International ConferenceInternational Conference««Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security Missile defense Factor in Establishing New Security

EnvironmentEnvironment» »

VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF VIEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MISSILE

DEFENSE ISSUESDEFENSE ISSUES

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian FederationFederation – – First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian

Federation, Army General NFederation, Army General N..EE..MAKAROVMAKAROV

Moscow, 2012

Russian Core BMD Guidelines

Equal and indivisible

security as crucial feature of regional

and global security

Solid linkage between strategic

offensive and defensive

weapon systems

Mutual nuclear deterrence is key to global security

and stability

1

FUNDAMENTALS OF ABM TREATY OF 1972

The Treaty had the USSR and the USA committedThe Treaty had the USSR and the USA committed:: to limit their Missile Defense systemsto limit their Missile Defense systems;; not to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense systemnot to deploy nation-wide Missile Defense system;; not to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areasnot to deploy Missile Defense to protect selected areas;; not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD not to create sea-based, air-based, space-based and ground-mobile MD

systemssystems;; not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles.not to engage radars’ capabilities to fight strategic ballistic missiles.

2

US SDI PROGRAM

The purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting The purpose of SDI program was to create a Missile Defense System protecting the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike .the USA and its allies from a Soviet nuclear missile strike .

3

GRAUND-BASED RADAR

GRAUND-BASED

INTERCEPTOR

BATTLE MANAGTR

GRAUND-BASED LASER

BOOST-BASED SURVERLANCE &

TRACKING SYSTEM

HIGH ENDO-ATMOSPHERIC

DEFENSE INTERCEPTOR

SPACE-BASED SURVERLANCE &

TRACKING SYSTEM

BOOST-PHASE SURVERLANCE & TRAKING SYSTEM

SPACE-BASED LASER

FRONTING MIRROR

NEUTRAL PARTICLE

BEAM

SPACE-BASED INTERCEPTOR

RELAY MIRROR

ABMD AGREEMENTS OF 1990-sJoint US-Russian statement on

global protection system(Washington, 17th of June 1992)

Joint US-Russian statement on global protection system

(Washington, 17th of June 1992)

Joint statement of Presidents of the Russian Federation and the

United States of America regarding Agreement on Ballistic

Missile Defense(Helsinki, 21st of March 1997)

Joint statement of Presidents of the Russian Federation and the

United States of America regarding Agreement on Ballistic

Missile Defense(Helsinki, 21st of March 1997)

First agreed statement regarding Agreement between

the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,

dated 26th of May 1972(New-York, 26th of September 1997)

First agreed statement regarding Agreement between

the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,

dated 26th of May 1972(New-York, 26th of September 1997)

General understanding to the first agreed statement of 26 September 1997 regarding

Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of

ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972

General understanding to the first agreed statement of 26 September 1997 regarding

Agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of

ABMD systems, dated 26th of May 1972

Second agreed statement regarding Agreement between

the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,

dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997)

Second agreed statement regarding Agreement between

the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,

dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997)

General understanding to the second agreed statement

dated 26th of September 1997 regarding Agreement between

the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,

dated 26th of May 1972.

General understanding to the second agreed statement

dated 26th of September 1997 regarding Agreement between

the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,

dated 26th of May 1972.

Agreement on confidence-building measures regarding systems for fighting Ballistic

Missiles, which are not strategic ballistic missiles

(New-York, 25th of September 1997)

Agreement on confidence-building measures regarding systems for fighting Ballistic

Missiles, which are not strategic ballistic missiles

(New-York, 25th of September 1997)

Provision on Standing Consultative Commission

(New-York, 26th of September 1997)

Provision on Standing Consultative Commission

(New-York, 26th of September 1997)

Memorandum of understanding regarding Agreement between

the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,

dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997

Memorandum of understanding regarding Agreement between

the USSR and the USA on limitation of ABMD systems,

dated 26th of May 1972.(New-York, 26th of September 1997

4

PLANS OF THE USA FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THIRD POSITIONING AREA 5

Kozelsk

Tatistchevo

TPA defense zone

Radar ‘s range in Czech

Republic

Possible trajectories of Russian ICBMs

DECLARED PHASES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF US BMD SYSTEM IN EUROPE (NATO BMD)

Phase I(2011)- deployment of MD ships with «Standard-3» 1А interceptors in Aegean, Adriatic and Mediterranean seas.

PhaseII (2011-2015)-deployment of MD base with «Standard-3» interceptors 1B in Romania.

Phase III (2015-2018)-deployment of MD base with «Standard-3» 2А interceptors in Poland. Outfitting deployed MD shooters with «Standard-3» 2А interceptors.

Phase IV (2018-2020)- outfitting deployed MD shooters in Europe with «Standard-3» 2B interceptors.

Protection of South European States from

shorter range missiles

Protection of South and South-East European

States from shorter range missiles

Protection of European states from

intermediate range missiles

Protection of European states from

ICBMs

6

7RUSSIAN “SECTORAL” APPROACH

NATO area of responsibility

(NATO BMD assets only)RUSSIAN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

(RUSSIAN BMD assets only)

NATO-RUSSIA JOINT SYSTEM OF COMBAT CONTROL(information exchange and target distribution)

BM trajectories do not cross NATO BMD

area of responsibility

Territoies of European states (NATO members)

covered by Russian BMD, where deployment of

NATO BMD challenges Russian Strategic Nuclear

Force capabilities

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE8

European MD system element

The Russian Federation proposal («sectoral

approach»)

NATO approach («cooperative system»)

Concurrence of views

Defense areaJoint sector wise area Two independent areas

No

ResponsibilityResponsible for interception of any BM attacking Europe in its «sector»

NATO responsible for NATO territory,

Russia – for Russian territoryNo

Information

Full data sharing on shooter performances, missile threats, target distribution, results assessment

Limited data sharing on missile threats, joint exercises

No

Missile killsAll BMs within the area of responsibility

Only the BM attacking the area of responsibility (including adjacent area)

No

Decision to engage

National level National levelYes

«Buffer» zoneNot required (possible outside of Russian BM trajectories)

Possible ( with NATO and Russian areas overlapping to embrace Russian territory)

No

RUSSIAN PROPOSALS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTIBLE DECISIONS

9

CRITERIA LIST:technical performances of BMD components (interceptor’s speed, number of interceptors, radar range, control system capabilities etc.), deployment sites, capabilities for interception of various types of BMs at boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight.

joint familiarization with European BMD deployment plans and its implications for the relevant strategic deterrence capabilities

development of verification measures to assure security of strategic capabilities

legally binding agreements defining mutual obligations of the pertinent parties to deploy a European BMD system providing equal security to all

participants

to increase defense of fixed launching sites,

to ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers,

to increase readiness of deployed BM platforms,

to increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense,

to decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time,

to increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification by Russian AD and BMD assets,

to employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets,

to ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets (interceptors launchers, command & control posts, outer-space detection means).

RETALIATORY MEASURES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDRATION

All said measures will be implemented only as retaliatory steps provided a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force from the US and NATO

deployed BMD assets appears to be on the rise. Russian response will be adequate, economically well-balanced and effective.

10