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T“Domestic” refers to activity in the 50 states and DCEnergy Dictionary 7 – “domestic”, 11-3http://www.photius.com/energy/glossaryd.html#domest

Domestic: See United States .

[CONTINUES]

United States: The 50 States and the District of Columbia . Note: The United States has varying degrees of jurisdiction over a number of territories and other political entities outside the 50 States and the District of Columbia, including Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, Johnston Atoll, Midway Islands, Wake Island, and the Northern Mariana Islands. EIA data programs may include data from some or all of these areas in U.S. totals. For these programs, data products will contain notes explaining the extent of geographic coverage included under the term "United States."

Violation- The affirmative decreases surivellance on US persons, not Domestic Surviellance.

Limits---the explode the topic to include all foreign spying and espionage. This makes it impossible to get negative ground.

Ground- Their limits explode the topic and make it impossible to gain CP ground

Education- They make it so we do not learn about the

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PTX

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1ncObama’s all in on TPP, but PC key to bring deal itself across the finish line. And the TPP key to asia pivot.Vinik, 15 -- Danny Vinik is a staff writer at The New Republic, New Republic, 4/8/15, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121476/trans-pacific-partnership-foundation-all-future-trade-deals

A theme runs through these four disagreements: They're overrated. The actual effects of the TPP are exaggerated. Labor unions warn about mass job losses and the Obama Administration touts the significant labor provisions in the law, but

the academic evidence largely points to small job losses or gains. The left demands a chapter on currency manipulation while knowing that the 11 other TPP countries will never accept one without significant restrictions on the Federal Reserve. Even for Washington, a town where every policy decisions becomes a massive lobbying free-for-all, the TPP seems overblown. Until , that is, you consider what’s really at stake with the TPP. "I think its larger importance is trying to establish a new framework under which global trade deals will be done , ” said Hanson. “Now that the [World Trade Organization] seems to be pretty much ineffective as a form for negotiating new trade deals, we need a new rubric." Looked at through that lens, i t makes sense why both the unions and the Obama administration have spent so much p olitical c apital on the TPP. If the TPP sets the framework for future trade deals , it could be a long time before unions have the leverage again to push for a crackdown on currency manipulation. They understand, as the Obama Administration and many interest groups do, what much of the media doesn't: The TPP isn't just a 12-country trade deal. It's much bigger than that. When I shared this theory with Jared Bernstein, he began to rethink his position. “When

you put it that way, I kind of feel myself being pulled back into the initial title of my post,” he said. “In other words, if this is the last big trade deal , then perhaps the absence of a currency chapter is a bigger deal than I thought.” If the TPP could determine the course of global trade for decades to come , then each interest group has a huge incentive to fight for every last policy concession. It explains why labor and business groups are putting huge amounts of money into this fight. That money and the accompanying rhetoric has only made it harder for policy journalists to cut through these complex debates. It may take decades before we really understand the stakes of the TPP.

LEADS Act is controversial – lack of support and debates over MLATs Schultheis 15 (Ned, Summer Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, “WARRANTS IN THE CLOUDS: HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT THREATENS THE UNITED STATES’ CLOUD STORAGE INDUSTRY,” Volume 9 Issue 2, CMR)

As previously discussed, a clear indication of Congress’s extraterritorial intent is worriedly missing from SCA itself.227 The language of the SCA is vague at best, and its legislative history does not give insight as to whether Congress intended the SCA warrant to apply so broadly when it was First drafted in 1986. The LEADS Act seeks to clarify Congress’s intention of the extraterritorial application of the SCA and to limit the judicial warrant’s international scope and reach. The courts should not be forced to interpret the SCA as it is currently written with as much discretion as they are forced to use since the statute is dated and presently insufficient. The reactions from U.S. Technology Companies and nations abroad from the current SCA warrant interpretation shows that clarification and

limitations on the United States’ extraterritorial warrant powers on electronic data is necessary going forward.228 Whether the LEADS Act clarifies the SCA enough or whether it will be passed by the Senate and ratified at all remains to be seen . In

addition, the LEADS Act seeks to improve the MLAT process. The U.S. government’s decision to seek an SCA warrant for the

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e-mails in Ireland, as opposed to following MLAT procedure for production, was largely based on the MLAT’s inefficiencies, especially in matters of high security.229 The LEADS Act would “require the Department of Justice to create an online intake form through which foreign governments could request mutual legal assistance, and it would permit the DOJ to give preference to requests made on-line.”230 The LEADS Act seeks to modernize the MLAT process so that countries can more easily obtain evidence abroad through their respective treaties.'31

However, such computerization of the MLAT requires money, and this is subject to the politics of obtaining sufficient federal funding.

Impact is multiple scenarios for conflict throughout asia and east asia – impact D and thumpers don’t apply – TPP is necessary AND sufficient condition, accesses every structural check – 11 reasons

- Pivot- Institutions and Rules that moderate and constrain Territorial disputes and escalation- US regional leadership- Perception and credibility of US regional commitment- Perception and Regional credibility of US-Japan alliance effectiveness- Economy- Trade - Economic interdependence- Peaceful china rise and transition- Rule of law- Outweighs US military shift

Economist 14. [11-15-14 --- http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21631797-america-needs-push-free-trade-pact-pacific-more-vigorously-americas-big-bet]

Mr Froman, the trade tsar, puts TPP into a dauntingly ambitious context. He calls it central to America’s pivot to Asia, a chance to show the country’s commitment to creating institutions that moderate territorial disputes , and an opportunity to show emerging economies (meaning China) what economic rules the global economy should follow. “At a time when there is uncertainty about the direction of the global trad ing system , TPP can play a central role in setting rules of the road for a critical region in flux ,” he says.

The flipside of this is that failure becomes an even bigger risk , which Mr Froman acknowledges. Perhaps in an effort to

prod a somnolent, introspective Congress into action, he makes the dramatic claim that failure could mean America “ would forfeit its seat at the centre of the global economy ”. Many pundits in Washington agree that American leadership in Asia is on the table . Michael Green of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies says TPP failure would “ undermine the impression of the United States as a Pacific power and look like an abdicat ion of leadership ”. It would also take pressure off Japan and China to reform their economies . Mireya Solís, a Japan expert at the Brookings Institution, says it would be a “ devastating blow to the United States’ credibility”. Those views are echoed in East Asia. Mr Tay in Singapore says TPP failure would be a disaster: “If the domestic issues of these two countries cannot be resolved, there is no sense that the US-Japan alliance can provide any kind of steerage for the region.” Deborah Elms, head of the Singapore-based Asian Trade

Centre, suggests that so far the American pivot has manifested itself mainly as an extra 1,000 marines stationed in Australia. “Without TPP , all the pivot amounts to is a few extra boots on the ground in Darwin,” she says. Even members of

America’s armed forces are worried . As one senior serving officer in the Pacific puts it, “the TPP unites countries that are committed to a trade -based future, transparency and the rule of law . It is the model that the United States and Europe have advanced versus that advanced by China. It is an opportunity to move the arc of Chinese development, or identify it as a non-participant.”

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Nuclear warLanday 00 (Jonathan S., National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, 3-10, Lexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a

nuclear war . India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons , and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “ Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relations hips so fragile ,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and

National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the U nited States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no

defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia, with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources, indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

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Block Shit

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Politics—ECPA Reform Unpopular ECPA reform is a huge political fight Rosenblatt 14 (Senior writer Seth Rosenblatt covered Google and security for CNET News, with occasional forays into tech and pop culture. Formerly a CNET Reviews senior editor for software, he has written about nearly every category of software and app available, “Google cheers growing support for ECPA reform,” June 18, http://www.cnet.com/news/google-cheers-growing-support-for-ecpa-reform/, CMR)

The ECPA changes still face a long road ahead . While Google says that it agrees with the 2010 federal appeals court ruling that

declared unconstitutional the portions of ECPA that pertain to email storage, and the reform bill now has a slim bipartisan majority of support in the House, it still must be voted on by a Congress notorious for its inaction . Furthermore,

the bill is likely to face political opposition from the Justice Department, which has argued against reform.

ECPA reform empirically unpopular – GOP resistance Gross 14 (Grant, “Republican gains in Congress would have limited impact on big tech issues,” IDG News Service, Oct 30, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2841572/republican-gains-in-congress-would-have-limited-impact-on-big-tech-issues.html, CMR)

Anticipated Republican gains in the U.S. Congress after next Tuesday’s election have limited implications for tech-related issues like net neutrality and reform of National Security Agency surveillance programs, with some observers expecting no huge changes. Many pollsters and prognosticators are predicting Republicans will add to their majority in the House of Representatives and possibly take over majority control of the Senate, allowing Republicans to set the legislative agenda for the next two years. In recent years, with split party control in the two chambers of Congress, it’s been difficult for lawmakers to pass any major pieces of legislation, particularly involving anything controversial. That may not change with Republican majorities, with many in their ranks resisting new regulations, with a few exceptions. On many tech issues, however, there isn’t a clear partisan breakdown and trade groups have worked to court lawmakers in both parties. Here’s how Republican control of Congress could affect several major tech-related issues. Net neutrality Majority Republicans in the House have attempted several times in recent years to stop the U.S. Federal Communications Commission from creating net neutrality rules. Those efforts have gone nowhere, partly because of a Democratic majority in the Senate that supports new rules. If Republicans take control of the Senate, there may be a new push to stop the FCC’s current net neutrality rulemaking proceeding. The Democratic minority in the Senate would have the numbers to filibuster any legislation, however, and President Barack Obama almost certainly would veto any legislative efforts to sidetrack the FCC’s proceeding. Some observers say they don’t expect Congress to focus on the issue, because it’s in the FCC’s hands. If the FCC’s rules don’t heavily regulate broadband providers, Republicans in Congress may see little benefit to pushing against net neutrality rules when their efforts would be unlikely to become law, some observers said. Nearly 4 million people filed comments in the FCC’s net neutrality proceeding and it appears that a large majority of those support net neutrality rules, noted Althea Erickson, policy director at Etsy, an online marketplace that has supported strong rules. On any attempts to overturn FCC net neutrality rules, advocates and members of the public “would have their back and take that fight to the Senate and the House to protect the rules,” Erickson said. The people who’ve filed millions of comments at the FCC “could easily turn their attention to the folks ... who might try to overturn those protections.” That said, if Republicans gain control of both houses of Congress this year, then maintain that majority, and if a Republican president is also elected in 2016, then net neutrality rules could be in trouble. Surveillance reform NSA reform isn’t a partisan issue, with liberal Democrats joining with Tea Party and libertarian-leaning Republicans to push for major changes in surveillance programs. Lawmakers are likely to push for a vote on the USA Freedom Act in a lame-duck session of the current Congress, following Tuesday’s elections. Some of the loudest voices against sweeping reform have come from Republicans, including Representative Mike Rogers of Michigan. But Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, announced earlier this year he’s leaving Congress to become a radio talk show host. On the other side, the Senate may lose one of its loudest voices for surveillance reform. Senator Mark Udall, a Colorado Democrat, faces a tough re-election fight. Still, Republican gains in Congress could come from the Tea Party and libertarian wings of the party, with many new lawmakers generally skeptical of government surveillance programs. “I think this is actually an opportunity for the Republican party in a big way,” said Chris Calabrese, senior policy director at the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), a digital rights group that supports surveillance reform. Republicans, by passing surveillance reform, can “put their stamp on privacy and become the libertarian privacy party that core parts of the Republican party

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would like it to become.” CDT and several other tech groups would also like to see Congress update the Electronic

Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to give more privacy protections for stored electronic communications. The

Email Privacy Act, an ECPA reform bill introduced in the House last year, had 270 cosponsors, more than half of all House

members, but failed to move forward. Tech groups have been pushing for ECPA reform since early 2010, but Congress has failed to pass legislation.

Huge backlash – err neg on empirics Molly 14 (MS, “Over Easy: Reform the ECPA,” June 20, http://firedoglake.com/2014/06/20/over-easy-reform-the-ecpa/, CMR)

The bill is still stalled out, because the SEC and the IRS have scared off the House leadership. Attempts to update the law — including from Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) — have been largely supported by law

enforcement agencies but have faced backlash from some agencies, like the SEC, which as a civil agency relies on subpoenas to obtain information. At a hearing in April, SEC Chairperson Mary Jo White could not explain why they think paper documents require a warrant, but yet the SEC doesn’t bother with the much higher standard (including judicial review) of a warrant for electronic documents. A big collection of organizations and companies, including the Center for Democracy and Technology, Free Press, EFF, Fight for the Future, Demand Progress, and the ACLU — got together last year to establish VanishingRights.com, committed to working for a long overdue update to ECPA’s archaic rules. The NSA revelations have helped give House bill 1852 extra momentum, but it’s important to note that this is separate from the NSA

reform issue. ECPA reform is an effort that’s been ongoing for more than ten years , and with more than half the

House now backing it, when will the Congressional leadership finally take it up? The bill still must be voted on by a Congress infamous for its inaction, and it is likely to face political opposition from the Justice Department, which has argued against reform. I’m hopeful, but I’m not holding my breath!

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Politics—LEADS Act Unpopular Plan ensures bruising political fights Schultheis 15 (Ned, Summer Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, “WARRANTS IN THE CLOUDS: HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT THREATENS THE UNITED STATES’ CLOUD STORAGE INDUSTRY,” Volume 9 Issue 2, CMR)

The introduction of the LEADS Act into the Senate floor is a start to clarifying and narrowing the scope of the SCA.241 However, the LEADS Act is only the beginning of what is a long process of overhauling data privacy statutes written during the Internet’s mainstream conception in the Regan-Era. Beyond making congressional statutes more relevant to modern times, however, the U.S. government must also assist U.S. Technology Companies by updating its own cross-border processes as well. The U.S. government should take advantage of the technological advances available in order to improve the efficiency of the international exchange of online information and evidence for criminal proceedings. The world will only continue to become more and more

globally dependent. Issues of crossborder conflict over the exchange of online information will be a continuously heated issue of contention unless steps are taken now to catch up to the realities of the global infrastructure of electronic information.

LEADS Act is controversial – lack of support and debates over MLATs Schultheis 15 (Ned, Summer Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, “WARRANTS IN THE CLOUDS: HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT THREATENS THE UNITED STATES’ CLOUD STORAGE INDUSTRY,” Volume 9 Issue 2, CMR)

As previously discussed, a clear indication of Congress’s extraterritorial intent is worriedly missing from SCA itself.227 The language of the SCA is vague at best, and its legislative history does not give insight as to whether Congress intended the SCA warrant to apply so broadly when it was First drafted in 1986. The LEADS Act seeks to clarify Congress’s intention of the extraterritorial application of the SCA and to limit the judicial warrant’s international scope and reach. The courts should not be forced to interpret the SCA as it is currently written with as much discretion as they are forced to use since the statute is dated and presently insufficient. The reactions from U.S. Technology Companies and nations abroad from the current SCA warrant interpretation shows that clarification and

limitations on the United States’ extraterritorial warrant powers on electronic data is necessary going forward.228 Whether the LEADS Act clarifies the SCA enough or whether it will be passed by the Senate and ratified at all remains to be seen . In

addition, the LEADS Act seeks to improve the MLAT process. The U.S. government’s decision to seek an SCA warrant for the e-mails in Ireland, as opposed to following MLAT procedure for production, was largely based on the MLAT’s inefficiencies, especially in matters of high security.229 The LEADS Act would “require the Department of Justice to create an online intake form through which foreign governments could request mutual legal assistance, and it would permit the DOJ to give preference to requests made on-line.”230 The LEADS Act seeks to modernize the MLAT process so that countries can more easily obtain evidence abroad through their respective treaties.'31

However, such computerization of the MLAT requires money, and this is subject to the politics of obtaining sufficient federal funding.

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Politics—Link Alone Turns Case Huge opposition to reform – ensures watered-down version of the plan, kills solvency Stanley 13 (Mark Stanley is currently an Account Supervisor at Edelman, “Five Reasons to Reform ECPA Now,” Sept 4, https://cdt.org/blog/five-reasons-to-reform-ecpa-now/, CMR)

After years of inertia , ECPA reform legislation is moving . In the Senate, Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) have introduced the ECPA Amendments Act, which passed out of the Judiciary Committee this spring with bipartisan support and is poised to go to a floor vote this fall. In the House, the Email Privacy Act, introduced by Representatives Kevin Yoder (R-KS) and Sam

Graves (R-GA), now has 137 bipartisan co-sponsors. 5. We’re close, but opposition is working to derail reform . Despite all of

the progress on ECPA this year, there have been hurdles. The biggest has been an ongoing attempt by the SEC to attach a provision to the Leahy-Lee bill that would give regulatory agencies authority to access digital communications without a warrant. As CDT Senior Counsel Greg Nojeim warns, while the Leahy-Lee bill is a crucial and long

overdue reform, the SEC exception would “neuter” the bill from a privacy standpoint. The attempts by the SEC to hijack the Senate bill illustrate an important point: If advocates and all of those who care about digital rights stand on the sidelines this fall

without pushing for clean legislation, we could get stuck with a bad bill or no bill at all . Now’s not the time to sit back – it’s time we finally update ECPA.

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Terror

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1ncUniqueness – Domestic surveillance successfully checks terror incidents now. Prefer longitudinal studies.

Boot ‘13

Max Boot is a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2004, he was named by the World Affairs Councils of America as one of "the 500 most influential people in the United States in the field of foreign policy." In 2007, he won the Eric Breindel Award for Excellence in Opinion Journalism. From 1992 to 1994 he was an editor and writer at the Christian Science Monitor. Boot holds a bachelor's degree in history, with high honors, from the University of California, Berkeley and a master's degree in history from Yale University. Boot has served as an adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is the published author of Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present. From the article: “Stay calm and let the NSA carry on” - LA Times – June 9th - http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/09/opinion/la-oe-boot-nsa-surveillance-20130609

After 9/11, there was a widespread expectation of many more terrorist attacks on the United States. So far that hasn't happened. We haven't escaped entirely unscathed (see Boston Marathon, bombing of), but on the whole we have been a lot safer than most security experts, including me, expected. In light of the current controversy over the National Security Agency's monitoring of telephone calls and

emails, it is worthwhile to ask: Why is that? It is certainly not due to any change of heart among our enemies.

Radical Islamists still want to kill American infidels. But the vast majority of the time, they fail. The Heritage Foundation estimated last year that 50 terrorist attacks on the American homeland had been foiled since 2001. Some, admittedly, failed through sheer incompetence on the part of the would-be terrorists. For instance, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani American

jihadist, planted a car bomb in Times Square in 2010 that started smoking before exploding, thereby alerting two New Yorkers who in turn called police, who were able to defuse it. But it would be naive to adduce all of our security

success to pure serendipity. Surely more attacks would have succeeded absent the ramped-up counter-terrorism efforts undertaken by the U.S. intelligence community, the military and law enforcement. And a large element of the intelligence community's

success lies in its use of special intelligence — that is, communications intercepts. The CIA is notoriously deficient in human intelligence — infiltrating spies into terrorist

organizations is hard to do, especially when we have so few spooks who speak Urdu, Arabic, Persian and other relevant languages. But the NSA is the best in the world at intercepting communications. That is the most important technical advantage we have in the battle against fanatical foes who will not hesitate to sacrifice their lives to take ours. Which brings us to the current kerfuffle over two NSA monitoring programs that have been exposed by the

Guardian and the Washington Post. One program apparently collects metadata on all telephone calls made in the United States. Another program provides access to all the emails, videos and other data found on the servers of major Internet firms such as Google, Apple and Microsoft. At first

blush these intelligence-gathering activities raise the specter of Big Brother snooping on ordinary American citizens who might

be cheating on their spouses or bad-mouthing the president. In fact, there are considerable safeguards built in to both programs to ensure that doesn't happen. The phone-monitoring program does not allow the NSA to listen in on conversations without a court order. All that it can do is to collect information on the time, date and destination of phone calls. It should go without saying that it would be pretty useful to know if someone in the U.S. is calling a number in Pakistan or Yemen that is used by a terrorist organizer. As for

the Internet-monitoring program, reportedly known as PRISM, it is apparently limited to "non-U.S. persons" who are abroad and thereby enjoy no constitutional protections. These are hardly rogue operations. Both programs were initiated by President George W. Bush and continued by President Obama with the full knowledge and support of Congress and continuing oversight from the federal judiciary. That's why the leaders of both the House and Senate

intelligence committees, Republicans and Democrats alike, have come to the defense of these activities. It's possible that, like all government programs, these could be abused — see, for example, the IRS making life tough on tea partiers. But there is no evidence of abuse so far and plenty of evidence — in the

lack of successful terrorist attacks — that these programs have been effective in disrupting terrorist plots. Granted there is something inherently creepy

about Uncle Sam scooping up so much information about us. But Google, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Citibank and other companies know at least as much about us, because they use very similar data-mining programs to track our online movements. They gather that information in order to sell us products, and no one seems to be overly alarmed. The NSA is gathering that information to keep us safe from terrorist attackers. Yet somehow its actions have become a "scandal," to use a term now loosely being tossed around. The real scandal here is that the Guardian and Washington Post are compromising our national security by telling our enemies about our intelligence-gathering capabilities. Their news stories reveal, for example, that only nine Internet companies share information with the NSA. This is a virtual invitation to terrorists to use other Internet outlets for searches, email, apps and all the rest. No

intelligence effort can ever keep us 100% safe, but to stop or scale back the NSA's special intelligence efforts would amount to unilateral disarmament in a war against terrorism that is far from over.

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Relying on MLATs results in lengthy delays – compromises responses to terrorismSchultheis 15 (Ned, Summer Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, “WARRANTS IN THE CLOUDS: HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT THREATENS THE UNITED STATES’ CLOUD STORAGE INDUSTRY,” Volume 9 Issue 2, CMR)

At the same time, there is merit to the U.S. government’s argument that the current MLAT process is slow and subject to political objectives that may not conform to time sensitive investigations of international matters of concern.233 It is evident Microsoft and Ireland denounce the U.S. government’s alleged bypass of the U.S.-Irish MLAT.234 Although the U.S.- Irish MLAT’s purpose is “to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement authorities of both countries in the investigation, prosecution, and prevention of crime through cooperation and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters,”235 and, traditionally,

is the process by which the U.S. government would obtain evidence located in Ireland through a domestic warrant, the U.S. government’s arguments for efficiency in relation to criminal investigation has legitimate backing in today’s post-9/11 era. Criminal investigations on high security matters, such as drug enforcement or terrorism , need to run smoothly and efficiently because time of the essence . There is no reason to bog down investigations where critical evidence is located abroad and risk losing valuable intelligence due to another nation’s potential political goals that may be in opposition with the ongoing U.S. investigation in sending the evidence in a timely manner.

Successful acquisition causes nuclear spoofing – extinctionBarrett et al. 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals , which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity . 2 Nuclear war between the U nited States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accident al or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack

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through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized

attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side a nd to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk . 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with

war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the

wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the U nited States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible . 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to

circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear

tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks . 16

Vigilance link - Strong intel gathering’s key to discourages initiation of Nuclear attacks.

Pittenger ‘14

US Rep. Robert Pittenger, chair of Congressional Task Force on Terrorism, “Bipartisan bill on NSA data collection protects both privacy and national security” - Washington Examiner, 6/9/14, http://washingtonexaminer.com/rep.-robert-pittenger-bipartisan-bill-on-nsa-data-collection-protects-both-privacy-and-national-security/article/2549456?custom_click=rss&utm_campaign=Weekly+Standard+Story+Box&utm_source=weeklystandard.com&utm_medium=referral

This February, I took that question to a meeting of European Ambassadors at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the conference, I asked three questions: 1. What is the current worldwide terrorist threat? 2. What is America’s role in addressing and mitigating this

threat? 3. What role does intelligence data collection play in this process, given the multiple platforms for attack

inclu ding physical assets, cyber, chemical, biological, nuclear and the electric grid? Each ambassador acknowledged the threat was greater today than before 9/11, with al Qaeda and other extreme Islamist terrorists

stronger, more sophisticated, and having a dozen or more training camps throughout the Middle East and Africa. As to the role of the United States, they felt our efforts were primary and essential for peace and

security around the world. Regarding the intelligence-gathering, their consensus was, “We want privacy, but we must have your intelligence.” As a European foreign minister stated to me, “Without U.S. intelligence, we are blind.” We cannot yield to those loud but misguided voices who view the world as void of the deadly and destructive intentions of unrelenting terrorists. The number of terrorism-related deaths worldwide doubled between 2012 and 2013, jumping from

10,000 to 20,000 in just one year. Now is not the time to stand down . Those who embrace an altruistic worldview

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should remember that vigilance and strength have deterred our enemies in the past. That same commitment is required today to defeat those who seek to destroy us and our way of life. We must make careful,

prudent use of all available technology to counter their sophisticated operations if we are to maintain our freedom and liberties.

The Disad turns the case via rollback and new civil liberty violations. Status Quo detection is key.

Clarke ‘13

(et al; This is the Final Report and Recommendations of The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies. President Obama ordered a blue-ribbon task force to review domestic surveillance. This report releases the findings of that group. The report was headed by five experts – including Richard Alan Clarke, who is the former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States. Other expert contributors include Michael Joseph Morell, who was the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency and served as acting director twice in 2011 and from 2012 to 2013 and Cass Robert Sunstein, who was the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama administration and is currently a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. “LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD” – December 12th, 2013 – Easily obtained via a google search. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F2Fwww.whitehouse.gov%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocs%2F2013-12 12_rg_final_report.pdf&ei=Db0yVdDjKIKdNtTXgZgE&usg=AFQjCNH0S_Fo9dckL9bRarVpi4M6pq6MQ&bvm=bv.91071109,d.eXY)

The September 11 attacks were a vivid demonstration of the need for detailed information about the activities of potential terrorists. This was so for several reasons. First, some information, which could have been useful, was not collected and other information, which could have helped to prevent the attacks, was not shared among departments. Second, the scale of damage that 21st-century terrorists can inflict is far greater than

anything that their predecessors could have imagined. We are no longer dealing with threats from firearms and conventional explosives, but with the

possibility of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices and biological and chemical agents. The damage that such attacks could inflict on the nation,

measured in terms of loss of life, economic and social disruption, and the consequent sacrifice of civil liberties, is extraordinary. The events of September 11 brought this home with crystal clarity. Third, 21st-century terrorists operate within a global communications network that enables them both to hide their existence from outsiders and to communicate with one another across continents at the speed of light. Effective safeguards against terrorist attacks require the technological capacity to ferret out such communications in an international communications grid. Fourth, many of the international terrorists that the United States and other nations confront today cannot realistically be deterred by the fear of punishment. The conventional means of preventing criminal conduct—the fear of capture and subsequent punishment—has relatively little role to play in combating some contemporary terrorists. Unlike the situation during the Cold War, in which the Soviet Union was deterred from launching a nuclear strike against the United States in part by its fear of a retaliatory counterattack, the terrorist enemy in the 21st-century is not a nation state against which the United States and its allies can retaliate with the same effectiveness. In such circumstances, detection in advance is essential in any effort to “provide for the common defence.” Fifth,

the threat of massive terrorist attacks involving nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons can generate a chilling and destructive environment of fear and anxiety among our nation’s citizens. If Americans came to believe that we are infiltrated by enemies we cannot identify and who have the power to bring death, destruction, and chaos to our lives on a massive scale, and that preventing such attacks is beyond the capacity of our government , the quality of national life would be greatly imperiled. Indeed, if a similar or even more devastating attack were to occur in the future, there would almost surely be an impulse to increase the use of surveillance technology to prevent further strikes, despite the potentially corrosive effects on individual freedom and self-governance.

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Block Shit

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---Laundry List 2NC Link The plan creates numerous hurdles for law enforcement: weak MLAT process, U.S. person exception, and evasion from cross-country providers Nojeim 14 (Greg, Senior Counsel and Director, Freedom, Security and Technology Project, “LEADS Act Extends Important Privacy Protections, Raises Concerns,” Sept 18, https://cdt.org/blog/leads-act-extends-important-privacy-protections-raises-concerns/, CMR)

However, it is widely admitted that the MLAT process for trans-border access does not work very well now. Basically, it is under-resourced and too slow . Recognizing that the MLAT process is the best way to accommodate the interests of two governments when one country seeks data stored in another country, the LEADS Act includes a number of sensible improvements to the U.S. MLAT process; improvements that the U.S. can hold up as a model for other countries to emulate. The bill would require the Department of Justice to create an online intake form through which foreign governments could request mutual legal assistance, and it would permit the DOJ to give preference to requests made on-line. The bill also would require the DOJ to track and report on its processing of MLAT requests. These requirements are designed to make MLAT processing more efficient and transparent to the foreign government seeking the disclosures. The Department of Justice had already sought a $25.1 appropriation to hire more lawyers to handle MLAT requests it receives and makes. CDT supports this funding request and believes that, should the LEADS Act pass, MLAT funding should be increased to help DOJ implement the improvements in the bill. The LEADS Act creates one exception to the principle that U.S. warrants are not sufficient to reach content stored abroad. The bill says that a U.S. warrant, served on a company in the U.S. can force that service provider to disclose email and other content stored outside the U.S. if the holder of the account is a “U.S. person” — a citizen or lawful permanent resident

of the United States, or a company organized under the laws of the United States or of a state. A savings clause permits the service provider to seek a modification of the warrant if compliance would put the provider in the position of violating the law in the place where the data is stored. This U.S. person exception gives us pause. One way to look at it, and at the bill as a whole, is that it extends the warrant protection to all content stored in the U.S., regardless of citizenship of the account holder, and it extends the warrant requirement to all content of U.S. persons stored by U.S. companies abroad, while disavowing U.S. claims to unilaterally obtain the content of non-U.S. persons stored abroad.Looked at that way, the U.S. person exception is not an exception – it is a further extension of the warrant requirement. It will reduce the burden the bill would otherwise place on the MLAT process because MLATs would not be necessary for content stored abroad in an account a U.S. person had established. On the other hand, the

exception may be difficult to administer . Sometimes, the citizenship or residence of the account holder will be unknown, and when it is, does the warrant reach that stored content, or not? Also, the exception would seem to create some odd results. C onsider , for example, two people working side-by-side in the U.S., one a citizen and one a foreign national. The LEADS Act would establish one rule (the extraterritorial warrant) for U.S. law enforcement to access content that a U.S. provider stores abroad on behalf of the American, and a different rule (the MLAT process) for the person who sits in the cubical next door, but who happens to be a non-citizen working in the U.S. on a temporary visa. Also, we have to consider how foreign governments will react. Some adverse consequences would be mitigated because the LEADS Act would make it clear that data stored in the U.S. could be disclosed only with a warrant. Even if foreign governments copied the LEADS Act’s extraterritorial assertion of authority over data regarding their own citizens, those governments could not unilaterally force U.S. companies to disclose data stored in the U.S. ECPA already protects that data and requires compliance with the MLAT process, and the LEADS Act enhances that protection. However, all stakeholders need to think carefully about how the LEADS Act would affect the global balance of privacy versus government power with respect to data U.S. providers store outside the U.S. for account holders who are not Americans. There is also a risk that the LEADS Act will increase the pressure for data localization mandates. The bill includes language

that puts the Senate on record as opposing data localization, but it may not be enough. Finally, it is not clear how the bill would apply to providers who move data to different data centers around the globe in order to balance the burden on their network and better serve their users. If a load-balancing provider stores a user’s data at one moment in India, the next in the U.K., and the next in the U.S., will the U.S. warrant reach the data because the data at some point comes to the U.S.?

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---Evasion 2NC Link The plan sets a precedent for manipulation and evasion by criminals – crushes law enforcement effectiveness Bharara 14 (Preet, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, “GOVERNMENT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S DECISION TO UPHOLD A WARRANT ORDERING MICROSOFT TO DISCLOSE RECORDS WITHIN ITS CUSTODY AND CONTROL,” July 9, http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/federalbrief-microsoftcase.pdf, CMR)

4. Policy Considerations Weigh Decisively Against Microsoft’s Position The policy consequences of Microsoft’s position further demonstrate that it cannot reflect the

intent of Congress. 14 In today’s digital environment, email and other electronic communications are used extensively by criminals of all types in the United States and abroad, from fraudsters to hackers to drug dealers, in

furthera nce of violations of U.S. law. The ability to obtain electronically stored information from domestic service providers—pursuant to judi cial authorizat ion as required by the SCA—is a fundamental component of effective modern law enforcement. Yet such information, like the data sought by the Warrant here , can be maintained in any location and moved around the world easily, at any

time and for any reason. Were Microsoft’s position adopted, the Government’s ability to obtain such information

from a provider would turn entirely on whether it happens to be stored here or abroad, even though the provider, based in the U nited States, maintains control over the data wherever it is. Such a regime would be rife with potential for arbitrary outcomes and criminal abuse . Microsoft’s own data storage policy provides but one illustration. According to Microsoft, where a user’s data is stored depends entirely on which country the user selects when signing up for the account. Microsoft does not re

quire or verify any actual conn ection between the user and the selected country. As Judge Francis noted, a criminal user can easily manipulate such a policy to evade the reach of U.S. law enforcement “by th e simple expedient of giving false residence information, thereby causing the [p rovider] to assign his account to a server outside the United States.” In re Warrant , 2014 WL 1661004, at *8. 15 Of course, a provider need not base the location where it stores a user’s data on the user’s location at all—whether se lf-reported or verified. A provider may choose to st ore user data abroad, for example, simply to take advantage of lowe r costs associated with foreign server-hosting facilities. Or, on any given day, a provider might move a particular user’s data from a U.S.-based server to a foreign server, and perhaps back again, for network maintenance or load-balancing reasons, which is an increasingly common pr actice with the growth of cloud computing. See Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the Cloud , 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1623, 1629 (May 2013) (“‘[C]loud computing is most freque ntly based on a complete lack of any stable location of data within the cloud provider’s network. Data can be in one data cent re at 2pm and on the other side of he world at 4pm.’” (quoti ng Article 29 Data Prot. Work ing Party, Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing 17, (EC) No.

01037/12, WP 196 (Jul. 1, 2012))). A provider may even choose to store user data abroad with the specific intent to place it out of the Government’s reach, based, for example, on a desire to avoid the inconvenience of responding to legal process. Indeed,

some providers less scrupulous than Mi crosoft may do so with the specific intent to accommodate criminal users . See, e.g., United States v. Paunescu , No. 13 Cr. 41 (RPP), Indictment (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2013) (bringing charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b) against operator of “bulletproof hosting service,” who, “in exchange for fees, . . . provided cyber criminals with Internet Protocol . . . addresses an d servers in a manner designed to enable them to preserve their anonymity and evade detection by law enforcement”).

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---Delay 2NC LinkExisting policy key to expedience – any risk of delay is catastrophic Schultheis 15 (Ned, Summer Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, “WARRANTS IN THE CLOUDS: HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT THREATENS THE UNITED STATES’ CLOUD STORAGE INDUSTRY,” Volume 9 Issue 2, CMR)

Another prominent issue of contention was whether Congress intended for the SCA warrant to reach or apply extratcrritorially.76 When

Congress enacted the SCA as part of the ECPA, it did not expressly cover the issue of its extraterritorial application.77 However, even though the Senate report “did not address the specific issue of extraterritoriality,” the court felt there reflected an understanding that information was being maintained remotely by third-party entities.”7^ Microsoft argued that the U.S. Supreme Court previously held that a presumption against extraterritoriality exists when Congress has not given

“clear indication of an extraterritorial application” within the language of the statute or explicitly noted otherwise.79 However, the court rejected Microsoft’s argument. The court stated that the existence of “the nationality principle,” which recognizes that American criminal laws can apply outside the United States to legal entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, may require U.S. companies,

such as Microsoft, to obtain evidence located aboard in connection with an ongoing domestic criminal investigation.80 To help its argument on the ambiguity of Congress’s extraterritorial intent for the SCA, the court used other pieces of Congressional legislation to fill in the holes left by Congress within the SCA statute itself.8' The court looked to the legislative history of the Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the Patriot Act) for guidance and found that Section 108 of the Patriot Act allows “nationwide service of search warrants for

electronic evidence.”82 Specifically, the House Committee stated the incredible time sensitivity of suspected terrorist’s criminal proceedings rationalized the expansion of national search warrants.83 The House Committee was focused on the potentially devastating “investigative delays caused by the cross-jurisdictional nature of the Internet.”84 The Patriot Act allows a warrant under § 2703 to reach throughout the United States, so long as the ISP was located within the United States.88 Therefore, it does not matter where the actual server that stored the electronic information (emails, etc.) was located.86 The court interpreted the focus on the location of the ISP as opposed to the location of the actual server as evidence that Congress had “anticipated that an ISP located in the United States would be obligated to respond to a warrant issued pursuant to section

2703(a) by producing information within its control, regardless of where that information was stored.”87 Based on the courts’ interpretation of congressional legislative history, the court ultimately upheld the SCA warrant forcing Microsoft to disclose the e-mails located in Dublin, Ireland.

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---MLATs 2NC LinkNo precedent for reliance on MLATs – only results in delays and resource overstretch Schultheis 15 (Ned, Summer Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, “WARRANTS IN THE CLOUDS: HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT THREATENS THE UNITED STATES’ CLOUD STORAGE INDUSTRY,” Volume 9 Issue 2, CMR)

Microsoft contends that extraterritorial application of the SCA allows the United States to bypass its MLAT obligation to Ireland and to obtain emails without going through the proper request channels.132 According to Microsoft, the United States avoided asking for permission to obtain emails held within Irish borders altogether and instead, demanded Microsoft to produce the e-mails without Irish consent.133 In

response, the U.S. government claimed that nowhere is there a law that mandates the U.S. government to obtain evidence located in foreign nations through the MLAT process when other legal measures exist to appropriately obtain that evidence.134 More importantly, the U.S. government argued that the MLAT process was, if anything, an impractical method of obtaining the pertinent evidence in the ongoing investigation.135 Ultimately,

the court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s opinion that it made little sense to require the U.S. government go through the U.S.-Irish MLAT process.136 Chief Judge Prcska agreed with Magistrate Judge Francis that in drafting the SCA, Congress likely did not intend the U.S. government go through the time consuming and inefficient MLAT process to obtain overseas documents and information located on domestic ISPs .137 The

court found reliance on MLAT process alone was not necessary, as the process is excessively dependent on mutual cooperation between nations who could have varying political and judicial agendas, which runs counter to the time sensitive nature of ongoing criminal investigations .138

MLATs don’t work – results in excessive delays and to much political variability Bharara 14 (Preet, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, “GOVERNMENT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S DECISION TO UPHOLD A WARRANT ORDERING MICROSOFT TO DISCLOSE RECORDS WITHIN ITS CUSTODY AND CONTROL,” July 9, http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/federalbrief-microsoftcase.pdf, CMR)

Microsoft’s cavalier retort to these practical concerns—that the Government can simply use an MLAT whenever

records are unavailable through the SCA (Br. 27- 30)—hardly suggests a satisfactory alternative. As an initial matter,

Microsoft’s rosy view of the efficacy of the MLAT process bears little resemblance to reality . In contrast to an SCA warrant, which can be served upon a provider immediately upon issuance by a judge , an MLAT request typically takes months to process , with the turnaround time varying widely based on the foreign country’s willingness to cooperate, the law enforcement resources it has to spare for outside requests for assistance, and the procedural idiosyncrasies of the country’s legal system. See, e.g. , In re Grand Jury Subpoenas , 318 F.3d 379, 381-82 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that foreign country’s response to MLAT request was still incomplete after two years); United States v. Safavian , 644 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 n.5 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting the long “length of time that frequently is required to acquire evidence by way of an MLAT”). It is no accident that federal law specifi cally provides for an ex clusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act (for up to a year), as well as the suspension of a crim inal statute of limitations (for up to three years), while the Government is waiting to receive foreign evidence in response to an MLAT request. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(8) & 3292.

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Providers will evade MLATs by exceeding territorial jurisdiction – direct disclosure is best Bharara 14 (Preet, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, “GOVERNMENT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S DECISION TO UPHOLD A WARRANT ORDERING MICROSOFT TO DISCLOSE RECORDS WITHIN ITS CUSTODY AND CONTROL,” July 9, http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/federalbrief-microsoftcase.pdf, CMR)

Moreover, there are many countries in the world that do not even have MLATs with the U nited States. A U.S. provider could easily choose to locate its user data in such a country, either for business reasons or for the specific purpose of evading the reach of U.S. law enforcement. By the same token, a U.S. provider could—again, for legitimate or illegitimate reasons—distribute the contents of a single user account across computers maintained in dozens of countries, making it practically impossible for the Government to collect the account data through international channels, regardless of whether the countries involved have MLATs or not. As

Judge Francis observed, it is even conceivable that a provider could establish server locations at sea or otherwise beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any nation. In re Warrant , 2014 WL 1661004, at *9. There is no reason to believe that

Congress intended for su ch obstacles to thwart the Government from obtaining evidence of criminal activity, particular ly when the providers involved often can, like Microsoft, easily disclose the relevant data thr ough their information

systems in the United States, no matter where the original copy happens to reside.

MLATs weak and beyond repair – risks years of delay, compromising law enforcement response Hill 15 (Jonah Force, writes on Internet policy and cybersecurity issues, and formerly served in the White House Office of the Cybersecurity Coordinator and as a Cybersecurity Teaching Fellow at Harvard, “Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age,” Jan 28, http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/, CMR)

But the MLAT system has struggled to keep pace with globalized data . The number of MLAT requests has skyrocketed and the matters they concern have grown vastly more complex. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) estimates that over the past decade the “number of MLAT requests for assistance from foreign authorities has increased by nearly 60 percent, and the number of requests

for computer records has increased ten-fold.” Many of today’s MLATs were drafted before globalized data and

therefore do not address core questions of data jurisdiction, like how to treat data held overseas by a subsidiary of a domestic parent company. Perhaps most significantly, many MLATs do not effectively address fundamental

issues like notions of privacy versus law enforcement’s need for evidence. For example, MLATs frequently do not specify what constitutes “protected data” or under what conditions “content” differs from “metadata” for the purposes of information sharing. This hinders cooperation between states with differing domestic understanding of these terms. The increase in MLAT requests and legal uncertainty surrounding privacy and data

protection regulations have significantly delayed the MLAT process. The President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communication Technologies (the independent review board tasked with assessing U.S. intelligence collection practices following Snowden)

estimates that it takes an average of ten months for DOJ to process MLAT requests, and can take years . Foreign countries’ MLAT requests are similarly drawn out, and can take far longer . Such delays are unacceptable to law enforcement officials who urgently need info rmation. Unsurprisingly, impatient prosecutors are looking for MLAT alternatives. However, those prosecutors and their governments must be mindful of the potential long-term consequences of those alternatives, particularly adverse consequences to the functioning of the Internet itself.

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MLATs bad – Months of delay and whims of foreign governments Kerr 14 (Orin, Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor at The George Washington University Law School, where he has taught since 2001, “What legal protections apply to e-mail stored outside the U.S.?,” July 7, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/07/what-legal-protections-apply-to-e-mail-stored-outside-the-u-s/, CMR)

I gather that is the same reason why DOJ doesn’t want to go through the alternative of Mutual Legal Assistance. It’s not that Irish law is more privacy protective. My understanding is that in Ireland, where the e-mails are stored, e-mails are disclosed to law enforcement when the e-mails will “likely . . . be of substantial value to the investigation” and “it must be in the public interest that they be produced, having regard to the likely benefit to the investigation and the circumstances under which the person in possession of the documents holds them.” Some folks who work in this area have suggested to me that this is actually somewhat lower than the U.S. probable cause

standard. I gather the problem from DOJ’s perspective is that mutual legal assistance takes a really long time — from what I hear, on the order of several months — and it often gives the foreign governments various

discretionary calls as to whether they will go agree to hand over the data. Given that time is often critical in criminal investigations, that kind of delay and uncertainty presumably is a big problem from the government’s perspective.

MLATs fails – squo is preferable Hill 15 (Jonah Force, writes on Internet policy and cybersecurity issues, and formerly served in the White House Office of the Cybersecurity Coordinator and as a Cybersecurity Teaching Fellow at Harvard, “Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age,” Jan 28, http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/, CMR)

DOJ made a policy choice to seek a warrant rather than using the MLAT process, based in large part on concerns about the efficacy of the MLAT system and the potential for a drawn-out waiting period. In its brief to the District Court supporting the warrant, the government argued, “[i]n contrast to an SCA warrant [the statutory form of warrant issued], which can be served upon a provider immediately upon issuance by a judge, an MLAT request typically takes months to process, with the turnaround time varying widely based on the foreign country’s willingness to cooperate, the law enforcement resources it has to spare for outside requests for assistance, and the procedural idiosyncrasies of the country’s legal system.” The Federal Magistrate ruling in support of the

government’s issuance of the warrant likewise noted that the “slow and laborious” MLAT procedures placed such a “substantial” burden on the government as to necessitate other means of retrieval. In other words, the government, the Federal Magistrate, and the District Court all rejected Microsoft’s contentions and accepted the view that MLAT did not offer a satisfactory means of obtaining evidence and a warrant was a necessary alternative, notwithstanding extraterritoriality concerns.

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CPText: The United States federal government should pass comprehensive reforms to MLATs including a substantial increasing in funding and establishing online request forms. The counterplan institutes key reforms to streamline MLATs – dramatically improves law enforcement cooperation Hill 15 (Jonah Force, writes on Internet policy and cybersecurity issues, and formerly served in the White House Office of the Cybersecurity Coordinator and as a Cybersecurity Teaching Fellow at Harvard, “Problematic Alternatives: MLAT Reform for the Digital Age,” Jan 28, http://harvardnsj.org/2015/01/problematic-alternatives-mlat-reform-for-the-digital-age/, CMR)

V. Policy Recommendations These MLAT alternatives are potentially harmful to a robust and free Internet, and could be rendered unnecessary by appropriate MLAT reforms like the following . A. Increase MLAT funding Insufficient resources are a primary cause of MLAT backlogs. The U nited States must spend more money to make MLATs work for foreign law enforcement. America’s recent $24 million in new funding was necessary but insufficient. More MLAT requests will come in as criminal prosecutions increasingly focus on digital evidence. The U nited States is also entitled to expect other countries to spend more to expedite responses to American requests. Realistically, other nations must recognize that American prosecutors will turn to warrants like in Microsoft if their MLAT requests gather dust in foreign justice ministries. B. Issue unilateral guidelines for direct data requests Governments should issue unilateral, self-binding guidelines to limit prosecutors’ authority to bypass an applicable MLAT and compel production of electronic records stored outside their own jurisdiction. For instance, when the information sought is particularly sensitive (perhaps political or financial information) governments should unilaterally require that prosecutors use MLAT procedures. Further, once increased resources (recommendation #1) speed up the MLAT process, governments ought to consider instituting a “first use” constraint, requiring that law enforcement agencies try in good faith to use to the MLAT process prior to pursuing direct access. A “first use” constraint, of course, is likely to

be politically palatable only among nations that adopt parallel reciprocal procedures. C. Streamline the MLAT process The MLAT review process should be reformed and streamlined . There are no online submission forms for MLAT requests today. MLATs must either be submitted by paper or by email to relevant authorities in a slow and cumbersome process. All nations with MLATs should create an online submission form and guide. As the President’s Review Group has

noted, the current MLAT process also contains multiple, often redundant, request reviews. For instance, the U.S.

DOJ’s Office of International Affairs and the U.S. Attorney’s Office must conduct separate, independent reviews. Such redundancies should be reevaluated for efficacy and necessity. D. Adopt industry-wide legal interpretations for data requests Major technology and Internet firms should seek industry-wide consensus on how to interpret national and international law on data collection from law enforcement authorities. This industry-wide statement will not necessarily alter the way in which governments seek to access data, but it will give law enforcement a sense of the types of requests that will be challenged versus the types of requests that are broadly seen as appropriate. This could help avoid unnecessary legal and political confrontations.[2] E. Renegotiate existing MLATs Tech sector innovation and data globalization has complicated former notions of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, agreement can be reached on key terms and principles in a sufficiently broad way as to avoid bottlenecks in the MLAT process. These key terms and principles must be incorporated into updated MLAT agreements. To ensure that MLATs keep pace with changing technologies, provisions dealing with data issues should be revisited frequently

within multi-national working groups.[3] V. Conclusion Reforming the MLAT system is tremendously important to inter-state law enforcement cooperation and the future of the global Internet more generally. If left unreformed, or reformed

poorly, law enforcement and jurisdictional battles among and between governments and technology firms could place yet another strain on the already stressed global Internet system. By contrast, developing updated and efficient MLATs could pay enormous dividends, not only for law enforcement as it faces enormous

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international challenges, but also by serving as confidence-building measures as sovereign nations take on the task of resolution of other, even more difficult, global Internet policy challenges. The question is whether or not governments will take the steps necessary to expedite and modernize the MLAT system before alternatives do irreversible damage to the international system.

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Solvecy/Inherency

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Squo SolvesNo retaliation or risk to competitiveness – it’s exaggeration that glosses over existing protections Bharara 14 (Preet, United States Attorney Southern District of New York, “GOVERNMENT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S DECISION TO UPHOLD A WARRANT ORDERING MICROSOFT TO DISCLOSE RECORDS WITHIN ITS CUSTODY AND CONTROL,” July 9, http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/federalbrief-microsoftcase.pdf, CMR)

Microsoft asserts that, unless the Government is required to use MLATs to obtain data stored abroad, U.S. foreign relations will be damaged and other countries will retaliate by asserting jurisdiction over electronic data stored here. (Br. 29). Aside from being purely speculative , such concerns are exclusively for the

consideration of the political br anches and do not provide a sound basis to graft extra-statutory restrictions on duly enacted legislation. See generally Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co. , 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative—‘the political’—departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or d ecision.”). They do not provide a basis

for challenging enforcement of a warrant validly issued under the SCA. Microsoft also argues that, unless its position is adopted, the U.S. technology sector stands to lose overseas customers who fear “the U.S. Government’s extraterritorial

access to their user information.” (Br. 30). However, an SCA warrant permits the Government to access user information—wherever it may be stored—only after a neutral magistrate judge has found probable cause to believe that the information contains evidence of criminal activity. This is a time-tested manner by which the Government obtains evidence in criminal prosecutions, and nothing could be farther from an unchecked exercise of power. The form of legal process at issue is specifically designed to protect legitimate privacy interests, by requiring that a ny intrusion on those interests be properly justified by the need to uncover evidence of a crime.

Existing protections solve Schultheis 15 (Ned, Summer Associate at Ropes & Gray LLP, “WARRANTS IN THE CLOUDS: HOW EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT THREATENS THE UNITED STATES’ CLOUD STORAGE INDUSTRY,” Volume 9 Issue 2, CMR)

Additionally, the current extraterritorial application of the SCA warrant does not allow the U.S. government to obtain electronic information from anyone for any reason. There are constitutional measures in place, in

particular the Fourth Amendment that requires the U.S. government to show before a judge probable cause for issuing the SCA warrant. To establish probable cause, the U.S. government must establish the individual in question is suspected of illegal activity and that obtaining the e-mails located abroad is vital to the ongoing investigation.236 The extraterritorial application of the SCA would not unduly expand the power of the U.S. government to freely obtain any electronic information from anybody it so chooses. However, there are serious problems with allowing the U.S. government to bypass the MLAT process altogether. Instead, the U.S. government has chosen to take an expansive interpretation of a dated statute to allow the U.S. government to obtain electronic evidence without the consent or even request of the foreign nation where the electronic evidence is stored."37 It was able to do this because the SCA is so vague to begin with and therefore can be construed widely. The courts had little choice but to uphold the extraterritorial application of the SCA warrant based on current legislation.

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No Solvency—Circumvention DOJ will circumvent the plan Rash 15 (Wayne, “U.S. Bill Would Ban DoJ Warrant for Email in Overseas Microsoft Server,” 2-14, http://www.eweek.com/cloud/u.s.-bill-would-ban-doj-warrant-for-email-in-oversears-microsoft-server-2.html, CMR)

However, if the LEADS Act were to be passed and signed by President Obama, there would be little choice. But of course that's the issue for

the current administration, which so far has not hesitated to carry out actions of questionable legality , such as ignoring existing treaties to gain access to foreign emails . Would President Barack Obama sign the LEADS Act? Considering the level of support in both houses of Congress, he might realize that he has no choice, but the president might also dare Congress to override his veto. However, I don't think a veto for this bill is likely. It has strong bipartisan support in both houses. It's also presented as a way to update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to reflect current technology, which the Obama administration has consistently said it favors. The act is also presented as a way to keep U.S. companies from breaking the law, which is pretty difficult for the president to oppose. "Law enforcement agencies wishing to access Americans' data in the cloud ought to get a warrant," Coons explained when the act was introduced, "and just like warrants for physical evidence, warrants for content under ECPA shouldn't authorize seizure of communications that are located in a foreign country. "The government's position that ECPA warrants do apply abroad puts U.S. cloud providers in the position of having to break the privacy laws of foreign countries in which they do business in order to comply with U.S. law. This not only hurts our businesses' competitiveness and costs American jobs, but it also invites reciprocal treatment by our international trading partners," Coons said. While there's every reason to believe that eventually federal prosecutors' demands that Microsoft disgorge emails stored abroad will be found

contrary to existing law, the LEADS Act removes all doubt. Attempting to extend the reach of U.S. domestic laws to apply anywhere in the

world is one of the worst types of overreach. This law would rein in the DoJ's excesses. Assuming, of course, the DoJ didn't decide to ignore that law as well .

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Competitiveness

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Generic 1ncCompetitiveness inevitable – U.S. can absorb innovation from anywhere Beckley, Harvard International Security Program research fellow, 2012

(Michael, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure”, International Security 36.3, lexis)

In theory, globalization should help developing countries obtain and absorb advanced technology. In practice, however, this may not occur because some of the knowledge and infrastructure necessary to absorb certain technologies cannot be specified in a blueprint or contained within a machine. Instead they exist in peoples’ minds and can be obtained only through “hands-on” experience. The World Bank recently calculated that 80 percent of the wealth of the United States is made up of intangible assets, most notably, its system of property rights, its efficient judicial system, and the skills, knowledge, and trust embedded within its society. If this is the case, then a huge chunk of what separates the United States from China is not for sale and cannot be copied. Economies and militaries used to consist primarily of physical goods (e.g., conveyor belts and tanks), but today they are composed of systems that link physical goods to networks, research clusters,

and command centers. 72 Developing countries may be able to purchase or steal certain aspects of these systems from abroad, but many lack the supporting infrastructure, or “absorptive capacity,” necessary to integrate them into functioning wholes. 73 For example, in the 1960s, Cummins Engine Company, a U.S. technological leader, formed joint ventures with a Japanese company and an Indian company to produce the same truck engine. The Japanese plant quickly reached U.S. quality and cost levels while the Indian plant turned out second-rate engines at three to four times the cost. The reason, according to Jack Baranson, was the “high degree of technical skill . . . required to convert techniques and produce new technical drawings and manufacturing specifications.” 74 This case illustrates how an intangible factor

such as skill can lead to significant productivity differences even when two countries have access to identical hardware. Compared to developing countries such as China, the U nited S tates is primed for technological absorption. Its property rights, social networks, capital markets, flexible labor laws, and legions of m ultinational companies not only help it innovate, but also absorb innovations created elsewhere .

Declinists liken the U.S. economic system to a leaky bucket oozing innovations out into the international system. But in the alternative perspective, the United States is more like a sponge , steadily increasing its mass by soaking up ideas, technology, and people from the rest of the world. If this is the case, then the spread of technology around the globe may paradoxically favor a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States.

STEM shortage means US competitiveness is unsustainableWaldron ‘12 [Travis, reporter for ThinkProgress.org at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, “REPORT: How America’s Falling Share Of Global College Graduates Threatens Future Economic Competitiveness,” http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/08/21/722571/report-us-share-of-college-graduates-dropped-over-last-decade-compared-to-china-india/]

The United States’ share of global college graduates fell substantially in the first decade of the 21st century and stands to drop even more by 2020 as developing economies in China and India have graduated more college students, presenting challenges for American workers’ ability to remain competitive in a global economy in the future. The U.S. share of college graduates fell from nearly one-in-four to just more than one-in-five from 2000 to 2010, according to “The Competition That Really Matters,” a report from the Center for American Progress and The Center for the Next Generation: From 2000 to 2010, the U.S. share of college graduates fell to 21% of the world’s total from 24%, while China’s share climbed to 11% from 9%. India’s rose more than half a percentage point to 7%. Based on current demographic and college enrollment trends, we can project where each country will be by 2020: the U.S. share of the

world’s college graduates will fall below 18% while China’s and India’s will rise to more than 13% and nearly 8% respectively.

No impact to US competitiveness- it’s all hypeKrugman ’11 [Paul, Nobel Prize-winning economist, professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, received his B.A. from Yale University in 1974 and his Ph.D. from MIT in 1977. He has taught at Yale, MIT and Stanford. At MIT he became the Ford International Professor of Economics, “The Competition Myth,” 1-24-11, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/opinion/24krugman.html?_r=0]

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Meet the new buzzword, same as the old buzzword. In advance of the State of the Union, President Obama has telegraphed his main theme: competitiveness. The President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board has been renamed the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. And in his Saturday radio address, the president declared that “We can out-compete any other nation on Earth.” This may be smart politics. Arguably, Mr. Obama has enlisted an old cliché on behalf of a good cause, as a way to sell a much-needed increase in public investment to a public thoroughly indoctrinated in the view that government spending is a bad thing.¶ But let’s not kid ourselves: talking about

“competitiveness” as a goal is fundamentally misleading. At best, it’s a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it could lead to policies based on the false idea that what’s good for corporations is good for America.¶ About that

misdiagnosis: What sense does it make to view our current woes as stemming from lack of competitiveness?¶ It’s true that we’d have more jobs if we exported more and imported less. But the same is true of Europe and Japan, which also have depressed economies. And we can’t all export more while importing less, unless we can find another planet to sell to. Yes, we could demand that China shrink its trade surplus — but if confronting China is what Mr. Obama is proposing, he should say that plainly.¶ Furthermore, while America is running a trade deficit, this deficit is smaller than it was before the Great Recession began. It would help if we could make it smaller

still. But ultimately, we’re in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because American companies have lost their ability to compete with foreign rivals.¶ But isn’t it at least somewhat useful to think of our nation as if it were America Inc., competing in the global marketplace? No.¶ Consider: A corporate leader who increases profits by slashing his work force is thought to be successful. Well, that’s more or less what has happened in America recently: employment is way down, but profits are hitting new records. Who, exactly, considers this economic success?¶ Still, you might say that talk of competitiveness helps Mr. Obama quiet claims that he’s anti-

business. That’s fine, as long as he realizes that the interests of nominally “American” corporations and the interests of the nation, which were never the same, are now less aligned than ever before.¶ Take the case of General Electric, whose chief executive, Jeffrey Immelt, has just been appointed to head that renamed advisory board. I have nothing against either G.E. or Mr. Immelt. But

with fewer than half its workers based in the United States and less than half its revenues coming from U.S. operations, G.E.’s fortunes have very little to do with U.S. prosperity.¶ By the way, some have praised Mr. Immelt’s appointment on the grounds that at least he represents a company that actually makes things, rather than being yet another financial wheeler-dealer. Sorry to burst this bubble, but these days G.E. derives more revenue from its financial operations than it does from manufacturing — indeed, GE Capital, which received a

government guarantee for its debt, was a major beneficiary of the Wall Street bailout.¶ So what does the administration’s embrace of the

rhetoric of competitiveness mean for economic policy?¶ The favorable interpretation, as I said, is that it’s just packaging for an economic strategy centered on public investment, investment that’s actually about creating jobs now while promoting longer-term growth. The unfavorable interpretation is that Mr. Obama and his advisers really believe that the economy is ailing because they’ve been too tough on business, and that what America needs now is corporate tax cuts and across-the-board deregulation.¶ My guess is that we’re mainly talking about packaging here. And if the president does propose a serious increase in spending on infrastructure and education, I’ll be pleased.¶ But even if he proposes good policies, the fact that Mr. Obama feels the need to wrap these policies in bad metaphors is a sad commentary on the state of our discourse.¶ The financial crisis of 2008 was a teachable moment, an object lesson in what can go wrong if you trust a market economy to regulate itself. Nor should we forget that highly regulated economies, like Germany, did a much better job than we did at sustaining employment after the crisis hit. For whatever reason, however, the teachable moment came and went with nothing learned.¶ Mr. Obama himself may do all right: his approval rating is up, the economy is showing signs of life, and his chances of re-election look pretty good. But the ideology that brought economic disaster in 2008 is back on top — and seems likely to stay there until it brings disaster again.

Competitiveness not key to hegNuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he teaches International Relations theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. “ Theory of Unipolar Politics” (Cambridge University Press) April 2014 p. 14-17

At the same time, the debate on unipolar durability is almost exclusively focused on differential rates of economic growth and their determinants. Will China continue to grow faster than the United States, or will its economic development slow down or even stall? When will China's economy overtake that of the United States? What can the United States do to boost its own pace of economic growth? ¶ Although these are important questions in their

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own right, they are nearly irrelevant for the durability of U.S. military power preponderance . The reason is simple: military power is not a side product of economic development. Rather , military power is the result of purposeful state action . Specifically, it is the product of a decision by a state to invest a fraction of the country's wealth into the production of military capabilities over time. As such, military power does not necessarily follow from economic growth. ¶ Put in the context of a unipolar world in the nuclear age, this means that - independently from recurrent arguments about U.S. economic decline - the power preponderance of the United States is not set to end . But, again, nowhere in the literature do we have an argument laying out the conditions under which a unipolar distribution of military power is likely to end - or, on the contrary, to endure for a long time even in the presence of a shifting distribution of economic power. This book sets out to provide one such theory, refocusing the debate on unipolar durability from differential rates of economic growth to political decisions to invest in additional military capabilities.

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Block Stuff

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AT: Competitiveness—High/Resilient Competitiveness durable and free riding solvesFallows 10 – correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, studied economics at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. He has been an editor of The Washington Monthly and of Texas Monthly, and from 1977 to 1979 he served as President Jimmy Carter's chief speechwriter. His first book, National Defense, won the American Book Award in 1981; he has written seven others (James. “How America Can Rise Again”, Jan/Feb edition, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/201001/american-decline)

This is new. Only with America’s emergence as a global power after World War II did the idea of American “decline” routinely involve falling behind someone else. Before that, it meant falling short of expectations—God’s, the Founders’, posterity’s—or of the previous virtues of America in its lost, great days. “The new element in the ’50s was the constant comparison with the Soviets,” Michael Kazin told me. Since then, external falling-behind comparisons have become not just a staple of American self-assessment but often a crutch. If we are concerned about our schools, it is because children are learning more in Singapore or India; about the development of clean-tech jobs, because it’s happening faster in China. Having often lived outside the United States since the 1970s, I have offered my share of falling-behind analyses, including a book-length comparison of Japanese and American strengths (More Like Us) 20 years ago. But at this point in America’s national life cycle, I think the exercise is largely a distraction, and that Americans should concentrate on what are, finally, our own internal issues to resolve or ignore. Naturally there are lessons to draw from other countries’ practices and innovations; the more we know about the outside world the better, as long as we’re collecting information calmly rather than glancing nervously at our reflected foreign image. For instance, if you have spent any time in places where tipping is frowned on or rare, like Japan or Australia, you view the American model of day-long small bribes, rather than one built-in full price, as something similar to baksheesh, undignified for all concerned. Naturally, too, it’s easier to draw attention to a domestic problem and build support for a solution if you cast the issue in us-versus-them terms, as a response to an outside threat. In If We Can Put a Man on the Moon …, their new book about making government programs more effective, William Eggers and John O’Leary emphasize the military and Cold War imperatives behind America’s space program. “The race to the moon was a contest between two systems of government,” they wrote, “and the question would be settled not by debate but by who could best execute on this endeavor.” Falling-behind arguments have proved convenient and powerful in other countries, too. But whatever their popularity or utility in other places at other times, falling-behind concerns seem too common in America now. As I have thought about why overreliance on this device increasingly bothers me, I have realized that it’s because my latest stretch out of the country has left me less and less interested in whether China or some other country is “overtaking” America. The question that matters is not whether America is “falling behind” but instead something like John Winthrop’s original question of whether it is falling short—or even falling apart. This is not the mainstream American position now, so let me explain. First is the simple reality that one kind of “decline” is inevitable and therefore not worth worrying about. China has about four times as many people as America does. Someday its economy will be larger than ours. Fine! A generation ago, its people

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produced, on average, about one-sixteenth as much as Americans did; now they produce about one-sixth. That change is a huge achievement for China—and a plus rather than a minus for everyone else, because a business-minded China is more benign than a miserable or rebellious one. When the Chinese produce one-quarter as much as Americans per capita, as will happen barring catastrophe, their economy will become the world’s largest. This will be good for them but will not mean “falling behind” for us. We know that for more than a century, the consciousness of decline has been a blight on British politics, though it has inspired some memorable, melancholy literature. There is no reason for America to feel depressed about the natural emergence of China, India, and others as world powers. But second, and more important, America may have reasons to feel actively optimistic about its prospects in purely relative terms. The crucial american advantage Let’s start with the more modest claim, that China has ample reason to worry about its own future. Will the long-dreaded day of reckoning for Chinese development finally arrive because of environmental disaster? Or via the demographic legacy of the one-child policy, which will leave so many parents and grandparents dependent on so relatively few young workers? Minxin Pei, who grew up in Shanghai and now works at Claremont McKenna College, in California, has predicted in China’s Trapped Transition that within the next few years, tension between an open economy and a closed political system will become unendurable, and an unreformed Communist bureaucracy will finally drag down economic performance. America will be better off if China does well than if it flounders. A prospering China will mean a bigger world economy with more opportunities and probably less turmoil—and a China likely to be more cooperative on environmental matters. But whatever happens to China, prospects could soon brighten for America. The American culture’s particular strengths could conceivably be about to assume new importance and give our economy new pep. International networks will matter more with each passing year. As the one truly universal nation, the U nited S tates continually refreshes its connections with the rest of the world —through languages, family, education, business—in a way no other nation does, or will . The countries that are comparably open—Canada, Australia—aren’t nearly as large; those whose economies are comparably large—Japan, unified Europe, eventually China or India—aren’t nearly as open. The simplest measure of whether a culture is dominant is whether outsiders want to be part of it. At the height of the British Empire, colonial subjects from the Raj to Malaya to the Caribbean modeled themselves in part on Englishmen: Nehru and Lee Kuan Yew went to Cambridge, Gandhi, to University College, London. Ho Chi Minh wrote in French for magazines in Paris. These days the world is full of businesspeople, bureaucrats, and scientists who have trained in the United States. Today’s China attracts outsiders too, but in a particular way. Many go for business opportunities; or because of cultural fascination; or, as my wife and I did, to be on the scene where something truly exciting was under way. The Haidian area of Beijing, seat of its universities, is dotted with the faces of foreigners who have come to master the language and learn the system. But true immigrants? People who want their children and grandchildren to grow up within this system? Although I met many foreigners who hope to stay in China indefinitely, in three years I encountered only two people who aspired to citizenship in the People’s Republic. From the physical rigors of a badly polluted and still-developing country, to the constraints on free expression and dissent, to the likely ongoing mediocrity of a university system that emphasizes volume of output over independence or excellence of research, the realities of China heavily limit the appeal of becoming Chinese. Because of its scale and internal diversity, China (like India) is a more racially open society than, say, Japan or Korea.

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But China has come nowhere near the feats of absorption and opportunity that make up much of America ’s story, and it is very difficult to imagine that it could do so —well, ever. Everything we know

We’re lightyears ahead in key sectors Zakaria 8 (Fareed, Newsweek Editor, International Relations Expert, Host of Fareed Zakaria: GPS (on CNN), “The Future of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, May/June)

This difference between the United States and Britain is reflected in the burden of their military budgets. Britannia ruled the seas but never the land. The British army was sufficiently small that Otto von Bismarck once quipped that were the British ever to invade Germany, he would simply have the local police force arrest them. Meanwhile, London's advantage over the seas -- it had more tonnage than the next two navies put together -- came at ruinous cost. The U.S. military, in contrast, dominates at every level -- land, sea, air, space -- and spends more than the next 14 countries combined, accounting for almost 50 percent of global defense spending. The United States also spends more on defense research and development than the rest of the world put together. And crucially, it does all this without breaking the bank. U.S. defense expenditure as a percent of GDP is now 4.1 percent, lower than it was for most of the Cold War (under Dwight Eisenhower, it rose to ten percent). As U.S. GDP has grown larger and larger, expenditures that would have been backbreaking have become affordable. The Iraq war may be a tragedy or a noble endeavor, but either way, it will not bankrupt the United States. The price tag for Iraq and Afghanistan together -- $125 billion a year -- represents less than one percent of GDP. The war in Vietnam, by comparison, cost the equivalent of 1.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 1970, a large difference. (Neither of these percentages includes second- or third-order costs of war, which allows for a fair comparison even if one disputes the exact figures.) U.S. military power is not the cause of its strength but the consequence. The fuel is the United States' economic and technological base, which remains extremely strong. The United States does face larger, deeper, and broader challenges than it has ever faced in its history, and it will undoubtedly lose some share of global GDP. But the process will look nothing like Britain's slide in the twentieth century, when the country lost the lead in innovation, energy, and entrepreneurship. The United States will remain a vital , vibrant economy, at the forefront of the next revolutions in science, technology, and industry . In trying to understand how the United States will fare in the new world, the first thing to do is simply look around: the future is already here. Over the last 20 years, globalization has been gaining breadth and depth. More countries are making goods, communications technology has been leveling the playing field, capital has been free to move across the world -- and the United States has benefited massively from these trends. Its economy has received hundreds of billions of dollars in investment, and its companies have entered new countries and industries with great success. Despite two decades of a very expensive dollar, U.S. exports have held ground, and the World Economic Forum currently ranks the United States as the world's most competitive economy. GDP growth, the bottom line, has averaged just over three percent in the United States for 25 years, significantly higher than in Europe or Japan. Productivity growth, the elixir of modern economics, has been over 2.5 percent for a decade now, a full percentage point higher than the European average. This superior growth trajectory might be petering out, and perhaps U.S. growth will be more typical for an advanced industrialized country for the next few years. But the

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general point -- that the United States is a highly dynamic economy at the cutting edge, despite its enormous size -- holds. Consider the industries of the future. Nanotechnology (applied science dealing with the control of matter at the atomic or molecular scale) is likely to lead to fundamental breakthroughs over the next 50 years, and the United States dominates the field . It has more dedicated "nanocenters" than the next three nations (Germany, Britain, and China) combined and has issued more patents for nanotechnology than the rest of the world combined, highlighting its unusual strength in turning abstract theory into practical products. Biotechnology (a broad category that describes the use of biological systems to create medical, agricultural, and industrial products) is also dominated by the United States.

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AT: Competitiveness—Resilient Competitiveness inevitable – U.S. can absorb innovation from anywhere Beckley, Harvard International Security Program research fellow, 2012

(Michael, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure”, International Security 36.3, lexis)

In theory, globalization should help developing countries obtain and absorb advanced technology. In practice, however, this may not occur because some of the knowledge and infrastructure necessary to absorb certain technologies cannot be specified in a blueprint or contained within a machine. Instead they exist in peoples’ minds and can be obtained only through “hands-on” experience. The World Bank recently calculated that 80 percent of the wealth of the United States is made up of intangible assets, most notably, its system of property rights, its efficient judicial system, and the skills, knowledge, and trust embedded within its society. If this is the case, then a huge chunk of what separates the United States from China is not for sale and cannot be copied. Economies and militaries used to consist primarily of physical goods (e.g., conveyor belts and tanks), but today they are composed of systems that link physical goods to networks, research clusters,

and command centers. 72 Developing countries may be able to purchase or steal certain aspects of these systems from abroad, but many lack the supporting infrastructure, or “absorptive capacity,” necessary to integrate them into functioning wholes. 73 For example, in the 1960s, Cummins Engine Company, a U.S. technological leader, formed joint ventures with a Japanese company and an Indian company to produce the same truck engine. The Japanese plant quickly reached U.S. quality and cost levels while the Indian plant turned out second-rate engines at three to four times the cost. The reason, according to Jack Baranson, was the “high degree of technical skill . . . required to convert techniques and produce new technical drawings and manufacturing specifications.” 74 This case illustrates how an intangible factor

such as skill can lead to significant productivity differences even when two countries have access to identical hardware. Compared to developing countries such as China, the U nited S tates is primed for technological absorption. Its property rights, social networks, capital markets, flexible labor laws, and legions of m ultinational companies not only help it innovate, but also absorb innovations created elsewhere .

Declinists liken the U.S. economic system to a leaky bucket oozing innovations out into the international system. But in the alternative perspective, the United States is more like a sponge , steadily increasing its mass by soaking up ideas, technology, and people from the rest of the world. If this is the case, then the spread of technology around the globe may paradoxically favor a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the United States.

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AT: Competitiveness—Alt Cause: STEM STEM shortage means US competitiveness is unsustainableWaldron ‘12 [Travis, reporter for ThinkProgress.org at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, “REPORT: How America’s Falling Share Of Global College Graduates Threatens Future Economic Competitiveness,” http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/08/21/722571/report-us-share-of-college-graduates-dropped-over-last-decade-compared-to-china-india/]

The United States’ share of global college graduates fell substantially in the first decade of the 21st century and stands to drop even more by 2020 as developing economies in China and India have graduated more college students, presenting challenges for American workers’ ability to remain competitive in a global economy in the future. The U.S. share of college graduates fell from nearly one-in-four to just more than one-in-five from 2000 to 2010, according to “The Competition That Really Matters,” a report from the Center for American Progress and The Center for the Next Generation: From 2000 to 2010, the U.S. share of college graduates fell to 21% of the world’s total from 24%, while China’s share climbed to 11% from 9%. India’s rose more than half a percentage point to 7%. Based on current demographic and college enrollment trends, we can project where each country will be by 2020: the U.S. share of the

world’s college graduates will fall below 18% while China’s and India’s will rise to more than 13% and nearly 8% respectively.

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AT: Competitiveness—No Impact No impact to US competitiveness- it’s all hypeKrugman ’11 [Paul, Nobel Prize-winning economist, professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, received his B.A. from Yale University in 1974 and his Ph.D. from MIT in 1977. He has taught at Yale, MIT and Stanford. At MIT he became the Ford International Professor of Economics, “The Competition Myth,” 1-24-11, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/opinion/24krugman.html?_r=0]

Meet the new buzzword, same as the old buzzword. In advance of the State of the Union, President Obama has telegraphed his main theme: competitiveness. The President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board has been renamed the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. And in his Saturday radio address, the president declared that “We can out-compete any other nation on Earth.” This may be smart politics. Arguably, Mr. Obama has enlisted an old cliché on behalf of a good cause, as a way to sell a much-needed increase in public investment to a public thoroughly indoctrinated in the view that government spending is a bad thing.¶ But let’s not kid ourselves: talking about

“competitiveness” as a goal is fundamentally misleading. At best, it’s a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it could lead to policies based on the false idea that what’s good for corporations is good for America.¶ About that

misdiagnosis: What sense does it make to view our current woes as stemming from lack of competitiveness?¶ It’s true that we’d have more jobs if we exported more and imported less. But the same is true of Europe and Japan, which also have depressed economies. And we can’t all export more while importing less, unless we can find another planet to sell to. Yes, we could demand that China shrink its trade surplus — but if confronting China is what Mr. Obama is proposing, he should say that plainly.¶ Furthermore, while America is running a trade deficit, this deficit is smaller than it was before the Great Recession began. It would help if we could make it smaller

still. But ultimately, we’re in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because American companies have lost their ability to compete with foreign rivals.¶ But isn’t it at least somewhat useful to think of our nation as if it were America Inc., competing in the global marketplace? No.¶ Consider: A corporate leader who increases profits by slashing his work force is thought to be successful. Well, that’s more or less what has happened in America recently: employment is way down, but profits are hitting new records. Who, exactly, considers this economic success?¶ Still, you might say that talk of competitiveness helps Mr. Obama quiet claims that he’s anti-

business. That’s fine, as long as he realizes that the interests of nominally “American” corporations and the interests of the nation, which were never the same, are now less aligned than ever before.¶ Take the case of General Electric, whose chief executive, Jeffrey Immelt, has just been appointed to head that renamed advisory board. I have nothing against either G.E. or Mr. Immelt. But

with fewer than half its workers based in the United States and less than half its revenues coming from U.S. operations, G.E.’s fortunes have very little to do with U.S. prosperity.¶ By the way, some have praised Mr. Immelt’s appointment on the grounds that at least he represents a company that actually makes things, rather than being yet another financial wheeler-dealer. Sorry to burst this bubble, but these days G.E. derives more revenue from its financial operations than it does from manufacturing — indeed, GE Capital, which received a

government guarantee for its debt, was a major beneficiary of the Wall Street bailout.¶ So what does the administration’s embrace of the

rhetoric of competitiveness mean for economic policy?¶ The favorable interpretation, as I said, is that it’s just packaging for an economic strategy centered on public investment, investment that’s actually about creating jobs now while promoting longer-term growth. The unfavorable interpretation is that Mr. Obama and his advisers really believe that the economy is ailing because they’ve been too tough on business, and that what America needs now is corporate tax cuts and across-the-board deregulation.¶ My guess is that we’re mainly talking about packaging here. And if the president does propose a serious increase in spending on infrastructure and education, I’ll be pleased.¶ But even if he proposes good policies, the fact that Mr. Obama feels the need to wrap these policies in bad metaphors is a sad commentary on the state of our discourse.¶ The financial crisis of 2008 was a teachable moment, an object lesson in what can go wrong if you trust a market economy to regulate itself. Nor should we forget that highly regulated economies, like Germany, did a much better job than we did at sustaining employment after the crisis hit. For whatever reason, however, the teachable moment came and went with nothing learned.¶ Mr. Obama himself may do all right: his approval rating is up, the economy is showing signs of life, and his chances of re-election look pretty good. But the ideology that brought economic disaster in 2008 is back on top — and seems likely to stay there until it brings disaster again.

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AT: Competitiveness—Heg D Competitiveness not key to hegNuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he teaches International Relations theory and security studies. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago in 2009. “ Theory of Unipolar Politics” (Cambridge University Press) April 2014 p. 14-17

At the same time, the debate on unipolar durability is almost exclusively focused on differential rates of economic growth and their determinants. Will China continue to grow faster than the United States , or will its economic development slow down or even stall? When will China's economy overtake that of the United States? What can the United States do to boost its own pace of economic growth? ¶ Although these are important questions in their own right, they are nearly irrelevant for the durability of U.S. military power preponderance . The reason is simple: military power is not a side product of economic development. Rather , military power is the result of purposeful state action . Specifically, it is the product of a decision by a state to invest a fraction of the country's wealth into the production of military capabilities over time. As such, military power does not necessarily follow from economic growth. ¶ Put in the context of a unipolar world in the nuclear age, this means that - independently from recurrent arguments about U.S. economic decline - the power preponderance of the United States is not set to end. But, again, nowhere in the literature do we have an argument laying out the conditions under which a unipolar distribution of military power is likely to end - or, on the contrary, to endure for a long time even in the presence of a shifting distribution of economic power. This book sets out to provide one such theory, refocusing the debate on unipolar durability from differential rates of economic growth to political decisions to invest in additional military capabilities.

Competitiveness doesn’t threaten heg-US leads in R&D, innovation and corporations.Cox, London School of Economics IR professor, 2012

(Michael, “Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?”, International Relations, December, SAGE)

We also have to judge economic power not only in terms of the size of an economy but also by the qualitative criteria of ‘competitiveness’. Economies like China, India and Brazil are undoubtedly large and will no doubt get larger over time.

But this does not necessarily make them competitive in relationship to most Western countries or the United States. In a 2011 survey, in fact, the United States came fourth in the world in a group of 15 countries. Moreover, 11 within the 15 were definably Western, while the other 4 included Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – countries all closely tied to the West and to the United States. As for the BRICs, they came well

down the list. Thus, China came in at 27, India at 51, Brazil at 58 and Russia at 63.66 Other studies have arrived at not dissimilar conclusions concerning the qualitative gap that continues to exist between a number of the ‘rising’ economies and many of the more established ones, the United States, in particular. In terms of cutting-edge research in science and technology, for example, the U nited S tates continues to hold a clear lead . Indeed in 2008, the United States accounted for 40 per cent of total world research and development (R&D) spending and 38 per cent of patented new technology inventions. More significantly, scientific research produced in the United States accounted for 49 per cent of total world citations and 63 per cent of the most highly cited articles. The United States also continued to employ around 70 of the world’s Nobel Prize winners and could lay claim to twothirds of its most cited individual

researchers in science and technology.67 Innovation is also an American strength .68 Other countries are clearly beginning to catch up. The

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United States, however, is still a country that continues to innovate across the board. Critics would no doubt point to the fact that the United States is slipping down the league table. However, it still ranks fourth in the world. China meanwhile only came in at 54th in 2009, India at 56th and Brazil and Russia even further behind. Of course, this does not take account of change over the longer term, or of the fact that a country like China is making a concerted effort to build a more innovative economy.69 But as even the Chinese would accept, it still has very long way to go. Indeed, in spite of official efforts to encourage what is termed in China a ‘capacity for independent innovation’, there remain several weaknesses in the Chinese political economy. Among the most significant, it has been noted, are ‘poor enforcement of intellectual property rights, an educational system that emphasizes rote learning over critical thinking, and a shortage of independent organizations

that can evaluate scientific progress’.70 There is also wider political restraint as well. Innovation usually requires open debate, a capacity to challenge established truths and incentives to think the unthinkable; and none of these, to be blunt, are much in evidence in modern China today.71 Finally, in terms of global economic power, the U nited S tates is still well ahead in one other vital respect: corporate stre ngth.72 Some of the emerging economies are beginning to catch up, and some of America’s closest allies in Europe and Asia run it a good second.73 But the United States clearly remains in ‘poll position’ with

American companies in 2011 constituting 4 of the top 10 corporations in the world, 14 of the top 30 and 25 of the top 50. Western companie s more generally still outperform all others , with the United States and the EU together representing 6 out of the top 10 global corporations, 22 out of the top 30 and 37 out of the top 50. Some of the BRIC economies do have some very large companies with China, unsurprisingly, leading the way with 4 out of the top 10, 8 out of the top 50 and 61 out of the top 500, a remarkable achievement for a country that only 25 years ago was virtually irrelevant in the world economy. 74 Still, as a recent Brookings study has shown, it does not follow that these companies are internationally active or should even be regarded as ‘multinationals’ in

the true sense of that word. Indeed, 49 of the top 57 mainland companies in China remain under state control; and with a very few exceptions, the overwhelming majority all operate predominantly within the country – and for several good reasons including a shortage of managers with the necessary linguistic skills and experience of working abroad, a lack of transparency , poor global brand presence , and a very real difficulty in adapting easily to foreign legal, tax and political environments.75

Competitiveness not key to hegBrooks and Wohlforth, 8

[Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor and William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “World out of Balance, International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy,” p. 32-35]

American primacy is also rooted in the county's position as the world's leading technological power. The United States remains dominant globally in overall R&D investments, high-technology production, commercial innovation, and higher education (table 2.3). Despite the weight of this evidence, elite perceptions of U.S. power had shifted toward pessimism by the middle of the first decade of this century. As we noted in chapter 1, this was partly the result of an Iraq-induced doubt about the utility of material predominance, a doubt redolent of the post-Vietnam

mood. In retrospect, many assessments of U.S. economic and technological prowess from the 1990s were overly optimistic; by the next decade important potential vulnerabilities were evident. In particular, chronically imbalanced domestic finances and accelerating public debt convinced some analysts that the U nited S tates once again confronted a competitiveness crisis .23 If concerns continue to mount, this will count as the fourth such crisis since 1945; the first three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s

(the Soviet threat and Japan's challenge). None of these crises , however, shifted the international system 's structure: multipolarity did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each scare over competitiveness ended with the American position of primacy retained or strengthened .24

Our review of the evidence of U.S. predominance is not meant to suggest that the United States lacks vulnerabilities or causes for concern. In

fact, it confronts a number of significant vulnerabilities; of course, this is also true of the other major powers.25 The point is that adverse trends for the United States will not cause a polarity shift in the near future. If we take a long view of U.S. competitiveness and the prospects for relative declines in economic and technological dominance, one takeaway stands out: relative power shifts slowly . The United States has accounted for a quarter to a third of global

output for over a century. No other economy will match its combination of wealth, size , technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future (tables 2.2 and 2.3).

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The depth, scale, and projected longevity of the U.S. lead in each critical dimension of power are noteworthy. But what truly distinguishes the current distribution of capabilities is American dominance in all of them simultaneously. The chief lesson of Kennedy's 500-year survey of leading powers is that nothing remotely similar ever occurred in the historical experience that informs modern international relations theory. The implication is both simple and underappreciated: the counterbalancing constraint is inoperative and will remain so until the distribution of capabilities changes fundamentally. The next section explains why.

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MLATs

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Generic 1ncReform in the MLAT system wont change government motivesWoods, ’15 (Andrew K. Woods is an assistant professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law.  He holds a JD from Harvard Law School and a PhD in Politics from the University of Cambridge. “You should Care About Mutual Legal Assistance More Than You Do” Just Security, 1-28-15, http://justsecurity.org/19449/care-mutual-legal-assistance/ 7-9-15)

About a year ago, I wrote here that the mutual legal assistance (MLA) regime – the legal system that regulates government-to-government requests for evidence in criminal investigations, including personal data – was badly in need of reform. Today, the Global Network Initiative is releasing my report on the subject. The report outlines some of the key reforms that can and ought to be implemented by states in the next year to improve the MLA process. (The report is being launched at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in DC at 1pm EST today and will be live streamed here.) Many of us live much of our lives “online” – meaning that we store our personal data on internet-connected servers, which are very often located in far away locations. As a result of our peripatetic lives, our data is flung across a number of different jurisdictions. When governments seek access to this data – perhaps in connection with a criminal investigation – they increasingly find that it is beyond their jurisdictional reach. (This is the problem raised by the much–discussed Microsoft Ireland case.) If you care about privacy, you might think this is all good because it means that the government has a harder time getting access to the digital goods. But this view badly misunderstands

the tradeoffs associated with the MLA regime. Embracing the fact that MLA tends to prevent

governments from gaining lawful access to personal data is both shortsighted and dangerous. When governments do not get access to data through MLA, they occasionally try other tactics that do not have the same built-in due process constraints that MLA provides (tactics, in other words, that might make those of who care about privacy prefer MLA). When governments feel they cannot get access to data through the MLA process, they might

assert that their laws apply extraterritorially – as the US has done in the Microsoft Ireland case – or they might demand that communications companies store data locally on servers (the easier to raid). Even worse: they might turn to surveillance. A few months ago, I spoke with a salesman from a company (I will not name) who was selling a tool that allows states to intercept their citizens’ communications. I asked him if he had ever heard of the mutual legal assistance treaties. He grinned and said: “MLAT! I love MLAT! States buy my product because MLAT doesn’t work!” It is no

longer a surprise to learn that governments turn to surveillance to gain unwarranted access to citizen data . Here, however, we are talking about data that might be warranted, but

the government does not have the patience or felt the need to go through the MLA process to prove that their access is in fact justified. For example, an Italian judge may issue a warrant for data only to discover that the data controller – perhaps a foreign company or a domestic company with data stored abroad – will not submit to its jurisdiction. Local law enforcement agencies can then request MLA from the country with the authority to compel the data and wait 9 or 10 months for the response. Or they can buy off-the-rack software and get the data now. If any of these alternatives bothers you, you should be urging your government to improve its handling of MLA requests, both outgoing and incoming. That is the thrust of the report being released today. The report highlights a number of important reforms that ought to be implemented by governments in the next year. These include: creating an electronic system for making and processing MLA requests (which are sometimes still done in paper); better training for government officials as to how to file and process MLA requests; and more staffing at justice departments around

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the world for the oncoming wave of MLA requests that is likely to materialize in the next few years. These reforms are low-hanging fruit. The report says little about the much larger and more intractable problems that arise from an Internet that spans multiple jurisdictions. For example, the report is silent on how to determine the scope of a state’s jurisdiction. Needless to say, this is the subject of much debate. (Again, see the Microsoft Ireland case for evidence of this controversy.) Nor does the report attempt to resolve the deeper “conflict of laws” questions that arise when two states do not agree about the legality of the conduct in question. For example, if France asks the United States for data in connection to speech that constitutes a crime in France but not in the U.S., what should the U.S. government do? And what if the suspect is French, the harm is felt in France, and there is no tie to the U.S. but for the location of the data or the location of the company managing the data?There are some who think that in order to resolve these deeper issues, we need a completely new regime to regulate government access to personal data. That may be the case. But for now, let us fix the MLA system we have.

(Insert Impact D depending on Scenario)

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Block stuff

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AT: MLATsReform in the MLAT system wont change government motivesWoods, ’15 (Andrew K. Woods is an assistant professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law.  He holds a JD from Harvard Law School and a PhD in Politics from the University of Cambridge. “You should Care About Mutual Legal Assistance More Than You Do” Just Security, 1-28-15, http://justsecurity.org/19449/care-mutual-legal-assistance/ 7-9-15)

About a year ago, I wrote here that the mutual legal assistance (MLA) regime – the legal system that regulates government-to-government requests for evidence in criminal investigations, including personal data – was badly in need of reform. Today, the Global Network Initiative is releasing my report on the subject. The report outlines some of the key reforms that can and ought to be implemented by states in the next year to improve the MLA process. (The report is being launched at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in DC at 1pm EST today and will be live streamed here.) Many of us live much of our lives “online” – meaning that we store our personal data on internet-connected servers, which are very often located in far away locations. As a result of our peripatetic lives, our data is flung across a number of different jurisdictions. When governments seek access to this data – perhaps in connection with a criminal investigation – they increasingly find that it is beyond their jurisdictional reach. (This is the problem raised by the much–discussed Microsoft Ireland case.) If you care about privacy, you might think this is all good because it means that the government has a harder time getting access to the digital goods. But this view badly misunderstands

the tradeoffs associated with the MLA regime. Embracing the fact that MLA tends to prevent

governments from gaining lawful access to personal data is both shortsighted and dangerous. When governments do not get access to data through MLA, they occasionally try other tactics that do not have the same built-in due process constraints that MLA provides (tactics, in other words, that might make those of who care about privacy prefer MLA). When governments feel they cannot get access to data through the MLA process, they might

assert that their laws apply extraterritorially – as the US has done in the Microsoft Ireland case – or they might demand that communications companies store data locally on servers (the easier to raid). Even worse: they might turn to surveillance. A few months ago, I spoke with a salesman from a company (I will not name) who was selling a tool that allows states to intercept their citizens’ communications. I asked him if he had ever heard of the mutual legal assistance treaties. He grinned and said: “MLAT! I love MLAT! States buy my product because MLAT doesn’t work!” It is no

longer a surprise to learn that governments turn to surveillance to gain unwarranted access to citizen data . Here, however, we are talking about data that might be warranted, but

the government does not have the patience or felt the need to go through the MLA process to prove that their access is in fact justified. For example, an Italian judge may issue a warrant for data only to discover that the data controller – perhaps a foreign company or a domestic company with data stored abroad – will not submit to its jurisdiction. Local law enforcement agencies can then request MLA from the country with the authority to compel the data and wait 9 or 10 months for the response. Or they can buy off-the-rack software and get the data now. If any of these alternatives bothers you, you should be urging your government to improve its handling of MLA requests, both outgoing and incoming. That is the thrust of the report being released today. The report highlights a number of important reforms that ought to be implemented by governments in the next year. These include: creating an electronic system for making and processing MLA requests (which are sometimes still done in paper); better training for government officials as to how to file and process MLA requests; and more staffing at justice departments around

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the world for the oncoming wave of MLA requests that is likely to materialize in the next few years. These reforms are low-hanging fruit. The report says little about the much larger and more intractable problems that arise from an Internet that spans multiple jurisdictions. For example, the report is silent on how to determine the scope of a state’s jurisdiction. Needless to say, this is the subject of much debate. (Again, see the Microsoft Ireland case for evidence of this controversy.) Nor does the report attempt to resolve the deeper “conflict of laws” questions that arise when two states do not agree about the legality of the conduct in question. For example, if France asks the United States for data in connection to speech that constitutes a crime in France but not in the U.S., what should the U.S. government do? And what if the suspect is French, the harm is felt in France, and there is no tie to the U.S. but for the location of the data or the location of the company managing the data?There are some who think that in order to resolve these deeper issues, we need a completely new regime to regulate government access to personal data. That may be the case. But for now, let us fix the MLA system we have.

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AT: Organized Crime—Inevitable Organized crime funding inevitable.

GIFT No Date – UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, HUMAN TRAFFICKING – QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, www.unglobalcompact.org/.../HUMAN_TRAFFICKING_-_BACKGROUND_BRIEFING_NOTE_-_final.pdf

However, a conservative estimate of the crime puts the number of victims at any one time at 2.5 million. We also know that it affects every region of the world, ranks as the third largest source of income for organized crime (exceeded only by arms and drugs trafficking), and is the fastest growing form of international crime. We also know that it generates tens of billions of dollars in profits each year.

Organized crime resilient.

Adamoli et al, Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime Research Assistant, 1998, (Sabrina, “Organized Crime Around the World”, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, Publication Series No. 31, Pg. 17) www.heuni.fi/uploads/mmadzpnix.pdf

Some of the changes in organised crime have been brought about by the altered environment23 in which criminal organisations operate. The growing globalisation of financial markets and communications, together with the increased effectiveness of law enforcement control activities, are provoking a series of changes in the structure of organised crime groups and in their relations with

other criminal groups.24 Evident today, therefore, is the growth of transnational criminal organisa- tions able to

adapt to changes in this global environment rather than to national changes. Analysis of the transnational operations of criminal groups in association with multinational organisations is therefore of paramount importance. Since criminal activities are transnational, the criminal groups engaged in them must be able to deal with different markets, even if this means developing a structured organisation, like a corporation, with different tasks and sections for every phase from production to marketing.25 Large, monolithic and rigidly hierarchical structures have proved rela- tively easy targets for law enforcement operations.

The results of these operations suggest that criminal enterprises are now replacing a centralised structure, often without multinational characteristics, with more flexible and decentralised ones. The

current trend seems to be towards the creation of small organisations based on mutual understandings and agreements, and with relatively few operating procedures, adjusting them to new market features so that they can maximise the profits deriving from new business opportunities and minimise their vulnerability to law enforcement (arrest of their members and the seizure of their assets).26 This re-organisation of criminal enterprises in terms of structure seems to be happening along the lines of

more flexibility and more co-operation with other criminal groups. A flexible structure allows for the prompt re-organisation of illicit activ- ities according to demand and to the number of competitors. Occasional businesses or specific targets increasingly require small sub-units27 of crimi- nal specialists, who work with external individuals to provide services and expertise in fields unknown or not directly accessible to the criminal organi- sation, thus enabling their rapid adjustment to new market opportunities. An outstanding example is provided by the Nigerian networks in the drugs market. Small groups of executives, or even individuals, carry out operational tasks or missions co-ordinated and instructed by a strategic centre in the country of origin. Further examples are provided by the fraudulent activities of Belgian or Dutch white-collar criminals and by the car thefts carried out by Polish and Yugoslav organisations, networks which have acquired specific expertise in the division of labour.

Organized crime resilient.

Ayling 9 - Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Regulatory Institutions, Julie, “Criminal organizations and resilience”, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice

37 (2009) 182e196

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Criminal organizations inhabit dynamic environments where the pressures of competition and state opposition

constantly challenge their very existence. To survive and prosper, they must be sufficiently resilient to adapt to changing conditions arising from new competition, alterations in laws, policies and law enforcement practices, expansion or contraction of illegal markets and the availability of new technologies. Change may also result from internal conflicts: the organization may splinter, merge with other groups or reorganize (Weisel, 2002a). While the study of criminal organizations has not entirely overlooked resilience (see, for example, Williams, 2001; Kenney, 2006, 2007; Jackson, 2006; Bouchard, 2007), little attention has been paid to how resilience in criminal organizations develops. What is it about criminal organizations that have survived and flourished amid constant threat and frequent confrontation that has given them the resilience to do so?

Shift

Adamoli et al, Joint Research Centre on Transnational Crime Research Assistant, 1998, (Sabrina, “Organized Crime Around the World”, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, Publication Series No. 31, Pg. 17) www.heuni.fi/uploads/mmadzpnix.pdf

Turning to the trafficking of migrants and their exploitation (especially of migrant women and

children) in the prostitution markets of host countries, the same pattern of vertical interdependence among offences emerges. In fact, in order to perpetrate these crimes, a criminal organisation involved in alien smuggling activities (also with the further purpose of sexually exploit- ing migrants or of placing them on black labour markets) must usually plan the commission of further offences, such as deception, illegal immigration, corruption of public officials and theft and counterfeiting of documents for use in their trafficking operations. Once it is realised that the activities of organised criminal groups are increasingly interdependent, it becomes easier to understand the way in which transnational organised crime shifts from one activity to another. The more a criminal organisation develops horizontal interdependencies, the more it is characterised by

opportunism. The horizontal interdependencies, distinctive of opportunistic criminal organisations, display a pattern of diversification rather than one of specialisation. The concept of horizontal interdependencies among activities refers, in fact, to the connections estab- lished among different activities by the same criminal organisation. A crimi- nal enterprise usually relies on the particular expertise, skills and means acquired in a specific illicit sector to expand its criminal activities,

changing into new criminal circuits. In practice, a criminal group with already-trained personnel, already-acquired means, already-tested trafficking routes, al- ready-developed corruption networks, and already-existing contacts in dif- ferent countries of the

world, will move into new illicit markets (adding new activities to the ones in which it already specialises). Examples

of these horizontal interdependencies are readily available. One thinks, for example, of the connections established between drug trafficking and alien smuggling operations by the Albanian groups which transport both nationals and drugs across the Adriatic Sea. The same applies to the organised crime groups of Asiatic origin which move illegal immigrants across the Canada-US border, utilising the routes, means and methods already devel- oped for the smuggling of cigarettes. Generally speaking, when activities of this kind involve diverse forms of trafficking (in drugs, arms, humans, toxic waste, stolen vehicles), it is not difficult for criminals to shift from one form to another, exploiting the knowledge that they have already acquired.

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AT: Organized Crime—No Violence

Organized crime doesn’t cause violence

Igor V. Dubinsky, 2007, B.A.: Integrated Science, Advanced Physics, and Molecular/Genetic Biology, 2004, Northwestern University; J.D. Candidate, May 2007: DePaul University College of Law Winter, 2007, (DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal, 5 DePaul Bus. & Comm. L.J. 379, COMMENT: How Bad Boys Turn Good: The Role of Law in Transforming Criminal Organizations Into Legitimate Entities by Making Rehabilitation An Economic Necessity, p. Lexis)

Yet even an underground business must still operate as close as possible to the guidelines of the law - the further it deviates, the

higher its costs. Destruction and gang wars may look like fun in movies, but they are generally unprofitable and cause increased prosecutions. n33 In both legal and illegal markets, "the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life." n34 Instead of attempting competition in the same area, criminal organizations split up territories establishing cartels and geographic monopolies. n35 For example, it may be easier to kill a rival-drug selling mafia than to engage in product competition (manufacturing higher quality and cheaper drugs), but if this will lead to government prosecutions, rival mafia wars, or increased police enforcement,

it may be cheaper to instead cartelize the industry or divide up the territory between the various suppliers. n36 The more murders the mafia commits, the more police and judges it has to bribe, and the more witnesses it has to kill. For example, when a Chicago drug ring leader was asked by one of his subordinates why he could not just shoot and kill competitors, he explained: "you've got to belong to a serious organization - you can't just tear [things] up. It's

bad for business." n37 Thus a mafia behaves just like any other profit maximizing organization - seeking to minimize its costs and maximize its profits. However, unlike a legal organization, the mafia will use illegal means if the expected profits from those means are more than the expected profits from their legal counterparts. n38 As one Mafioso eloquently said in [*386] Mario Puzo's Godfather, "I don't like violence ... I'm a businessman; blood is a big expense." n39

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AT: Biodiversity/EcosystemsNo impact to biodiversity Sagoff 97 Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science

writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth . Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the elimination of all but a tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning.

n345 "The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct , provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346 [*906] The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or

loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349 Other biologists believe, however,

that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and

processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if every threatened organism becomes extinct . n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352 [*907] To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is

endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they? Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes . The cast of species in nearly every

environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in

spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen. One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress . Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able

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to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically , not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals,

insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed , "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [*910] He added: "For net

primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters only up to a point ; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make little difference ." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To

be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of

louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious,

aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural,

and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of

use. What is good for [*912] the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless .

Biodiversity is resilient and inevitable Sagoff 8 Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy @ School of Public Policy @ U. Maryland, Environmental Values, “On the Economic Value of

Ecosystem Services”, 17:2, 239-257, EBSCO

What about the economic value of biodiversity? Biodiversity represents nature's greatest largess or excess since species appear nearly as numer ous as the stars the Drifters admired, except that "scientists have a better understanding of how many stars there are in the galaxy than how many species there arc on Earth."70 Worldwide the variety

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of biodiversity is effectively infinite ; the myriad species of plants and animals, not to mention microbes that arc probably more important, apparently exceed our ability to count or identify them . The "next" or "incremental" thousand species taken at random would not fetch a market price because another thousand are immediately available , and another thousand after that. No one has suggested an economic application, moreover, for any of the thousand species listed as threatened in the United States.77 To defend these species - or the next thousand or the thousand after that - on economic grounds is to trade convincing spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical arguments for bogus, pretextual, and disingenuous economic ones.78 As David Ehrenfeld has written,

We do not know how many [plant] species are needed lo keep the planet green and healthy, but it seems very unlikely to be anywhere near the more than quarter of a million we have now. Even a

mighty dominant like the American chestnut, extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bring¬ing the eastern deciduous forest down with it. And if we turn to the

invertebrates, the source of nearly all biological diversity, what biologist is willing t o find a value - conventional or ecological - for all 600,000-plus species of beetles?7*

The disappearance in the wild even of agriculturally useful species appears to have no effect on production. The last wild aurochs, the progenitor of dairy and beef cattle, went extinct in Poland in 1742, yet no one believes the beef industry is threatened. The genetic material of crop species is contained in tens of thousands of landraces and cultivars in use - rice is an example - and doe s not depend on the persistence of wild ancestral types. Genetic engineering can introduce DNA from virtually any species into virtually an y other - which allows for the unlimited creation of biodiversity .

A neighbor of mine has collected about 4,000 different species of insects on his two-acre property in Silver Spring, Maryland. These include 500 kinds of Lepidoptera (mostly moths) - half the number another entomologist found at his residence.80 When you factor in plants and animals, the amount of "backyard biodiversity" in suburbs is astounding and far

greater than you can imagine.8' Biodiversity has no value "at the margin" because nature provides far more of it than anyone could possibly administer . If one kind of moth flies off, you can easily attract hundreds of others.

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AT: Disease No extinction

Gladwell, ‘95

Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses

are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once : as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not , well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once . It is one of the ironies of the analysis of

alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms .

No risk of pandemics – new advancesEconomist, 10

(11 22, http://www.economist.com/node/17493456)

Fortunately, globalisation will also speed the flow of health data. In 2011 the growing field of digital epidemiology will attract more students, health officials and resources than ever before. People in viral hotspots around the world will report suspicious human and animal deaths (often a warning sign of a coming plague) by mobile phones. These data will be posted to the web, instantly enriching the data that came from traditional surveillance systems and electronic medical records. Organisations like Google.org will scour search patterns around the world, expanding their search-based predictions of influenza to other infectious diseases. Still more creative early-detection systems will begin to pull together

illness information present in social-networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, allowing us to see changing disease patterns before they make the morning news. Novel laboratory approaches to the discovery of new viruses will emerge . The long-awaited era of single-molecule DNA sequencing will begin in earnest with new machines from companies like Pacific Biosciences, and with a bit of luck this will improve the speed at which we can recognise unknown bugs. At the cutting edge, new studies of virus evolution and chips housing tiny cell cultures will improve our capacity to sort through the viral chatter and determine if a newly identified outbreak has the potential to spread globally or is likely to fade away. The discovery of new viruses will make the move from universities to laboratories around the world, helping to facilitate international scientific collaboration and decrease fears of biopiracy. Towards a global immune system In 2011 you may be among those who will watch “Contagion”, a forthcoming movie about a frightening fictional pandemic. But whether you are a head of state wary of the political and economic costs of a disease catastrophe, a CEO concerned by supply-chain and staff disruption associated with the next pandemic or a citizen worried about your family, in 2011 you will have access to better, more accurate and rapidly available data on actual

outbreaks. In the increasingly popular Silicon Valley model, organisations like ours will mash up multiple data sources —combining lab results in far-flung viral listening-posts with international news feeds, text messages, social-networking and search patterns to create a new form of epidemic intelligence. The past ten

years have seen noteworthy progress in the development of truly global systems. In the world of outbreaks, 2011 will mark the beginning of the development of a worldwide immune system that will detect and respond to biological threats before they go global . Although this will take years to build fully, if successful it could make pandemic anniversaries a thing of the past.

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AT: US-China War No China war---leaders are pragmatic

Goldstein 11 —professor emeritus of IR, American U. PhD in pol sci from MIT. Former visiting professor emeritus at Yale (Sept 2011, Joshua, Think Again: War, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war)

What about China, the most ballyhooed rising military threat of the current era? Beijing is indeed modernizing its armed forces, racking up double-digit

rates of growth in military spending, now about $100 billion a year. That is second only to the United States, but it is a distant second: The Pentagon spends nearly $700 billion. Not only is China a very long way from being able to go toe-to-toe with the U nited S tates ; it's not clear why it would want to . A military conflict (particularly with its biggest customer and debtor) would impede China's global trading posture and endanger its prosperity . Since Chairman Mao's death , China has been hands down the most peaceful great power of its time . For all the recent concern about a newly assertive Chinese navy in disputed international waters , China's military hasn't fired a single shot in battle in 25 years.

"A More Democratic World Will Be a More Peaceful One."

Not necessarily. The well-worn observation that real democracies almost never fight each other is historically correct, but it's also true that democracies have always been perfectly willing to fight non-democracies. In fact, democracy can heighten conflict by amplifying ethnic and nationalist forces, pushing leaders to appease belligerent sentiment in order to stay in power. Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant both believed that selfish autocrats caused wars, whereas the common people, who bear the costs, would be loath to fight. But try telling that

to the leaders of authoritarian China , who are struggling to hold in check , not inflame, a popular undercurrent of nationalism against Japanese and American historical enemies. Public opinion in tentatively democratic Egypt is far more hostile toward Israel than the authoritarian government of Hosni Mubarak ever was (though being hostile and actually going to war are quite different things).

Economic interdependence checks war

Doctoroff 10—MBA at the University of Chicago, North Asia Area Director of JWT advertising firm (Tom, 28 November 2010, “Standing Up to China, the Obama Way”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-doctoroff/standing-up-to-china-the_b_788704.html)

Third, and fortunately, China knows its ascent will not continue without Western complicity . No matter how successful the central

government is in rebalancing the economy toward domestic consumption, exports to Western markets, which have fueled more than 60% of economic expansion since 1990, will determine growth rates for decades to come. Even the military acknowledges armed conflict with the U nited States would strike a fatal blow to China's "peaceful rise ."

Importantly, China has always productively engaged with other societies -- from Indian Buddhism to American capital markets,

absorbing new influences and applying them in Chinese contexts. After the Great Leap Backwards -- thirty years

of economic and social disaster triggered by post-Liberation isolation -- it knows walls, at least outside cyberspace, are counterproductive. As one street smart sixty-year-old confided, "We're afraid of not having any friends." In China, there is no desire , even amongst reactionary military factions, to become divorced from global forces of progress .

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AT: Terrorism—Adaptation/ResilienceTerrorists adapt---cutting funding makes them strongerSantos 11 – Major David N Santos, Active Duty Army Intelligence Officer Currently Attending the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, “What Constitutes Terrorist Network Resiliency?”, Small Wars Journal, 5-31, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-constitutes-terrorist-network-resiliency

As important as ideology and social networking are, their benefits will only carry a terrorist organization to a certain extent. As with virtually any other organization or activity around the world, money, is the lifeblood of any organization or movement. Without a reliable source of funding a terrorist organization loses its ability to be proactive in conducting operations as well as procure needed support services and material items. Since acquiring and maintaining sources of financing is vital to the existence of a terrorist organization, security for those sources of funding along with the methods of transferring and storing funds is equally vital. As a result, terrorist organizations have proved to be exceptionally agile in identifying and implementing numerous methods of funding and transferring money in order to prevent effective countermeasures by state governments (Williams, 2005).

The process of globalization has created unprecedented levels of interconnectivity among not only state governments but also among domestic and international financial institutions. As such, vast sums of money can be transferred from one part of the world to another nearly instantaneously . The sheer pace and vastness of the globalization process with developments in information and telecommunications technology has created a nearly impossible task to monitor effectively daily financial transactions to ensure there is no link to terrorist activity. Previous attempts to counter terrorist financing, such as in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, has been to freeze known or suspected terrorist financial assets. Yet this countermeasure has only yielded limited success . As Williams (2005) notes, current attempts to identify and attack terrorist financing has only served to increase the “ capacity of terrorist organizations to adapt quickly to new regulations by adopting novel methods of circumventing rules and regulations ” (pp. 6).

If Williams (2005) is correct in his analysis that current efforts to target terrorist funding are only resulting in making smarter and more efficient fiscally minded terrorist organizations than what is enabling this trend? One of the key issues is current international law is lacking in specificity and applicability to the nature of the threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. One of the main deficiencies with international law is with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which had been created in 1989 by the G-7 states to counter money laundering activities conducted by international criminal and drug trafficking organizations (Williams, 2005). The FATF identified 40 recommendations to be implemented to counter money laundering activities. However, no formal binding convention or treaty was created therefore consistent implementation of the FATF recommendations did not occur thus leaving loop holes in international law for use by terrorist organizations to circumvent the FATF. Efforts like the FATF can only be successful if they receive the full support of the international community. Limited or no support provides opportunities for terrorist organizations to continue their financing operations relatively unmolested. The FATF was a lackluster effort to combat terrorist financing due to inefficiency in the manner in which it operated resulting in money laundering not being truly deterred but rather shifted to other areas around the globe where these activities could be conducted more freely (Williams, 2005). The FATF is only one example of inconsistencies in international economic law (as well as with state domestic law) which have inhibited

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effective terrorist financing countermeasures. The ineffectiveness of the FATF and other counter drug and organized crime measures which have been used to target terrorist financing has only served to actually create more experienced and smarter terrorist financing practices . Instead of preventing terrorist financing, efforts such as the FATF have only facilitated it to expand.

They’ll move to other areasVaknin 5 – Sam Vaknin, Ph.D., Editor in Chief of Global Politician and Investment Politics, “Money Laundering in A Changed World”, May, http://samvak.tripod.com/pp96.html

Quo Vadis, Money Laundering? Crime is resilient and fast adapting to new realities. Organized crime is in the process

of establishing an alternative banking system , only tangentially connected to the West's, in the fringes, and by proxy. This is

done by purchasing defunct banks or banking licences in territories with lax regulation , cash economies, corrupt politicians, no tax collection, but reasonable infrastructure. The countries of Eastern Europe - Yugoslavia

(Montenegro and Serbia), Macedonia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Albania, to mention a few - are natural targets . In some cases, organized crime is so all-pervasive and local politicians so corrupt that the distinction between criminal and politician is spurious. Gradually, money laundering rings move their operations to these new, accommodating territories. The laundered funds are used to purchase assets in intentionally botched privatizations, real estate, existing businesses, and to finance trading operations. The wasteland that is Eastern Europe

craves private capital and no questions are asked by investor and recipient alike. The next frontier is cyberspace. Internet banking , Internet gambling, day trading , foreign exchange cyber transactions , e-cash , e-commerce , fictitious invoicing of the launderer's genuine credit cards - hold the promise of the future . Impossible to track and monitor, ex-territorial, totally digital, amenable to identity theft and fake identities - this is the ideal vehicle for money launderers. This nascent platform is way too small to accommodate the enormous amounts of cash laundered daily - but in ten years time, it may. The problem is likely to be exacerbated by the introduction of smart cards, electronic purses, and payment-enabled mobile phones.

Shifts to hawala---makes detection impossibleGouvin 3 – Eric J. Gouvin, Professor of Law at the Western New England College School of Law, “Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, and the War on Terrorism”, Baylor Law Review, Fall, 55 Baylor L. Rev. 955, Lexis

C. Terrorists Move Money Through Hard-to-Regulate Non-Bank Channels Even if the reporting requirements of the Patriot Act

work perfectly, the new law still will not be effective to intercept terrorist financing because terrorists do not have to use banks to move money . The lynchpin of our existing money laundering scheme is the conventional banking system. We count on bankers to file CTRs and SARs because bankers are subject to a rigorous regulatory scheme and they know they will get

into trouble if they do not comply with the law. Terrorists, however, do not necessarily rely on the banking system to move money because they have access to other reliable ways to transfer funds around the world. The Islamic world is tied together financially by a traditional banking system known as the hawala . n104 These ancient networks

of settling [*978] payments have deep roots in Islamic culture. They are essentially based on trust, and involve no physical transfer of funds . For example, a hawala broker in one country instructed by his client arranges for a broker in another country to make a

payment to the intended beneficiary. n105 Such informal systems are not designed to deal with official transactions; instead, they provide complete confidentiality and no paper trail . Given the pervasiveness of the hawala system and its informality, law enforcement officials find it difficult to use the hawala network to fight crime. In India, Pakistan, and the Middle East where these systems are common, they create significant money laundering problems. One big problem they present is the difficulty of

distinguishing between legitimate transactions and those involving money laundering. n106 In the aftermath of September 11, the U nited

States and other nations froze a Dubai based hawala called "Al Barakaat." n107 This action made headlines and significant sums

were impounded, but one wonders what effect it had on terrorist operations. n108 These networks are highly adaptive entities and if currency transfers are targeted by law enforcement, they may very well change tactics . If need be, the funds to be transferred are paid in jewelry to the brokers, who later rationalize their own

inter-banking levels and fund flows amongst themselves. n109 The Patriot Act ostensibly applies to hawala banking, n110 but

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enforcement will be difficult. FinCEN has identified a strategy for dealing with hawalas: [*979] Our strategy is (1) to force terrorist financiers to reduce reliance on hawala and similar systems and to channel their money into more transparent, formal financial transactions; (2) to regulate hawaladars so that legitimate hawaladars comply with financial reporting structures; and (3) to target the illegal use of hawala for intensive

investigation. n111 Although this approach is laudable, it sounds like a true clash of cultures. Given the long history of hawala banking, its informality , its secrecy, and its deep roots in Islam, it seems unlikely that hawala bankers will be enthusiastic in their compliance with the new law . More importantly, the law might never be enforced against the hawala

because the identities of the hawala bankers are difficult to establish. Without knowing who is participating in the hawala, the regulatory scheme will be ineffective. n112

Or, charitiesSantos 11 – Major David N Santos, Active Duty Army Intelligence Officer Currently Attending the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, “What Constitutes Terrorist Network Resiliency?”, Small Wars Journal, 5-31, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-constitutes-terrorist-network-resiliency

Perhaps one of the most widely used method s of rising , moving and storing funds by terrorist organizations is through the use of charities . The concept of charity is an integral part of the Islamic faith and the responsibility of every Muslim to perform. According to Islamic law each Muslim is expected to donate a percentage of their own personal wealth (a process known as zakat) as well as provide assistance to charitable efforts through personal service of some kind (Comras, 2005). These donations are quite often collected by local religious centers or mosques and later distributed to other charitable organizations to support various social programs. However, terrorist organizations like al Qaeda, Hizbollah and Jemaah Islamiyah have gained access to these donations through their support of the religious centers and mosques where these donations are made. To complicate matters these donations , viewed as individual religious obligations, have little to no oversight by state governments, particularly within the Middle East (Comras, 2005). Therefore these donation sites provide in many ways a secure and continuous form of access to funds for terrorist organizations . Unfortunately, many of the individuals providing these donations do not know their funds will ultimately end up supporting terrorist violence.

Terror funding’s resilient and adaptableSantos 11 – Major David N Santos, Active Duty Army Intelligence Officer Currently Attending the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, “What Constitutes Terrorist Network Resiliency?”, Small Wars Journal, 5-31, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-constitutes-terrorist-network-resiliency

Since the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001 there have been numerous discussions on the issue of terrorism and terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda, within the media and the intelligence community. At times these discussions have created an image of the terrorist phenomenon as one of a monolithic and unstoppable menace continuing to spread around the world unabated. Lost in these discussions is a

basic understanding of what any organization needs to continue to exist. What are its basic needs? What are its sources of strength and resiliency ? Most organizations, whether terrorist or not, rely on some basic essential elements that are used to help define,

guide and maintain the organization. These elements allow an organization to develop strength in its structure as well as its

cause in order to maintain a resilient mindset . These elements of strength and resiliency enable the organization to experience periods of adversity , look critically at the outcomes of those experiences and take the

lessons learned to improve the organization’s performance. Every successful organization, to include terrorist organizations, has to identify what their most essential elements for survival are. These basic elements will vary to some degree based on an organization’s unique qualities. However, there are some elements that are almost universal to all organizations and those identified as terrorist organizations in

particular. Some of the more universal elements that can contribute to a terrorist network’s strength, longevity and resiliency

involve the organization’s ideology, social network apparatus and capability as well as the ability to maintain a source of funding for its operations. These are the key basic elements needed by any terrorist network to maintain and further a viable long lasting organization.

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If a terrorist organization were to fail to maintain a high level of proficiency in each of these elements, either individually or collectively, the organization could experience a degraded ability to achieve its desired objectives.

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EU relations

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Generic 1nc No impact to US/European relations Haas 11—president of the CFR Lecturer in public policy, Harvard. DPhill, Oxford (17 June 2011, Richard, Why Europe No Longer Matters, http://www.cfr.org/europerussia/why-europe-no-longer-matters/p25308)

Gates sounded a pessimistic note, warning of "the real possibility for a dim if not dismal future for the transatlantic alliance." Yet, the outgoing Pentagon chief may not have been

pessimistic enough. The U.S.-European partnership that proved so central to managing and winning the Cold War will inevitably play a far

diminished role in the years to come . To some extent, we're already there: If NATO didn't exist today, would anyone feel compelled to create it? The

honest, if awkward, answer is no. In the coming decades, Europe's influence on affairs beyond its borders will be sharply limited, and it is in other regions, not Europe, that the 21st century will be most clearly forged and defined. Certainly, one reason for NATO's increasing marginalization stems from

the behavior of its European members. The problem is not the number of European troops (there are 2 million) nor what Europeans collectively spend on defense ($300 billion a year),

but rather how those troops are organized and how that money is spent. With NATO, the whole is far less than the sum of its parts . Critical decisions are still made nationally ; much of the talk about a common defense policy remains just that -- talk . There is little specialization or coordination. Missing as well are many of the logistical and intelligence assets needed to project military force on distant battlefields. The alliance's effort in Libya -- the poorly conceived intervention, the widespread refusal or inability to participate in actual strike missions, the obvious difficulties in sustaining intense operations -- is a daily reminder of what the world's most powerful

military organization cannot accomplish. With the Cold War and the Soviet threat a distant memory, there is little political willingness, on a country-by-country basis, to provide adequate public funds to the military . (Britain and France, which each spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense, are two of the exceptions here.) Even where a willingness to intervene with military force exists, such as in Afghanistan, where upward of 35,000 European troops are deployed, there are severe constraints. Some governments, such as Germany, have historically limited their participation in combat

operations, while the cultural acceptance of casualties is fading in many European nations. But it would be wrong, not to mention fruitless, to blame the Europeans and their choices alone. There are larger historical forces contributing to the continent's increasing irrelevance to world affairs. Ironically, Europe's own notable successes are an important reason that transatlantic ties will matter less in the future. The current euro zone financial crisis should not obscure the historic accomplishment that was the building of an integrated Europe over the past half-century. The continent is largely whole and free and stable. Europe, the principal arena of much 20th-century geopolitical competition, will be spared such a role in the new century -- and this is a good thing. The contrast with Asia could hardly be more dramatic. Asia is increasingly the center of gravity of the world economy; the historic question is whether this dynamism can be managed peacefully. The major powers of Europe -- Germany, France and Great Britain -- have reconciled, and the regional arrangements there are broad and deep. In Asia, however, China, Japan, India, Vietnam, the two Koreas, Indonesia and others eye one another warily. Regional pacts and arrangements, especially in the political and security realms, are thin. Political and economic competition is unavoidable; military conflict cannot be ruled out. Europeans will play a modest role, at best, in influencing these developments. If Asia, with its dynamism and power struggles, in some ways resembles the Europe of 100 years ago, the Middle East is more reminiscent of the Europe of several centuries before: a patchwork of top-heavy monarchies, internal turbulence, unresolved conflicts, and nationalities that cross and contest

boundaries. Europe's ability to influence the course of this region, too, will be sharply limited. Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still

consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence. No doubt, Europe's security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less immediate to the population than its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their

continent. Moreover, intimate ties across the Atlantic were forged at a time when American political and economic power was largely

in the hands of Northeastern elites, many of whom traced their ancestry to Europe and who were most interested in developments there. Today's United States -- featuring the rise of the South and the West, along with an increasing percentage of Americans who trace their roots to Africa, Latin America or Asia -- could hardly be more different. American and European preferences will increasingly diverge as a result. Finally, the very nature of international relations has also undergone a transformation. Alliances, whether NATO during the Cold War or the U.S.-South Korean partnership now, do best in settings that are highly inflexible and predictable, where foes and friends are easily identified, potential battlefields are obvious, and contingencies can be anticipated. Almost none of this is true in our current historical moment. Threats are many and diffuse. Relationships seem situational, increasingly dependent on evolving and unpredictable circumstances. Countries can be friends, foes or both, depending on the day of the week -- just look at the United States and Pakistan. Alliances tend to require shared assessments and explicit obligations; they are much more difficult to operate when worldviews diverge and commitments are discretionary. But as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya all demonstrate, this is precisely the world we inhabit. For the United States, the

conclusions are simple. First, no amount of harping on what European governments are failing to do will push them toward what some in Washington want them to do. They have changed. We have changed. The world has changed. Second, NATO as a whole will count for much less. Instead, the United States will need to maintain or build bilateral relations with those few countries in Europe willing and able to act in the world,

including with military force. Third, other allies are likely to become more relevant partners in the regions that present the greatest potential challenges. In Asia, this might mean Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, especially if U.S.-China relations

were to deteriorate; in the greater Middle East, it could again be India in addition to Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others.

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Relations will stay low, but cooperation is inevitableWalt 11, IR – Harvard, [The coming erosion of the European Union Posted By Stephen M. Walt Thursday, August 18, 2011 - 11:19 AM Share http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/18/the_coming_erosion_of_the_european_union]

Third, I argued that the glory days of transatlantic security cooperation also lie in the past, and we will see less cooperative and intimate security partnership between Europe and America in the future. Why do I think so? One obvious reason is the lack of common external enemy . Historically, that is the only reason why the United States was willing to commit troops to Europe, and it is therefore no surprise that America's military presence in Europe has declined steadily ever since the Soviet Union broke up. Simply put: there is no threat to Europe that the Europeans cannot cope with on their own, and thus little role for Americans to play. In addition, the various imperial adventures that NATO has engaged in since 1992 haven't worked out that well. It was said in the 1990s that NATO had to "go out of area or out of business," which is one reason it started planning for these operations, but most of the missions NATO has taken on since then have been something of a bust. Intervention in the Balkans eventually ended the fighting there, but it took longer and cost more than anyone expected and it's not even clear that it really worked (i.e., if NATO peacekeepers withdrew from Kosovo tomorrow, fighting might start up again quite soon). NATO was divided over the war in Iraq, and ISAF's disjointed effort in Afghanistan just reminds us why Napoleon always said he liked to fight against coalitions. The war in Libya could produce another disappointing result, depending on how it plays out. Transatlantic security cooperation might have received a new lease on life if all these adventures had gone swimmingly; unfortunately, that did not prove to be the case. But this raises the obvious

question: If the United States isn't needed to protect Europe and there's little positive that the alliance can accomplish anywhere else, then what's it for? Lastly, transatlantic security cooperation will decline because the U nited States will be shifting its strategic focus to Asia . The central goal of US grand strategy is to maintain hegemony in the Western hemisphere and to prevent other great powers from achieving hegemony in their regions. For the foreseeable future, the only potential regional hegemon is China. There will probably be an intense security competition there, and the United States will therefore be deepening its security ties with a variety of Asian partners. Europe has little role to play in this competition, however, and little or no incentive to get involved. Over time, Asia will get more and more attention from the U.S.

foreign policy establishment, and Europe will get less. This trend will be reinforced by demographic and generational changes on both sides of the Atlantic, as the percentage of Americans with strong ancestral connections to Europe declines and as the generation that waged the Cold War

leaves the stage. So in addition to shifting strategic interests, some of the social glue that held Europe and America together is likely to weaken as well . It is important not to overstate this trend -- Europe and America won't become enemies, and I don't think intense security competition

is going to break out within Europe anytime soon. Europe and the United States will continue to trade and invest with each other, and we will

continue to collaborate on a number of security issues ( counter-terror ism, intelligence sharing, counter- prolif eration, etc.). But Europe won't be America's "go-to" partner in the decades ahead, at least not the way it once was. This will

be a rather different world than the one we've been accustomed to for the past 60 years, but that's not necessarily a bad thing. Moreover, because it reflects powerful structural forces, there's probably little we can do to prevent it . Instead, the smart response -- for both Americans and Europeans -- is to acknowledge these tendencies and adapt to them, instead of engaging in a futile effort to hold back the tides of history

Expanding economic and trade ties are the only way to sustain the relationship Brattberg ’13 (By Erik Brattberg. Published 8 November 2013. Erik Brattberg is Analyst at The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and currently Visiting Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC.

If so, this could be the start of a recreated and re-invented transatlantic relationship. The development of a more strategic EU-US relationship could also help allay fears regarding the US ‘abandonment’ of Europe . While US strategic thinking is changing – and fast ( the so-called ‘Asian pivot’ is only the beginning ) – a more strategic transatlantic relationship would still serve a critical function for Washington , and not just on the security side of things. The drawdown of the military mission in Afghanistan means that the US will have less need for Europe in coming years. Focusing more on global economic and trade issues could constitute a new strategic imperative for closer EU-US ties.

US-EU relations kill EU unityMarquand 9 By Robert Marquand | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor from the April 2, 2009 edition

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Strasbourg, France - As Barack Obama leaves London and heads to a key NATO gathering here Friday, he steps onto the European continent as new, fresh – an urban guy, a 21st century American, someone Europeans understand and admire. Yet that may be part of the problem.

President Obama, the new US face and policy, represents an inherent challenge to Europe: It is not just that Obama drips soft power from every pore, is a listener, a

Democrat, "sympathetique," and a hero for immigrant populations in Europe's suburbs

that have yet to achieve political power. More deeply, the popular young American president is stirring basic questions here over how to coordinate and respond to a chief ally that is suddenly sending all the signals Europe asked for . In London, in a last-minute compromise that many called historic, the White House got far more stimulus to relight the global trade economy than many thought possible. However, at NATO's 60th anniversary here in Strasbourg, he may not get more troops for Afghanistan – though the new "Afpak" review indicates such troops are needed even for the civil building that Europeans say will aid in "mission accomplished" there. But the "Obama in Europe" storyline runs deeper than a difficult diplomatic checklist that includes Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the global crisis, say political thinkers here. It

has to do with a Europe that, for 40 years, and in significant strides, has sought to speak with one voice. For almost a decade, Europe and America, tied by history, drifted apart in terms of stated values and policy. But with a n avowedly liberal internationalist at the US helm, Europe has less to complain about . Ahead of his visit,

in inconclusive meetings in Brussels, there was uncertainty and bickering. What's causing stress in the E uropean U nion is not US badgering and unilateralism, but the Obama dynamic of moving toward agreement, consensus, and multilat eralism, say

some economists and political scientists. "President Bush was an extraordinary catalyst for Europe , a bogeyman. Even people with diverging views on economic and foreign policy were united against the US policy," says Karim Bitar, a Paris consultant and scholar at the Institute

for International and Strategic Relations. "But now the US can no longer be accused of all the world's ills. The truth is, Europeans now think more about America than about Europe. There is no European consensus on the most basic questions of our future, what we should be. Under Bush, we could evade them. Not now." Europe's internal conflict over the Russian war in Georgia last summer, and the crisis over interrupted oil and gas supplies to Europe this winter, were indicators of division in what is still an economic union struggling to achieve political solidarity. The question is whether Europe can find its voice when there is basic agreement with Washington. " When the Europeans agree with the US, they often disagree with each other , " as a European diplomat puts it.

Unified Europe solves hotspots, growth and global warSTABILITY, GROWTH AND PROSPECT – A REVIEW OF CHINA-EU RELATIONS IN 2010 Ambassador

SONG Zhe December Mr SONG Zhe is the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China’s

Mission to the European Union. Issue 6, December 2010 2010 eu china observer

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Europe is a major power in the international community. Europe plays an important role in upholding world peace , promoting common development , tackling global challenges , and resolving regional and hotspot issues. Europe is a strong force in building a fair and just international political and economic order . The EU’s integration process is the most viable choice for European countries in order to develop strength through unity. For decades, the European Union has demonstrated admirable determination and resolve in overcoming all difficulties and hardships and in establishing from scratch an otherwise highly integrated union today. We firmly believe that the European integration process will continue to enjoy a promising prospect in the future. Europe is the world’s most important economy . As the world’s largest bloc of developed countries, the EU is a leading player in terms of foreign trade, innovation, brand marketing, and economy of scale. We have full Issue 6, 2010 4 confidence that the euro will emerge from the current crisis and contribute to the stability and diversity of the international monetary regime. Europe enjoy

s strong influence over international public opinion and agenda-setting. Europe is the birthplace of Western civilization and modern philosophy and a supporter and practitioner of multilateralism,

global governance, and of peaceful resolutions to international disputes. We believe that thanks to the many active minds present in Europe and thanks to the strength of its media, Europe is in a position to contribute more forcefully to the prosperous development of a more diverse world .

(Insert Impact D depending on Scenario)

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2NC – Resilient EU/US relations resilientJoyner 11—editor of the Atlantic Council. PhD in pol sci (James, Death of Transatlantic Relationship Wildly Exaggerated, 14 June 2011, www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/death-transatlantic-relationship-wildly-exaggerated)The blistering farewell speech to NATO by U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates warning of a "dim, if not dismal" future for the Alliance drew the Western public's attention to a longstanding debate about the state of the transatlantic relationship. With prominent commenters voicing concern about much more than just a two-tiered defensive alliance, questioning whether the U.S.-Europe relationship itself is past its prime, doubts that the

Western alliance that has dominated the post-Cold War world are reaching a new high. But those fears are overblown, and may be mistak ing short-term bumps in the relationship for proof of a long-term decline that isn't there. Gates' frustration with the fact that only five of the 28

NATO allies are living up to their commitment to devote 2 percent of GDP to defense, which has hindered their ability to take on even the likes of Muammar Qaddafi's puny force without American assistance is certainly

legitimate and worrying. Though the U.S.-Europe partnership may not be living up to its potential, it is not worthless, and that relationship continues to be one of the strongest and most important in the world. Gates is an Atlanticist whose speech was, as he put it, "in the spirit of solidarity and friendship,

with the understanding that true friends occasionally must speak bluntly with one another for the sake of those greater interests and values that bind us together." He wants the Europeans, Germany in particular, to

understand what a tragedy it would be if NATO were to go away. Most Europeans don't see their security as being in jeopardy and political leaders are hard pressed to divert scarce resources away from social spending -- especially in the current economic climate -- a dynamic that has weakened NATO but , despite fears to the contrary, not the greater Transatlantic partnership. It would obviously have been a great relief to the

U.S. if European governments had shouldered more of the burden in Afghanistan. This disparity, which has only increased as the war has dragged on and the European economies suffered, is driving both Gates' warning and broader fears about the declining relationship. But it was our fight, not theirs; they were there, in most cases against the strong wishes of the people who elected them to office, because we asked. We'd have fought it

exactly the same way in their absence. In that light, every European and Canadian soldier was a bonus. Libya, however, is a different story. The Obama administration clearly had limited interest in entering that fight - Gates himself warned against it -- and our involvement is due in part to coaxing by our French and British allies. The hope was to take the lead in the early days, providing "unique assets" at America's disposal, and then turn the

fight over to the Europeans. But, as Gates' predecessor noted not long after the ill-fated 2003 invasion of Iraq, you go to war with the army you have, not the one you wish you had. The diminished capabilities of European militaries, spent by nearly a decade in Afghanistan, should be of no surprise. NATO entered into Libya with no real plan for an end game beyond hoping the rebels would somehow win or that Qaddafi would somehow fall.

That failure, to be fair, is a collective responsibility, not the fault of European militaries alone. But the concern goes deeper than different defensive priorities. Many Europeans worry that the United States takes the

relationship for granted, and that the Obama administration in particular puts a much higher priority on the Pacific and on the emerging BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economies. New York Times columist Roger Cohen recently wrote that this is as it should be: "In so far as the United States is interested in Europe it is interested in what can be done together in the rest of the world." In Der Spiegel, Roland Nelles and

Gregor Peter Schmitz lamented, "we live in a G-20 world instead of one led by a G-2." It's certainly true that, if it ever existed, the Unipolar Moment that Charles Krauthammer and others saw in the aftermath of the Soviet

collapse is over. But that multipolar dynamic actually makes transatlantic cooperation more, not less, important. A hegemon needs much less help than one of many great powers, even if it remains the biggest. Take the G-20. Seven of the members are NATO Allies: the US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and Turkey. Toss in the EU, and you have 40 percent of the delegation. If they can form a united front at G-20 summits, they are much more powerful than if each stands alone. Add in four NATO Partner countries (Russia, Japan, Australia, and South Korea) and you're up to 60 percent of the delegation -- a comfortable majority for the U.S.-European

partnership and its circle of closest allies. Granted, it's unlikely that we'll achieve consensus among all 12 states on any one issue, let alone most issues. But constantly working together toward shared goals and values

expands a sense of commonality. And, like so many things, projects end. Indeed, that's generally the goal. The transatlantic military alliance that formed to defeat fascism remained intact after victory; indeed, it expanded to

include its former German and Italian adversaries. NATO outlasted the demise of its raison d'être, the Soviet threat, and went on to fight together --along with many of its former adversaries -- in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. Is there seriously any doubt that other challenges will emerge in the future in which the Americans and its European allies might benefit from working together?

Conflicts over surveillance won’t collapse relations – it’s all for show, strategic interests prevail Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” Feb 3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)

Other analysts argue that the purported U.S. surveillance operations remain a point of friction but that tensions have proven manageable and do not pose a sustained threat to the overall transatlantic relationship . Those holding this view contend that much of the outrage expressed by European leaders has been for domestic public consumption. They also note that while senior European officials may not have been familiar with the details of U.S. surveillance activities, many were well aware that their own security services conduct various surveillance operations and often work closely with U.S. intelligence services to help prevent terrorist attacks and other serious crimes in Europe. In addition, especially given the potential threat posed by the Islamic State and returning foreign fighters, officials indicate that cooperation between U.S. and European intelligence and security services has continued uninterrupted despite any loss of trust at the political level. 35

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Relations resilient – any conflict is self-correcting Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” Feb 3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)

Polls show that European perceptions of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama Administration remain relatively

favorable, and considerably more positive compared to the years of the George W. Bush Administration. 3 The overall tone of transatlantic relations has been mostly constructive over the past six years, and many of the broad global challenges faced by the United States and Europe have pushed the two sides toward common or cooperative approaches. In attempting to deal jointly with the daunting list of challenges they

face, however, both sides have also encountered frustrations and reality checks that have reminded each side to be realistic about what it can expect from the other.

Prefer consensus Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” Feb 3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)

As the United States and Europe face a changing geopolitical environment, some observers assert that the global influence of the

Euro-Atlantic partnership is in decline. In addition, the Obama Administration’s announced intention of “re-balancing” U.S.

foreign policy toward Asia has caused some anxiety among Europeans. Overall, however, most analysts maintain that the United

States and Europe are likely to remain one another’s closest partner, and that U.S.-European cooperation is likely to remain the foundation of international action on a wide range of critical issues.

Cooperation is resilient- shared values, economic ties, and issue specific cooperation McCormick ‘6 (The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations James M. McCormick 1 1 Iowa State University ABSTRACT AU: James M. McCormick TI: The War on Terror and Contemporary U.S.-European Relations SO: Politics & Policy VL: 34 NO: 2 PG: 426-450 YR: 2006

Even if the conceptual gap were to narrow only slightly over U.S. foreign policy generally and terrorism particularly, powerful international and domestic constraints remain, which may motivate both the United States and Europe to close the action gap. In other words, certain existing constraints may actually serve as incentives to close the action gap between these two global actors in the near term. Some of these constraints result from the common ties that already exist, but others are unique to the United

States and Europe.First, of course, the United States and Europe are still bound together by a set of underlying common values and beliefs that brought them together during the Cold War after World War II, albeit no longer with the Soviet

Union acting as a lone star guiding policy formulation. Those common values and beliefs are hardly empty notions to the vast majority of Europeans and Americans, particularly not to the new European states that have escaped communist rule since the fall of the Berlin Wall. How those values should be advanced will surely remain as a source of disagreement both within and

between Europe and America, but those values will undoubtedly continue to serve as incentives for all parties to seek some policy accommodations. Second, Europe and America are fundamentally tied by the significant economic links that serve as the "sticky power" (Mead 2004, 46-53; Mead 2005, 29-36) between them. Indeed, economic

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ties remain very strong, despite recent political differences and lingering disputes over access to both participants'

markets (Drozdiak 2005). Third, the often unspoken levels of cooperation on terrorism—for example, in the areas of law enforcement, intelligence matters, or the tracking of financial matters—remain in place, even in the face of more visible political differences over Iraq and the wider war on terrorism. Moreover, the events of 3/11/04 in

Madrid and 7/7/05 in London continue to provide very powerful incentives for this kind of transatlantic cooperation. I n this sense, these different kinds of "ties that bind"—and continue to bind—should not be forgotten as important sources of momentum to seek common ground between America and Europe.

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2NC – Alt Cause – Energy

Renewable energy is the cornerstone to the transatlantic alliance Stori ’14 (January 27, 2014 | by Val Stori, OWAP Project Director Trade Missions Critical in Building an Offshore Wind Industry

Perhaps one of the most cost-effective measures US developers can take to reduce project risk and installation costs is partnership with experienced developers. Reducing risks and construction time can have a significant impact on overall project costs. In Europe, growing professionalism in the industry—mainly market entry by large construction companies and major utilities, has led to faster installation times and improved methods. These major players have developed and improved techniques and equipment specific to offshore wind development, which has led to speedier installations and thus, reduced costs. In fact, leading utility and major offshore wind developer DONG Energy predicts that a cost reduction of 10-20% by 2017 is realistic; companies like these are focused on streamlining, improving efficiencies,

and incentivizing OEMs and suppliers to reduce costs. Through partnerships , a US developer can gain valuable experience and tap the wealth of knowledge that European developers have already amassed . To spur the development of offshore wind in the US and to gain public acceptance through more acceptable power prices, the US must take advantage not only of European know-how, but also of the European supply chain. State renewable energy agencies and local economic development councils who already are heavily invested in offshore wind-related infrastructure and who are looking to position

themselves as leading US offshore wind players, are engaging with key European developers and political leaders through international trade missions . In 2013, two CESA members travelled to Germany and Denmark along with a contingent from economic development councils and port authorities as part of international trade missions. Both contingents returned to the US cognizant of the major challenges that lie ahead in building a domestic industry, yet aware of the tremendous opportunities for growth. After touring some of the world’s largest wind farms, visiting offshore wind-dedicated ports, and speaking with turbine OEMs, the US representatives returned home to champion for offshore wind. In the words of New Bedford Mayor Jon Mitchell, who travelled to Europe with the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center, “it is hard to avoid the adage that seeing is believing.” But what

other than awe at the industry’s huge potential is to be gleaned from these international missions? Beyond the fact finding and knowledge sharing lies an integral component of these trade missions—the opportunity to build relationships and establish joint ventures . Dedicated matchmaking sessions and networking opportunities are critical to kick-

starting efficient development off US shores. The opportunity to partner—whether a US contractor partners to operate in Europe and brings the experience back or a US project partners with an experienced European contractor—enables us to benefit from Europe’s learning curve. We do not have to reinvent the wheel every step of the way. In fact, to do so would likely be cost prohibitive at this point in the game. The US currently does not have the volume or the guaranteed market to develop a robust supply chain or to justify investment in domestic ventures that would support the nascent-at-best industry. Even in Germany, where nearly 400MW of offshore wind were installed in 2013, factories sit idle when demand is low despite investment of an estimated $1.3 billion for specialized ports and factories. Even though economic development and job creation are key goals for the states interested in building an offshore wind industry, until a sufficient pipeline of projects is established along the US Atlantic coast, the first few projects will be supplied by

European manufacturers. European developers and manufacturers are eager to work on this side of the Atlantic. Recently, the Maryland Energy Administration was invited to attend the annual European Wind Energy Association’s conference at the request of European turbine manufacturers who recognize that Maryland may be the first state to deploy a large-scale project in the US. And in late December, Cape Wind contracted with Siemens to supply the project with Siemens’ 3.6MW turbines and an electrical services platform. The platform, in fact, has been contracted out by Siemens to Cianbro Corp.—a Massachusetts-based company, that will construct the offshore substation at its manufacturing facility in Brewer, Maine. While it may be too early for European developers to establish significant

facilities in the US at this stage, they are looking for project partners and prime locations to invest—especially if states set

offshore wind targets. It could be a win-win situation . Local content is lacking and would be a substantial hurdle causing major bottlenecks if US offshore developers chose to go “local only.” Overseas cooperation with local industry will be key in getting the US offshore wind industry up and running, while providing a large opportunity for the established European players to get involved in US developments.

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2NC – NATO Collapse Heightened US-EU cooperation will tradeoff with NATO and other regional alliancesJohn Van Oudenaren 2005, Chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress, Summer [National Interest]

Two elements are important for a new U.S. strategy. First, a renewed attention to liberal multilateralism should make clear the direction that

U.S. policy should not take. The U nited S tates should not pursue with the EU the kinds of charters, compacts, partnerships and other bilateral arrangements currently being promoted in Atlanticist circles. However well intentioned, this kind of U.S.-EU bilateralism moves away from a more plural and open international order . Within

Europe, it cannot help but promote the further centralization of policymaking in and through Brussels that shifts power to the E uropean C ommission and member states such as France and Germany, even as it helps to marginalize the contributions of more

liberal outliers such as the UK, the Scandinavian countries and the new member states to the east. In the wider world, it increases the likelihood that U.S.-EU understandings will be imposed worldwide, thereby marginalizing the influence of third countries that tend to be closer to U.S. positions . The result is a double loss for international pluralism, both within Europe and at the global level. For the United States, such a loss might be worth paying if it meant "pinning the EU down", both with regard to substantive principles (concerning regulation, global governance and so forth) and procedural norms to ensure that these principles would be universalized

in a cooperative rather than competitive manner. This is unlikely to happen, however. Any bilateral U.S.-EU understanding is certain to be ambiguous enough to preserve both the EU's internal autonomy and external freedom of action, even as it diminishes the importance of other mechanisms (such as NATO or the U.S.-Japanese relationship) that are valuable in their own right and that give the United States levers of influence over the EU.

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Uniqueness

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Rels High NowUS-EU united on foreign policy with M.E and Russian

Mason ‘15

(Jeff Mason covers the White House for Reuters. He was the lead correspondent for President Barack Obama's 2012 campaign and has been posted in Washington since 2008, when he covered the historic race between Obama, Hillary Clinton and John McCain, traveling with all three candidates. Jeff has also been posted in Frankfurt, Germany, where he covered the airline industry and Brussels, Belgium, where he covered climate change and the European Union. He has appeared on MSNBC, CNN, BBC, and NPR. Jeff is a graduate of Northwestern University and a former Fulbright scholar, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/06/us-g7-summit-obama-idUSKBN0OM0OJ20150606

When President Barack Obama attends the Group of Seven summit in Germany on Sunday, he will join fellow leaders who are growing accustomed to a new dynamic in the transatlantic relationship: less direction from Washington, more demands on Europe. In responding to Russia's intervention in Ukraine, the crisis in Libya and efforts to advance Middle East peace, European leaders have stepped up their role after a real or perceived sense that the United States was drawing back. The shift has created both annoyance and satisfaction among European officials. Some privately express frustration at what they view as reluctance by the Obama administration to get involved. They contrast a "leading from behind" strategy in the Middle East and Europe with the more proactive U.S. stance in Asia, where Obama is acting diplomatically and militarily to counter growing Chinese influence. France has publicly berated the U.S. administration for not launching air strikes in 2013 against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It said that the decision caused irreparable damage to the Syrian opposition on the ground and emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin on the international scene. "At the heart of what’s going on is that the Americans themselves don’t want to be on the front line in this region" a senior French official said. The phrase "leading from behind" grew out of the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya when Washington let France and Britain do most of the heavy military lifting. DIVISION OF LABOR Other diplomats and U.S. officials say France and Germany's leading role in talks between Moscow and Kiev, which led to a shaky ceasefire deal in eastern Ukraine, was appropriate for a crisis that hits them closer to home. "It's not a question of ceding responsibility, it's the natural division of labor between us," said David O'Sullivan, the European Union's ambassador to the United States. Other areas, however, have been hurt by a lack of U.S. leadership, foreign policy analysts said. Stephen Hadley, Republican President George W. Bush's national security adviser, said it was very attractive to Russia not to have the United States at the table in the Ukraine ceasefire talks. He noted that Europeans were eyeing a new approach to peace between Israelis and Palestinians by potentially backing a U.N. resolution for a Palestinian state. "Overhanging this, of course, is this perception of American disengagement and stepping back from leadership on a lot of problems in the world, which is a perception that our Arab friends and allies have in the Middle East and, you know, I think is very much prevalent in Europe," he said. "STRONG ALIGNMENT" The White House rejects that charge, which is voiced by many Republican critics. It points to U.S.-European unity on Iran's nuclear program, global climate change negotiations, strikes against Islamic State militants, and sanctions against Russia. "If you look at the president’s key foreign policy priorities, every single one of them, just

about, is supported by these key European partners," Obama's deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes said. "I think this is a moment of very strong alignment with Europe." That alignment has not translated into pro-American sentiment in Germany, which is hosting the G7 summit. Germans remain angry at U.S. spying practices, an issue German Chancellor Angela Merkel has raised repeatedly with Obama. In an effort to set a more positive tone, Obama and Merkel will spend some public time together before the summit on Sunday, walking around a small village and sampling local food. The United States has openly talked about the need for Europe to step up militarily and has recently reiterated a long-standing message that its NATO partners must boost their military spending.

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US-EU Relations strong for the future

Hughes ‘14

US, EU and tradehttp://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/238633-us-eu-and-trade(Julia K. Hughs, President of International Development Systems, Inc., which has a proven international reputation as the resource for companies, trade associations and countries when they need the latest information regarding trade statistics and government regulation of textile and apparel products. Additionally, Ms. Hughes serves as Vice President, International Trade and Government Relations for the United States Association of Textiles and Apparel (USA-ITA), where she leads the development of new strategies to liberalize trade in textiles and apparel. Prior to joining IDS, Ms. Hughes was Divisional Vice President of Government Relations for the Associated Merchandising Corporation (AMC), the largest retail merchandising, marketing and consulting organization in the world.)

TPA, TPP, AGOA, and TESA are just a few of the trade policy acronyms we’ve heard on Capitol Hill lately, but this

week, the trade community is focusing on yet another acronym that could have an enormous benefit for both companies and consumers: TTIP, or the Transatlantic Trade & Investment Partnership. Trade negotiators from the United States and European Union are currently meeting in New York City for the ninth round of TTIP negotiations in

hopes of strengthening the important partnership between the United States and Europe, which already supports 13 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. While the U.S.-EU relationship is already quite strong, many obstacles to trade remain in place. This is why our organizations—representing American and

European brands, retailers, and importers in a variety of industries, including the fashion industry—urge the negotiation of

an ambitious, high-standard agreement that recognizes the way companies do business in the 21stcentury. This means that

the agreement should include the elimination of all tariffs as well as the reduction and harmonization of product-related

regulations. For companies, the benefits are clear. The United States and European Union have higher tariffs and more restrictive practices on textile, leather, and fashion products than most consumer goods. By eliminating tariffs and reducing technical barriers, companies would experience greater efficiencies and reduced costs of doing business, allowing them to sell more products globally, expand their operations, and create more high quality jobs, including design, compliance, retail, and marketing jobs in the fashion industry. Such an

agreement would also benefit the consumers those companies serve. Studies show an ambitious agreement could create as

many as 750,000 new jobs in the United States, while the expansion of transatlantic commerce would add approximately

€95 billion to the United States’ economy and approximately €119 billion to Europe’s economy and each year. Families

will reap the benefits, as the average American household could gain approximately $865 annually while European

households could gain approximately $720 annually. An ambitious agreement would also have a positive impact on global

trade. By instituting uniform, high-standard regulations on everything from product labeling and testing, to sustainability

and safety in the global value chain, the United States and Europe could set the global standard. TTIP would serve as a

model for future trade agreements when other nations see the widespread benefits of an ambitious elimination of tariffs

and reduction of trade barriers—as well as the cost savings and efficiencies that result when they need to follow only one

set of regulations for exporting to the United States and Europe. We strongly urge the negotiators to take a fresh look at

the proposals, and take a new, 21st-century approach to trade policy. If they do, TTIP won’t just be another acronym—but

will be a landmark agreement that changes the future of business and trade for the better.

US-EU Communication never been higherEU 2006

(http://eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/infopack_06_en.pdf)

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Enhanced EU–US communication has been essential in developing a closer understanding of respective policy positions and a better coordination of activities. The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration introduced structured political dialogues to allow for EU–US discussion on a great variety of regional and horizontal themes. The New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) which followed in 1995 now governs the relationship. This ambitious agenda of cooperation between the EU and the USA in a large number of areas requires intensive dialogue. The

yearly summits between the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Council and the President of the United States are the apex of an intensive dialogue. The summits are prepared by senior level representatives from the EEAS, the European Commission, the Council Secretariat and the US State Department. Implementation of summit decisions is taken forward via regular working level contacts. Under the EU’s Industrialised Countries Instrument for 2007-2013, over € 20 million are earmarked for cooperation with the United States under three focal areas: dialogues, people to people and cooperation. Following an Annual Work Programme, tenders or calls for proposals for the various instruments (EU Centres of Excellence, people to people actions, dialogues and outreach activities) are published on that same website and are opened to EU and US participants. Such activities should be eligible for support as of 2014 under the new Partnership Instrument proposed by the European Commission under the Multi-Annual Financial framework for the period 2014- 2020. In recent years, the development of more informal and operational ad hoc contacts have allowed for a more detailed understanding of our respective priorities and policies, provided early warning of potential problems and improved the coordination of policy planning and assistance. The EU and the US have continued to work together in the field of both civilian and military crisis management and conflict prevention. In March 2008, both sides concluded a work plan on crisis management and conflict prevention, setting out the concrete steps to operationalise co-operation in a number of areas, with specific elements on conflict prevention and early warning. In May 2011, the EU and the US formalised an agreement to allow US civilians to participate in EU CSDP operations. Close cooperation continues in stabilization efforts, for example in the Balkans, concerning the EULEX Kosovo rule of law mission.

French Anger Over NSA Spying Further Strains Europe-U.S. Relations, Williams ’15 BY LAUREN C. WILLIAMS JUN 24, 2015 1:06PM, http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/06/24/3673403/french-anger-nsa-spying-strains-europe-us-relations/, Lauren C. Williams is the tech reporter for ThinkProgress with an affinity for consumer privacy, cybersecurity, tech culture and the intersection of civil liberties and tech policy. Before joining the ThinkProgress team, she wrote about health care policy and regulation for B2B publications, and had a brief stint at The Seattle Times. Lauren is a native Washingtonian and holds a master’s in journalism from the University of Maryland and a bachelor’s of science in dietetics from the University of Delaware.

New WikiLeaks documents show the U.S. National Security Agency spied on the private communications of three French presidents, angering the French government and adding strain to an already tenuous Europe-American relationship.French news site Mediapart first published the documents Tuesday, which cover NSA activity from 2006 to 2012, and were part of the original WikiLeaks provided by former NSA

contractor Edward Snowden. That news quickly drew the ire of French President François Hollande, who called an emergency meeting Wednesday with the U.S. ambassador and government attorneys. “France will not tolerate actions that threaten its security and the protection of its interests ,” Hollande said in a statement Wednesday. “These are unacceptable facts that have already been the subject of clarification between the US and France, notably at the end of 2013 when the first revelations were made and during a state visit by the president of the Republic to the United States in February 2014. Commitments were made by the US authorities. They need to be recalled and strictly respected.”

US-EU relations High Now—Key to counteracting terrorismArchick ‘14

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(“U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism”, Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs, December 1, 2014, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS22030)U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law

enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions with individual EU member states. Despite some frictions, most U.S. policy makers and analysts view the developing partnership with the EU in these areas as positive. Like its predecessor, the Obama Administration has supported U.S. cooperation with the EU in the fields of counterterrorism, border controls, and transport security. At the November 2009 U.S.-EU Summit in Washington, DC, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to work together to combat terrorism and enhance cooperation in the broader JHA field. In June 2010,

the United States and the EU adopted a “Declaration on Counterterrorism” aimed at deepening the already close U.S.-EU relationship and highlighting the commitment of both sides to combat terrorism within the rule of law. In

June 2011, President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism asserted that in addition to working with European allies bilaterally, “the United States will continue to partner with the European Parliament and European Union to maintain and advance CT efforts that provide mutual security and protection to citizens of all nations while also upholding individual rights.” The EU has also been a key U.S. partner in the 30-member Global Counterterrorism Forum, founded in September 2011 as a multilateral body aimed at mobilizing resources and expertise to counter violent extremism,

strengthen criminal justice and rule of law capacities, and enhance international counterterrorism cooperation.

US EU Relations Tense- Asia risks souring relationsEsther Brimmer, 2015, 6-22-15"Why rising Asia risks souring U.S.-EU relations," Europe’s World, http://europesworld.org/2015/06/22/why-rising-asia-risks-souring-u-s-eu-relations/#.VZ7SuvlVgaB

Asia’s rise is going to need careful management by the U.S. and the EU, The U.S. and EU must manage their

reactions to the rise of Asia because this transition for it has the potential to deepen existing strains in the transatlantic relationship . The need for America and Europe to manage cope with such external influences is hardly new. Transatlantic relations have been buffeted over the years by trends ranging from Europe’s process of de-colonisation to America’s Vietnam War, and

from conflict in the Middle East to war in Afghanistan. Global changes affect North America and Europe differently, and so

can lead to misunderstandings because the long-term rise of Asia will change the world. Europeans and Americans need to build a more nuanced

understanding of their shared interests. There are different interpretations of the rise of Asia, but five aspects are particularly interesting. It can be seen as an economic phenomenon, a strategic challenge, a global power shift, a recognition of the re-emergence of China and India, and an acknowledgement of the many “middle powers” in the region. All five interpretations are likely to influence the views from North America and Europe. “The biggest transatlantic divergence over Asia’s rise is the strategic outlook now that many Asian countries are greatly increasing their military spending” Asia contains a number of the largest economies in the world. China last year accounted for over 16% of global GNP, as measured by purchasing power parity. Japan for 5.4%, India 5.8% and the U.S. 16.3%. Although trade is important, investment flows show a more complex relationship. International capital is taking a renewed interest in stable, established markets now the sparkle of emerging ones is being dimmed by slower growth. For European countries, Asia and especially China has become a source of investment income. The economic crisis has ushered in an era of inadequate intra-European investment, creating a profound need for investment in Europe just at a time when China wanted to invest its huge surpluses internationally. Chinese investors and others found bargains in Europe. The result is that Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) into the EU grew a whopping 338% between 2010-2012. UNCTAD reports that Chinese investment in the United Kingdom doubled from $1.4bn, it was $2.8bn during that period, and the overall value of Chinese investment stock in the EU rose to $31.5bn from a mere $1.3bn in 2006. Chinese investment in the U.S. reached $17bn in 2012, up from a similarly low level of $1.2bn in 2006. Yet, despite this dramatic increase in Chinese investment, the U.S. and Europe are still by far each other’s most significant economic partners. In 2012, the U.S. accounted for about a quarter of the EU’s foreign investments, with China trailing far behind at 6.1%, Hong Kong at 5.9% and India only 2.1%. As to U.S. foreign investment, Europe received $2.7 trillion in 2013, almost a fifth of which went to the UK alone. Asia as a whole was of far less interest than Europe to American investors, getting $695bn in 2013, of which $61.5bn went to China. “The rise of Asia is creating opportunities, but is also opening new areas for politically charged debate” The transatlantic partners know well that increased investment brings deeper social engagement. But cCorporate investors’ decisions canalso affect local labour conditions, and now some of the most difficult negotiations over TTIP relate to investment disputes. The perception that other countries’ standards are not as high as your own creates a politically charged climate for negotiations. Europe has agreed investment provisions with Canada, but is still debating them with the U.S. in the TTIP negotiations. Europeans worry that American companies will use the investor state dispute mechanisms to circumvent the EU’s labour, health and safety standards. For their part, the Europeans want such mechanisms to be included in the pending EU-China bilateral investment treaty precisely to protect them from local actions in the less transparent Chinese dispute resolution system. Different types of investors in China enjoy different degrees of market access, with the state-owned enterprises there controlling an important segment of Chinese international investment., although tThey are less transparent than many commercial investors yet wield political clout. Europe arguably needs this investment agreement more than China as it wants greater access to Chinese markets, while China already benefits from access to Europe’s open economies. One possible source of transatlantic tension is that the U.S., and but only some EU countries, requires a security review of investments by foreign government entities. This raises questions about whether NATO-member the EU countries will be able to develop acceptable investment rules with some Asian

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countries from a security perspective. The rise of Asia is creating opportunities, but is also opening new areas for politically charged debate. The biggest transatlantic divergence over Asia’s rise is the strategic outlook now that many Asian countries are greatly increasing their military spending. China last year spent $216.4bn, triple its 2006 defence budget of $71.4bn. While the U.S. accounts for over a third of global military spending, China’s share has risen to 12.25%. Part of the heralded U.S. “rebalance” to Asia reflects Washington’s efforts to revitalise transpacific political and security relationships as Asia raises strategic and political issues for America as well as economic ones. Europeans may speak of Asia as a neighbouring region, but for many Americans the U.S. is part of the Asia/Pacific region. Fifty million Americans live in the five states that border the Pacific Ocean. The United States is not alone among the countries of the Asia/Pacific region to have been alarmed by China’s adventurism in the East China and the South China Seas. Yet from a U.S perspective the rise of Asia in strategic terms means not only the challenge of a more assertive China but also the benefit of more capable regional partners for Washington. America and Japan have been allies for over 60 years, and Australia and New Zealand have been bound by the ANZUS treaty for as long. The U.S. and India have moved closer together over the past decade in a stronger security relationship, with their 2008 agreement

and subsequent work to bring India closer to international nuclear weapons control regimes having removed barriers to more widespread co-operation. The re-emergence of Asia is recalibrating global power balances. These changes are likely to have a particular impact on Europe, whose leaders may feel they need to ingratiate themselves with the emerging Asian powers to stay in the

game. While the United States will be a large and powerful country for decades to come, Europe may feel disadvantaged in its relations with Asia, and that could cause tensions with the U.S.

US-EU will continue to work together O’Sullivan ’15 (22 June 2015, “HENRY GRATTAN LECTURE: EU-US RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD SPEECH BY DAVID O’SULLIVAN EU AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES”, http://www.euintheus.org/press-media/henry-grattan-lecture-eu-us-relations-in-a-changing-world-speech-by-david-osullivan-eu-ambassador-to-the-united-states/, David O'Sullivan is an Irish civil servant who serves as the Ambassador of the European Union to the United States and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United States. Prior to arriving to the United States, he was the chief operating officer of the European Union's diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service (EEAS). He has held a number of high level positions including Head of Cabinet to Romano Prodi and Secretary-General of the European Commission)

Working increasingly with what I call ‘institutional Europe’ has rendered the EU-US relationship much more effective. Without a program of joint EU-US wide sanctions, we would not have brought Iran back to the table and we would certainly have had a lot less leverage on Mr. Putin. So far, despite the drag of these sanctions on the European economy, we have managed to maintain unity, and as long as attempts

to divide us fail, the EU will continue to work hand-in- glove with the United States on these complicated issues. Washington increasingly sees Europe as having an important role to play also in our southern

neighbourhood and Federica Mogherini has been tireless in her attempts to contribute to

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Rels Low Now U.S- E.U. relations are becoming increasingly strained as the U.S. continues with international spyingGramer, 14

(Robert Gramer, Gramer staffs the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, Collateral damage: US spy scandals endanger the world's largest trade deal, 7/22/14, URL, LJG)

After two German officials were arrested on charges of spying for the United States, Germany ordered the CIA station chief in Berlin to leave the country. This story ripped open painful wounds from the NSA-spying scandal that had barely begun to scab over, when leaked documents revealed that the United States had spied on German citizens and tapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel's personal phone. According to U.S. officials, this scandal is simply a crisis du jour spurred primarily by naivety and hypocrisy from an ally who spies right back on the United States. But to German officials, it's the latest example of overreaching U.S. intelligence practices that irrevocably damage the U.S.-German relationship and deeply undermine the sanctity of allies' trust — to the point where the German committee investigating the NSA has

considered switching to typewriters. In this politically charged climate, German and EU leaders may find a new political lightning rod for rising frustration toward the U.S. in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), an ambitious trade deal between the United States and the European Union slated to add $280 billion and 13 million jobs to the transatlantic economy. Germany is the EU's economic center of gravity, making it the United States' most important bilateral partner in the TTIP negotiations. German and EU politicians will have to sell TTIP to their people for it to pass. This will be much more difficult with citizens furious at the country on the other side of the negotiating table. As one German official told The New York Times, the latest scandal "overshadows everything we do," including TTIP negotiations (complicated by the fact that the next round of TTIP negotiations started this week with the spy scandal still saturating headlines). Indeed, the chair of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, Elmar Brok, hinted in an interview after the Edward Snowden scandal first broke that TTIP could be leveraged against the United States: "the European Union is in charge of all the trade negotiations, all the rules and regulations on data protection, on the new transatlantic marketplace agreement. ... I think the Americans should see that it is in their interests to find a solution to this question." While few European officials have explicitly stated that the spy scandal will slow TTIP talks, it will undoubtedly be the elephant in the negotiating room. How can the United States

salvage TTIP's prospects before political pressures grind the trade negotiators' efforts to a halt? First, American officials need to acknowledge the full scale of damage to U.S.-German relations. Right now, American officials appear to be more annoyed than concerned, neither comprehending how deeply the multiple spy scandals scarred the German public nor how it could hinder TTIP negotiations. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said Germany should understand what allies' "intelligence relationships and activities entail" and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Intelligence, accused Germany of throwing a "political temper tantrum." Intelligence, especially surveillance, is a deeply personal and contentious subject for the German people, inextricably rooted in the country's painful and infamous past. That makes this scandal disastrous for U.S.-German relations, but this fact falls on deaf ears in the White House. Second, the U.S. government must demonstrate that it will exert additional oversight on overly broad intelligence collection practices. Even if the government didn't substantially alter U.S. intelligence policy (something even Angela Merkel conceded is tough), it would demonstrate to allies that at least publicly elected bodies were sufficiently "watching the watchmen." Lastly, the United States should include language in TTIP that explicitly signals a commitment to agreeable civil liberty protection for both American and EU citizens, while still effectively protecting national security interests. European officials can brandish this as a victory, and the United States can link TTIP's success with policies on curbing broad surveillance it should have implemented in the first

place. The NSA spy scandal unleashed a political firestorm in Europe, and this most recent scandal further fanned the

flames. American policymakers must realize that this will not simply blow over with the right mixture of time, a few

quotes about being "great friends," or a nice photo-op. This is a disastrous turning point for U.S.-German relations, and potentially TTIP, but few Americans seem to notice. The United States has shown it's more than capable of eavesdropping on allies, but now it's time to listen to them.

U.S. - E.U. relations are becoming increasingly strained as businesses in the E.U. realize that U.S. privacy policies are mostly false. Bernard, 14

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(Doug Bernard, Bernard covers cyber issues for Voice of America News, “EU Data Retention Ruling May Roil US-European Relations”, 4/8/14, http://www.voanews.com/content/eu-data-retention-ruling-may-roil-us-european-relations/1888781.html, LJG)

Before any data can leave an EU member nation, U.S. telecommunications firms must certify they follow privacy policies and programs similar

to the more stringent EU protections, creating a "safe harbor" for data privacy. However, Kelley said, regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have long known that many U.S. safe harbor certifications are actually false, creating a serious

potential problem for U.S. companies doing business in the EU. This week's court ruling, he said, will only make

commerce more difficult. "Even before Snowden, there were concerns about the EU Safe Harbor," Kelley said. "There's already skepticism in Europe because of that, and then you throw in Snowden, it creates more distrust. Having one more element of differentiation between the U.S. and EU is just not helpful."

Rise of Asia is likely to deepen problems with U.S. – E.U. relationsBrimmer, 6/22/15

(Esther Brimmer, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs (2009-2013) and Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, “Why rising Asia risks souring U.S.-EU relations”, 6/22/15, http://europesworld.org/2015/06/22/why-rising-asia-risks-souring-u-s-eu-relations/#.VZ06wflVikp, LJG)

Asia’s rise is going to need careful management by the U.S. and the EU, The U.S. and EU must manage their reactions to the rise of Asia because this transition for it has the potential to deepen existing strains in the transatlantic relationship. The need for America and Europe to manage cope with such external influences is hardly new. Transatlantic relations have been buffeted over the years by trends ranging from Europe’s process of de-colonisation to America’s Vietnam War, and from conflict in the

Middle East to war in Afghanistan. Global changes affect North America and Europe differently, and so can lead to misunderstandings because the long-term rise of Asia will change the world. Europeans and Americans need to build a more nuanced understanding of their shared interests. There are different interpretations of the rise of Asia, but five aspects are particularly interesting. It can be seen as an economic phenomenon, a strategic challenge, a global power shift, a recognition of the re-emergence of China and India, and an acknowledgement of the many “middle powers” in the region. All five interpretations are likely to influence the views from North America and Europe.

EU US Relations Falling Apart- Obama Administration to BlameSputnik, 4-2-15, By, 7-9-2015, "What transatlantic renaissance? US-EU relations falling apart at the seams," SOTT.net, http://www.sott.net/article/294681-What-transatlantic-renaissance-US-EU-relations-falling-apart-at-the-seams

While the US President urges his Western allies to rally support for Washington's stance on the most burning international issues, he should not be surprised that consensus is hard to come by, notes David J. Karl, pointing to the fact Barack Obama has repeatedly snubbed the continent's leaders. The "continuing ructions" in the US relations with its Western allies caused by Obama's failure to develop strong ties with European leaders have ultimately overshadowed Washington's plan of a "transatlantic renaissance," David J. Karl, president of the Asia Strategy Initiative, an analysis and advisory firm, pointed out. "[In 2008] speaking before a massive crowd assembled in Berlin's "Tiergarten", [President Obama] grandly vowed to "remake the world once again," this time in a way that allies would "listen to each other, learn from each other and, most of all, trust each other." That pledge is now so yesterday that Mrs. Merkel is reportedly longing for the days of George W. Bush," the expert emphasized. Barack Obama has repeatedly snubbed the European leaders, Mr. Karl pointed out. Instead of taking a chance to demonstrate to the world US-NATO solidarity, Barack Obama "in fact deliberately" missed an opportunity to meet with the new NATO Chief, Jens Stoltenberg, in Washington last week. Stoltenberg requested a meeting with the US President "well in advance," the expert underscored. Obama's move could only be considered as an obvious slight to Jens Stoltenberg: the US President is one of a few

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Western leaders who have yet to with the NATO chief, who assumed the position almost six months ago. However, Obama has demonstrated disinterest in the US' European allies many times before. For instance, in November 2009, Barack Obama opted out of holding a meeting with E uropean U nion leaders at the White House sparking speculations that British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, one of the most pro-American French leaders, felt like they were being ignored. Remarkably, a year later the American President once again missed a summit with the EU leaders. In September 2009, during a so-called "reset" of relations with Moscow, Barack Obama changed his plans of deploying a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, but did not bother to inform his eastern European counterparts about his decision. David J. Karl cited a top Polish security official who said that Warsaw heard Obama had shifted the plan though the media. Another European security official complained that US President Obama "does not do consultation, and he doesn't do discussion with allies. He reports, and he describes his analytical process," as quoted by the expert. Curiously, the members of the Obama administration also demonstrated little if any respect to the US' continental allies. A senior German official close to Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked that Susan Rice, the US National Security Adviser, in 2013, pressed the German team to adopt the US approach to the Syrian crisis openly demonstrating that she was not interested in the EU view, David J. Karl noted. The expert added that Rice even used the hardly diplomatic term "mother**ker," causing outrage among German politicians. The leaked phone conversation of Victoria Nuland, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who graphically cursed the EU, once again demonstrated the Obama cabinet's attitude towards its European allies . While Obama is urging the EU to rally common Western positions on such issues as the Ukrainian conflict, Iran's nuclear program and the rise of China, he should not be surprised that consensus is hard to come by, the expert underscored. Instead of repairing ties with Europe, Barack Obama has evidently mismanaged relations with the continent, David J. Karl stated.

Despite Stress over Surveillance- US EU Relations Still HighJohn Curran,, 6-16-2014, "EU AMBASSADOR NOTES EU-U.S. 'STRESS' OVER SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY," No Publication, http://search.proquest.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/docview/1541351319?pq-origsite=summon

Joao Vale de Almeida, the E uropean Union ambassador to the U.S., this week called for a renewal of a more trusting relationship between the EU and the U.S. following the past year's discord between the two over disclosures of National Security Agency surveillance programs, which he said have constituted a "stress test" of the relationship. Speaking at a cloud computing policy conference organized by Forum Global, Mr. de Almeida said the EU and the U.S. need to "cultivate, nurture, protect, and promote" a more trusted relationship. "In Europe, this is a serious issue," he said. "We should not underestimate the importance of trust." "If trust does not exist...then the whole concept is not sustainable," he said, speaking of agreements on cross-border data flows that are involved in cloud computing and other communications services. Along those lines, he said the future may hold "severe weather alerts" over security and policy differences. "Some clouds bring storms . . some storms can be linked to cybersecurity - this is the most obvious problem," he said. On the policy front, he said NSA program revelations constitute a "political" storm, with the "capacity to pollute policy making. He said, for example, that transatlantic trade talks now underway between the EU and U.S. do not involve surveillance issues, but that those issues "are having an impact on the negotiations. I don't think we should ignore this." Mr. de

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Almeida offered that it was difficult to find the right balance between security and privacy, but that the EU and the U.S. nonetheless have to attempt to "square the circle" on that issue. At the same event, Federal Trade Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen emphasized the importance of cross-border data flows to economic growth, and said they constitute "the purest form of a broadband bonus - nobody loses, and everybody wins." She also offered that the relationship between the U.S. and the EU has been improving in recent times following the NSA surveillance program disclosures. "Despite some of the storms, it's getting stronger because it needs to get stronger," she said. "It triggered a discussion, but I think we'll come out stronger." Cameron Kerry, a former Department of Commerce general counsel and now a fellow at the Brookings Institution, said that NSA surveillance "revelations have fueled the worst fears" that some Europeans have about U.S. policy," and that some European institutions have tried to move forward on their own with data privacy reforms as a result. "But at the end of the day, I don't think either side of the Atlantic can afford that ," he said. "Trade is too important, and the Internet is too important." He said the U.S. and the EU need to affirm the continuing validity of their existing Safe Harbor framework for cross-border data flows, and improve the "interoperability" of the exchange. "We need to dial back some of the regulatory friction so we can focus on regulatory outcomes, not process." - John Curran, john.curran@wolterskluwer.com

US Spying on French Presidents Strain RelationsKhabar.Eu, 6-24-2015, "US must work to repair relations after spy claims, says French PM," Khabar.eu, http://www.khabar.eu/france-summons-us-ambassador-over-spying-claims-diplomatic-source/

PARIS: The U nited S tates must “do everything in its power” to repair relations after reports emerged that it spied on French President Francois Hollande and two of his predecessors , Prime Minister Manuel Valls said Wednesday. “ The US should recognise not only the danger that such actions represent for our freedom, but should also do everything in its pow er – and quickly – to repair the damage they have done to relations… between the U nited S tates and France , ” Valls told parliament. France earlier summoned the US ambassador to complain about the “unacceptable” spying that was apparently revealed in leaked documents. Hollande was due to discuss the documents released by WikiLeaks with US President Barack Obama in the coming hours. France “will not tolerate any acts that threaten its security” the presidency said, after a meeting between Hollande and his top intelligence officials and cabinet ministers. US Ambassador Jane Hartley has also been summoned to meet French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, diplomatic sources told AFP. The United States wiretapped France's former presidents Jacques Chirac (L) and Nicolas Sarkozy (C), as well as current leader Francois Hollande (R), French media report - AFP/File The United States wiretapped France’s former presidents Jacques Chirac (L) and Nicolas Sarkozy (C), as well as current leader Francois Hollande (R), French media report – AFP/File The documents – labelled “Top Secret” and appearing to reveal spying on Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and Hollande from 2006 to 2012 – were published by WikiLeaks in partnership with French newspaper Liberation and the Mediapart website. The leak coincides with a vote later on Wednesday in the French parliament on a controversial new law granting the state sweeping powers to spy on its citizens. The White House said it was not targeting Hollande’s communications and will not do so in the future, but it did not comment on past activities. “We are not targeting and will not target the communications of President Hollande,” said National Security Council spokesman Ned Price late

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Tuesday, calling the US partnership with France “indispensable”. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (pictured) on Wednesday summoned the US ambassador over leaked documents that suggest her government spied on President Francois Hollande and two predecessors - AFP/File / Francois Guillot French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius (pictured) on Wednesday summoned the US ambassador over leaked documents that suggest her government spied on President Francois Hollande and two predecessors – AFP/File / Francois Guillot Hollande’s office recalled US promises in late 2013 not to spy on French leaders following accusations that the US National Security Agency (NSA) had wiretapped German Chancellor Angela Merkel . “Commitments were made by the US authorities,” the Elysee Palace said in a statement. “ They must be remembered and strictly respected .”

New Leaks show US Surveillance of German Officials- Further Strains RelationsGuardian, 7-1-2015, "WikiLeaks: US spied on Angela Merkel's ministers too, says German newspaper," http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jul/02/wikileaks-us-spied-on-angela-merkels-ministers-too-says-german-newspaper

The U nited S tates did not just tap chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone but also eavesdropped on several of her ministers, the German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung has reported, citing documents from WikiLeaks. G erman-US relations were badly strained after fugitive US intelligence contractor Edward Snowden in 2013 revealed widespread US foreign surveillance , although a probe into the alleged tapping of Merkel’s mobile phone was dropped in June over a lack of evidence. But according to the latest revelations the US National Security Agency did not limit its snooping activities to Merkel and showed particular interest in the activities of the ministries of finance, economy and agriculture, Sueddeutsche Zeitung reported. It said WikiLeaks had shown it a list of 69 phone numbers belonging to ministers and senior officials that were reportedly targeted . The list appears to date back to between 2010 and 2012. The current economy minister and vice-chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel, was among those spied on by the NSA, the report said, although it noted he had been in the opposition at the time. The list also features the number of former finance minister Oskar Lafontaine, who left the job in 1999. But the number was “still active” according to Sueddeutsche Zeitung, ringing through to the secretariat of the current finance minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble. While Snowden alleged US spying on many European governments, his disclosures triggered particular anger in Germany where bitterness lingers over mass state spying on citizens by the Stasi secret police in former communist East Germany where Merkel grew up. Merkel herself phoned the US president, Barack Obama , over the revelations and in public told Germany’s traditional post-war ally and Nato partner that “spying between friends just isn’t on”. Washington appeared to confirm her phone had previously been tapped when US officials said the cellphone was “no longer” a target.

NSA Foreign Surveillance Strains European-US RelationsLauren C. Williams, 6-24-2015, "French Anger Over NSA Spying Further Strains Europe-U.S. Relations," ThinkProgress, http://thinkprogress.org/world/2015/06/24/3673403/french-anger-nsa-spying-strains-europe-us-relations/

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New WikiLeaks documents show the U.S. N ational S ecurity A gency spied on the private communications of three French presidents, angering the French government and adding strain to an already tenuous Europe-American relationship. French news site Mediapart first published the documents Tuesday, which cover NSA activity from 2006 to 2012, and were part of the original WikiLeaks provided by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. That news quickly drew the ire of French President François Hollande, who called an emergency meeting Wednesday with the U.S. ambassador and government attorneys. “ France will not tolerate actions that threaten its security and the protection of its interests ,” Hollande said in a statement Wednesday. “These are unacceptable facts that have already been the subject of clarification between the US and France, notably at the end of 2013 when the first revelations were made and during a state visit by the president of the Republic to the United States in February 2014. Commitments were made by the US authorities. They need to be recalled and strictly respected.” The White House has denied the spying allegations, saying via a statement Wednesday: We are not targeting and will not target the communications of President Hollande. Indeed, as we have said previously, we do not conduct any foreign intelligence surveillance activities unless there is a specific and validated national security purpose. This applies to ordinary citizens and world leaders alike. We work closely with France on all matters of international concern, and the French are indispensable partners . Spying on friendly and enemy governments alike isn’t a new occurrence and is widely practiced, the U.S. is generally more brazen about it. German lawmakers accused its own intelligence agencies earlier this year of violating German regulations and gathering information in European targets for the NSA. The new Snowden-derived information comes as trust in U.S. government wanes domestically and overseas. Only a quarter of Americans trust the government always or most of the time, according to a 2014 Pew Research survey. When it comes to foreign relations, only 43 percent are at least fairly confident in how the U.S. handles international matters, Gallup found. This week’s WikiLeaks also follows news that Germany folded its investigation into the NSA’s spying practices after documents surfaced in 2013 indicating the agency spied on Chanecellor Angela Merkel’s personal communications. But public disclosing of what should be clandestine movements fuels international sentiment of American government’s disregard for civilian privacy. “We find it hard to understand or imagine what motivates an ally to spy on allies who are often on the same strategic positions in world affairs,” Stéphane Le Foll, a French government spokesman told iTELE television. Negative global perception of the NSA’s actions could also affect how the U.S. does business overseas . European regulators have already begun investigating tech companies’ potential wrongdoing by participating in NSA surveillance programs. The Court of Justice of the European Union is hearing a case involving Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Yahoo, for potential privacy law violations. The decision could seriously damage the U.S.-European relationship by deterring companies from doing business through stricter regulations. Facebook’s European public policy director Richard Allan warned legislators in April that imposing stringent regulations on tech companies would be bad for business stateside and abroad: National regulators in a number of countries, including Belgium and the Netherlands, appear to be initiating multiple, overlapping investigations of Facebook, revisiting basic questions about how our services work. In effect, this would mark a return to national regulation. If it is allowed to stand, complying with EU law will no longer be enough; businesses will instead have to comply with 28 independently shifting national variants. They would have to predict the enforcement agenda in each country… Facebook’s costs would increase, and people in Europe would notice new features arriving more slowly, or not at all. The biggest victims would be smaller European companies. The next big thing might never see the light of day.

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EU Impact Defense

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A2: Afghanistan

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1NC – Stable NowAfghanistan stability nowPressTV, “US withdrawal brings stability to Afghanistan: Officials”, Feb 14, 2015, http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/02/14/397602/US-pullout-brings-peace-to-Afghanistan

The security situation across Afghanistan is gradually improving following the partial withdrawal of US-led forces from the war-ravaged country, officials say, Press TV reports. Local residents and security officials in Afghanistan say order has significantly improved in the volatile southern and eastern provinces , which were once the epicenters of the Taliban militancy . US-led forces have closed most of their military facilities in the southern, eastern and central regions of the

violence-torn country. Thousands of Afghan troops have assumed full responsibility for the security of several provinces. Maidan Wardak Police Chief Khalil Andarab has recently said attacks have decreased drastically in the past few

months. “Attacks and insecurities in Maidan Wardak Province, especially on Kabul-Kandahar highway , have decreased by around 95 percent in the past 8 months,” he told Press TV.

Even if they win that Afghan is unstable now ---Solving Afghan Instability requires increasing ground forces --- they don’t do that Faizi and Roufi 15 (Abdul Rashid Faizi graduated from the United Arab Emirates University, in the UAE. Abdul is a researcher at the UAE University focusing on political economy, international economic, economics of development, and foreign direct investment. Shahabuddin Roufi is a research assistant at the College of Business and Economics, UAE University. His research interests include economics and political economy focusing in Islamic countries. “Three Factors Contributing to Afghanistan’s Instability” January 13 2015 accessed 7/9/15 http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/rural-population-afghanistan-476/) DAH

Political scientists believe that higher population size and concentration raises the risk of civil conflict. It could also lead to higher probability of revolutions to overthrow governing elites in non-democratic countries. This claim, supported by political scientists, does not refer to the number of people that eventually join an insurgency, but only the number of people that start one. They constitute enough rebels to pose a

serious threat. In Afghanistan the rural population is an important determinant of political stability. Now and in the past, the political stability in Afghanistan has been threatened mainly by rural residents. Currently almost all insurgent groups such as the Taliban are based in rural areas. From those safe heavens they recruit insurgents and manage all of their destructive activities against the government. As a footnote in history, most resistance groups were based in rural areas during Afghanistan’s fight against the Soviet Union. In 1996 when the Taliban conquered Kabul, almost all of their fighters were

recruited from rural communities. The reasons are very obvious: rural areas are safe havens where insurgents could easily and freely plan their destructive activities. Moreover, the threat of rural populations to political stability of Afghanistan results from the interconnection of the following well-known facts: Geography Insurgency is closely related to the geography of the country. The presence of rough terrain, poorly served by

roads and at a distance from the centers of state power, favors insurgents. This is fostered by the availability of cross-border sanctuaries inhabited by people that can be easily manipulated by local insurgents. In this scenario it is not uncommon that these local populations get trapped between their responsibilities as citizens of the country and their cultural loyalty to the

local insurgent groups. Moreover, the government does not have a permanent control over these areas, which nurtures a decent atmosphere for insurgent groups. Poverty People feel that their government has abandoned them and failed to provide financial means to elevate their living standards. This problem is

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enhanced by the fact that the country has a large percentage of young men who cannot find enough employment opportunities. Their contribution to economic development and their participation in the political process is highly underexploited. Afghan young men tend to participate in activities that are either economically unproductive, such as joining gangs and drug

cartels or politically destructive, such as organizing resistance groups under leadership of insurgents. Extremism It is a well known fact that religious extremism has become the core of much of Afghanistan’s violence. Extremists justify their version of Islam to force people to accept their Islamic interpretation. This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that almost all of the rural residents are uneducated. The presence of madrasas (Islamic schools) works in their favor. In these schools they mainly spread their radical political thinking to the public. The products of madrasas are radical Muslims who play key roles in destabilizing

activities. Recently, there has been a dramatic increase in insurgent attacks in the country. Security handovers from NATO to Afghan forces, and the American pullout have motivated the Taliban to increase their destructive activities. The threat might strongly resurface yet again. Based on these three reasons,

the rural population has a strong impact on the political stability of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it seems that the

government is not taking this problem very seriously. This threat is becoming very grave by the reduction and withdrawal of American and NATO forces from the country. History might repeat itself again if the government fails to tackle the challenges.

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1NC – No Spillover Afghanistan won’t spillover Kazemi, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2012

(S. Reza, “A Potential Afghan Spill-Over: How Real Are Central Asian Fears?”, http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=3152, ldg)

A spill-over of the Afghan conflict or aspects of it like the drug trade into Central Asia is realistic, but it need not be as threatening and disastrous as the region’s governmental officials depict i t. It also may differ for particular Central Asian countries. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – of Afghanistan’s three direct Central Asian neighbours (with the third being Turkmenistan) – are likely

to continue to be most affected. A spill-over of Islamist terrorism from Afghanistan seems unlikely, however, at least for the

time being. The leadership of the IMU , regarded as the most serious militant threat against the region, has been largely dismantled . Although a 2011 AAN report identified some IMU presence in Afghanistan’s Balkh, Faryab and Kunduz provinces bordering Central Asia, the bulk of the IMU fighters are based in Pakistan’s Waziristan, far away from any shared Afghanistan-Central Asia frontier. It is unclear, therefore, if the movement can re-group to organise and carry out attacks in Central Asian territory, apart from causing localised instability and violence on Afghan soil.(9) And even if so, terrorist and extremist threats facing Central Asia (and particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are more home-grown than what would originate from Afghanistan, as, for example, Christian Bleuer argues (read, for example, here), although others like Ahmed Rashid have, both in the past and recently, talked about

larger regional networks of militants. If there is any actual spill-over of the Afghan conflict into Central Asia, it is more likely to continue to be drug trafficking. Afghanistan is by far the largest global producer of poppy and hashish and increasingly of derivates

produced from them. As the recent fighting in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) has shown, there are cross-border networks functioning and corrupt government officials both in Afghanistan and Central Asia can hugely benefit from their trafficking (for a UN report on drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia and onwards, see here). In a reverse way, Uzbekistan has engaged to influence Afghanistan’s socio-political developments more seriously than any other Central Asian government. It has supported the Uzbek commander-turned-politician Abdul Rashid Dostum and his party Jombesh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan (Afghanistan’s National Islamic Movement) (for latest developments in the party, read a recent AAN paper). Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also have large numbers of co-ethnics inside Afghanistan, but Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks are very different from their ethnic kin in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, mainly because of Central Asia’s Sovietisation, despite speaking almost similar languages (see, for example, here).(10) It also needs to be recalled that conflicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan have had mutual spill-over effects. During the 1992-97 Tajik civil war, parts of the Tajik opposition fled to Afghanistan, were supported by Afghan mujahedin and used Afghanistan as a safe haven and base to carry out attacks in Tajikistan. During the conflict between the Northern Alliance and the Taleban, Tajikistan had provided, among other things, an airbase to the Northern Alliance in Kulyab in southern Tajikistan for them to use to mobilise and organise the resistance against the Taleban’s advance towards northern Afghanistan (read, for example, here). In addition, the civil war in Tajikistan drove tens of thousands of people out of Tajikistan to the northern Afghan provinces of Balkh, Kunduz and

Takhar (read here). Judging by recent contemporary precedents, an American Central Asia researcher, who requested not to be named, wrote to AAN that ‘ the previous experience in the mid- to late 19 90s of having a civil war in northern Afghanistan and a Taleban government controlling much of the north was not particularly traumatic’ . Whatever the speculations about the Afghan conflict going northwards may be, Central Asia plus Afghanistan is one of the world’s least integrated regions. To subsume the five former Central Asian Soviet republics under one term – ‘the -stans’ – reflects an un-informed and superficial look at this region. Considering the growing number of bilateral and intra-regional conflicts and competing attempts to achieve regional leadership, this perception is everything but justified.

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A2: Asian

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1NC – No Asia War

No Asia war Nick Bisley 14, Professor of IR @ La Trobe University (Australia) and Executive Director of La Trobe Asia, “It’s not 1914 all over again: Asia is preparing to avoid war”, 3/10, http://theconversation.com/its-not-1914-all-over-again-asia-is-preparing-to-avoid-war-22875

Asia is cast as a region as complacent about the risks of war as Europe was in its belle époque. Analogies are an understandable way of trying to make sense of unfamiliar circumstances. In this

case, however, the historical parallel is deeply misleading. Asia is experiencing a period of uncertainty and strategic risk unseen since the US and China

reconciled their differences in the mid-1970s. Tensions among key powers are at very high levels: Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe recently invoked the 1914 analogy. But there are very good reasons, notwithstanding these issues, why Asia is not about to tumble into a great power war. China is America’s second most important trading partner . Conversely, the US is by far the most important country with which China trades. Trade and investment’s “golden straitjacket” is a basic reason to be optimistic . Why should this be seen as being more effective than the high levels of interdependence between Britain and Germany before World War One? Because Beijing and

Washington are not content to rely on markets alone to keep the peace. They are acutely aware of how much they have at stake . Diplomatic

infrastructure for peace The two powers have established a wide range of institutional links to manage their relations . These are designed to improve the level and quality of their communication, to lower the risks of misunderstanding spiralling out of control and to manage the trajectory of their relationship. Every year, around 1000 officials from all ministries led by the top political figures in each country meet under the auspices of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The dialogue has demonstrably improved US-China relations across the policy spectrum, leading to collaboration in a wide range of areas. These range from disaster relief to humanitarian aid exercises, from joint training of

Afghan diplomats to marine conservation efforts, in which Chinese law enforcement officials are hosted on US Coast Guard vessels to enforce maritime legal regimes. Unlike the near total absence of diplomatic engagement by Germany and Britain in the lead-up to 1914, today’s two would-be combatants have a deep level of interaction and practical co-operation. Just as the extensive array of common interests has led Beijing and Washington to do a lot of bilateral work, Asian states have been busy the past 15 years. These nations have created a broad range of multilateral institutions and mechanisms intended to improve trust , generate a sense of common cause and promote regional prosperity. Some organisations, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), have a high profile with its annual leaders’ meeting involving, as it often does, the common embarrassment of heads of government dressing

up in national garb. Others like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus Process are less in the public eye. But there are more than 15 separate multilateral bodies that have a focus on regional security concerns. All these organisations are trying to build what might be described as an infrastructure for peace in the region. While these mechanisms are not flawless, and

many have rightly been criticised for being long on dialogue and short on action, they have been crucial in managing specific crises and allowing countries to clearly state their commitments and priorities.

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A2: Asia Pivot

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1NC – Fails/FalseAsia pivot failsAuslin, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2012

(Michael, and columnist at wsj “America Doesn't Need a Pivot to Asia,” 8/27, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444506004577614941100974630.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)

It is time to bury the Obama administration's pivot to Asia. This reallocation of military and diplomatic resources was supposed to guarantee stability in a region seeking to balance China's rise. In reality, this strategic shift is less

than it appears. It won't solve Asia's problems and may even add to the region's uncertainty by over-promising and under-delivering. Everything wrong with the pivot can be summed up by Four R's: rhetoric; reality; resourcing; and raising expectations

and then doubts. So far, the first and perhaps biggest problem with the idea of the pivot—or, as the Defense Department calls it, the

rebalancing—is that it remains largely rhetorical , vague and aspirational . True, there are some laudable moves, such as basing U.S. Marines in northern Australia and agreeing to port new U.S. warships in Singapore . These,

however, hardly add up to a breakthrough . The world still wonders what the purpose is: to contain China, to promote

democracy, to make the United States the de facto hegemon of Asia, or simply to reassure nervous nations about China's rise? The reality is

that not much will change in America's actions. The pivot says nothing about taking on new commitments , for example toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or to countries with whom America does not currently have formal alliances. Just as importantly, Washington has made clear in recent months that it will not take sides in the territorial disputes that have roiled the East and South China Seas, even when allies like Tokyo and Manila are involved. Further evidence for this reality comes from the resource constraints imposed on this grand project. The Obama administration is trying to do it on the cheap. Pivot funding is in danger from sequestration—forced budget cuts resulting from larger budget politicking in Washington—that, if allowed to proceed, will cut another $500 billion from a defense budget already reduced by $900 billion since 2009. The administration claims that America's military presence in Asia will not be affected by these budget cuts. If that is so, then U.S. military posture in the rest of the world will be cut back. More likely, any buildup will be difficult to sustain. The shifting of more planes and ships to the Pacific will soon slow down, as the size of the Air Force and Navy shrink, and as other world problems such as Iran and Syria continue to dominate the attention of American policy makers. This, in turn, is raising doubts about the pivot in Asia, so soon after the rhetoric from Washington had raised expectations. Countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines led themselves to believe that the pivot would have concrete results, such as quickly increasing American presence in the region and perhaps even American support in their maritime territorial disputes with China. Both accordingly reached out to Washington, holding new military exercises or discussing greater security cooperation. Yet this enthusiasm makes it all the worse when those hopes turn out to be dashed by Washington's failure to act. As one Philippines senator asked during his country's standoff this spring with China over the

Scarborough Shoal, what good is the alliance with the U.S. if America refuses to back up its partners in times of need? By appearing to make unrealistic promises, the Obama administration has created new diplomatic headaches for itself in managing the fall-

out from its failure to deliver. What then is the point of the pivot? By not getting involved in maritime disputes, other than rhetorically,

Washington is actually taking the most realistic approach possible. No administration, Republican or Democratic, is going to risk a crisis with China short of any overt attempt by Beijing to take over territory clearly controlled by other nations. Building up U.S. forces in Asia, were it even possible, would not change that political calculation. The current American military posture can be diversified to a few more countries, but essentially, Washington has had the right balance for the past several decades. While it would be a mistake to

shrink the U.S. air and naval presence in Asia, all Washington could do is slightly increase it, and that will change nothing in the

region . Moreover, there are few realistic options for new partners in Asia, especially ones such as Japan and Australia that can provide

some level of regional security cooperation. That means America's current grouping of allies and partners is right-sized for the political and security realities of the Asia-Pacific for the foreseeable future.

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Asia pivot is inflated- the status quo solves literally every impactInnocent, foreign policy analyst at Cato, 2012

(Malou Innocent, “Talk of a U.S.-Asia 'Pivot' Is Overblown,” http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/12/13/talk-of-a-us-asia-pivot-is-overblown)

The greatest misperception surrounding Washington's "pivot" to Asia is that America's dominant presence is not already felt there on a regular basis. It is. The United States plays a considerable role in the Far East, despite the

Obama administration's proclamations last autumn that it would "pivot" or "rebalance" there in the future. For one, the United States maintains forward-deployed forces in South Korea , with 28,500 U.S. troops; Guam, with 4,500 U.S. troops; and Japan, with 40,000 U.S. troops. Guam, of course, is part of America as a non-self-governing, unincorporated tervritory. South Korea and Japan, however, after decades of proven internal stability and peaceful democratic transitions, are equipped to defend themselves. [See a collection of political cartoons on defense spending.] Once upon a time, South Korea was incapable of surviving without America's support. That began to change in the 1980s. Today, its economy ranks around 13th in the world, it has twice the North's population, and, if South Korea's leaders chose to, could be spending on defense the equivalent of the North's entire annual GDP. As for Japan, despite its recent economic woes, it had the fifth highest defense budget in the world in 2011, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Japan surpassed Russia, India, and Brazil, and fell only behind the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and France. Moreover, as scholars Shinichi Ogawa and Michael Schiffer have pointed out, in criticism of its policy, Japan possesses a nuclear "breakout'' capacity, meaning its civilian nuclear fuel cycle is so advanced "that, at the flip of the switch, [it] could be militarized." Save for a planned contingent of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Australia, four littoral combat ships stationed in Singapore, and rotating troops and surveillance aircraft in the Philippines, it is unclear whether U.S. troop deployments will grow more robust in Japan and South Korea. They should not. Such prosperous allies can live without the generous welfare of American taxpayers. [Read the U.S. News Debate: Should Cuts Be Made to Domestic Social Programs to Protect the Defense Budget?] Aside

from these forward-deployed forces, the Far East feels Washington's constant presence with the United States Pacific Command. This regional unified military structure consists of about one-fifth of total U.S. military strength. It includes six aircraft carrier strike groups, about two-thirds of U.S. Marine Corps combat strength, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which goes on frequent patrols conducting joint, military-training exercises with America's allies and partners. Talking about partners, Uncle Sam has a lot of them in a region home to over 50 percent of the world's

population. The United States has been cultivating warmer relations with India, most especially after accommodating New Delhi's nuclear expansion with a symbolic, 2008 agreement facilitating civilian nuclear cooperation between them. Moreover, despite recent hand wringing over U.S.-Russia relations, Washington's so-called "reset" has rebounded ties from their 2008 low, particularly with regard to Moscow's help supplying NATO's war effort in Afghanistan. [Read the U.S. News Debate:

Are Cuts to the Defense Budget Necessary?] Elsewhere, the United States has forged better relations with Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines, and has embraced existing multilateral organizations and trade agreements, like the East Asia Summit, the T rans- P acific P artnership, and the A ssociation of S outheast A sian N ations . In the end, Washington's obsessive fixation on the Middle East and North Africa should warrant serious reconsideration. More of America's attention should be paid to the future of the Asia-Pacific, since maintaining peace in that region will be the challenge of the 21st century. However, what foreign policy planners in Washington should be asking themselves is what the United States should be willing to defend in this region, and at what cost? What implicit commitments should Washington make to prosperous, populous countries eminently capable of defending themselves? Allies are intended to supplement a nation-state's power, not hinder or jeopardize it. [See a collection of political cartoons on the Middle East.] Primarily, America's deepening involvement in Asia is meant to reassure allies nervous over China's growing assertiveness and increased military spending. However, the United States can both value being a strong military power and allow other countries in the Far East to assert a greater leadership role. These policies are neither zero-sum nor mutually exclusive. For more than half a century, the United States has played a prominent military and economic role in the Asia-Pacific. The American

people should not be led to believe that their country was a never a force to be reckoned with there. Indeed, the biggest tale proponents of U.S. prominence in Asia ever sold was the intimation that we do not already have it.

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A2: Bioweapons

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1NC – I/L DEU is not willing to upgrade security to help bioterrorismStokes, 15- Director of Global Economic Attitudes

5 key takeaways about the U.S.-German relationship http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/07/5-key-takeaways-about-the-u-s-german-relationship/

Half (50%) of both Germans and Americans say their country should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with their own challenges. Roughly comparable proportions of Germans (43%) and Americans (39%) believe their nation should help other countries deal with their difficulties. Younger Germans and Americans in particular are more inward-looking than their older counterparts. More than half of Americans (57%) and Germans (54%) ages 18 to 29 hold the view that their country should deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs. And only 36% of that age group in Germany and 31% in the U.S. believe that their country should assist other nations. This stands in sharp contrast with the attitudes of their older countrymen: 46% of both Americans and Germans ages 65 and older say their countries should do more to help others.

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1NC – No BioweaponsNo risk of bioterrorRebecca Keller 13, Analyst at Stratfor, 7 March 2013, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)

The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits . Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with

national authorities. The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal . The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low . Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 -- or any influenza virus, for that matter -- is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely . The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors . Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like

small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.

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A2: European War

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1NC – Europe War European war is impossible Karaganov 11 et al – head of the Russian Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Dean of the School of the World Economy and International Affairs at the National

Research University–Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE); Chairman of the Presidium, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP); Chairman of the Editorial Board, Russia in Global Affairs journal. -- Report by the Russian Participants of the Working Group on the Future of the Russian—U.S. Relations, The U.S.—Russia Relations after the «Reset»: Building a New Agenda. A View from Russia, http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/US-Russia%20relations_eng.pdf

This short list of challenges shows that the main threats to Russia and the U.S. in the world of today and tomorrow stem not from each other’s policies but from external global and

regional factors. Russia and the U.S. do not pose direct military threats to each other, either in the field of conventional forces in Europe, or in the strategic sphere. A conventional

«big war» in Europe is physically impossible . The preservation by Russia and the U.S. of their ability to

physically destroy each other, while maintaining appropriate c onfidence -b uilding m easure s and strategic stability, has a stabilizing effect both on their own policies and the policies of other nuclear and nonnuclear countries .

No European war and no escalation John J. Mearsheimer 10, PROF OF POLITICAL SCIENCE --- University of Chicago, “why is europe peaceful today?,” ECPR KEYNOTE LECTURE, european political science: 9 2010, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/eps/journal/v9/n3/pdf/eps201024a.pdf

Much has happened since then, including the dire economic crisis that we are now experiencing. It promises to have farreaching effects on European life. Nevertheless, I think that the

most important development of the past two decades is the fact that Europe remains at peace. Of course, there were a handful of small wars in the Balkans during the 1990s, but the major European powers did not start them, did not exploit them for national gain, and with the

help of the United States ultimately managed to shut them down . Very importantly there has been no war between any of the major powers. Indeed, there has been little security competition among them. Given Europe’s tumultuous

history, this is quite remarkable. Remember that from 1900 to 1990 Europe was the site of two of the deadliest wars in recorded history followed by the Cold War. The broad sweep of European history certainly looks very different from the past two decades.

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A2: Institutions

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1NC – Coop FailsCooperation internationally is terminally ineffective and small measures like the aff can’t save itHellmann, 13 (Gunther Hellmann is a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, an initiative of the German Marshall Fund, “The Decline of Multilateralism,” May 2, German Marshall Fund Blog, http://blog.gmfus.org/2013/05/02/the-decline-of-multilateralism/)

WASHINGTON—It is becoming increasingly difficult to argue against retrenchment in Europe and North America. Economic crises and domestic political stagnation absorb energy and consume financial resources . Global military engagements in faraway places cost lives and treasure and often yield limited success. There is growing disillusionment with democracy promotion. Coalitions of sovereign state defenders like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South

Africa) make life for the guardians of the liberal world order ever more challenging. The upshot is multilateral fatigue in both Europe and North America . This is a perilous state of affairs because state-transcending global problems are proliferating. “Global Trends 2030,” a study published by the U.S. National Intelligence Council last December, predicts that “the current, largely Western dominance of global structures … will have been transformed by 2030 to be more in line with the changing

hierarchy of new economic players.” Yet even if this were to happen, the report argues, it remains unclear to what degree new or reformed institutions “will have tackle d growing global challenges .” One might be forgiven for taking this to be an overly optimistic projection. Based on current trends, the outlook is much gloomie r, due mainly to the political contagion effects of sovereigntism, the fixation on state sovereignty as an absolute value, and minilateralism . Moisés Naím, who initially

coined the term, defined minilateralism as getting together the “smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem.” The problem is that the smallest possible number may quickly grow very large; Naím’s own book, The End of Power, provides ample evidence that this is so. Consider, for instance, the number and political weight of countries needed to address the problems in the aftermath of a military escalation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The minimum number of countries required to effectively regulate global warming does not look any more encouraging. In other words, sovereigntism and minilateralism are symptoms of the crisis of liberal world order — manifestations of The Democratic Disconnect — and not a recipe for curing its ills. In the old days when multilateralism was not yet qualified politically with such adjectives as “assertive” (Madeleine Albright) or “effective” (EU), it served as a descriptor for a fundamental transformation of interstate collaboration in the second half of the 20th century. In an influential article, John Ruggie, a Harvard professor and former high-ranking UN official, showed that the actual practice of multilateralism by the liberal democracies of North America and Europe after World War II was based on a set of generalized principles of conduct. These principles rendered segments of the post-war international order into more reliable cooperative settings, such as the United Nations, or islands of peaceful change, such as the zone of European integration. A readiness to give up sovereignty or, at least to cooperate on the basis of reciprocity, were characteristic elements of

multilateralism and what came to be called the “liberal world order. ” This liberal order is under strain today because its creators and guardians have themselves strayed from these principles. In the security field, “coalitions of the willing” have undermined multilateralism not only in the UN context, but also in NATO. In economic and financial matters, the politics of European sovereign debt crisis management illustrates both the dangers of executive federalism and the limits of diffuse reciprocity among Europe’s nation states in the world’s most integrated region. “Responsible stakeholders,” the former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick once said, do more than merely “conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests…They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system.” What was meant as advice to China when Zoellick

gave that speech in 2005 can easily be redirected at the liberal democracies of North America and Europe today. There are no easy ways out. Even if the slide toward retrenchment can be stopped , the prospects do not seem bright for the kind of bold new initiatives for global institutional reform that are required . It is debatable whether calls for “democratic internationalism” or a new alignment among “like-minded democracies” can do the trick, but Europe and North

America need to realize that their stakes in the liberal order are much higher than those of relative newcomers. Indeed, overcoming crises at home hinges at least in part on sustaining a conducive global environment. Readjusting the balance between minilateralism and multilateralism will help.

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A2: Iran Prolif

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1NC – I/L US would prefer more EU involvement than there is in the squoAdebahr, 6/8 (Cornelius, Adebahr is an associate in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. His research focuses on European foreign policy, “Leave It to Europe: Why Iran Is Not (Solely) America’s Responsibility”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/08/leave-it-to-europe-why-iran-is-not-solely-america-s-responsibility/i9l7)

Even before a nuclear deal with Iran has been signed, the debate in Washington has shifted to the regional implications of a possible accord. But lessons learned from the success of the nuclear negotiations so far help explain why the United States should not lead international efforts to bring about regional cooperation with Iran. Instead, Washington should let its Europe an allies take the initiative. After all, it was the E uropean U nion —particularly France, Germany and Britain—that laid the diplomatic groundwork since 2003 . They brought China, Russia and the United States on board and, in close transatlantic coordination, pursued a two-track approach of sanctions and diplomacy that led to the current nuclear talks. Secondly, both sides have accepted the other’s domestic discourse. For Iran, the narrative is about how the international community is ready to accept its demands to keep what Tehran insists is a peaceful nuclear program, while dropping its sanctions and also helping to modernize this program. In the U nited S tates, the narrative is that considerable concessions have been extracted from Iran, which agreed to substantial program limitations, both of proportions and duration. The third success factor of the talks lies in compartmentalization and de-politicization. By focusing on the nuclear issue—and excluding everything from human rights to terrorism from the negotiations—the aim is to find creative, but sustainable technical solutions that dodge the broader political questions . However, certainly the first two ingredients are not yet there when it comes to regional cooperation. Washington’s major accommodation would be to accept that Iran has a (legitimate) role to play in the region, while Iran would have to overcome its refusal even to talk to Saudi Arabia—its regional rival—based on sectarian as much as on geopolitical grounds. Both sides would have to be ready to ignore fundamentally different viewpoints on regional order, not least because the power competition between them—with Israel and the Arab Gulf states each playing their part—does not lend itself to the (comparatively easy) “no bomb” compromise in the nuclear field. Moreover, simply getting the nuclear deal through will likely exhaust the necessary willingness—both in Tehran and Washington—to accommodate the other side .

EU Unilateralism supported by the USAdebahr, 6/8 (Cornelius, Adebahr is an associate in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. His research focuses on European foreign policy, “Leave It to Europe: Why Iran Is Not (Solely) America’s Responsibility”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/08/leave-it-to-europe-why-iran-is-not-solely-america-s-responsibility/i9l7)

This is where the EU comes in. Establishing a multilateral framework, the EU’s focus should be on the third ingredient, i.e. to de-politicize and compartmentalize possible areas of cooperation. Maritime security in the Gulf and the situation in Gaza are two such practical issues on which the European Union

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could engage Iran. A regional maritime-security regime would broadly be based on the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (which neither Iran nor the United States have ratified) that regulates nonmilitary fields of cooperation such as maritime safety, fisheries protection, marine-environment protection and port security. Such an approach would also dovetail with the G7 declaration last month to strengthen maritime governance in a cooperative, rules-based approach at the regional and global level. Addressing the Gaza conflicts means involving Iran in the international efforts to implement the unity government that the Palestinians agreed on, but so far failed to put in place. Even such narrow and technical cooperation can be a difficult hurdle to jump, even before one could start thinking about conflict resolution in Yemen or Syria. Given the Old Continent’s internal and external woes, it may seem naïve to expect Brussels to provide a framework for regional cooperation with Iran. However, with clear signals from Washington that it would support such a European lead in the aftermath of a nuclear agreement, the EU and its member states should be happy to oblige. Previous European initiatives with strong U.S. backing include the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which helped establish security cooperation between the Cold War superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) and the Madrid and Oslo talks leading to the Israeli-Palestinian accords of the early 1990s. While these cases also show that agreement cannot guarantee lasting success, the diplomatic opening that a deal can create in its wake is what counts. Such momentum, however, needs to be given a direction. A single nuclear deal cannot bring fundamental change to a region torn by religious strife, sectarian rivalry and weak governance. Add to this the fact that the United States has now entered the pre-election season, and it becomes clear that it is up to the European Union as the often-overlooked mediator of the nuclear talks to make a push for regional cooperation after a possible deal. The United States, happy to direct its top-level diplomatic resources to other burning crises, should welcome and support such an initiative of its European partners.

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1NC – No Escalation No prolif and long timeframeKahl ’12 (Colin H. Kahl 12, security studies prof at Georgetown, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, “Not Time to Attack Iran”, January 17, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran?page=show

Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented Iranian

efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a six-month horizon,Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-

grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the

source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons- grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities . The IAEA would thus detect such activity with sufficient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.

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A2: ISIS

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1NC – I/L D

ISIS distinct from terrorist organizations--- traditional EU-US coop is insufficient Cronin 15 (AUDREY KURTH CRONIN is Distinguished Professor and Director of the International Security Program at George Mason University and the author of How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won't Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat” Foreign Affairs94.2 (Mar/Apr 2015): 87-98.)

After 9/11, many within the U.S. national security establishment worried that, following decades of preparation for confronting conventional enemies, Washington was unready for the challenge posed by an unconventional adversary such as al Qaeda. So over the next decade, the United States built an elaborate bureaucratic structure to fight the jihadist organization, adapting its military and its intelligence and law enforcement agencies to the tasks of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Now, however, a different group, the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (isis), which also calls itself the Islamic State, has supplanted al Qaeda as the jihadist threat of greatest concern. Isis' ideology, rhetoric, and long-term goals are similar to al Qaeda's, and the two groups were once formally allied. So many observers assume that the current challenge is simply to refocus Washington's now-formidable counterterrorism apparatus on a new target. But isis is not al Qaeda. It is not an outgrowth or a part of the older radical Islamist organization, nor does it represent the next phase in its evolution. Although al Qaeda remains dangerous-especially its affiliates in North Africa and Yemen-isis is its successor. Isis represents the post-al Qaeda jihadist threat. In a nationally televised speech last September explaining his plan to " degrade and ultimately destroy" isis, U.S. President Barack Obama drew a straight line between the group and al Qaeda and claimed that isis is " a terrorist organization, pure and simple." This was mistaken; isis hardly fits that description, and indeed, although it uses terrorism as a tactic, it is not really a terrorist organization at all. Terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda, generally have only dozens or hundreds of members, attack civilians, do not hold territory, and cannot directly confront military forces. Isis, on the other hand, boasts some 30,000 fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations. If isis is purely and simply anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. And that is why the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies that greatly diminished the threat from al Qaeda will not work against isis. Washington has been slow to adapt its policies in Iraq and Syria to the true nature of the threat from isis. In Syria, U.S. counterterrorism has mostly prioritized the bombing of al Qaeda affiliates, which has given an edge to isis and has also provided the Assad regime with the opportunity to crush U.S.-allied moderate Syrian rebels. In Iraq, Washington continues to rely on a form of counterinsurgency, depending on the central government in Baghdad to regain its lost legitimacy, unite the country, and build indigenous forces to defeat isis. These approaches were developed to meet a different threat, and they have been overtaken by events. What's needed now is a strategy of " offensive containment": a combination of limited military tactics and a broad diplomatic strategy to halt isis' expansion, isolate the group, and degrade its capabilities.

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1NC – Not a ThreatISIS isn’t a threat—they can’t execute outside attacks or kill more than a dozen peopleBenjamin 8/17 (Daniel, “Hawks exaggerate Islamic State threat to the United States,” Boston Globe, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/08/17/hawks-exaggerate-isis-threat-united-states/yICJ0bpzRhoK88GtauyHLO/story.html)

To judge by the doom-laden prophecies cascading in from Washington, the United States faces a towering and imminent threat in the form of the militant group calling itself the Islamic State, or ISIS. “They are coming here,” Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina intoned on Fox News Sunday. “I think of an American city in flames because of the terrorists’ ability to operate in Syria and Iraq.” Senator Graham’s friend Senator John McCain is no less alarmist. Calling for immediate air strikes in Iraq and Syria, he declared, “They are getting stronger all the time . . . And their goal . . . is destruction of the United States of America.” Stoking the panic has been a very excitable press. On CNN last week, I was asked if Islamic State fighters represented an

“existential threat” to the United States. Set aside that absurdity; no terrorist group threatens our existence.

(America has faced one existential threat in modern times — the Soviet nuclear arsenal — and that is it.) But is the Islamic State (IS) a huge and menacing terrorist threat? Certainly not to the United States today . The danger to Iraq and its neighbors is real. The Islamic State has shown itself to be a formidable insurgency. Its focus is on ripping apart Iraq and Syria, sowing sectarian conflict, and creating in its midst a new jihadist state or caliphate. (That very word seems to incite fearmongers: “Every day that goes by, ISIS builds up its caliphate, and it becomes a direct threat to the United States,” said New York Representative Peter King, conjuring an image of a new Golden Horde with nuclear-tipped scimitars.) If the insurgency grows, and the threat to Jordan or Lebanon increases, we may have to act.

But, for now, it’s important to understand that even if marauding operatives in Land Cruisers may be humiliating Iraq’s hollowed-out military, that doesn’t mean they have genuine terrorist skills . Consider the details: The Islamic State has never carried out a significant attack outside of its neighborhood . In 2005, when its operatives were still part of Al Qaeda in Iraq, operatives carried out hotel bombings in Jordan and tried and failed to attack an American warship in the Red Sea. More recently, four people were killed in an apparent lone-wolf attack at the Jewish museum in Brussels by a young

man trained in Syria. In other words, we’ve seen no demonstrated ability to carry out the kind of complex international strike that kills dozens or hundreds, let alone engulfs a US city in flames .

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A2: Middle East War

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1NC – I/L DAlliance doesn’t solve foreign policy challenges Techau 2011

(Jan, director of Carnegie Europe, the European centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10/6/11, “The Dirty Secret of US European relations” http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/06/dirty-secret-of-u-s-european-relations/8l1h)

For the internal psychology of the transatlantic relationship, this is undoubtedly good news. The more interesting question, however, seems to be whether all this new love translates into a more meaningful partnership on shared foreign-policy challenges. Here the answer is less clear. While cooperation on issues such as the Middle East, Iran and

terrorism was and is constructive, one of the most crucial items on the Euro-American agenda remains untouched by the improved atmosphere: transatlantic burden sharing in the field of security and defense. Here, Europeans have for the last sixty years been in a position of utter

dependence on the Washington’s willingness and ability to guarantee their security. And even though the global strategic framework has drastically changed since the beginning of this transatlantic bargain in the

1950s, Europeans still conduct their defense planning as if American generosity were the most naturally abundant and easily accessible political commodity. By doing so, they increase their reliance on U.S. guarantees, and they

become less and less interesting as an ally for their American counterparts. All attempts to wake Europeans up and make them rethink their priorities have died away without much impact.¶ It would be easy to blame President Obama for not using his popularity with allies intelligently enough to induce them to get their act together. But the European passivity on security and defense issues goes far beyond the reach of even the most popular American president. By and large, Europeans are unaware of their utter dependency; they don’t feel particularly threatened, they hold a deep mistrust in all things military, and they have learned to look at the world without regard to

strategic considerations. Despite Libya, their willingness for an active approach to the world around them and for intervention on behalf of values and interests is small. Their political leaders—to the

extent that they are aware of today’s realities—shy away from the enormous budgetary and political costs that a realistic security and defense posture would create.The dirty little secret of transatlantic relations is that, under these circumstances, they will undoubtedly become a whole lot less boring very soon. Both America and Europe are broke. Their ability to shape the world around them is getting weaker. The global center of gravity is shifting

towards the Pacific. Americans are ultimately better suited to master this process of relative decline. But it is in Washington’s fundamental interest to keep Europe safe and stable, to keep its best allies strong and to defend the enormous economic investments it has placed in the old world. Obsessing about perceptions and sympathy ratings will soon look like frivolous luxury. The ball is in the European court. For Americans, a Europe with a grown-up strategic culture will be more important than one that produces high approval ratings for the United States. For Europeans, investing in a relevant and workable transatlantic future will be more important than an American president they find easy to like.

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1NC – No Escalation No escalationFettweis 7, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, (Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the

religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which

would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border;

once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own,

and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region . Once again, however, none of these outcomes is particularly likely. Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos . Although it might seem

counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Mid dle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its

monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's

autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads.

Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of

stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in

Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet , and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's

neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into

penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role

that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired

solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable)

fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable,

functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address

that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare.

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A2: Multilat

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1NC – I/L DThe EU itself is a terrible model for multilatVan Schaik and Ter Haar 2013 (Louise van Schaik is Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. She has extensively analysed the EU’s international activities in the fields of health (WHO), climate change (UNFCCC) and food standards (Codex Alimentarius). She has also worked on related research areas such as EU external affairs and the Lisbon Treaty, EU development cooperation and trade policy, scarcity of natural resources, global public goods, and sustainable development, Barend (Bas) ter Haar is Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. During his career at the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs he took part in many multilateral negotiations, inter alia on chemical weapons and within the EU, NATO, OSCE, IAEA and UNESCO. At the ministry he served as Director of the Policy Planning Staff. As Ambassador for International Security Affairs he represented the European Union at the ASEAN Regional Forum, “Why the EU is not promoting effective Multilateralism”, http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Why%20the%20EU%20is%20not%20promoting%20effective%20multilateralism.pdf)

However, in the decade since 2003 the EU has become increasingly quiet about this objective. Paradoxically (but logical in view of the explanation given below) the only field where the EU has been partly successful is the field of classic security, a field where feelings of national sovereignty are usually strongest. In other fields the support of the EU for effective multilateralism has, for the most part, been fragmented and weak. The experts who represented EU countries in international talks on issues such as the environment, health, food, water, education and transport, often seemed hardly aware of the existence of a European strategy to strengthen an effective multilateral system . And the diplomats who were aware of this strategy usually rather concentrated on the promotion of their national priorities. This, in combination with the Eurocrisis and the threat of the UK to leave the EU reinforced the impression that the EU is a power in decline , better known for its rhetoric than for its action . At the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 the EU was rudely confronted with a new world order in which emerging economies use their increased power to further their interests. Despite tenacious efforts to promote a new international climate treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol and a detailed ‘leadership by example’ strategy, the EU found itself sidelined, partly because of its inability to speak with a strong single voice. The case also illustrates the EU’s lack of sensitivity to its negotiating environment. Promoting effective multilateralism is not the same as simply expecting others to adopt European views and standards. An ongoing study of the way the EU has operated in a large number of multilateral forums has led us to the conclusion that the fiasco at Copenhagen is not an exceptional case, but is symptomatic .1 We were struck by the lack of a European strategy in most forums. We found some instances where the EU supported a multilateral approach, e.g. in the G20. However, in most cases the EU did not promote strategic goals, but concentrated instead on administrative reforms. In larger debates the EU was sometimes conspicuously absent due to its inability to come to a joint position, or because nobody felt responsible to cover the topic. Furthermore, many of the representatives of the EU were unaware of the positions of EU member states and EU institutions in other relevant forums. This made issue linkage difficult and could lead to contradictory positions (e.g. on intellectual property rights).

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1NC – Multilat FailsMultilateral coop will always structurally fail regardless of their internal link Barma et al., 13 (Naazneen, assistant professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School; Ely Ratner, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Steven Weber, professor of political science and at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, March/April 2013, “The Mythical Liberal Order,” The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146)

Assessed against its ability to solve global problems, the current system is falling progressively further behind on the most important challenges, including financial stability, the “responsibility to protect,” and coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare and maritime security. The authority, legitimacy and capacity of multil ateral institutions

dissolve when the going gets tough—when member countries have meaningfully different interests (as in currency

manipulations), when the distribution of cost s is large enough to matter (as in humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa) or when the

shadow of future uncertainties looms large (as in carbon reduction). Like a sports team that perfects exquisite plays during practice but fails to execute against an actual opponent, global -governance institutions have sputtered

precisely when their supposed skills and multilateral capital are needed most . WHY HAS this happened? The hopeful liberal notion that these failures of global governance are merely reflections of organizational dysfunction that can be fixed by reforming or

“reengineering” the institutions themselves, as if this were a job for management consultants fiddling with organization charts, is a costly distraction from the real challenge. A decade-long effort to revive the dead-on-arrival Doha Development Round in international trade is the sharpest example of the cost of such a tinkering-around-the-edges

approach and its ultimate futility. Equally distracting and wrong is the notion held by neoconservatives and others that global governance is inherently a bad idea and that its institutions are

ineffective and undesirable simply by virtue of being supranational. The root cause of stalled global governance is simpler and more straightforward.

“Multipolarization” has come faster and more forcefully than expected . Relatively authoritarian and postcolonial emerging powers have become leading voices that undermine anything approaching international consensus and, with that, multilateral institutions. It’s not just the reasonable demand for more seats at the table. That might have caused something of a decline in effectiveness but also an increase in legitimacy that on balance could have rendered it a net positive. Instead, global governance has gotten the worst of both worlds: a decline in both effectiveness and

legitimacy. The problem is not one of a few rogue states acting badly in an otherwise coherent system. There has been no real breakdown per se.

There just wasn’t all that much liberal world order to break down in the first place. The new voices are more than just numerous and powerful. They are truly distinct from the voices of an old era, and they approach the global system in a meaningfully different way.

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A2: NATO

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1NC – I/L DEU doesn’t solve – NATO is redundant and other international organizations fill the gapHartung 13 (Farina Hartung, Master Thesis International and European Relations, Linköping University, “Case-study of NATO: Is NATO a redundant international organization or not?”, http://www.liu.se/utbildning/pabyggnad/F7MME/student/courses/733a27masterthesis/filarkiv/spring-2013/theses-june/1.464731/MasterThesisFinalVersionFarinaHartung.pdf)

Just as mentioned above, NATO has gone through a process of changes since it was first established. It can be said that the changes where necessary or as a matter of fact that they were not - it always depends on the view one takes. The position of this paper has been stated before

that it is going to investigate the question if NATO is redundant and to show proof that it is. As history has shown, it can be argued that the

organization is redundant and has survived much longer passed its due time . From this point of view, it can be

argued that this is what hurts the organization ; they need to reform before they have a chance to act. It is quite difficult to claim that NATO is not redundant, but as mentioned before, this Thesis will take a look at the opposite side of this

claim. Instead of trying to prove that NATO is needed, I will try to show that it is not needed and has long surpassed

its duty . That has become clear over the past years. NATO has reformed itself in order to ensure that it will stay relevant enough in order to play an impacting role in politics and international relations. Although

they have taken the initiative to stay relevant, they seem to have failed. There have been different voices,

such as Theo Sommer and Kenneth Waltz, who claim and argue that NATO is as a matter of fact redundant. One could always ask what is redundancy and how can it be measured. Redundancy is not self-evident, and it also cannot really be defined. Neither can redundancy be measured. Redundancy is what one makes out of it and what others understand of redundancy is left open for discussion. But in regards to this

paper, redundancy is just the fact that NATO is not really needed any longer. The task it is currently doing ,

such as the peacekeeping, can be done by other international organizations, such as the U nited

N ations There is no longer the need for just one international organization to have its sole focus and propose on collective security. Security is something that is desired by so many countries and there is no need that NATO needs to be the one organization that will provide this to all the countries in the world. And as mentioned before, NATO already goes outside its territorial borders in order to provide security to the world (“NATO in the 21st Century). NATO is a redundant international

organization simply because it has lost its endeavor . It strives to do so much in order to provide its member states with the necessary certainty that in case of a threat, there is a whole community that will act and

protect each member state. But how should NATO really do that in reality? The member states have cut down their

size of military they have . In time of great danger, one country might not want to act because there could be a conflict of interests. Currently, there is just not such a big threat as the Soviet Union was that there needs to be a military alliance. In case that such a great threat rises to the surface again ,

it is just simply as easy to create a new international military organization which can then function

according to the actual needs, because it is always during the time of threat that new alliances are created. As mentioned above, the main

purpose of NATO has vanished when the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Since the

Cold War and the threat that the Soviet Union posed so close to European borders dissolved in the beginning of the 1990s, NATO just has lost

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its main function. According to Theo Sommer, NATO has ever since then been in a constant stage of “transformation”, never really knowing what it should achieve and what its goal is (17). In addition to that, one could argue that NATO is facing more problems that seem to have come

along with the problem of the lacking threat. This Thesis argues that NATO is neither necessary to fulfill a defensive function or that of providing security for its members . NATO is an international organization that is in fact no longer permissible. It has surpassed its life expectancy by many years. Moreover, it can be said that since it has surpassed its reason of existence, it will

step down from the position it holds in regards of an international security organization. It is no longer the main focus of the member states. NATO should also no longer be the main focus. Other organizations have emerged over the past decades that show that

they are able to do the necessary work without having to go through a process of transformation. For example regional international organization, such as the E uropean U nion could take over this task , since most of the members are located on the European continent to begin with. Furthermore, it can be claimed that NATO should be able to see that they are no longer fit for modern times. Before NATO is able to act on any kind of problem or concern, it has to go through a process of transforming itself; otherwise, it might not be able to act. This point of view may seem a bit exaggerated; however, it is suitable for NATO since it is pragmatic. NATO is not the same since the end of the Cold War. It can be said that the main reason why the NATO was established was to be able to encounter the Soviet Union in a time of crisis. According to Lindley-French, NATO today is a strategic and defensive focal point that can project both military and partnership power worldwide (89). She continuous her argument by noting that the job the alliance has to done is the same as ever and has not changed (Ibid). The job of the alliance has always been to safeguard the freedom and security of its member nations through political and security needs, instituted by the values of “democracy, liberty, rule of law and the peaceful resolution to disputes” (Ibid). Yet another point he claims is that NATO provides a strategic forum for consultation between North Americans and Europeans on security issues of common concern

and the facility for taking joint action to deal with them (Ibid). To repeat, NATO has lost its power and maybe even its standpoint in the modern day time politics. There are many different international organizations that all could take over the work of NATO or even could continue it in a better manner than NATO is currently doing. Claiming that NATO is not redundant just does not seem to follow the actual fact of the position that NATO is currently in. They have missed indeed the point where it was time to either dissolve the whole international organization or the time to reform which would have actually created positive outcomes. The latter point, however, seems

impossible now. It just is impossible for NATO to change yet again . In the time of its existence, NATO has undergone so many different changes and reforms, altogether a total of six . There is just no logical reason why NATO is able to successfully undergo another process of changes and transformation. New

reforms always bring changes and if they actually will help NATO is left in the open. As Theo Sommer puts it, NATO has served its time simply because the world has changed (9). The threats are no longer the same and to some extend may not even exist anymore. There are of course new threats , such as terrorism, piracy, and cyber-attacks, now that have emerged and rose to the surface of international politics. However, those are not really

the same as they were when NATO was created . Hence, NATO is not suitable to tackle new issues

and problems . They can try to reform, but it will never be the same because NATO itself will have to adjust to the new

situation. But this is not what this once great military alliance was intended to do .

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1NC – Collapse InevNATO collapse inev—no purpose and shrinking force-structureGranatstein 13 (Jack, has held the Canada Council's Killam senior fellowship twice, was editor of the Canadian Historical Review, and was a founder of the Organization for the History of Canada. Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, awarded the Society’s J.B. Tyrrell Historical Gold Medal. He has been awarded honorary doctorates by Memorial University of Newfoundland, the University of Calgary, Ryerson Polytechnic University, the University of Western Ontario, McMaster University, and Niagara University. Senior Fellow of Massey College. Officer of the Order of Canada Member of the Advisory Committee of the Dominion Institute, an adjunct fellow of the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military and Strategic Studies and Chair of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century. Board member and the Chair of the Advisory Council of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. “J.L. Granatstein: The end of NATO?” 3/13, http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/03/04/j-l-granatstein-the-end-of-nato/)

Perhaps it might have been better if NATO had wound itself up at the end of the Cold War. The alliance instead sought for a new role, a new strategic purpose, and it found it outside the boundaries of the alliance . Provoked by ethnic slaughter in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, it conducted operations in the former Yugoslavia, involving air attacks against Serbia and the deployment of

troops in Kosovo. Then came 9/11 and a long war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, followed by an air campaign that

brought down the Gaddafi regime in Libya.¶ None of these operations were notable successes . In June 2011, then U.S.

secretary of defence, Robert Gates, stated in public what many had privately acknowledged: NATO, the linchpin of European

security and transatlantic relations, faced “the real possibility [of] a dim, if not dismal future … While every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t . The military capabilities simply aren’t there. ” This was an affirmation of the ineffectiveness of the alliance after six decades of existence. ¶ Matters have since worsened. NATO members have begun pulling combat troops out of Afghanistan on their own timetables , and all the troops , except an undisclosed number of Americans, are scheduled to depart by 2014. The global economic crisis has led members to cut back on defence spending . And faced with the increasing power of China, the Obama administration indicated that it was rebalancing its forces toward Asia.¶ The NATO alliance seemed completely unprepared for this new uncertainty. As secretary Gates stated, “the U.S. share of NATO defence spending has now risen to more than 75% — at a time when politically painful budget

and benefit cuts are being considered at home.” The U.S., in other words, won’t pay the bills much longer. We know Canada won’t, and the Europeans don’t seem willing to do so, either. If this continues, NATO may not be long for this world.

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A2: NoKo Prolif

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1NC – I/L DAlliance doesn’t solve foreign policy challenges Techau 2011

(Jan, director of Carnegie Europe, the European centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10/6/11, “The Dirty Secret of US European relations” http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/06/dirty-secret-of-u-s-european-relations/8l1h)

For the internal psychology of the transatlantic relationship, this is undoubtedly good news. The more interesting question, however, seems to be whether all this new love translates into a more meaningful partnership on shared foreign-policy challenges. Here the answer is less clear. While cooperation on issues such as the Middle East, Iran and

terrorism was and is constructive, one of the most crucial items on the Euro-American agenda remains untouched by the improved atmosphere: transatlantic burden sharing in the field of security and defense. Here, Europeans have for the last sixty years been in a position of utter

dependence on the Washington’s willingness and ability to guarantee their security. And even though the global strategic framework has drastically changed since the beginning of this transatlantic bargain in the

1950s, Europeans still conduct their defense planning as if American generosity were the most naturally abundant and easily accessible political commodity. By doing so, they increase their reliance on U.S. guarantees, and they

become less and less interesting as an ally for their American counterparts. All attempts to wake Europeans up and make them rethink their priorities have died away without much impact.¶ It would be easy to blame President Obama for not using his popularity with allies intelligently enough to induce them to get their act together. But the European passivity on security and defense issues goes far beyond the reach of even the most popular American president. By and large, Europeans are unaware of their utter dependency; they don’t feel particularly threatened, they hold a deep mistrust in all things military, and they have learned to look at the world without regard to

strategic considerations. Despite Libya, their willingness for an active approach to the world around them and for intervention on behalf of values and interests is small. Their political leaders—to the

extent that they are aware of today’s realities—shy away from the enormous budgetary and political costs that a realistic security and defense posture would create.The dirty little secret of transatlantic relations is that, under these circumstances, they will undoubtedly become a whole lot less boring very soon. Both America and Europe are broke. Their ability to shape the world around them is getting weaker. The global center of gravity is shifting

towards the Pacific. Americans are ultimately better suited to master this process of relative decline. But it is in Washington’s fundamental interest to keep Europe safe and stable, to keep its best allies strong and to defend the enormous economic investments it has placed in the old world. Obsessing about perceptions and sympathy ratings will soon look like frivolous luxury. The ball is in the European court. For Americans, a Europe with a grown-up strategic culture will be more important than one that produces high approval ratings for the United States. For Europeans, investing in a relevant and workable transatlantic future will be more important than an American president they find easy to like.

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1NC – No NoKo ProlifNorth Korea can’t prolifHymans ‘12

[Jacques E. C. Hymans, PhD from Harvard, Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, his most recent book is Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation, “Botching the Bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs Often Fail on Their Own-and Why Iran's Might, Too,” Foreign Affairs91. 3 (May/Jun 2012): 44-53, Proquest]

The third lesson is that states that poorly manage their nuclear programs can bungle even the supposedly easy steps of the process. For instance, based on estimates of the size of North Korea's plutonium stockpile and the presumed ease of weapons fabrication , U.S. intelligence agencies thought that by the 1990s, North Korea had built one or two nuclear weapons. But in 2006, North Korea's first nuclear test essentially fizzled,

making it clear that the "hermit kingdom" did not have any working weapons at all. Even its second try, in 2009, did not work properly. Similarly, if Iran eventually does acquire a significant quantity of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, this should not be equated with the possession of a nuclear weapon.

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Extra I/L D

The U.S. is known to be unfit to deal with North Korean policies. They have disagreed with the EU on related policy in the past. Wagner 01

Alex Wagner is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, Nonproliferation Reporter/Analyst at the Arms Control Association, and many other professional occupations involving governmental law affairs. His extensive education includes a degree from the Department of War Studies at King's College London, U. of London, a B.A. in political science at Brown University, and a law degree from the Georgetown Law Center in which he had the role as the executive editor of the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, “Bush Puts N. Korea Negotiations On Hold, Stresses Verification”, ACA, April 1, 2001

Adopting a harder line toward North Korea than that of his predecessor, President George W. said March 7 that his administration would not immediately resume missile negotiations with Pyongyang left unfinished by the Clinton administration. The announcement differed from previous statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had indicated that the administration planned to pursue what appears to have been a nearly complete deal by the Clinton administration to end North Korea's missile development and exports. Bush, who made his remarks during a joint press conference with visiting South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, expressed "skepticism" about North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and said that he has concerns about the ability to verify any agreement with a closed society like North Korea. Bush said he "look[s] forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any potential negotiation would require complete

verification of the terms of a potential agreement." During the press conference Bush also said that the United States is "not certain as to whether or not [the North Koreans] are keeping all terms of all agreements." The statement sparked some confusion because the United States has only one agreement with North Korea: the 1994 Agreed Framework, which ended Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. In a briefing following the conference, a senior administration official explained that,

despite his phrasing, the president was referring to the potential verifiability of a future missile deal with North Korea. The official said that there are no indications North Korea is violating the Agreed Framework. Bush's decision to put off negotiations contrasted with statements Powell had previously made on the administration's approach to North Korea. On March 6, Powell told reporters that "we do plan to engage with North Korea and pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off." Powell went on to say that "some promising elements were left on the table" and that the United States has "a lot to offer that regime if

they will act in ways that we think are constructive." However, emerging from the March 7 meeting between Bush and Kim, Powell shifted gears, emphasizing that there is "no hurry" to engage Pyongyang. He said that the administration is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward North Korea and that it would, "in due course,

decide at what pace and when we engage." Amending his remarks from March 6, Powell said that if "there was some suggestion that imminent negotiations are about to begin—that is not the case." According to a former senior U.S. official, North Korea had been prepared at the end of the Clinton administration to stop its missile development and missile exports in exchange for international satellite launch services and nonmonetary compensation, respectively. Writing in The New York Times March 7, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, Clinton's special adviser on North Korea, characterized such an agreement as "tantalizingly close." The former senior official noted, however, that the problem of how to verify and monitor an agreement, in addition to the status of Pyongyang's current missile inventory, had remained unresolved. Powell indicated this was one reason the Bush administration was reviewing its options before proceeding. "What was missing in what had been done was how one would put in place any kind of monitoring or verification regime. And the North Koreans had not engaged on that in any serious way in the period of the Clinton administration," he said in March 8 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Powell also said that the administration would consider issues beyond missile negotiations in its policy review, including whether the conventional military balance on the Korean Peninsula should be considered simultaneously with missile talks—a course the Clinton administration had avoided. "There's a huge army poised on the demilitarized zone, pointing south, that is probably as great a threat to South Korea and Seoul and regional stability as are weapons of mass destruction. Should that be included in a negotiation with the North Koreans?" Powell asked. In what may have been a reaction to Bush's comments, on March 13 Pyongyang canceled cabinet-level discussions with Seoul hours

before they were set to begin. On March 15, North Korea threatened to "take thousand-fold revenge" on the United States "and its black-hearted intention to torpedo the dialogue between North and South [Korea]." The statement, issued by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, called Washington's new policies "hostile" and noted that Pyongyang remains "fully prepared for both dialogue and war." Congress Reacts Following Bush's demand for verification in dealings with North Korea,

Republican leaders in the House and Senate urged the administration to reconsider the terms of the Agreed Framework, under which North Korea is to be

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provided with two light-water reactors. On March 9, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms (R-NC), along with Senators Mike DeWine (R-OH) and Bob Smith (R-NH), sent a letter to Bush calling for the administration to abandon the reactor project in favor of "several clean-burning, coal-fired

power plants to meet North Korea's civilian energy needs." The letter called into question Pyongyang's "track record" and said that "North Korea's regime hardly

can be trusted with [light-water reactor] technology, or with fissile material." In a March 13 speech to the American Enterprise Institute, Henry Hyde (R-IL), chairman of the House International Relations Committee, also championed replacing the light-water reactors with conventional power plants while stressing the need for comprehensive verification in light of past actions by North Korea. Congressional Democrats urged Bush to continue to pursue a negotiated solution to U.S. concerns over Pyongyang's nuclear and missile capabilities. In a March 6 letter to Bush before his meeting with Kim, the Democratic leadership of the House and Senate, as well as the ranking members of the International Relations and Foreign Relations committees, encouraged the president to work with South Korea to address North Korea's nuclear and missile programs and said that, if he does so, they "stand ready to support" him. EU to Send Delegation to Korean Peninsula Following President George W. Bush's decision to put off missile negotiations with North Korea, the European Union (EU) announced it would send a high-level delegation to the Korean Peninsula. Speaking at the EU summit in Stockholm, President of the European Council and Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson said March 24 that he, EU Secretary-General Javier Solana, and EU External Affairs Commissioner Christopher Patten hope to visit Seoul and Pyongyang before the end of May. Persson said he planned to broach "a broad agenda" with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, including discussions on missiles. Sweden currently holds the six-

month rotating presidency of the EU and has had diplomatic relations with Pyongyang for the past 26 years. According to a senior Swedish official, the EU

discussion is intended to be "complementary" to both the North-South peace process and any further U.S.-North Korean security negotiations. The official stressed

that it is "important that the U.S.-North Korean discussions resume" and said that the dialogue on missile negotiations "cannot and should not" be taken up without the United States . However, in a March 24 interview on Swedish television, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh reportedly stated that the unanimous decision by the 15 EU leaders to send the delegation came about because "it's becoming clear that the new U.S. administration wants to take a

more hard-line approach toward North Korea . " Lindh went on to say that such a policy "means that Europe must step in to

help reduce tension between the two Koreas, not least because the outside world is so worried about North Korean missiles." —A.W.a

U.S. and EU collaborative sanctions against North Korea don’t work Bajpai 15

Prableen Bajpai is the Founder and Director at FinFix Advisors & Planners Pvt. Ltd., a financial planning and investment advisory firm. Prableen contributes for The Tribune (India), IndiaNotes.com and has authored a section of the Equity Research Module by the National Stock Exchange (NSE). She has also taught Investment Analysis and Macroeconomics to business students at the Royal Thimphu College (RTC), Bhutan. She is a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) from ICFAI, holds a masters degree in Economics and is pursuing her CFP® certification, “US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea”, Febuary 18, 2015

The dynasty regime in North Korea continues to splurge and squander its resources towards nuclear armament and military expansion, while its people suffer from food deprivation and continue to be fed by aid. The secretive totalitarian economy has increasingly isolated itself from the world except for a few allies. Its activities and actions have time and again violated international agreements, thus inviting sanctions against it. However, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been repeatedly sanctioned by the United Nations (UN), the US, Japan, Canada, Australia, and European Union, the regime has shown little inclination to comply with international agreements. (For more, see: How the North Korea Economy Works) Relations: The European Union & The United States The European Union (EU) and most of its constituent countries have bilateral diplomatic relationships with North Korea and maintain embassies in Pyongyang, and the EU indulges in annual talks with North Korea. The European Union’s stance regarding North Korea is based on a few key issues, including peace and stability in the region, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, aid (and cooperation), and human rights. According to the European Commission External Action Service, “Since 1995, over €366 million in aid has been provided in the form of food aid, medical, water and sanitation assistance and agricultural support. In 2011, the EU provided €10 million in emergency aid following a severe food crisis.” The total trade between DPRK and the European Union was €144 million or about 2.09 percent of North Korea’s trade volume. Though there is no direct involvement by the EU in North Korea’s economic reforms, Brussels is supportive of any initiatives toward reform. The European Union (through a few member countries) provides education and training in economic policy making and business to North Korean officials. The United Sates does not have any diplomatic relations with DPRK, thus neither has an embassy in the other's country. The US operates through the Swedish embassy in North Korea for any services for US citizens in DPRK. While economic interaction between the two countries is minimal, the US is concerned with issues like human

rights and food deprivation in North Korea. The only form of US economic assistance to North Korea is humanitarian during times of natural calamities or emergencies. Sanctions The US and EU comply by the UN Resolution 2094 (2013) and earlier resolutions regarding restrictions (and bans) against North Korea on the following: Travel

and asset freezes on certain individuals involved in arms dealing and exports of goods and equipment related to ballistic missiles and other weapons. Asset freezes of certain organizations involved in supporting activities towards arms and weapon dealings, as well as illegal trading activities. Items, Materials, Equipment,

Goods, and Technology (nuclear items, missile items, and chemical weapons list). Luxury goods (jewelry, pearls, gems, precious, and semi-precious stones and precious metal, as well as transportation items like yachts, racing cars, and luxury automobiles). The first EU sanction was imposed in 2006 in reaction to North Korea’s first test of a nuclear device. Currently, the European Union has autonomously banned provision of new DPRK bank notes and coins, any financial support which could be used for nuclear-related or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, and any new commitment towards DPRK in the form of concessional loans and financial assistance. There is a restriction on the issue and trade in certain bonds, use of EU airports, and establishment of subsidiaries or branches of DPRK banks. Moreover, there will be enhanced monitoring of banks in DPRK that work with EU financial institutions, as well as increased scrutiny of DPRK diplomats. In addition to supporting the UN resolutions, the US has time and again imposed sanctions on North. The US, which has backed South Korea since the start of the Korean War, first imposed an economic embargo on the North in 1950. Over the years, the US US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea By Prableen Bajpai, CFA (ICFAI) | February 18, 2015 7/9/2015 US And EU Sanctions Against North Korea http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021815/us-and-eu-sanctions-against-north-korea.asp?view=print 2/2 © 2015, Investopedia, LLC. has levied additional sanctions against North Korea, especially in the wake of its nuclear tests and provoking episodes against South Korea. Broadly, the US prohibits any foreign and military aid, government-backed credits, agricultural credits or financing, US commercial bank financing, export licenses and imports into the US for certain goods and services, export-import bank financing, any support for energy-related programs, cultural exchanges, and support in international institutions and banks. Under the Bush administration in 2008

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(Executive Order 13466), the US ended the Trading With the Enemy Act but continued with certain restrictions on North Korea and a few individuals. In 2010 (Executive Order 13551), the US blocked three North Korean entities and one individual from property and interests in property that were under US jurisdiction. In 2011 (Executive Order 13570), direct and indirect import of goods, services and technology was prohibited. The most recent sanctions (Executive Order 13687) were triggered by the cyber-attacking incident on Sony Pictures Entertainment and affect three North Korean entities, including including a government intelligence agency and a North Korean arms dealer, as well as 10 individuals employed by those entities or by the North Korean government. They have been barred from the US financial system; any assets under US jurisdiction have been blocked. (Related reading, see: How US & European Union Sanctions Impact Russia) Stance From 1988 to 2008, the US designated the DPRK government as state sponsor of terrorism. Though there are many sanctions in place against North Korea, the US has not levied any travel ban for US citizens, nor is there a ban on trade of basic goods (the trade volume is negligible though). The sanctions imposed by the US on North Korea have resulted in minimal trade limited to medicines and food. The US also prohibits any cultural exchange with DPRK. The limited engagement of Washington with Pyongyang on the diplomatic, political, and economic fronts gives it less leverage over North Korea. On the other hand, the European Union’s focus on backing any economic reform in DPRK but wanting to put a stop to the proliferation of WMD has created a quandary over what is the right balance of “pressure” and “support.” If the European Union exerts pressure without any economic engagement, the effectiveness could be minimal. While if there is no constructive pressure while it offers some economic backing, the EU stance on DPRK becomes questionable and opposed to its own stated policies. Thus, the European Union’s sanctions are aimed at blocking any direct or indirect help in North Korea’s nuclear armament program, while trying to maintain basic economic engagement in the form of trade, aid, and assistance that might improve North Korea’s economic development, human rights, and its citizen’s standard of living. (Related reading, see: Socialist Economies: How China,

Cuba And North Korea Work) Bottom Line There many opinions about the effectiveness of the sanctions. It seems that North Korea is able to get access to almost everything it requires whether it is for a luxury project or nuclear program through a back channel via its allies from the time of the Cold War. Another reason for the limited effectiveness of both EU and US sanctions is the fact that North Korea does not depend greatly on the West; its main trading partner and benefactor is China. Strings can be pulled when they are attached.

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A2: Prolif

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1NC – I/L D EU defenses solve – Alliance isn’t keyBandow 2013

(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, 4-22, "NATO's Lack Of Any Serious Purpose Means It Should Retire", http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2013/04/22/natos-lack-of-any-serious-purpose-means-it-should-retire/)

Alliances should be based on international circumstance. Rasmussen recently argued that “The need for a strong military alliance between

Europe and North America has never been stronger.” That is nonsense. Neither continent faces an existential military threat. Neither faces a significant global competitor. Neither has a compelling interest to meddle in regional conflicts. While there is much about which the U.S. and Europe should cooperate , there is no need for an American-dominated

transatlantic military alliance . Thus, what is needed is U.S. burden-shedding rather than allied burden-sharing. Europeans could provide forces sufficient to defend themselves , patrol the Mediterranean , aid the Central Asia states, and protect their interests in North Africa and the Middle East . If they chose not to do so, no worries for America. But they shouldn’t expect Washington to step in. And U.S. officials then could stop their unproductive whining about Europe’s defense choices.

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1NC – No Prolif

No impact – takes too long and too many disincentives – reversal of the program is more likelyKahl et al., Georgetown Security Studies professor, 2013

(Colin, “If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?” http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf, ldg)

I I I . LESSONS FROM HISTOR Y Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could

catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable proliferation cascades have historically proven false (see The Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than

nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most countries that have started down the nuclear path have

found the road more difficult than imagined , both technologically and bureaucratically, leading the majority of nuclear-weapons aspirants

to reverse course. Thus, despite frequent warnings of an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam,

has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to

Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue nuclear weapons. Analysts

predicting proliferation cascades tend to emphasize the incentives for reactive proliferation while ignoring or downplaying the disincentives . Yet, as it turns out, instances of nuclear proliferation (including reactive proliferation) have been so rare because going

down this road often risks insecurity, reputational damage and economic costs that outweigh the

potential benefits. 19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate. All else being equal, if a state’s leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is

required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22 The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception – and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964). However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they

produced a bomb. Over time, the number of nuclear reversals has grown while the number of states initiating programs with possible military dimensions has markedly declined . 26 Furthermore – especially since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – reactive proliferation has been

exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In the Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran’s program persists and none of these states initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest

failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to finish. According to Jacques Hymans, the average time required to complete a nuclear weapons program has increased from seven years prior to 1970 to about 17 years after 1970, even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial base required for proliferation has expanded to more and more countries.33 Yet

throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival’s

acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but leaders have to weigh these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons would make the country or regime less secure by triggering a regional arms race or a preventive attack by outside powers. Countries also have to consider the possibility that pursuing nuclear

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weapons will produce strains in strategic relationships with key allies and security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a

bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that

many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, rulers to take a coercive, authoritarian management approach to their nuclear programs. This approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately undermines nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy and professionalism of the very scientists, experts and organizations needed to successfully build the bomb.46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent

without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g., Taiwan). In contrast, several

potential proliferation candidates appear to have abstained from developing the bomb at least partly because of formal or informal extended deterrence guarantees from the U nited States (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan, Norway, South Korea and

Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that security assurances have empirically significantly reduced proliferation proclivity among

recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.

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A2: Russian War

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1NC – I/L DAlliance fails to deter Russia – Europe alone solvesBandow 2012

(Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, 8-12, "How NATO Expansion Makes America Less Safe", http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-nato-expansion-makes-america-less-safe)

With the end of the Cold War the justification for NATO disappeared. The Soviet Union split, the Warsaw Pact

dissolved, the global communist menace vanished. There no longer was any there there, as Gertrude Stein said of Oakland. President Putin is

no friend of liberty, but he evidences no design — and possesses no capability — to recreate a global empire.

Under him Russia has reverted to a pre-World War I great power, focused on winning respect and protecting its borders. A Russian invasion of Eastern Europe, let alone the core western members of NATO, is but a paranoid fantasy. Anyway, the Europeans are able to defend themselves . Today the E uropean Union has ten times the GDP and three times the population of Russia . Despite their ongoing economic crises, EU members together still spend far more than Moscow on the military. There is no prospect of Russia dominating Eurasia. Unfortunately, expanding NATO over the last two decades has turned what once was a military alliance into an international social club. Other than Poland, the post-1989 NATO entrants have been military midgets, security black holes requiring the U.S. to pay to rearm and retrain militaries which remain too small to do anything useful in a real war. Yes, the new members contributed small contingents in America’s other conflicts; President Saakashvili similarly sent Georgian troops to Afghanistan and Iraq to win American support. But the U.S. has paid

mightily for de minimis benefits. Still, alliance advocates claim that NATO could at least protect countries at Europe’s periphery. For instance, had Georgia been a member, they argue, Moscow would not have attacked. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Petras

Vaitiekunas contended that including Tbilisi would “clearly show to Russia how unhelpful it is to even try flexing its muscles.” Yet history is full of examples of alliances which failed to deter powers from acting when they believed their vital interests to be at stake. In World War I most of the continent plunged into bloody conflict despite competing military leagues . In World War II Germany ignored British and French commitments to Poland. Today Moscow might not believe that Americans and Europeans with little at stake would be so foolish as to confront a nuclear armed power over interests it viewed as vital. Moreover, the Russians are not likely to be any more inclined toward “appeasement” than would

the U.S. in a comparable situation. Indeed, given the West’s consistent policy of ignoring Russian interests, Moscow

likely would insist even more strongly that concessions not be made and humiliations not be countenanced. Attempting to establish friendly, democratic regimes along Russia’s borders , and turn them into military outposts as members of the historic

American-led, anti-Soviet alliance, is geopolitically aggressive. As America developed, Washington demonstrated little patience for European “meddling” in Central and even South America, which it considered to be America’s backyard. Perhaps U.S. intentions were better, though the Latin Americans might not agree. Nevertheless, European security guarantees for America’s neighbors would have made

Washington less rather than more tractable. Worse, NATO expansion brings the political and territorial disputes of new members with each other and Russia into the alliance. The organization then threatens to act as a transmission belt of rather than firebreak to war. Countries reliant on their own resources are more likely to compromise . In contrast, having a superpower in their corner makes them more likely to be intransigent. Although most of the new NATO members, and especially the most recent additions like Albania and Croatia, are money pits for American aid, at least these nations are geopolitically irrelevant. Moscow has no reason to pay them any mind.

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1NC – No Russian War

No Russia war – no motive or capabilityBetts, Columbia war and peace studies professor, 2013

(Richard, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence”, Foreign Affairs, March/April, ebsco, ldg)

These continuities with the Cold War would make sense only between intense adversaries. Washington and Moscow remain in an adversarial relationship, but not an intense one. If the Cold War is really over, and the West really won, then continuing implicit deterrence does less to protect against a negligible threat from

Russia than to feed suspicions that aggravate political friction. In contrast to during the Cold War, it is now hard to make the case that Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse . First, the East-West balance of military capabilities , which at

the height of the Cold War was favorable to the Warsaw Pact or at best even, has not only shifted to NATO's advantage; it has become utterly lopsided . Russia is now a lonely fraction of what the old Warsaw Pact was. It not only lost its old

eastern European allies; those allies are now arrayed on the other side, as members of NATO. By every significant measure of power -- military spending, men under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory -- NATO enjoys massive advantages over Russia. The only capability that keeps Russia militarily potent is its nuclear arsenal. There is no plausible way, however, that Moscow's nuclear weapons could be used for aggression , except as a backstop for a conventional offensive -- for which NATO's capabilities are now far greater. Russia's intentions constitute no more of a threat than its capabilities. Although Moscow's ruling elites push distasteful policies, there is no plausible way they could think a military attack on the West would serve their interests . During the twentieth century, there were intense territorial conflicts between the two sides and a titanic struggle between them over whose ideology would dominate the

world. Vladimir Putin's Russia is authoritarian, but unlike the Soviet Union, it is not the vanguard of a globe-spanning revolutionary ideal.

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A2: Terrorism

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1NC – I/L DTerror coop is strong and resilient Mix 15 (Derek E. Mix, Analyst in European Affairs, “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,” Feb 3, http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf, DAH)

Overall, in the years since the 9/11 attacks, transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism has been strong . U.S. and European officials from the cabinet level down maintain regular dialogues on issues related to homeland security and counterterrorism. In 2010, new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance entered into force. The United States and the EU have also reached agreements on container security and sharing airline passenger data as part of their efforts to strengthen aviation, transport, and border security. In

addition, the United States and the EU actively work together to track and counter the financing of terrorism, in forums such as the Financial Action Task Force and through information sharing deals such as the U.S.-EU “SWIFT agreement,” which allows U.S. authorities access to financial data held by a Belgium-based consortium of international banks as part of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). While the EU has been increasing its relevance in this area, bilateral intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperat ion between the United States and individual European countries also remains key to disrupting terrorist plots and apprehending those involved.

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1NC – No Terror

No risk of nuclear terrorism – too many obstaclesMearsheimer, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 2014

(John J. “America Unhinged”, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show)

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the U nited

States has a terrorism problem . But it is a minor threat . There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and an other attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it

arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers

were toppled. What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon ? Such an occurrence

would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil . No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that

weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency. Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well : there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the

terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism , in short, is not a serious threat . And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.

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A2: Trade

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1NC – I/L D*Read generic take-outs to relations (resiliency, inevitable, alt causes, etc)

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1NC – No Trade Wars

Trade is strong and resilientIkenson, 9 – associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute

[Daniel, “ A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10651]

Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic . According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research

Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates , the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 perce nt over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 19 29 and 19 34 , a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls " legal protectionism" is actually not that " massive ," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse

impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers , and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and

China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively

account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignite s a global trade war . Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s , and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus

bill.12 But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers . In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide

consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January

1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13v And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision

in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as

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they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

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