MULLA SADRA'S CRITICISM OF mN SINA AND AL-SUHRAWARDI ON THE PROBLEM OF GOD'S· KNOWLEDGE

. Molla Sadrô'nın, Ibn Sina ve Suhraverdi'yi

Allah 'ın Tikelleri Bilmesi Konusundaki Eleştirisi

Bilal KUŞPlNAR ·AR.GOR., S.O.ILAHIYAT FAKÜLTESI. KONYA MCGILL UNIVERSITY. PH.D. CANOlDA TE. CANADA

. · .· ·· ..

ÖZET

· İnsanın-bilgi elde etme silred bugzüi hıilti fel­sefenin. önemli konulanndan birini teşkil etmektedir. İsldm felsefesinde İbn S~JUJ gibi Meşşaf filozoflıu, bilgi . sarecin~ "soywlama kuranu" adını verebileceg;miz bir 'anlay;şla. ·· . açıkkimaya çalışmışkudır. Soyutlama kuranuJUJ giJre, tilmeller insanın bilgi elde etmesilide im önemli rolu oynOmaktadu. Tüm eller, tikellerden · akıl vasuasiyle · soyuılıınarak elde edilir ve böylece te"rf likellere veya olay \'e olgulma uygulmıar'ak bilgi efdŞt­mefT# sağlarlar. ÇöriJldağa gibi .soywla!na ·kuramı,

bilgi siJ!eciıü tilmellerin elde edilme sflrec~ indir- .

INTRODUCTION

The process of lcnowing stili remains asa conırover­sial problem in philosophy. The Muslim Peripatetics, fal­lawing Aristotlc, tried to solve this problem by a theory which can be called "doctrioe of abstraction". According to this doctrine un.iversals play the major role in the process of lcnowing. In this case, they inevitably reduce this process to the acquisition of universals. For if one ex­plains how universals are acquired by the intellect, then one has alsa explain.ed adequately the process of lcnow­ing. According to the same doctrine, universals are ac­quired by abstracting the form from the very existent beings. The universals, acquired in· this manner, are then applied to individual things and phenomena in a process, which in the end yielcıS.Icnowledge. The doctrine of Mus­lim Peripatetics, such as Ibn Sina and al-Farabi, thus sketched in a broad and rough outline, yiclds anather controversial issue in lslamic philosophy when it is ap­plied to explaining God's.lcnowledge of the world. Ii is the purpose of this pa per to examine a dimension of this

lo11mal of lslamic Research Vol: 5, No:l, January 1991

gemektedir. ·Aynı .lauamin, Al/olı 'ın bilgisi sofWiil?ıa·

çöziJ.m getinnek iÇin ·laıllanıunası, İs11Jm~ felsefesin.de Allah.'ın tikelleri bilmesi sonuiunu doğumuışiıu. Büin­diği gib~ İbn Sina gibi MeşşdFier, Allah'ın tikelleri

: tı1mel bir şekilde bildiğini ileri samıelt.tedir. Gaz41f·iSe, · . bıınıın asluıda Allah'ın bilgisini inkar etme ·~ . . . ... -·- ...

geldiğini belirterek bu görüşün Al/olı'ın nqsıl bildiğini · açıkJo!nıııia yetersiZ kaldığım savunniuııu, . Bıuadlı İbn. Sin.a_'nın dayanılığı temelkri tartışarak, SUhraverdf'nin bu konuya Illisıl yakljıştığmı inceleyeceğiz ve SadTIJ'nuı b!ınlfıra getirdiği ekşıirileri sunmaya çalışacağız.

issue as reflectcd ·in Sadra's critique of Ibn Sina and ai­Suhrawardi, two promincnt philosophers who belong to diffcrent schools of thought in Islamic philosophy; Mash­sha'l and lshraqi respectively.

As is well known, the best authentic study can be carricd out only by a thorough and careful examination that covers the whole available data. In the present sı udy, however, we cannot claim that we have done jus­tice to the whole set of writings of our fıgure, Mulla Sadra. This would have been 'veıy diffıcult for us to do, becali6C of a few obvious reasons. First of all, Sadra's owri method in exposing his doctrines, which takes various forms in various places, prevented us from cap­turing a full picture of his own views. It is the very charac­ıcıistic of Sadra to involve himself predominantly with making critiques of his predecessors in exposing his idcas. Therefore one would fail ~o grasp his original views unless he or she has made a thorough study of his writ­ings. In his Magnum Opııs, for instance, al-Asfar al­Arba'a, which we have mainly referred to in this paper,

45

46 MULLA SADRA'S CRJTICISM OFffiN SINA AND AL-SU liRA W ARDI ON TIIE PRORLEM OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

be rather citicized the previous doctrines in regard to God's knowledge and tberefore did not put foıward his own tbeoıy as decisively as he did in his Kitab al­Masha'ir, which is more precise buı much shorter than theformer.

Anather reaason for the diffıculty of the present re­search is that the topic itself, viz. Sadra's theory of God's Knowledge, due to the large amount of material, deser­ves an independent dissertation rather than a brief pa per !ike the present one. Since the topic is very broad, here I have prefered to concentraıe exclusively on only two scbools of Muslim philosophy, not even schools, buı

simply the founders of them: namely Ibn Sina and al-Suh­rawardi.

The method which I have foUowed is not critical­analytical, but mostly analytical-expository. The primary reason for this is that the intention is only to gra~p the theory of Sadra in respect to God's knowledge as ac­curately and adequately as possible for us. That is why here we have been satisfied to introducc his ideas by ex­tracting them primarily from the two works mentioned above. Nonetheless, we have occasionally u~d . a com­paraıive approach particularly when trealing the other philosophers besides Sadra.

I. Mu Ila Sadrats Theory of Godts Knowledge

Sadr al-Din Muhammad ai-Shirazi (979-1050/1571-1640) as a Muslim existential.ist philosopher and theosopher seems to have based his doctrine of God's knowledge on a critical coordination of the rational and gnostic argumenıs, the rooıs of which mighı be ıraecd to the philosophers prior to him. The task of preseniing Sadra's theory of God's knowledge and puıting it ina sys­tematie form is, as eited in the introductfön, extremely complicated owing to the basic characıeristic of Sadra's pbilosophy that seems to have been based upoo modify­ing previous traditiOns by refutation, criticism and ap­praisal.

lo his Kitôb al-Asfiir ai-Arba'a (the Foıu Joumeys) Sadra appears to have fully etaborared his philsophical as well as theosophical views. Therefore, this book takes priority over his othçr worlcs. In this book he begins to eoumerate the previous philosoph_ers' argumenıs on God's knowledge and puts them in seven diffcrenı

caıegories each of which he either acknowledges or

modifies partially or rejects completely. These seven various views could be summarized as follows:

ı. The view of the adherenıs of the Peripaıeıic School, like two Muslim masıers, AhO Nasr al-Farabr and AbO 'AJf ai-Tlusayn Ibn sına, and Bahmanyar, and Ahu ai-'Abbas at-I..awkarf and so on. According to this school, the forms of the contingenıs are imp.rinted (inisiim) in God's Essence, and they are mcntally acıual­ized in His Essence in a universal way.1

2. The existence (wujlld) of the things in external reality, whcther they be separate from matter or be mat­ter or composiıe or simple, is the bac;is of Ilis knowledge. This is the view of the followers of the ~toic School, like Shihab al-Din ai-Maqtül ai-Suhrawardl, Nasir al-Din ai­Tusi, lhn Kammuna, ai-'AIIama Qutb al-Din ai-Shirazi, and Muhammed Shahrazuri.2

3: In the third category, Sadra enunciatcs the view aıtrihuted to Porphyry hy lbn Sina and. al-Suhrawardi, which admits that God's being is unilied with intclligible forms?

4. Here comeş Plato's thcory of ideas. Molla Sad ra articuıaıes this vicw as: ''1lıe po.citulaıe of the separaıe forms and intclligible images, thcsc are the knowledge of the Divinity, and God knows all the existing things by vir­ıue ofthese formsand images."4

5. In this place, our philosopher Mulla Sadra puts Mu'ıazilites' opinion claiming that the non-existenı con­tigenıs have some sort of existence before their actual ex­isıence. In other words, the Mu'tazilites hold that God knows the things by reason of the subsistence of the non­existent 'things in cternity. Sin~ this view, says Sad ra, at­ıribuıes existence to the absenı contingenıs, it draws near to that of Sufıs who proclaim that these contingenı

things, before their acıual_!:xistence, _s_l!bsist intelligibly, though not concreıety as the Mu'tazilitcs held.5

6. In the sixth and seventh section, Mulla Sadra presents the views of the two unqualilied groups of philosophers. According to some philosophers, God's es­sence is universal knowledge of all the conıingents. As God · appreheods His essence, He accordingly ap­prehends all the things in one knowledge. Furthermore, the Iate philosophers of this school a~pı that God as a Necessary Exisıenı has two kinds of knowledge: (a) Universal knowledge ('ilm ij!71ôü) that precedes its ob­jecıs, and (b) deıailcd knowledge or particular knowledge ('ibn taffiÜ) töat corresponds ıo them.6

ı. Sadra,AI-AsJar, vol. III, the Third Mawqif, the Fourth Fas!, ts. 2-3. pı ~)l.)L l,.pj "1~ L,.i 4J~.ı..ıı;.) ..:ıl:.UI.J.JJ rW) 2. In the printed text of al-AsflJr, th.ere seems to have been writıcn misıakcnly ai-Shahrisı<1ni, si nce ıhe work, Kitôb ol-Shojura cited

ıherein by Sad ra Bclongs to the latter. See, Henry Corbin. Le l.iiTI: /H l.o Soxe.rse Oriema/e, 1986, pp. 59-60. In regard to the second view. Sadra's original expn;.ssion is: 4c .)w .c.:.tWJ.~~L-..ıl ~~~.,. ~ı.,,l. _,ı ~ı,_,.. .:.;lS' . ı_,...t}LI.,J .t.,..:."1 ı .)JJ•r<.ı lbid, ıs. 3-4.

3. lbi.d, 1.5. lJ_,ı.JI....,..ıl t' uı.ıl\c 4. ı.ıs- .;.l,.;t)I.J.ıı ,.ı... 4c L:4JI rJs ~~.ı~~ J:.ll.ıuJuıı....,..ıı ~ı;ı lbid,Js, ~-1. 5. lbid. 6. lbid.

İslami Araşttrmalar Cilt: 5, Sayı: 1, Ocak 1991

BİLAL KUŞPlNAR

7. Some other philosophers, Sadra proceeds, claim that God's essence is the detailed knowledge of the fırst caused; and the essence of the fırst caused is the detailed knowledge of the sı:cond caused and the universal knowledge of that which is other than the second caused, and So this goes on successively to the other existent things? •

Having classifıed the various views, Sadra focuses on his major concem, the question of whether or not God's knowledge is identical with God, a question which is alsa intrinsically related to the attributes of God. In this context, the view of the Mu'tazilites first has under­gene the severe attack of Sadra on two grounds. Firstly, in canırast to the assertian of the Mu'tazila School, the non-existenı things, according to him, cannot exist at all unless they are endowed with real existence. Secondly, these non-cxistent things, even though they are con­sidered to subsist before their coming int o real exisıence, cannot be separate from God Himself.8 In other words, the problem of God's knowledge in the hands of the Mu'tazila School turns out to be of a two-fold operation; one is concerned with "God's knowledge", the other with "separation ol knowledge from God Himself". To the first question, their response that God knows the things before !heir acıual existence, namely in the state of "sub­sistence", is invalid, since, a view as such, according E Sadra, would necessarily entail that God's objects.~ knowledge are simply the essences which are found in the position of "subsisıence" (thubut). However, this is unacceptable, because essences, in his view, have no reality on their own part. On the other hand, Sadra rejects the Mu'tazila's view that God's knowledge is apart from God Himself, saying that, on the contrary, GQ!i..'ş__kııcmıle.ç!ge is j_d_ç__nji<;<!!.~l.lı. Him, _S9, ac.cording tp him, "the position of the Mu'tazilites is mistaken, be­cause non-existent things (a "square circle" and the like, which they considered . acıually subsist in God's Knowled~e) do not exist at all (in the way they had posited)."

In this paper, since we are concerned primarily to · set out Sadra's own view of·God's knowledge in connec­

tion with the views of his ıwo predecessors, Jbn Sina and Suhrawardf, we shall focus on the first two views, lcaving aside the rest· of them.

Il. lbo Sina And The Simple Being

Among the seven various views enumerated above, the fırst one that all the contingenı forms are inscribed in

7. lbid.

47

God's essence and known to Him intetligibly in a univer­sal manner has been ascribed by Mutıa Sadra to the Peripatetics and particularly to ai-Farabi and Ibn Sina. Therein he makes no criticism nor justifıcation of this point. However, when he later begins to examine each view separately and at length, he relates to a greaıer or tesser extent the quotations from the eminent works of the representatives of this view. As far as lbn Sina's theory of God's knowledge is concerned, Sadra fırst dea ls with the distinction between intelieel and intelligible, and hqw they are related to each other. From there on, he moves to the Platonic Forms which have been sornewhat misundersood by lbn Sina and greatly misinterpreted by his disciple; Bahmanyar.

As has been just pointed out above, Sadra's first aim is to elucidate the interconnecıed relationship be­tween the knower and the objecı known, which has been considered by Ibn Sina as distinct; whereas, according to Muııa Sadra, they are absolutely unifıed and indistin­guishable.

In the very beginning of 'his discussion canceming the "imprint of the forms of the thin gs in God Himself', Sadra refers us to Jbn Sina's way of getting knowledge. lt seeins that according to Jbn Sina there are two' ways to acquire intelligible forms. An intelligible from, lbn Sina says, is derived either from the external form, !ike, for in­stance, the form "sky" is acquired from the sky in reality, or it is derived not from the external existent but rather vice-versa. Namely, .the intelligible form first occurs to the ·intellectual power and then establishes it. In other words, while in the former the form of a thing is depend­ent enlirely on the concrete existent, in the Iatter, however, it exists fırst in the mind and then in the reality. God's knowledge, says lbn Sina, is of the second manner, namely that is what makes things exist is God's knowledge of them. 10 To put it in anather way, for Ibn Sina, God's knowledge is active (fi71j, in which the· form initiates and causes things to exist, whereas man's knowledge is passive (inji'liü), in which the form is abstracted from the very existent beings_ll In the active position, the forms would be the cause for the existence of the known in reality; white, in the passive one, they would be based on the real existing things.

In referring once again to the example of the house, Sadra objecıs to Ibn Sina, saying that the builder's knöwledge of the house seems to afford no complete and

8. lbid, The Fifth FasL 9. Sadra,A/-Hilana al-'Arshiya (The Throne of the Wisdom), trans: James Winsıon Monis. Princeton University Press, 1981, p.107. 10. Al-lshllrllt, vol. lll, p. 707; Sadra, al-Asfôr, Fasl 6. 11. Sadra, lbid.

Journal of lslamic Research Vol: 5, No: I, January 1991 . · ... - .. - ~ ..

48 MULLA SADRA'S CRJTICISM OF mN SINA AND AL-St.'TIRA W ARDI ON 11-tE PROBLEM OF GOD'S KNOWI;-EDGE

necessary cause of the acıuar existence of the house, since, io order to build it outside, we stili need some sup­.plements such as instrument, definite location, specifıc time and other similar conditions.12 This example, ı here- ' fare, according to Sadra, even though it points to the ac­tive aspect of God's knowledge, cannot be used for this purpose, just because it falls short of reflecting His full creative knowledge. So Sadra replaces it by his own ex­ample in drawing an analogy bctween "Gad and His knowledge" and actor and his acı. Ile thus maintains that "the re la tion of all thin gs in this world to Gad Himself is just !ike the relation of the acı of the free actor to the acıor himself, or the relation of the compilation of the book of wisdom to the author himself ... "13 In thcse ıwo similitudes, there seems only one active figurc; bence in case of the action there is the actor, and in rclation to the book we have the author. Neither acıor nor author do need any accidcntal instrument to carry out thcir ac­tivities.

On the other hand, Sadra oppos~s to the estab­lishment of a relationship betwecn God and man in any respect, and particularly in the subject of their distinct knowledge. In his view, if we accept that Gad's knowledge of things is similar to 9ur knowledge on the ground that man, !ike Gad, firsı thinks up an image in his mind and then actualizes it outside, and so man's knowledge as such, as God's knowledge, is the cause of the thing outside, in that case we would be mistaken for reducing God's pure knowledge to man's mixed knowledge. Nevertheless, man, Sadra argues, can ac-

. quire the image of som~thing only aftcr having per­formed some necessary procedures such as thinking and imagining, and so on. Besides, he alsa needs·some·other necessary materials to bring into reality the plan he pas-

. sesses; whereas Gad, owing to His complete Being, needs nothing to create a thing, as expressed in this verse: "When His corrimand wills something, He says to it, be! and it is."14

Sadra's attack against lbn Sina on the example of "house" seems to be convincing only when God's

. knowledge is considered to be enlirely different from that of man. However, when refering to lbn sına's own works for the safce of clarity of tlııe issue at band, it is real­ized easily that Ibn Sina's intention is not to make Gad resemble man, but most likely to point out the transcen-

12. lbid. 13. lbid. 14. The Qur'an, 36: 82.

dental aspect of Gad. Thcn it seems that Jbn Sina has ex­ploited that example symbolically for the fallawing pos­sible reasons: ı. To notc that Gad's knowledge precedes the existence of things and bence does not depend on them, 2. to depict that God's knowledge is active and creative, and 3. to show that God's knowledge is simple and pure. I could find Jbn Sina's example of "house" only in his work, Danish Nfbna-i 'ala 'i (1be Boôk of Scientific Knowledge), in which he argues:

All things are known to lt, then, due to Iıs own es­sence. It does not become a knower of things because lı is caused by them, buton the contrary, I ıs knowledge is the cause for the existence of all things. Similar to such knowledge is the (scientific) knowledge of the buiider with regard to the form of the house he has received. His canception of the form of the house is the cause of this form in the extemal reality, which is the cause of the builder's knowledge. But the form of the heavens is the ca use of the form of our knowledge because the heavens exist: 15

In al-lslıiirfit, however, lbn Sina proclaims that the intclligible forms are acquired in two ways:

The intelligible forms are derived from the extemal forms, like the form •sı..-y• that is derived from the sky itself. But they also might come first to the in telleetual power and then gain existence in the reality, like for in­stance, you lirst conceive a shape csnakJ) and then give it existence. And It is necessary tor the Necessary Exis­tent to conceive all (al-kul/) according to the second way.ı6 _

The commentatar of ai-Jsharaı, Nasfr al-Din ai­Tusf, while interpreting the text above, turns his alten­tion to the distinction of knowledge as "active'' (fi'li') and i•passive" (infi'iili']. For him, although Ibn Sina seems not to have made any explicit separation of knowledge as such, he, however, has implied it by his distiction of the forms. lt is for this reason that our philosopher Sadra as indicated earlier, attributed this distinction to · ıbn Sina and thereby eriticized his· example of "house" wıiich was givcn by the laıtcr to reflecı the creative and active aspects of God's knowledge. 17 It should be noted that ai­Tusf, unlike Ibn Sina, and !ike Sadra, avoids applying the distinction of this sorı to the knowledge of Gad. In his famous treatise of knowledge, he articulates that "Gad's knowledge is neither of them (viz. fi'/i' and infi'ali); SÔ the statcment that God's whole knowledge is active (fi'li') is

. not true at all".18 By the expressian "the sıatement that

15. The Metaphysica of Aı•icenna, trans. Parviz Morewedge. London, 1973. p. 61). 16. lbn Srna,!slıtlrtlt Ma'a Sharh Nasira~-Din al-Tas~ vols. DI-IV, pp. 706-7. 17. Al-Asfdr, Vol. III, Fasl, 7. 18. AI-Tiısi, Slıarh al-Mas'alat al-'Rm (The Explanation of the Problem of Knowledge), 1385, p. 21.

İslam/ Araştınnalar Cilt: 5, Sayı: 1, D_cak _199!._

BILAL KUŞPlNAR --

God's whole knowledge is active is not true", ai-TOsi in­tends ftOSSibly to reject Ibn Sina's proposition quoted above. 9 Yet it is astonishing that ai-TOsi remains sorne­what silent in his commentary on al-Ishiirfit, in which he

) makes simply the distinction in question without eriticiz­ing Ibn Sina.

As it has been pointed dut above, Ibn Sina's primary goal in his view that God's knowledge precedes the form to be known is to esiablish the fact that God's knowledge cannot derive from things, since such a view, for him, would make God dependent upon something other than Himself. This is the gist of'Ibn Sina's doctrine of God's knowledge, that appears in alması all of his works. In his al-Shifti, as noticcd by Sadra also, he argucs as follows:

lı is not possibte for the Necessary Ex:istent to conceive things from things themselves; if it were so, His es­sence would be either constitutcd of what he conceives, and hen ce would be constitutcd of things, or accidental to the things to be conceived, in which case Ilc would not be the Necessary Existent in any way whatsoever. But this is impossible ... 1 Ie is, therefore. the origin or principle of all beings, and He conceives by rcason of Ilis essence that lle himself is the origin of 1 limsclf and also the origin (mabdo ') of all the exisıents in the ir very realiıy ... 10

1, It has become cıear then that God's knowledge o~

things, according to lbn Sina, is not produccd by things, on the contrary, they exist as a consequence of 1 I is knowledge of them. One of the ultimate reasons for this idea is that God's knowledge is eternal, unchangcahle, universal and intellectual, in canırast ıo man's knowledge that is ıemporal, changeable, parıicular and mostly pcr­ccpıual . . Strictly spcaking, . for lbnSrna, the Necessary Bcing passesses an insıantaneous knowledge in which everything is ordered according ıo the principle of causaliıy (cause-cffect). This poinı is made clear by him as follows:

Do QOt think that if God's knowledge of. objects pes­sessed many foiıns. then the multiplicity of the forms that He apprehends would consıitute the parts of Ilis essence. In that case, sin ce by means of His apprehen­sion of His essence He apprehends llimself, and then apprehends . all that which are posterior to Ilim (Ma ba'tklıu), how rould. these forms come after Ilis es­sence? His apprehension of His essence is the ca use of

His apprehension of (things) that whieh come after Hi.s cssence. Thus His appreherision of (things) that which rome after His essence is the effect (ma'/Q/) of His apprehension of His cssence.2t

49

All that has been said so far by lbn Sina is sum­marized elaborately by his commenıator, al-TOsi:

Since the First apprehends His essenc.: by means of Ilis essence and because His essence is the cause of multiplicity, it follows that He apprehends multiplicity because of His apprehension of His cssence by means of Ilis essence. Thus. his apprehension .of multiplicity i.s a concomitant effected by Him, and the forms of ~ultiplicity, which are the objects of His apprehcnsion, are also His effects and His concomitants ranked in the orde( of effects and. therefore posterior to the reality ?l His essence as an effecı is posterior to its ca use ...

Then, as noted above, God's knowledge of thingS is hascd exclusively on Ilis apprehension of Ilis essence which constiıutes the cause of the multiplicity of them. Now when we revert again to our philosopher, Mulla Sadra, we lind him agreeing wiıh lbn Sina on the whole or the premises which have been presented so far. IIowever, oh specilic points which we shall treat now, he seems to oppose Jhn Sina and refute him on several grounds.

One of the apparen.ı disagreements between lbn Sina and Mulla Sadra in regard to God's knowledge lies in the qucstion a~ to how this knowledge is related to God I rimself. This is .a question whose ramilications are twofold: ı. What is the re la tion of God's knowledge of His essence to TJimself 2. What is the rclation of God;s knowledge of all Lhings Lo Himsell'? ı:-o the lirst quesLion which seems simpler than the other, lbn Sina offers an answer Lhat God as a Neccs.~ry Being is the Knowledge ( 'ilm), the Knowing ('alim) and the object known (ma'lüm). And since ıhese three qualities, lbn Sina proceeds, are indisıinguishable from one anoıher, they ncvcr involve any multiplicity in God's Bcing.23 This .being so, God, for him, is one simple reality, and His knowledge of Ilimself is identical with TJimself. On Lhis parıicular issue, i.e. God's knowledge of Tiimself, Mulla Sadra seems to he of the same opinion sincc he at least remains silent wiıhout saying anyıhing for or against ft.

19. 1bn Sina's original words: . ..;I!Jı ~..ıı.;.. JS:ll u- ·~..ıı ~~~ .u..., ı. ;;,,h ,:ıl~

ai-Tüsis eıcpression: . ..;... .,.,ı.,;.; .JS' .s~l,ll ~;;,lı J.,..ıı ;;,iü lhid. 20. Al-Shifô, aı-llahiy3t ll. pp. 358-9. 21. Ib id., p. J6.1. 22. al-Tusi. Slıarh al-lshôrôı, trans. Nicholas lleer. The Precious Pcarl Al-Jômi'sAI-Durralı al-Faklıirah, Albany. 1979. p. 45: see for its

original Arabic text, ai-IsMrat, vols. 34, p. 713. 23. lbn Sina, "ai-Risalah ai-'Arshiyyah", in Rastıil a/-Shayklı lbn Sina. lntashatat Baydar. n.d. pp. 248 see for another connotation or

the same sıatement, al-Shiftı ll. p. 357. Thercin lhn Sina u~es the ıerm 'aql instead of 'ilm. namcly God is Intcileel ('aql), Intcl­ligent ('ôqil) and l nıclligilıle (ma'qQ/).

Journal of lslamic Research Vol:. S, No.:J, January 1991 -·-- .- - . · ... - - ":" ..

SO MULLA SADRA'S CRJTICISM OF IBN SrNA AND AL-SL't IRA W ARDI ON THE PROBLEM OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

The most problematic issue for both of the philosophers, i.e. Ibn Sina and Sadra, is how God's knowledge of forms and ,objects can be logically linked with God Himsetf without endangering His absolute unity, and how such a knowledge can be plausibly expli­cated. To begin with, Ibn Sina bolds that God ap­prehends the multiple thin gs by virtue of Ilis apprehen­sion of His essence and that these t.hings come to Ilim as posterior concomitants (lilzima.tun muta-akhkhiratwı),

and never enter into His essence as constituents of Him.24 Furthermore, in Ibn Sina's view, the forms and objects known to God exist intelligibly in Ilis essence as "concomitants". Or strictly speaking, they are rather im­printed in His essence as "posterior accidcnts or con­comitants".25 If these forms were not in such a_state, i.e. in the state of "posterior concomitants", then, Ibn Sina continues, they would jeopardize the unity of God:

If you made these formsapart of His essence, then the multiplicity would occur to Him; or if you made them additicnal to His essence, in that case, the contingency would attach to His essence, and bence He would be no tonger Necessary Be ing; or if you made them inde­pendent things by their own essence, then they would become Platonic Forms .. u

As is obvious, Ibn Sina's besitatian is that God's uniqueness and simplicity would be destroyed by an er­roneous relation between the forms and His esscnce. These forms should not be attached at any rate to the ab­solutely Necessary_ Being. Rather they should be take~ as "the necessary consequences" or "concomitants", which are inscribed in His Being in a causa\ and effective or­dered manner.27·Furthermore, thesı; forms, befoı:e thcir actual existence, are conceived by Gocl; however it does not mean that God conceives them only in thcir status .of forms, on the contrary, their existence and their intellec­tion by God is one and the same fact. So, according to lbn Sina, when we say that, since God ~nceiv~ the forms, then they come in to existence, we subsequently ac­knowledge that their apprehension and their existence are one and the same thing for God.ıa It is debatable, however, wbat exactly lbn Sina means bere by the term existence. ·

24. Al-Jsh/Jrtıı, vi:ıls. m-IV, p. 715. 25. Al-Shi/4, al-ll4Jıiyaıll, p. 364. 26. lbid, p. 365; Sadra, al-Asf/Jr, Vol. m, Fasl, 7. 27. Al-Shi/4, al-/Wiiyaı/1, p. 365. 28. lbid. See also, al-Asfbr, Fasl. 7.

This theory of lbn Sina is mostly admitted by Mu Ila Sadra, except for only one significant point that is the position of the forms to God as "posterior concomitants". Th.is parlieular point is also concemed closely with the issue of Platonic Forms and that of identity of the knower and the knowledge that has been originally ascribed to Porphyry. In the first place, Muııa Sadra af­fırms lbn Sina's view of God's knowledge of multiplieity that flows from Himself in an ordered way of causes and effects by means of His apprehension of Ilis essence. After that, he makes a little moclification to the part of the existence of forms, declaring that "it is not the case that the forms are fırst intellected and then they come into existence, or they fırsı exist and thcn are intel­lected; but rather they exist intelligibly and are in­tellected existcntially".29

The most scv~re criticism against lbn Sina on this qucstion, viz. God's knowledge of forms as "posterior concomitants" is made by'Nasir al-Din at-TOsi'wbo holds that in apprehending. I I is cssence as well as the other things, God does not need any form other than "the form of Ilis own essence" 'and "the form of the emanation",30

and by al-Suhrav,:ardi who claims that to aııribute "acci­dents" and "posterior qualities" to God means to destroy Ilis absolute perfection, since, in that case, Ilis essence would be a substratum for those qualities, which means that Ilisessence would be eventually affccted by them.31

In the case of ai-TOsf, what God perceives is God Him­self, and when Ile pcrceives things other than Himself, His perception implies some sorı of participation by them; there are not two forms at all, side by side for the apprehender to apprehend them, but rather what malces lhem double, he- says, is "your- mental considerations -(i'tibtirlit) connected with your essence and that form only".32 AI-Tılsi's critique of Ibn Sina, as noticed above, intensifıes on the point that God cannot be a place for the forms, since such a view leads us to ad mit that Gocl is both an agent (fô'il) and recipient (qôbil); in this case, Ilis being would be a substratum for Ilis multiple-conlin­gent effects, whereas He is exalted above this. In this issue, ai-TOsi seems to have shared the same vicw witb ai­Suhrawardi who alsa held, as indicated above, that the very bcing of God cannot become a substratum for the

29. Text: •·~Y ~ .. ll_,ı.... .:.~_, J. .:.ıı...ı .:.~.ul.:.~_,.ı ~ lt,;.-.) 1+!. al-Asflir, Fasl. 7. 30. AJ-To.sr; Slı{uh al-IsMrdt, vols. DI-IV, p. 714. 31. AJ-Suhrawardf, "Kit4b at-MutaMr.i", MajmCt'ah-i Musannafaı Shaykh-i lshraq, ed. Henry Corbin, 2nd ed., Teheran and Paris,

1976, p. 481, par. 207. 32. AJ-TO.Si, op. ciL, p. 715.

İslamf Araştınnalar Cilı: 5, Sayı: 1, Ocak 1991

>

BİLAL KUŞPlNAR

accidents at all, as he himself expounds in the fallawing p~ge:

As to their statement .(i.e. of Peripatetics) that "His es­sence indeed is a substratum for the multiple acci­dents, but (being so) His essence is not affected _by them (i.e. by these accidents), we should remind that this sıatement has some meaning in itself for the ig­norant to think. He (the ignorant person) esıimates that the "affect" (infi'ôl) is not used but only in the case of renewal (rajaddud) as u nderstood from the categoıy of "Possivity" (an yanfa'il). lt is of no ıise to him, since, even though the renewal affect is not necessitated by the existence oJ the accident, however, the variety of the requirement and the reception becomes attached necessarily (to essen ce), as mention ed previously, it is "acı" in one respect and "reception" in another. Then how can an intelligible person believe that an essence can be a substratum to accidents without being qualified by them? And how would the quiddities be qualified with attributes in that essence, untcss they would be the suhstratum for ıhem?33 ,

As noticed, for both al-TOsl and ai-Suhrawardi, what seems to be dangcrous for the uniqucness .of God is tô bring forms int o His very essence so as to ma kc Ilim con­

ccive other thin gs. And both of thcm ma kc an efforı to · save God from characterizing Ilim with any additicnal or

accidental forms. If put into a simplc qucsıion, why does J

God asa Sclf-existcnt and Necessary Being necd oth~ things besides Himself to be a knower? In as mu ch as the

so-callcd concomitants (lawazim), no matter what they

and their nature are, are establishcd in the bcing of God,

they would produce multiplicity in Ilis csscnce anyway, and hcnce they would change the etcrnity and the neccs­sity of God on the account that they would connecı Him with -Cö-ntingciıts .. Thls means"üiiı"ı "dod wöuici ·no langer

be the Necessary Being.

Now Jet us· go back to our philsophcr, Sadra, and

have a look at his opinion of· the critiqucs directcd

againsı Ibn · Sina. As remarked previously, Sadra's

criticism of lbn Sina stresses his dcscription of forms as

"postcrior concomitants" and as "imprintcd in God's es­sence", to which we shall rcfer in the succecding lines. As

for the rest of lbn Sina's prcscnt theory, Sadra appears

to be in agreement with him. He does not only agree

with Tbn Sina but also dcfends him on ccrtain points against the severe attacks of ai-Suhrawardi and ai-TOsi. The most relentless objection of both philosophers to

lbn Sina, as citcd carlicr, is the question as to how God

33. Al-Sul:ırawardi. op. ciL, p. 481; and Sad ra, al-Asftır, Fasl. 7. 34. Sadra, al-Asftır, vol. lll. Fas!, 7. 35. lbid. 36. lbid.

. .. fouma.f. oflsJ..a!1JiÇ_ Researcl! VoL·.5, Ng_:J, .[qnıiary l991 . . . .

sı

can be a substratum for the.accidents; it, ·they say, is im­pos.<iible, just because such a view implies change and mul­tiplicity in the being of God. To this, Sadra replies that Ibn

Sfna has never said in his works that God's being is a sub­stratum for the accidents. This statement, however, he says, was later stated explicitly by Babmanyar in his book,

al-TahsiL 34 On the other han d, Sad ra continues, Ib n Sina

has not intended to attach aoy extrinsic forms at all to God by his "posterior concomitants" which, as he himself

citcd, are not at any ra te the constituents of His essence whaısoever. Furthermore, lbn Sina's insistence upon the

con·cept of "simple being" representing the being of God is alsa a uniquc evidcnce to prove that God's knowledge of

forms and God himself are one and the same?5 When

wc look carcfully we can see that, Sadra implies that both ai-Suhrawardi and al-TOsf take God as a Subject and

forms as Objccı. And in any relationship, one of thcm should be attachcd to the other; otherwise, in their view, thcrc would be no knowledge. Iiı this case, !here would sccm to be two separate entities whose natures are dis­

ıinct. So, insofar as God as a subject, e.g. apprehender

gcıs in touch with the object, He is in possession of it. If

wc think from thisstandpoint, for Suhrawardfand ai-Tusr,·

it is hardly possible to save God's absolute perfection from

the attachment of the contingents. The ultima te solution ıo this complcx issue, for Sadra, might be that God's

knowledge of forms is identical with God ·mmself. ~d kccping in mind that God is a simplc being,· HiS ·

knowledge of forms and His attributes must be _con­

ccivcd not as distinct but as absolutely identical with His simple reality. Thcrefore, Ibn Sina's treatment of God's

cognitive forms ncvcr posits any multiplicity in His very

bcing. From this point, Sadra moves a little further and·

dcclarcs that God does not know things as we know them,

since in His case, the occurence of the forms is His very

cogınition of thcm, and that is why His knowledge is so

simple, whercas in our case, we know them arter they

occur to us?6

One of the severe aııacks of Sadra against lbn Sina is intcnsifıcd, as mentioned above, on his denial of the idcntity of the intcllccı and the intelligible attributed to Porphyry. He wonders how lbn Sina claims, on the one hand; that God's cognitive forms and His being are one and the same and denics, on the other hand, the ideİltical

52 MULLA SADRA'S CRITICISM OF mN SINA AND AL ..SU I IRA W ARDI ON ll fE PROBLEM OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE

unification of the fonn and the perceiver.37 As it is recalled, Sadra, having been inspired from this principle of unification, has proved that God's being and His knowledge are identical.

As a coroUary of this unification, Sadra first poses the queslion of Platonic Forms and their rela­tion to God. Here he accuses Ibn Sina of having misunderstood and misintefPreted the Platonic Forms as separate from God.38 Iofact, 5ays Sadra, Plato did not proclaim that these forms are distinct from God's being, on the contrary, he toolc them as identical with God.

The most relentless attaele of Sadra against Ibn Sina on the present issue is related to the question of

"the imprint of the cognitive forms in God's mind".39

Sadra declares openly that God's cognitive fonns cannot

be described, as Ibn Sina and other Peripatetics held, as "imprinted" (murtasim) in His essence, since such a view would violate the principle of identity betv.:een Gad and

His knowledge. Nar can these forms be talcen only men­tally, but existentially as well. The obvious fallacy of Jbn

Sina's treatment of forms, is not be~use there would be

multiplicity in God's being, but rather becausc he regarded them to be mental and "imprinted" in the es­

sence of God. Sadra immediately objects to this view, as­serting that the forms of God's knowledge are existenlially

identical with God, yet conceptually distinct. In addition,

they cannot be deseribed as "imprinted" nor "accidcn-tal".40 .

Although Sadra rejects Ibn Sina's theory of God's knowledge on several grounds that we- haveiöoicated above, he, nonetheless, forms his own theory. Further­more all existence has been explained by him by virtue of this primary concept. God as a simple being is the most perfcct Being in which all existence is present. In likc, manner, Platonic Forms, Attributes and the Intelligibles of Peripatetics are existentially unified with this simple Being. In Sadra's ~yes, therefore, this simple Being, viz. God, knows all things, particulars as well as unjversals, because he encompasses all existence-as His manifesta­tions, and because His existence and His knowledge are co-extensive. ·

37. Ib id., Fasl, 7. ·

Ili. AI-Subrawardi a nd Theory of Ligbt

As we have remarlced iq the beginning of the preceding part, Muııa Sadra has put al-Tusf and al-Suh­rawardf in the same category and attributed to them the view that "all the forms of things in external reality, be maıerial or abstract, are the objects of God's knowledge•.41 Before embarking upon the criticism of Sadra against this view, it would be better to gjve a surn­mary of Suhrawardrs own theory in reference to his own worlcs.

According to ai-Suhrawardf, God's knowledge oc­curs by a direct illuminational relationship bctwcen God and thin gs. Regarding the nature of this relation, he him­sclf articulates as follows:

So, the true nature of this sort of knowledge (i.e. Oivine Knowledge) is the principle of lllumination (ishrbq), that is. His knowledge of His essence consists in that He is a light to His essence, and apparent (ı:Mıir) to His essence .. And His knowledge of things consisıs in that they are apparent to I lim either by themselves or by thcir attachments (muta'alliqôt), which are the dwellings (mawadi') or the pennanent cognizance for the suprcme regents. This is a relation. (idlifah). 42

As it is seen, al-Suhrawardf bases his thcory on the concepts of "light" and "relation". In fact, it seems dif; ficutı to dcciphcr the passage above in a logical way, be­cauı;e of i ts obscuriıy. IJowcver, the ultimate point is that all Lhings are manifcsı to Gad, as Gad is manifcst to His esscnce. It means that all existence is open to God's knowledge, thcrefore He does not need any intermediary forms at all ıo know them. This is more illusırated by ai­Suhrawardf-in -the- fallawing -lines- of- the ·text- above. Therein he promulgates:

The vision (ibsôr) is acquired by the relationship be­tween the eye and the ohject manifest to it along with the non-existence of veil . So that the relation of the Necessary Existent with all things that a·re manifest, is vision and perception for Him. and the variety of the intellectual relations does not require a plurality in His essence .. .'0

· It is amazing that ai-Suhrawardf, as seen above, connects the vision with the perception, and thereby as­scrts that Gocİ has a direct relation with the objects.

38. For Ib n Sina's treatment of Platonic Fonns in connection with God. refe r to, a/-Shifô, al-llôhiyôtll, p. 365. 39. Sadra, al-Asfdr, vol. m, the Third Mawqif, Fas!, 8. 40. lbid.; and refer, for the usage of the tenn "inisam" in connection with God's knowledge. to Ib n Sina, ai-ShiflJ, a/-flôlıiyti ll, p. 365 41. See, n. 2.

42. AI..Suhrawardi, Ki~b Hikmah aJ.Jshrnq, Majmfi'a-yi Duvum-i Musonnofôı-i Shaykh-i lshrôq, ed. Henry Corbin, vol. ll, Teheran, 1952, pp. 152-3. .

43. l bid., p. 153.

İslam/ Araştıl?!lalar Cilt: 5, Sayı: 1, Ocak 1991

BiLAL KUŞPlNAR

Therefore God knows things directly as He sees thcm

without any mediation. Moreover, His knowledge and His visian are the one and the same, since His knowledge is reducible to His vision, bul not vice-versa.44

According to ai-Suhrawardl, the basic idea is that, as noted earlier, thcre is no rorm at all bctween the

knower and the ohject to be known. He advocates this view on several grounds. Al fist, he says that when one

perceives his essence, he does not pçrccive a form at all. The form that exists in the saul (nafs) is not the saul it­self. Secondly, the form would stili be universal and there­

fare be applicable to many, not to the individuaı.45

Therefore, ai-Suhrawardl claims, man passesses an il­luminational and presential knowledge, not cognitivc knowledge.46

On the other _ha nd, ai-Suhrawardi rejects Ibn Sina's theory of God's knowledge of cognitive forms on the

ground that such a knowledge is something negativç (salbi). for it posits the absence of the real objccı and the

prcccdence of the form ıo cxistcncc and also posiıs that

God's knowledge of Ilis concomitants is included in Tlis . knowledge of essencc.

47 This is inconceivable for him. ·

After having rccapitulatcd bricny ai-Suhrawardi's

view on the issue at hand, ıcı us rcfer to Sadra's otıjec­tions against him. In the fırst placc, Sadra accuscs hi~ having violated the Divine Plan ('infiyalı) according ıo

which all bcings have a cause-cffect r~laıion and makc a

harmony in the world system. In other words, sincc ai­Suhrawardi denics all cognitive forms to God, he sub­sequently dcstroys the marvellous order of the -universe,

and pushes it to a haphazard system. Sadra wonders

how.ai-Suhrawardtovcrloolcs this order,. notwiıhstanding that many ancicnt philo.~ophers acknowledgcd it, even,

Aristotle, in his pscudo-theology (Utluihljiyfi). em­

phasized it.48

Anather ground for rejecıing ai-Suhrawardi's theory is his treatment of knowledge as "rclation"

(idöfah). In this conıext, Sadra announccs that knowledge cannot be dcfincd as "a purc rclation",

whcthcr this relation is called "ishrôq" or not. Knowledge,

Sadra continues, could be deseribed and classifcd in several way5, like, for example, the one whieh cor­

rcsponds to-reality, and knowledge of canception (tasaw-

44. Sad ra, op. ciL, Fasl, 11. 4S. Al-Suhrawardi. ol-Mutahar6t, p. 484. 46. Ib id., p. 4&5. 47. Id., Hilanah a/-lshr6q, p. ısı. 48. Sad ra, op. ciL, Fasl, ı 1. 49. lbid. so. lbid., p. 153. sı. Ibid. sı. Ibid .

. Journal o[.Is.lpmic Research Vol: 5, No:l, January 1991

53

wur) and that of judgement (tasdfq), whercas this is not the casc for "relation".

49 ·

Sadra refuscs this relation atso on the basis that a rclation as such takes place just after the existence of

both the knower and the object known, in which case, God's glorious aıtributes would need the crcature. This implies that God is not perfcct, which is impossible.50

One other objcction is related to the theory of per­

ccption, which has bccn treated in various ways by various philosophcrs. As wc have mentioned above, ai­Suhrawardf believcs that knowledge occurs hy a direct

rclationship between the knowing subject and the known ohject or beıter the seen objecı. This is refuıed by Sadra

on the ground that material ıhings a-; such cannot be­come even ohjccts of human pcrception, let alone of

God's.51

Paralici to the idea just mcnıioned above, Sadra

tırings anothcr argumenı to refuıe the so-called direct il­lu mination, that the forms as well as ohjects cannoı be­come knowledge, for they nccd to be absıracted from

ı heir very beings, i.c. from the ir material coverings. I Iow can, Sadra poses, the direct illuminational rclation ac­

quire the cogniıion of them wiıhout abı.ıracıing their

forms?52

To su m up, according to · Sad ra, the theor)r of "ishaq" fails to inıerpret the rcal nature of God's

knowledge, becausc it rules out the existcnce of God's

prior knowledge, viz. Ilis cognitive forms. Again, this vicw is false in reducing allknowledge to simply vision.

IV. An Evaluation and Sadra's Originality

As was remarked at the very outset of this papcr, it

is very hard to givc a deıailed and accuraı.c revicw of

Sadra's theory of God's knowledge, bccause of his eriti­

cal but sornewhat unsystematic characıcr of treating the

subject, which forccs him mosıly to eriticize the thcorics of the earlicr philosophers on this particular issuc rather

than to set out his own idcas. This fact scems to have bcen intensively dominaıed especially in his al-Asfiir al­Arba'alı, which ha-; been so far the primary source for us.

However, now wc would belter turn our aliention to his

morc precise work, al-MaslıiJ'ir in which t~e author seems to have exerted an intensive cffort to establish his

:;; . . •'

54 MULLA SADRA'S CRITJCISM OF IBN SINA AND AI.-SL'IIRA W ARDI ON Til E PRORI.EM OF GOD'S K.'iOWLcDGE

own thcories; although he therein h.as occasionally made severe attades against his predecessors, bul it is more in­formative rather than critica!. In what follows, therefore, we shall present a bricf summary oJ Sadra's theory of God's cognition, drawn from al-Marha'ir.

According to Sadra, as in the case of Ihn Sina, Gad as a Necessary Bcing conceives Himsclf and conceives alsa aU things from Himself. Gad is a simplc bcing free from any kind of mixture, deficiency and contingeney. Bc­cause of this, His essence is prcscnt to Ilis essence without there bcing any veil.53 This is Sadra's description of God's nature. As pointcd out in our discussion of his vicw on this issue, for Ibn Sina too, Gad is a simplc es­sence or bcing. This dietum has bcen the primary tcnct of Sadra, on which alması the wholc prcscnı thcory is based.

Knowledge, according ıo him, is simply the prcscnce of the cxistcncc without co.rporcal cov.crings. It is astonishing that, in Sadra's vicw eıcistencc (•mjıld) and prcscnce (IUldıir) sceın to be identical with ea'ch other, in so far as knowledge is eonccrned. The perception (idra) is attaincd by means of abstraction from matter and material coverings. The matter is the source of the ah­sence and the negation, and each part of the oorporcal body is abscnt from the other part of it. When it is· so, the whole is absenı from the part, and the wholc from the whole. From this analysis, Sadra passes on to examinc the reıaıionship beıween matter and form in conjunction with percepıion. He rcasons that "the morc a form is dis­engaged from maııer, the more ıruely it becomes prescnce ıo its esscnce":54 In the lowcsı degrcc the form,

' ıha_!!ks to iLS f~ll cngagemçnt wilh maı~er, would ~ sen­sible only as such. What eomcs above the sensible is the imaginative forms, above which the intclligibles inherc. So, !n the hierarchy of the forms, the intclligibles (al­ma'qılZaf) descrve ıo be placed at the most clevııtcd

level, since, for Sadra, the most elevated forms are the most intcnsive cxistcnts, that is the Neces.o;ary Exisıcnı whose Cs.sence is apprebendcr of Ilis essence, and ap­prehensible to Ilis essence with the most glorious intel­lect. Furıhcrmorc Ilis essence is the sourcc of evcry cmanation, and He conceives evcrything inıclligihly by mcans of His cssence wit}lout thcre bcing any multi-

ı . . . ll ss p ıcııyata ..

S3. ai-Mashô'ir. p. SO, par. 11 ı. 54. Ibid. SS. Ibid. . S6. Ibid, pp. SO-S1. par. 112. 57. Ibid . .:.t.ilt ·~J .u.. ül-.'tt 4).:.-;,.r

After having expounded the relationship bctween the forms themselves, and the forms and the Necessary Being, Sadra moves on to explain the relationship be­ıwccn the knower and the objecıs to be known. Here the main issue is to show the real unifıcaıion bctween intei­Jecı and intelligible in terms of exisıence. lle s.ıys:

Afterwards. each percepıional form - whcthcr he intel­ligihle or sensillle- is uniried with the pcrceiving agcnı in existcnce acronJing ıu the prnuf that emanaıes from (;nd. Anti c.:al'h pcrccpıional form. lct it he a form or inıettecıion. i ts cxisıencc in it~clf. and iıs being ohject of inıettcction (or intclligihility). anti its existence for iıs apprchender, {all three; of thcm) are one and the same withouı any differenıiaıion ... 56

As wc have mentioncd in the prcceeding parıs, one of the objccıicıns of Sadra to Ibn Sina is his inconsisteney in holding, on the one hand, that God's knowledge of forms and Ilimsclf are the one and the same, and in dis­rcgarding the unification of the intclligihles and inıellcct on the other. For Sadra, the unification (itıihad) bctwecn ıhcm is a rcal unification in terms of existence,. not a unification that conjoins two originally distinct entities. If they wcre ıwo separate thin gs from each other, then both of them would ge ı inıo an accidental relation, like for ex­ample, the relaıion of father to son and that of power to staıc. In these examples, as one may notice easily, the rclationship comes aftcr "the cxistcnce of the e:,c;sence".57

This sarı of unificaıion (ittihdd) is applied by Sadra ıo prove first that God's knowledge of eveıy individual ıhing and God's essencc (IIimself) are one and the same, and that God's existcnce and God's knowledge are one and the same. I Ic dcclares that Ilis existcnce, His knowledge of--IIimsclf-and Ilis -knowledge-of all thin gs are one Reality. This oncness or unity, he says, is not in the nurnerical scnse, namely one in number, but in the ıruc sensc.58 Nevcrthelcss, Sadra docs not elueidate what he inıcnds by "true sense". from what he said in his ni-Asflir, wc can conelude that this unity may tenably be explaincd and somehow justified on the ba~is of his theory called by fazlur Rahman,59 "sysıcmatic am­biguity" (taslıkik), hy which Sadra illustraıes primarily the various lcvels of existcnec in reality. As it is recalled, all the cxisıing things, according to Sadra, are sprcad out in reality in varying dcgrecs of exisıcnce, therefore, they, though bcing the same in their very nature, are diffcrcnt,

SB. Sad ra, 17ıe Wisdom of17ıe 17ırone, trans. J. Winston Morris. Princeton. 1981, p. 105.

59. Fazlunahman. 17ıe Philosophy of Mulllı Sadra. Alhany. 197S. p. 34.

İslami Araştırmaltır Cilt: 5, Sayı: 1, Ocak 1~91

BİLAL KUŞPINAR

however,. in· .existence 'from öne anather in· temis of priority and posteriority, pcrfection and imperfection, strength and weakness. This unity in divcrsity could be reasonably explained by principle of •ıashkı"k". According to this principle, ttıe actual difference betwecn existents does not-spring from the very ~at u re of cxisıence itsclf; on the contrary, they are disıinct, bccaus~ of the fact that each possesses a differenı level of existence in terms of remotcness and closeness to the Real Existence. They are, in their very nature of existence, one and the same, yet different in their participaıion with cxistence at various degrees.

When this systematie ambiguity is applied to the multiple knowledge of God, it is rcached that God's knowledge of forms including Platonic ldeas, the Tntel­ligiblcs of Peripatetics and His Attribuıes -three of them are ıaken to be one and the same by Sadra- and His very being are existentially one and the same, Lhough they are multiple conceptually. This canceptual plurality does not produce an essence in God's being. In a short word, His knowledge, for Sadra, is ex:istentially unique, bu ı notionally distinct.

I have tried to expose Sadra's undersıanding of God's knowledge in conjunction with the views of hL~

./}

ss

· predecess6rs. With regard to tiıe problem of God's knowledge, Sadra has an eclectic theory whose traces ex­tend to the early Greek a~ well as Muslim philosophers. It is clear that from Plato he has received the Platonic Forms and identified them with God's being; and from Porphyry"he has taken over the theory of unifıcation be­tween intelieel and inıelligibles and made use of them to explicaıe · ıhe identifıcation of the cognitive forms witb the existence of God. Among the Muslim philosophers he has borrowed primarily the concept of "simple being" and secondarily God's cognitive forms from lbn Sina. Bu ı it does not mean that Sadra has offcred just a repete­ıive account canceming the doctrine of God's knowledge. Such a judgement would be unfair, for this would be overlocking his cssential concept of "tashkı"k", by which, as remarkcd above, he has esıablished a ıerıable ground to explicaıc the complicatcd problem of God's multiple knowledge, which is existcnıially one bul noıionally pt ural.

1\s a rcsult, we can say that undcr the overwhelm­ing impacı of the inspiraıion of the accumu laıe_d heritage of the lJhilosophic ıradilian of his time, Sadra has foundcd a thcory which is sysıematically cclcctic but mys-tically and conccptually rriginal. ·

SELÇUK YAYlNLARI Babam

SULTAN ABDÜLHAMİD

Ralım.etli kızı tarafmda.n tarihi

(Hatıralarım) gerçekleri nefis uslfıbu ile anlatan tarihi

yazacak olanlara 'birinci ağızdan' sunul­

muş hatıralar. Ayşe Osmanoğlu

Genel Dağıtım

Boğaziçi Yayınları A.Ş.

Kazım İsmail Gürkan Cad. 12/25 34410 Cağaloğlu- İSTANBUL

Tel: 526 09 77 P.K. 1397 Sirkeci

"'

\'; \ . ___ ........_.

--~------------~-~~-------~