of the disputed property as its owner, consequently giving her the right to recover it from the respondent.18To be resolved is the issue ofwho between the petitioner and the respondent had the better right to the possession of the disputed property.RulingThe petition for review on certiorarilacks merit.An ejectment case can be eitherfor forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved.19 The sole question for resolution in the case is the physical or material possession (possession de facto)of the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure)nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case. Hence,even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of possession.20 The adjudication of ownership in that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving the title to the property.21Considering that the parties are both claiming ownership of the disputed property, the CA properly ruled on the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining who between them had the better right to possess the disputed property.The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano Quijano, and passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon his death.22 Prior to the partition, the estate was owned in common by the heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased.23 In a co-ownership, the undivid