Lab-to-Lab Case Neg

Nuclear Security

1NC Frontline1. High level dialogue between US and Chinese scientists happen absent the planBin ’11 – Lee Bin, Senior associate working jointly in the Nuclear Policy Program and Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011

(“Promoting Effective China-U.S. Strategic Nuclear Dialogue”, Carnegie Endowment, October 18th, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/18/promoting-effective-china-u.s.-strategic-nuclear-dialogue, accessed Jul 5th, CE)

The expertise in strategic dialogues built in the Chinese nuclear establishment gives their leaders the confidence to encourage participation in such dialogues at all levels and in different formats. The 1999 U.S. Cox Commission Report, which accused Chinese nuclear scientists of spying , among other charges, interrupted the nascent U.S.-Chinese lab-to-lab dialogue . The Chinese nuclear establishment has set as a precondition to resume the dialogue that the U.S. government formally acknowledge the benefits of the prior U.S.-China lab-to-lab exchange. Although the U nited S tates has yet to meet this pre condition, scientists from the Chinese nuclear establishment never mind talking with and hosting scientists from U.S. national labs at various nuclear dialogues. The active posture of the Chinese nuclear establishment on international nuclear dialogues comes from its confidence in the ability of its experts to participate effectively in these discussions. These institutions are always prepared to send their experts to strategic nuclear dialogues no matter whether the dialogues are multilateral or bilateral, track I or track II, or on contentious or agreeable topics. Such confidence does not arise from international pressure. Instead, foreign assistance in cultivating experience and expertise in international dialogue was very useful in shaping the long-term active posture of the Chinese nuclear establishment.

2. US-China cooperation can’t solve for poor global nuclear security standardsMalin et al ’16 -- Martin B. Malin, Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Director of the Program on Science and Global Security at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, taught courses on international relations, American foreign policy, and Middle East politics at Columbia University and Rutgers University, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom, Research Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, 2016

(“A New Era for Nuclear Security”, Arms Control Association, May 31, http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_06/Features/A-New-Era-for-Nuclear-Security, accessed June 29th, CE)

In their communiqué, the participants in the 2016 summit pledged to “continuously strengthen nuclear security at national, regional, and global levels.”8 Striving for continuous improvement is the right way to frame the challenge of providing effective and sustainable nuclear security. Unfortunately, summit participants missed important opportunities to give added momentum to the effort. The following issues continue to require attention. Still no global standard for nuclear security. Although the amended CPPNM establishes general security principles, it lacks specific standards or guidelines and applies only to materials in civilian use. UN Security Council Resolution 1540

requires states to provide “appropriate effective” protection for all materials, among other relevant measures, but does not specify what constitutes appropriate effective protection .9 IAEA recommendations, to which dozens of states have now publicly subscribed, provide somewhat more specificity, but their implementation is voluntary. Although the summit process certainly helped produce a shared understanding of the importance of nuclear security, it fell short of producing a consensus on a meaningful minimum global standard. If a global standard was beyond reach during the summits, a public commitment to stringent nuclear security measures among the states possessing the biggest stocks of HEU and plutonium would have been a consequential step. Although China’s and India’s endorsement s of the initiative on strengthening nuclear security implementation was an important development, Russia’s absence from the summit and Russia’s and Pakistan’s refusal to sign that statement is a significant gap in the patchwork of nuclear security commitments. Furthermore, the summit outcomes were not comprehensive. Although the summit communiqués explicitly covered “all” nuclear material, most of the concrete progress from the meetings focused on civilian materials, largely ignoring the roughly four-fifths of the world’s remaining HEU and plutonium that is controlled by military organizations.10

3. Alt causes— the drive to lower prices, understaffing, and agency fragmentation deck nuclear security

Green 14—Jim Green, national anti-nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth Australia and Australian coordinator of the Beyond Nuclear Initiative, honors degree in public health from the University of Wollongong, PhD in science and technology studies, 2014. (“China's Nuclear Power Plans: Safety and Security Challenges,” World Information Service on Energy, December 19th, Available Online at https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/796/chinas-nuclear-power-plans-safety-and-security-challenges, Accessed 07-09-2016)

Numerous insiders have warned about inadequate nuclear safety and regulatory standards in China. He Zuoxiu, a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said last year that "to reduce costs, Chinese designs often cut back on safety " .9 Li Yulun, a former vice-president of China National Nuclear Corporation, said last year that Chinese "state leaders have put a high priority on [nuclear safety] but companies executing projects do not seem to have the same level of understanding ." 10 Cables released by WikiLeaks in 2011 highlighted the secrecy of the bidding process for nuclear power plant contracts in China, the influence of government lobbying, and potential weaknesses in management and regulatory oversight. Westinghouse representative Gavin Liu was quoted in a cable as saying: "The biggest potential bottleneck is human resources – coming up with enough trained personnel to build and operate all of these new plants, as well as regulate the industry."11 In August 2009, the Chinese government dismissed and arrested China National Nuclear Corporation president Kang Rixin in a US$260 million (€209m) corruption case involving allegations of bid-rigging in nuclear power plant construction.12 Regulation In 2011, Chinese physicist He Zuoxiu warned that "we're seriously underprepared, especially on the safety front" for a rapid expansion of nuclear power. Qiang Wang and his colleagues from the Chinese Academy of Sciences noted in 2011 that China "still lacks a fully independent nuclear safety regulatory agency"13, and they noted that China's nuclear administrative systems are fragmented among multiple agencies; and China lags behind the US, France, and Japan

when it comes to staff and budget to oversee operational reactors.14 The 2011 report by the State Council Research Office recommended that the National Nuclear Safety Administration "should be an entity directly under the State Council Bureau, making it an independent regulatory body with authority."8 China's nuclear safety agency is still not independent. And there are other problems: salaries for regulatory staff are lower than in industry, and workforce numbers remain relatively low . The State Council Research Office report said that most countries employ 30−40 regulatory staff per reactor, but China's nuclear regulator had only 1000 staff.8

4. Russia is key, the US and Russia hold 80% of the worlds nuclear materialMalin et al ’16 -- Martin B. Malin, Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Director of the Program on Science and Global Security at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, taught courses on international relations, American foreign policy, and Middle East politics at Columbia University and Rutgers University, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom, Research Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, 2016

(“A New Era for Nuclear Security”, Arms Control Association, May 31, http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_06/Features/A-New-Era-for-Nuclear-Security, accessed June 29th, CE)

A mixed picture on implementation. Nuclear facilities in many countries still are not protected against the full range of threats. States with large stocks of nuclear weapons-usable material still contend with corruption and extremism. 11 On the ground, security upgrades remain urgently needed in many spots around the world. One indication of the extent of the inconsistent application of physical protection measures is that, after all of the high-level attention since the 2010 summit, at least six countries —Argentina, Brazil, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden— still do not have armed guards at their nuclear facilities.12 The collapse of U.S.-Russian bilateral cooperation is particularly alarming. Without Russian and U.S. commitments to rebuilding their bilateral nuclear security relationship, it will be impossible for the two states that possess roughly 80 percent of the world’s weapons-usable nuclear material to reassure one another that their nuclear security is sound . Slippage of consolidation and minimization goals. The Obama administration put laudable effort into cleaning out HEU and plutonium from many countries and minimizing the use of HEU elsewhere. Yet, political obstacles will likely make substantial additional progress more difficult than in the past , in particular for the hundreds of kilograms of HEU in Belarus and South Africa. C onversion of additional HEU-fueled research reactors to use low-enriched uranium fuel, particularly but not only in Russia, is hampered by technical challenges and political inattention. Moreover, summit participants failed to reach agreement, even in principle; on stopping or reversing the buildup of separated plutonium.13 The summits put the notion of nuclear security culture on the agenda for many countries where it previously had been neglected.

5. Plan can’t solve – incentives to cut corners on nuclear security still exist post planBunn ’06 -- Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice at Harvard University, adviser to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2006

(“INCENTIVES FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY”, March, Harvard University, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/inmm-incentives2-05.pdf, accessed July 9th, CE)

Effective nuclear security is expensive and often inconvenient. Every dollar that a facility manager spends on protection is a dollar not spent on revenue-generating production (“safeguards don’t make kilowatts,” as the saying goes). Every hour that an employee spends following security procedures is an hour not spent on activities more likely to lead to a promotion or a pay raise. For a state, every budget allocation for nuclear security is an allocation not made for other urgent priorities. In short, the incentives to cut corners on nuclear security are strong. Most individuals and organizations tend to do what they have incentives to do. Hence, unless strong counter-incentives to maintain effective security and accounting for nuclear stockpiles can be put in place, the goal of ensuring that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide are secure enough to defeat the threats that terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose is not likely to be achieved . 1 To date, programs such as the nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) program have provided equipment and training that have increased recipients’ ability to provide effective security, but have been less successful in arranging incentives that would give them the motivation to do so. The problem of incentives is among the most critical policy issues currently facing nuclear security efforts. It is a key issue in Russia , but it is also a key issue in the United States and everywhere else that nuclear stockpiles and facilities – or other particularly hazardous materials and facilities – have to be secured.

6. Each attempt of theft decreases chance of acquiring nuclear materialsMueller 8 — John Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of International Relations, Professor at the Ohio State University, 2008 (“The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” Department of Political Science, January 1, Available Online at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF, Accessed 07/09/16, JZ)

Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by self-interested governments--there is considerable agreement, for example, that Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were ten or fifteen years ago (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 257). Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive.

7. No impact: multiple hurdles makes nuclear terror improbableMueller 8 — John Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of International Relations, Professor at the Ohio State University, 2008 (“The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” Department of Political Science, January 1, Available Online at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF, Accessed 07/09/16, JZ)

As noted earlier, most discussions of atomic terrorism deal rather piecemeal with the subject-- focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. But , as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents "Herculean challenges" and requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished. The process requires obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon "that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart," and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute "the minimum requirements." If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can't produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can't be delivered (Gilmore 1999, 31, emphasis in the original).

8. Their ev concedes terrorists have no motivation to use a nuke 1AC Roth et al 16 — Nickolas Roth, Research Associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom, Research Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, Martin B. Malin, Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Director of the Program on Science and Global Security at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, taught courses on international relations, American foreign policy, and Middle East politics at Columbia University and Rutgers University, Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice at Harvard University, adviser to the O ce of Science and Technology Policy, Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2016

(“Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PreventingNuclearTerrorism-Web.pdf, accessed June 30th, RKim)

Such concerns, coupled with relentless Congressional investigations—which revealed, among other things, walls protecting weapons-usable nuclear material areas so thin investigators cut them with a tin snip—led to a series of steps to further strengthen U.S. nuclear security regulations.255 But there were others who thought the concern was overblown. In 1975, Brian Jenkins, a terrorism expert at the RAND Corporation, authored a short paper titled “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” While warning that his views were highly speculative and might be “dead wrong,” Jenkins argued that terrorists “may try to take advantage of the fear that the word ‘nuclear’ generates without taking the risks or making the investment necessary to steal plutonium and build a working bomb . . . . While we cannot rule out the possibility of a ‘large-scale Lod,’ or holding a city for ransom with a nuclear weapon, the detonation of a nuclear bomb appears to be the least likely terrorist threat.”256 His conclusion was based on the premise that “ Mass casualties simply may not serve the terrorists’ goals and could alienate the population. You don’t poison the city’s water supply in the name of the popular front.”257 (Jenkins had previously coined the often-used aphorism that “ terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead .”) Jenkins’ analysis proved highly influential. In 1977, the U.S. Office of Technology

Assessment, drawing on the advice of a distinguished advisory panel and acknowledging assistance from RAND, concluded, “On the basis of the historical record and the theory of terrorism, it is not clear that causing massive casualties is attractive to terrorists; indeed it could even be regarded as counterproductive . ”258 This conclusion was hedged by the caution that, “Nihilist groups may emerge.”259 By 1986, both Jenkins’ thesis that terrorists probably would not want to detonate a nuclear bomb and the conclusion that they might well have the technical capacity to do so if they got enough of the right kinds of nuclear material were accepted as the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community. Elaborating on and largely consistent with an earlier Special NIE in 1978 and Memorandums to Holders in 1982, the 1986 National Intelligence Estimate found that: • “High level terrorism [e.g., detonation of a nuclear device] may be within the capabilities of a few terrorist groups. The constraints that exist against it, therefore, probably are behavioral.” • “Most important, the fact that most terrorists place a high premium on the political consequences of their actions probably helps dissuade them from threatening terrorist acts that could lead to mass, indiscriminate casualties, because such a threat would alienate even those that they consider to be sympathizers among the affected public .”263 For a decade and a half, this judgment held. In the best available, highly classified analyses used by the U.S. government, sophisticated terrorist groups were assessed to be capable of detonating a nuclear explosion if they were able to steal a weapon or sufficient nuclear material , but were also judged to be unlikely to do so, because it would defeat their political objectives.

Ext. Squo SolvesChina has already committed to high-level dialogue with the US – their 1AC evidenceJinping ‘16—Xi Jinping, el es el presidente de China, 2016

(“Full text of Chinese president's speech at the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit”, Global Times, 4/2, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/976951.shtml, accessed July 7th, CE)

While stepping up its own nuclear security, China will actively advance related international cooperation, share its technologies and expertise and contribute resources and platforms. I hereby announce: First, China will build a network for capacity building on nuclear security. We will use existing platforms including the Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security and the China Customs Radiation Detection Training Center to carry out training of nuclear security professionals, exercises and exchanges regarding nuclear security technologies and other activities. We welcome the participation of Asia Pacific countries, countries along the Belt and Road and other developing countries in relevant projects and will stay in close cooperation with the IAEA. Second, China will promote cooperation model for less use of HEU. We support all countries in minimizing the use of HEU according to their needs as long as it is economically and technologically viable. We are willing to build on the Ghana model and help countries convert HEU-fueled MNSR imported from China under the principle of voluntarism and pragmatism. We will present to other interested countries the multi-party cooperation model for converting HEU-fueled MNSR for their reference. Third, China will implement the action plan on strengthening security of radioactive sources . To prevent the large amount of radioactive sources from falling into the hands of terrorists, we will , in the coming five years, review the radioactive sources within China, improve the security system and give priority to conducting real-time monitoring of high- risk mobile radioactive sources. We stand ready to share our experience with other countries and work with them to enhance the security monitoring of radioactive sources. Fourth, China will launch the technological support initiative against crisis of nuclear terrorism . We will , together with like-minded countries and organizations, carry out scientific research in the fields of civilian nuclear material analysis and tracing, actively organize mock exercises and jointly enhance our capacity for addressing crisis. Fifth, China will promote its national security monitoring system for nuclear power. China applies the most stringent security monitoring to ensure the safety and security of the nuclear power stations within China and those exported to other parts of the world. Nothing is left to chance. Relying on the National Research and Development Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security Monitoring Technologies, we will help others enhance their capacity in security monitoring and contribute our share to enhancing nuclear power safety and security worldwide.

The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and the Center of Excellence solve Chinese Nuclear SecuritySanger ’16—David E. Sanger, Chief Correspondent of the New York Times, won the Pulitzer Prize twice, 2016

(“As Nuclear Security Summit Begins, Materials Remain Vulnerable to Theft”, The New York Times, March 29th, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/nuclear-fuels-are-vulnerable-despite-a-push.html?_r=0, accessed July 9th, CE)

The results of previous summit meetings have ranged from treaty ratifications to the establishment of more than a dozen training centers around the globe w here guards, scientists, managers and regulators sharpen their skills at preventing atomic terrorism. Near Beijing, one of the largest training center s opened this month . “It’s in our national interest” to help foreigners secure their atomic materials, said Nick Winowich, an engineer at Sandia National Laboratories, one of the American nuclear labs that helped in the center’s development. The biggest wins have been the removal of all highly enriched uranium from 12 countries, including Austria, Chile, Hungary, Libya, Mexico, Turkey and Vietnam. The material was mostly reactor fuel. But officials said terrorists could have turned it into least 130 nuclear weapons.

China supported nuclear security at the nuclear security summitKai 4/4/16— Chen Kai, Secretary General China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, April, 4 2016 (“China’s Vital Role at the Nuclear Security Summit,” 4/4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/chen-kai, Accessed numbered date, JW)

As the curtain of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit finally dropped on April 1 in Washington, Xi Jinping, the president of China, alongside leaders from 51 other countries and four international organizations — including the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations — were there. Together, they focused on strengthening the global nuclear security architecture in order to seek a more coordinated and effective approach to the world’s lingering nuclear security challenges. The summit bore fruit with a joint China-U.S. communique, plus five separate action plans from different participants. At present, terrorism is the most severe security challenge to the international community. Worse, it will be a nightmare for all mankind if nuclear materials are used by terrorists or if nuclear terrorists abuse cyberspace and other high-tech areas. Six years ago, the first Nuclear Security Summit was initiated in Washington. Now, the NSS process has contributed to strengthening the international nuclear security architecture and upholding international peace and security. There are three central aspects of the NSS that are worth looking at: The NSS served as a platform for sharing experience. Taking this opportunity, leaders from various countries shared their opinions and best practices on nuclear security issues, discussed simulated crises and debated different solutions with a view to learning from each other and mutually making up deficiencies. The NSS enhanced global capacity for emergency responses. Under the guidance of the NSS process, participating countries have taken concrete steps toward that goal — closely monitoring and evaluating the global nuclear security situation, formulating policies and laws and streamlining administration and procedure, all of which are beneficial to avoiding nuclear security accidents, preventing nuclear terrorist attacks and continuously consolidating our defense to nuclear terrorism. The NSS promoted international nuclear security cooperation. Established international institutions and new initiatives are complementary to one another. Multilateral and bilateral cooperation are mutually reinforced. The nuclear security cooperation framework with the IAEA as its core gained universal recognition around the globe and plays a significant role in integrating and coordinating global resources and actions. nuclear north korea A new multiple launch rocket system is test fired in this undated photo released by North Korea on March 4. (REUTERS/KCNA) China plays an active role in establishing, constructing and upholding this international nuclear security architecture. China supported the NSS process by participating in and carrying out the outcomes of the previous summits. In The Hague in 2014, President Xi put forward a Chinese approach to nuclear security for the first time, which provided an important and useful perspective to promote international nuclear security . At the 2016 summit, President Xi delivered a speech that fully demonstrated China’s policies

and initiatives. I believe that speech will be welcomed by the international community, becoming another significant contribution to promoting international nuclear security architecture and global nuclear order. As a responsible member of the international community, China fulfills its commitments and takes the foremost responsibility for improving its domestic nuclear security. In recent years, China placed more emphasis on the overall planning of nuclear security and made great efforts in various fields — from the improvement of administration to the formulation and amendments of laws and regulations, the development of advanced technology and the fostering of nuclear security culture. By doing so, China achieved movement forward in developing nuclear security, which constitutes an important contribution to the international nuclear security architecture. We will build an international nuclear security architecture featuring fairness and win-win cooperation. At the same time, China fully participates in global nuclear security governance. Alongside other countries, China is committed to promoting a healthy and sustainable development of the international nuclear security process. China firmly supports the work of the IAEA and the U.N., and continuously benefits from the deepening exchange and cooperation with other countries on nuclear security. China takes an active role in rule-making in the field of nuclear security and plays a constructive role in influencing the nuclear security governance and establishment of nuclear order. In the end, China adds its share to the cause of global nuclear security by utilizing its experience and capacity. Though this is the conclusion of the NSS process, the endeavor to promote global nuclear security will never stop. The small steps we made will lead to great advances in the field of nuclear security. We will build an international nuclear security architecture featuring fairness and win-win cooperation and will embrace a world with shared nuclear security.

China’s nuclear security is working and benefits the common goodXinhua 16 — Xinhua, IAEA official, March 3, 2016 (“Chinese efforts to enhance nuclear security contribute to the common good: IAEA official,” 3/3/16, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/30/c_135237001.htm, 7/9/16, JW)

UNITED NATIONS, March 29 (Xinhua) -- China is contributing to the common good through its efforts to improve nuclear security both at home and abroad, a senior official from the International Association for Atomic Energy (IAEA) has said. China has taken effective steps to ensure the security of nuclear materials, including those at nuclear power plants and medical research centers , and to protect people and environment from being harmed by nuclear materials, Khammar Mrabit, director of the IAEA's Nuclear Security Office, said in a recent interview with Xinhua. The interview was conducted ahead of the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, which is scheduled to take place in Washington, D.C., from Thursday to Friday. Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the meeting. Nuclear security refers to ensuring that peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technology are not diverted into the wrong hands, Mrabit said. "Nuclear security is a common good. It's good for everybody whether you have a nuclear power program or you don't," said Mrabit. "You have to protect your people and the environment from malicious acts and anything that would harm the public society and the environment." He said countries such as China that own nuclear power programs should bear special responsibilities on nuclear security, while calling on all countries to use radioactive sources at a minimum level, even for medical purposes. "(Ensuring the) security of such materials and facilities is the responsibility of China because this is the responsibility of each country when you have such materials and such facilities," he said. "That nuclear power program, those installations, have to be protected from falling, of course, into the wrong hands, meaning criminals and terrorists." In this regard, Mrabit said that China is a very important partner of

the IAEA and enjoys sound cooperation with the international nuclear watchdog. He described China's recently completed Nuclear Security Center of Excellence as "a big achievement." "(The center) would not only improve nuclear security but would sustain nuclear security infrastructure in China and certainly would contribute... to improving nuclear security in the region," he said. The center, which is the largest in the Asia-Pacific region, opened in Beijing, the Chinese capital, on March 18, with the aim to boost nuclear security cooperation in the region and the world. The IAEA supports its member states, including China, to reach nuclear security standards, in some cases providing support as requested, and in other cases providing more hands-on assistance. For example, China has requested that the IAEA visit China to conduct a peer-review of its national nuclear program and facilities, the official said, adding that the IAEA can provide a higher-level of support to other countries in need. "There are countries where we need more assistance, where we have what we call integrated logistical support plans, where we identify all that is needed to help them improve their nuclear security infrastructure," Mrabit said. But he did not disclose the names of these countries. Mrabit, a national from Morocco, has a PhD in nuclear physics and has been working for the IAEA since 1986. The IAEA is the world's center for cooperation in the nuclear field and a part of the United Nations family. It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and currently has 168 member states.

China US nuke coop high in the status quoHolt, Nikitin, Kerr 15 — Mark Holt, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Paul K. Kerr, Mark Holt is a Specialist in Energy Policy, Mary Beth D. Nikitin is a Specialist in Nonproliferation, Paul K. Kerr is a Analyst in Nonproliferation, August 18, 2015 (“U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” 8/18/16, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33192.pdf, Accessed 7/17/16, JW)

In the President’s letter of transmittal to Congress,12 he says that the U.S.-China 123 agreement “will advance the nonproliferation and national security interests of the United States .” Once a Section 123 agreement is in place, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Department of Energy approves licenses for specific transfers. The agreement does not permit the transfer of restricted data or sensitive nuclear technology. It does allow for the enrichment up to a level less than 20% U-235 and reprocessing of U.S.-obligated material at safeguarded or safe guards eligible sites. The agreement’s duration is 30 years. Either country may terminate the agreement with one year’s notice. The proposed agreement includes an Agreed Minute, which lays out steps that are to be pursued if either side has concerns about the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on transferred material, including facility design review, exchange of records to ensure material accounting, and the designation of individuals who may access and inspect material accountancy systems. This is to ensure that fuel and other transferred technology remain in peaceful use. The Agreed Minute also addresses byproduct material, and says that there will be annual information exchanges on byproduct material, including tritium, subject to the agreement. Any byproducts shall only be used for peaceful purposes under Article 8 of the agreement. The Agreed Minute includes a section on retransfers and technology exchanges. Retransfers to a third country are still subject to the requirements of the original supplier country and will need to have written consent. The United States and China are to implement a process for “obtaining government assurances needed for certain technology or information transfers .” This includes a Pre-Approved Activity and Nuclear Technology List (based on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) trigger list) and a Pre-Approved Entity List. For example, if China or the United States authorizes a transfer of a technology on the preapproved list to an entity on the preapproved list, it will notify the other party of this transfer. These lists will be updated on a yearly basis. This transfer will still be subject

to transfer conditions . These measures are to give additional assurance for U.S. consent rights on further transfers within and outside of China.

Ext. Can’t solveMultiple alt causes to nuclear securityHui 16—Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2016. (“China’s Nuclear Security: Progress, Challenges,and Next Steps,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March, Available Online at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/Chinas%20Nuclear%20Security-Web.pdf, Accessed 07-07-2016 p. ii-iii, aqp)

While China has substantially advanced its nuclear security during last several years, significant challenges still remain:

• China has changed a number of important parts of its nuclear security requirements and instructions to operators in recent years, including the 2008 guidance requiring operators to defend against a regulator-reviewed design basis threat (DBT). But the underlying regulations that provide the legal basis for their requirements have not been updated since the 9/11 attacks.

• There are still significant challenges to China’s efforts to establish an effective nationwide MPC&A system. Although the 2008 guidelines require a DBT, the operators typically design site-specific DBTs on a case-by-case basis, without any national DBT to serve as a guide. Moreover, no Chinese regulations require realistic force-on-force exercises at nuclear facilities. China’s MC&A system for bulk processing facilities (e.g. reprocessing plants) may not be sufficient to detect material being stolen in small amounts at a time. The problems with material accounting at China’s pilot reprocessing plant demonstrate the challenge.

• Although strengthening cyber security at nuclear facilities has recently been receiving attention, China has not yet written specific regulations and guidelines with provisions in this area. Currently, the licensing process for nuclear facilities does not cover cyber security for systems relevant to safety and security.

• China still faces substantial challenges in its efforts to build a robust nuclear security culture. Many Chinese experts continue to doubt that there is a credible threat to Chinese nuclear materials and facilities. Complacency is still widespread among a significant number of senior officials within its nuclear industry. Problems like secrecy and corruption remain challenges to China’s nuclear establishment.

Can’t solve Russian or Pakistani nuclear securitySanger ’16—David E. Sanger, Chief Correspondent of the New York Times, won the Pulitzer Prize twice, 2016

(“As Nuclear Security Summit Begins, Materials Remain Vulnerable to Theft”, The New York Times, March 29th, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/nuclear-fuels-are-vulnerable-despite-a-push.html?_r=0, accessed July 9th, CE)

As President Obama gathers world leaders in Washington this week for his last Nuclear Security Summit, tons of materials that terrorists could use to make small nuclear devices or dirty bombs remain deeply

vulnerable to theft. Still, Mr. Obama’s six-year effort to rid the world of loose nuclear material has succeeded in pulling bomb-grade fuel out of countries from Ukraine to Chile, and has firmly put nuclear security on the global agenda. But despite the progress, several countries are balking at safeguards promoted by the U nited S tates or are building new stockpiles. President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, where some of the largest stockpiles of civilian nuclear material remain, has decided to boycott the summit meeting , which begins Thursday night. Mr. Putin has made it clear he will not engage in nuclear cleanup efforts dominated by the United States. In addition, Pakistan’s embrace of a new generation of small, tactical nuclear weapons, which the Obama administration considers highly vulnerable to theft or misuse , has changed the way the administration talks about Pakistani nuclear security. While Mr. Obama declared early in his presidency that the United States believed Pakistan’s nuclear assets were secure, administration officials will no longer repeat that line. Instead, when the subject comes up, they note the modest progress Pakistan has made in training its guards and investing in sensors to detect break-ins. They refuse to discuss secret talks to persuade the Pakistanis not to deploy their new weapons.

Can’t solve global nuclear insecurity a thousand alt causes, Belgium, Pakistan, India, Japan, Hospitals, Industrial ImagingSanger ’16—David E. Sanger, Chief Correspondent of the New York Times, won the Pulitzer Prize twice, 2016

(“As Nuclear Security Summit Begins, Materials Remain Vulnerable to Theft”, The New York Times, March 29th, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/nuclear-fuels-are-vulnerable-despite-a-push.html?_r=0, accessed July 9th, CE)

Pakistan, China, India and Japan are all planning new factories to obtain plutonium that will add to the world’s stockpiles of bomb fuel . And Belgium , where a nuclear facility was sabotaged in 2014 and where nuclear plant workers with inside access went off to fight for the Islamic State militant group, has emerged as a central worry. The country is so divided and disorganized that many fear it is vulnerable to an attack far more sophisticated than the bombings in the Brussels airport and subway system last week. For the first time, the Nuclear Security Summit will include a special session on responding to urban terrorist attacks — and a simulation of how to handle the threat of imminent nuclear terrorism. Continue reading the main story Advertisement Continue reading the main story “The key question for this summit,” said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard and a former White House science adviser, “is whether they’ll agree on approaches to keep the improvements coming.” The nuclear initiative has been a signature issue for Mr. Obama: It is among the goals he campaigned on in 2008 and part of the reason he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize barely a year into his presidency. Benjamin J. Rhodes, a deputy national security adviser, told reporters on Tuesday that the administration’s overall efforts had made it “harder than ever before for terrorists and bad actors to acquire nuclear material.” But the administration’s budget for aiding global nuclear cleanups has been cut by half ; some officials argue that less funding is needed with fewer nations willing to give up nuclear materials. A report Mr. Bunn helped write noted, “ The administration is now projecting lower spending year after year for years to come, postponing or canceling a wide range of nuclear security activities that had been included in previous

plans.” In a recent report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private advocacy group in Washington that tracks nuclear weapons and materials, warned that many radioactive sources were “poorly secured and vulnerable to theft .” The report called the probability of a terrorist’s detonating a dirty bomb “much higher than that of an improvised nuclear device.” Ingredients for so-called dirty bombs , which use conventional explosives to spew radioactive material, are still scattered around the globe at thousands of hospitals and other sites that use the highly radioactive substances for industrial imaging and medical treatments . Less than half of the countries that attended the last nuclear summit in 2014 pledged to secure such materials, and they in turn represent less than 15 percent of the 168 nations belonging to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Photo Mr. Obama with Japan’s leader, Shinzo Abe, in 2014. Credit Pool photo by Yves Herman And while the administration succeeded in getting more than a dozen countries to give up their civilian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, a main fuel of atomic bombs, the Nuclear Threat Initiative said in another report that some 25 nations still had such materials — enough for thousands of nuclear weapons. The report called highly enriched uranium “one of the most dangerous materials on the planet ,” warning that an amount small enough to fit in a five-pound sugar bag could be used to build a nuclear device “with the potential to kill hundreds of thousands of people.” Still, that does not mean Mr. Obama’s efforts have failed altogether. He is expected to announce a major achievement soon: the removal of roughly 40 bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium from Japan. Some of the uranium was fabricated in pieces the size of squares of chocolate that could be easily slipped into a pocket , a terrorist’s dream.

Counter-incentives to cut corners surrounding nuclear security are too strongBunn ’06 -- Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice at Harvard University, adviser to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2006

(“INCENTIVES FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY”, March, Harvard University, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/inmm-incentives2-05.pdf, accessed July 9th, CE)

Effective systems and procedures to ensure security for nuclear warheads and weapons -usable nuclear materials are expensive and often inconvenient . Hence, strong incentives exist to cut corners on nuclear security – for states and ministries to provide fewer resources than needed, for facilities to invest what resources they have in activities directed toward generating revenue or fulfilling their principal missions, and for individuals not to follow burdensome security procedures. This paper outlines approaches under which U.S. policy and policies by other key governments could provide incentives to put in place effective nuclear security, at the state or ministry level, at the facility level, and at the individual level. Effective regulatory approaches, decisions not to provide lucrative U.S. government contracts to foreign facilities that have not demonstrated strong nuclear security, and steps to ensure that actions related to nuclear security are appropriately included in individual performance reviews and facility-level performance fees are among the kinds of incentives that could be considered. Ultimately, maintaining effective nuclear security should be part of the “price of admission” for doing business in the international nuclear marketplace. Without such incentives, current programs to cooperate in improving nuclear security worldwide may

not succeed in putting in place nuclear security systems and procedures that provide genuinely effective security and will be sustained for the long haul.

Alt Cause—threat plans and regulations aren’t terrorist-proofHui 16—Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2016. (“How China Needs to Improve its Legal Framework on Nuclear Security,” Bulletin for Atomic Scientists, March 24th, Available Online at http://thebulletin.org/how-china-needs-improve-its-legal-framework-nuclear-security9276, Accessed 07-09-2016)

Major gaps remain. While China has been making progress at improving the legal framework surrounding its nuclear laws and regulations, there have not been many updates of nuclear regulations and rules on the security of nuclear materials and facilities. All the existing regulations and rules were written before the attacks on New York and Washington in September 11, 2001, and the threat of nuclear terrorism was not specifically mentioned.

Although the 2008 guidelines require all civilian nuclear facilities to be designed in such a way that they consider threats to their security coming from outsiders, insiders, or a collusion of both—technically known as a “design basis threat”—they contain no clearly defined standards for how each nuclear facility should be designed for local conditions. Operators typically create their site-specific designs on a case-by-case basis. But as National Nuclear Safety Administration director Li Ganjie noted, t he existing design basis threat plans for nuclear power plants could have produced facilities that are unable to resist attacks from large-scale and well-organized terrorist groups with powerful weapons. Neither the upcoming Atomic Energy Law nor the Nuclear Safety Law is expected to address such a specific issue. The physical protection guidelines usually deal with those specifics, but, at the moment, the National Nuclear Safety Administration has no plan to update its 2008 physical protection guidelines.

Ext. No Nuclear TheftNo insider threatMueller 8 — John Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of International Relations, Professor at the Ohio State University, 2008 (“The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” Department of Political Science, January 1, Available Online at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF, Accessed 07/09/16, JZ)

Corruption in some areas may provide an opportunity to buy the relevant material, but purchasers of illicit goods and services would have to pay off a host of greedy confederates, any one of whom could turn on them or , either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Not only could the exchange prove to be a scam, it could also prove to be part of a sting --or become one. Although there may be disgruntled and much underpaid scientists in places like Russia, they would have to consider the costs of detection. A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist was once a national hero for his lead work on his country's atomic bomb. But when he was brought down for selling atomic secrets to other governments, he was placed under severe house arrest, allowed no outside communication or contact, including telephone, newspapers, or internet, and is reportedly in declining health (Langewiesche 2007, 75-76).10 Renegade Russian scientists who happen not to be national heroes could expect a punishment that would be considerably more unpleasant. Once it is noticed that some uranium is missing, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. There is something decidedly worse than being a disgruntled Russian scientist, and that is being a dead disgruntled Russian scientist. Thus even one initially tempted by , seduced by, or sympathetic to , the blandishments of the sneaky foreign terrorists might well quickly develop second thoughts and go to the authorities.

Terrorists can’t utilize Nuclear WeaponsKrepon 9 — Michael Krepon, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center. He worked previously at the Carnegie Endowment, the State Department, and on Capitol Hill. His areas of expertise are reducing nuclear dangers -- with a regional specialization in South Asia -- and improving national and international security in outer space, March 1, 2009 (“5 Myths About All Those Nukes Out There,” 3/1/09, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/27/AR2009022703672.html, Accessed numbered date, JW)

Last week's news that North Korea plans to test a ballistic missile that could reach Alaska gave doomsayers more grounds for gloom. But amid the fear about nuclear attacks by terrorists or leaders such as Kim Jong Il, let's not forget that the United States has managed to protect itself from such a catastrophe not only since 9/11, but since the birth of the bomb in 1945 . That record could end tomorrow, and we have a lot of work to do to stay safe. But fear-mongering -- such as Dick Cheney's warning last month about the "high probability" of terrorists attempting a nuclear or biological attack -- can lead to costly mistakes. We don't need to scare ourselves silly to guard against the worst. The threat of a nuclear attack is high and growing. We've actually survived much more harrowing times. In 1962 there was the Cuban missile crisis, the worst two weeks of the Cold War. And how about the decade-long free fall that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union? During its final days, the U.S.S.R. possessed

30,000 nuclear warheads and enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium for about 64,000 more. Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev were jockeying for control over nuclear launch codes, and many experts worried that the military chain of command would splinter. Then, after the Soviet Union fell apart, thousands of weapons suddenly belonged to fragile states such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan. American officials wisely brokered the return of the nuclear weapons to Russia, where they were locked down. Stranded Soviet missiles and bombers were also returned for dismantling. 2. Sooner or later, a mushroom cloud will burst over an American city. Fortunately, the darkest nuclear nightmares are also the least likely to occur. During the Cold War, many Americans lived in fear of a bolt-out-of-the-blue Soviet missile attack; today our anxieties center on nuclear terrorism. Yet since 9/11, not a single person has died in an act of nuclear terrorism, while 57,000 have been killed and 99,000 injured in a total of 36,000 terrorist attacks involving explosives, firearms and grenades. Terrorists have had a hard time getting their hands on nuclear weapons. Although governments and enterprising freelancers have sold missiles and centrifuges, there is no reliable evidence that they have auctioned off nuclear weapons to wild men they can't control . More good news: It would be very hard for a terrorist group to build a nuclear weapon on its own without being discovered in the process. Terrorists could acquire enough nuclear material to make a dirty bomb, which would use conventional explosives to spew radioactive material, but they could actually do much more damage with automatic weapons

Countries won’t give terrorists nukes – multiple warrantsMueller 8 — John Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of International Relations, Professor at the Ohio State University, 2008 (“The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” Department of Political Science, January 1, Available Online at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF, Accessed 07/09/16, JZ)

A favorite fantasy of imaginative alarmists envisions that a newly nuclear country will palm off a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. As Langewiesche stresses, however, this is highly improbable because there would be too much risk , even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered (2007, 20; also Kamp 1996, 33; Bunn 2006, 115; Bunn and Wier 2006, 137).6 Moreover, there is a very considerable danger the bomb and its donor would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve (including on the donor itself). It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state-- even a close ally, much less a terrorist group--a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently. For example, during the Cold War, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused (Oberdorfer 2005; see also Pillar 2003, xxi). There could be some danger from private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, its activities were rather easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time (Langewiesche 2007, 169-72).

Al Qaeda in particular will not get nukes from countriesMueller 8 — John Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of International Relations, Professor at the Ohio State University, 2008 (“The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” Department of Political

Science, January 1, Available Online at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF, Accessed 07/09/16, JZ)

In addition, al-Qaeda --the chief demon group and one of the few terrorist groups to see value in striking the U nited S tates-- is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone. 7 As Peter Bergen (2007, 19) has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the U nited N ations ; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along all that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban government (Burke 2003, 150, 164-65; Wright 2006, 230-1, 287-88; Cullison 2004).

Ext. No terror impactNo nuclear terror – empirics proveMueller 8 — John Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of International Relations, Professor at the Ohio State University, 2008 (“The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” Department of Political Science, January 1, Available Online at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF, Accessed 07/09/16, JZ)

At any rate, experience thus far cannot be too encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. One group that tried , in the early 1990s, to pull off the deed was the Japanese apocalyptic group, Aum Shinrikyo. Unlike al-Qaeda, it was not under siege, and it had money, expertise, a remote and secluded haven in which to set up shop, even a private uranium mine. But it made dozens of mistakes in judgment, planning, and execution (Linzer 2004). Chagrined, it turned to biological weapons which , as it happened, didn't work either, and finally to chemical ones, resulting eventually in a somewhat botched release of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that managed to kill a total of 12 people.

Terrorists can’t build nukes – too many hurdles Mueller 8 — John Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of International Relations, Professor at the Ohio State University, 2008 (“The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” Department of Political Science, January 1, Available Online at http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF, Accessed 07/14/16, JZ)

Younger has more recently made a similar argument: it would be wrong to assume that nuclear weapons are now easy to make ....I am constantly amazed when self-declared "nuclear weapons experts," many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon, hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive....While it is true that one can obtain the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive from articles on the Internet, none of these sources has enough detail to enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive (2007, 86, 88).15 Although he remains concerned that a terrorist group could buy or steal a nuclear device or be given one by an established nuclear country (2007, 93), Younger is quick to enumerate the difficulties the group would confront when trying to fabricate one on their own. He stresses that uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine" while "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed. Both need special machining technology that has evolved through a process of trial and error." Others contend the crudest type of bomb would be "simple and robust" and "very simple" to detonate (Bunn and Wier 2006, 140). Younger disagrees: Another challenge...is how to choose the right tolerances. "Just put a slug uranium into a gun barrel and shoot it into another slug of uranium" is one deception of how easy it is to make a nuclear explosive. However, if the gap between the barrel and the slug is too tight, then the slug may stick as it is accelerated down the barrel. If the gap is too big, then other more complex, issues may arise. All of these problems can be solved by experimentation, but this experimentation requires a level of technical resources that, until recently, few countries had. How do you measure the progress of an explosive detonation without destroying the equipment doing the measurement? How do you perform precision measurements on something that only lasts a fraction of a millionth of a second? (2007, 89) All this work would have to be carried out in utter secret, of course, even while local and international security police are likely to be on the intense prowl. "In addition to all the usual intelligence methods, " note the Los

Alamos scientists, "the most sensitive technical detection equipment available would be at their disposal ," and effective airborne detectors used to prospect for uranium have been around for decades and " great improvement in such equipment have been realized since" (Mark et al. 1987, 60). As Milhollin presents the terrorists’ problem, "the theft of the uranium would probably be discovered soon enough, and it might be only a short matter of time before the whole world showed up on their doorstep" (2002, 48).16 Moreover, points out Langewiesche, people in the area may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals (2007, 65-69).17 In addition, the bombmakers would not be able to test the product to be sure they were on the right track (Linzer 2004; Mark et al. 1987, 64). The process of fabricating an IND requires, then, the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will remain completely devoted to the cause. This is not an impossible task--some of the terrorists who tried to commit mayhem in Britain in 2007 had medical degrees--but it certainly vastly complicates the problem. In addition, corrupted co-conspirators , many of them foreign, must remain utterly reliable, no curious outsider must get wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off, and international and local security services must be kept perpetually in the dark.

Nuclear Energy

1NC – Nuclear Energy1. China is implementing safe nuclear tech now —no need for coopMacDonald 16—Fiona MacDonald, Director of Content at ScienceAlert, freelance journalist, Bachelor of Science, Zoology, from University of Melbourne, 2016. (“China Says It'll Have a Meltdown-proof nuclear reactor ready by next year,” Science Alert, February 15th, Available Online at http://www.sciencealert.com/china-says-it-ll-have-a-meltdown-proof-nuclear-reactor-ready-by-next-year, Accessed 07-09-2016, aqp)

China has announced that it'll be bringing a nuclear power plant online in 2017 that's immune to meltdown. Consisting of next-generation, twin 105-megawatt reactors, the plant doesn't rely on complex, external systems to regulate its temperature - such as the kind that failed at Fukushima - and, in theory, it shouldn't ever overheat. While the technology behind the reactor originated in Germany decades ago, this is the first time the design will be built on a commercial scale anywhere in the world , and it's a pretty big deal . If China pulls this off, it'll take away one of the biggest concerns about nuclear power, and suggests that the technology could be used to safely provide energy, with far less greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels. The reactor is being built in the Shandong province, south of Beijing, and construction is almost complete, according to Zhang Zuoyi, director of China's Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology. The next step involves 18 months of testing and fuel-loading, before the reactors finally go critical in November 2017. If it's successful, the new plant will generate 210 megawatts of energy, and China is ready to go all in on the technology, with a 600-megawatt facility already planned in the Jiangxi province. China has also announced plans to sell the reactors internationally, with an agreement in place to construct a reactor in Saudi Arabia. " This technology is going to be on the world market within the next five years," Zhang told MIT Technology Review. "We are developing these reactors to belong to the world. "

2. Nuclear Energy cooperation is high in the status quoWorld Nuclear News 2015 — WNN 2015, News site for nuclear power information, 2015 (“China-USA cooperation agreement renewed”, WNN, Available online at http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-China-USA-cooperation-agreement-renewed-1011157.html, Accessed at 7-11-16, RKim)

A new agreement formalizing nuclear cooperation between China and the USA and establishing the terms for nuclear trade between the countries has entered into force . The agreement replaces a previous version which had been due to expire at the end of the year. Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements - often referred to as 123 agreements, as they are required under subsection 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - are a prerequisite for nuclear trade and materials transfer between the US and any other country. They provide a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation as well as permitting the transfer of material, equipment (including reactors), components, information, and technology for nuclear research and nuclear power production. President Barack Obama approved the renewal of the agreement in April, sending it before the US Congress for review. The agreement has now entered into force after completing its mandatory review over a total period of 90 days continuous session by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The existing US-China agreement was enacted in 1985, covering a 30-year period. Its renewal means that projects such as Westinghouse's AP1000 reactor exports, which use many US-based suppliers, as well as US-Chinese nuclear collaborations can continue unimpeded. The US nuclear industry, through the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), has previously urged Congress to approve the renewal. The institute's

vice president for suppliers and international programs, Daniel Lipman, welcomed its entry into force, saying: "The nuclear energy industry applauds the renewal of the US-China agreement for nuclear energy cooperation." The direct economic benefit to the country from the renewed agreement is expected to be between $70 billion and $204 billion in the period to 2040, he said. China currently has 22 reactors under construction, with work to start on many more. The first of four Westinghouse AP1000s under construction in China, Sanmen 1, is expected to start up next year. The AP1000 design has been standardized for many of China's planned nuclear power plants and work is expected to begin on a further 13 reactors by 2017, NEI noted. "The continued US presence in China's nuclear energy market and China's adoption of US technology and operating plant exchanges will deepen its relationship with the United States and advance international nuclear safety practices ," Lipman said.

3. Chinese tech safe nowMartin 16—Richard Martin, senior editor for energy at MIT Technology Review, author of Coal Wars: The Future of Energy & The Fate of the Planet, 2016. (“China Could Have a Meltdown-Proof Nuclear Reactor Next Year,” MIT Technology Review, February 11th, Available Online at https://www.technologyreview.com/s/600757/china-could-have-a-meltdown-proof-nuclear-reactor-next-year/, Accessed 07-14-2016, aqp)

In what would be a milestone for advanced nuclear power, China’s Nuclear Engineering Construction Corporation plans to start up a high-temperature, gas-cooled pebble-bed nuclear plant next year in Shandong province, south of Beijing. The twin 105-megawatt reactors—so-called Generation IV reactors that would be immune to meltdown —would be the first of their type built at commercial scale in the world. Construction of the plant is nearly complete, and the next 18 months will be spent installing the reactor components, running tests, and loading the fuel before the reactors go critical in November 2017, said Zhang Zuoyi, director of the Institute of Nuclear and New Energy Technology, a division of Tsinghua University that has developed the technology over the last decade and a half, in an interview at the institute’s campus 30 miles south of Beijing. If it’s successful, Shandong plant would generate a total of 210 megawatts and will be followed by a 600-megawatt facility in Jiangxi province. Beyond that, China plans to sell these reactors internationally; in January, Chinese president Xi Jinping signed an agreement with King Salman bin Abdulaziz to construct a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor in Saudi Arabia. “This technology is going to be on the world market within the next five years,” Zhang predicts. “We are developing these reactors to belong to the world.” Pebble-bed reactors that use helium gas as the heat transfer medium and run at very high temperatures—up to 950 °C—have been in development for decades. The Chinese reactor is based on a design originally developed in Germany, and the German company SGL Group is supplying the billiard-ball-size graphite spheres that encase thousands of tiny “pebbles” of uranium fuel. Seven high-temperature gas-cooled reactors have been built, but only two units remain in operation, both relatively small: an experimental 10-megawatt pebble-bed reactor at the Tsinghua Institute campus, which reached full power in 2003, and a similar reactor in Japan. During a recent visit to the Tsinghua facility, technologists were testing the huge helium blower that will circulate the gas coolant at the Shandong site once it starts up. Such high-temperature reactors are immune to meltdown because they don’t require elaborate external cooling systems of the sort that failed at Fukushima, Japan, in 2011. The graphite coating protects the fuel from breaking down, even at temperatures well beyond those found in the reactor core during operation, and once the interior temperature passes a certain threshold, the nuclear reactions slow, cooling the reactor and making it essentially self-regulating. And while pebble-bed reactors do not totally solve the problem of nuclear

waste, the fuel’s form also gives rise to multiple options for waste disposal. China’s eventual goal is to eliminate or greatly reduce waste by recycling the spent fuel.

4. Impacts to nuclear meltdown are systemically exaggerated—causes the impactsAdams 12— Rod Adams, Publisher of Atomic Insights, Host and Producer of The Atomic Show Podcast, Former Officer, United States Navy, Former Submarine Engineer Officer, Graduate of US Navy Nuclear Power School and Naval Postgraduate School, 2012.(“Exaggerated Myths about Nuclear Accidents CAUSE Negative Health Effects,” Atomic Insights, May 29th, Available Online at http://atomicinsights.com/exaggerated-myths-about-nuclear-accidents-cause-negative-health-effects/, Accessed 07-09-2016)

This video was produced by the World Nuclear Association (WNA). It shows that the predicted health consequences of nuclear accidents are often orders of magnitude greater than the actual , measured health consequences of the accidents that have occurred . Instead of the “worst case scenarios” of hundreds of thousands to millions of people getting sick and dying , Chernobyl produced a few dozen casualties, a few thousand illnesses, and few, if any, additional long-term radiation related illnesses . Fukushima will result in no casualties and no long term radiation related illnesses, because the key mistakes that were made in the initial response to the accident at Chernobyl were not repeated. Worker doses at Fukushima were controlled so that no one was exposed to dangerous radiation doses. The public was sufficiently informed about radiation releases so that no one drank milk that was contaminated by I-131. Unfortunately, the most important lesson from 25 years worth of intense international study of the Chernobyl accident has not been learned. That accident had very real social, economic and health consequences. Those completely avoidable consequences were due to the way that governments, the antinuclear movement, and the media chose to react. Government edicts led to permanent relocation and the associated stress and economic disruption . The antinuclear movement created tales of hundreds of thousands of deaths and promoted those stories relentlessly (and continues to do so). Sensational media reports of catastrophic predictions were never followed with calm, reasoned reporting of the actual results. As a result of those actions, people have continued to live in fear of a boogyman that has never arrived. People who have been repeatedly told that they are condemned to an early death often make choices like smoking, excessive drinking and reckless behavior that allow the predictions of illness and early death to become self-fulfilling. The WNA video overlooks the fact that there are many people who have purposely inflated the potential effects of nuclear accidents and produced scare stories for hire . Some of those scare stories are actually published as official government documents by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There are plenty of economic motives for fighting the beneficial use of nuclear energy and for exaggerating the effects of the few accidents that occasionally happen.

5. Not anthropogenic – multiple warrantsSpencer ‘12 (Roy, former NASA climatologist and author, “Ten Years After the Warming,” 2/26, http://www.drroyspencer.com/2012/02/)

As can be seen, in the last 10 years the estimated forcing has been the strongest . Yet , most if not all temperature

datasets show little or no global-average warming recently, either in the atmosphere, at the surface, or in the upper 700

meters of the ocean. For example, here are the tropospheric temperatures up though a few days ago: So what is happening? You cannot simply say a lack of warming in 10 years is not that unusual, and that there have been previous 10-year periods without warming, too.

No, we are supposedly in uncharted territory with a maximum in radiative forcing of the climate system. One cannot compare on an equal basis the last 10 years with any previous decades without warming. There are 5 possibilities for the recent

cessation of warming which are most discussed: 1) cooling from anthropogenic aerosols has been cancelling out warming from more greenhouse gases 2) natural cooling from internal climate fluctuations or the sun is cancelling out the GHG warming 3) increased ocean mixing is causing the extra energy to be distributed into the deep ocean 4) the temperature ’sensitivity’ of the climate system is not as large as the IPCC assumes. 5) there is something fundamentally wrong with the GHG warming theory itself Of course, some combination of the above 5 explanations is also possible. The 1st possibility (aerosol cooling is cancelling out GHG forcing) is one of the more

popular explanations with the climate modelers, and especially with NASA’s James Hansen. The uncertain strength (and even sign)

of aerosol forcing allows the climate modelers to use aerosols as a tuning knob (aka fudge factor) in making their models produce warming more-or-less consistent with past observations . Using an assumed large aerosol

cooling to cancel out the GHG warming allows the modelers to retain high climate sensitivity, and thus the fear of strong future warming if those aerosols ever dissipate. The 2nd possibility (natural cooling) is a much less desirable explanation

for the IPCC crowd because it opens the door to Mother Nature having as much or more influence on the climate system than do humans. We can’t have that, you know. Then you would have to consider the possibility that most of the warming in the last 50 years was natural, too. Goodbye, AGW funding. The 3rd possibility (increased ocean mixing) is one of the more legitimate possibilities, at least theoretically. It’s popular with NCAR’s Kevin Trenberth. But one would need more observational evidence this is happening before embracing the idea. Unfortunately, how vertical mixing in the ocean naturally varies over time is poorly

understood; the different IPCC models have widely varying strengths of mixing, and so ocean mixing is a huge wild card in the global warming debate, as is aerosol cooling. I believe much of past climate change on time scales of decades to many centuries might be due to such variations in ocean mixing, along with their likely influence on global cloud cover changing the

amount of solar input into the climate system. The 4th possibility (the climate system is relatively insensitive to forcing) is

the top contender in the opinion of myself, Dick Lindzen, and a few other climate researchers who work in this field. The 5th possibility (increasing GHGs don’t really cause warming) is total anathema to the IPCC. Without GHG warming, the whole AGW movement collapses. This kind of scientific finding would normally be Nobel Prize territory…except that the Nobel Prize has become more of a

socio-political award in recent years, with only politically correct recipients. The self-flagellating elites don’t like the idea humans might not be destroying the Earth. The longer we go without significant warming, the more obvious it will become that there is something seriously wrong with current AGW theory . I don’t think there is a certain number of years – 5, 10, 20, etc. – which will disprove the science of AGW….unless the climate system cools for the next 10 years. Eek! But I personally doubt that will happen.

6. Producing nuclear energy pollutes just as much as conventional energyCaldicott 7 — Helen Caldicott, University of Adelaide Medical School (medical degree), President of Physicians for Social Responsibility, founder of Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament, lecturer at the New School for Social Research on Media, Global Politics, and the Environment, founder of Nuclear Policy Research Institute, 2007 (“Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer,” Google Books, Available Online at https://books.google.com/books?id=eNCsSm7EBncC, Accessed 07/15/16, JZ)

They were wrong. Although a nuclear power plant itself releases no carbon dioxide , the production of nuclear electricity depends upon a vast , complex, and hidden industrial infrastructure that is never featured by the nuclear industry in its propaganda , but that actually releases a large amount of carbon dioxide as well as other global warming gases. One is led to believe that the nuclear reactor stands

alone, an autonomous creator of energy. In fact, the vast infrastructure necessary to create nuclear energy, called the nuclear fuel cycle, is a prodigious user of fossil fuel and coal. The production of carbon dioxide (CO2) is one measurement that indicates the amount of energy used to create nuclear energy – to mine uranium ore for fuel, to crush and mill the ore, to enrich the uranium, to create the concrete and steel for the reactor, and to store the thermally and radioactively hot nuclear waste – comes from the consumption of fossil fuels, that is, coal or oil. When these materials are burned to produce energy, they form CO2 (reflecting coal and oil’s origins in ancient trees and other organic carboniferous material laid down under the earth’s crust millions of years ago). For each ton of carbon burned, 3.7 tons of CO2 gas are added to the atmosphere, and this is the source of today’s global warming. CO2 and other gases hover in the lower atmosphere or troposphere, covering the earth like a blanket, and this gaseous layer behaves like glass in a greenhouse. Visible white light from the sun enters the atmosphere, heating up the surface of the earth, but the infrared heat radiation created cannot pass back through the terrestrial layer of trapped gases. Carbon dioxide accounts for 50% of the global warming phenomenon, and other rare gases comprise the rest. The total energy input of the nuclear fuel cycle – the energetic costs of nuclear power – must be openly and honestly assessed if nuclear power is to be compared fairly with other energy sources. Very few studies are yet available that analyze the total life cycle of nuclear power and its final energy input versus output. One of the best is a study by Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen and Philip Smith titled “Nuclear Power – the Energy Balance.” Much of the material for the next section has been derived from this excellent report. To quote the final conclusion of their lengthy analysis, “The use of nuclear power causes , at the end of the road and under the most favourable conditions, approximately one-third as much carbon dioxide (CO2) emission as gas-fired electricity production. The rich uranium ores required to achieve this reduction are, however, so limited that if the entire present world electricity demand were to be provided by nuclear power, these ores would be exhausted within nine years. Use of the remaining poorer ores in nuclear reactors would produce more CO2 emission than burning fossil fuels directly.” In this instance, nuclear reactors are best understood as complicated, expensive, and inefficient gas burners.

Ext. Coop High Now Reactor safety is improving now largely because of current US-Sino CooperationNakano 15 (Jane Nakano is a Fellow, Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Looking Toward Nuclear Expansion, China Works with U.S. on Safety”, March 18, 2015 , Accessed 7/18/16, Available online at http://www.chinafaqs.org/blog-posts/looking-toward-nuclear-expansion-china-works-us-safety, JRR)

Since Fukushima, nuclear safety has received elevated attention , with concerns especially raised with respect to potential inland plants.6 China’s 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) called for an investment of almost RMB 80 billion ($13

billion) on safety at new and existing plants. In 2012, China’s cabinet, the State Council, issued a nuclear safety plan targeting the inclusion of internationally recognized safety standards in domestic regulations by 2020 . Further, C hina is seeking to shift toward newer reactors designed to be safer than its current fleet. U.S.-China

Cooperation The U.S. and China have a long history of cooperation on nuclear safety, beginning with the protocol on Cooperation in Nuclear Safety Matters in 1981. Under this agreement, the two countries have cooperated on several aspects of safety , including assessment and inspection of reactor construction, operation and decommissioning of reactors, emergency preparedness and radiation protection, and collaborative research. Still, China’s nuclear regulatory system is highly fragmented and under-funded, and lacks sufficient independence, trained personnel and R&D capacity for regulating safety at the scale that would be required should China meet its

2020 safety standards and capacity target. Cooperation with the United States presents an opportunity to help address these issues . The 1981 protocol provides a series of learning opportunities for Chinese regulators, such as shadowing U.S. inspectors and attending workshops led by U.S. experts. Bilateral safety

cooperation is not limited to the public sector. U.S.-based company Westinghouse7 is training AP-1000 reactor operators at its construction sites in China, while since 2011, U.S. company Exelon Nuclear Partners has trained China National Nuclear Corporation personnel. In 2007, Westinghouse sold to China four of its next-generation AP-1000 reactors. The AP-1000 was certified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2011. Important AP-1000 safety measures are driven by forces such as gravity and convection, and in the event of an emergency can temporarily function independently of an operator.8 While the associated technology transfer could help Chinese companies in the marketplace, Westinghouse decided that the benefits made it worthwhile, and that if it did not engage in China, firms from other countries

would.9 With respect to technological cooperation, the U.S. Department of Energy is working with China’s National Energy Administration on probabilistic safety assessment workshops and pilot projects. R&D collaboration between the two governments, which seeks to “explore advanced nuclear fuel cycle approaches in a safe, secure and proliferation-resistant manner,” includes research on advanced fuel cycle technology, fast reactor technology, small and medium reactors, and materials and fuels irradiation.10

Ext. Reactors Safe NowChina world leader for safe nuclear power—Thorium provesEvans-Pritchard 11 — Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor of The Daily Telegraph. He has covered world politics and economics for 30 years, based in Europe, the US, and Latin America. He joined the Telegraph in 1991, serving as Washington correspondent and later Europe correspondent in Brussels., March 20, 2011 (“Safe nuclear does exist, and China is leading the way with thorium,” 3/20/16, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/8393984/Safe-nuclear-does-exist-and-China-is-leading-the-way-with-thorium.html, Accessed 7/9/16, JW)

Safe nuclear does exist, and China is leading the way with thorium A few weeks before the tsunami struck Fukushima’s uranium reactors and shattered public faith in nuclear power, China revealed that it was launching a rival technology to build a safer, cleaner, and ultimately cheaper network of reactors based on thorium. Thorium could be a much safer option for China which has been unsettled by the nuclear crisis in Japan where fears over radiation levels are rising This passed unnoticed –except by a small of band of thorium enthusiasts – but it may mark the passage of strategic leadership in energy policy from an inert and status-quo West to a rising technological power willing to break the mold. If China’s dash for thorium power succeeds, it will vastly alter the global energy landscape and may avert a calamitous conflict over resources as Asia’s industrial revolutions clash head-on with the West’s entrenched consumption. China’s Academy of Sciences said it had chosen a “thorium-based molten salt reactor system”. The liquid fuel idea was pioneered by US physicists at Oak Ridge National Lab in the 1960s, but the US has long since dropped the ball. Further evidence of Barack `Obama’s “Sputnik moment”, you could say. Chinese scientists claim that hazardous waste will be a thousand times less than with uranium. The system is inherently less prone to disaster. “The reactor has an amazing safety feature,” said Kirk Sorensen, a former NASA engineer at Teledyne Brown and a thorium expert. Related Articles “If it begins to overheat, a little plug melts and the salts drain into a pan. There is no need for computers, or the sort of electrical pumps that were crippled by the tsunami. The reactor saves itself , ” he said. “They operate at atmospheric pressure so you don’t have the sort of hydrogen explosions we’ve seen in Japan. One of these reactors would have come through the tsunami just fine. There would have been no radiation release.” Thorium is a silvery metal named after the Norse god of thunder. The metal has its own “issues” but no thorium reactor could easily spin out of control in the manner of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, or now Fukushima. Professor Robert Cywinksi from Huddersfield University said thorium must be bombarded with neutrons to drive the fission process. “There is no chain reaction. Fission dies the moment you switch off the photon beam. There are not enough neutrons for it continue of its own accord,” he said. Dr Cywinski, who anchors a UK-wide thorium team, said the residual heat left behind in a crisis would be “orders of magnitude less” than in a uranium reactor. The earth’s crust holds 80 years of uranium at expected usage rates, he said. Thorium is as common as lead. America has buried tons as a by-product of rare earth metals mining. Norway has so much that Oslo is planning a post-oil era where thorium might drive the country’s next great phase of wealth. Even Britain has seams in Wales and in the granite cliffs of Cornwall. Almost all the mineral is usable as fuel, compared to 0.7pc. There is enough to power civilization for thousands of years.

New tech checks meltdowns and terrorismWilliams 13—Arthur R. Williams, condensed-matter theorist, retired from IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center after 30 years there, 2013. (“Nuclear Power: The Only Available Solution to Global

Warming,” Physics Today, April 8th, Available Online at http://scitation.aip.org/content/aip/magazine/physicstoday/news/10.1063/PT.4.2433, Accessed on 07-15-2016, aqp)

There are two safety issues in the context of nuclear power: meltdown and terrorism. Both are essentially eliminated by next-generation fission technologies.

Concerns raised by incidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl were seriously aggravated by recent events at Fukushima. Such dangers are not intrinsic to fission, but stem from military priorities favoring fuel rods comprised of metal-clad ceramics. Ceramics conduct heat poorly, and active cooling (powered externally) is required to prevent overheating, melting and rupture of the cladding. Molten-salt reactors are qualitatively different. First, the exploiting the molten state leads to an inherently safe reactor design, since no additional melting is possibl e . More specifically, the far superior thermal conductivity of molten salt eliminates the need for active cooling. At any time and without any external power, the reactor can be drained, by gravity, into a subterranean vessel in which passive cooling suffices. Such reactors are termed “walk-away” safe. A molten-salt reactor ran successfully and without incident at Oak Ridge National Laboratory for four years.

High-level wastes produced by fission are unavoidable, but they are only a tiny fraction of what we call nuclear waste . The complete burning of nuclear fuel in molten-salt reactors provides all the benefits of reprocessing, which has permitted France, for example, to produce about 80% of its electricity from fission for decades, without theft of fissile material by terrorists, although Greenpeace did block a plutonium shipment. Because next-generation reactors integrate breeding and burning into a single process, fissile material does not exist outside the reactor , where it is both hot and diluted, thereby reducing the risk of theft significantly below even that of reprocessing.

Ext. Nuclear can’t solve warmingUranium mining uses fossil fuels and is unsustainableCaldicott 7 — Helen Caldicott, University of Adelaide Medical School (medical degree), President of Physicians for Social Responsibility, founder of Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament, lecturer at the New School for Social Research on Media, Global Politics, and the Environment, founder of Nuclear Policy Research Institute, 2007 (“Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer,” Google Books, Available Online at https://books.google.com/books?id=eNCsSm7EBncC, Accessed 07/15/16, JZ)

The largest unavoidable energy cost associated with nuclear power relates to the processes of mining and milling uranium fuel. Variable grades of uranium ore exist at different mines around the world. A greater amount of energy is required to extract uranium from a mine containing a low-grade uranium concentration of 0.1% than from another mine containing a uranium concentration of 1% - ten times more. Therefore the specific energy expenditure required for uranium extraction from the original ore body is largely dependent upon the ore grade. The energy used to mine the uranium is fossil fuel – the kind of energy nuclear power is touted as replacing – with the concurrent production of carbon dioxide. The high-grade uranium ores are finite – global high-grade reserves amount to 3.5 million tons. Given that the current use of uranium is about 67,000 tons per year, these reserves would supply fifty more years of nuclear power at current production levels (but only three years , as noted above, if all the world’s energy needs were met by nuclear energy). The total of all the uranium reserves , including high and low grade, is estimated to be approximately 14.4 million tons, but most of these ores would be extremely expensive to mine, and the ore grades would be too low for electricity production. Many uranium mines are therefore out of use already.

Nuclear power not key to solve warming— the risks outweigh the benefitsRobock 14—Alan Robock, Distinguished Professor of Climatology in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University. S.M. and Ph.D. in meteorology from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. (“Nuclear Energy Is Not a Solution for Global Warming,” The Huffington Post, July 12th, Available Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alan-robock/nuclear-energy-is-not-a-solution_b_5305594.html, Accessed 07-15-2016, aqp)

Don’t get me wrong. Global warming is real , it is caused by human emissions of greenhouse gases, it is bad (as described in detail by the new National Climate Assessment), and we have to do something about it. But s olar and wind power, combined with increased efficiency and conservation, can do the trick . Elimination of exorbitant government subsidies to the nuclear and fossil fuel industries, and a gradually increasing carbon tax, fee and dividend, or a cap and trade system like the one that worked to tame acid rain, will push us to do the right thing.

More than 99 percent of the current 437 nuclear power systems in the world use highly enriched uranium to produce heat and boil water, which drives turbines. Plutonium and many other highly radioactive elements are waste products. The benefits of nuclear power include minimal emissions of greenhouse gases that cause global warming, and a fairly reliable continuous source of electricity.

But nuclear power presents many downsides. These include:

Nuclear weapons proliferation. A plant for processing fuel for a typical nuclear reactor could produce enough highly enriched uranium for 10-30 nuclear weapons per year. Waste reprocessing could produce 30 plutonium weapons per year. Nuclear power, partly due to the ill-conceived Atoms for Peace program, preceded the spread of nuclear weapons to India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea, and Iran appears to be trying the same route. While additional nuclear reactors in existing nuclear states would not be a problem, proliferation of nuclear power around the world would only exacerbate the problem of nuclear weapons, and this is the greatest danger the world faces.

Possibility of catastrophic accident. Based on the 20 core melt events that have occurred in military and commercial reactors worldwide since the early 1950s, including Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, Lelieveld, Kunkel, and Lawrence showed that the risk of catastrophic nuclear accidents has been drastically underestimated. They showed that the risk of human exposure to dangerous radiation from nuclear accidents in eastern United States, virtually all of Western Europe, and East Asia is higher than once every 50 years. Nuclear reactors are built, operated, and regulated by humans, and humans make mistakes. Accidents can happen not just from meltdowns, but from earthquakes, tsunamis, and aircraft accidents.

Possibility of terrorist attack and radioactive release . None of the nuclear reactors in the United States are guarded against terrorist attacks. The spent fuel, now being stored outside the containment vessels, would be an easy target, and sophisticated terrorists could also cause a meltdown.

Unsafe operation. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has a cozy relationship with the nuclear industry, resulting in poor oversight and enforcement of rules. The industry has a for-profit culture that emphasizes profit over safety. There are planned and unplanned radioactive releases during routine operation. There is lax enforcement of fire protection rules at nuclear plants. And there are no viable evacuation plans should accidents happen.

Not economically viable. Nuclear power is incredibly expensive. It could not even exist in the U.S. without huge government subsidies, including insurance against accidents. Too cheap to meter, a claim when nuclear power was first being developed, was a fantasy.

Waste disposal problem not solvable in near future. For political reasons, there is no repository for the spent fuel, which accumulates at each nuclear power plant, just waiting for an accident to happen.

Extraction of uranium very damaging. Uranium mining exposes workers to lung cancer and the surrounding areas to contamination. In the U.S., it is Native Americans who suffer disproportionately.

Nuclear power emits 10-20 times the carbon dioxide as wind power. Mining, processing, and transportation of nuclear fuel is energy intensive .

Ext. No impact - meltdownNuclear meltdowns not disastrous and overreaction worsens impacts— Fukushima provesConca 15—James Conca, Chief Technical Officer at UFA Ventures, Trustee of the Herbert M. Parker Foundation, former Director of the Center for Laboratory Sciences with the RJ Lee Group, former Director of the Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring and Research Center New Mexico State University, consultant on strategic planning for the DOE, EPA/State environmental agencies, 2015. (“The Fukushima Disaster Wasn't Disastrous Because of the Radiation,” Forbes, March 16th, Available Online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/03/16/the-fukushima-disaster-wasnt-very-disastrous/#4259be4f51e7, Accessed 07-09-2016, aqp)

Fukushima children have no more thyroid cancer rates than any other regions in Japan, and are actually lower than many. The one thing the Japanese government did right was tell everyone to not eat anything from the area for a few months while radioactive iodine died away completely. New ultrasound diagnostic techniques found more thyroid nodules and cysts in all Japanese (these were already in the population), but the numbers for Fukushima children were actually lower than the rest of Japan (NIH; NYTimes; UN Report; Nuclear News; J. of Am. Phys. and Surg.; CBCnews; Hiroshima Syndrome; National Geographic; Asahi Shimbun). Unfortunately, some very unethical and greedy people knowingly reported the wrong data sets and claimed that thyroid cancers have exploded in Japan and Japanese children are dying by the thousands (Business Insider; Eco Child’s Play). - Food from Fukushima is safe to eat, even the seafood. Fukushima’s home cooked meals have no detectible radioactive cesium. Three of the prefecture’s food cooperatives tested two days-worth of meals from 100 households, and none had detectable radiation from Fukushima (MINPO). The fishing stocks off the Japanese coast are not contaminated (NAR). - Radiation in most of the Evacuation Zone around Fukushima is low enough for people to move back. Except for a relatively small region around the reactors, the risk of evacuees moving back to their homes are the same as driving a car (UNSCEAR). Yes, driving can be dangerous, but it is not a reason to live as a refugee for the rest of one’s life. On the other hand, the forced relocations of people in the evacuation zone is what caused all of the deaths and hardship that these people suffered in the aftermath of the reactor accident . But even with the fear and gross misrepresentations, about a third of the people from Fukushima want to return to their homes. About a third don’t want to and about a third are undecided (MINPO News). - None of the crewmembers from the USS Reagan stationed at Fukushima have cancer rates or other ailments that are any different than the rest of the Navy. A Pentagon study found mildly elevated levels of stress disorders, but radiation effects such as cancer were actually lower on the USS Reagan than most other ships. Which is reasonable since the total cumulative dose during the entire mission was only 0.08 mSv, way too low to cause any health effects (DTRA). But some unethical lawyers might make some real money. - There is no, and never will be, a Fukushima Death Toll. No one received enough radiation to change the background cancer rates that normally exist in Japan. For the general population in Fukushima prefecture, across Japan and beyond, the World Health Organization said, “the predicted risks are low and no observable increases in cancer rates above baseline rates are anticipated“. The Fukushima disaster doesn’t even rate on the scale of common radiation hazards. The EPA estimates that the radiation from natural radon gas in our homes results in over 20,000 cancer fatalities in the United States every year, although this number is based on the LNT model just like all predictions. This radon

effect is equivalent to five times the total radiation released from Fukushima every year, with no outcry from those who cry out against radiation effects. I know the lack of death and destruction is boring to some, and doesn’t fit into the evil picture painted by zealots against anything nuclear . But the amount of radiation released from Fukushima, while sounding big, was too small when spread out over so many miles to have much discernable effect on the Japanese people, now or in the future. Or anyone else, anywhere. But the stoking of fear and misrepresentation, the botched response and forced evacuations, the ridiculous limits on low levels of radiation, the closing of all nuclear plants and the increase of coal- oil- and gas-fired electricity, and the politicization of the tragedy – these have huge and lasting effects. Yes, the Fukushima site is a mess. It will cost billions to clean up. It was completely avoidable but Japan did not have a working regulatory commission or the safety guidelines that are in place in America. And they ignored our repeated warnings. But as to death and destruction, the Fukushima accident shows that nuclear power plant disasters are not very disastrous.

China reactors won’t cause disaster and further development prevents resource conflicts. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard 2011— Ambrose Evans-Pritchard 2011, Washington Correspondent, 2011 (“Safe nuclear does exist, and China is leading the way with thorium”, Telegraph, 3/20, Available online at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/8393984/Safe-nuclear-does-exist-and-China-is-leading-the-way-with-thorium.html, Accessed at 7-13-16, RKim)

If China’s dash for thorium power succeeds, it will vastly alter the global energy landscape and may avert a calamitous conflict over resources as Asia ’s industrial revolutions clash head-on with the West’s entrenched consumption. China’s Academy of Sciences said it had chosen a “thorium-based molten salt reactor system”. The liquid fuel idea was pioneered by US physicists at Oak Ridge National Lab in the 1960s, but the US has long since dropped the ball. Further evidence of Barack `Obama’s “Sputnik moment”, you could say. Chinese scientists claim that hazardous waste will be a thousand times less than with uranium. The system is inherently less prone to disaster . “The reactor has an amazing safety feature,” said Kirk Sorensen, a former NASA engineer at Teledyne Brown and a thorium expert . “If it begins to overheat , a little plug melts and the salts drain into a pan. There is no need for computers, or the sort of electrical pumps that were crippled by the tsunami. The reactor saves itself,” he said. “They operate at atmospheric pressure so you don’t have the sort of hydrogen explosions we’ve seen in Japan . One of these reactors would have come through the tsunami just fine. There would have been no radiation release.”

Chernobyl proves meltdowns don’t cause lasting damageBosselman 7 (Professor of Law Emeritus, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Fred, “THE NEW POWER GENERATION: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ELECTRICITY INNOVATION: COLLOQUIUM ARTICLE: THE ECOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES OF NUCLEAR POWER,” 15 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1, 2007)

C. "But What About Chernobyl?" In 1986, an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine caused the release of large amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. 247 Initially, the Soviet government released little information about the explosion and tried to play down its seriousness, but this

secrecy caused great nervousness throughout Europe, and fed the public's fears of nuclear power all over the [*46] world. 248 Now a comprehensive analysis of the event and its aftermath has been made : In 2005, a consortium of United Nations agencies called the Chernobyl Forum released its analysis of the

long-term effects of the Chernobyl explosion. 249 The U.N. agencies' study found that the explosion caused fewer deaths than had been expected. 250 Although the Chernobyl reactor was poorly designed and badly operated 251 and lacked the basic safety protections found outside the Soviet Union, 252 fewer

than seventy deaths so far have been attributed to the explosion , mostly plant employees and firefighters who suffered acute radiation

sickness. 253 The Chernobyl reactor , like many Soviet reactors, was in the open rather than in an American type of pressurizable containment structure, which would have prevented the release of radiation to the environment if a similar accident had occurred. 254 [*47] Perhaps the most surprising finding of the U.N. agencies' study was that " the ecosystems around the Chernobyl site are now flourishing . The [Chernobyl exclusion zone] has become a wildlife sanctuary, and it looks like the nature park it has become." 255 Jeffrey McNeely, the chief scientist of the World Conservation Union, has made similar observations: Chernobyl has now become the world's first radioactive nature reserve... . 200 wolves are now living in the nature reserve, which has also begun to support populations of reindeer, lynx and

European bison, species that previously were not found in the region. While the impact on humans was strongly negative, the wildlife is adapting and even thriving on the site of one of the 20th century's worst environmental disasters . 256 Mary Mycio, the Kiev correspondent for

the Los Angeles Times, has written a fascinating book based on her many visits to the exclusion zone and interviews with people in the area. 257 She notes that the fear that radiation would produce permanent deformities in animal species has not been borne out after twenty years; the population and diversity of animals in even some of the most heavily radiated parts of the exclusion zone is similar to comparable places that are less radioactive.

No impact – backupsIBEW 14 – (2014, International Brotherhood of Elctricial Workers, http://www.ibew.org/IBEW/departments/utility/IBEW-Nuclear-FAQ.pdf The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) represents approximately 750,000 active members and retirees who work in a wide variety of fields, including utilities, construction, telecommunications, broadcasting, manufacturing, railroads and government. The IBEW has members in both the United States and Canada and stands out among the American unions in the AFL-CIO because it is among the largest and has members in so many skilled occupations.

Some of the units at the Japanese plants lost both off - site power and diesel generators . This is called a “station

blackout.” U .S. nuclear power plants are designed to cope with station blackouts by having multiple back - up power sources at the ready . All U.S. plants are also responsible for demonstrating to the NRC that they can handle such situations in order to legally remain in operation.

No impact to meltdown – Chernobyl provesRiedl, ‘11 - assistant editor at The Blaze, quoting Jay Lehr, science director at the Heartland Institute [Jonathon, 3/15/2011, “’This Panic has been Horribly Overblown Decries Nuke ‘Fear Mongering’,” The Blaze, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/this-panic-has-been-horribly-overblown-scientist-decries-nuke-fear-mongering/, DS]

Jay Lehr, science director at the Heartland Institute, has some advice for doomsayers wondering if radiation from the crippled Japanese nuke plants could mean massive local deaths and even cross the Pacific and reach America: calm down. In an interview on Fox

News today, Lehr told host Bill Hemmer that not only is the U.S. not at risk of experiencing nuclear fallout, but he also drew stark differences between atomic bombs and nuclear reactors. “ We only have to look at the worst nuclear disaster in history, that was Chernobyl, where there was no containment structure ,” he said. “10 years later when all the facts were in there were less than 10 fatalities from that explosion — only people right near the plant were affected by the radiation, 1,000 people got leukemia, 998 were cured … . It was

predicted that tens of thousands of people would get cancer … [but] this never happened. This is not an atomic bomb and people don’t understand a nuclear reactor is something very different than an atomic bomb.”

Can’t Build NowMultiple obstacles to effective nuclear power that they don’t solve. Richard Lawson et al 2009 — Richard Lawson and Blythe J. Lyons and John R. Lyman and Mihaela Carstei 2009, Lawson is the chairman of the Atlantic Council, Lyons is the rapporteur of the council, Lyman is the director, and Carstei is the assistant director, 2009 (“United States-China Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security, Atlantic Council, March 4th-6th, available online at https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/25798/uploads, accessed on 7-11-16, RKim)

China faces several domestic constraints and issues relating to commercial ties between China and its U.S. partners that may constrain its ability to more rapidly develop commercial nuclear power. They include: Workforce: While the demand for nuclear professionals continues to rise, neither the number nor quality of trained personnel are currently available to meet a surge in new plant construction. To put this into perspective, it is estimated that the CGNPC, alone, will require 13,500 engineers, technicians and operators for their planned program. Historically, there have been few jobs in China in the nuclear profession, universities have cut back their degree programs, and the pay scale has to date not been sufficient to attract the best and brightest. In addition, there are significant needs for craft labor. Importing labor is not an acceptable option; China must develop programs to provide and train its workers. Public acceptance: A recent survey of public acceptance of nuclear power showed that the public knows little about the development of nuclear power in China. Out of six forms of energy, nuclear ranks fourth in acceptance behind solar, hydropower and natural gas, but much better than acceptance of coal power. Safety is the number one concern, followed by concerns about its impact on the environment. Supply chain: Significant ramp up of nuclear power plant construction exposes potential problem areas , particularly in the engineering and large equipment manufacturing sectors. It is expected that the supply chain can be expanded over time as demand grows. Assurance of quality and safety: Because China plans to indigenously design, manufacture and operate a fleet of nuclear power plants-and eventually export reactor components, ensuring the reliability and performance of Chinese-made plants and components will pose a challenge. China must staff its regulatory and other oversight agencies with a sufficient number of highly trained individuals with the needed authority to assure absolute quality and safety assurance. In addition, China needs to close the gaps in their technical capabilities in desig n, to better benefit from the U.S.’s skills in computer codes and analyses. • • • • Communications: Relations between the Consortium and SNTPC face challenges any project would due to differences in language, measurement systems, and cultures. The geographic distance between the U.S. and China makes frequent meetings hard to hold . However, the real (but surmountable) challenge is that access to U.S. sites is made difficult as the process to obtain visas often takes 3 or more months. Chinese attendance at meetings is not finalized until the last minute and visas are often rejected. Understandably, U.S. government authorities are sensitive to nuclear security issues in light of unauthorized access at U.S. nuclear labs in the recent past. As a result, the U.S. has increased its scrutiny of Chinese visitors to commercial nuclear facilities, leading to a lengthy visa processing timeframe. Legal: Differences between Chinese and American legal frameworks can cause delays when negotiating contracts. Compatibility of regulatory systems, codes and standards: While the nuclear power facility licensing process differences themselves are not particularly problematic (China and the U.S. follow two-step and one-step processes, respectively) issues have arisen because standards are different. The AP 1000 was designed to meet U.S. specifications and regulations. The Chinese regulatory body, NNSA, is requiring adherence to different (not necessarily more rigorous) standards than those Westinghouse had designed around. The AP 1000 was designed to meet a different containment vessel pressure safety

margin than that required by the Chinese. During the licensing reviews for the AP 1000 plants, the Chinese authorities have requested safety information that is not required by the U.S. NRC’ or that is copyrighted under U.S. laws and so must be acquired independently by the Chinese. The advanced technology used in the AP 1000 design is new to the Chinese regulatory body. U.S. authorities approved the AP 1000 design for a 40-year operating period of time, but the Chinese require data to support an operating license for a 60-year period.

Ext. Warming not real/not anthro( ) Warming not real- recent temperatures show no increaseHapper ‘12 (William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years . Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The

latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979

Climate impact exaggerated ---mitigation and adaptation will solve Mendelsohn ‘9

(Robert O. Mendelsohn, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf)

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention,

society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences . The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of

Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net

economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential ” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long ‐ range climate risks . What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

( ) Feedbacks are net negative Spencer ‘8 (Roy W. Ph.D., climatologist, author, former NASA scientist, “Satellite and Climate Model Evidence Against Substantial Manmade Climate Change (supercedes “Has the Climate Sensitivity Holy Grail Been Found?”)”, Roy W. Spencer, 12/27/08, http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/satellite-and-climate-model-evidence/)

The comparisons modelers make between their models and satellite data are typically rather crude and

cursory. They are not sufficiently detailed to really say anything of substance about feedbacks — in either

the models or the satellite data – and yet it is the feedbacks that will determine how serious the manmade global warming problem will be . And as I have tried to demonstrate here, the main reason for the current inadequacy of such methods of comparison between models and observations is the contaminating effect of clouds causing temperatures to change (forcing) when trying to estimate how temperatures cause clouds to change (feedback). This not a new issue, as it has been addressed by Forster and Gregory (2006, applied to satellite measurements) and Forster and Taylor (2006, applied to climate model output). I have merely demonstrated that the same

contamination occurs from internal fluctuations in clouds in the climate system. The bottom line from the model and observational

evidence presented here is that: Net feedbacks in the real climate system — on both short and long time scales — are probably negative . A misinterpretation of cloud behavior has led climate modelers to build models in which cloud feedbacks are instead positive , which has led the models to predict too much global warming in response to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.

Ext. No Warming( ) No warming – models are wrong, feedbacks are negative and its cyclical

Evans ‘11(David, doctor in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian government, designing a carbon accounting system, “Climate models are fundamentally flawed as they greatly overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide,” 3/23, http://www.ted.com/conversations/2533/climate_models_are_fundamental.html)

The core idea of every official climate model: for each bit of warming due to carbon dioxide, it ends up causing three bits of warming due to the extra moist air . The climate models amplify the carbon dioxide

warming by a factor of three – so two thirds of their projected warming is due to extra moist air (and other factors), only one

third is due to extra carbon dioxide. This is the core of the issue. All the disagreements spring from this. The alarmist case is based on this guess about moisture in the atmosphere. There is simply no evidence for the amplification that is at the

core of their alarmism. Weather balloons had been measuring the atmosphere since the 1960’s. The climate models all predict that as the planet warms, a hot-spot of moist air will develop over the tropics about 10km up. Weather balloons have found no hot-spot. Not even a small one. This evidence proves the climate models are fundamentally flawed and they greatly overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide . There are now several independent pieces of evidence showing that the earth responds to the warming due to extra carbon dioxide by dampening the warming. In the US, nearly 90% of official thermometers surveyed by volunteers violate official siting requirements that they not be too close to an artificial heating source. Global temperature is also measured by satellites, which measure nearly the whole planet 24/7 without bias. The satellites say the hottest recent year was 1998, and that since 2001 the global temperature has leveled off. So what is really going on with the climate? The earth has been in a warming trend since the Little Ice Age around

1680. The Pacific Decadal Oscillation causes alternating global warming and cooling for 25 – 30 years at a go in each direction. Having just finished a warming phase, expect mild global cooling for the next two decades.

( ) Aerosols block warming now

Biello ‘11 (David Biello- award-winning online associate editor for environment and energy for Scientific American- Stratospheric Pollution Helps Slow Global Warming-July 11 2011- http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=stratospheric-pollution-helps-slow-global-warming)

Now, research suggests that for the past decade, such stratospheric aerosols—injected into the atmosphere by either recent

volcanic eruptions or human activities such as coal burning—are slowing down global warming . "Aerosols acted to keep warming from being as big as it would have been," says atmospheric scientist John Daniel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's ( NOAA ) Earth System Research Laboratory, who helped lead the

research published online in Science on July 21. "It's still warming, it's just not warming as much as it would have been." Essentially, sulfur dioxide gets emitted near the surface, either by a coal-fired power plant's smokestack or a volcano. If that SO2 makes it to the stratosphere—the middle layer of the atmosphere 10 kilometers up—it forms droplets of diluted sulfuric acid, known as aerosols . These aerosols reflect sunlight away from the planet, shading the surface and cooling temperatures . And some can persist for a few years , prolonging that cooling. By analyzing satellite data and other measures,

Daniel and his colleagues found that such aerosols have been on the rise in Earth's atmosphere in the past decade , nearly doubling in concentration. That concentration has reflected roughly 0.1 watts per meter squared of sunlight away from the

planet, enough to o/ffset roughly one-third of the 0.28 watts per meter squared of extra heat trapped by rising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide. The researchers calculate that the aerosols prevented 0.07 degrees Celsius of warming in average temperatures since 2000.

( ) Temperatures this decade have balanced out- no changes

Totty ‘9Michael Totty, 2009 news editor in the WSJ's San Francisco bureau. reporter, editor and podcaster (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703819904574551303527570212.html) Wall Street Journal, “What Global Warming?”, December 6, 2009)

But this isn't evidence of a cooling planet . Partly, it's a result of picking an exceptionally hot year —1998—as a starting point. That year experienced an unusually strong El Niño, a natural and periodic warming of the Pacific Ocean that can have powerful effects on global climate. The long-term trend since the mid-1970s shows warming per decade of about 0.18 degree Celsius (about 0.32 degree Fahrenheit). That temperatures this decade have hardly increased demonstrates how natural year-to-year variations in climate can either add to or subtract from the long-term warming trend caused by the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The '00s still have been exceptionally warm: The 12 years from 1997 through 2008 were among the 15 warmest on record, and the decade itself was hotter than any

previous 10-year period. While 2008 was the coolest year since 2000— a result of the cooling counterpart of El Niño—it was still the 11th-warmest year on record. And 2009 is on track to be among the five warmest.

Lab-to-Lab Neg Off-Case

US-Russia CP

1NC ShellPlan: The United States federal government should agree to end its efforts to implement reforms that exclude countries from international nuclear security institutions if and only if Russia agrees to a joint presidential commitment to support and fund International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear security projects.

1. Russia refuses to engage in international non-proliferation efforts only because of US pushes for restrictions on the IAEA

TASS ’16 – TASS, the largest Russian news network, fourth largest news network in the world, run by the government of Russia, 2016

(“Russia believes key role in nuclear security should be played by IAEA”, The Organization of Asia Pacific News Agencies, 1/13, http://www.oananews.org/content/news/general/russia-believes-key-role-nuclear-security-should-be-played-iaea, accessed July 20th, CE)

MOSCOW, January 13. /TASS/. Actions of the organizers of the fourth N uclear S ecurity S ummit (NSS) who suggest developing "instructions" for the UN and other organizations, fundamentally change the concept of the event and are unacceptable , Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Maria Zakharova said on Wednesday. " The organizers of the summit have fundamentally changed the concept of the event by proposing to develop some kind of "instructions" for the I nternational A tomic E nergy A gency (IAEA), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism as well as the UN, Interpol and the Global Partnership," the diplomat noted. "Apparently, such recommendations , whatever formal status they may have, will be an attempt to impose an opinion of a limited group of countries on the above- mentioned agencies and groups bypassing their own mechanisms of political decision-making. " Zakharova recalled that Russia had taken part in three Nuclear Security Summits - in Washington, Seoul and The Hague. "Significant progress has been made in strengthening nuclear security. However, at the moment the political agenda of these summits is exhausted. There are no objectively emerging breakthrough solutions in international cooperation on nuclear security that require the involvement of heads of state and government." " We consider unacceptable the creation of such a precedent of outside interference in the planning of work of the international agencies that have the expertise and rely on democratic procedures," Zakharova said. "In this connection, as we know, Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to terminate our participation in preparing for the 2016 summit." "We believe that the central role in coordinating efforts of the international community in the nuclear security field should be played by the IAEA, which has the necessary expertise," Zakharova added.

2. Percieved cooperation on nuclear security between the US and Russia gives IAEA projects international legitimacy

Rohlfing ’16 – Joan Rohlfing, co-founder and president of the nuclear threat initiative, 2014

(“We Must Be a Global Model for Collaboration on Nuclear Security”, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nov. 14, http://www.nti.org/analysis/opinions/we-must-be-global-model-collaboration-nuclear-security/, accessed July 20th, CE)

The crisis in Ukraine, Russian withdrawal from successful nuclear security programs and other posturing makes Russia today look more like an adversary. NATO is working to deter Russian aggression, but tensions remain high. So why cooperate? The world’s ability to prevent or defend against today’s nuclear threats is simply not possible without cooperation from Russia. We know cooperation is possible. It’s worked in the past, even amid tensions. The United States and Russia hold nearly 95 percent of the world’s plutonium and highly enriched uranium – the raw materials of nuclear terrorism. Decades of cooperation under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program have made significant progress in preventing nuclear terrorism by strengthening the security of nuclear facilities, removing dangerous nuclear materials from 27 countries, dismantling weapons and building a stronger global security culture. The rest of the world will not take seriously the idea that they should limit their own nuclear proliferation and cooperate to keep dangerous materials out of the hands of terrorists, if the U.S. and Russia don’t cooperate on the same objectives . There’s no question today that serious damage to the U.S.-Russia relationship has been done, and cooperation doesn’t happen in a vacuum. What should the United States do? Continue meeting New START commitments and working with Russia to reach an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. Take seriously President Putin’s recent comments in support of talks to reduce nuclear arsenals and “concrete discussions” on nuclear disarmament. Leave an opening for Russia to rejoin the Nuclear Security Summit. Engage all countries in a dialogue about the role of nuclear weapons — before trillions of dollars are committed to modernize them. Remember the stakes. To expect that nuclear weapons and materials can continue to proliferate, including among potentially unstable states, without being used one day is sheer folly. We can’t afford the security risk or the financial costs of a continued arms race. The U.S. and Russia must get back to work .

3. International legitimacy is key for IAEA standards to be adopted globally, IAEA standards check any risk of nuclear theft

Thakur ’13 – Ramesh Thakur, director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, 2013

(“The Global Governance Architecture of Nuclear Security”, March, The Stanley Foundation, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/Thakur_PAB_313.pdf, accessed July 21st, CE)

Will there be life for the nuclear security agenda after 2014? There is a serious issue of how to sustain the necessary commitment. One option would be for the IAEA—the only existing international organization with a (limited) nuclear security mandate— to leverage its institutional credibility, integrity, and legitimacy , based on near-universal membership and technical expertise, to take over the NSS agenda. Its work on nuclear security has been given greater prominence , visibility, and importance since the 2010 summit. Its dedicated office on strengthening nuclear security provides global leadership as well as invaluable technical information, guidance, training, and assistance. But it lacks authority to establish mandatory baseline standards for nuclear security and to monitor and enforce compliance with the standards. Regular, independent international review of

safety, security, and safeguards measures should be the international norm. As the world’s premier nuclear regulator , the IAEA must be mandated to negotiate binding agreements that establish global nuclear security standards and given the authority and the responsibility to certify compliance with these standards by monitoring national implementation. That said, it is difficult to visualize states agreeing to give the IAEA mandatory and intrusive authority and powers in the foreseeable future . Another possibility is the negotiation of a framework convention on nuclear security,38 similar to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, that would bring together the existing disparate and loosely defined nuclear security conventions, rules, and standards. The Fissile Materials Working Group believes that a framework convention would solve the problem of the “patchwork of voluntary, nonbinding, nontransparent national commitments, ad hoc bilateral and multilateral initiatives, and vague legally binding measures” without specific standards that currently exists. 39 The IAEA could be made the convention’s executive agent to monitor and assess national implementation of the international standards and requirements. As already indicated, the best solution is to empower and fully capacitate the IAEA instead of pursuing a framework convention. However, given the reputational damage to the Framework Convention on Climate Change at and since the Copenhagen conference, an explicit parallel may not be politically wise. A Nuclear Threat Initiative-sponsored global dialogue on nuclear security has concluded that while legally binding mechanisms may be desirable in the future, the search for it now, when no consensus for it exists, is likely to delay urgently needed security upgrades that are feasible within voluntary mechanisms.40 Thus, the negotiation of a new legal mechanism or convention does not appear to be an immediate priority.

A/t Says NoRussia does care about nuclear security – their core concern is US pushes for exclusive regulationsStarchak 16 (Maxim Starchak is a consultant at the PIR Center (Russia) and a Fellow of the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University (Canada)., “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Diplomacy is Deadlocked”, April 15, 2016, Accessed 7/20/16, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-russian-nuclear-diplomacy-deadlocked-15792?page=3, JRR)

However, Russian officials were conspicuously absent from the Nuclear Security Summit that took place in

Washington from March 31 to April 1. Russia’s minister of foreign affairs explained that there were several reasons for this omission. First, Russia said that the political goals of previous summits have been realized. As a political meeting, the summit format has outlived its usefulness. Further discussions should be carried out among nuclear physicists, special forces and engineers. Although there is some truth in this, some political issues are still pressing. For example, the issue of the security of weapon stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium has not yet been raised at the highest political level. Stocks of nuclear material for the production of nuclear weapons still exist in all five nuclear-weapons states. However, it is not clear how well they are protected. This issue was not raised at any of the Nuclear Security Summits, and Russia has

not initiated discussion of this issue. Moscow’s next objection was that Washington takes the role of a primary and privileged player in the field of nuclear security. The Russian government supposedly objected to the lack of outreach during preparation for the summit , and the fact that the United States, South Korea and Netherlands supposedly enjoyed special rights in the run-up to and during the summit, as well as the fact that Russia was only invited to participate in one of the five working groups . In other words, Russia is not satisfied with merely participating in a matter on which it is one of the most significant countries in the world. The Nuclear Security Summit is the brainchild of U.S. President Barack Obama, who set as an objective of his presidency the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons, looking toward the future of a nuclear-free world. The first summit was held in 2009, Obama’s first year in office, and it has been held once every other year since then. On April 7, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he would have attended the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington if it were not “such an internal American affair.” It means that the problem of competition with the

United States turned out to be more important than the problems of nuclear terrorism. By refusing to participate in the summit, Russia signaled that its pride was slighted. Moscow simply did not want to sign documents that it did not participate in drafting—even if Moscow supported them. Moscow demonstrated that it is ready to cooperate only if its role is one of leadership. Moscow also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the summit wanted to make recommendations to international organizations and initiatives including the

UN, the IAEA, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership and Interpol. Russia’s means of legitimizing its power include membership in these organizations, and it saw these steps as an attempt to impose a limited group of countries’ opinion on those international organizations and initiatives . Moscow is not ready to accept this. But it is obvious that the summit never considered its decisions legally binding in the first place; moreover, the aforementioned structures have no obligation to follow any outside agreements. And would it come as a surprise if heads of countries and governments made recommendations to organizations and structures of which they are members? Russia’s unwillingness to provide national and international security at the expense of political concessions to the United States was confirmed at the last summit at The Hague. At that summit Moscow parted ways with thirty-five other countries, refusing to accept additional controls on the control of nuclear materials. The summit centered on signing an initiative to implement actions strengthening nuclear safety, making internal procedures open to independent international evaluation. The Kremlin was offended by treatment as an ordinary element in matters of international security, seeing it as tantamount to being a mere cog in the regulatory system.

Russia’s core concern with status quo nuclear security regimes is that the US is pushing for reforms that would limit opinions within the IAEA to a few countries – they’ll say yes if the US agrees to stop these reformsOriental Review ’16 – The Oriental Review, an open dialogue research journal funded by the People’s Friendship University of Russia, 2016

(“Why is Russia going to skip the Nuclear Security Summit in the US?”, The Oriental Review, Nov. 21, http://orientalreview.org/2014/11/21/why-is-russia-going-to-skip-the-nuclear-security-summit-in-the-us/, accessed July 20th, CE)

Russia is not dismissing the need to examine and discuss this urgent and vital issue of international magnitude . Indeed, the motives behind Moscow’s refusal have an entirely different origin . The Russian Foreign Ministry explained that its aversion to taking part in the preparations for the fourth summit, to be held in the US, has nothing to do with the Ukrainian crisis or even some other circumstances unrelated to this forum, but rather stems from the following: First is the fact that as of now, most of the political commitments made by the participants at the previous summits have been met, and great progress has already been made toward strengthening nuclear security. Thus, from a practical point of view, the goals set by the summits’ political agenda have been accomplished. Second is the fact that the one-sided approach to preparing for a new, high-level event, as proposed by Washington, allows special rules for the United States, South Korea, and the Netherlands , because they were the organizers behind the previous summits on nuclear security. The US has arbitrarily taken the position that this trio should be the ones to develop the final documents for the scheduled meeting, despite the blatant discrimination against the other participants, most of which will be excluded from taking part in this process. This situation has caused the Russian Foreign Ministry serious concern. There is not, and cannot be, any just international precedent for having “primary” and “secondary” players that are responsible for the preparation of important multilateral documents. Third, it is of no small concern to Russia that Washington plans for the established limited-membership working groups to prepare the guiding documents for such international organizations and initiatives as the UN, the IAEA , Interpol, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Partnership. The Russians feel that it is unacceptable and counterproductive to establish such a precedent of outside interference in the planning of the work of international organizations, which have more significant expertise and are founded on generally accepted democratic procedures. The Russian Foreign Ministry believes that when planning the work of international organizations, the proposed system for the summit preparations would mean discounting the opinions of states that are not ready to fully accede to the line dictated by the summit organizers, and that this may be exactly what we see from the Nuclear Security Summit scheduled to be held in the US in 2016.

A/t Russia co-op doesn’t solve

US-Russia nuclear cooperation is key to spill over into global nuclear security and independently decreases the risk of nuclear terrorismPerry and Brown 16, (William J. Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense. He has formed the William J. Perry Project (www.wjperryproject.org) to educate the public on the modern threat of nuclear weapons. He is the author of "My Journey at the Nuclear Brink." And Jerry Brown is the Governor of California, “A Call for Russia and the U.S. to Cooperate in Protecting Against Nuclear Terrorism”, May 12, 2016, Accessed 7/21/16, Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-j-perry/a-call-for-russia-and-the_b_9929336.html, JRR)

But progress has stalled, much more remains to be done , and the danger of a terror group obtaining fissile material is still unacceptably high . A quantity of HEU the size of a basketball would be sufficient to make an improvised nuclear bomb that had the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb and was small enough to fit into a delivery van. Such a bomb, delivered by van (or fishing boat) and detonated in one of our cities, could essentially destroy that city, causing hundreds of thousands of casualties, as well

as major social, political, and economic disruptions. The danger of this threat is increasing every day; indeed, we believe that our population is living on borrowed time. If this catastrophe were allowed to happen, our society would never be the same. Our political system would respond with frenzied actions to ensure that it would not happen again, and we can assume that, in the panic and fear that would ensue, some of those actions would be profoundly unwise. How much better if we took preventive measures now—measures that increase our safety while still preserving our democracy and our way of life. Two actions cry out to be taken. One is the international effort to improve the security of fissile material. The Nuclear Security Summits have made a very good start in that direction, but they are now over, and the pressure to reduce supplies of fissile material and improve security for the remainder predictably will falter. It is imperative to keep up this pressure, either through continuing summits, or through an institutional process that would be created by the nations that attended the summits and that would be managed by the Disarmament Agency of the UN, which would be given additional powers for that purpose. The U.S.

should take the lead to ensure that a robust follow-on program is established. Beyond that, and perhaps even more importantly, the U.S. and Russia , the nations that possess 90 percent of the world’s fissile material, should work closely together, including cooperation in intelligence about terror groups, to ensure that a terror group never obtains enough material to destroy one of their cities. After all, these two nations not only possess most of the fissile material, they are also the prime targets for a terror attack . Moscow and St. Petersburg are in as great a danger as Washington, D.C. and New York City. Sen. Sam Nunn has proposed that Russia and the U.S. form a bilateral working group specifically charged with outlining concrete actions they could take that would greatly lessen the danger of Al Qaeda or ISIL obtaining enough fissile

material to make improvised nuclear bombs. Whatever disagreements exist between our two countries—and they are real and serious—certainly we could agree to work together to protect our cities from destruction. If our two countries were successful in cooperating in this important area, they might be encouraged to cooperate in other areas of mutual interest , and, in time, even begin to work to resolve other differences. The security of the whole world would be improved if they could do so. Even with these efforts, we cannot be certain that a terror group could not obtain fissile material. But we can greatly lower that probability by taking responsible actions to protect our societies. If a nuclear bomb were to go off in one of our cities, we would move promptly to take actions that could prevent another attack. So why not do it now? Timely action can prevent the catastrophe from occurring, and can ensure that the preventive actions we take are thoughtful and do not make unnecessary infringements on our civil liberties.

US-Russia scientific nuclear cooperation solves nuclear proliferation, energy security, and overall weapon safety Hecker and Davis 14 (Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering CISAC Stanford University and Peter Davis is a research assistant to Professor Siegfried Hecker, senior fellow at CISAC and FSI, “Why the U.S.

Should Keep Cooperating with Russia on Nuclear Security”, August 2014, Accessed 7/20/16, Available Online at http://perspectives.carnegie.org/us-russia/u-s-keep-cooperating-russia-nuclear-security/, JRR)

Now, the crisis in Ukraine has not only put nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia on the back burner, but Washington appears to be erecting its own roadblocks that threaten to irreparably damage such cooperation. The House Armed Services Committee recently approved legislation that would put nuclear security cooperation with Russia on hold. While the White House has opposed the Committee’s efforts to limit cooperation, the Department of Energy has issued its own restrictions on scientific interchanges as part of the U.S. sanctions regime against Russia. In contrast to Moscow’s

pronouncements, Russia’s nuclear specialists recognize that continued cooperation is needed . It is clearly in Moscow and Washington’s common interest to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and global nuclear terrorism. Keeping all nuclear materials in the control of governments and erecting effective barriers to nuclear trafficking requires cooperation. It is in their common interest to make further arms reductions, rather

than return to the arms race era and nuclear testing. And, if nuclear power is to provide clean electricity in more places around the world, Russia and the United States must share a common goal of making sure this spread happens safel y and without exacerbating proliferation concerns. These are precisely the objectives the Obama administration had been promoting with Russia and around the world, although Moscow has become a reluctant partner. Now, Washington appears willing to sacrifice nuclear cooperation in the short term in order to sanction Russia for its actions in Ukraine. But Washington does not

have to choose between the two. It should be able to pressure Moscow on Ukraine, while still cooperating on nuclear issues. Progress on the nuclear front requires good working relationships between Russian and American scientists . These relationships, already strongly opposed by Russia’s security services, cannot be turned off and on at will. They must be nurtured and maintained over time to foster the cooperation needed to reduce the nuclear dangers. Relationships are difficult to rebuild once they have been cut off. In addition, curtailing cooperation now will threaten the gains that have been made over the

past 20 years and jeopardize Washington’s enormous investment in cooperative threat reduction. We realize, however, that the nature of nuclear cooperation must change to reflect Russia’s economic recovery and its political evolution over the past two decades. Future cooperative threat reduction programs must also reflect the return to adversarial governmental relations resulting from the Ukraine crisis. The programs must change from wide-ranging U.S.-funded and -led activities to more selective, jointly sponsored collaborations in the two

countries’ common interest. A strong U.S. role in nuclear security cooperation remains imperative . In spite of

Moscow’s assertion to the contrary, its vast stockpile of nuclear materials remains vulnerable to theft or diversion . Whereas the physical security of nuclear facilities has improved greatly, both because of years of American support and the

reemergence of Russia’s overbearing security services, control and accounting of nuclear materials, which are crucial to

combat insider threats, still fall far shy of international best practices. For example, Russia still has no baseline inventory of all nuclear materials the Soviet Union produced and where they are today. Moreover, it has shown no interest in trying to discover just how much material is unaccounted for. Our Russian colleagues voice concern that progress on nuclear security in their country will not be sustained once

American cooperation is terminated. They believe that Russia’s nuclear security culture and the government’s commitment to fund continued security upgrades are still very fragile and require continued cooperation. Over the past 20-plus years, along with our Russian colleagues, we have found that at times we must move beyond political

disagreements such as the political situation in Ukraine, to work together to advance the cause of nuclear security. It is also in Washington’s interest for Russia to cooperate on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons . Iran is a good case in point. Much progress has been made toward a negotiated settlement of Iran’s nuclear program since President Hassan Rouhani

was elected in June 2013. However, little would have been possible without U.S.-Russia cooperation. It is not in Moscow’s interest to have nuclear weapons spread to its near abroad. It needs Washington’s continued global leadership in this area . Washington, in turn, needs Moscow, especially if it is to develop more effective measures to prevent proliferation as Russia and other nuclear vendors support nuclear power expansion around the globe. Although cooperation related to the stewardship of Washington and Moscow’s respective nuclear arsenals would be more difficult in an adversarial governmental relationship, there are numerous areas that

would still benefit from collaboration. Scientific understanding of problems such as the aging of plutonium remains elusive and beyond the full reach of either country. One of the authors of this column has personally been involved in

plutonium science collaboration with his Russian counterparts for the past 15 years. Continued cooperation in this area, as in some areas of nuclear weapon safety and security , remain in our common interest . As the United States and the European Union take short-term measures to restrain Russia’s actions in Ukraine, they should not sacrifice the hard-earned gains made to

stabilize the nuclear threats that arose after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some forms of nuclear cooperation, especially on arms control and nonproliferation, were supported even during the darkest days of the Cold War, because the alternatives proved unacceptable to both sides. With the Cold War’s end, nuclear cooperation flourished. Washington should foster continued cooperation to meet our shared challenges, rather than allowing it to be held hostage to the Ukrainian crisis. Over the past 20-plus years, along with our Russian colleagues, we have found that at times we must move beyond political disagreements such as the political situation in Ukraine, to work together to advance the cause of nuclear security.

US-Russia nuclear security cooperation spills over to solve international threats of nuclear terrorismRoth 15 (Nickolas Roth is a Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Cooperation: Rebuilding Equality, Mutual Benefit, and Respect”, June 2015 Accessed 7/20/16, Available online at http://deepcuts.org/files/pdf/Deep_Cuts_Issue_Brief4_US-Russian_Nuclear_Security_Cooperation1.pdf, JRR)

The United States and Russia are the two countries with the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons and material – enough for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. In an age of global terrorism, they share both a special responsibility in ensuring that they each employ effective nuclear security systems and an understanding of the unique challenge of securing hundreds of tons of nuclear material .2 For two decades, the United States and Russia lived up to this responsibility by working together to strengthen nuclear security in Russia and around the globe. That ended in 2014 when Russia halted the majority of its work on nuclear security with the United States. Although almost all of the major

equipment installations planned for the effort have been completed, significant more work is needed. This abrupt suspension of the majority of nuclear security cooperation between the two countries will result in damage to international efforts to secure nuclear material, increasing the risk that nuclear material might fall into the hands of terrorist groups intent on building and using a nuclear weapon. Nuclear security cooperation is not something countries do as a favor to each other. It is in the interests of all countries to ensure that nuclear material does not end up in the hands of terrorists. Moreover, neither nuclear security, nor international cooperation, can simply be turned on and off like a light switch. Both effective and sustainable nuclear security and international cooperation require continuous attention and improvement.3

Russia-US coop is key to global nuclear securityAnggitta 6/23/16 (Mutti Anggitta, nuclear specialist and lecturer from Department of International Relations, BINUS University, “2016 Nuclear Security Summit: Pointless and Toothless”, Accessed 7/20/16, Available online at http://www.politik.lipi.go.id/kolom/kolom-1/politik-internasional/1060-2016-nuclear-security-summit-pointless-and-toothless, JRR)

The fourth and perhaps the last session of Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was held in Washington, D.C. The NSS is a biannual forum for world leaders to engage with each other and strengthen their commitment to securing nuclear materials. Besides 56 heads of state, there were a number of researchers, think tank fellows, nuclear industry executives, and journalists that attended the forum. The NSS is the largest meeting of world leaders since the establishment of the United Nations. It was initiated by President Barack Obama during his famous 2009 Prague speech. In his speech, he stated “nuclear terrorism is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security”, and announced “a new

international effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world” – the NSS.[1] To be fair, all four summits successfully brought up nuclear security issues to a high political level and increased the awareness of nuclear terrorism as a serious threat. Overall, there has been substantial progress in improving nuclear security. Some of the tangible improvements are:[2] (1) removal or disposal of approximately 3.8 metric tons of vulnerable highly enriched uranium and plutonium around the world; (2) Austria, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Jamaika, Libya, Mexico, Romania, Serbia, South Korea, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam removed their highly enriched uranium stockpiles completely; (3) Indonesia, Australia, The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Hungary, and South Korea revised their Design Basis Threats (used as a basis for designing safeguards systems to protect against sabotage or theft of special nuclear or radiological material); (4) physical security was upgraded at 32 nuclear facilities around the world that store weapon-grade fissile materials; (5) radiation detection equipment was installed at 328 international border crossings, airports, and seaports around the world in order to combat nuclear material illicit trafficking; (6) several states

are strengthening their cyber security, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and China. Despite all of the positive progress , the strategic goal of the NSS to develop an effective global nuclear security

system is still unachieved. The absence of several important head of states, such as Russia , Pakistan and Iran, at the last NSS has further contributed to the failure to reach such goal. As Russia is the world's largest stockpile of both nuclear weapons and nuclear material, an international forum aimed to secure nuclear material without its participation just seems pointless. Consequently, it has a crucial role to play in global effort to prevent nuclear terrorism . Unfortunately, President Vladimir Putin refused to attend the last NSS. According to Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, it was because “the organizers of the summit have fundamentally changed the concept of the event by proposing to develop some kind of 'instructions' for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism as well as the UN, Interpol, and the Global Partnership.” She goes on by stating that “Apparently, such recommendations, whatever formal status they may have, will be an attempt to impose an opinion of a limited group of countries on the above-mentioned agencies and groups by passing

their own mechanisms of political decision-making.” [3] Russia’s absence may also illustrates how the discord caused by Ukraine crisis has spilled over into nuclear security field. Its political will to work with the US and the West began to decline as Moscow’s disagreements with Washington intensified over Ukraine crisis. In 2013, Russia withdrew from the Nunn-Lugar Act that helped secure tons of highly enriched

uranium and plutonium. In December 2014, Russia cut off all but a small portion of its nuclear security cooperation with the US. [4] With such tensions between two states with the most nuclear weapon and nuclear material arsenals in

the world, a global nuclear security system seems to be a very distant dream. Besides President Putin, Pakistani Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif was also absent due to a deadly terrorist attack in Lahore. Even though Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs replaced him, Syed Tariq Fatemi, some argue that the absence of PM Sharif absence may hinder international efforts aimed at cooling the tensions between Pakistan and India. The absence of PM Sharif was also worrisome because Pakistan possesses one of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals in the world.

A/t IAEA Can’t solveAllowing for the IAEA guidelines to play a leading role in the international arena solves global nuclear securityHaegeland ’16 – Hannah Haegeland, Researcher at the National Bureau of Asian Research, Odegaard Writing and Research Center, 2016

(“Why the Nuclear Security Summit Alone Won't Stop Nuclear Terrorism”, The Diplomat, April12th, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-the-nuclear-security-summit-alone-wont-stop-nuclear-terrorism/, accessed July 9th, CE)

Solutions for a Secure Nuclear Future. Moving forward, successful measures to counter contemporary nuclear security threats call for more dynamic, IAEA-led, collaborative efforts . Specifically, speaker Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi, former chief of cabinet in the Office of the Director General and Assistant Director General for Policy of the IAEA, outlined two challenges the IAEA faces. First, states are hesitant to permit the IAEA to have a lead coordinating role on nuclear security initiatives. Second, there is a gap between the 53 nations that participated in the NSS and the 168 member states of the IAEA. This disconnect is indicative of the international community failing to recognize that a major failure in nuclear security resulting in nuclear or radiological terror will have a widespread impact . Nuclear security is a global problem that requires a global solution. The 2016 NGO Side Summit Statement puts it well: “any nuclear terrorist event anywhere in the world will have profoundly negative consequences for the economies, societies, and security of all nations.” Moving forward from the final NSS, solutions to nuclear security require international cooperation beyond what we have seen so far and an IAEA enabled to lead those efforts . While the NSS is a more than valiant attempt to draw attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism, aspects of the NSS are inherently problematic. In a spirited speech at the Side Summit, Grossi disclosed that the exclusivity of the Summit cripples the IAEA’s ability to act as lead coordinator in implementing nuclear security initiatives around the world: “It is curious to see that in Vienna we cannot mention the Nuclear Security Summit. It sounds comical, but you cannot. If you mention the Nuclear Security Summit, you will have one or the other delegation that is not invited to the club object of course, because they are not invited. And why are they going to receive instructions from a club of 53 nations that get together? It’s a problem.” It is unclear how and why participants are included or excluded from the NSS process. What is clear, however, is that participation can be a badge of political legitimization, as in the case of Azerbaijan. Though Azerbaijan has participated in the summits since 2012, its invitation to the 2016 NSS was celebrated in local media. AzerNews quoted Rob Sobhani, former Georgetown professor and head of Caspian Group, as extolling Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Summit because it “signals the importance of Azerbaijan on the global stage… [It] is no longer a ‘former republic of the Soviet Union,’ but a responsible, trusted and reliable partner of the community of nations.” In comparison, just south of the border, Iran was not invited to the 2016 NSS. After the remarkable success of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran constitutes a high-profile exclusion from the Summit. While the decision, reportedly a response to Iran’s

continued ballistic missile tests, is understandable, it undermines some of the Summit’s ultimate goals. According to Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association, another participant in the Side Summit, the appeal of participating in negotiations with other world leaders would have further incentivized Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA. Additionally, Iran’s participation in the Summit process might have provided an opportunity for Iran to be more transparent about its opaque nuclear security regime. Rejecting Iranian participation in the Summit discourages compliance instead of facilitating engagement with global nuclear norms. This exclusion is especially poignant in that Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); India, Israel and Pakistan, all of whom have regularly participated in the Summits, are not. This seemingly selective invitation method adds a level of politics that takes authority away from the Summit . The impact of the NSS, like that of the NPT today, is limited as a platform for global initiatives by its exclusivity. Ultimately, tackling the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear security measures more broadly requires strengthening the role of the IAEA . This will not necessitate a trade off in national sovereignty or security. States with nuclear weapons programs are faced with the task of promoting nuclear security while simultaneously safeguarding the integrity of their sensitive nuclear military materials. As highlighted by John Carlson of the Nuclear Threat Initiative at the NGO Side Summit, most military materials are not in military custody; about 80 percent is not in classified forms (e.g. bulk material, materials being prepared for naval propulsion, research reactor fuel).

Adoption of IAEA standards solves global nuclear securityRohlfing ’16 – Joan Rohlfing, founder and president of the nuclear threat initiative, 2016

(“Radiological Security Progress Report”, April12th, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Rad_Security_Report_final.pdf?_=1458750009, accessed July 9th, CE)

Radiological security is the responsibility of each individual country and the private sector, but international cooperation is vital to support states in establishing and maintaining effective radiological security regimes . The IAEA’s role reflects its broad membership, its mandate, its unique expertise, and its substantial experience of providing technical assistance and practical guidance to states. The IAEA should continue to play a central role in promoting and strengthening the global radiological security architecture . The central role of the IAEA in facilitating such cooperation, and providing assistance to states, is well recognized. The IAEA provides guidance in developing and implementing effective nuclear and radiological security measures , and supports national efforts to enhance nuclear security through nuclear and radiological security guidance documents and associated support and review programs (e.g., assessments through self-assessment and peer review missions). The IAEA can perform assessment missions, but these must be at the request of the specific country . Recently, the IAEA included a module on radiological security within the framework of IPPAS. Member States should request more of these peer review missions and share the report findings and recommendations with other states. The IAEA also serves as a coordinating body for nuclear and radiological security, encouraging continued pledges and universalization of the Code of Conduct. States that publicly express their full support and endorsement of the Code of Conduct must undertake to formally support (in writing) their commitment to the IAEA. The IAEA can continue to play a centralized role in enhancing the security of radiological sources by raising awareness, developing standards and guidance documents,

convening international conferences and workshops, and providing assistance and review services to national infrastructure for radiological sources. This will require political support as well as predictable programmatic funding to support the IAEA’s core nuclear and radiological functions within the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. To date, the IAEA has relied on extra-budgetary contributions to implement its nuclear security action plan through the Nuclear Security Fund and to fulfill requests from Member States for radiological security support, including training, equipment, and physical protection upgrades. In order to ensure that the IAEA continues to grow in strength and effectiveness, the upcoming NSS should also reinforce the IAEA’s “essential role” in coordinating global nuclear and radiological efforts. The IAEA ministerial-level nuclear security conference in 2013 sent a strong message that nuclear and radiological security is recognized globally as a priority. The results of the conference also served as important input for the IAEA Nuclear Security Action Plan (2014–2017). The next IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Security will take place in December 2016, and radiological security should continue to be a prominent part of the agenda for this meeting. A core group of like-minded countries should take advantage of this unique opportunity for action, in consultation with the IAEA , on radiological security.

Espionage

LinksNuclear lab cooperation allows China to steal vital us defense informationOswald ’14 – Rachel Oswald, George Washington University, major in Middle Eastern Studies, International Reporting Project fellow, reporter for Global Security Newswire, Michael Auslin, Founding Director of the Project on Japan-U.S. Relations, Senior Research Fellow at the MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies at Yale, 2014

(“U.S.-China Nuclear Security Exchanges Hampered by Lingering Suspicions”, Building A Safer World, July 17th, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-china-nuclear-security-exchanges-hampered-lingering-suspicions/, accessed July 1st, CE)

"Resuming nuclear laboratory cooperation with China ... is a terrible idea," Auslin, an expert on U.S.-Asia relations, wrote in an email response to questions from Global Security Newswire. "It sounds like it would be a good way to promote trust and best practices, but in reality has the high likelihood of becoming a Trojan Horse whereby the Chinese gain sensitive, if not vital, information about how we protect against threats and evaluate our nuclear programs . " Auslin found particularly objectionable Zhang's recommendation that Chinese specialists be allowed to observe "force-on-force" exercises at U.S. civilian atomic sites that are designed to assess a nuclear power operator's ability to protect sensitive materials from theft or disturbance by potential intruders. To do so "is an invitation to give away our deepest plans for defense of nuclear facilities," he said.

Science and tech cooperation aids Chinese espionageWortzel 13 —Larry M. Wortzel, eight-term Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of the United States Congress, 32-year military veteran, former director of the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, former vice president of The Heritage Foundation, former military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, 2013. (“Espionage Threats at Federal Laboratories: Balancing Scientific Cooperation while Protecting Critical Information,” Testimony of Larry M. Wortzel before the House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, May 16th, Available Online at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Wortzel_Espionage%20Threat%20at%20Federal%20Laboratories05.16.13.pdf, Accessed 07-11-2016, p.2-3, aqp)

Science and technology cooperation programs are vital to China’s own long-term goals , but they also help foster bilateral cooperation between China and the United States. However, there also is a substantial espionage threat posed by the large number of Chinese nationals working at U.S. laboratories and academic institutions. The counterintelligence education web site maintained by the F ederal B ureau of I nvestigation highlights the “insider threats” posed by foreign intelligence collection to research, technologies, and intellectual property ostensibly protected by export controls.4 Indeed, of the ten incidents of “insider threat” espionage cited by the FBI, six cases are related to China. Three former U.S. officials, Mike McConnell, former Director of National Intelligence; Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland Security; and William Lynn, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, said in a January 27, 2012 Wall Street Journal opinion piece that: “The Chinese government has a national policy of espionage in cyberspace, pointing out that “it is more efficient for the Chinese to steal innovations

and intellectual property than to incur the cost and time of creating their own.” This cyber espionage takes place alongside or in conjunction with other forms of espionage. 3

Elections

LinksNuclear Energy cooperation unpopularMiles Simpson 8/7 2015— Miles Simpson 2015, contributors at Georgetown and specialist on China, 2015 (“Special Report: Thorium and China’s Growing Nuclear Power (and Why That May Be a Good Thing)”, Armada, 8/7, Available online at http://www.armada-intel.com/special-report-thorium-and-chinas-growing-nuclear-power-and-why-that-may-be-a-good-thing.html, Accessed at 7-15-16, RKim)

The largest stumbling block to nuclear development in the United States is from a public relations problem. Incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are still in American’s minds when they think of nuclear energy. For all of the talk of clean energy and reducing CO2, there just isn’t the p olitical c apital to develop it for fear of a public backlash. Congress can’t even agree on where to store the nuclear waste we already have.

Americans massively oppose nuclear energy coop, polls prove Mark Hensch 2016 — Mark Hensch 2016, staff writer at the Hill, 2016 (“Most Americans now oppose nuclear energy, poll finds”, The Hill, 3/18, Available online at http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/273558-poll-majority-of-americans-oppose-nuclear-energy-for-first-time , Accessed at 7-15-16, RKim)

A majority of Americans oppose using nuclear energy for the first time, according to a new poll. Fifty-four percent dislike nuclear energy in the Gallup survey released Friday, with 44 percent who support using it. Pollsters found that opposition toward nuclear energy is up 11 points since last year, when 43 percent rejected using it as an energy source. Support for nuclear power is down 7 points during the same period, with 51 percent backing the resource in 2015. The poll has tracked public opinion on nuclear power since 19 94 . The high point in support for nuclear energy was in 2010 at 62 percent. In 2011, support was at 57 percent just before the disaster at Japan's Fukushima nuclear plant.