“missile defence factor in establishing a new security environment” international bmd conference...
TRANSCRIPT
International BMD Conference
“Missile Defence Factor in Establishing a New Security “Missile Defence Factor in Establishing a New Security Environment”Environment”
““Russia’s Assessment of NATO-Russia’s Assessment of NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defence Russia Theatre Missile Defence
exercise”exercise”
Chairman of Military-scientific Committee of the Russian Federation Chairman of Military-scientific Committee of the Russian Federation Armed Forces – Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces – Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian
Federation Armed ForcesFederation Armed Forces
General-MajorGeneral-Major I. SheremetI. SheremetMoscow, 2012.Moscow, 2012.
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NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defence NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defence Command Post Exercise StagesCommand Post Exercise Stages
Key Dates & FactsKey Dates & Facts
From From 2003 2003 tilltill 2008 2008 4 stages of the exercise were conducted 4 stages of the exercise were conducted::
CPX-1. Stage 1 December 2003. NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) (the Hague, the Netherlands);
Stage 2 March 2004 Joint National Integration Center at AFB Shriver (Colorado-Springs, USA).
CPX-2. March 2005. Royal Air Force Base (Venray, the Netherlands).
CPX-3. October 2006. 4th Central R&D Institute, MOD, the Russian Federation (Moscow).
CPX-4. January 2008 Ottobrunn, Germany.
CPX AAR proved that the aim and objectives in planning and conducting CPX AAR proved that the aim and objectives in planning and conducting operations based on simulated models had been successfully fulfilled. operations based on simulated models had been successfully fulfilled.
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Specific Features of NATO-Russia Theatre Specific Features of NATO-Russia Theatre BMD Command Post ExerciseBMD Command Post Exercise
Exercise is not linked to any geography or specific Exercise is not linked to any geography or specific existing threatsexisting threats;;
Exercise scenarios are not based on possible actual Exercise scenarios are not based on possible actual cooperation of the partiescooperation of the parties;;
Complication was achieved by introducing more units Complication was achieved by introducing more units and increasing the scale of missile strikesand increasing the scale of missile strikes;;
Both Russian and NATO AD and BMD assets Both Russian and NATO AD and BMD assets performances were used as imaginary initial dataperformances were used as imaginary initial data
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NATO-Russia Theatre BMD Computer-Assisted NATO-Russia Theatre BMD Computer-Assisted Command Post Exercise Command Post Exercise 26 - 30 26 - 30 March March 2012 2012
((OttobrunnOttobrunn, , GermanyGermany))
Aim: development, research and efficiency assessment of various ways to establish a BMD in Europe taking into account the results of previous NATO-Russia Theatre BMD cooperation activities.
Objectives: exploring options for early warning data exchange in the framework of a Joint BMD Centre; Examining ways of coordination for intercepting ballistic missiles by both Russian and NATO assets; looking into options for coordination and operation of Russia and NATO BMD command and control forces; planning, implementing and assessing of joint missile defense options.
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Format and Framework for Format and Framework for Command Post ExerciseCommand Post Exercise
Considering the European region as a platform for exploring various Considering the European region as a platform for exploring various
ways to establish a joint BMDways to establish a joint BMD;;
Examining hypothetical missile threatsExamining hypothetical missile threats not connected with political not connected with political
views of Russia and NATOviews of Russia and NATO;;
Using closest to real BMD assets performances to obtain more reliable Using closest to real BMD assets performances to obtain more reliable
simulation datasimulation data;;
Studying various ways to build a missile defense and establish Studying various ways to build a missile defense and establish
cooperation of the parties that reflect NATO and Russia approaches cooperation of the parties that reflect NATO and Russia approaches
to BMD in Europeto BMD in Europe..
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Options for NATO and Russia Groups of Options for NATO and Russia Groups of Forces Joint OperationsForces Joint Operations
Independent combat operations of Russian and NATO BMD Independent combat operations of Russian and NATO BMD and AD groups and AD groups ((option option 1)1);;
Independent combat operations along with joint employment Independent combat operations along with joint employment of missile attack early warning systems’ data of missile attack early warning systems’ data ((option option 22));;
Independent but coordinated combat operations: decisions to Independent but coordinated combat operations: decisions to engage targets were made by Russia and NATO engage targets were made by Russia and NATO independently, but either party could call for support if independently, but either party could call for support if needed needed ((option option 3)3);;
Use of shared early warning dataUse of shared early warning data and conduct of combat and conduct of combat operations under single centralized command and control operations under single centralized command and control from BMD Centre from BMD Centre ((option option 4)4);;
Best streamlined missile defense arrangement and single Best streamlined missile defense arrangement and single command and control while jointly protecting hypothetical command and control while jointly protecting hypothetical areas areas ((option option 4А)4А)..
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7Command and Control, Information Support Command and Control, Information Support Framework with Single Centralized Framework with Single Centralized
ArrangementArrangement
NATO operational level Command
Russian operational level Command
Automated data
integration
BMD CentreBMD Centre
NATO tactical level Command
Shooters
NATO tactical level Command
Shooters
Russian tactical level Command
Shooters
Russian tactical level Command
Shooters
YELLOWLAND ORANGELANDBLUELAND
21.622.55
1 2 3 4 4А
21.622.55
1 2 3 4 4А
Episode 1
Episode 2
Episode 3
Amount of engaged missiles depending on specific Amount of engaged missiles depending on specific episode and level of cooperationepisode and level of cooperation
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88.8 89
95.2
101.45
107.2
1 2 3 4 4А
108.45
112
114.95
120.8123.4
1 2 3 4 4А
Recommendations for Future ResearchRecommendations for Future Research
Real geography; Scaling of ballistic missiles strikes by intensity, direction and
trajectory types; Playing with a broader range of ballistic missiles performances,
including missiles with over 3000 km range; Scaling by composition of BMD group in terms of both
independent and joint combat operations; Exploring various options of information support based on joint
information processing arrangements; Adding episodes with complications – e.g. disablement of some
BMD assets; Examining impacts of different killing techniques on the
effectiveness of joint groups operations; Improving performance indicators and criteria of joint
operations effectiveness.
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