murdock, g. p. science of culture

8/8/2019 Murdock, G. P. Science of Culture

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TH E SCIENCEOF CULTURE By GEORGE PETER MURDOCKOCIAL anthropology and sociology are not two distinct sciences. TheyS orm together but a single discipline, or a t the most two approaches tothe same subject matter-the cultural behavior of man. This identi ty has

been all too frequently overlooked-by the general sociologists in their madpursuit of the alluring mirages of social philosophy, methodology, and uto-pianism, and by the anthropologists in their eagerness to unearth beforei t is too late the facts of ethnography from which alone a general science ofculture can be developed. If the anthropologists in many cases have failedto see the forest for the trees, the majority of the sociologists have yet tolearn that such a thing asa tree exists. Nevertheless, the leaders in the vari-ous branches of these two allied fields, working independently, have suc-ceeded in accumulating a respectable body of general conclusions based oninductive research. I t is no longer admissible to spin out new theories ofsociety and culture from the cozy depths of an armchair. We must s tartfrom the facts, of which an imposing mass has been assembled, and from theexisting body of conclusions derived from the facts and verifiable by them.When this is done, and the deductions of armchair theorists are treatedwith the neglect they deserve, the apparent inconsistencies in the results ofthe reliable investigators in the several fields seem to fade away, and thebroad outlines of an actual science of culture stand revealed.

That culture, a uniquely human phenomenon independent of the laws ofbiology and psychology, constitutes the proper subject of the social sciences,is a proposition accepted with practical unanimity by social anthropolo-gists today. A large and increasing proportion of sociologists hold substan-tially the same position, and agree with Willey tha tthe study of culture-the processes of its origin and its growth, its spread and itsperpetuation-constitutes the study of sociology.As regards the exact definition of culture, however, and its precise relationto the da ta of the biological sciences, certain vagueness still prevails.Even the brilliant analysis of Kroeber2 has left the concept hanging in arather mystical though splendid isolation. Recent studies in various fields,however, have shed new light on the subject, and there seems to be nolonger any basis for the criticism that the concept of culture is baseless orsupernatural. The differences in interpretation tha t exist are more ap-

1 P. 208.2 1917.

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YupDocK:] SCIENCE OF CULTURE 201parent than real. They are for the most part differences in emphasis only,resulting from the fac t th at some autho rit ies have s tressed one facto r andothers ano ther . I t is the thesis of this pap er t h a t the various approaches are ,ac tual ly , not contradic tory, bu t supp lementary; that thei r adh erents err ,not in wh at they asser t , bu t in w hat they den y; tha t , in short , a t rue con-ception of cu ltu re will flow, no t from th e rejection of divergent po in ts ofview, but from their acceptance and reconciliation. After all, culture is acomplex subject, and over-simple, particularistic explanations have goneou t of fashion in the social sciences. It is here m ainta ined, then, not th a t thestud ents of culture should unite on some new concept, b ut th at the y are al-ready in subs tant ia l harmo ny and need only to recognize th a t a n ad equ atepic tu re of cu ltu re emerges from a m ere synthesis of the ir conclusions.T he re is,in th e first place, universal agreement-if we except th e extrem eracialists, eugenists, an d instinctivists-that cu ltu ral behav ior is sociallyrath er tha n biologically d eterm ined; th at i t is acquired, not i nn ate ; habit-ual in cha racter rather tha n instinctive. Culture rests , in s ho rt , no t onmans specific germinal inheritance, but on his capacity to form habitsund er th e influences of his social environ me nt.Instinct and the capacity to form habits, while related functions, are present in anyanimal in inverse ratio.H abit ual behavior, being more susceptible t o m odification as th e result ofexperience, possesses a certain survival valu e which h as led to selection inits fav or during the course of o rganic evolution. Hence, in gen eral, as werise in t he organic scale th e proportion of specific instinctive r ea cti on s de-clines while adaptive behavior becomes correspondingly more prominent.Th e higher th e animal, the fewer i ts instincts and the gre ater i ts abil i ty t oprofit b y experience. M an stan ds in this respect a t th e head of the anim alworld; he is th e habit-forming crea ture par excellence.If we neglect the vegetative . . .and the direct life conserving functions, such/asattack and defense, there are few complete and perfect instincts in man yet ob-served.Briffault, following Fiske, has soug ht t o explain th e ad ap ta bi lit y of mansbehavior, its comparative freedom from fixation by heredity, by the im-matur i ty of the hum an child a t b i r th and the prolongation of infancy; thenetw ork of association fibers in th e brain, he m aintains, is organized under

a Watson, 254.Briffault, 1: 45.Watson, 254. :96110.


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23 2 A M E R I C A N A N T H RO P O LO C I ST [N. . , 34, 932the influence of environmental factors before heredity, as i t were, can com-plete it s work. Be this as it m ay , however, no dou b t exists of mans suprem ehabit-forming capacity and of its basic r61e in cul ture . Th e endeavor, fash-ionable am ong psychologists n ot long ago, to inte rpr et cultural phenomenaa s th e manifestations of a n equip me nt of assorted instincts, is now com-pletely outmod ed, it s coup de grace having been de alt by Bernard. Manshabit-forming capacity, of course, has an instinctive or hereditary basis.T he individ ual comes into the world equipped w ith a v ast n um ber of un-organized responses, which he g rad ual ly organizes int o ha bit s as th e resultof experience. It is through this conditioning process t h at c ultu ral ac-tivities, like all oth er hab its, are acquired. As Tozzer* points ou t:from the point of view of human culture we can eliminate everyth ing but thosecharacteristicsof man which he learns from his fellow man.

T h e stu de nt of culture b y no means denies th e existence or importanceof heredity. H e acce pts fully, an d cordially welcomes, th e immense stridesbeing made b y th e science of genetics. H e neither asserts nor denies th at thelaws of heredity, well established for an ato m ica l an d physiological tra its,ap ply also to me nta l traits. T his question, he believes, it is the province ofpsychology t o decide. Bu t he does den y th at the laws of heredity can con-tri bu te to his unde rstanding of cu ltu ra l phenomena-phenomena which arein no respect hered itary b u t ar e characteris t ically and with out exceptionacquired. T h e s tud en t of cu lture assumes heredity as a s tart in g point , a s amere condit ion perhaps comparable to th e geographic environm ent, andth at is all.Heredity merely underlies culture. It gives man the unorganized re-sponses which ar e organized through the cond itioning process in to habi ts.It also furnishes him with the mechanism-the sensory, nervous, an d motorapparatus-through which all behavior, acquired a s well a s instinctive, in-dividual as well as social, finds expression. And finally, it p ro ba bly provideshim w ith cert ain basic impulses which urge him toward behavior t h at willsatisf y them. T he na tu re an d num be r of these impulses, indeed their veryexistence, still need t o be established b y careful objective research. N ever-theless, the stu de nt of cul ture is pro bab ly justified in assuming them on thes t reng th of their almost universal acceptance, al thoug h i t is not his prov-ince to weigh th e respective merits of th e wishes of T homa s, the dis-positions of Williams, the drives of Woodworth , he socializing forcesof Su m ner , the residuesJJ of Par eto , an d the co untless similar concepts of1924.P. 56.


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WJRDOCK] SCIENCE OF CULTURE 203other writers. He assumes them, but he recognizes that neither they norany of the other contributions of heredity determine or explain culturalphenomena. At best they merely direct human activities into certain mainchannels. Thus a sex impulse drives men to seek sexual gratification, andpresumably underlies the marriage relation, while other impulses may simi-larly lie a t the root of language, economic organization, religion, etc. Thecomplexes of habit pa tterns which, in human society, surround the variousimpulses and their satisfaction are known as institutions,J which Allportcorrectly regards as clusters of similar and reciprocal responses of a largenumber of individuals rather than as entities in themselves capable of act-ing upon and controlling individuals. The institutions of economic organiza-tion, marriage, religion, etc., which recur in all civilizations because theypresumably have their roots in hereditary impulses or drives, constitutein their ensemble what Wisslerlo has aptly termed the universal culturepattern.I t is of the utmost importance to note, however, that although heredityprobably establishes the broad outlines of the universal culture pattern, itin no way determines the content of the lat ter . Heredity may enable manto speak, but it does not prescribe the particular language he shall employ.It may drive him to some form of sexual association, but the impulse mayfind adequate satisfaction in a wide variety of polygynous, polyandrous,and monogamous relationships. In short, culture owes to heredity only thenumber and general character of its institut ions, not their form or content.Here, where environmental influences alone are a t work, almost infinite di-versity prevails. If we compare human behavior to a fabric in which heredityfurnishes the warp and habit forms the woof, the warp remains everywheremuch the same, for the student of culture is forced to recognize the essen-tialequality and identity .of all human races and strains as carriers of civilization.*lThe woof, however, varies with the number and variety of cultural influ-ences. Since the warp remains comparatively constant, cultural diversitiesare due solely to diversities in the woof. To continue the figure, in the loweranimals, whose behavior consists in the main of instinctive responses, thewoof of habit is so thin and scanty that it scarcely ever conceals the strandsof the warp. To this is due the unfortunate bu t natural tendency of biologi-cal scientists, familiar with the overwhelmingly important r61e of heredity

1927,p.168.10 Pp. 73-97. -l1 Kroeber, 1915, p. 285.


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204 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [N. ., 34, 1932in animal behavior and cognizant of mans animal ancestry, to assume th athuman behavior is necessarily similarly determined and to seek explana-tions of cultural phenomena in terms of race or instincts or other organicfactors. They overlook the fundamental fact tha t, in man, habits, especiallythose of cultural origin, overlie the hereditary warp so thickly tha t it is ex-tremely di 5c ul t to perceive the latte r a t all, as s evidenced by the endlesslyconflicting attempts to reconstruct mans original nature. The studentsof culture, on the other hand, agree tha t explanations in terms of heredityare inadmissible, and tha t an adequate analysis of culture must s tart with arecognition of the unique r61e of habit in human behavior.

Habit alone, however, is far from explaining culture. Many culturelessanimals possess a considerable habit-forming capacity, and some of themammals are in this respect not radically inferior to man. Social scientistsagree, therefore, that culture depends on life in societies as well as on habit.Individual habits die with their owners, but i t is a characteristic of culturethat i t persists though i ts individual bearers are mortal. Culture consists ofhabits, to be sure, but they differ from individual habits by the fact thatthey are shared or possessed in common by the various members of a so-ciety, thus acquiring a certain independence and a measure of immortality.Habits of the cultural order have been called group habits.* To the aver-age man they are known as customs, and anthropologists sometimesspeak of the science of custom.The process of custom forming [asChapin, p. 178,correctly states] is similar to thatof habit forming, and the same psychological laws are involved. When activitiesdictated by habit are performed by a large number of individuals in company andsimultaneously, he individual habit is converted into mass phenomenon or custom.To the anthropologist, group habits or customs are commonly known asculture trai ts, defined by Willey as basically, habits carried in the in-dividual nervous systems. The sociologists, on the other hand, almost uni-versally speak of them as folkways. I5 General agreement prevails, there-fore, tha t the constituent elements of culture, the proper data of the scienceof culture, are group habits. Only the terms employed are at variance.

Of the several terms, folkway possesses certain manifest advantages.Custom lacks precision. Moreover, though it represents adequatelyenough such explicit group habits as words, forms of salutation, and burialpractices, it scarcely suffices for implicit common responses, mental habits,

u Smith, 82; Kroeber, 1928, p. 330.la See Benedict, 1929.14 P. 207.1 See Sumner,1906.


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-4 SCIENCE OF CULTURE 205or ideas, such as religious and magical concepts, which are equally a pa rt ofculture. The term culture trait, though it covers both of these types ofgroup behavior, is also used to include material objects or artifacts, whichare not group habits, indeed not habits a t all but facts of a totally differentorder. Artifacts are not themselves primary data of culture, as is shown bythe recognized distinction between their dissemination by trade and theprocess of cultural diffusion proper.Material objects [says Willey, p. 2071 are considered as the outgrowths of habits;the material cultureis transmitted, in the long run, in terms of knowledgeof how tomake material objects.Culture trait thus suffers from a basic inconsistency which renders itsuse frequently misleading and conducive to confusion of thought. The in-adequacy of the term is tacitly recognized by anthropologists when theypoint out the danger of considering artifacts apar t from their cultural set-ting.Articles of everyday use [says Herskovits, p. 2411, which might seem identical tothe museum worker, may be utilized for vastly different purposes by each of theseveral tribes which employ them and with entirely different emotional reactions.The substitution of folkway for culture trait would obviate all thesedifficulties. The term has never been employed for artifacts themselves butonly for the group habits which surround them-the processes of theirmanufacture, the styles of decorating them, the methods of using them, thecurrent ideas about them, etc. The folkways, in short , supply the social set-ting. T he acceptance of folkway by the science of culture would havethe great advantage of reducing the da ta of the science to a single class ofstrictly comparable phenomena. These phenomena, moreover, are ob-jective behavioristic facts susceptible of repeated verification-an absoluteprerequisite for a scientific study. The attempt in certain quarters to builda sound scientific structure on the quicksand of unverifiable subjectivefacts, such as att itudes, has proved singularly sterile.A study of the behavior of man shows that actions are on the whole more stable thanthough ts.I6

What differentiates the folkway from the individual habit is primarilythe intervention of society. Non-gregarious animals, whatever their habit-forming capacity, could not possibly possess culture. From this it resultsthat culture is superindividual. Individuals, to be sure, are the carriers of

1h,48.


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206 A M E R I C A N ANTHROPOLOGIST IN. S., 34, 932culture; a culture has no real existence save as i t is embodied as habits inthe nervous organization of the individuals who compose the group.A culture is a system of interrelated and interdependent habit patterns or re-sponses.Nevertheless, culture does not depend on individuals. An ordinary habitdies with its possessor, but a group habit lives on in the survivors, and istransmitted from generation to generation. Moreover, the individual isnot a free agent with respect to culture. He is born and reared in a certaincultural environment, which impinges upon him a t every moment of hislife. From earliest childhood his behavior is conditioned by the habits ofthose about him. He has no choice but to conform to the folkways currentin his group. Culture is superindividual, also, in the fact th at its constituentfolkways have in every case a history of their own, a history of their originand diffusion which is quite independent of the lives and qualities of in-dividuals. Even in the case of invention-the formation of a new habitwhich becomes a folkway when adopted by others-the individual is littlemore than the agent of social and historical forces. The study of parallelinventions* shows tha t cultural innovations spring, not full-fledged fromthe brains of their reputed inventors, but from the cultural background orcultural base, in each case as a synthesis of many previous inventions.@While each step in an invention is made by a specific individual, no step can betaken until necessary antecedents have been established, no matter what theabilities of the inventor. Because the inventor utilizes the transmitted culture andis limited by it, . . . t m a y be said that invention is superindividual.*oThis view does not deny or minimize genius, but simply maintains that itis irrelevant to culture. Even more clearly is the history of folkways super-individual. An innovation may spread or stagnate, have its rise and fall,undergo countless historical fluctuations and vicissitudes. But in any case,once launched into the stream of culture, i t is beyond the power of anyindividual to control. Evolution in the folkways, as Keller* has so over-whelmingly demonstrated, is governed by massive impersonal forces.Hence it is both possible and permissible to study the history of a folkway,or the evolution of culture in general, without reference t o individuals ortheir organic and mental characteristics.

11 Willey,207.1 Kroeber, 1917,pp. 196203; Ogburn, 80-102.1 See Gilfillan,530.*o Willey, 210.n 1915.


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YURDOCK~ SCIENCE OF CULTURE 207The fact that culture is superindividual lifts it beyond the sphere of

psychology. As LowiePhas expressed it:the principles of psychology are as incapable of accounting for the phenomena ofculture 89 is gravitation to account for architectural styles.Psychology deals only with the individual. I t can and does study hishereditary traits. I t can also study the genesis of an individual habit, or ofa group habit in the individual. As social psychology i t can concern itselfwith the responses of the individual to his social and cultural environ-ment. But i t is powerless to explain the development of culture. N o psy-chological laws can possibly account for the evolution of the radio, or thediffusion of the use of tobacco, or the spread of the commission form ofmunicipal government. It is a matter of indifference to psychology thattwo persons, instead of one, possess a given habit, but i t is precisely thisfact tha t becomes the starting point of the science of culture.Cultural phenomena, from their independence of the laws of biologyand psychology, may be said to operate in a distinct realm-the super-organic. The concept of the superorganic, though named by Spencer,=was first consistently adhered to by Lippert: and first clearly formulatedand analyzed by Kroeber. According to this concept, the phenomena ofnature fall into three great realms: (1) the inorganic, where the chemicaland physical sciences study the phenomena of matter and energy; (2 ) theorganic, where the sciences of biology and psychology study living organ-isms and their organic behavior; and (3) the superorganic, where the socialsciences study cultural and historical phenomena. The superorganic, t obe sure, rests upon the organic, precisely as the latter rests upon the in-organic. But the science of culture is just as distinct, as to subject matter,laws, and principles, from biology and psychology as the biological sciencesare from those of the inorganic realm. This point of view does not deny thefundamental unity of all nature, nor the legitimacy in each realm of utiliz-ing to the utmost the knowledge acquired in the realm immediately belowit, nor the possibility or even probability that the superorganic may beultimately resolvable into the organic, a i d both into the inorganic. Itmerely maintains that natural phenomena are divided into three realmsof ascending complexity, and tha t the data of each may be most profitablystudied by i ts own students with their own methods and instrumentalities.

4 . 2 5 6 .1 :3-15.

3 188687m 1917.


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208 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST [N. ., 34,1932Although it is society which intervenes between, and in large measure

distinguishes, the organic from the superorganic, society alone, even inconjunction with habit, is insufficient to explain the existence of culture.As Kro eb eP points out:something more than gregariousness is needed to produce culture; otherwise cattlewould possess t.Society alone does not raise behavior to the superorganic plane, for, al-though ma ny lower animals live in societies, none of them possesses cul ture.In this respect a tremendous gulf separates man and the lower forms of life, the an-thropoid apes and social insects not excepted.*The uniqueness of human culture is revealed by a comparison betweenman and the social but cultureless insects. A justly famous passage byKroeber**will lose none of its luster by another repetition.Take a couple of ant eggs of the right sex-unhatched eggs, freshly laid. Blot outevery individual and every other egg of the species. Give the pair a little attentionas regards warmth, moisture, protection, and food. The whole of ant society,every one of the abilities, powers, accomplishments, and activities of the species,. . .will be reproduced, and reproduced without diminution, in one generation. Butplace on a desert island or in a circumvallation two or three hundred human infantsof the best stock from the highest class of the most civilized nation; furnish them thenecessary incubation and nourishment; leave them in total isolation from their kind;and what shall we have? The civilization from which they were tom? One tenth ofit? No, not any fraction; nor a fraction of the civilizational attainments of the rudestsavage tribe. Only a pair or a troop of mutes, without arts, knowledge, fire, withoutorder or religion. Civilization would be blotted out within these confines-not dis-integrated, not cut to the quick, but obliterated in one sweep. Heredity saves for theant all that she has, from generation to generation. But heredity does not maintain,and bas not maintained, because it cannot maintain, one particle of the civilizationwhich is the one specifically human thing.Th e social phenomena of the a nt s are instinctive rather th an acquired,transmitted through the germ plasm rather than through tradition, inshort, biologically rather than culturally determined. All analogies drawnby enthusiastic biologists between human and insect or other animalsocieties, fall to the ground on this point. However strik ing the similaritiesma y appea r, they a re never more than superficial.

1928, .330.* case, xxix.1917,pp. 177-8.


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SCIENCE OF CULTURE 209The oft-cited parallel between human marriage and forms of permanent

mating among certain lower animals, especially the birds, furnishes anexcellent illustration of this fallacy. When a male and a female bird associ-ate in a seemingly monogamous relationship, they do so because they areimpelled by a specific mating instinct. It is an organic rather than a super-organic fact. Man, on the other hand, marries because in the course of hiscultural evolution he has developed around his sexual impulse certain con-ventional taboos and restraints which leave marriage as the proper andsocially sanctioned form of sexual association. The only organic fact in-volved is the sexual impulse or drive; a specific mating instinct is lacking.The impulse urges man only to seek sexual gratification; i t does not evenpredispose him to contract a permanent union; the form of expression ittakes is determined by cultural factors alone.*#The almost infinite varietyof marriage forms precludes the possibility of a specific mating, much lessa monogamous, instinct in man. As Lippertsoso aptly phrases it :the institutionof human marriage is not a subject of natural history but of culturehistory.Nevertheless, the majority of writers on this subject have confused theorganic and superorganic, perhaps none so persistently as Westermarck,alwho thus states his major premise:The marriage of mankind is not an isolated phenomenon, but has its counterpartin many animal species and is probably an inheritance from some pre-human an-cestor.From such a premise he can only reach, for all his wealth of data and hisserious scholarship, conclusions of the utmost unreliability. Yet manystudents of culture, with a n amazing inconsistency, have accepted uncriti-cally the results of a work which violates their every canon.

The analysis of social phenomena among the lower animals demon-strates that society, however essential, is insufficient in itself to explainculture. This fact needs to be stressed, for the danger is, not that the r61eof society may be overlooked, but tha t i t may be overemphasized. Indeed,the tendency among sociologists in particular has been to single out society,not as an outstanding factor in culture, but a s their very subject of studyitself. Thus they commonly define their field, not as the science of culture,but as the "science of society." They ignore the fundamental distinctionbetween the social and the cultural, which Stern" has so clearly pointed out.

See Surnner an d Keller, 3:1495-8.1931,p. 69.a' 132.a 1929.


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2 10 A M E R I C A N .4 NTHROPOLOGIST (N. . , 34,1932Allport,= too, though with a different object in mind, has repeatedly at-tacked what he calls the group fallacy. Not society, but culture is thedistinctively human phenomenon. Those sociologists who have overlookedthis fundamental fact have spent their time seeking social processescommon to ants, cattle, and men alike, and they have found little saveabstractions distressingly suggestive of the conation and cognitionwhich an outmoded psychology once accepted as realities. The sterility oftheir work, as reflected in the contempt for sociology manifested by scholarsin other fields, shows tha t they have been on the wrong track. As a conse-quence, the social anthropologists, whose results have encountered any-thing but a contemptuous reception from historians and others, now findthemselves joined by a rapidly increasing school of cultural sociologists,who realize tha t the proper study of sociology is culture.If society does not suffice to explain culture, just what is it which, whenadded to social life, has made possible the development of culture in thehuman race? Numerous writers have suggested human intelligence as theanswer to this question. It has frequently been pointed out that manstypical manner of adapting himself to his environment differs significantlyfrom tha t of the lower animals. His characteristic mode of adaptation, itis suggested, is mental; that of the animals, physical. The development ofone great physical adaptation, the human brain, has rendered unnecessaryany further important physical specialization, since it enables man, forexample, to invent fur clothing in the Arctic instead of developing a furcoat of his own, or to invent an airplane instead of growing wings. On thebasis of this distinction Kel leP defines culture as the sum or synthesis ofmental adaptations. Biological scientists (e.g., Tilney, 1931) go evenfurther in stressing the importance of the human brain and human intelli-gence. But important as this factor unquestionably is, it by no meanssuffices to explain culture, and it has probably, like society, been consider-ably overemphasized.The distinction between animal and m an which counts is not that of the physicaland mental, which is one of relative degree, but that of the organic and social, whichisone of kind.Recent studiesa6have clearly demonstrated that the anthropoid apes pos-sess intelligence, insight, or ideation, of an order comparable to thatof man, inferior only in degree; th at both apes and men. for example, solve

aa 1924and elsewhere.P. 21.Kroeber, 1917, p. 169.Kiihler, 185-224; Yerkes, 575-6.


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Y U R D o C K ] SC I E N C E OF CU L T U RE 211problems by intelligent behavior as opposed to the mere trial-and-errorlearning characteristic of the rest of the animal world. Yet, in spite oftheir intelligence, the apes lack culture.A realistic view of human culture indicates that the r61e of intelligenceis smaller than many have assumed. It is a truism of psychology and almosta matter of general knowledge tha t the chief use of the human mind is theinvention of reasons or justifications for our beliefs and actions. The scienceof culture has suffered much in the past from rationalization or wishfulthinking, and it should be among the first to minimize the importance ofintelligence in human affairs. Comparatively little intelligence is needed toacquire a habit or folkway, none to preserve it.Most habitual responses [says Bernard, 1926, p. 341 occur on a relatively low levelof consciousness.Intelligence probably plays a more prominent part in the life of the in-dividual than in that of society. A t any rate, practically the only socialprocess in which it demonstrably plays a significant r61e is invention. Yetit is a fact that apes also invent.With the ape inventive but cultureless, the question arises whether we have notperhaps hitherto exaggerated the importance of invention in human culture. Weare wont to think of it as he creative or productive element in civilization.W e tendto view the other processes in culture as essentially those of transmission, preserva-tion, or decay. The idea of progress, which has so powerful a hold on the unconsciousas well as the conscious thought of our day, may have led us to overemphasize thedle of invention. Perhaps the thing which essentially makes culture is preciselythose transmissive and preservative elements. . . .While it would be absurd to deny intelligence any importance in culture,the evidence clearly suggests the need of a search for other factors.

That which distinguishes man from animals, says Anatole France,is lying and literature. This aphorism expresses, with a characteristictwist, a widely if not universally recognized truth. The underlying idea,in more prosaic terms, is that man differs from the animals in the posssesionof language, which undoubtedly goes far to explain his possession ofculture as well as his propensity for both forms of story-telling. Kroebe9*has shown that the lower animals completely lack true language. Theircries, unlike human speech, are instinctive rather than acquired, organicrather than social. They convey to other animals, not objective ideas suchas most human words represent, but merely subjective emotional states,

Kroeber, 1928, p. .+MI.1923, pp . 106-7.


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212 A M E R I C A N A N TH ROPOLOGIST [N. S., 34 , 1932such as suffering or sexual excitement. Thus they are comparable only tosuch words as the ouch uttered by a man unexpectedly pricked with apin.

Since culture is not innate, i t must be acquired anew by each individualand transmitted from generation to generation. I t is this transmission offolkways which insures the continuity of culture in spi te of the imperma-nence of the individual. The folkways thus transmitted consti tute what iscalled the social heritageof the group. But culture is not only continuous;i t is also cumulative.ag New inventions and acculturations from withoutare added t o the stream of culture in each generation, and in most cases thenew does not displace the old. Thus we still retain wine in spite of the laterinvention of distilled spirits, and both in spite of Prohibition. The streamof culture, the socia1 heritage, thus shows a definite tendency to growricher and fuller with the passage of time. This does not mean that culturalacquisitions are never lost, but the lost ar ts of antiquity are few by com-parison with the ar ts which have survived alongside newer inventions.

Both the transmission and diffusion of culture require some meansof communication. Imitation alone seems insufficient. To be sure, certainsongbirds, when reared in the nests of another species, are said to acquireand transmit the songs of their foster-parents. But except for such crudegerms, nothing resembling a social heritage exists among the lower animals.What gives language its importance in human culture is the fact that i talone, with its derivatives such as writing, seems to provide an adequatemeans of communication. It alone makes possible the transmission offolkways, the continuity and accumulation of culture, the very existenceof a social heritage. Without language, man would be li tt le bet ter off thanthe animals, as is proved b y studies of deaf-mutes and other speechlessperson^.'^ In a society without language, each individual would have tobegin exactly where his parents began ; he could possess only individualhabits, not group habits; his behavior, in short, would be confined to theorganic level.

Many authorities have recognized this fundamental r61e of languagein culture.The cultural life of man [says Stem, p. 2671 as distinguished from the social life ofsub-human groups is dependent on articulate language. . . .The most importantinfluence of language on social life is derived through its making possible the accu-mulation and transmission of culture. Recent studies in sub-human animals, es-pecially of anthropoid apes, reveal the presence of m a n y factors upon which culture

z set Toner, 9.(0 BriEault, 1:23-40,


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xvawcx] SCIENCE OF CU L T U RE 213depends, learning, inventiveness, mem ory, even the beginnings of symbolic abs trac-tion. But the absence of an articulate language prevents cultural life in the sensepossessed by men.If the t ransmissive and preserva t ive e lements in cu l ture a r e bas ic , saysKroeber,"then the indispensability of speech to the very existence of culture becomes under-standable. It is the com munications, perhaps, more than the thing comm unicated,that count. A t any rate the fact that speech, o the best of our knowledge, is as tho r-oughly wanting among the anthropoids as is culture, tends to confirm this concep-tion.

Four factors , as we have now seen, have been advanced by var iouswriters, and have received wide recognit ion, as explanat ions of t he fa c tt h a t m an alon e of all livin g cren tur es possesses culture-namely, ha bit -form ing capa city, social l ife, intell igence, an d languag e. Th ese fac tors m aybe l ikened to the four legs of a s tool , ra is ing human behavior f rom thefioor, the organic level or hereditary basis of a l l behavior , to the super -organic level , represented by the seat of the s tool . No other animal issecurely seated on such a four-legged stool. Many live in societies. Somemanifes t no m ean inte ll igence an d habi t - forming capaci ty . N one, how ever ,possesses languag e. J u s t as no one or two of these factors alone can sufficeto explain cu l ture , so no an imal can main ta in an equi l ib r ium on a s too lwi th b u t one or tw o legs. Al l four legs seem necessary t o a t ta in the levelof th e superorga nic, an d m an alone possesses al l.T h e case of th e anthropo id ape s is par ticular ly ins t ruct ive. T h ey possessthree comparatively well-developed legs of the cul tural s tool , lacking onlylanguage. And they app ear to hover on the very verge of cul ture . K o h le Fhas descr ibed th e fads which occur wi th grea t frequency in groups of chim-panzees. Fro m t ime to t im e one of these res tless and cur ious anim als makesan invent ion or discovery, e .g . , sucking water through a s t raw, paint ingobjects wi th whi te c lay, catching an ts on a twig moistened with saliva, teas-ing ch ickens by o5er ing bread in one hand an d jabbing w i th a sharp s t i ckheld in t he other , or c l imbing rapidly to t h e t o p of a pole planted ver t icallyon t he g r ound an d jumpi ng 05 before i t fal ls . T h e res t of the group thentakes u p the innovat ion b y im ita t ion, and for days or weeks th e new prac-t ice rages with al l the vigor of a recent fashion amo ng hum ans , on ly todisapp ear af ter i t s nove l ty has worn off. While the f ad las ts , i t i s cer ta inly

1928, p. 341.1925.


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214 A M E R I C A N A N T H R O P O L O G I S T [N. ., 34, 1932a gro up habit, a n incipient element of c ultu re. Only the absence of language,apparently, prevents the retention and accumulation of such acquisitionsand their transmission to succeeding generations a s a social heritage.Chimpanzee fads, in sh or t, differ from hu m an folkways on ly in the irimpermanency. K ro eb eP would therefore seem to be wrong when he s ta testhat they possess no residuum of unmitigatedly cultural material.Little more t ha n a time elemen t differentiates th e chimpanzee use ofstraw s from the modern American folkway observable in soft-drink parlors,or the apes use of t he ju mp ing stick from hum an pole vaulting. T h echimpanzee seems to be in the position of a man insecurely perched on afour-legged stool of which one of the legs is wanting. He can preserve aprecarious balance only for a short t ime before the s tool overturns andplunges him an d his incipient cultu re once more t o th e organic floor.T h e well-informed reader will find little t h a t is new in th e foregoing,little indeed th at is no t alrea dy widely accepted am on g stu de nt s of culture.B ut this is precisely th e purpose of the art icle, namely, to dem onstrate t h a tan a deq uate conception of t he n atu re an d basis of cultu re alrea dy existsand needs only to be recognized. T h e various par t ial interpretation s ofculture, stressing some of the basic fac tors and neglecting or even d enyingothers , tur n ou t upon examination to be no t mu tually exclusive bu t com-plementary. T h e general recognition of this fact should go far toward clear-ing the air of dogmatism and laying the foundation for constructivecoijperative effort in solving th e manifold prob lems of the science of cul-ture.

BIBUOCRAPRYAllport, F. H. 1924. The Group Fallacy in Relation to Social Science. Journal of Abnormal andSociil Psychology, vol. 19.1927. The Nature of Institution s. Social Forces, vol. 6.Benedict, R. 1929.T h e Scienceof Custom. Century Magazine, vol. 117.Bernard, L. L. 1924. Instinc t. New York.Boas, F. 1928.Anthropologyand Modem Life.New York.B d a u l t , R. 1927. The Mothers. 3 vols. New York.Case,C. M. 1924. Outlines of Introductory Sociology. New York.Chapin, F.S. 1915. An Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution. Revised edition. NewGihillan, S. C. 1927.Who Invented It? Scientific Monthly.Henbv i t s , M . J. 1926. The Cattle Complex in East Africa. American Anthropologist, newKeller, A. G. 1915. Societal Evolution. New York.

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YrraDOCK] SCIENCE OF CU L T U RE 215K6bler, W. 1925. Th e Mentality of Apes. Translated. New York.Krocber, A. L.1915. E i h t c e n Professions. American Anthropologist, new series, vol. 17.

1917. Th e Superorganic. American Anthropologist, new series, vol. 19.1923. Anthropology. New York.1928. Su bh um an Culture Beginnings. Quarterly Review of Biology, vol. 3.Lippert, J. 188687. Kulturgcschichte der M enschheit in ihrem organischen Aufbau. 2 vols.stuttgart .1931. Th e E volution of Culture. T d t c d . New York.Lorrie, R.H. 1917. Cultu re and Ethnology. New York.Ogburn, W. F. 1922. Social Change with respect to Cultu re and Original Nature. New York.Smith, R.G. 1930. Fugitive Papers. New York.Spncer , H. 1882-96. Principles of Sociology.3 vols. London.Stem, B. J. 1929. Concerning the Distinction between the Social and the Cultural. Socialh e r , W. C. 1906. Folkways. BostonSumner, W. ., and Keller, A. G. 1927. Th e Science of Society. 4 voh. New Haven.T h y , F. 1931. T he Master of Destiny, a B w r a p h y of the Brain. New York.Toszer,A. M. 925. Social Originsand Social Continuities. New York.Watson, J. B. 1919. Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist. Philadelphia.Wcstermarck, E. 1922. T he History of Human Marriage. 3 volr. 5th edition. New York.Willcy, M. M. 1929. The Validity of the Culture Concept. American Journal of Sociology,W i d e r , C. 1923. M an and Culture. New York.Yerkes, R. M. and A. W. 1929. The Great Apes. New Haven.

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