ibn sina and suhrawardi on self-consciousness: some
TRANSCRIPT
IBN SINA AND SUHRAWARDI ON SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS:
SOME COMPARATIVE REMARKS
Haruo KOBAYASHI*
I. Introduction
The epistemic explanation of "self-consciousness" is one of the main
topics in Islamic philosophy.(1) Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) is most
probably the first Muslim philosopher who took it up as a main subject
and treated it in detail.(2) Since this problem holds a special place in such
his later writings as Isharat wa Tanbihat, Mubahathat and Ta'riqat, it seems
to be in his late years that he came to be more concerned with it.(3) This
problem was one of the most important concerns in the whole philosophicalcareer of Suhrawardi (Shaykh al-Ishraq, d. 587/1191) who was an acute
critic of the Muslim Peripatetics (al-Mashsha'un) and their chief, Ibn Sina,
in particular. Consequently "self-consciousness" is a key philosophical concept
in his celebrated Hikmat al-Ishraq as well as in his "propaedeutic" writings
described within the limits of Peripatetic philosophy such as Talwihat and
Mashari' wa Mutarahat.(4) In this paper, I try to analyze this important but
complicated concept in these two philosophers mainly through their arguments
for its "self-evidence" and its "apriority," and thereby I would like to shed
light upon the similarity and difference between the two.
II. Ibn Sina
What is "self-consciousness"? Introspection seems to be a first and
indispensable step to clarify the notion of "self-consciousness." I therefore
would like to start my analysis by quoting a passage from Isharat wa Tanbihat
where Ibn Sina describes his procedure of introspection explicitly:(5)
Return to your self (nafs) and reflect whether, being sound, or even
* Graduate Student, University of Tokyo.
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in another state, as far as you discern a thing correctly, you would be
oblivious to the existence of your self (dhat) and would not affirm your
self. To my mind, this does not happen to the perspicacious (mustabsir).
Therefore the sleeper in his sleep or the drunk in the state of his
drunkenness will not be unconscious of his self, even if his representation
(tamaththul) of his self does not remain in his memory.
In this passage it is clearly stated that human being can never become
oblivious to the existence of his self. But one may say, "Certainly, every
human being will be aware of his self even in such states, but it is as far
as he can see, hear, feel, or think about something other than his self, and
thus 'self-consciousness' is reflexive and it can occur only as a by-product
of consciousness of others." Against this kind of objection, Ibn Sina replies:(6)
If you imagine that your self (dhat) has been created whole in mind
and body at its first creation (awwala al-khalq) and it finds itself in the
physical circumstance where it does not perceive its parts, and its limbs
do not touch each other being spread apart and suspended in temperate
air, you will find that it is unaware of everything except the fixedness
(thubut) of its individual existence (anniyyah).
This is a version of the famous "Flying Man" argument,(7) where Ibn
Sina asserts that even in the case of "Fying Man" lacking for every kind
of sensations and experiences it is inadmissible for him to lack his "self-
consciousness" as well. For this assertion, however, Ibn Sina assignes no
reason. On this point Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209), a theologian-
philosopher and a commentator on Ibn Sina's Isharat wa Tanbihat, writes:(8)
The gist of the argument in this section is that human being is never
oblivious to his self-consciousness even in such states. Though he [i. e.,
Ibn Sina] does not remark whether this proposition is primary (aw-
waliyyah)(9) or not, this proposition seems not primary. The reason is
the following. When we subject this proposition ... to a close scrutiny
of our intellect ('aql) and next we subject [a primary proposition such
as] "the whole is bigger than its part" to the same scrutiny, we do not
find the first proposition equal to the second in its clearness and its
Vol, XXVI 1990 63
distinctness but we find it questionable. That proposition thus needs
confirmation by proof (hujjah).
As Fakhr al-Din al-Razi rightly points out, Ibn Sina has not offered
in this section any "proof" concerning the reality of this proposition except
the "fixedness" of "self-consciousness" confirmed by the introspection, much
less established it through "demonstration" (burhan) in a strive manner.
However, It is not because he is unaware of the "hypothetical" nature of
this argument,(10) but rather because he considers that the reality of "self-
consciousness" is indemonstrable and thus it must be grasped intuitively.
On this point Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (d. 672/1274), a philosopher-scientist
and another commentator on Isharat wa Tanbihat, supports Ibn Sina's opinion:(11)
The absolutely first and clearest cognition (idrak) is the self-consciousness
of human being. It is clear that this kind of cognition can be neither
acquired through definition (hadd) or description (rasm)(12) nor established
by proof (hujjah) or demonstration (burhan). Therefore the remark of
the eminent commentator [i. e., Fakhr al-Din al-Razi]-the chief [i. e.,
Ibn Sina] has not explained whether this proposition is primary or
demonstrable (burhaniyyah), his judgement that it is demonstrable,
his fruitless effort to establish it by demonstration, and his fogery of
demonstrations for it, all of them are sheer nonsense, and thus it is
useless to deal with.
Now it would become clear that in this "Flying Man" argument the
proposition "human being cannot be oblivious to his self" is not its conclusion
but its premise, and it is no longer possible to establish this premise by
definition or description, nor proof or demonstration because, as Nasir al-Din
al-Tusi precisely comments, "self-consciousness" is self-evident and prior
to all other kinds of cognition.
Ibn Sina, however, is not content only with this kind of "hypothetical"
argument, but he goes further to elaborate the reality and the property of"self-consciousness" from quite a different point of view in other places.
Hence I turn to the analysis of "self-consciousness" by comparison with other
kinds of cognition.
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According to Ibn Sina, cognition (idrak) consists in "occurrence"(husul)
and "representation" (tamaththul) of the essence (haqiqah), or form (surah),of object known (mudrak) in knowing subject (mudrik)(13). The object can beanalyzed into internal and external from the viewpoint of its subject, but
the object in the primary and strict sense is what is internal and representedin the subject.
This internal object, though the essence or form of its external object,
cannot be the same as its external correspondent in its "individuality" (shakhs),
but it is the same in its "species" (naw') or in its "nature" (tabi'ah). If these
two objects were identical in "individuality" and thus the "occurrence" of
internal object in knowing subject were useless, then everything should be
known simply because it exists externally, and the essence of "what has
actually no being among external existents" (al-a'yan al-kharijiyyah)(14) could
never become known. Hence, the external object, if material, needs the"occurrence" by means of abstruction from matter in order to become internal
object and mentally represented. Further if the object is immaterial from
the beginning, such as active intellect, it is not active intellect itself but its
representative that becomes an internal object.(15) Even if the object is fictitious
and something only mentally posited, such as 'anqa' or a regular pentahedoron,
the "occurrence" as internal object is still needed. The object, therefore, as
far as the cognition of others is concerned, should "occur" in the subject
as internal object.(16)
For instance, "sensation" (ihsas) consists in receiving the form which
is abstructed from matter and to which the sense-subject' (hass) comes to
be assimilated. In this case, the "first and real sense-object" (al-mahsus
al-awwal bi-al-haqiqah) is not an external and material thing, but the form
which is impressed in sense organ (alat al-hiss) and which the sense-subject
actually perceives.(17)
Necessary as it is, "occurrence" is not sufficient, but "representation"
is also needed in cognition because it is probable that the subject, as a
result of its illness or devotion to something else, does not perceive an
essence occurring in it. Therefore it is no less important that the essence
occurs in "knowing" subject (mudrik) and thus the essence comes to be"represented" (mutamaththil) in it. Concerning this importance Nasir al-
Din al-Tusi explains as follows, though here he uses "presense" (hudur) in
place of "occurrence" almost synonymously:(18)
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Presence (hudur) is not sufficient [in cognition of a thing] because the
thing present to sense (hiss) is not perceived unless the subject-soul
(al-nafs) pays attention to it.... Cognition therefore does not consist inthe presence of a thing in sense, but rather it consists in the presence
of a thing in knowing subject (mudrik) by virtue of its presence in
sense.(19) (emphasis added)
In the light of cognition in general, what kind of feature does "self-
consciousness"(20) have? Can the analysis of the cognition into three elements-
external, internal objects and subject-be sustained also in the case of"self-consciousness"? In the following passage Ibn Sina explains" self-
consciousness" from this viewpoint:(21)
Suppose, in the same manner as I perceive something other [than my
self] on the ground that its effect (athar) exists in my self (dhati), I
perceive my self when some effect of my self exists in my self. It is insofar
as the effect by which I perceive my self exists in me that it can exer-
cise any influence on my perception of my self, Because I exist always
in me, however, it is not necessary for perceiving my self that besides
my self another effect exists in me, and hence [when I perceive my
self] I am influenced neither by my self nor by any other effect.
As far as the cognition of others is concerned, the internal object is"representative," or "effect," which occurs from an external object in its
subject, or which is only mentally posited. The internal object, even though
it exists in the subject and is represented in it, is still its object, and thus
the dichotomy of subject and object can never disappear. As for "self-
consiousness," on the contrary, the object is nothing other than its knowing
subject, and no split exists between its subject and its object. Therefore
it is impossible as well as useless that something other than the self-
subject, such as a "representative" or an "effect," occurs or comes to be
posited in the subject as its object. This fact suggests that the object is
the same as its subject not only in "species" but also in "indi-viduality,"(22)
and thus the analysis of cognition into three elements can no longer be
sustained and even the dichotomy of subject and object disappears. This self-
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objectivity in "self-consciousness" Ibn Sina explains as follows:(23)
The self (al-dhat) is present (hadirah) to its self in any state and there
is no oblivion (dhuhul) of its self. The existence (wujud) of the self
is none other than its consciousness (idrak) of its self. It is needless for
the self to become conscious of its self, since there is no separation
between its subject and its object when the self is conscious of, and
present to, its self. As long as the self exists, it is inevitable for theself to be conscious of its self.
In this passage, the identity of "self-consciousness" with "existence" of the
self, or with its "presence" to its self, is explicitly stated.
Next I turn to other reductio ad absurdum types of argument for the
property of "self-consciousness."First, Ibn Sina discusses that "self-consciousness" cannot be acquired
through perceiving an effect of the self in the following manner:(24)
If it were due to an effect occurring in me that I perceived my self,
how could I perceive that the effect was ascribed to my self unless I
had already known ('alimtu) my self and recognized ('araftu) through
some sign ('alamah) or other that the effect was of my self. And, again,
if I presented (ahdartu) an effect of my self to my self or to its organ
(alah) and I judged thus the effect to be ascribed to my self, then Ishould first connect the effect with my self and thereby judge and say
that it was an effect of my self. Hence my perception of my self is
prior, not dependent on [the perception of] the effect.
In other words, as one cannot connect and identify honey and its effects
such as yellow or sweetness unless one has known honey beforehand,
"self-consciousness," similarly, if it were the identification between one's
self and its effect, one should have known his self anyhow without "self-
consciousness."(25)
Second, Ibn Sina argues that "self-consciousness" cannot be acquired
through one's action (fi'l), which means that "self-consciousness" is not
to perceive the agent of one's action. If, then, anyone say, "I confirm my
self (dhati) by means of my action," since action is either general (mutlaq)
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or specific (khass), the following cases can be supposed:(26)
If you acknowledge (athbatta) your action as general, you must acknowledge
through it a general, not specific agent as your very self [which is
apparently absurd]. If you acknowledge it [i. e. your action] as your
action, it is not through it that you acknowledge your self, but your
self is a part of the concept of your action inasmuch as it is your
action. Thus it [i. e., the agent] has been acknowledged in such compre-
hension before it [i. e., its action] or, at least, simultaneously, not
through it, and thus your self is not acknowledged through it. (emphasis
added)
"Self-consciousness," furthermore, cannot be established through the
consciousness of others, either that of actions or that of other cognitions,
because one must express his consciousness, explicitly or not, by means
of the term indicating the knowing self-subject. When one says, for example,"I am doing such and such," he has already expressed his cognition of his
self. "Unless," writes Ibn Sina, "I considered my self first and then its action,
how could I know that it was I who was doing such and such?"(27)
Setting forth these arguments Ibn Sina insists on the self-evidence and
the apriority of "self-consciousness," whose characteristics he explains in
the following manner. For human being "self-consciousness" is "first" (awwali),"by nature" (bi-al-tab'), "innate" (gharizi), "instinctive" (maftur), "essential"
(dhati), "constituent" (muqawwim), "concomitant" (lazim), "absolute" ('ala
al-itlaq, la shart), and "always in actuality" (bi-al-fi'l da'iman). It is identical
with "existence" (wujud) or "presence" (hudur) of the self, and therefore
it is unobtainable a posteriori by "acquisition" (kasb, iktisab).(28)
Though "self-consciousness" is a priori and always in actuality, this
does not mean that one is always and exclusively conscious of one's self
and that "self-consciousness" is incompatible with other cognitions. How is
the relation between them? On this point, Ibn Sina remarks in the passage
below:(29)
You know that whoever intellectually perceives (ya'qul) something
perceives in the state of potentiality near to actuality (bi-al-quwwah
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al-qaribah min al-fi'l)(30) that he perceives that thing, which means that
he perceives his self. Therefore whoever perceives something perceives
his self.(31)
My primary concern in this passage is the fact that Ibn Sina has distin-
guished here two kinds of "self-consciousness:" (1) to perceive one's selfand (2) to perceive one's self perceiving something other. In order to
perceive one's self perceiving something other, as already discussed, onemust have perceived one's self as an agent of that perception. "Self-conscious-
ness" (1) therefore is indispensable to "self-consciousness" (2), but not
vice versa. "Self-consciousness" (2), which, I suppose, is "self-consciousness"
in the ordinary sense, is neither a priori nor always in actuality, but it
accompanies other perceptions "in the state of potentiality near to actuality,"
which suggests the possibility that other perceptions may occur without"self-consciousness" (2) in actuality. Ibn Sina writes, "consciousness of
self-consciousness" (al-shu'ur bi-al-shu'ur) is in potentiality (bi-al-quwwah),
then sometimes it occurs and sometimes not,"(32) and "if it were in actuality,
it were incessant and its consideration with intellect (i'tibar al-'aql) were
unnecessary,"(33) and thus it is obtained by "acquisition" (kasb, iktisab).(34) The
self-evidence and apriority therefore are applicable only to "self-consciousness"
(1).
Ibn Sina's analysis of "self-consciousness" is closely linked with the ex-
planation of the immateriarity of human soul, from which follow his manyfundamental doctrines such as the theory of intellect or the immortality
of human being as an individual. As discussed above, if "self-consciousness"
depends on such bodily perceptions as sensation or imagination, human being,
after his body perished, cannot identify his self, which means his annihilation
as an individual, and hence one of the main concerns of Ibn Sina's analysis
of "self-consciousness" seems to lie in denying its dependence on body and
thereby indicating that the human "self-consciousness" will continue after
his bodily death."Self-consciousness" (1) at least, independent of the other bodily
perceptions, can remain after the separation of human soul from his
body. Before the separation, however, "self-consciousness" cannot exist
exclusively of other perceptions because "adhesion" (mulabasah) of human
soul to his body disturbs his "return to the very self" (ruju' ila khass
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dhatiha) and "verification of his self" (tahaqquq bi-dhatiha).(35)
III. Suhrawardi
Concerning the reality of "self-consciousness," Suhrawardi's view is
clearly stated in the following passage:(36)
You are absent neither from your self (dhat) nor from your self-conscious-
ness (idrak). Since the self-consciousness cannot be by form (surah)
or superaddition (zayid), in your self-consciousness you do not need
anything other than your self which is apparent to your self (zahirah
li-nafsiha), or rather, which is not absent from your self (al-ghayr
al-ghayib 'an nafsiha).
I would like to analyze his theory of "self-consciousness" in four types of
argument.
"Self-consciousness," says Suhrawardi, is a kind of "intellection" (ta'aqqul).
"Intellection" means "presence" (hudur) of a thing known to the immaterial
self-subject (al-dhat al-mujarradah 'an al-maddah) or "non-absence" ('adam
ghaybah) of a thing known from the immaterial self-subject. In these twofomulae Suhrawardi considers the latter more perfect because of its
applicability to "self-consciousness" as well as to the cognition of others.
Self-soul (nafs), for instance, is conscious of its self in proportion to its
immateriality, but one cannot say that the self-soul comes to be present to
its self (yahdur li-nafsihi) because its self is always present to its self. Thus
it is proper to say that the self-soul is not absent from its self. As for the
cognition of others, when its object is absent from the self-subject and
cannot be present in itself to the self-subject, "to make present" (istihdar),
or "representation," of its form (surah) is necessary. "Intellection," therefore,
denotes not only the cognition of universals by means of "representation" of
forms, but also the cognition of the self by virtue of its immateriality and
its "non-absence" from the self.(37)
Why "self-consciousness" cannot be a cognition by form? Suhrawardi
answers this question on a reduction ad absurdum type of argument:(38)
Suppose that the self-soul perceived its self by form. Every form
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occurring in the self-soul is universal, and its application to many
individuals is not prevented. Even if the form were a bundle of universals
(majmu' kulliyyat) which were proper as a whole to an individualself-soul, it would not cease to be universal. Human being, however,
perceives his self as something unassociable with others, and hence it is
never admissible that the intellection of his individual self (dhatihi
al-juz'iyyah) is by form.
On the same ground Suhrawardi denies the possibility that "self-consciousness"
is the representation of the concept "I" (mafhum ana).(39) "Intellection" in the
case of "self-consiousness" thus does not mean "representation" of form.(40)"Self-consciousness," furthermore, cannot be the perception of any kind
of "representative" (mithal). Since, in "self-consciousness" the subject and
the object being utterly identical, "representative" of the self, however,
insofar as it is "representative" of the self, cannot be identical with its
self-subjest in its "individuality." In the following sentenses, Suhrawardi
explains the self-objectivity in "self-consciousness," and thereby he denies
the theory of "self-consciousness" by "representation:"(41)
A thing subsistent in itself (al-shay' al-qayim bi-dhatihi) and conscious
of its self does not know (la ya'lam) its self through a representative
of its self in its self. Suppose the knowledge ('ilm) were through the
representative. The representative of I-ness (ana'iyyah) is not the same
as it [i.e., I-ness] but it [i.e., representative of I-ness] is it in relation
to it [i.e., I-ness], and the object known (mudrak) here [i.e., on this
supposition] is the representative. Heuce it follows necessarily that the
perception (idrak) of I-ness were nothing but the perception of what itis, and thus the percertion of the reality of it [i.e., I-ness] (dhatiha)
were exactly the same as the perception of what it [i.e., I-ness] is not.
This is absurd. As for [the perception of] external things, however,
[this kind of absurdity does not follow] because both the representative
and the thing to which the representative is ascribed [i.e., external
object] are it. (emphasis added)
"I-ness" is the essence or reality of a self -subsisting and self-conscious
being, and then it is not a mere concept applicable to all selves but the
Vol. XXVI 1990 71
very self-subject to which such a being can never be oblivious. If human
being, a member of such beings, knew his self through "representative,"
this self-subject "I" should perceive and indicate the "representative" with
the pronoun "it" which can denote all selves other than the self-subject "I,"
and hence the cognition of the self-subject "I" were the same as the
cognition of another self "it," which means the synonymity or inter-
changability between "I-ness" and "it-ness." As for the cognition of external
objects, however, the situation is quite different because it is an external
object "it," whether "representative" or not, that the self-subject "I"
perceive. Hence there is no conversion between the subject "I" and the object"it."(42)
In the next argument, Suhrawardi discusses further the impossibility
that one cannot know one's self by means of anything superadded to one's
self:(43)
Suppose ["self-consciouness" of a self-subsistent and self-conscious thing]
were by a representative, and if it did not know that the representative
were ascribed to its self, it could not know its self, but if it knew that
the representative were ascribed to its self, it should have already known
its self without the representative.
It is inconceivable, furthermore, that anything knows its self by
means of a superaddition to its self on the grounds that it [i.e., the
superaddition] is an attribute (sifah) to its self; because, if it [i.e., the
knowing thing] judges that every attribute superadded to its self, whether
knowledge ('ilm) or another it may be, belongs to its self, it has
already known its self before these attributes and even without them,
and hence it is not by means of the attributes superadded that it knows
its self.
Now we return to the passage previously quoted concerning the reality
of "self-consciousness," which approximately runs: "You are absent neither
from your self nor from your self-consiousness, and since self-consciousness
cannot be by form or superaddition, you need in your self-consciousness
nothing other than your self apparent or not absent from your self."(44)"Human being," writes Suhrawardi in other words, "when he is
conscious of
his self and points it out, he find only a self-conscious thing (amrun yudrik
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dhatahu)."(45) It is exactly this "self-conscious thing" that Suhrawardi means
by "I-ness" which is the essence and the real self-subject of human being,(46)
and hence it is evident that the existence of this real self-subject means
nothing other than its "self-consciousness."
Suhrawardi, however, seems to go further when he writes, "When I
devote myself exclusively to my self (tajarrattu bi-dhati) and gaze at my self,
I find my self exactly the same as real being (anniyyah) or existence
(wujud),"(47) because he seems to mean here that the self of human beingis "existence." On this "self-conscious thing" Suhrawardi states as follows:(48)
[This self-conscious thing] is the apparent to its self in itself (al-zahir
li-nafsihi bi-nafsihi) and it has no property (khusus) [besides its apparent-
ness] so that its apparentness can be a state (hal) of it, but it is nothing
other than the apparent, and thus it is a light for its self (nur li-nafsihi)
and a genuine light (nur mahd). As for your being conscious (mudri-
kiyyatuka) of the other things, it is subsequent to your self, and accordingly
the readiness (isti'dad) for your being conscious of the other things is
accidental to your self.
Suhrawardi thus concludes, "self-consciousness of the thing is nothing other
than its apparentness to its self,"(49) that is, "self-consciousness" is the essence
or reality of self-subsistent and genuine light.
IV. Conclusion
Although the main discussion being limited to its "self-evidence" and"apriority." my analysis of "self-consciousness" in Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi has
made the following points clear. First, both of the two consider "self-
consciousness" of human being self-evident and a priori. Ibn Sina states that"self-consciousness" is synonymous with "existence" or "presence" of his
self. He also uses such terms as "by nature," "first," "constituent," "essential,"
"always in actuality" and so on. Suhrawardi, on the other hand, states that
"self-consciousness" is "self-apparentness" or "non-absence from its self" of
a self-subsistent and self-conscient thing, that is "I-ness," "real being" or
"genuine light."
Second, in favor of its "self-evidence" and "apriority," both of them bring
Vol. XXVI 1990 73
up several arguments, most of which are on reductio ad absurdum. Ibn Sina
argues that "self-consciousness" can be acquired neither through "effect" of
one's self nor through one's "action." Suhrawardi also argues the impossibi-
lity that "self-consciousness" depends on "form" or "representative." The
similarity, or influence, among these arguments seems evident.
Difference, however, exists between the two even within the limited
scope of this research. Ibn Sian's arguments, on one hand, though they are
detailed as a whole, they seem to be fragmentary and confusing in part.
Suhrawardi's arguments, on the other hand, though they seem sometimes to
be too concise for their thorough comprehension, they are consistent as a
whole. This difference seems to result from the following matter. Ibn Sina's
main concern is to explain the "self-evidence" of "self-consciousness" and its"apriority" consistently with the "Peripatetic" psychology already established
in such a work as Kitab al-Nafs of al-Shifa'.(50) For Suhrawardi, on the contrary,
the explanation of "self-conciousness" lies in the very foundation of his whole"Oriental Theosophy" and fills the role of a criterion of other theories.(51)
Notes
(1) See F. Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology, Oxford, 1952 (rep., 1981), pp. 12-19,a concise but useful survey on this subject in the pre-Islamic period. As for the Islmic
period, general survey has not been done. For special studies, see below.(2) See S. Pines, "La conception de la conscience de soi chez Avicenne et chez
Abu'l-Barakat al-Baghdadi," in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age,29 (1954), pp. 21-56, a detailed and valuable study. Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi (d. ca.560/1164), whom S. Pines has also treated in the same study (ibid., pp. 57-98), isimportant also as a mediator from Ibn Sina to Suhrawardi, on whose subject close
study is needed.(3) See S. Pines, op. cit., pp. 43-45. For the chronology of Ibn Sina's writings,
see D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna'sPhilosophical Works, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988.
(4) For the general accounts on Suhrawardi, see H. Corbin, Histoire de la philosophieislamique, Paris: Gallimard, 1986, pp. 285-305, and S. H. Nasr, "Shihab al-DinSuhrawardi Maqtul," in A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif, 2 vols.,Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1961, vol. 1, pp. 372-398. For his theory of "consciousness,"see M. Ha'iri Yazdi, Knowledge by Presence, Tehran: Cultural Studies and ResearchInstitute, 1982, pp. 121-182 in particular.
(5) al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat (henceforth abbreviated Isharat), ed. S. Dunya,Misr: Dar al-Ma'arif, 2d ed., n.d., vol. 2, pp. 343f. This edition contains the com-
mentary by Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. For interpretation of this intricate passage, see M.E. Marmura, "Avicenna's 'Flying Man' in Context," The Monist 69-3 (1986), p. 391and A.-M. Goichon's french translation, Livre des directives et remarques, Beirut
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and Paris, 1951, p. 303.
(6) Ibid., pp. 344-345.(7) "Flying Man" or "Suspended Man" (insan mu'allaq) appears thrice in his
writings. For their contexts and meanings, see M. E. Marmura, op. cit. pp. 383-395.
(8) Sharhay al-Isharat, reprinted ed., Qum, 1403 A. H., (original ed., Misr,〔1325
A. H.?〕), p. 122. This edition contains the text of Isharat with two commentaries by
Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi.
(9) "Primary" is applied to the self-evident and fundamental propositions likeaxioms or postulates (al-Najat, ed. M. Fakhri, Beirut, 1985, pp. 101f., 105). IbnSina also applies this term to some ideas such as "the existent" (al-mawjud), "the thing"(al-shay') and "the necessary" (al-wajib). These ideas, according to him, are impressedin the human mind in a "primay way" (irtisam awwali), that is, innate ideas, and thusit is needless, or rather impossible, to define them. See al-Shifa': al-Ilahiyyat, ed. G.C. Anawati and S. Zayid, vol. 1, Cairo, 1960, p. 29. For more details, see M. E.Marmura, "Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of his al-Shifa'," inLogos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens, ed. R. M.Savory and D. A. Agius, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984,
pp. 219-239.(10) See M. C. Marmura, "Avicenna's 'Flying Man' in Context," p. 388.(11) Isharat, p. 345. See also Sharhay al-Isharat, p. 122.(12) "Definition" is composed of genera (jins) and differentia (fasl) but "description"
is of genera and accidens proprium ('arad khass).
(13) Isharat, pp. 359-366. As Nasir al-Din al-Tusi has pointed out, this formula isnot a definition (ta'rif) but a specification (ta'yin) of idrak, because it contains thedefinienda, such as "knowing subject" (mudrik) or "object known" (mudrak).
(14) "Like many geometric figures", such as regular pentahedron, "which canbe supposed but cannot exist actually" (Isharat., pp. 362f.), and also fictitious
animals like 'anqa' or phoenix.
(15) Mubahathat, in Aristu 'inda al-'Arab, ed. A. Badawi, 2d ed., Kuwait, 1978,pp. 135 (par. 58), 193f. (par. 336).
(16) Mubahathat, pp. 183 (par. 302), 217 (par. 411), Ta'liqat, ed. A. Badawi,Cairo, 1973, p. 79.
(17) Avicenna's De Anima (Arabic Text): Being the Psychological Part of 'Kitabal-shifa", ed. F. Rahman, London: Oxford UP, 1959, pp. 61-62.
(18) Isharat, p. 360.(19) As al-Tusi adds, this does not mean that a thing, in order to be perceived,
must occur twice in subject, that is, once in sense-more precisely speaking, in senseorgan-and then in knowing subject because the real knowing subject is subject-mind,not sense organ. In the case of sensation, therefore, the object occurs in subject-mindby means of sense organ. See ibid., p. 360.
(20) "Self-consiousness" corresponds to shu'ur bi-al-dhat, but Ibn Sina also uses forit idrak or 'aql instead. Generally speaking, idrak denotes "cognition" or "perception"
in its most general sense and 'aql denotes "intellection." As S. Pines has proposed,shu'ur can be translated "aperception." See S. Pines, op. cit., p. 31.
(21) Ta'liqat, p. 79.(22) Mubahathat, pp. 135 (par. 58), 194 (par. 336).(23) Ta'liqat, p. 148.(24) Ibid., p. 79, see also p. 162.
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(25) Ibid., p. 147.(26) Isharat, p. 349.(27) Mubahathat, p. 207 (par. 370), Ta'liqat, pp. 147f. 161f.(28) Ta'liqat, pp. 30, 79, 147f., 160f.(29) Isharat, pp. 415f.(30) According to Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, the state of "potentiality near to actuality"
corresponds to "intellect in actuality" in Ibn Sina's theory of intellect, which meansan ability of an intellectual to perceive the intelligible which he has already acquiredwhenever he wants. See his commentary in Isharat, p. 416.
(31) The whole structure of this passage can be analyzed as follows: Whoeverperceives something can perceive his self perceiving it whenever he wants, andwhoever perceives his self perceiving something perceives his self (since his perception"I perceive something" contains the representation of its subject "I," that is, the self),
therefore whoever perceives something perceives his self. See al-Tusi's commentaryin ibid., pp. 416f.
(32) Ta'liqat, p. 82.(33) Ibid., p. 161. The problem whether "self-consciousness" is intellection or not
is very confusing. For example, Ibn Sina writes as follows, "As long as the humansoul is connected with matter, he does not perceive his self with intellection. If he did,he were as perfect as the [active] intellects actually are" (ibid., p. 107); and also,"Self-consciousness consists in the intellection of the self and the intellection is proper
to abstracted [immaterial] things. Since the animal souls are not abstracted, they donot perceive their selves with intellection but with estimation (wahm)" (ibid., p. 82).This problem is more fully discussed in Mubahathat, which S. Pines has studied indetail, still its ambiguity exists. See Mubahathat, especially pp. 208f. (paragraphs 371f.),and S. Pines, op. cit., pp. 47-56.
(34) Ta'liqat, pp. 30, 79, 160.(35) Ibid., pp. 23, 81. For the problem of immateriality of human soul in Ibn Sina,
see also M. E. Marmura, "Ghazali and the Avicennan Proof from Personal Identityfor an Immaterial Self," in A Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy andCulture, ed, R. Link-Salinger, The Catholic University of America, 1988, pp. 195-205;T.-A. Druart, "The Soul and Body Problem: Avicenna and Descartes," in ArabicPhilosophy and the West: Continuity and Interaction, ed, T.-A. Druart, WashingtonD. C.: Georgetown Uriversity Press, 1988, pp. 27-49.
(36) Hikmat al-Ishraq, in Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques, vol. 2, ed. H. Corbin,2d ed., Tehran and Paris, 1977, p. 112. For this work, see also Sharh Hikmat al-Ishraq
(which contains, besides the text, the commentary by Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi and thegloss by Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi), lithographed ed., Tehran, AH1315 and Le livre dela sagesse orientale, trans. H. Corbin, ed. C. Jambet, Lagrasse, 1987.
(37) Talwihat, in Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques, vol. 1, ed. H. Corbin, 2d ed,Tehran and Paris, 1976, p. 72.
(38) al-Mashari' wa al-Mutarahat (abbreviated henceforth Mutarahat), in Oeuvresphilosophiques et mystiques, vol. 1, ed. H. Corbin, 2d ed, Tehran and Paris, 1976, p. 484.
(39) Talwihat, pp. 70f.(40) Suhrawardi also denies that the perceptions of one's own body and other
internal activities, such as estimation (wahm) or imagination (khayal), are acquired
through their forms. "If," writes Suhrawardi, "the self-soul perceived these things
by the universal form in its self-subject, the self-soul would be a mover of universal
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body and a user of universal faculty," and since these bodily faculties cannot perceivethemselves, human being must perceive "his particular body present" (badanahu al-juz'ial-hadir) to his self-subject and "his particular faculties present" (quwahu al-juz'iyyahal-hadirah) to his self-subject, and there by he uses them. Mutarahat, pp. 484f. andalso see Talwihat, pp. 71f.
(41) Hikmat al-Ishraq, p. 111.(42) This argument of "I-ness" and "it-ness" in cognition seems original and
important, for its interpretation, see the commentary by Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi,op. cit., pp. 292f. and M. Ha'iri Yazdi, op. cit., pp. 130-146.
(43) Hikmat al-Ishraq, p. 111.(44) See note (36).(45) Mutarahat, p. 403f.(46) Hikmat al-Ishraq, p. 112.(47) Talwihat, p. 115.(48) Hikmat al-Ishraq, pp. 112f.(49) Ibid., p. 114.(50) See S. Pines, op. cit. pp. 43f., 46.(51) See H. Corbin, prolegomenon of Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques, vol. 1,
pp. XXXIII-XXXVI.
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