keys to shift conflicts from arms to...

Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue The Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012

Organized by Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development

(HiPeC-II)

in Partnership with

JICA, IDE-JETRO, UNITAR, Hiroshima Prefectural Government

2-3 August 2012 Hiroshima, Japan

Published by Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development (HiPeC-II) Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC), Hiroshima University Kagamiyama 1-5-1 Higashi-Hiroshima City, Hiroshima 739-8529, JAPAN Tel/Fax +81-82-424-6936 Email: [email protected] http://home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/hipec/ Cover design and book layout Bessho Yusuke Copyright©2013 HiPeC All rights reserved

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CONTENTS

Preface v

Workshop Program vi

Concept & Objectives of the Workshop viii

Day 1: 2 August, 2012

Opening Session

Opening Address by the President of Hiroshima University

Welcome Address by the Dean of IDEC, Hiroshima University

Congratulatory Address by the Chief of International Affairs, Hiroshima Prefecture

Briefing on HiPeC Activities by the HiPeC Secretary General, Hiroshima University

1

3

5

6

Panel-1: Mindanao (the Philippines) Group Presentations

“Keys to Shift Conflict from Arms to Dialogue”

Mohagher Iqbal

10

“Understanding the GPH – MILF ceasefire and the Peace Process”

Rasid T. Ladiasan

15

“A Mindanao Historian’s View on the Basic Issues of the GRP-MILF Peace Process”

Rudy “Ompong” Rodil

19

“Lumad: Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan-Manobo Ethnic Groups’ Position on

the Peace Process By and Between the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF)”

Timuay Melanio U. Ulama

25

Comments on Mindanao Case

Kei Fukunaga

28

Open Discussion 30

Panel-2: Aceh (Indonesia) Group Presentations

“Transformation of conflict into peace in Aceh”

Sofyan A. Djalil

33

“Presentation on Aceh Peace Process 1”

Muhammad Nur Djuli

39

“Presentation on Aceh Peace Process 2”

Shadia Marhaban

42

Comments on Aceh Case

Akihisa Matsuno

46

Open Discussion 48

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Panel-3: Nepal Group Presentations

“Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 1”

Padma Ratna Tuladhar

53

“Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 2”

Shekhar Koirala

57

“Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 3” (Attended by paper)

Krishna Bahadur Mahara

60

Open Discussion 63

General Discussion 70

Day 2: 3 August, 2012

Summary of Analysis & Discussion 77

Synthesis: the Result of Analysis & Discussion 86

Closing Discussion 87

Statement

97

Acknowledgement

98

Annex 1: List of Participants 99

Annex 2: Guide to Acronyms 101

Annex 3: The Lumad Concept of Peace and Justice 102

Annex 4: Photo Documentation 109

iv


PREFACE

Peace Process Exchange Workshops are one of the main active research endeavors of

Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development, or

HiPeC-II. The basic idea is to put experiences of the parties of conflicts in the comparative

experimental workshop during the phase I of HiPeC (HiPeC-I) in March 2008 by inviting both the

conflicting parties, government side and liberation movement side, from Mindanao, the

Philippines, and the Sudan, to discuss about Ceasefire and Development.

When we resumed the project as HiPeC-II in 2010, we decided to hold two workshops of

this kind and this volume is the record of the second one held in August 2012. In the first

workshop in HiPeC-II, we expanded the covering areas to include Nepal and Aceh, Indonesia,

and discussed reconciliation. Putting the four cases in comparative framework made our

discussion more dynamic but also more complicated. We found many insights as well as

differences that should not be overlooked when we approach the peacebuilding issues. We

increasingly felt it necessary to prepare order-made solutions to each of the conflicts, although

there clearly existed some lessons that could be learned from others.

In this second workshop, we henceforth focused more on the Asian conflicts by

requesting those having come to Hiroshima in 2010 from Asian region once again and invited

observers from another conflict area, though still in embryotic situations, i.e., West Papua,

Indonesia, so that lessons could be more vividly discussed for those who were currently fighting

for peace. For this purpose, we set the topic of the workshop as Keys to Shift Conflicts from

Arms to Dialogue.

I am very grateful to those coming all the way to Hiroshima to share their experiences.

My thanks is particularly directed to Mr. Muhammad Nur Djuli and Ms. Shadia Marhaban, who

gave us an instinct to hold this workshop as was done. My gratitude also goes to those who

spare their precious time to attend the workshop; Dr. Sofyan Djalil, Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar,

Dr. Shekhar Koirala, Prof. Rudy "Ompong" Rodil, Mr. Melanio U. Ulama, Mr. Rasid Ladiasan, Mr.

Kei Fukunaga and Prof. Akihisa Matsuno. My list of great appreciation does not conclude

witout mentioning Mr. Mohagher Iqbal’s continuous cooperation for the HiPeC activities. His

determination to attend this workshop in the most hectic days of peace negotiation with the

Philippine Government encouraged us very much.

Osamu Yoshida

Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee, Hiroshima University

perspectives by themselves to learn lessons from others’ processes toward peace. We had an

v


WORKSHOP PROGRAM

Tuesday, 2 August

Venue: Large Conference Room, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hiroshima University

09:00 - 09:30 Opening Session

(09:00 - 09:10) Opening Address: Toshimasa Asahara (President, Hiroshima Univ.)

(09:10 - 09:15) Welcome Address: Akimasa Fujiwara (Professor and Dean of IDEC,

Hiroshima Univ.)

(09:15 - 09:20) Congratulatory Address: Yasuo Hashimoto (Chief of International Affairs,

Hiroshima Prefecture)

(09:20 - 09:30) Project Briefing: Masahiko Togawa (Associate Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,

HiPeC Secretary General)

09:30 - 11:20 Panel 1: Presentations: The Mindanao Group

Chair: Noriaki Nishimiya (Director General of Japan International Cooperation

Agency Chugoku International Center)

Commentator: Kei Fukunaga (Member of International Monitoring Team,

The First Secretary of the Embassy of Japan to the Philippines) Open Forum

11:20 - 12:50 Panel 2: Presentations: The Aceh Group

Chair: Koki Seki (Associate Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,

Member of HiPeC Executive Committee)

Open Forum

13:00 - 14:30 Lunch Break / Prayer Time

14:30 - 16:00 Panel 3: Presentations: Nepal Group

Chair: Osamu Yoshida (Professor, Hiroshima Univ.

Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee)

Open Forum

16:00 - 17:00 General Discussion

Chair: Masahiko Togawa (Associate Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,

HiPeC Secretary General)

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Friday, 3 August

Venue: Large Conference Room, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hiroshima University

09:00 - 11:30 Summary of Analysis & Discussion

Chair: Osamu Yoshida (Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,


Maharjan Keshav Lal (Professor, Hiroshima Univ.)

Group Summary

Yusuke Bessho (Assistant Professor, Hiroshima Univ.)

Humayun Kabir (HiPeC Research Fellow)

Meg Kagawa (HiPeC Research Fellow)

Synthesis

11:30 - 13:00 Lunch/Break/Pray

13:00 - 14:00 Closing Session

Chair: Osamu Yoshida (Professor, Hiroshima Univ.,


19:00 - 21:00 Reception at Mermaid Café

vii


CONCEPT NOTE & DISCUSSION POINTS

Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuidling and Capacity Development (HiPeC)

II is pleased to announce that it will hold the Second Peace Process Exchange Workshop from

August 2 to 3, 2012, with ‘Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue,’ as its subject.

HiPeC II was started in 2006. It is a project to assist “Indigenous Initiatives for

Peacebuilding” by university academia, peacebuilding practitioners and indigenous people

working together and sharing each experience. In order for the academia to have first-hand

knowledge and experiences of peacebuilding, HiPeC II so far established two field offices, one in

Nepal in Sep., 2010 and the other in the Philippines in Feb., 2011, to which HiPeC researchers

have been dispatched in the short and medium terms.

At the same time, HiPeC is keen to invite people from the conflict and/or post-conflict

areas to Hiroshima, a city of peace, whose peaceful environment creates pro-dialogue

atmosphere. The Peace Process Exchange Workshops are among those opportunities HiPeC

provides and representatives are invited from both sides of conflicting parties, governments and

rebels along with representatives of civil society in different conflict areas, aiming to facilitate the

peace by learning from others’ experiences.

We discussed “A Ceasefire and Development” in our first and experimental workshop

held in March 2008 by inviting representatives of Mindanao and Sudan conflicts and found that

development and a ceasefire have reciprocal effects. The officially first workshop was met in

March 2011, and discussed “Peace and Reconciliation” among peace negotiators from Nepal,

Mindanao, the Sudan and Aceh. The delegates agreed that a peacebuilding theory for local

conflicts and initiatives must include the painful reconstruction process among conflicting parties.

From the results of these two workshops, we, the HiPeC, have concluded that to find the

key moments that conflicts shifted from armed ones to dialogue in the actual peace negotiation

processes would be one of the most crucial lessons we could draw from this kind of endeavors.

This is reason we decided that the Second HiPeC Peace Process Exchange Workshop

would be to discuss “Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue” and invite Asian peace

negotiators from Aceh, Mindanao and Nepal. The subjects to be discussed include 1) triggers

to shift conflicts from arms to dialogue, 2) a consensus making process within each of the

contending camps and with other stakeholders, and 3) its necessary environments to bring

consensus among the people of the camps and with other stakeholders.

A brief history of each of the peace processes of invitees and subject matters of each

case are provided below. The sessions of the Workshop will be closed to the public; only HiPeC

partners and members besides official invitees will participate in a discussion.

viii

Mindanao:

The official peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH) and

the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been conducted since 1997 to find a

comprehensive, just and lasting solution for the Moro struggles for self-determination and to put

an end to the armed conflict. The MILF is the third Muslim independence movement in the

Philippines from 1968 by Moro people, composed of 13 Muslim tribes in Mindanao and Sulu

Archipelago in the Southern Philippines. Moro people are descendants of the sultanates in

Mindanao in the 15thcentury and onward which kept independence against Spanish invasion.

However, they were merged into the Philippines without their consent at the Treaty of Paris

between Spain and the USA in 1898. Through a development-resettlement program of the

American colonialism, Japanese occupation and the Philippine government policy, Moros have

been marginalized in their own ancestral lands. They founded Muslim Independence

Movement in 1968 which was disorganized after their leader had been appointed as the

Presidential Adviser on Muslim Affairs in the same year. The Moro National Liberation Front or

MNLF took it over in 1969, and then the MILF in 1984.

After the full-scale civil war from1973 to 75 between the GPH and the MNLF, the 1976

Tripoli Agreement brought a ceasefire and established the Autonomous Region for Muslim

Mindanao or ARMM in Southwestern part of Mindanao under the sovereignty and territorial

integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. But it was after twenty years that two parties finally

agreed on the Final Peace Agreement in 1996 and how to administer the ARMM. Meanwhile,

the MILF broke away from the MNLF in 1984 seeking the right to the Moros for self-determination.

After the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the MNLF and the GPH, the MILF started to

engage in armed struggles.

Some negotiations and a couple of all-out wars had preceded the MILF’s negotiated and

thus compromised solution to the self-determination that directly affects 13 of the 25 provinces of

Mindanao, Sulu Archipelago and Palawan now. The terms of negotiation are to recognize

political existence of Bangsamoroor Moro state within the Republic of the Philippines. In 2008,

the GPH-MILF panels produced the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain

(MOA-AD), a guide to the formulation of the Comprehensive Compact; however, the popular

opposition, especially from local politicians, was widespread in Mindanao before the signing of

the agreement and the Temporary Restraining Order, or TRO, was requested at the Supreme

Court, which issued the requested TRO and aborted the signing of MOA-AD. The Supreme

Court later also declared that the document was unconstitutional, and then the parties went into

armed conflict once again. In July 2009, the GPH-MILF re-established official contact after

nearly a year of deadlock in the peace negotiations, and negotiations for a Bangsamoro political

entity continues even today.

This independent movement of Moros also affected the communities of Lumad -

Indigenous People of Mindanao with 35 tribes and sub-tribes which occupies 8.9 % of the

ix

Population of Mindanao in 2000, while Moros occupy 18.5 % and Christian migrants and their

descendants 72.5 %. In August 2008, more than 200 leaders of various Lumad tribes stated

their position on the MOA-AD issue and their desire to be excluded in the Bangsamoro body.

While most of Lumad recognize the legitimacy of Bangsamoro aspirations and claim distinct

identities, ancestral domains and right to self-determination of their own, the Teduray tribe,

already inhabited within the ARMM, makes it clear that they do not oppose the MOA-AD and

want the Bangsamoro body to recognize their Teduray identity, their ancestral domain and their

right to self determination within this area.

With these historical complexities of Mindanao conflict, all the invitees, the GPH and the

MILF panel members and a Lumad leader, will discuss at this Workshop about ; 1) trigger

moments –why and how the GPH and the MILF picked up peace talks after all-out wars in 2004,

2) a consensus making process - why and how the GPH and the MILF panel members after

2008beganto speak in public about the peace process, and 3) elements of necessary

environments for unity of the people within their own camps and with stakeholders for resuming

the peace negotiations.

Aceh

The Peace Agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or

GAM (the Free Aceh Movement) is one of the noted examples of the transformation of a

separatist conflict into transitional peace the international community has witnessed in recent

years. Aceh, an independent sultanate state until the second half of the nineteenth century, had

been exploited by the Dutch colonial power and the Japanese military occupation. After the birth

of Indonesia as an independent nation-state in 1949, Aceh was annexed as a part of a new state

with special autonomy status. The continuity of this status had been interrupted several times

in later period.

Many contend that the centralized unitary statecraft’s intervention in and exploitation of

Aceh in its natural resources for the benefits of ruling and military elites of Javanese Indonesia

had contributed to the growing resentment among Acehnese against the Indonesian state. The

resentment was transformed into separatist movement after the foundation of the GAM in the

1970s to free Aceh from Indonesia. The continued conflict between the GAM and the Indonesian

state until the early years of 21st century had caused severe human rights violation including

deaths of several thousands of people. Internal political dynamics and the transition from

dictatorship to democracy in Indonesian power politics also affected the transformation of the

conflict in Aceh. Peace talks between the government and the GAM began in 2000, but they

were unsuccessful several times due to the lack of trust between the two parties and continued

military and other law enforcing forces’ intervention in Aceh.

The great Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami that took away estimated lives of

170,000 Acehnese in 2004 added a new dimension of Acehnese sufferings. In this context,

x

international community came forward with humanitarian assistance to save Aceh from the

severe sufferings caused not only by natural but also by human disasters. A more

comprehensive peace negotiation facilitated by the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari

began in January 2005. After several rounds of discussions and negotiations in Helsinki, the

Peace Agreement was signed between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM in August

that brought the Aceh conflict to the end.

Considering the background context of Aceh’s conflict, the discussions of this workshop

will focus on the factors, mechanism and modalities of the peace negotiation. The invited

speakers, former activists of Free Aceh Movement and the representative from the Indonesian

government, both of whom played profound roles in the peace negotiation process, will discuss

a) what contributing factors affected the transformation of the Aceh’s armed conflict into peace

dialogue, b) how the leaderships of the Indonesian government and the GAM mobilized other

members of their own groups in order to get consensus on the peace agreement, and c) what

techniques and modalities were applied for this. The lessons learned from the transformation of

conflict into peace in Aceh would be beneficial to those countries currently experiencing political

and other forms of conflicts.

Nepal

The “People’s War”, launched by the Maoist party, a faction of Communist Party of Nepal (CPN),

in February 1996, came to an end with the Peace Accord between the Maoist and the Seven

Party Alliance government of Nepal in 2006. Many believe that successful growth and spread of

Maoist movement in Nepal were closely associated with several factors characterized in Nepal

such as fragile democracy, powerful monarchy, socio-economic, cultural and ethnic-caste

inequality. Eventually, the end of insurgency transformed Maoists not just to be a legitimized

political force but also the largest and strongest power in the post-conflict Nepali state. What

motivation brought the Maoist to the open space as a legitimized democratic force in Nepal?

In this workshop, the invited participants who played profound roles in the peace dialogue

would focus on three major topics: a) what triggered the initiation of peace talk between the

Maoists and the Government of Nepal i.e. in what particular social and political contexts and time

both parties recognize the necessity for dialogue; b) how the leaderships of Maoists and the

Seven Party Alliance could get consensus and endorsement from their own party members; and

c) how leaderships, facilitators and negotiators could able to gain greater solidarity from other

stakeholders and peoples of the society in the process of dialogue, which was crucial for the

recognition and acceptance of the outcome of the dialogue by different social groups, political

and ethnic leaderships and international community as well.

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DISCUSSION POINTS:

1) triggers to shift conflicts from arms to dialogue,

2) a consensus making process within each of the contending camps and with other stakeholders

3) its necessary environments to bring consensus among the people of the camps and with other

stakeholders

ACEH

The Peace Agreement in 2005

b/w the GOI – GAM

to end the armed movement for Aceh’s

independent and to recognize the

“self-governance” of the people of Aceh

1) what contributing factors affected the

transformation of the Aceh’s armed conflict

into peace dialogue

2) how the leaderships of the Indonesian

government and the GAM mobilized other

members of their own groups in order to get

consensus on the peace agreement

3) what techniques and modalities were applied

for the peace agreement.

MINDANAO

In Process of Peace Negotiation

b/w the GPH-MILF since 1997

to find a comprehensive, just and lasting solution for

the Moro struggles for self-determination

1) trigger moments –why and how the GPH and the

MILF picked up peace talks after all-out wars in

2004

2) a consensus making process - why and how the

GPH and the MILF panel members after 2008

began to speak in public about the peace process

3) elements of necessary environments for unity of

the people within their own camps and with

stakeholders for resuming the peace

negotiations.

NEPAL

The Peace Accord b/w the Maoist and the Seven Party Alliance government of Nepal in 2006

to end the People’s War, transition to Federal Democratic Republicanism and to a peacemaking

process without Monarchism

1) what triggered the initiation of peace talk between the Maoists and the Gov. of Nepal i.e. in

what particular social and political contexts and time both parties recognize the necessity for

dialogue.

2) how the leaderships of Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance could get consensus and

endorsement from their own party members.

3) how leaderships, facilitators and negotiators could able to gain greater solidarity from other

stakeholders and peoples of the society in the process of dialogue.

xii


OPENING ADDRESS

Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, thank

you very much for your coming all the way to my

university. You are most welcome, I would like to say

‘welcome back’ as some of you already came here

once or more times, to Hiroshima, the Symbol of

Peace, for this second workshop for exchanging the

precious experiences of you, our distinguished guests,

about your peace process .

On behalf of Hiroshima University I am very

pleased and honored to welcome you, great

peacebuilders of Ache, Mindanao and Nepal.

Established on the devastated city destroyed by

the single atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima at the

end of the last world war, my university has emphasized the “Pursuit of Peace” as one and the

first of its five guiding principles. However, our peace does not end at the nuclear weapon

issues but has a broader scope including peace from the immediate and contemporary issues

like regional conflicts. As a national university on the City of Peace, we recognize this

responsibility of disseminating peace in every aspect.

Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development or

HiPeC is a leading project for peace in my university and struggling hard to establish the studies

of peacebuilding as an integrated science with special emphasis on the “Indigenous Initiatives” in

conflict and post-conflict areas. HiPeC’s uniqueness in peace research in Japan is its academic

commitment to the practical issues of peacebuilding to such an extent that it has established two

field offices, one in Kathmandu and the other in Davao, Mindanao, the Philippines, with the help

from our partner universities.

With HiPeC, we would like to contribute more to the peace in contemporary world and this

workshop is one of these attempts we are making for this direction. I know that we must learn

from the local realities of contemporary peace. And distinguished peacebuilders, you are the

ones that guide us for peace updated.

My congratulations on their coming back to this workshop is to two old friends from Aceh,

Sir Nur Djuli and Ms. Shadia Marhaban, tough negotiators of Free Aceh Movement, and I would

like to welcome His Excellency Dr. Sofyan Djalil, also from Aceh and from Indonesian

Government working hard at Helsinki for resolving the longstanding conflict and creating

sustainable peace in Aceh.

I have a deep sympathy for the resumed efforts of negotiations on peace in Mindanao, the

Philippines, and I put a great hope to the roles to be played by Chairman Mr. Mohagher Iqbal and

1

Mr.Rasid Ladiasan. I also believe from the bottom of my heart that continued efforts of

Chairperson Mr. Melanio Ulama and Mindanao Historian Professor Rudy Ompong Rodil will

bring peace in this futile island.

I would like to congratulate a Nepali peacemaker, His Excellency Mr. Padma Ratna

Tuladhar, on his historical role to bring the two parties in armed conflict together to the dialogue

for peace. He came to Japan so often and this is the second time to come to my university. I

feel very much honored to see you today for the first time.

Since I am a medical doctor, and since I have my former student in Nepal, I have special

pleasure to meet Dr. Shekhar Koirala, who is also a medical doctor and has a deep insight in the

future of the beautiful country. I hope I can make a trip to Nepal after you and all other political

leaders come together to create a stable democratic country soon. It is my great regret that His

Excellency, Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, is not with us today to discuss the peace process in

Nepal in which he was a crucial figure. I heard he was suffering from the fever. I wish his

earliest recovery and another chance to meet him.

I sincerely believe that this workshop with all of you here will bring a new horizon to the

research on and practice of peacebuiding. Hiroshima University through HiPeC will continuously

do our best to bring peace in Asia and everywhere in the world with our reliable partners, JICA,

IDE-JETRO, UNITAR and Hiroshima Prefectural Government, by creating a team for peace in

which Hiroshima University plays a pivotal role.

Thank you very much once again for joining us here and hope you enjoy your time in my

university.

Asahara Toshimasa

President, Hiroshima University

2


WELCOME ADDRESS

First of all, on behalf of IDEC, graduate school for

international development and cooperation, I wish to

express my hearty welcome you to Hiroshima University.

I feel very much honored to be part of this both timely

and highly fruitful workshop.

IDEC was established in April 1994 on a special mission

of actively nurturing expertise in various challenging

issues facing developing countries. Since then, IDEC

has brought together internationally leading researchers

and exceptional students, and we are consequently

being a distinguished center of excellence in the field of

international cooperation studies with 3 pillars of research and education; international peace

cooperation, international environmental cooperation and international educational cooperation.

Within the context, IDEC gives great emphasis to the importance of broadening the students'

opportunities in developing countries to meat the major challenges. As of March 2012, totally 274

students composed of approximately 70% of international ones are now studying in IDEC. The

graduates including 1,194 with master’s degrees and 225 with doctoral degrees since the

establishment play an active part as leaders in the global world.

As our president introduced, HiPEC, Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding

and Capacity Development has initially established in 2005 supported by Ministry of Education,

Culture, Sports, Science and Technology as a representative project of peacebuilding study field

in collaboration with worldwide academic/practical and global/local institutes. For instance,

HiPeC established two field offices in the conflict and post-conflict areas, those are in Katmandu,

Nepal and Mindanao, the Philippines, in order to conduct researches on peacebuilding closely

with the people who have experiences of conflict and peace making. The uniqueness of HiPEC

can be found in their emphasis in the activities at local places.

IDEC also follow the uniqueness to take an importance role and contributions to their valuable

research and educational activities on peace.

Distinguished delegates,

Almost one half year has passed since the devastating accident of March 11 in Northeast Japan.

3

The whole country and indeed the whole world were eyewitnesses for the first time in history to

an unfolding major nuclear accident, triggered by a super-scale earthquake and a super-size

tsunami. These succeeding events turned into a complex disaster of calamitous proportions.

The March 11 earthquake and tsunami caused human casualties going up to nearly 20,000

people, 93% of whom by tsunami. One year after, the number of people displaced from their

homes by the nuclear accident is more than 100,000 and several hundred thousand more people

continue to live with fears of radiation.

My own background will constrain my capacity to discuss the procedure of recovery and the

building resilient society against the terrifying disaster. However, I can believe the world network

to share and exchange our experience will lead us to a solution, by witnessing a lot of anxiety

and encouraging e-mails from all parts of the world at that day. Hiroshima University has a long

and strong tradition in peace study for obvious reasons. In this sense, I sincerely hope that

today’s workshop would also be quite meaningful.

Let me end on an optimistic address here to finally express my sincere thanks to all domestic

partners, JICA, IDE-JETRO, UNITAR Hiroshima Office, and Hiroshima Prefecture for your daily

great contributions.

Thank you

Akimasa Fujiwara

Dean of IDEC, Hiroshima University

4


CONGRATULATORY ADDRESS

Dr. Asahara, president of Hiroshima University and

distinguished guest and ladies and gentlemen, good morning.

On behalf of Hiroshima prefectural government I would like

to express my sincere welcome to Hiroshima to our friends

from Ache in Indonesia, Nepal, Mindanao in Philippines as

participants of this workshop and also I would like to

welcome friends from Papua New Guinea as observer to this

workshop. We are very happy to receive you in our

prefecture I hope you enjoy stay in the prefecture.

Last year Hiroshima prefectural government

formulated Hiroshima for global peace plan in order to contribute for global peace, that is why

Hiroshima is satisfied this HiPeC project. we are hoping support this program and work together.

As you know Hiroshima was completely destroyed by atomic bomb first time in human history.

However thanks to support from around the world and untiring effort we were able to reconstruct

Hiroshima from ashes. Mr. Mejia, head of UNITAR, one of United Nation’s institutes in Hiroshima

said knowledge technology and funding/money is important for reconstruction. However faith

and belief in reconstruction is essential. I hope Hiroshima can be a place that gives this faith

people who visit here. I think faith in reconstruction is faith in the future, also hope for the future.

This seems important for reconciliation and collaboration for the future or development of

country’s future. I hope Hiroshima might be a place of peace dialogue and reconciliation. I again

welcome you from Ache Nepal Mindanao Papua New Guinea. You will feel power of faith in

Hiroshima and return Hiroshima’s message of peace. In closing I would like to express

appreciation to all the people who work hard for this workshop and I wish this work shop will be a

meaningful and fruitful successful one. Thank you very much.

Hashimoto Yasuo

Chief of International Affairs, Hiroshima Prefecture

5


BRIEFING ON HiPeC ACTIVITIES

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am Togawa Masahiko, Secretary General

of HiPeC. I am very honored to speak to you about the Hiroshima University Partnership Project

for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development (HiPeC) and about our event today -- the Second

Peace Process Exchange Workshop.

Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development

or HiPeC is a research project which started in 2005. Hiroshima University has a long history of

peace studies but research on peacebuilding is a new phenomenon after the end of the Cold War.

As a matter of fact, the ‘practice’ in peacebuilding went much ahead of the ‘research’ work on

peacebuilding. This contributed on how HiPeC evolved. It has been organized in such a way that

it works in close partnership with those practitioners’ organizations assisting peacebuilding such

as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the Japan International

Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the Prefectural Government of Hiroshima has just joined us as

a new partner. From the academic side, the Institute of Developing Economies – Japan External

Trade Organization has been a partner since the beginning of HiPeC-I (the first phase) just like

UNITAR and JICA.

We have overseas academic partners too including Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies

(CNAS), Tribhuvan University, and University of the Philippines, Mindanao. In the partnership

framework, we learned a lot from the problems and difficulties they encountered and were

convinced that not only the practitioners with ‘research’ mind but also researchers with ‘practice’

mind were necessary to facilitate the research on peacebuilding.

In addition to our partnership research, we invited the activists in the field of

peacebuilding to hold an international conference in March 2007. The aim of that conference

was to find ways of assisting agencies to have more interactions with the peacebuilding activists

to facilitate indigenous initiatives for peacebuilding. Further in 2008, we brought leaders from the

conflicting parties in Mindanao, Philippines and South Sudan to Hiroshima where we held an

experimental Peace Process Exchange Workshop as a platform for them to exchange their

peace process experiences.These occasions were very valuable first-hand sources for our

research on peacebuilding and made us conclude that people in the conflict areas who suffer

from the direct impact of the conflict must be at the center of the peace and post-conflict

reconstruction. At the same time we also thought that if facilities for those indigenous

peacebuilders to learn more from other indigenous peacebuilders were provided, it would be

more beneficial for peace and reconstruction processes to proceed. I believe provision of those

facilities is what the international community can do to help peacebuilding processes. Thus,

academic institutions can contribute significantly to this international endeavor in peacebuilding.

Deriving lessons from our experiences, we realized the need to have research offices in

the places where peacebuilding is going on. Thus, we decided to establish the three pillars in the

6

current HiPeC, as we call it “HiPeC-II” since this is the second phase of our project. We added

the activities of our own peacebuilding efforts as academicians to the existing two pillars in phase

I, namely: the Peacebuilding Research Seminars and the Peace Process Exchange Workshops,

though the latter was still experimental.

Furthermore, I would like briefly to explain the three pillars of HiPeC activities.

‘Peacebuilding research seminars’ will always remain as the core activities from the academic

point of view. We expect these seminars to be held simultaneously at the three offices

(Hiroshima, Kathmandu and Davao). The aim is to be able to apply the results of the academic

researches to the areas of peacebuilding activities and vice versa through trans-dimensional

exchanges between researchers and practitioners. By trans-dimensional, I want to imply various

meanings and perspectives coming from different actors, different places and different phases of

peacebuilding.

The second pillar, as an attempt to exchange experiences of peace and peacebuilding

processes in different conflict or post-conflict areas, all parties of the conflict including the local

civil society representatives will be invited to Hiroshima to participate in workshops. This

workshop is the second occasion after last Peace-Process Exchange Workship in 2010 under

such intention and concept in HiPeC-II.

The third pillar is the ‘Peacebuilding Research Project. This is the new pillar in the

project of HiPeC- II. In phase I, we in Hiroshima University mainly did the coordinating work for

the practitioners to exchange their experiences and ideas and through these processes we get

the research data and materials. But we came to realize that to further our activities, our own

involvement in the real peacebuilding efforts was necessary. Thus we have decided to establish

the local offices of HiPeC at the areas where peacebuilding is required. Following this thought,

we are establishing two local offices for researchers to practically involve in the ‘Indigenous

Initiatives for Peace and Reconstruction Process’. Dispatching the teachers and the researchers

from Hiroshima to the offices for medium-term and cooperating with the organizations, we

encourage the search for establishing peacebuilding studies on the basis of indigenous

initiatives. We do not mean that we will go and do the job of reconstruction together with those

peacebuilders. Our mandate limits us. Rather we should work closely together with researchers

in those places.

Hiroshima University has relatively many South Asia specialists as academic staff who

have decade-long experiences of academic exchange with other universities in Japan as well as

with Tribhuvan University in Nepal. During that period, mutual understanding of the tasks and

problems of Nepal was deepened. Coincidentally, while we were planning the second phase of

HiPeC, the peace process in Nepal progressed making it possible for us to involve them in the

process from the very early stage. This is the reason why we established our first local office in

Kathmandu in September 2010.

Similarly, Hiroshima University had a decade-long experiences of academic exchanges

with the University of the Philippines System. In HiPeC-I, we did a lot together with them on the

development of the peacebuilding. The Mindanao peace process occupies a unique place also in

7

Japan’s aspiration to contribute to the peacebuilding efforts. Japan for the first time embarked to

be involved in the peace process through development assistance even before any peace

agreement was reached. This encouraged us to open the second office in Davao, Mindanao.

With the tripartite office of the three organizations, namely, HiPeC, UP Mindanao and SSN, we

can start the joint research projects together. This will encourage other Filipino and

international researchers to join us eventually.

In summary, Hiroshima University’s HiPeC-II in cooperation with partner organizations of

practitioners as well as researchers in Japan, namely: JICA, IDE-JETRO, UNITAR, the

Hiroshima Prefectural Government and with our overseas partners will conduct the activities

according to the three pillars with a shared goal of enriching and developing a comprehensive

theory for seamless assistance for peacebuilding with indigenous initiatives at its core.

Through this 2nd Peace Process Exchange Workshop, we will have a comparative

exchange of views based on the different experiences we learned from each of you. We will then

proceed to a general discussion and hopefully we will be able to synthesize the entire exchange

of experiences. So that’s all I have to tell you and please enjoy the workshop. Thank you very

much for your attention.

Masahiko Togawa

HiPeC Secretary General, Hiroshima University

8

Panel-1: Mindanao (the Philippines) Group Presentations

Chair

Noriaki Nishimura

Director General of JICA Chugoku International Center

Presenters

Mohagher Iqbal

Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel

Rudy “Ompong” Rodil

Former Vice Chair of the Govt. of the Philippines Peace Panel

Professor, Mindanao State University


Chairperson of the Organization of Teduray-Lambangian Congress

Rasid T. Ladiasan Head of Secretariat of the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities of the MILF

Commentator

Kei Fukunaga

Member of International Monitoring Team

The First Secretary of the Embassy of Japan to the Philippines

9


Keys to Shift Conflicts from Arms to Dialogue

Mohagher Iqbal, Chairman, MILF Peace Panel

This paper aims at directly responding to the theme of this workshop, “Keys to Shift Conflicts from

Arms to Dialogue,” with my thought also drifting to the other auxiliary issues that require serious and

sincere reflections on why and how this shift has taken place, but whose terminal point is yet to be

reckoned by the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

They are still in the thick of hard negotiation. Honestly, the end of this process is difficult to say,

although what is clear now is that it is in the final stretch; and for which reason, discussions are

getting more intense and, at times, emotional. The cliché’ that in negotiation, the devils are in the

details is very much evident.

As a backdrop, as a member of the underground revolutionary movement for almost 40

years since 1972, I must confess that this shift from militancy to dialogue is not an easy

transformation. This was also true with the rest of the leaders in the MILF. How much more difficult

if the decision is made at the formal organizational level. Consider the following obstacles in the

shift of policy: First, when one decides to fight the government, it carries with it not just the litany of

legitimate grievances against it, but a program to change the system or status quo, which, in the

first place, caused the miseries and sufferings of our people. To achieve this, the main approach is

through armed struggle. The premise is that the status quo will not yield to reformist approach

except by force of arms or revolutionary struggle. Second, the excesses of the state and its armed

forces continued unabatedeven in the course of the negotiation. Third, any appearance of

“softening” by anyone in the movement does not auger well for the rest. Sometimes, it is viewed

very negatively. Fourth, after persevering in organizing the people into committees and the military

into a fighting force, in addition to asupport from those who are engaged in the open and legal

struggle, any radical shift in approach, even for strategic or tactical reasons, is hard to justify in the

eyes of our people and our fighters. And fifth, a localized peace talks is largely considered as giving

in to the dictate of the enemy, because the playing field is not level. The government has all the

edge, in terms of resources, skills, and manpower. It can also use the open engagement to pry on

the secrets of the rebel organization. This is the rationale why it took the MILF 20 years before it

decided to negotiate peace with the GPH in 1997.

Indeed, the negotiation that ensued was not easy. Our counterparts in government were

former military generals, and at times, while we were still facing each other in the negotiating table,

fighting had already or was already taking place somewhere. This harsh state of the negotiation

remained for years until it suffered a major setback in 2000. President Joseph Estrada declared an

all-out war against the MILF, despite the ceasefire and the on-going negotiation. More than a million

10

people were displaced; hundreds of combatants and civilians on both sides died or wounded; and

millions worth of properties were destroyed. As a consequence, the negotiation bogged down

completely. The MILF withdrew its peace panel and hit back, using ahighly mobile tactical counter-

offensive. But in his characteristic “arrogance”, Estrada summarily declared victory after

government forces succeeded to occupy some of the major camps of the MILF, without knowing

that the withdrawal was largely part of the tactical maneuver of the MILF to engage the enemy in full

guerrilla warfare, which is most suited for smaller forces fighting a superior enemy.

The bloodshed could have prolonged indefinitely, but an unexpected event took place.

President Estrada was ousted from office and Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed

the presidency. She immediately reversed the all-out war policy of Estrada into all-out peace policy

and asked Malaysia’s help to convince the MILF to resume the negotiation. True enough, the talks

resumed not long after. This, however, elevated the peace talks from the domestic stage to the

diplomatic stage, with third party facilitation. However, barely two years after, Arroyo resorted to the

same policy of her predecessor by declaring another all-out war against the MILF, this time in Buliok

Complex in Pikit, North Cotabato on February 11, 2003. The target, dubbed as “high value”, was no

less than the late MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim who was delivering an early morning sermon for

the Eid’l Adha prayers marking the culmination of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Almost

simultaneously, the lairs of Vice Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and Vice Chairman Ghazali Jaafar

were also target. Both leaders luckily anticipated the dragnets and escaped unscathed.

Because of this treachery, reviving the talks was very difficult. Trust was at its lowest level.

It was compounded by the lengthening peace process. Adding to this difficulty was the intense

lobbying of the Arroyo administration with the United States Government to declare the MILF as a

“terrorist organization”. The Arroyo government almost succeeded had not the MILF was quicker in

the draw when it engaged the United States constructively earlier on. The late Chairman Salamat

Hashim had sent a letter to President George Bush reminding him of the unfinished obligation of the

United States to correct the “historic injustice” committed against the Moros when it “illegally and

immorally” annexed the Moro homeland into the Philippines in the grant of independence in 1946.

President Bush responded through the US Assistant Secretary of State affirming that the US

recognized the “legitimate grievances” of the Moros which shall be addressed through a peaceful

negotiation between the two parties. When President Bush addressed the Joint Session of the

Congress of the Philippines in 2003, he mentioned the Salamat’s letter and urged the Philippine

government and the MILF to resume their negotiation immediately. He also promised to extend help

to the peace process “politically” and “economically”.

At this juncture, the two parties signed the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the GPH-MILF Ad

Hoc Joint Action (AHJAG) whose main task and responsibility is “to interdict and isolate” kidnap-

for-ransom groups; and by extension covers also the so-called terrorists, because kidnapping is

also their forte. These twin developments effectively staved off the terrorist tag to the MILF. The

11

main reason, however, is the fact that the MILF is truly a revolutionary organization with a clear

political agenda. As such, it disdained resort to anti-people activities like kidnapping, robbery,

extortion, etc.

In the meantime, the peace negotiation continued to crawl forward, despite the fragile

ceasefire on the ground and the occasional flare-up of skirmishes in some part of Mindanao. But

the parties persevered and moved on. This time they agreed to bring in the International Monitoring

Team (IMT) led by Malaysia, and with Libya, Japan, Brunei, as members. The task is mainly to

monitor the ceasefire agreement and create peace and tranquility on the ground while the two

parties engage in the negotiating table.

By this time, the parties had already signed the implementing guidelines for the two aspects

of the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, namely, on security and relief, rehabilitation, and development,

which brought them to confront the third and last aspect, the ancestral domain, which is a very

difficult matter to crack. They put this in the agenda of talks in December 2004 and after three years

and eight months of hard bargaining, they clinched a deal called Memorandum of Agreement on

Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which they initialedon July 27, 2008, but not after an MILF walkout the

day before, in protest of the changing of positions by the government. They set August 5 as the

formal signing ceremony, which attracted several foreign dignitaries including the US Ambassador

to the Philippines, Kristie Kenny. But what was set as a day of rejoicing turned out to be a black day.

The Philippine Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.

Given this setback in the negotiation, the reaction of the MILF, at least its three

commanders – Abdullah “Bravo” Macapaar, Omra Kato, and Ali Pangalian – was almost predictable

and instantaneous. Without clear mandate from the MILF central leadership, they initiated firefights

in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte. At first, the Arroyo administration adopted a hardline stance,

and sent massive force for a counter-offensive. But the MILF stood its ground and refused to budge

an inch including condemning its three commanders. The most that it conceded was to call for a

third party investigation to determine who was really guilty in starting the firefight. While it can easily

concede that Bravo started the haywire in Lanao del Norte, but in North Cotabato, Kato was the

aggrieved party. He was attacked by government soldiers and militias in Aleosan, North Cotabato

on July 1, 2008, without justifiable reason.

Not long after, the Arroyo administration agreed to cease fighting and wanted the

negotiation to resume. The MILF refused to return to the negotiating table and denounced the

government as traitor for failing to sign the MOA-AD. Malaysia, as third party facilitator, intervened

and asked the MILF to reconsider its decision and to return to the negotiating table immediately.

After some serious inner thoughts, the MILF agreed to resume the negotiation on the condition that

an international guarantee must be in place. The government refused to accept the nomenclature,

citing that no state on its own volition could accept outside imposition. However, after some back-

channeling or shuttling, the term “International Contact Group” or ICG was agreed by the parties,

12

whose main function is to “exert proper leverage” to the parties. The ICG is composed of states and

international non-government organizations (INGOs) namely, for the states: the United Kingdom,

Japan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and for the INGOs: Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Asia

Foundation, Conciliation Resources, and Muhammadiyah.

Meanwhile, while there was relative peace in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte, the

Province of Maguindanao became the new scene of disturbances. More than 300,000 people fled

their homes and evacuated to safer places. The military also blocked the flows of food, medicines,

and other supplies to the beleaguered communities. The desperate situation came to fore when Lt.

Col. Jonathan Ponce, spokesman of the Army 6th Infantry Division in Awang, Datu Odin Sinsuat,

Maguindanao, described these internally displaced persons (IDPs) as “enemy reserve force’. He

made matter worst when he made the pronouncement during an interview with a group of media,

some of whom came from Manila, and a few were members of international news agencies and

wire services. As a consequence, the MILF pounded on this blunder and demanded that a

mechanism attached to the IMT must be in place for the protection of non-combatants including

children, women, and old folks. This gave way to the creation of the fourth componentcalled

“Civilian Protection” of the IMT, now having additional members namely, Norway, Indonesia, and

the European Union.

Currently, CPC has four members: Non-Violent Peaceforce, an international NGO,

Mindanao People’s Caucus, MinHRac, and MOGOP. By the way, the other components of IMT are

Security, Socio-economic, and Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, and Development. Malaysia leads the

security; Japan the socio-economic; and the European Union the HRDC.

Today, the GPH-MILF peace negotiation is creeping forward very slowly. Two years into the

Aquino administration, the parties have managed only to sign one agreement of consequence. This

is GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles which they signed on April 24, 2012. Whether there will

be signing of the comprehensive compact or merely a framework agreement is difficult to say. The

difficulty lies in the very nature of the Moro Problem or Moro Question, which is centuries-old

problem, and the protracted nature of negotiation. By their nature, all sovereignty-based

negotiations, except perhaps, the Aceh-Indonesia peace negotiation, are incremental in character.

Besides, the status quo is so established that undoing it is not an easy task. Those enjoying the

benefits will naturally resort to everything, including brute force, to prevent any change thereof. The

problem gets even more difficult, because those in the top echelon of government, who are the

decision-makers, are the ones mainly benefitting from the status quo. Moreover, there are many

spoilers who do not want the peace talks to succeed., Their motives are varied, ranging from hatred

to whatever is associated with the Moros or Islam to ensuring that their selfish or vested interests

are not put in harm’s way. Their eyes and ears are closed and they cannot see reasons except

theirs.

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By the way, there are other institutions, blocs and players, aside from the Philippine state,

which are powerful and are not onboard the peace process. If they are only supportive, they will

make a big difference, perhaps including the signing of the comprehensive compact. Who are they?

They are the business groups, some of whom are in government, the Catholic Church in the

Philippines, which holds at least the spiritual side of the majority Christians in the Philippines

including their leaders, and members of the Fourth Estate or the media, which are generally hostile

when it comes to giving powers to Moros in general. One can see the extent of their biases,

prejudices, and hatred in their writings, editorials, columns, and talk shows.

Similarly, the international community is not fully mobilized in support of the peace process.

The inability partly rests in the limited capability of the parties to involve or rally them on the basis of

clear proof that it is to their national interests that the Moro Question will be settled once and for all.

The other consideration is the fact that there is no enough stakes in the problem in Mindanao that

the international community will consider as very important and strategic. This explains why the

international community is slow in the coming, as compared to their swift responses in Kosovo, East

Timor, South Sudan, Northern Ireland, and even Libya. In these conflicts, the stakes for the

international community are high in terms ofsecurity, military, political, and economic.

The GPH-MILF peace negotiation is entering its 16th year and by any stretch of imagination,

this is already too long a process. Surely, uneasiness to fatigue is creeping into the players,

particularly on the rebel side, who, after all, want a fundamental change, a real change for the better.

The ideologues in their ranks can certainly sustain through to the end. But surely they will not be

there in the driver’s seat forever. Thereafter and inevitably, the young will soon be in the saddle.

What can we, therefore, expect from this crop of new leaders who are borne in the heat of

frustration and treachery of the government? Combine these with their idealism and the radicalism

of the day, the outcome is not hard to foresee. This is the concern of the current leadership of the

MILF. If the problem will not be settled during their lifetime, a chance of solving it in the next episode

with the emerging young Moro leaders is hard to imagine. It is on this urgency that solving this

conflict without delay is of paramount priority. Thank you very much for lending me your ears.

14


Understanding the GPH – MILF ceasefire and the Peace Process

Rasid T. Ladiasan, MILF-CCCH Head of Secretariat

This presentation focuses on understanding the GPH – MILF ceasefire and the Peace Process.

This is a good opportunity to understand local way of peace process. What is Ceasefire and what is

the definition?

1. Ceasefire by definition and essence

A state of peace agreed to between opponents in order to discuss (negotiate) and forges peace

terms/accord and implementation. In order to stop firing, suspension of active hostilities and

temporary cessation of hostilities by mutual consent of the contending parties are necessary. It is

temporary, fragile and not a final solution to armed conflict.

2. GRP – MILF Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities

It is mother of all ceasefire accords and implementing guidelines between the government and the

MILF. Two issues are important- first is the agreement between the two parties, signed on July 18,

1997 in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines and second is commitment of both parties for their

respective armed forces to a general cessation of hostilities. For this parity of esteem and equal

footing of the government and MILF forces, essential element in this smooth continuity and

successful conclusion of the peace talks aimed at forging a just and lasting solution to the

centuries-old “Bangsamoro Problem” and the conflict in Mindanao, which resulted in the GPH and

MILF CCCHs and the subsequent ceasefire accords and mechanisms on the ground.

3. Peace building Framework

In this section the function and significant to the GPH – MILF peace process is important. Mainly

two issues for this framework: (1) Builds trust and confidence, teamwork and cooperation between

and amongst principal parties and stakeholders at various levels down to the ground and (2) Assist

in the implementation of humanitarian, rehabilitation, and development undertakings within the

context of the peace process. This is not happened overnight this happened in long time. Within

these aspects Established within the operational structure and system of the four pillars of the

ceasefire mechanisms on the ground – CCCH, IMT, AHJAG and LMTs are very important.

4. Conflict: historically the centuries of continuing moral and legitimate Moro resistance against

colonialism and assertion of rights is important to discuss the conflict situation. More than four

centuries of war and armed conflict imposed by the Spanish colonialism in the 16th century (1570)

15

against the Moros under the Sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao. This is cession of the Philippines,

incorporating the Moro homeland, to the United States by Spain with the Treaty of Paris on

December 10, 1898. Similarly the Illegal and immoral usurpation of the Bangsamoro freedom and

independence, and annexation of the Bangsamoro people and homeland (Mindanao and Sulu)

could be seeen when US granted independence to the Philippine Republic in 1946. Until now we

are in the conflict situation, Continuing suppression and denial of Bangsamoro’s Right to Self-

Determination through restoration of self-governance, homeland and identity by Philippine

government up to present time. It’s basically political. Until now we are not in the peaceful position.

The MILF agreed to enter the arena of peace negotiations with the GRP with the sole intent

of addressing the root cause of the Mindanao conflict and the Bangsamoro Problem, which is the

continued denial of the historic and legitimate right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination.

This is the photo of the leadership of the central committee. We do not indented to solve only the

Bansamoro problem we also wanted to resolve the interest into Philippine government. This is the

peace process background and we have 3 words in spite of the ceasefire and this is the question us

what are the common grounds with the continuous of the peace process. Firstly it is the

Commitment of the both side to negotiate with sincerity and mutual trust. That is the common

ground. Second is the Commitment to honor, respect and implement, without derogation, all GRP /

GPH – MILF agreements. The third common ground is negotiation and peaceful resolution of the

conflict must involve consultations with the Bangsamoro people, free of any imposition in order to

provide chances of success and open new formulas that permanently respond to the aspirations of

the Bangsamoro people for freedom and self-determination through self-governance. Finally, the

incrementally and irreversibility. We never going back to square one or ground zero, Work in

progress, without let ups and lost opportunities, in order to solve and not just manage the conflict.

This is the picture of MILF solders are holding guns and the Ceasefire Mechanisms on the

ground with gunman. This was taken in this year and this is unbelievable. I never say that this is

the picture of peaceful situation with the gunman. These are all agreement basis on our operation.

In 1997 they made agreement of the guidelines of the peace process with acknowledgements of

MILF camps and communities. Rehabilitation and all sign documents are presented in this slide.

This is the structure of ceasefire and it has four pillars: ceasefire coordination, 3rd Party Monitoring,

action vs. lawlessness, and LMTs. These are the so-called four legs or pillars of the GPH – MILF

Ceasefire / Security Mechanisms. This is the operational framework of CCCH. MILF central

committee, MILF peace panel, Chief of staff BIEF, MILF CCCH, General and staff of front

commands, MILF LMTs, Base commands, MILF interim local monitors, Local and unit commands;

MILF Task Force ITTIHAD (UNITY) & ISLAH Reconciliation) Internal Peacekeeping.

5. BIAF general staff

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The formation of BIAF staff are as follow: Chief of staff and vice chief of staff, 7 Front commands:

Central Mindanao Front (biggest in strength), Southern Mindanao Front, Eastern Mindanao Front

(biggest in area), National Guard Front, Western Mindanao Front, Northeast Mindanao Front,

Northwest Mindanao Front. This is our functions. And we should avoid confrontational situations

and stop fighting. This is the prohibited hostile acts. Terroristic acts such as kidnapping hijacking,

torture and arrests are prohibibited. GRP and MILF shall desist from committing any prohibited

hostile and provocative acts.

6. Ground rules

All those forces not identified by the GRP and MILF CCCH shall be deemed not covered by this

implementing guidelines and ground rules. Government and MILF forces shall comply with the

provisions of cessation of hostilities and support the conduct of inquiry by the government – MILF

CCCH and other mutually agreed.

7. Ceasefire mechanism

Supervise and monitor the implementation of the guidelines and general rules of the GRP-MILF

agreement on the general cessation of hostilities. Conduct fact finding inquiry, investigation,

prepare reports and recommend measures and actions in order to sustain the ceasefire.

8. International Monitoring Team (IMT): The second pillar of the ceasefire mechanism is the

International Monitoring Team (IMT). It serves as the third party observer to the implementation of

the ceasefire agreement between GRP and MILF. Third party observer to the implementation of the

ceasefire agreement between the GRP & MILF is also important to IMT. As shown is the disposition

of IMT- Mindanao and its team site within the Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (CAAM).

The third pillar of the ceasefire Mechanism is the Adhoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG). The

ahjag is a coordinating body which is tasked to coordinate, monitor and disseminate information

between and among the AFP/PNP and MILF- BIAF to effect the apprehension and arrest of

suspected criminal syndicates, kidnap for ransom groups, lost command and other criminal

elements within or near MILF affected communities/ communities. This is the local monitoring teams

that are established in the 13 provinces in Mindanao. It has also composed by the five members

representing the local government concerned, MILF political committee, religious sector, NGO

nominated by MILF, and NGO nominated by GPH. This is the gains armed hostilities in the conflict

prone areas effectively contained.

Allows the peace negotiating panels are tackle to substantive issues/agenda of the

negotiations. Another issues negotiations are: help accelerate implementation of relief, rehabilitation

and development projects in CAAs; Blosters international participation and support to the peace

17

process; increased level of trust and confidence among BIAF and AFP combats to the ceasefire

mechanisms; Heightened participation of CSOs in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement;

improved awareness and support of some LGU executives as well as BIAF and AFP/PNP unit on

the GRP-MILF ceasefire agreement and drastic decrease in armed skirmishes between the GRP

and MILF forces to an upward trend on trust and confidence to the peace process mechanisms and

negotiations.

18


A Mindanao Historian’s Views

On the Basic Issues of the GRP-MILF Peace Process

Rudy “Ompong” Buhay Rodil**

1. Historical Background.

The peace process between the government and the Bangsamoro Fronts, the Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has been going on in the last

37½ years, from January 1975 to August 2012. Already between 100,000 to 120,000 lives have

been lost. Billions of pesos have gone down the drain. If the problem has taken so long to discuss

and has not yet been solved, maybe we do not have a common grasp of the problem. So, how

about re-thinking the problem? Some military generals have said: we were second lieutenants

when we starting fighting the Moro rebels in the early 70s. Now, we are generals and are still

fighting. They have solid reason to think that military force is not the answer, they said.

The peaceful way, peace process, peace education, community dialogues just might

provide the way, they added.

2. Agenda of the GRP/GPH-MILF peace talk, Jan 1997-Aug 2012

1) In 1997 the MILF presented “Solve the Bangsamoro problem” as the sole agenda. In the course

of subsequent deliberations this was broken down into six sub-agenda items.

2) In the Tripoli Agreement on Peace, the following three agenda items were agreed upon:

a. Security Aspect

b. Rehabilitation Aspect

c. Ancestral Domain Aspect

i. Concept

j. Territory

k. Resources

l. Governance

3. In the first agreement between the GPH Panel and the MILF panel on April 24, 2012, two years

since they started, They signed the Ten Decision Points on Principles which would serve as the

basic framework in the formulation of the comprehensive compact . I will not enumerate all ten

Delivered at the Peace Process Exchange Workshop, hosted by HiPec, IDEC, Hiroshima University, July 30 to August 5, 2012. ** Mindanao Historian, retired professor of history, MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology, Iligan City. Twice member of the Government Peace Negotiating Panel, GRP-MNLF in Aug 1993 to Sep 2, 1996; GRP-MILF Aug 2004 to Sep 3, 2008.

19

points, they are too numerous for our limited time here, but let me just focus on three items of

interest, not necessary in their order of appearance.

4. The first item is that both parties recognize Bangsamoro identity and the legitimate grievances

and claims of the Bangsamoro people.

5. The second item is that the status quo, meaning the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM) is unacceptable and that a new political entity, ministerial in form, will be created by them

in its place.

6. The third point is that they would have a transition mechanism from the present ARMM to the

new political entity.

7. My observations as a historian follow. Let me use the three items from the ten decision points

as my reference points.

1) The name Moro had a bloody history in the Philippines. In the 333 years that the Spanish

colonizers tried to conquer the Moros, they always employed thousands of Filipino Christians as

soldiers and supporters. In their counter-attacks, the Moros would also hit these Filipino Christian

communities. Since it was the Spanish chroniclers who wrote the stories, they naturally labeled the

Moros as pirates. They even wrote books, one of them being titled Guerras Piraticas. Unfortunately

for us historians, the Moros never wrote their own impressions of these bloody events. What we

have inherited is the deepseated mutual distrust that that Filipino Christians have for Moros. This is

one of the invisible problems that we face today. It interferes with the proper objective appreciation

of the political issues being raised by the Bangsamoro advocates. The Moros hated the name that

is why when I was in the grade school, if one wanted to have a fight with Moro kids, all one had to

do was call him Moro. After the Moro National Liberation Front used this name in Moro National

Liberation Front and fought for it, it has now acquired an honored position in Bangsamoro

consciousness. It has become a badge of honor.

It took a while for government to accept the name Bangsamoro. I remember using it in 1973

in one of the early meetings of the GRP Panel in the talk with the MNLF, was immediately told by

my chair that the government panel, representing the Republic of the Philippines, cannot used this

name because government did not recognize that there is such a thing as Bangsamoro or Moro

nation in our republic.

Again, when I was member of the GRP panel in the peace talk with the MILF, the same

name Bangsamoro was being used in panel meetings, even in meetings with other officials of

20

government and nobody was raising any issue about it. This was between 2004 and 2008. It was

gaining public acceptability.

So, now we see both GPH and MILF panel using the name in an agreement and, to me as

Mindanao historian this is historic and unprecedented. More so, because the recognition of the

name is followed by the recognition of the legitimate grievances and claims of the Bangsamoro

people.

If I may go back to the early years of the struggle for self-determination, the immediate

labels and comments – this was in the time of President Ferdinand Marcos and remained so until

the reign of President Fidel Ramos – that I would read or hear about were: Moro secessionist, the

government cannot allow the dismemberment of the national territory and the integrity of the

Republic. The assumption of course was that the formation of the Republic was based on solid

historic grounds, and that the challenge being posed by the Bangsamoro Fronts were wrong.

But what does history say? The Bangsamoro were definitely not Filipinos prior to the Treaty

of Paris in 1898, nor their sultanate territories part of the Spanish colony. And the Philippines, that

was once Spanish colony, had declared its independence six months prior to the Treaty of Paris.

What Spain sold to America, the newly independent Philippines, the uncolonized Moro Sultanates,

and the Pat a Pongampong ko Ranaw, she did not own. It was the Filipino and Moro defeat in the

war against American that brought them together, as colonial subjects, under the American flag.

For the government to sign an agreement recognizing the legitimate grievances and claims

of the Bangsamoro people is also equally unprecedented, if not unheard of. What does this imply?

That the Bangsamoro Front, the MILF in this case, is right after all? Am I getting this right, Mr.

Chairman? And so, it is alright to agree to another point… (please move on to #2 below)

2) that the ARMM is unacceptable and the right thing to do is create a new political entity,

ministerial in form, to put in its place. Wow! To my non-lawyer’s mind, this is mind-boggling. For

one, ARMM is really a product of the GRP-MNLF peace process and the GRP-MNLF Final peace

agreement of September 1996 has yet to be fully implemented, in fact meetings are still being held,

presided over by the OIC Committee of the Eight, to put in legal form the remaining points of

agreement so that its processing by Congress which will lead to the amendment of the Organic Act

governing ARMM can be initiated.

There is also the fact that honest to goodness reforms are being undertaken by the current

Acting Regional Governor who seems to be doing a great job cleansing the whole ARMM

machinery. And now here comes the Ten Decision Points that will lead to its dissolution. Not only

that. How to insert the ministerial form of regional government into the national structure which is

both presidential and unitary? This is enshrined in the Philippine Constitution but the ministerial

form is not even mentioned. Does the new agreement mean that the ministerial form can be

inserted into the constitution without constitutional amendment? Or does it mean that that

21

administration of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III is ready and able to bring about a

constitutional amendment without fail?

3) The transition mechanism is another name for provisional government as it was called in the

Tripoli Agreement of 1976. Within the context of martial law where the president had dictatorial

legislative powers, this was possible. But since the post martial law government of President

Ramos did not anymore allow the president to create such a government, what came out of the

GRP-MNLF peace talk was the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development, a

mechanism that was not a government, only a structure with advisory or recommendatory powers. It

did not even have the authority to receive and disburse funds. Now, given the ambitious push for a

ministerial form of structure, my question is, does the present constitution allow the President, or

Congress for that matter, to create such a transition mechanism, with power to govern, with

authority to create the way for the smooth passage to the new political entity? Another mind-

boggling proposition, I should think. But I leave it to the wisdom of the present negotiating panels.

Where there is a will, there is a way.

8. Before I close, let me comment on two important items which both sides tended to take for

granted in the past.

1) The Lumad or Indigenous Peoples as they are referred to in the Indigenous People’s Rights Act

of 1997 have equal rights to their ancestral lands, as the two Bangsamoro Fronts, the MNLF and

the MILF often state both in writing and in public declarations. Both sides, Lumad and Muslim,

claim common ancestral roots. These are duly documented in my book A Story of Mindanao and

Sulu in Question and Answer (2003) This is partly why they are included in the Front’s \definition of

Bangsamoro. It must be noted, however, that these Indigenous Peoples have reached a level of

political maturity such that in 1986, they had their own Congress in North Cotabato where 15 of the

then known 18 tribes of Mindanao decided to adopt Lumad as a collective name – this means

indigenous or native. It is Bisaya but it is common knowledge that when Lumad come together in

big assemblies they spontaneously shift to Bisaya as their lingua franca. Along with the name they

also proclaimed that they have their own right to self-determination and they wished to govern

themselves within their respective ancestral domains in accordance with their customary laws.

Eleven years later, the government enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act recognizing the

right of the Indigenous Peoples to their ancestral domains/lands and the right to use of their

customary laws to govern themselves. Now, they, too, like the Bangsamoro, cite the provision in the

UN Declaration of Indigenous Peoples Rights recognizing their right to self-determination.

22

I should point out that from 1975 to 1996, both government and MNLF saw no need to

consciously involve the Lumad in their negotiations. It was only in the last two years of the three-

year negotiation that the MNLF saw the need to include in their delegation one Lumad for a while,

then a larger number in the last two rounds of negotiations. But they just sat there, in silence. On

the government side, there was zero attempt to even consider Lumad presence in the negotiations.

To the credit of the GRP-MILF negotiations, Lumad presence was felt but only in the

background, as invited consultants, as deemed appropriate, in government technical working group

meetings. In subsequent negotiations, starting from 2004, the government panel had one lady

Lumad, and three, one lady, two gentlemen in the technical working group. The MILF has had one

in the technical working group until the present. In the current government panel, there used to be a

Lumad member but then his status was modified to senior consultant on IP affairs.

Lumad voice was also getting louder and more systematic in the espousal of their cause.

Among the points raised is the assertion that while they recognize the legitimacy of the

Bangsamoro struggle, they must insist that they, too, have their distinct identity, their own ancestral

domain and their own right to self-determination. They also recall, louder and more clearly, that their

ancestors, Moro and Lumad, had entered into agreements which included territorial borders. They

urged upon their Bangsamoro counterpart to affirm these sacred agreements. For one thing, not

only are these sacred, these also have no expiration dates.

I like what I heard that the MILF panel had been holding dialogues with Lumad leaders in

their public sorties. And more positive developments to date, there have been held already several

re-affirmation ceremonies between Lumad and Moro leaders in Maguindanao, in Cotabato, in

Bukidnon and in Pagadian City.

2) Migrants and their descendants have been made to believe by government that the lands they

acquired were public lands and their acquisitions were legitimate under the law, and that this

government is the only legitimate government they know. They are bewildered not only by

Bangsamoro claims to ancestral homeland, as it was articulated by the MNLF – the MILF later

shifted the language to ancestral domain-- but also by their audacity to assert their right to self-

determination, not hesitating to employ the weapons of war. Threatened by these claims, they are

naturally wary and afraid that they lands might be taken away from them and their lives disrupted by

the wars that intermittently erupt in their midst.

In my experience in peace advocacy, I have noted that that a patient narration of history will

tell them that we have all been heirs to a history that brought about the marginalization of the

Lumad and the Bangsamoro in their ancestral lands, and the settlers were unwitting instruments in

this marginalization process.

23

Many participants in my various audiences have consistently asked: how come your version

of history is not taught in our Philippine history books? It is incumbent upon government to ensure

that correct Mindanao history is told in Philippine history books used in schools.

9. So, while the two panels are trying to sort out the details of their agreements, the public must

also be prepared through dialogues to come to terms with each other. So much the better if the

details the agreements can be publicly discussed with them. They themselves ought to appreciate

that they will positively gain from the comprehensive compact.

It is important for all, Lumad, Bangsamoro, setllers to realize that coming to terms with

history is also coming to terms with each other’s presence in a land that is now shared.

We need to dialogue to determine acceptable social space for everyone in a spirit of mutual

recognition and mutual acceptance of each other’s collective rights. We must learn to dream

together, to find peace in each other presence.

24


Lumad: Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo Ethnic Groups’ Posotion on

the Peace Process by and between the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic liberation Front (MILF)


My courtesies to the officials of the Japanese Government, the organizers, officials of the Hiroshima

University, participants from the other countries and my colleagues from the Philippines, guests,

facilitators and expectators, ladies and gentlemen, Good Day. FIYO TERESANG!

Indeed, I am greatly honored as representative of the disadvantaged, least fortunate and

marginalized group in Mindanao, the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples that I

was invited to this very momentous activity to attend as participant and to reveal to this international

forum our unified position as distinct group of People in Mindanao particularly the conflict affected

area on the ongoing peace process between the government of the Republic of the Philippines

(GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF).

We, the Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo are among the distinct Indigenous

People inhabitant of Mindanao, particularly in the province of Maguindanao in the Autonomous

Region in Muslim.

Mindanao and in Sultan Kudarat in the Administrative Region XII have consistently been a

part of the struggle of the Bangsamoro for self -determination. We shared and experience the

travails and difficulties of war. We were a witness and victims of the armed confrontation between

the government forces and the Moro revolutionary fronts during the past decades. Many of us• were

rendered homeless and displaced notwithstanding the numerous lost of lives and property

concomitant with the armed struggle because our ancestral domains were used as a battle field.

But now we see "light in the tunnel" as the MILF -GPH are about to conclude a Peace Agreement

that may redound to a just and lasting solution of the so-called "Mindanao Problem".

As stakeholders of the Peace process, we are not merely "fence sitters" but very much, we

are "role players", and ultimate end -users ' and beneficiaries of whatever "peace formula" that may

be reached and agreed upon by both parties. We are therefore presenting our views and proposal

as agreed upon by our group and product as series of tribal consultations, as follows:

1. On Ancestral Domain

That our Ancestral Domain claim shall be delineated pursuant to the present and future

laws that may be applicable. For the moment, the tribes had laid claim to our ancestral domains

covering a land area of 289, 268 hectares comprising the municipalities of Upi, Datu Blah Sinsuat,

25

South Upi, Ampatuan, Shariff Aguak, Datu Hoffer, Datu Unsay, Datu Saudi, Guindulungan, Talayan,

and Datu Odin Sinsuat in Maguindanao Province and portions of Esperanza, Lebak, Bagumbayan,

Sen. Ninoy Aquino, Kalamansig and Palembang in Sultan Kudarat Province and the City of

Cotabato where the tribes are predominantly situated.

2. On Political Territory

We support the proposal of the MILF panel to create and compose the 48th

province

primarily for the Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan. Manobo tribes who are already and presently

in the area prior to such creation. It is also the desire of the tribe to be at liberty to practice and

promote their cultural identity by way of actual implementation of tribal and customary laws through

the Timuay Justice and Governance.

3. On Resources

The rights of the IPs-Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo in matters of exploitation and

exploration of natural resources that may be found within their ancestral domain areas shall be

upheld and respected. The tribe shall have an equitable share in all natural resources to include

strategic minerals and forestry resources.

4. On Governance

As earlier stated, the tribe shall conform to any type or form of governance that maybe

agreed upon and mutually adopted, hence it is also the desire of the tribe to have equal

opportunities and representation on all levels of governance, side by side with their Muslim brothers.

Provided, that in the province designated for the Teduray, Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo

tribes, their right to rule and govern must be pursued, implemented, recognized, and respected vis-

a-vis their traditional and customary laws in a form of a genuine autonomy within the Bangsamoro

nation.

Conclusion

As Indigenous Peoples inhabiting the areas since time immemorial, the Teduray,

Lambangian and Dulangan Manobo tribes are very much part of Bangsamoro nation. However, it is

the belief and aspiration of the tribe to cultivate and promote their own distinct traditional and

cultural practices as a vital and potent factor to consider in their own struggle for self-determination.

The tribes may have joined the mainstream society, be it in public and private endeavors, but none

the less, we maintained our own identity throughout all these years.

We are strongly supporting the MILF who initiated to resolve the problems in Mindanao

through negotiated Political settlement. We are touching the kind hearts of people in higher

positions in our government to understand deeply and give what are the demands of the MILF; this

26

place is ours, return what is ours and therefore must be OURS. Further, we are appealing to both

the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces not to bring their

armed confrontation to our ancestral domains and put an end in using our communities as their

Camps and Barracks.

"THANK YOU VERY MUCH AND FIYO BAGI, MEUYAG"

27


COMMENTS on Mindanao Case

Kei Fukunaga

Thank you very much, chairman. As I am Japanese citizen, but assigned to Japanese embassy,

as a member of IMT, from outsider it is very difficult to understand situation in Mindanao

especially as historian already explained it has very long historical background. So I just pick up

some of point of very nice presentation, it may be useful for your consideration from observation

of outsider. Mr. Rashid explained about ceasefire mechanism in Mindanao conflict. It was very

unique when panel discussion started between government and MILF, they organized

simultaneously CCH ceasefire stopping mechanism and also invited international monitoring

team that I belong. This is still ongoing and very functioning as Mr. Rashid mentioned. As he

finally showed it graphically, until formalized 2004 more than 100 cases per year fire attacking

both sides. There was quite rapidly increase 2008 and 2009 at that time NGO members withdrew

but after efficient negotiation coming back since 2010. We are hoping the Philippine government

and MILF very function not only for top level but rural area as Mr. Rashid mentioned rural

monitoring team functioning with NGO people to observe especially humanitarian rights violence.

That can be not also from outsider organized relation itself can introduce basic idea in detail. You

have time during this workshop to ask Rashid. Second point is Mr. Ulema mentioned about

indigenous people problem because it is long history also important things it take so long time

more than 40 years even MILF started to talk with government.

In Mindanao there are several provinces each province consists of different people,

some of indigenous, some of Christian immigrant from outside, even Muslim people, fisherman

in island, some of few different tribe, it is very important making consensus among those

Bangsamolo people. Third point is Prof. Ompon mentioned from historical view Bangramolo is

new approach to solve this problem from broader point of view. Molo means only Islam from

Christian view but Bangsamolo consists with indigenous people or who are living in Mindanao in

proper way, he mentioned first time as he was a member of government panel, Philippines

government denied to admit Bangsamolo. When Japanese government started IMT of

Japan-Bangsamolo initiative, Japanese government recognized Bangsamolo as counter body

for support that was very important step to solve the problem. In detail he has more experience

and a lot of papers documents, if you have interest about historical view you can question him.

Finally Mr. Iqbal, he is still acting chairman of peace panel as he mentioned MILF started

negotiation from 1997, takes 16 years a lot of time, president changed, even Philippines

government side said it is a rollercoaster game, negotiation comes to good mood but suddenly

slow down. Fortunately since last year there was good mood, I am very proud Japanese

government had good contribution. Since then regular meeting in Kuala Lumpur but as he

mentioned still long way and last month JICA president mentioned it is a long panel but there is

small light. We are still keeping on it is good momentum to fix this trend but it takes time. There is

28

negotiation as he mentioned he is back to panel negotiation but it is good chance for not only

Molo but international community because Mindanao problem make step forward, Mindanao is

not only a place however Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and also Philippines, south east Asian

regional hostility zone. That is why not only Philippines but Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei started to

contribute, Luckily Indonesia sending 15 member of IMT. We have good timing and it is chance

to come here, we are learning much from Ache and can learning from Nepal situation. Because it

is very complicated issue but from complicated issue, there are some idea to newly introduce

each. Because each conflict area have different background, different case some of ideas they

have already made in their paper, but unfortunately limited time.

We hope coming two days you may have some more detailed question directly to ask

each presenter that can help more bright idea for what we are talking. Thank you very much.

29


Open Discussion - Mindanao (the Philippines) Group

Chair: Thank you very much. I guess a couple of questions and answer may be possible. Do

you have any questions? This is an academic seminar, not critical dialogue anyway. You need

not to be better by the official position. Please raise your hand to ask questions. Mr. Tebay, To

whom?

Tebay: To one speaker. It is my surprise that you have been going through the post of

negotiation for 60 years. My question would be what is the base for formation and binding both

parties together to go through whole process of negotiation without or with all success of

welicious, what bring your parties together again come to evil of negotiation, I want to know this.

Thank you.

Chair: Please select by yourself.

Tebay: I want to get more, I think for participants. Thank you.

Iqbal: There are two answers to your question. First, the parties have decided to conclusion.

They are neutral decision to negotiation second, on the basses, it’s parties have experience

that heeling has indeed in the battle field and seen enterprise. And thirdly for the quiet

government, I think everything spent a lot of money. Fighting of Moro in Mindanao until this time

there was table to succeed. Military solution has never succeeded in Mindanao. Because all

regard of military very strong militarily. But we don’t have experience, 40 years in battle field, by

fighting regarding in mobile Manila for secure fighting by government in confront of China,

fighting Government is stronger, naturally if you fight them. In conclude of china mother then,

you are given advantage of enemy, we are heating them in highly mobile one phase escapes in

negotiation arrive, and after vote of parties have been arriving, we have gotten in harder. You

much 1,300 people dead, fighting. The problem right now is forgotten text too long for

government to evaluate central issues. It is very long historical background. It is very

complicated issues.

Secondly, the start school is who established, that any chase is not school. It is then to be

accepted by people who are enjoyed it. I think this is a great deal to answer your questions.

Ladiasan: It is just preferring. This part is potential published procedures established principal

and mechanism. It is then, it is to participants by Islam. Bothe sides are on track whatever by

consequences.

Chair: If you get ……

30

Djuli: Let me have a few minutes. I think, I have a book on the GRP to emulate peace process.

And this is well my questions to persuade in the book. And my answer, first answer is that they

don’t know because there is no official statement of Government and all related, why they

consented to negotiate. But I made some guesses to educated guesses of course. Number one

is that this package course of the world are the more than 100,000 people were killed and most

taken placed in 1973 to 1976. The cost was 70 million dollars faced. The part of the rest, I found

the Libyan Government spent some like that 30 million ponds, so emulate, so just the course.

The other, otherwise, there is apparently, but I cannot exactly pin-point the exact, but there is,

there are signs of OIC pressure talking about your organisations of Islamic countries.

Now, how much is express, purely remember of Arab-Israel war in 1973 in which the Arab

states have great difficulties for winning. So what is the thing they did was to analyze the

countries and supporting Israel, and Philippines was a weapon of them.

Both is oily-mingle in October 1973, and they remember by December there was an official

announcement by Government that gasoline and diesel oil would be related. I found related

when I was writing in my books. Then at that time, the Philippines could only offer three month’s

line of oil at any given time. There was no because of embargo, there was no assurance after

December UN had any more supply. So, that is what only first things president Marcos they was

done to open the embassy in Saudi Arabia. There was no diplomatic relations at that time with

Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Araba was principal actor in the embargo.

That was, it was all worried to have been to parties of the Government to negotiate except them,

if they engaged the relation. It was very imbalance of Government‘s initiate the negotiation. So,

it operated through intervenes mainly before I have seen. But it’s very carefully because at that

time Libya was the number one ventures of the emulation. It was very powerful influences I

have seen before I see. The Philippine Government was actually big boring. Eventually they

succeed indeed in January 1975. They were political compliments only a first meeting as the

Philippine Government and said. At least, Ice was broken, now they could talk with them indeed

before they could talk a research. Now, I started the story because in my time parties you after

deciding of peace agreement with eliminated enemy. Then we talk to MILF, and supposed

another group after MILF. Let me talk to this agreement that is the enough. The Government

has raw answer of peace process. And heavily discover very early in whole process. Having

discover my early in the world, let me military solution was not the answer. Let me begin your

letters in 1973. The Government, military and a number of actors come with the issues. I don’t

know if you are.

Chair: I intervene you have some general intersession in the schedule. Please discuss it later.

Thank you for your cooperation. Next presentator. Thank you very much. I transfer my abolition

to the Secretariat.

31

Panel-2: Aceh (Indonesia) Group Presentations

Chair

Koki Seki

Associate Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University,

Member of HiPeC Executive Committee

Presenters

Sofyan A. Djalil

Special Advisor to the Vice President of Indonesia,

Government Negotiator during Helsinki Peace Negotiation and Former State Minister for

Information and Communication of the Government of Indonesia

Muhammad Nur Djuli

Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Leader for the Helsinki Peace Negotiation

Shadia Marhaban

President of the Aceh Women’s League

GAM Member for the Helsinki Peace Negotiation

Commentator

Akihisa Matsuno

Professor, Osaka School for International Public Policy, Osaka University

32


Transformation of Conflict into Peace in Aceh

Sofyan A. Djalil

I think later on Nur can complement because, you know, we were working together even though

from different table. I want to make presentation on some theoretical perspectives. If you see,

there are theoretical perspectives on conflict or struggle between opposition parties. Actually

conflict exists in any society. If well managed, it will become a normal part for transformation

process for more mature community at large or nation building process. Stages of conflict could

be latent, emerging and manifested. This is very theoretical. Powers involve in a conflict such as

coercive power, soft power, economic power, and so on. If you see here theories of conflict, the

mosaic for comprehensive resolution, community relations theory says what is the cause of

conflicts and what could be the approach for solution. Principle of negotiation theory states

different interests on the zero-sum objectives and its approach. There are also theories relating

to human needs theory and identity theory. I think problem of Moro is a part of this identity theory.

Also there are intercultural miscommunication theory and conflict transformation theory. These

are from Fisher et.al. (2000).

I think we need to analyze conflict comprehensively. By analyzing conflict

comprehensively, we can theoretically find easier way to solution. Now I talk about Aceh. This is

the brief history of Aceh. Actually, Aceh was independent country from 1500 to 1873 and until

1900.Aceh Sultanate had embassy in Turkey and UK. At that time both European powers

admitted the legacy of Aceh Sultanate. In 1873, because of increasing competition between

Dutch and British, Dutch declared colonial war on Aceh. This is formal colonial war in Indonesia

that was declared by Dutch imperial government. War on Aceh took place for 40 years. The last

king of Aceh surrendered in 1904. In 1945, during independent of Indonesia, Aceh joined

Indonesia and contributed to the struggle of Indonesia. In 1950s, Aceh became a province. But

bureaucratic decision integrated Aceh into north Sumatra. This creates a problem of identity

actually. And then there was first rebellion from DI/TII, which was motivated by Islamic movement

from 1953 to 1960. It was a kind of civil war against central government. The rebellion was

concluded in 1963. As you know, the 1970s was the time of exploration of natural gas in Aceh.

Indonesia is still the biggest gas exporter in the world right now, even though in terms of reserve

it is smaller. In 1970s and 80s, gas exported from Indonesia mostly came from Aceh. But the

amount of money spend back to Aceh was very small. This was one of the reasons that Tengku

Hasan di Tiro, founder of Free Aceh Movement, declared Aceh Sumatra National Liberation

Front. From 1976 to 1999, during the Suharto regime, a series of military operations including

DOM were implemented and a lot of people were killed. As you know, Suharto stepped down in

1999. Then the issue of Aceh became full blow and everybody can discuss about that and the

Acehnese also get Banda Aceh one million people as for referendum. Since then the negotiation

takes place to seek peace solution through negotiation. In 2001, the law on Special Autonomy of

33

Aceh was issued without consulting with GAM at that time. The COHA (Cessation of Hostilities)

agreement was signed which was facilitated by Henry Dunant Center. The COHA failed after the

Peace Talk facilitated by JICA, Japan in May 2003. In 2004, military emergency was declared in

Aceh, martial law was implemented. As you know, the Tsunami hit Aceh in 2004, which led to

restart initial contact for peaceful resolution. From January to August, 2005, we negotiated with

GAM in Helsinki. We reAcehd to conclusion within six months. Negotiation was very intensive.

Every month the negotiation continued for one week in Helsinki which was facilitated by

President Ahtisaari. We signed MOU in Helsinki in August 2005. You can access to MOU in

internet. Outcome of that was the enactment of the law on governing Aceh. This was the result of

Helsinki. This is another Special Autonomy that replaced the law of 2001. But this time it was

with the participation of GAM and with aspiration of GAM.

In 2006, we introduced reintegration agency where Nur Djuli worked as former Chairman.

The local government election was held successfully in the same year. I heard the case of Moro.

It is very complicated. The case of Aceh is not that complicated. In some respects, it was based

on economy and historical perspectives rather than ideological war. If you see conflicts in Aceh

and Indonesia, they share so many similarities. GAM leadership is also important, which consists

of political and military factions, civil society, think tankers and representatives in various

countries. Later, Shadia can share on this.

Solution is at high level. We negotiate with top leaders. We were very fortunate that we

had very disciplined organization i.e. GAM. Decision made in Helsinki, Sweden by top political

leaderships of GAM was honored in the field. This is very important and fortunate. We can

resolve this problem very effectively. Demand for independent is simply unreasonable as there is

no support from friendly countries. GAM leaders wanted to talk with the government of Indonesia

as long as facilitated by credible third party. It must be solved without losing faces of the parties

involved. The last part is very important. We wanted the solution for Aceh conflict with dignity for

all.

Impact of conflict on economy of Aceh was very direct one as compared to national level.

Aceh had been suffering very much in terms of economic perspective. The problem of tsunami

brings some blessings. Tsunami effects, as some people believe that it was a divine warning to

solve conflict in Aceh, to no more conflict and no more victims. Stronger commitment from the

government of Indonesia and strong support from international community to rebuild Aceh in

post-tsunami period is very important from initial perspective. After tsunami tens of thousands

foreigners and expatriates came to Aceh to have rebuild Aceh. Governor of Aceh was very

worried if anyone of those people arrested or kidnapped by whomever, the full effort to rebel

Aceh after tsunami will be disarrayed. That was very strong motive from government to speed up

the peace talk. When we started negotiation a very important proposition was proposed by

President Ahtisaari: “nothing is agreed until everything has been agreed”. Therefore, we can talk

whatever in the room. From GAM side, they can upload all animosity toward the delegation of

Indonesia. We talked everything. In the first day of negotiation, Nur’s friend used sometime the

dirtiest word against Indonesia. That is part of conflict and we have been prepared by Jusuf Kalla.

34

At that time, we faced a very environment of animosity. Can you imagine 30 years of conflict?

And we met together. Everybody will abuse and curse the other part. From Indonesian part, we

did not take the advantage to curse GAM. But GAM used all dirty words against Indonesia. Just

listen, Jusuf Kalla told us.

The issue of internationalization of Aceh became very sensitive in Indonesia. There was

status quo during the peace talk. At the time, military operation still is in Aceh. We keep pressing

through military from government perspective, no truce during the peace talk. Indonesia

prepared to give the most whatever demand except independence. Government was ready to

give concession except independence. First, GAM surrenders the weapons and accepts the

integrity of Indonesia. We put all the issues in MoU. The role of president Ahtisaari is also very

important. He has a lot of experiences in dealing and mediating conflicts. He is very tough. The

President and Vice-President picked the negotiation team. This is not the issue of foreign affairs.

Foreign affairs were not involved in this negotiation. We asked the junior diplomats from foreign

affairs just to take notes. Last part is what we call diplomacy sui generis. The government of

Indonesia sent very high level negotiating team including two ministers. This created lot of issues

in Jakarta among opposition party. They said how comes that two ministers were sent to

negotiate with the rebel group. From government perspective, Jusuf Kalla said if you wanted to

show sincerity to solve the problem send the highest possible team. If I could go Helsinki I would

go but it was impossible for me. So he sent two ministers including me. We got strong support

from president and vice-president and it was very important. In the case of Philippines, a lot of

interests, a lot of spoiler and a lot of stakeholders are involved and they may not like to sign the

peace treaty. Sometimes military takes benefit out of conflict. Conflict for military is part of their

business. They are trained to kill or how to kill.

Be flexible. In the case of Aceh the only thing is that GAM cannot ask for independence.

Also important is to be creative and think outside the box to find options. Trust each other and

treat each other with respect. Never underestimate the importance of informal talks is also

important in the negotiation process. It is not a linear process based on official agenda. This is

the most important thing. Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed that is the great creation

created by president Ahtisaari. Both parties were required to agree on broad outline of political,

economy, security, justice, human rights formula before ceasefire and military and security

arrangements take into effect. Small issues and technicalities should not change the main

principle that has already been agreed. Foreign advisors may disturb the process that is what

president Ahtisaari believes. He said that the foreign advisors are often more orthodox than the

negotiators themselves, holier than the Pope. High expectation for gaining agreement within

short-time period is not reasonable; be prepared and accept for longer talks as long as it is

leading to the mutual agreement. But talking 15-16 years in the case of Philippines may be too

long.

Economic compensation to Aceh has been introduced. Because of law, Aceh will get

more money in the next 20 years as compensation from central government. In the past, central

government took so much from Aceh. Poverty increased in 2005 but decreased more in 2006.

35

This is very short period of time, one year after the conflict resolved. After the Helsinki agreement,

67 percent are very satisfied and only 23.7 are less satisfied with the peace agreement. From

Indonesian perspective, a better position of Indonesian nationhood is found. “Are you proud of

being Indonesian?” This was asked one year after the agreement. Originally it was 56 percent

because of oppression and human rights issues. It became 77.7 percent.

What issue faced by Aceh today. This is the answer. Peace-making process requires

marathon mentality and determination to keep moving forward for prolonged period even after

the signing of peace agreement. I believe Nur can tell us some issues that were not expected

because of political process. The signing is just a beginning for further long journey to make it

sustainable by implementing peace transformation, relief, rehabilitation and sustainable

development, and democratization processes. Aceh has experienced twice local general

elections for the legislature and for the executives under new Law on the Governing of Aceh.

These elections are considered to be the fruit of peace agreement: an important step for Aceh's

continued reconstruction and democratization. The local “Aceh Party”, founded by former GAM,

has dominated at the local legislature (47%) and won governorship twice. The first governorship

was in 2006. It was won by former GAM activist, even though he ran in the election as an

independent candidate. There was election three months before. The former minister of foreign

affairs of GAM now became the Governor of Aceh. They are involved in improving Acehnese

welfare. In fact economic progress is not as fast as expected due to external/global disturbances,

but at least it is much better compared to during the conflict period. Years after the tsunami,

major reconstruction projects has driven higher growth. The different challenge emerges after

the end of reconstruction period. Creating huge employment under current economic

condition is still a challenge, hence it is possible that some may not be relieving enough and

creating resentment. It is very critical to keep on moving forward to avoid the spoiler ruining this

peaceful situation and therefore we can not just wait and see, but to keep on supporting this

transformation process constructively.

Is Aceh peace talk model applicable to other conflicts? I think, no. There is no universal

solution applicable for all conflicts, but we can learn from previous experiences to avoid

unnecessary mistakes. General peace building and talking activities can be applicable, but the

specific solution to the conflict may need some adjustments accordingly. Each conflict has its

own background, root cause(s), context, involved parties, etc, and hence it deserves for its own

customized solution. Each conflict has its own background, root cause(s), context, involved

parties, and hence, it deserves for its own customized solution. Leadership and commitment for

peace are indeed among key factors. This is very important. Without strong and top leadership of

the country, I do not think the peace agreement in Aceh can be achieved. The government of

Indonesia gives concession. Concession is given whatever is legitimate. GAM was willing to set

aside the goal of independence. They accept solution based on self-governance. This is the key.

Indonesia does not recognize self-governance; we call it as special autonomy. But meaning is

self-governance for Aceh within the Republic of Indonesia. If see Hong Kong and China, it is one

country with two systems. Hong Kong is self-governed and completely different from China. If

36

communist China can accept that why not other countries can do so. GAM also demobilized all

its military troops and decommissioned of all arms. They promised to give away 840 rifles, but

they gave more than 1000 rilfes to be destroyed. The government of Indonesia gave consensus

among others that non-military police forces would be withdrawn from Aceh. Like the case in the

Philippines, we believe that we cannot solve the problem in Aceh with the military means. Before

the negotiation, Jusuf Kalla called the Chief of military and asked him that could he resolve the

problem in Aceh by military means. Yes, he replied, because we fought with them and there were

1,000 troops in Aceh. Jusuf Kalla asked him again that how long you have been fighting in Aceh?

Thirty years, but you cannot resolve it! How could you resolve it within one or two years? Finally,

military admitted that they could not resolve the problem in Aceh by military means. During the

martial law, Indonesian government sent more than 36 batallion military to Aceh, a place where

the population was not more than three million. Also special force of police was sent. A part of the

consesus was non-organic military and police forces would be withdrawn from Aceh. You gave

100 weapons, we would withdraw 10 batallion army. Finally all the weapons were surrendered

and all militaries were withdrawn from Aceh. In return, Aceh got 70 percent of revenues. In

addition to that, the government of Indonesia also pays 2 percent of national allocation fund to

Aceh as a part of compensation, which is applicable in the next 20 years i.e. until 2026. This is a

big amount of money. Of the earnings from hydrocarbon and other mineral resources in Aceh, 70

percent will return to Aceh. Amnesty is granted for all persons who have participated in GAM

activities. We released more than 3,000 political detainees those involved in GAM except two

persons. These two persons were considered as terrorist because they involved in bombings in

Jakarta. This is still in dispute with former GAM. At that time, we brought justices and judges from

Sweden and Norway to review all cases. Whatever they said the government of Indonesia

accepted. Even though the people who were convicted of killing someone or many people were

released if their activities were based on GAM activities. The Norwegian judge still considers

these two persons as not eligible for amnesty. So, we released all of them. We gave back the

citizenship of all former GAM members, if they want to be Indonesian again. Many of GAM’s

active member became citizen in other countries, now they get Indonesian citizenships.

Reintegration fund is allocated for GAM for reintegration into civil society, even though the

success is not that much great. The new governor of Aceh will exercise authority in all sectors of

public affairs except six issues, which will be governed by central government. This is

self-governance concept. These are foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary

and fiscal matter, justice, and freedom of religion. These are administered by central government

in conformity with the constitution. Local political parties are also allowed in Aceh. It is the only

region where local political parties are allowed. This was very critical at the time of peace

negotiation. Because of it, the MoU was about to fail. GAM demanded for the establishment of

local political parties; however, Indonesian constitution does not allow that. At that time, the

opposition parties oppossed the peace agreement. When the issue of local political parties were

raised by GAM, the government of Indonesia could not give that until the last minute of the

negotiation. Finally, we created a formula. We put in the MoU that stated “the government of

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Indonesia will create a political condition which allows the establishment of local political parties

with the approval from parliament”. Actually, this one did not promise anything. If we gave them

the establishment of local parties it would be against the constitution and parliament. But we

promised to create a local political situation. The political condition can be created if GAM is

sincere to surrender the weapons. In fact, when GAM surendered the weapons, the whole

environment of Indonesai actually has been changed. At that time, so many skeptical people said

the MoU is just a MoU and it will fail like COHA. But when GAM surrendered the weapons to be

destroyed and televised nationally, everybody beleived that that was a real MoU and could be

implemented. Since then no more criticism. We passed the law to establish local political parties

and there were no opposition any more in the parliament. We passed a new law on government

of Aceh and there was no opposition any more. The legislature of Aceh will redraft the legal code

of Aceh. Only six affairs is administered by central government authority. There is need to draft

legal code by the legislature of Aceh. Both parties accepted more robust monitoring provision.

Aceh Monitoring Mission was sponsored by European Union and participated by ASEAN

countries. We invited international monitoring team, which consisted of European Union and

ASEAN. They stayed in Aceh almost for one year. Everything went smoot. Now I think Aceh is

better than earlier and now Indonesia is getting stronger than before.

Thank you very much.

38


Presentation on Aceh Peace Process 1

Muhammad Nur Djuli

Sofyan Djalil made a very detail presentation. There are, however, different opinions. For

example, there is stress on the root of the problem in Aceh. Much stress is given on economy.

For us and GAM, the economic injustice is the consequence of the real issue. The real issue is

the question of sovereignty. As mentioned by Dr Sufian, Aceh was an independent nation way

back in the14th century that had been recognized by international countries. We had

communication with Europe and even with US. Of course, we had a long war with the Dutch. For

Aceh, it was Dutch War. For Dutch, it was Aceh War. The Dutch suffered causalities which was

bigger than all causalities in entire colonial war before World War II. We also saw the Japanese

time. We in Aceh do not consider Japanese as a colonial military occupation because Japan

never established a real rule in Aceh. Japan was invited to come to Aceh. First, a small intelligent

force that came by boat and on bicycles was welcomed in Aceh. Only later, when the Dutch

reenacted their promise to give independence to Aceh, we started to fight with the Japanese

after chasing the Dutch out.

Again the question is of sovereignty, which is also important to understand for other

conflicts. In 1945, when the Japanese surrendered in World War II not a single foreign officer

remained in Aceh. We consider 1945 to 1949 as a de facto independent, not part of any other

country. Of course, there was no foreign diplomatic mission and it was only de facto independent.

On 31st December of 1949, the sovereignty from Dutch East India rule to the republic of

Indonesia, in fact, federal republic of Indonesia, was declared in the Hague conference by the

United Nations. Aceh was not part of this delegation. This is the question we consider why the

inclusion of Aceh was illegal. That started the problem with Indonesia. Later, there were some

disputes that our leader has, in fact, signed or accepted to be part of Indonesia in the

arrangement of autonomous rule. But when the autonomy rule was inscribed in the Lamte

agreement, it was in the name only. In fact, it was very small autonomy at the time which just

covered cultural, religious and educational matters. Everything else was in the hands of

Indonesia. So, we had first Islamic rebellion that lasted for 12 years. And then there was an

agreement. We had Cessation of Hostilities Agreement…in fact, is not real agreement; it’s a

framework agreement that was supposed to be agreed later in Aceh between the lower ranking

officials of the party. That broke and then we went to Tokyo under the Tokyo Conference and it

was failed. Then we had the Helsinki negotiation.

The key success for Helsinki, in my view and general view of GAM, is that military

solution is not possible, which is also mentioned by Dr. Sofyan. I think both sides were on parallel

line. Our goal has always been independence. Indonesian goal has always been national

unitary republic. So whatever agreement we had, it was just in our minds. But this battalion lines

banned in war. In our view, the fall of General Suharto and the reforms took place in Indonesia i.e.

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Indonesia has been democratized, highly democratized, and also decentralized—these put us in

a very weak position. We became the only province in Indonesia that fought for independence.

The rests had given up, you know, like such South Sulawesi, which were our partner. So the

goal of independence became more and more impossible. But still we have not given that up.

There was still some hope that we could achieve. But then Tsunami happened that was the

triggering that made us to realize that nothing was more important than survival of the people.

Within 20 minutes more than 100,000 people, some estimated that 200,000 people, were buried.

So we said that we had to get into the peace process.

In Helsinki, the biggest problem was that the word autonomy is dirty word for us, the

Acehnese, because it had dirty connotation for us. As for Indonesian government, independence

was the word we did not talk about. What the wisdom of President Ahtisaari was at that time that

the phrase—nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Later, we agreed that three

words—autonomy, referendum and independence—were taboo. We did not talk about these on

the table. But of course, if you see now what we have you can say it autonomy. Autonomy is the

self-government and self-rule. But this word was avoided. Other strength of Helsinki was that

both sides were able to control its own side. Whatever we said our forces accepted or obeyed.

Same was in the Indonesian side. Of course, there were minor violations about that. The key is

also the realization. You can not write the wrong of history. Of course, Aceh has suffered the

wrong of history. We were independent and attacked by the Dutch. If you think in that way you try

to go back to your previous glory that was not achievable. It is no longer possible. Even for

Britain you don’t need to be Great Britannia. For Palestine, the Jews want to get 2,000 year back

and Palestinians want to go back before 1946. So the key, I think for our talk here, is that how we

can accept the reality and today’s situation. Can we accept today’s situation? What can we get

today? What the Moros can get from Philippines government today? You cannot demand all the

migrants who are settled in your land to go away. That is the reality of life, the painful reality of life.

But if you keep doing that, for the Papuan and for everyone else, it is not possible to write the

wrong of history. In order to be able to face the future, we have to accept this reality.

The foreign adviser fortunately gives some comments for us from the beginning. We took

the foreign adviser because we lost our own legal expert who died in jail during the tsunami. So,

we became just inexperienced people. She (Shadia Marhaban) did not know anything about law

because we were living abroad. But she was the last who left Aceh. Most of us were living in

abroad for decades. So, we need somebody to advise not on the content of negotiation. For

these, we have to be careful. The foreign adviser is not to be allowed to dictate your policies.

What we needed was the format i.e. how the tactics and how to present our case in an

acceptable manner or in the diplomatic way. That is his strength because he is a professor of

foreign relation in different universities. In the last moment when another situation almost

scuttled the agreement, though we agreed on everything, but we wanted to reform the initial

agreement on the number of the Indonesian soldiers remained in Aceh was too high that was

5,700. Even before the Marshall Law, the highest number of soldiers in Aceh was no more 6000.

So, we protested on that and fierce talks took place with the mediators who remained at that time.

40

For the Indonesian side, everything was done. They were gone home. There was no chance any

more that we could call back the Indonesian side. This was our own fault. In fact, our advisors did

not sign. But we decided at that time that we could not allow this hot negotiation to be thrown

away because of this. If you are weak, you should have foreign advisors. I think I should end

here.

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Presentation on Aceh Peace Process 2

Shadia Marhaban

Thank you very much for the opportunity. I think Dr. Sofyan Jalil and Nur Djuli have already

mentioned a lot. I would just like to add few things. I think all of us who sits here are victims of

colonization and we have to realize that and really take a look on different angle from what we

have seen in hundreds of years ago. So this is very important to look because I think on our case

why we hold the war for 30 years is for the sake of pride and the dignity of the people. So, when

the resolve of the problem in Aceh use dignity model that really clicks to our demand. Dignity for

all—this is not an anti-promise; this is the promise made by the President himself to solve the

problem in Aceh in a dignified way. We used that as a key to enter the negotiation room. The key

which is very important for us to look not Aceh hundred years back but 20 years from now. What

opportunities we can get 20 years from the signing of peace agreement. I think this is I would like

to share. The second thing is that during the negotiation most of the negotiators are a

combination of people in exile including myself, all of them. So, those people who are mentioned

and who signed the peace negotiation are living in exile at least for 20 years or 20 to 30 years.

Because of the GAM leadership lives in Stockholm and even the war itself in Aceh conducted

through phone because there is a discipline hierarchy of the troops to listen and obey the

instructions from Dr. Hassan Di Tiro from Sweden. There is no war conducted by the field, only in

the emergency matters. But every instruction is coming from Sweden. So, if you think about such

a strong hierarchy-based leadership you could imagine what kind of guy he is, like so powerful in

terms of managing from distance and at the same time looking at the problem closely as it can

be. I am just giving you a slightest example. Sofyan said about discipline army i.e. when the top

said “A” all at the bottom follow “A” and when the top refused everyone would refuse. So this is

very important thing, not very positive, I would say, sometimes it could create problem. But in

terms of implementation of peace agreement this could be very powerful. Because then you

don’t have spoilers, very little spoilers, then you don’t have people to dissatisfied with the result.

I want to comment on the democratization in Indonesia after the reformacy in 1998.

There was a tremendous freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of everything. That was

never happened for the last 32 years under Suharto rule. So when that happened, all the secret

talks that people hide in their rooms just to have a meeting five to ten people clandestine, we

have been organizing also clandestine movement, we manage to show our faces. We talk on TV

and GAM commander can give live talks in TV every week because of freedom of press and

media after the reformacy in Indonesia. So I think that is the plus and also the willingness—the

political will, very great political will from Indonesia to solve the problem in Aceh. Also that was

from the GAM leaderships. I would say the Tsunami is one of the factors because before

Tsunami there were 2 attempts of peace process. It’s not because of the tsunami GAM wants to

sign the peace process, I disagree with that. I think the reason of the tsunami is to expedite the

42

whole thing. But there were 2 attempts in 2000 and 2001 which were failed in Tokyo after the

Tokyo Conference. So, there is willingness even before, long before the tsunami in 2000. There

were willingness to solve the conflict by GAM and also by the Indonesian government; but the

sincerity is not there yet. The sincerity came later when both realize that they cannot win militarily.

Indonesia spent a lot of money on their military budget; unnecessary money spending which they

can use that money for development in various parts of Indonesia. That is used for stopping the

secessionist movement in Aceh. Now they are probably doing the same thing in Papua which is

too much money being spent. I remember when Jusuf Kalla came to Hiroshima, he challenged

the General by saying how much money can you save if I can stop the war in Aceh. I think this is

powerful words. He challenged the General and the General said oh! let me count and then he

found out that if the war stop in Aceh’s 5 provinces can be covered economically in terms of

development. So that huge amount of money to keep soldiers and all the logistics of war. GAM

can stay for another 30 years, it is guerrilla warfare. You know, during the day people are farmers,

they fight at night. Of my families some are fighters. So we used to live like that for many years.

So, for us, it is nothing strange if one of our members becomes GAM. GAM controlled 60-70

percent of the territory, only the main road controlled by the Indonesian army. But once you

stepped out of the main road, let us say for 2-5 kilometers, there is like GAM people are raining

flags and get marry, divorce and everything. Everything is structured under GAM in the village

level. It is almost like the LTTE in Sri Lanka, to that level, not all over in Aceh but in some part like

Northern Aceh and other areas. These are the strong hold pockets of GAM.

The good thing about this agreement, I think, is the big commitment from the European

Union because GAM refused to be mediated by ASEAN or Muslim countries or it’s the other way

around the Mindanao if I understood, you know. We are more like to seek a different instrument;

we want to see something different. So we do not want to experience an agreement where

everybody is pressuring us because more you know the person the easier you can pressure, you

know, on the party. So, GAM wants to have a little bit of flexibility, a room to breathe and that’s

why we agreed to the European Union. When Martti Ahtisaari came and asked for to mediate the

conflict, immediately GAM says ‘yes’ after the tsunami that expedite the whole things. And also

what is amazing, I think, that the GAM is also looking at the opportunity for the economic growth,

for example, at the international level. Since the signing of the peace agreement we managed to

have a direct trade with Malaysia, for example. There is a daily flight now to Malaysia, and to

Penang, which were happening hundred and hundred years ago. Indonesia blocked these

routes for 50-60 years but now it re-opened. So, the gate of Aceh is re-opened, the trade of

Malacca is re-opened and the South East Asia is welcomed to Aceh. It is huge economic benefits.

So, GAM thinks about this. And also they count the role of Indonesia, I think, at the ASEAN level,

as an important aspect. If they signed the peace agreement, economy will grow and everything

will come up. So, they see this possibility because the 30 years of war GAM cannot achieve

anything in terms of economically benefit for the people. I think, since the signing of the peace

agreement Indonesia economic growth rises from 4 to 6 percent per year, if I’m not mistaken.

GAM looked at shifting of the global power. United State is no more the police of the world. The

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police of the world will be shifted to Asia. So, the Western powers will become more and more

irrelevant in the future. So it will be Asia; it will be China; it will be Indonesia; it will be Thailand; it

will be, you know, Japan, may be, not now in the economic crisis, may be in the future. It’s

something that they oversee these kinds of things. To me, it is something great, you know, to talk

about them about this opportunity. This first thing GAM did, after the signing of the peace

agreement, during the period of the first Governor Irwandi Yusuf, was to organize a universal

health care for 4.2 million populations. You don’t have to pay anything, just bring your ID,

anything including her operation, her surgery, dental, eye care, you name it. This system, to me,

is an achievement. When I visit a village, I come to a house and I visit, and I see women groups

sitting there and they said when they just delivered a baby. I asked her did you have to pay for

c-section. No, nothing at all, she replied. I asked, did the doctor charge anything? No, only some

part, you know like diapers and things like that. I was like wow! This is something. Another

example is, tuberculosis goes down because most of the people can go to doctors, can visit to

hospitals, which are not like a luxury place but people come in and out easily. Second is

education. Invest for education is very very important for GAM and for the Indonesian

government because the Indonesian government’s policy do not charge and is very keen to

support the education system in Indonesia including the Islamic boarding school. I think Islamic

boarding school in Indonesia is one of the most successful stories that can share throughout the

world. If you look at Pakistan and others are mostly damaged by the Islamist, you know, and by

all the sorts of violent things. That is another achievement, I would say, that GAM is looking from

a different angle, really from a different angle.

The other is the self-government, the self-government model. I remember Ahtisaari

came to me and asked me to read this thick book about Oland Island in Finland, the example of

Oland Island’s self-government rule and territory, a Swedish speaking population but situated in

Finland. So, I said how could that be? And he said just read it and let me know what you think.

Three days later, I came to him and said Mr. President, I do not think Indonesia will implement;

this is too sophisticated; it is impossible. He said Shadia we live in a reality. If the Indonesia

government wants to implement this even 20 percent, you have something. Because the

question is to start everything is to get a good social welfare for the people and that is what we

did. We did first on health; we did on education; and we did on other social welfare matters that

like the facilities of hospitals, schools and so forth. The money we use from the reconstruction

money, from the tsunami money and also from the post-conflict money that were given by the

central government and also the international donors. So we have all sources of combinations. I

think that the war time is totally different. There is no development, very little development; very

little education, lack of education. The other achievement for what GAM, I think, is quite

successful is the Scholarship Commission. Scholarship Commission is the big investment on

scholarship for Masters and for Ph.D students for Acehnese to go to places like Malaysia,

Canada, Australia, United States, Germany, whatever, and Taiwan. It really invests on science

and technology, and agriculture. Well, some of them think that may be they are not coming back.

We will make them sign and make sure that they come back, and if not, we come and get them.

44

So this is the question of want to do it or not. But the willingness is there, very big. The only

problem with GAM is to manage. Because there were managing wars but they cannot manage

administration of government. They are good at work. But they have problem in managing

government. So, this will take time for them because of the military hierarchy; because of the

structure that they have; because of the convenient experience they have for the last 30 years

and nepotism and everything. These are the problems.

The second, of course, is corruption. But the basic service delivery to the people is very

very crucial. Because at the end of the day what do you fighting for? Are you fighting for you? Or

are you fighting for the people? If you say fighting for the people then the people should get what

they demand. At the end of the day you ask yourself. When I visit the village and I said myself

that all the women are happy; they go to paddy field; they can take their kids to school. I’m like

man! This is independence! What do you ask for more? Free school, free education, but of

course, there is a question—how do you sustain it. This is another big issue but a technical issue.

But at least a political will is there, the willingness to serve the people is there. I know, it is not an

easy task for a rebel group but that’s a good start and we try to share this experience. Aceh now

becomes a model for free healthcare. Lot of provinces from Java and West Java came to Aceh

and try to learn how Aceh can do a basic deliver of free health care for the people. I mean, of

course, it is still messy, you know, in terms of arrangements. But at least the willingness is there,

you can learn. So I think that’s all my presentation today. Thank you very much.

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COMMENTS on Aceh Case

Akihisa Matsuno

My comment will be very brief. Looking back at seven years of peace process after peace

agreement in 2005 in Ache, very simply I would say it started with the successful peace

agreement and it went through half successful peace process. After all these things, now we

have relatively grim prospect of becoming stable democracy. Why is this happening? May be this

is purely an outsider’s view, I am not sure whether the insiders have the same view. I think, the

presentation is enough to understand why the peace negotiation was such successfully done.

There are number of factors behind this.

I want to stress here as a student of conflict resolution that the peace negotiation in Ache

was the type of comprehensive solution type. It was more like northern island pattern of conflict

resolution. You discuss everything until down to the details and nothing is agreed if everything is

not agreed. This is unlike an Oslo accord, for example. This is not a step by step resolution

process. I think, the key of the success of peace agreement in Ache was this approach of

comprehensive solution. Very classic but very skillful notion of Martti Ahtisaari, I think.

Then another factor was, of course, the support by international actors such as the EU

with little bit backing of the US and ASEAN involvement in the peace process. But I would say

half successful peace process retrospectively. I was not really aware of this kind of notion when I

was looking at the contemporary situation, but retrospectively because we see now, after seven

years, the present political situation in Aceh is not very democratic. Of course, we cannot expect

Aceh’s democracy exceeds Indonesian level of democracy. It is totally within the Indonesian

political framework. But democracy is much more important in post-conflict society, because I

have experience in East Timor. Yes, East Timor made a successful peacebuilding but

nonetheless after four years of independence it is changing to another conflict. They had to invite

foreign troops from Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia once again to restore stability. The

second phase of peace building began after this political crisis in East Timor in 2006. But this is

not happening in Aceh. So, half successful peace process in Aceh, I think, number of things I

have to raise. One is successful aspect of peace process was DDR, political party formation, and

election. These major parts of political military peace building were successful.

What was lacking in peacebuilding in Aceh was what I called “democracy building”.

Weakness of democracy building is proliferating to all peacebuilding in all over the world. This is

a new area of study. I think that scholars pay more and more attention to the importance of

democracy building rather than security maintainence, political institution, election and so on.

Because democracy is more abstract and it’s scope is really wide; you have to build up not only

democratic institution but you have to build up the notion of democracy deeply rooted in the

society. So that you will have really functioning democracy not only the past democracy formed

in the Indonesian Suharto regime. If you talk about democracy building, you also deal with

46

accountability, transparency, and civic education. Many other things must be done. At the bottom

of democracy building also you have to have a rule of law and transitional justice must be

successfully addressed. You also have to create more democratic environment with the freedom

expression, infrastructure for democracy, facilities for community meetings, and reasonable

political party system. You also have to define competences in power of legislative and executive

and so on. It is very technical area but we have to go beyond just election and political party

formation in post conflict peacebuilding. If we really want to have functioning democracy in a

post-conflict society, this is the new challenge for the peacebuilding in Aceh. So far, I would say

we have been successful, even though I say half successful. Half successful is successful but

then we have to go beyond this.

Thank you very much.

47


Open Discussion - Aceh (Indonesia) Group

Koirala: What about the combatatants? Are they integrated?

Djuli: As pointed out by Dr. Sofyan, I was in charge of this. Prof. Akihisa said that it is

half-successful. If you look into the task given to me, it was successful because all the duties

assigned to me were carried out. Of 35,000 buildings, 29,000 were built when I left.

Compensations for 3,000 combatants and for another 6,500 non-armed combatants were given.

We also gave compensation for many conflict-victims and orphans. In that sense, it was

successful. When I took office I did initiate another stage of reintegration, which is social

cohesion. We have not even started doing that. There are many reasons for the failure of this. In

the final analysis, I would say that there is non-understanding of what reintegration is either

among central government and Aceh government. I do not think everybody reads carefully the

UN term DDR, which is not, in fact, just DDR. There is another R there which is recession, which

we skip in providing jobs and we did not do that. A specific time-limited was given to me. We

need very long time up to educate for social cohesion to take out the term like “ex-combatants”.

People are just people, not ex-combatants or victims of conflicts. I would say, if we look back, it

was 50 percent successful.

Marhaban: I would like to comment on that because your question is whether the GAM’s

ex-combatants became Indonesian national army. The answer is no. None of them. There is the

article in the MoU that allows them if they want to be trained to become Indonesian national army.

But none of them apply. Not a single person apply. I think that is understandable. People are still

having mix feeling with their pride and dignity to become Indonesian army. But may be in the

future, through education and through lot of cultural exposures with the other Indonesian people.

Imagine that they have been living in that kind of conditions for 10-15 years. The only thing they

know about Indonesia is the army. They have not been the places like Bali and Joyapura, which

are totally different. Their understanding about Indonesia is only soldiers. They need some

cultural exposures to understand this and to regain their trusts. Who are Indonesians? They are

not all the armies. This needs some education and time and also some psychological supports. I

do not think that the Indonesian army is ready to take them because of the issue of trust and so

forth. In the days of conflict, many Acehnese soldiers were defected and became very hard-core

GAM supporters. They still have the issue of trust. I think it is really about time.

Iqbal: Declaration of amnesty was part of whole debate. I raise the question first. When a group

of people struggle, they belive in the justice of their struggles. When an agreement specified that

they are going to be given a general amnesty, I do not think that it would be fair for those people

who undertook struggles. How did the GAM harmonize this? They believe on the justice of their

48

struggle. The declaration of amnesty means that they have committed something against the

Indonesian government. Now they accept the amnesty proclaimation. How did you harmonize?

You believe in justice of your struggle and all of a sudden you are granted amnesty.

Marhaban: The amnesty, what I understood, is given and totally, they do not have to do anything.

GAM person who killed many people during the conflict, they were given amnesty on the basis of

the Helsinki MoU and they can be free. They did not have to require to do anything. There is a

mechanism i.e. Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Due to time, we cannot discuss about this

issue and also it is very complex not only in the case of Aceh but also in the case of Timor Leste.

Djuli: I think, I understood your question. It is a matter of principle. If you have not committed any

offense, why you should be given amnesty? I think, I did quarrel with this term. Then our advisors

said what other term did we have? Those who have commited offenses in Indonesia, how they

can be released from prison? What were we going to say? We decided at that time with just

semantic. The importance was for those people who would be released within two weeks after

the signing of agreements. The majority, I think, more than 1200 were released within two weeks

and for others there were problem of logistic mechanisms. They were released later. There was

very serious contentions about the remaining two, even among ourselves. To me, I stress, they

should be given amnesty because of general amnesty and general means all. People said that

they committed offense under their orders. But there were GAM leaders who gave orders to

these bombers. They were not bombers themeselves. They were businessmen. The man who

did that said it is under them. That was a direct order from Commanders, which amnestiable

offenses. They were charged with treason and possession of arms in the name of terrorism. It is

a mistake to call them terrorist now. Lif imprisonment for them is for treason and belonging to

rebel movement and for possessing of arms which were found in their workshops. I am on the

side that they should be given amnesty. But unfortunately, our top leaderships until today have

not declared openly that they were acting under their orders and thereby, they are giving the

Indonesian government the pre-text for not to free them. I agree with you that the term of

amnesty does not go well with our side but I do not know what other term we can use. Thank you

so much.

Ladiasan: I have a very short question. What do you really mean by foreign advisor? Are they

part of the structure of the peace process? Do they have well-defined functions?

Djuli: Well, he is a foreigner. He was advisor. In fact, when he came, he was in secret. The next

day, the mediators asked us who were those two persons in your room? They are academics

and visiting here for conference and also visiting us, we replied. But of course, later, we admitted

that they were there to advise us because we did not have advisors. In the second round, they

were acknowledge and given recognition. There was no objection officially from Indonesian side

for their presences. From the first day, we made it clear to him and to also among ourselves that

49

he was there for advise us on how to conduct the format. We were not diplomats and we did not

know how to go with the negotiation. I had some experiences in Geneva. But it was different

because we had proximity meeting in Geneva. We talked among ourselves and conveyed it to

the mediator and the mediator went to other room to convey it. We did never meet face to face.

The only time we met face to face was in the openings where we attacked the other side and

they attacked us, that’s all. But we never talked face to face. This was the first time we talked

face to face and we did not even know how to go with this, how to present our case and who

should we talk. This was different in the case of Indonesian team, the leaders would talk. In our

side, the leaders did never say anything unless we needed to be corrected. This gave us

freedom. So, I became the number one shout-shooter. That was not chance. We discussed it

night before. This is what you say tomorrow. We cannot correct our leaders but our leaders can

correct us.

Marhaban: I think the advisor, Prof. David, advised us academically. We knew what we were

suppossed to do but he structured it. He helped us structure the whole things so that we did not

fall to the ground. I think every decision was made by GAM except on the academic issue. When

we thought that he knew more, we seeked for his advice. It was not like that he was advising the

whole political issues and policies. The leadership of GAM, he himself decided at the last

moment whether should we agree or disagree. I think it is just the style, the style of dialogue and

communication. President Ahtisaari was very clear from the begining that that was not an

ongoing negotiation for long. He has already said, “I am here to succeed and if you guys cannot

produce worth, I am out of here”. So, the first thing he did that he gave us that impression

whether we wanted to solve the problem or not. So, the willingness came immediately from both

of us. I think both of us were ready and also momentum were there. So, it is a combination of all.

This is the beauty of the Helsinki agreement; willingness is there; momentum is there; timing and

everything are perfect. It was a game; actually, all of us played different games in that room. We

managed that. We understood that was only the negotiation, which should be delivered

successfully. It was very different because that was in Europe. Everytime we walked out of the

negotiation, there were like 40 cameras, like BBC, CNN, and we had to deliver something. We

had to say something to the press. We could not just walk away. We were pressured to say

something. I have been chased by all the radio and tv reporters. We had to deliver something to

the international community because they are banking on the reconstruction efforts in Aceh.

Indonesia is a huge country, one of the democratic Islamic country in the world. And the world

needs to save Indonesia. So, it was not a small task for us. We were just nine of us. We had to

say something to the press after every meeting whether it was good or bad.

Djalil: I want to add some perspectives from Indonesian side. We knew that they had advisors,

but we never met them. Only five people from GAM and five people from Indonesia see each

other. Actually, all the strategies are discussed in the bed room. The speaker or the negotiator

just delivers what they have discussed or what we have prepared in our room. I think, talking

50

directly is very important. You can see their faces and body languages. You can hear and feel

their angers and animosity.

Chair: I know there are more discussions and questions. But we can discuss more later in this

afternoon. I think now it’s time for break.

Yoshida: Thank you very much for your active participation in the morning session.

51

Panel-3: Nepal Group Presentations

Chair

Osamu Yoshida

Professor, Graduate School of Social Sciences/IDEC,

Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee

Presenters


Facilitator for the Peace Talk between Govt. and Maoist during “People’s War”,

Former-Minister of Health and Labour

Shekhar Koirala

Former Member of the Constituent Assembly,

Member of the Central Committee of the Nepali Congress

Krishna Bahadur Mahara (Attended by paper)

Former Deputy Prime Minister and Former Minister of Communication, Govt. of Nepal,

Member of the Center Committee in charge of the International Affairs of the United

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

52


Presentation on Nepali Peace Process 1


Today I would like to share my personal experiences as one of facilitators.

From the very beginning of Maoist insurgency, In short I just wanted to inform you that

Nepal was ruled by say Monarchy and the family, autocratic rule was imposed for hundred and

four years. So when Nepali congress the Democratic Party led one revolution for introduction of

democracy in Nepal for the first time that was said to be a successful revolution but because of

several reasons you see our leader could not have constituent national election to make new

constitution and transition period was prolonged for long eight years.

In 1950 the revolution was there but only in 1958 we could have general election for

parliament. So the monarchy was there you see which always intervened and say ruled by

himself. King Mahendra that was a sort of royal coup which say the elected government was

there led by B.P. Koirala a famous democratic and socialist leader of Nepal or even south Asia

that the government was Nepali congress, they won the election with couple whelming majority

more than two third but the king was there you see so ambitious to rule by himself.

After that Nepali congress leaders, prime minister, ministers or so many leaders were

imprisoned and some of them fled to India as exile. So it took another say, 1960 to 1990, 30

years. It took 30 years. 30 years long you see, period of time for Nepalese political parties to

restore multiparty democracy and that movement was unitedly led by congress and the

communist fronts, Seven party, left parties were together in one front and another 5 communist

groups were together in another front. But the seven party front was together with Nepali

congress and the pro democracy movement was supported by India and other European

countries for democracy and peace Nepal. And there was say the parliament but the stability

was not there, political old stability was there but the parties could not deliver the expected

results from democracy. So there was a sort of dissatisfaction from the people from manifest.

So when the parties became weaker and weaker, then the King Gyanendra he also came to

rule the country by himself.

Then the elected government was disclosed, prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was

there and the parties were so weak, they could not come to the street to oppose the royal action

immediately. Only civil society group including myself were there in the center of Kathmandu to

oppose the King’s undemocratic intervention, resolution of parliament etc. When it became a

very serious problem for the country regarding democracy, development so the Nepali congress

and the united left from supported from civil society they led another prodemocracy movement

which is said to be ‘jana andolan second’ the people’s movement second that was also

supported by India and other democratic countries from all over the world.

That was successful within 19 days. The king was compelled to give up his rights and

parliament was restored and again the political parties could form democratic government. And

53

before that Maoist had started for example on Mindanao wise you have signed peace accord in

1996 but at the same time you see the Maoist party in Nepal declared for the first time in Nepal

in their own term that was ‘long term people’s war’.

At the beginning, the communist party, Maoist, was a very small party so many many

people could not believe that they could do any achievement but Nepalese people being poor,

you know Nepal being small country but very rich in diversity, we have ethnic diversity,

language diversity, cultural diversity, numbering more than 100. So Maoist although you see

they were small organization but when they started the war with the declaration that they

wanted to destroy parliamentary system and they want to establish people’s government,

people’s code, everything people’s like in China you see. So the Internationals also became

concerned because on the one hand China was there with people’s government with people’s

system, communist system, one party rule was there again on the other you see in India also

Communist party known as Naxalite now better known as Maoist also they are waging people’s

war or insurgency so for this region there was international concern also from the very

beginning that the Nepalese Maoist may create very big problem by imposing another

communist rule in Nepal.

And when the Maoist started insurgency for example in the beginning that was not so

affective but when they began to organize people from several ethnic groups because they

were deprived, they were discriminated, they were very poor. So once when Maoist commies

for the better life most of them joined insurgency raising arms including the women. And that

affected the whole country for example once they claim that they had already captured 80% of

the land but the international players or independent observers who visited several parts of the

country they said that if not 80% but at least 50% had already been captured by the Maoist i.e.,

police force were withdrawn by the government because of the Maoist threat.

Similarly the political parties also withdrew their party officers because of the terrorist

like actions or attacks against the party. That was the meaning of Maoist party capturing so

many parts of the country. And because of insurgency from both sides’ states and the Maoist

began to kill people even the innocent people, unlawful killings were there, exclusions were

there, so the Nepalese civil society, human rights movement also wanted the problem to be

solved peacefully through dialogue. So from the very beginning the civil society was there,

human right movement was there and people like myself were there to convince the Maoist and

the government.

But to start the dialogue for the peaceful solution, in the beginning it was very difficult to

trust Maoist if they come to the dialogue table or not because Maoist were also associated with

rim revolution international movement based on London which was said to be the international

center for the Maoist and their policy was said to be to fight to finish and to compromise to have

any solution to peaceful means etc.

Similarly in south Asia Maoist themselves formed, composed the Maoist center of the

south Asian countries. So it was very difficult for many national international could come to the

54

dialogue table. But with so many people involved, as facilitators formally and informally and

international press was there, so Maoist accepted to come to the dialogue table.

In 2001, that was the first official talks between them and government, Nepali congress

government that was. Maoist delegates came to Kathmandu for talks and that was failed within

month because Maoist had demanded a sort of say constitute assembly was said to be their

bottom line, then global sorry round table conference, interim government and the institutional

development of republican state. That time Nepal is a monarchical country so then government

the palace and other parties also couldn't accept the Maoist demand for republican, constituent

assembly, and people conference etc. The talks thus failed in 2001 and 2003 also. Only when

you see the King was there to rule by himself the parties became united and also they went to

Maoist for serious talks and Girija Prasad Koirala the great leader of Nepal who led our peace

process he was the one who decided by himself to go to New Delhi to talk to Prachanda the

supreme of communist party Maoist and that was a success. So the 7 party alliances, the

parliamentary parties and the Maoist have 12 point historical, 12 point agreement which

accepted for example multi party democracy, human rights and also constitution assembly etc.

The people became very hopeful that the parties, 7 party alliances, the Maoist party if

they come together to fight against monarchy the autocracy then we could bring democracy,

restore again. So people support was there, parties were united, international communities

support was there so we began our peace process. The interim constitution was promulgated

you must know because the present interim constitution, Nepal was declared by constitution as

a Hindu Kingdom because Hindus are there more than 80% of the population but because of

the movement led by Nepali congress and also the communists so they agreed to go for

secularism multi party democracy, periodical election, new constitution by constitution assembly

so many fundamental things were written in the interim constitution and that was said to be the

very successful beginning of peace process.

The interim parliament was there, restored parliament was there, the Maoist back from

jungle, the rebels were also met the members of parliament without any election as a major

political force for example Nepali congress was the first force the largest one in the parliament

and the second largest was another communist party known as united Marxist Leninist. The

Maoist got the seats just as par to the second largest communist party. So they also joined

interim government. Thus our peace process was started very successfully and the election for

constitution assembly was there, national international observers were there including all united

nation was there, including UNMIN United Nation was there.

All said that the election was free and fair and peaceful and Maoist came as the largest

political party through that election that was not expected by many many you see because they

came to peace process and they are just back from jungle from war how could they capture the

support of the masses. But you see to the surprise of many they became the largest one. So

Maoist formed new government led by Prachanda himself but as one of you said that the

process was successful or the experience in war was good but no good governance etc.

Similarly our Maoist also have been recognized as good in war people’s war but failed in

55

administration so Prachanda within 9 months he resigned and now again we do have another

problem on stability for example after Prachanda we did have another three governments one

after another. So many people were hopeful including myself that our peace process would be

concluded in time, our constitution could be finally drafted and promulgated within 2 years, but

we failed our leaders failed and the constitution assembly was elected for two years and that

was extended for another two years and the peace process for example the major party of the

peace process was that of integration of Maoist combatants into national armies that is also not

yet completed. So in our case, peace process is still going on and the constitution is to be

drafted again, promulgated again. Now the parliament parties are again in conflict. You must be

quite aware of the fact that in Nepal the conflict was totally political one on the one hand

revolutionary Maoist are there ideology is there, Marxist ideology and on the other the major

political party Nepali congress a democratic party a socialist party. So this conflict in Nepal is

said or recognized as purely a political conflict so we wanted the political parties to sit together

again and have seriousness or will power to be stronger to solve the problem that is to conclude

the peace process and to promulgate the new constitution. Thank you.

56



Shekhar Koirala

First of all, I thank to the organizer for providing this opportunity to share my views in this

workshop. The topic itself of the workshop is shifting conflicts from arms to dialogue. Since that

the dialogue and more meaningful dialogue is important and is the only answer for any conflict.

If we don't have dialogue or meaningful dialogue then it will be difficult.

As Mr Tuladhar has already said it in brief, He believe that the Maoist movement which

started in 1996 and which came to an end with comprehensive peace accord between Maoist

and the government that is seven party alliance in 2006. The triggering factor for conflict was

the monarch who was autocratic. The other factors of course was there like socio economic,

cultural, caste and ethnic discrimination and economic disparity. And there was also regional

imbalance in Nepal. There was a triangular fact between the monarch, the political parties which

represents the parliament or who believes in parliament and the Maoist. In fact there are three

political actors in the Nepalese political conflict, the monarchy, the seven political alliance and

the Maoist. Interestingly the history of politics in Nepal is the history of struggle for power

between the monarchy and the political parties as Mr Tuladhar has already said. However it

seems that monarchy and the political parties built the Maoist as the third force. Since the

Maoist were weakening in the political powers on the grass root level the monarchy was not

interested in wiping out the Maoist. As its main political force were the political parties that are

deprived the monarchy of the executive power through the people’s movement in 1990.

On the issue of deployment of army initially there was a tussle between the prime

minister that time it was GP Koirala and King Birendra and later on King Gyanendra also who

was not in favor of military action as he was lust to tacit working understanding with the Maoist

which the present Prime Minister Baburam, he is a Maoist has acknowledged in his article too.

During King Gyanendta’s tenure, Mr Koirala resigned due to the passive rule of Nepal

army in taking an action on mass gathering of Maoist in one of the district in Nepal that is Rolpa.

The Maoist on the other hand were interested in weakening the political parties because it

wanted to capture the state power with the help of monarchy.

From the very beginning, Maoist were against multi party democracy and parliamentary

system but not against the Monarchy as an institution initially and this was suitable to the King

too. In the meantime lots of civilians specially those affiliated with Nepali parliament particularly

in the rural areas were killed by the Maoist on the pretext of them being either informers for the

Nepal army or having feudal inclinations. Apart from civilians many Maoist rebels were killed by

the security forces and those in the police and the army were killed in encounter too. It’s very

interesting then Prime Minister Mr Koirala he was stanch anti communist and was not in favor of

any kind of dialogue with the Maoist that time. However his perceptions has changed when two

young Nepali congress cadres were murdered by Maoists in the tour far from districts when he

57

was on tour. Following this incident he spoke publicly in a meeting promising the people that

there will be no bloodshed and that he would work to make Nepal peaceful again. And he

tirelessly worked and he have no connection with Mr Prachanda that time and some how other

he got the middle person whom he could contact and its written in my paper. That way he came

in contact with Mr. Prachanda and later on he flew to China he was on a tour to China he

contacted Prachanda from there. Mr. Prachanda was there in Delhi and imagine a Nepali leader

who is in a tour to China flew straight from China to Delhi that is very many objectionable from

Chinese point of view or something like that. In the meantime the political parties we have

seven political parties who believe in parliamentary system. We were agitating but we could not

reach to any conclusion.

And the civil society people like Mr Tuladhar and others few of you might have met Mr

Daman Nath Dhungana also last year. They insisted that the political parties should come with

one agenda. Then only we can convince the Maoist. And the seven political parties they sat

together for several days and come up with the statement saying that the restoration of the

parliament is a must and we will go up to the election of CA. This led to the Maoist to being

assured that the political parties were serious about the peace process.

And then following this we had a 12 points understanding between the seven political

parties and the Maoist. And there was a debate between the seven parties and the Maoist.

Maoist they want to have an agreement. But Mr Koirala categorically said that if we will have an

agreement then we cannot move ahead in Nepal because there is a terrorist tag was put in by

US and other countries for the Maoist. So he convinced the Maoist that we should not have an

agreement we should just have understanding and we should move ahead. Secondly, Maoist

wanted to have republican system to be written in the 12 point understanding. Mr Koirala

convinced the Maoist leader that look if you will write republican system right now it will be

difficult for me to convince the international communities as well as the national actors. So we

should go for total democracy should be written instead of republican.

While going for the movement you can say that republican system and we will say the

total democracy. That way we have, that is there in the 12 point understanding. And third is

everyone in Nepal was concerned about there should be some supervision or some monitors or

some thing should be there for the combatants and royal Nepal army that time we used to call

royal Nepal army. And its written clearly in the agreement that combatants and the royal Nepal

army would have to be kept under the supervision of United Nation to please the Maoist and to

please India or other reliable international agency because you cannot displease India and go

ahead that was the situation at that time so we have mentioned other reliable international

agencies. And after that 19 days movement, of course we had a hectic telephonic conversation

and one to one conversation.

GPK(Girija Prasad Koirala), it’s very interesting, GPK has a separate telephone or

satellite telephone to talk to Prachanda that was the scenario because army was after him and

that's how we have reached the peace process and the CA (Constitution Assembly) elections.

But the latest situation, I will just be very brief we failed to promulgate the constitution. And the

58

take of 3000 plus Maoist combatants are waiting for integration in Nepal Army. Frustration

among them is increasing, if we don't start the integration process then things may go from bad

to worse. We don't have truth and reconciliation commission. We don't have we have yet to

make a disappearance commission yet to be formed. We are not able to form it because the

Maoist, the Nepal army and the leaders of the political parties they are bit afraid that if we go for

truth and reconciliation commission according to the international laws they may lined up in

trouble.

This is the scenario at present. I will stop it here. Time is also running out, I suppose

and if there is any question I will be happy. Thank you.

59



Krishna Bahadur Mahara (Attended by paper)

Dignitaries, Valued Participants, Ladies and Gentleman, please allow me to express my

heartiest thanks to the organizer for providing the opportunity of my opinion in this very

important second HiPeC Peace process Exchange workshop. I regret to mention that in spite of

my interest and will, I couldn't participate in this very important second HiPeC Peace process

Exchange workshop due to my bad health. Despite my illness, I was still planning to attend the

program but doctor strongly suggested having a complete rest. I had a great interest to

participate in this workshop and share my views and feelings, by my sudden sickness didn't let it

happen. So, I have sent my opinion as a brief statement.

At the outset I would like to briefly appraise the political discourse of last almost one and

half decade. People's war and movements in this period remained epoch making and

unprecedented in the global history of nations. Nepal's political movement dates back to

hundreds of years but I am briefly appraising the political movement of last decade that brought

a historic political transformation in Nepal. The then Nepal Communist Party Maoist (United

Nepal Communist Party, Maoist) launched peoples war in February 1996 for the first time in the

Nepalese history. The poor state of socio-economic conditions of the people, hierarchical

society that discriminates people based on caste and largely ever widening economic

inequalities were the real source of people's dissatisfaction that provided a solid ground for

revolt. State power monopolized by the monarchy limiting democratic rights of the people further

fueled the people's movement and people's war. People's war continued for a decade and

intensified affecting every walk of life. War raised the voices of oppressed and deprived people.

Legitimate government sequised to few urban areas that too with limited control. Different trials

with ad hoc policies adopted by frequently changing government but failed to yield any desired

result. In the midst of widely spreaded insurgency, uncertainties and political squabbles in the

capital among political parties with the then king a Royal Take Over took place in 2004. Royal

government intensified the war against Maoists and concurrently tried to limit the rights of

parliamentary parties. Parliamentary parties launched street protest in capital and few other

urban areas that was largely ignored by the royal regime. Democratic and human right

institutions stimulated the political parties to voice jointly with Maoists against the Royal move

which paved the way for polarization of political parties with the king and his supporters. Maoists

too while intensifying their war mounting pressure to king where trying to bringing in

socioeconomic transformation in Nepal with minimum casuality and loss. When autocratic

dynasty ruled feudal regime was emerging Maoists thought that the regime must go first to

secure the people' s right and liberate from feudal regime. They convene a meeting, which is

popularly known as Chunawang plenum, took decision to fight against monarchy joining hand

60

with parliamentary parties. This was a big opportunity for the political parties to bring the Maoist

nearer to them rallying against the king. Alliance of the political parties for Peoples movement

(Jan Andolan) fighting against kingship took momentum only when seven party alliance signed

a 12 point pact with CPNM against royal regime in November 2006 vowed to fight against king.

Seven party alliances too were not strong enough to fight against royal government. That

compulsion dragged them to join hand with the then rebel forces. Both the forces realized that

feudal monarchical system is the primary cause of deprivation, discrimination and

backwardness of the Nepalese society that had to do away with first for the socioeconomic

transformation of Nepal. Joint movement succeeded to step down the monarchy and seven

political parties with the CPNM took over the power. The major factor that brought in the political

parties together with Maoists was their inability to bringing desired change in the country fighting

separately or independently. Maoists could have secured the goal but with huge loss of lives

probably and with protracted war for several years to come. Maoist didn't opt that route. Seven

parties too took people into street for several months and realized that king will not listen them.

King had largely ignored their movement in many occasions. There was broader consensus

among civil societies, political actors and people's from different walks of life that Nepal should

remain a democratic country abiding by fundamental principles of democracy and human right.

That brought broader consensus among many stake holders. Many independent civil society

leaders facilitated the negotiations directly and indirectly. The basic characteristics of Nepal’s

peace process was no external mediation, as normally used to in many a case, there. In many

times we fiercely divide and reach virtually to a point to collapse peace process but again

resume for dialogue and came to conclusion. We sometime reach to deadlock and see no light

to move ahead but after sometime we find ways to settledown over differences. This was a

protracted, tedious and tireless job demands tremends patience, wisdom, flexibility, and ability

to take risk. We never give up hope of peace and agreement through dialogue even if sharp

differences emerge over issues in the negotiating table.

When Maoists suspended all armed movement after signing comprehensive Peace

Accord with the then Seven Party Alliance in November 2006 that paved the way for peaceful

transformation of the society. After the success of the popular people's movement the

intensively launched for 19 days, which is popularly known a spring movement, the political

situation changed remarkably. The success of the movement paved way to create conducive

platform of meetings and dialogue between political parties and the then CPN Maoist. A number

of agreements were made fallowed by decision made on consensus for restating the dissolved

house of parliament, agreement on ceasefire and formation of Negotiation Team of six

members-three from seven party alliance government and three from Maoist to discuss on each

aspect of the state affairs are few to mention. Historic Comprehensive Peace Accord was

signed and made public which was a milestone and foundation document for furthering peace

process in Nepal. Interim constitution was promulgated as a consensus document among

parliamentary political parties and Nepal communist party Maoists to run state affairs. This

document also paved way for the election of constitution assembly for the first time in Nepalese

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history. The interim constitution also declared Nepal as a federal democratic country with the

aim of empowering people at the grass root level.

Election of the constitutional assembly held for promulgating constitution through

elected representatives and eventually king ousted from throne in 2008. Last king of the Shah

dynasty, Gyanendra shah, had to quit throne after the first ever elected constitution assembly

took decision to abolish monarchy and declared Nepal a federal republic by its very first meeting.

Eventually king was forced to abandon power privileged to rule Nepal for last 240 years under

the shah dynasty. By this process Nepal become the newest republic in the world.

Although declaration of republicanism, election of constitution assembly and suspension

of all armed movement by the NCPM were historic achievements we have ever made the

doubting task remained adjacent to the political parties such as making constitution, integrating

and rehabilitating Maoist army to the Nepali security agencies and society for concluding peace

process founded on the comprehensive peace accord.

Constitutional assembly worked for four years, two years term as elected before and

two years extended period. Unfortunately, the most inclusive constituent assembly failed to

promulgate constitution and its term expired on May 27, 2012. The incumbent government has

declared fresh election of constitution assembly. Election requires amendment of different laws

that needs a broader political consensus in absence of parliament to amend laws. Government

is trying to care conducive environment for the election. The only way to legitimize the

government is election. Nepalese people want constitution written by their representative

nothing less. For that to happen we have to go for fresh election sooner than later, there is no

alternative to election, however intensive dialogue, understanding and flexibility in the part of

different political parties is required to bringing in consensus for election.

All the people's aspirations for socioeconomic transformation remained pending until

the new constitution evolves with the incorporation of basic expectations of the people.

Federalism, identity, rights of the oppressed and deprived, system that ensures fair and

equitable access over state resources are the required prerequisites for new constitution. Under

that foundation we can embark on a picture of a prosperous, just and equitable society of

Nepalese people. For achieving this negotiation will all stakeholders and regimes is must. So I

personally strongly believe that this kind of HiPeC exchange program with conflicting parties in

State will definitely help to build thrust and learn from each other experiences. I wise better

success on its aim.

Thank you.

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Open Discussion - Nepal Group

Djuli: Can you please elaborate how Maoists were able to establish the foothold? Does China

has anything to do with it?

Tuladhar: China being a northern neighbor and also a communist country so the impression in

the beginning when Maoist started insurgency that the Maoist party was directly influenced by

Chinese party but that was not true because the Maoist all over the world thought and said that

after Mao there is no communist party at all and the present Chinese communist party is

indigenous party. So there was no influence from China politically but when Maoist came to

power leading the government then state regulation began and Prachanda as Prime Minister

visited China first before visiting New Delhi otherwise the precedent was there that each and

every Nepalese Prime Minister should visit first to India but Prachanda a communist leader

visited first to China that was a problem that time with India also. So I think the Nepalese

communist movement was directly influenced by Indian communist movement not the Chinese

communist movement because we are so close to New Delhi or India and was still was far to

China because of our huge Himalayan mountains.

Djuli: What is the logic in calling them Maoist?

Tuladhar: After the election they came as the largest party in the constituent assembly. Logic

behind calling them Maoist…..Again communist movement they were divided when Soviet Union

was there the Chinese communist and the Russian communist divided. One center was that at

Moscow and another center was that of Peking. So in India for example the communist party of

India was with Soviet Union and communist party Marxist were with China. Similarly in Nepal

also the communist parties were divided similarly so this Maoist party other communist just took

Maoist thought as Mao. This communist party Maoist took the Maoist thought as Maoism. So

they are known as Maoism, not only in Nepal but also in India and several countries.

Chair: Probably it is most south Asian, to call that kind of communist party are called Maoist.

There strategy is may be typically the Maoist when we see the history of the communist party in

China during the Second World War after Second World War to control the whole state of China

so that their basic strategy is to encircle the city by the control of the rural areas. That kind of

strategy is sometimes called Maoist. That is the reason why they call themselves as Maoist.

Marhaban: I would like to address this question to Dr Padma may be can answer. I remember

when I visited in 2009 or 2010 I cannot remember exactly but there was a big hope for the

constitution building at that time. So my question is what are the most challenging enriching the

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political consensus in terms of enriching the political constitution….what are the biggest

challenges because you see the feeling of 2010 was very big in terms of hope gaining trust and

you can build this trust already so but now the constitution failed and you have to start again so I

just curious you know to know what are the biggest tumbling block, biggest challenges you may

face.

Tuladhar: You must know our constitution was elected for two years to draft the constitution and

to promulgate it. So the expectation was that the 7 party alliance and the Maoist when they

agreed to go for constitution assembly election along with several other democratic values

accepted and the interim constitution said that each and every thing to be decided consensus all

political parties in CA more than 25 parties were there major parties were just four and that was

extended for another two years, six months, three months, three months etc. because the parties

could not draft major issues in CA. Now at last when it is to be just last phase of four years the

parties very badly divided on federal issues that is for federalism while say committed by all the

parties including Nepali Congress and Maoist. But they differed all a sort of nature of provinces

to be formed. For example the Maoist wanted the provinces to be formed from the basis of ethnic

identity. Also the indigenous movement wanted the same, Tarai also wanted same. So Nepali

congress and UML two major parties could not agree with Maoist and indigenous movement to

go for a sort of racial type of ethnic type of state.

Chair: Dr Koirala may want to speak something on this issue, please.

Koirala: Mr Tuladhar has already said about the difference, the real difference is on federalism

whether we should go for ethnic federalism or that is single identity in hills and two in the plains

because Nepal is a multiethnic, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic and multi state and no community

and no ethnic community is in majority in anywhere. So Nepali Congress and UML is saying that

we should not go for the ethnic federalism number one and in plains there should be more than

two states or two provinces you can say because it's a long strip 1400km strip small strip

extending from far east of Nepal to far west and it should be divided into two or three otherwise it

would be difficult to manage but the Maoist and the Madeshi Morcha the another political group

they didn't agree they said that in hills it should be 8 states and in plain that two in single identical

base and secondly in plains it should be two. That is the major contentious issues in federalism

and that created the problem and we could not have the constitution on 27th of May.

Djuli: Thank you I have two questions…mentioned and during the first seminar of HiPeC there

was mentioned that the number of Maoist troops were increased when compensation were paid.

So the initial number there was some number mentioned then when the compensation was

started to be paid the numbers were somehow increased. The second question is that now has

the disarmament taken place, has the troops disarmed completely, partly or not at all. Thank

you.

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Koi: In fact we the political parties initially thought that Maoist combatants won’t be more than six

thousand to seven thousand and so initially we thought that we have to integrate round about

three thousand to four thousand something like that and we will send back home to others but

when the integration process started when they came to the camps it came around almost 30

thousand or so initially and we were very much dissatisfied with the Maoist because the Maoist

leader has a one to one discussion with our leader and all the time Maoist leader was saying that

we should not we will not have more than six to seven thousand or so. And secondly there was

lots of miners and the UNMIN, the UN mission they have sent the miners back home and

disarmament has now already been done in the sense that there was a chaotic situation within

the camps and the deputy commanders, commanders and everyone was very upset because

there was a political differences while the peace process because we have to know then only we

can, the leadership became weak not only in the Maoist but also in 7 party alliances of course

there is no 7 party alliance it has weaken. Similarly in the Maoist also there was a infighting

within their own party and the combatants were also divided in that line and that was the reason

that we had to and Maoist leader he promptly without wasting any time he just ordered that all

the camps should be taken over by the army and now they are disarmed and 3000 plus 3127

something like that is about to be integrated, they are still in the camps.

Chair: Thank you very much.

Iqbal: I don't know if I got correctly, the way I understood the presentation that right now the

current situation in Nepal is that president resign, president or prime minister resign.

Maharjan: It’s not resign, the constitution assembly equivalent to parliament is dissolved.

Iqbal: There is no new prime minister, dissolved. Consequently if the parliament is dissolved

new election is not called for then. There is no prime minster. That's how I understand it. I

understand that constitution was not promulgated. And then the reintegration process of Maoist

combatants has not been completed. So in other words I am trying to say here is the current

situation in Nepal right now is that there is no group in control, there is a vacuum power because

there is a vacuum power, and this opened to three situations. One, it is fertile for outside

intervention. Second, there is going to be a civil war because nobody is in control. Third, may be

a stronger party its obliviously military will take over. What’s the real situation in Nepal right now

and what’s going to be happened in the near future if you make time to figure out what is going to

happen, that's my question.

Tuladhar: After the end of constitution assembly we still do have interim constitution and the

prime minister was there, elected prime minister he was. He had majority. But the interim

constitution did not imagined that constitution assembly will be dissolved without new

constitution. So that's the big problem. We do have elected president and elected prime minister

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now. Now prime minister has been as president himself stated that he is now just a caretaker

government. Now the parties are still you see having serious discussions for the solution of this

present crisis. The prime minister before the dissolution of CA itself because he was to be

dissolved at the midnight 12 o’clock. So he declared new election for CA before the dissolution of

parliament. The controversy is prime minister dissolved the CA and constitution CA was

automatically dissolved. This kind of debate is also going on so as per as your concern about say

military take over for an intervention etc. etc. we don't think so because we still do have serious

political party, Nepali congress historical political party. Maoists are also for peace and

constitution. So we are quite hopeful that parties could come again together for the solution,

democratic solution or the solution for the benefit of the country will certainly happen.

Koirala: Constitution assembly is dissolved. The prime minister is caretaker. And the

constitution, the interim constitution is silent about how to go for next election. Of course up to

that part there is a vacuum. We all agree on that but there is seriousness on the part of the

political parties that we are having discussions almost every day. May be there are four major

political parties at present. Sometimes we four sit, sometimes only three. And sometimes just

bilateral. And we are serious about it that things should move as early as possible and personally

not only from my side but all political parties if u ask the same questions there is a vacuum but

there won’t be any outside intervention, there won’t be any army coup we don't think so and

there won’t be any civil war at present. Thank you.

Chair: Thank you very much. Any questions?

Tanggahma: May I ask the questions to all three? My first question is really about history and its

I think for the two cases were history doesn't seem to be same from one side into the other there

is different interpretation of how history in one case. The Philippines took over, before that

people who already more or less nation state or people were and on the other side we have

Ache who is recognized by other nation state as a separate entity. So my question really is

during these negotiation talks that you have what do you do with that side of history do you talk

about it or do you leave it aside and you don't talk at all about the differences or interpretation

that you might have with the other party. Because for in our case we have completely different

version of history with Indonesians. Indonesians tell us or tell the world that they freed us from

the Dutch colonizers and we say know we became annex we became next annexation to

Indonesia and we were not freed all. We went from one colonizer to another. And I really don't

see how during such negotiation we would be able to forget about that so that's one thing that I

curious to know during such dialogue such a dialogue what do you do with that? Do you start

recognizing that or do you not talk about it at all. The second question is about the role of women.

What is the role of women? Do they play a prominent role, dominant role in bringing about these

dialogue or during the dialogue? As see during the dialogue we do have seen in Ache. A

prominent player how does it happen in other cases. In our case what I believe is that the women

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will have to carry a lot to actual push towards the dialogue so I am curious to know about that

side of issue or that kind of perspective. So it was my 2 questions to all three.

Chair: Thank you for the questions about the status, then female role that can be a topic for

general discussion so that we will keep these questions for next session. So any other questions

for Nepali case. If not, ok please.

Djalil: To the Nepal group, who facilitated negotiation among the parties and who appointed their

facilitator? Thank you.

Tuladhar: Nepali peace process was appreciated by many experts as home grown indigenous

or facilitated by insiders because outsiders an agencies or staffs could not be accepted by our

government and Maoist. So in the first official talks that the Maoist proposed two names, myself

and Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana a democrat. then accepted by prime minister by Congress

leader Sher Bhadur Deuba and in the second talks that was during the Kings’ regime under two

prime ministers we were four facilitators, two proposed and supported by Nepali Congress and

another two were added from the palace but we all together worked as one group. And during

our this ongoing peace process I of us was nominated as observer from civil society. Although

civil society human rights movement were there offering facilitation for peace process of this

insurgency but finally with the government and the Maoist party they themselves decided to

appoint the facilitators, observers.

Chair: Thank you very much and now the as the time to stop this session and we have the ten

minutes break and after that we have general discussion for one hour that is the last session for

today. Thank you very much for the participation.

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Day 1 : GENERAL DISCUSSION

Chair: Let’s start the last session for today, general discussion for about one hour. We have

summarized the discussion of each group. I think still we have some questions and you can

exchange our views.

Ladiasan: My question is about Nepal. Koirala’s presentation mentioned about 12-point

understanding. Was the issue of terrorist target on the Maoist cover under the agreement? For

us, it was an issue. MILF was targeted as “terrorist” organization. Is the agreement only about

constitutional promulgation?

Koirala: The 12-point understanding is the annex of the Interim Constitution. When we had the

12-point understanding, there was a terrorist tag on Maoist.

Ladiasan: How you did this? I mean what is the implication of that tag?

Koirala: From Nepal side, that had already been gone. I mean that we did not mention terrorist

issue in the 12-point understanding. It is only about the roadmap that how we reach to

Constitutional Assembly and to make a new Constitution.

Tuladhar: Before the 12-point agreement in New Delhi, when the Maoist were having attacks,

destroying infrastructures and killing people, that was said to be terror like actions. Government

branded them as “terrorist” and also declared prizes for the heads of individual leaders. When

there was ceasefire, especially when the 12-point agreement was settled, there was no problem

in Nepali side. The problem was, for example, US. They also branded Maoists as “terrorist” after

the 9/11. It is still to be withdrawn. India also declared Maoist “terrorist”, although Maoist was said

to be hiding in New Delhi. When the Maoist came to the peace process and through the election

they became the largest one, the rebel relation with US was stopped. For example, the US

Ambassador used to visit the Maoist Prime Minister. May be they did not discuss on the

withdrawal of “terrorist” tag. Recently, the Americans said that now they are in the process of

withdrawal of the tag. Americans accepted Maoists and cooperated fully in the peace process.

Iqbal:At the beginning of your presentation, you mentioned Nepal is a Hindu state and right now,

there is democratization. My question is how democratization affects caste system in Nepal?

Tuladhar: According to our Interim Constitution, Nepal is a secular country, though Hindu

population is around 80 percent. There were several movements and civil society movements

that one day Nepal would be a democratic country and equal rights given to all including religious

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groups. We do have Christians, Buddhists, Hindus and smaller sections of religious groups.

According to Human rights value, all the religions should be treated equally. We thought that

these kinds of problems would be resolved by the Interim Constitution. But at the same time,

Hinduism, being the largest religion, guides so many things such as culture. We had King, who

used to be believed as the incarnation of Hindu God; still there are some people having that kind

of faith. Politically, we are secular. When we had, say, republican state, he (the King) was

criticized because he used to visit Hindu sites only; he immediately corrected himself and started

visit other religious places also.

Regarding the caste system, it is based on Hinduism. We do have Dalits in the caste

system. Almost 20 percent of our population is still being treated as untouchable caste people; it

is very bad and inhuman. They are fighting against this kind of discrimination. Their movement is

very strong. Dalits are scattered in many parts of the country and they could not have any

specific area or zone to have separate province or state. The Commission for state restructuring

issue proposed for one non-territorial province for Dalits. But they denied saying that they are

scattered.

Tanggahma: What about the differences in historical perspectives or interpretations? During the

negotiation talk did you leave that aside? In our case, it is one of the issues because we look

history very differently. The second question is about the women’s role in bringing about such

peace talks. Do they play certain roles? My questions are for all three cases.

Iqbal:In the Philippines, there is strong women movement. Of course, we do recognize the role

and importance of women’s participation in the current peace process. As a matter of reality, we

have two women members in the MILF board of consultation, one is lawyer and the other is an

educator. To me, men and women are equal in individual capacity. It is a requirement to include

women in peace negotiation.

Djuli: Well, I mentioned earlier that you cannot write the wrong of history. We have been wrong

many times by the Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesia. Do you want to accept the reality today or

you want to return to history? That is clearly impossible. If you want peace, you have to accept

the reality and look for future. Our struggle is about sovereignty. We want to get back our

sovereignty that was taken by the Dutch and returned to Indonesia, not to us. The Dutch

declared war against Aceh, not against Indonesia, because we were recognized as nation-state.

We had been in war since 1873. We felt that are we going to continue fighting with Indonesia with

half a million soldiers. We arrived at the place that we realized that this is really nowhere. People

are suffering and eventually we will be in extinct. Facing that fact, we realized that we have to

look into the future. We decided to get the best what we could get on that day. What is possible

for us then? We try to get the best. This is very important. Ask yourself. Can you accept the

reality of today? If you can, then you can proceed to the negotiation. Give your bottom line. What

is your bottom line? You do not have to tell but ask for the most. I am happy to say that our

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bottom line was met finally. If we discuss it and say Indonesia you are wrong because you took

our sovereignty and Indonesia would say no, we neither—it will bring you nowhere. The point of

discussion has to be what we can get for future. There are some people saying that we have sold

out our oath to get independence. There are numbers of our people who look at us as being

‘traitors”. If you want negotiation, you have to be ready to face such possibility.

Iqbal:There is little difference with Aceh. For us, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, history is

really a factor. We need to look back the history in order to understand the present and to project

the future. We are pragmatic but we need to look back in history. The historical incidence will

guide us to understand the situation now. What is in our history, we want to look back. Before the

coming of Spaniard, we were independent people; for 333 years, before and during the regime of

Spaniard. When the Americans came, we fought with the Americans. They established Moro

province. We protested and wanted our homeland to be separated from Manila. But the

American did not listen to us. They proceeded to grant the independence to the Philippines

including our homeland. We were never given to have consent on the grant to independence. We

were not given the right to be heard. So, history affects in our struggle. But we are also pragmatic.

We did not demand what was asked before because those were in the history. Similarly, we need

to understand the situation. The whole of Mindanao belonged to us before, but right now, I think,

around 25-30 percent is at our hand. So, we had to balance history and the current situation.

History really played very important role in our current negotiation with Philippine government.

One aspect of this, if we try to understand the history of the Philippines, their independence was

declared on June 12, 1898 and at that time we were not part of the Philippines. If stick on history,

definitely the Philippines government cannot claim our homeland as part of the Philippines

territory because their independence said that we were not part of the Philippines. I repeat

history is a factor in our current negotiation with the government of the Republic of the

Philippines but at the same time we are pragmatic. We are not dreaming; we know the past and

the situation right now.

Rodil: From the government side, there has never been recognition of this version of history.

What has been taught in the Philippines schools and in the Philippines history books is that the

Republic of the Philippines is… based on historical grounds. But I questioned this in my own

study. Up to now what is being taught? A lot of people are reacting without thinking to the Moros’

struggle that the Moros are really bad. This is the thinking of the Christians of the Spanish period.

We were being made to fight one another. As far as I am concerned, many of these

misconceptions can be corrected by simple act, I hope government will do something, such as

pulling together historians to correct the Philippines history courses. Just teach the proper history.

Indirectly, we can correct many misconceptions. I noticed that the chairman of new government

panel earlier proposed rewriting the Philippines history books. In a public forum I said negotiate

over facts of history. You research and write on them. Earlier this morning, I said that it seems

that the negotiation is taking too long because the two parties do not see eye-to-eye on history.

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They do not have a common version of the problem. Partly because the government side do not

see history as it should be seen.

Marhaban: I think I need to respond to Leoni’s question regarding the women. In the last survey,

I think, in 2010 under the UNIFEM (UN Women now), women participation in peace negotiation

is less than 2%, very small and very tiny. The role is not given in full force, not with full capacity. If

you look the cases not only among the rebel groups throughout the world but also in the case of

the UN themselves, for example, all of 35 special envoy of Kofi Anan to Syria were men. If you

look at the qualifications in various countries in Latin America, most educated population are

women. But they are not being included in the peace negotiation because of various reasons.

The inclusive model of peace process is very new. Now a day people ask for more inclusion.

There has been huge debate at the UN level at the mediator support unit that they should involve

women, civil society, and other elements in the society that includes indigenous communities and

different religious elements. This is a noisy process. Not many parties have the gut to jump into

the inclusive model. Sometimes, this could be stamping block and could be a problem for parties

to negotiate at the very beginning. Now they use special tools for this model. Mediators are now

trying to find formula that how to bring more people into peace negotiation. And one of the best

example, the case of Sudan, though it is not a good quality of peace process. The process itself

involves many people and elements in the society but the quality of the peace process is poor.

There is no guarantee that inclusiveness will bring good quality of peace process. Now if we ask

ourselves what does a good peace process look like? We do not have the answer because

every model is different. Aceh is different; Mindanao is different and may be Papua will be

different in future. You can look at different continents and the way mediators solve in that part of

the world. If try to implement that in Asia, for example, from Asia to Africa, that would be different

issue.

Under UN resolution 1325, women peace and security, women should be included be it

on affirmative action or capacity. We have been working on and trying to involve with more

women in peace negotiation.

I just want to make a comment on the history. In the Aceh case, we put in the MOU our

own flag. We have the rights of our Aceh flag; we have the rights of our hymn, kind of national

anthem. At the end of the day, you think whether you want a visual history or something for

educating the people. Now we are trying to educate our children the real history of Aceh. This is

what exactly our history looks like. This is what Indonesian told you about. So we teach both.

This is something that people promote and also Acehnese language is widely used since the

peace agreement. There are more different kinds of nationalist elements in terms of

understanding their own culture, history and religion.

Meg: I would like to raise issue to Aceh and Mindanao. For the Aceh case, the negotiation was

very short period. In the Aceh on the ground, do they talk about peace talk, about the subject? In

the case of Mindanao, they do not talk detail; how MILF try to pursue their peace talk. I can hear

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it in the public now. But I think before 2008 there was not much visual about peace talk in the

public and we could not see you in the public. Why MILF choose to speak about themselves in

the public?

Djalil: When the negotiation took place, at that time, if you see from outside, the negotiation was

not structured at all. We could talk everything. All complains could be put forward. We could talk

from vary serious thing to very trivial one. Some discussions were very emotional especially the

first two days discussions. The GAM expressed all the animosity to Indonesia. They accussed

military raping women. They accussed military killing children. We the Indonesian delegation at

that time was prepared for that. The Vice-President selected the members of delegations. You

know, majority of Indonesian are Javanese. These people idenify Indonesian government as

Javanese government, not Indonesian. When they hit Indonesia they told that the Javanese

people killed our people and raped our women. The Vice-President wisely selected the members

and none of us are Javanese. Because it may create some emotional problems. If there was

Javanese and GAM attacked Javanese, he might take it personally. I myself by born Acehnese. I

moved to Jakarta when I was 24 years old. The Chairman of the delegation was the Minister of

Justice. He was from the same tribe of Jusuf Kalla. We had also a General representing military.

He was Sundanese, people from West Java. Java alone consists of three tribes: Javanese,

Sundanese and Bandanese. The Sundanese never identify themselves as Javanese. The

military guy was from Sundanese. When GAM attacked Javanese, they did not care it. There

was doctor. He was also Sundanese and confident of Jusuf Kalla. We had also a junior diplomat.

He was a Balinese. He was just to take note.

The issue was raised from history to whatever. In the last four or five meetings, there

was no structure at all, if you see from outside. President Ahtisaari and his team chalked down

everything and recorded. At the end of third round meeting, he produced a draft of MoU and

gave it us and said that he summarized and concluded from the discussion. It took all the

important things that we raised. He took the most important substances and put into the MoU.

We brought this into cabinet meeting in Indonesia. 0f the draft, 80-90 percent was accepted by

our cabinet. Only 10 percent needed to discuss again with the delegation. In the next round

meeting, we talked about more technical issues. In the fourth meeting, all the issues can be

resolved except the local political parties that was about to derail the whole negotiation process.

Fortunate enough that one Finnish diplomate formulate the article, which is, if you see from our

side, as if not a committment at all. “The government of Indonesia will create a political condition

that allows the political establishment of local political parties with the approval of the parliament.”

The government of Indonesia promised this. I told GAM that the government of Indonesia cannot

give permission of local political parties because it would violet the law. If the law is violeted, the

President can be impeached. If the government of Indonesia is impeached by the parliament,

there would be nothing and no MoU. I think this kind of arrangment will make the talk easy. You

have to have a good note-taker, good formulator so that you can differentiate which one is

important.

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Djuli: I add a little bit. Did the people in Aceh talk about it? Not the people in Aceh but also the

people in Jakarta talked about it. In Aceh every time the negotiation took place, the whole prayer

houses open for prayer for the peace in Aceh because it was very hard for the people. The

economy was down and schools were closed and practically almost no food to eat and they

could not walk a few hundred meters without being stopped by the military. The people could not

stand any more in this war. So, they did talk. In Jakarta, press, TV of which three TV channels

stationed in Helsinki along with international channels had widely covered the issue. There were

wide media talks. As for convincing the people on the third round talk, we managed to bring

nearly 300 people to Denmark from all over the world except from Aceh because they could not

go out. Then we laid down what we were going to achieve and what we were going to accept.

They gave us eight conditions and of all these conditions we were able to achieve six but the two

we were not able when finally we signed the agreement. Of the two, one was controlling police

and demilitarized. When you go to the negotiation, you have to understand that you cannot get

all. You need to put your bottom line.

Iqbal: Negotiation requires ownership. This ownership does not mean that the two peace panels

and their principles are involved in. More importantly, the people have to be involved in. People

have to own the peace process. Telling the people what is going on is really important. This is the

reason that why MILF and the government of the Philippines created an advocacy group. This

group is composed with the members from MILF and government and we conduct advocacy

separately or jointly. This is how we value the importance of informing the people. After all,

people will benefit from the peace process and they will have the final say in any negotiation. But

we have to balance confidentiality and transparency. When there is a need for confidentiality, we

need to keep secret otherwise it would be spoiled. When there is a time for transparency, we

have to tell the people what is going on. This is the reason also that why MILF is undertaking so

many advocacy forums throughout Mindanao and even in Manila we faced diplomatic community.

Even we faced those people who are considered as spoilers against the peace negotiation. I

think there is some improvements in the way people understand the peace process, and there is

less opposition to the negotiation especially among the people in Mindanao including Christian

politicians. Before there was so much animosity between MILF and these politicians (Christian

politicians) and Muslims and Christian population, but right now there is certain level of trust.

That is why we can communicate with them.

Rodil: During the days of confidentiality, I would talk about history and eventually the discussion

would lead to ancestral domain. I can talk about the details of the negotiation without them

knowing that I can talk about the details of the negotiation. I must emphasize that the people who

demand transparency are already the people who do not like to be part of the whole thing. It is

because historically, these are the people who benefitted from the resettlement program that

brought them in Mindanao and in the process, they became the majority. When I come around to

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tell them you are also part of the party to the making of this problem. So, you must take a

responsibility for finding a solution. Now the politicians, settlers and large land owners do not

want to listen this kind of story. Government also does not want to listen this kind of story

because that will mean that it was government, whether Spanish colonial or American colonial or

the Republican government, that created a policy or project that brought the people in Mindanao.

Of course, I do not leave it hanging that way. Eventually we get around to the matter that how do

we look forward to the future. It starts by saying that we need to accept each other’s presence.

We need to be able to talk with each other so that we can figure out how we can live in peace.

This is how I developed the theory that this problem is not only a question of panel to panel

solution. There are prejudices among the people which are so deeply rooted that they carry over

the sentiments from the past. The only way to get rid of this that more people need to talk with

each other and figure out by themselves that how to live with one and another in peace. There

are models and there are communities which have done this. In Cotobato, we have at least

seven Barengais and they decide themselves and talk each other and established peace zone.

Later on, other NGOs create other peace zones. The idea is that the people are organized to talk

to each other. By doing this, we are able to show that we are not only creating the nucleus of

brotherhood and sisterhood among the people and residences but at the same we are creating a

situation for general acceptance. I must admit that we have not reached the critical mass. I have

involved in the dialogue business in 1981. What I can tell you that in 1981 you can count the

number of participants in the dialogue. Now we cannot count them anymore. A lot of people have

become peace advocators. We have not reached the critical mass. I do think if only the schools

can be encouraged to go into extension service other than academic works, and NGOs can

participate in facilitating dialogues, let the people talk, the whole business of dialogue can

snowball very quickly. My worry, of course, is if the peace agreement come soon, may be in the

six months, we may not able to say that the community is ready. This is one phenomenon that we

have to deal with. The schools must be used for the purpose. The government could have done

something. Until this time, it has not been mobilized such as education, the commission of higher

education and the textbooks have not been changed. It is basically because the government

does not know what the problem is.

Maharjan: We learnt from Sadia that there are two kinds of histories: Acehnese and Indonesian

version. We also learnt that history has to be recognized by the other party. My question now

would be what about the language? Is language taught in the schools like in the case for Aceh,

Acehnese and Javanese, or in the case of Mindanao, Mindanao language or Tagalog language?

And may be if our Nepali delegates can talk little bit about language issue, I think, we can

understand the common frame.

Marhaban: Indonesia covered only six areas of powers, as Dr. Sofyan has already mentioned in

his presentation slides. The rests are ours. It’s self-government; you can teach whatever you

want. If the department of education in Aceh decided to put Acehnese language as a medium of

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study in the schools, they can. But it will be for the students to graduate and also to go for higher

education. There is also pragmatic thinking also. Since the conflict and until today, many

Acehnese speak in Acehnese at home. None of us speak Indonesian language. In many cases,

when Acehnese people were arrested by the military they could not answer the questions

because they did not understand Indonesian language. Now what we are trying to do, I mean,

the Aceh government is to be realistic and even try English. There are lots of bilingual schools,

also Turkish because Turkish schools are coming to Aceh. We try to be internationalized. We

have special council that is Bahasa Aceh. We have produced lot of dictionaries from Dutch to

Acehnese and Acehnese to Dutch and English. Your identity is your identity and nothing can take

that away from you.

Djalil: Language is not a problem in Indonesia. According to the policy of Ministry education, it is

mandatory to teach local language in elementary schools. Bahasa Indonesia is very powerful. In

Aceh, there is need to teach Bahasa Aceh again. In Papua if you go to small village in mountain,

people speak Bahasa Indonesia. In many part of Indonesia, people feel proud if they speak

Bahasa Indonesia. Our concern is now that local languages are disappearing because of the

very powerful influence of Bahasa Indonesia.

Iqbal:In our case, we have 13 ethnic-linguistic groups. There is no common language that we

can use. Of these 13 ethnic-linguistic groups in Mindanao, there are three major groups. The

most populous group is Maguindanao. Other major tribal group is the Maranao. When Maranao

speaks we can understand it. The three groups make up 60 percent of the whole population in

Mindanao. The remaining 40 percent speak other languages and the most prominent language

is Tausug from Sulu area. We are still in the process of formulating our national language

because language evolves. What is important in the current negotiation is that we are able to

settle the issue of identity. We are Bangsamoro but we consider that we are still Filipino citizens.

Identity is really very important and language evolves from identity. I hope the current negotiation

will be able to settle everything in due time so that we can start to develop our own nationality.

Right now the government of the Philippines recognized that there are two nationalities in

Mindanao—Filipino and Bangsamoro. It’s not a question that one country has so many

nationalities and it’s not a problem. It takes time before we can succeed to have one common

language, which is a unifying factor in nationality formation.

Tuladhar: In Nepal, the problem is rich diversity. We do have more than 70 different languages.

Major language groups’ numbers are more than 10. Our Interim Constitution stated that all the

languages spoken in Nepal are national languages. In the previous Constitution it was stated

that the Nepali language written in Devnagari script is to be the national language. Still our

government has no national language policy. Language movement started since we started the

movement for democracy. They wanted equal rights to all the language groups in Nepal. Now the

Constitution recognizes all the languages but there is no policy. Still medium of administration,

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medium of court, medium of education—all mediums are in one language. There are demands

for democracy and language policy from indigenous communities, human rights groups and civil

society. After the 1990 movement, we had a Constitution that stated that the community

themselves learn languages for education in mother tongue. The state was not there to take any

responsibility and still it is going on. People can learn languages in private schools. We are

expecting that at least major languages will be the provinces if federalism is drawn. At present,

we can have major languages such as Newari, Sanskrit, and Hindi at college level, for example,

and in universities but at primary level we do not have any official government schools, which

have created a very big problem for the language groups.

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Day 2: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION

Introduction

The discussion divided mainly into four aspects as: Issues of conflict; Trigger moments from

arms to dialogue; Consensus building; and Necessary environment for successful peace

process by referring three cases: Bansamoro, Aceh, and Nepal. The purpose of this

classification is to make understanding about the different cases in different situation and

generate the discussion further by using the designed framework. In the meantime, these

aspects rated according to that impact of those particular cases. The importance of the factors

differ with each case therefore, rating based on its essentiality and the scale that particular factor

plays its role as contributing factor for shifting from arms to dialogue. While thinking about this

quantification method adopted in this discussion, there is another fact is to be understood that

the need for qualifying the terminology, otherwise it is difficult to specify one factor in its whole

picture for example, timeframe. However, the discussion included the timeframe on the basis of

entering into the sustainable peace via dialogue.

Elements and features are listed out according to these following categories and sub

categories: Issues of conflict: self determination, state imposed migration, status of military,

ethnic, linguistic and religious unity, natural resources, issue of injustices, and autocratic king

and economic disparities; Trigger moments from arms to dialogue: democratization, change of

policy as well as government structure, multilateral intervention, neighboring countries influence

and natural disasters; Consensus building: readiness to accept realities, cohesiveness in a rebel

groups, strong hierarchical leadership in government, balanced exposure to media, good

communication between and among the contending parties, and, bringing all the main

stakeholders; and, Necessary environment for successful peace process: ceasefire monitoring

mechanism, acknowledge the history of the other side, issue of relief, rehabilitation and

development, domestic support, arrangement of peace process, and, economic assistance.

Among the all above mentioned factors some of them might be more significant than the

others however, it depends on the situation where it is applicable. At the same time judgment put

on for rating it, whether it becomes very high, high, middle, or low, is the own. The following

sections are going to discuss deeply about the all selected categories by applying on the three

above mentioned cases.

Issues of Conflict

Issues identified here are mostly the elements or causes of the problem. In addition, these

elements are deciding the situation and determining the further progress.

Self-determination

Mindanao- Factors comprised together to claiming for self-determination in Bansamoro based

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on territory, identity, nationality, culture, religion, traditional mechanism, judicial system and etc.

Here self-determination considered as political rights of the people to determine their political

status and also social and economic development. It’s highly people-centered. Therefore,

political status is the most concern under the category of self-determination.

Aceh- self determination related to issue of independence, sovereignty, self-governance,

self-autonomy while talking about this conflict.

Nepal- Not extremely the core issue for Nepal compare with other cases.

State imposed migration

Mindanao- This is not only the claim in Bansamoro. Migration occurred in the purpose of

development. But migration occurred not like in Nepal. Contrast view: migration is very high

because at present number of population decreased in a greater number, main cause is

migration.

Aceh- numerical degree of the rating is required to talk about Ache case because it differs during

various times. For example, during the Suharto ruling period state imposed migration was very

high. But later it was stopped. Therefore, qualifying the terminology is required. In other sense,

most of the migration in Indonesia is voluntary, not sponsored by State. Of course some military

induced migrations made during Suharto regime but it was met a high level criticism by many

international organizations such as World Bank, International Monitoring Agency.

Nepal- Compare with the State imposed migration; scale of rebel imposed migration is high in

Nepal.

Status of military

Status of military is somehow different. Actually using the military power sometimes creates

resentment and conflict even in the democratic regime. Moreover, there are possibilities for State

to use the military for suppressing the other people. Therefore, even both democratic and

autocratic States; and even use the military power democratically or more discipline way is very

important for avoiding conflicts. In some cases, military is being used for repression, human

rights violations, and deployment for many instances, to control over resources. In most of the

cases, military is more powerful in the State. The main concern to put military in this discussion is,

military sometimes plays an independent or autonomous role in conflict, that can be as a 3rd

player in that particular conflict. Therefore, here it understood as whether the military plays its

own official role or uses as a tool by the government to act accordingly. However, when we talk

the status of military as an institution, they do not allow making orders to execute; therefore, they

can’t be as autonomous unit, especially in the case of Philippines. At the same time, military also

became as one of the important components in the conflict. In some events, those who became

as victims in the government side were soldiers. Therefore, soldiers should be take part in peace

process. Moreover, the role of the military is different from one country to another. In these

senses, qualifying the status of military, in terms of co-operation as well as in peace process, as

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an institution, can be as a separate third party and third element in the peace process. But this

has still under question because still military is the part of the government.

Mindanao- this is rating quite high compare with Aceh and Nepal because the government

control on military is in a high level. In other sense, control of military here is getting different

meaning. In Philippine military: they have control; they might follow the order, but still the

discipline of the military is questioned. Because the military can sell their weapons from the

storage; and the small arms spread everywhere. Discipline something is an issue for the military

and at the same time keeps the military in a well-disciplined manner is a kind of challenge for

many governments. In the Philippine context, role of military during the Marshal Law was very

strong. After the abolition of the Marshal Law till present, the military is very prominent.

Aceh- though the State is democratic there is a possibility that military could be misused by the

state power. Obviously the State was not purely democratic during the Suharto rule. Moreover, in

the case of Aceh, the term of autonomy for military is incorrect. In other sense, in Indonesia there

is a control by State over military; military will not oppose if the government says pull out or

withdrew. But sometimes this is the fact that the State itself allowed the military to perpetrate all

the violations of human rights and all other related events. When state control over military is

high the degree of violation also became high, this was happened during the Megawatt’s ruling

time. When we measure the impunity level, it implies this impunity whether because of the lack of

state control or because the State allows it since it doesn’t want to control just allows it.

Therefore, impunity level is measurable as high/ medium/ low level of impunity.

Nepal- military in Nepal is well disciplined and at the same time very independent. After the

abolition of monarchy, it gets influenced by Gurka soldiers; they are well disciplined. Role of the

military during the Maoist insurgency started since the inception of Maoist insurgency. During the

first event done by Maoist by capturing huge number of civilians, then the Government

responded to that event and rescued the people by using the military, continuously the following

events handled by using military towards Maoist. Therefore, it is clear to say that, any conflict

using military is given because the law and order is no longer is not sufficient and maintaining

law and order. Government has to use the military when the circumstances occurred but their

practice should hold the impunity. In general, the role of military according to these three cases

concerned as: role of military and government; role of command and control; secret instructions;

and military of personal decision. In other suggestion hold that, role of the military can be

measured its impunity after the violation is done or violation will be done because in the field that

is always happen, but these violations are tolerated or even it secretly initiated by the

government or not.

Ethnic Unity

Mindanao- it is far descriptive. People are fighting among each other because one group

belongs to the other ethnic tribe. Therefore, this is the real situation in Mindanao.

Aceh- usually unity in ethnicity has less probability for conflict compare with other causes. But

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here the unity of different ethnic groups formed high possibility for engendering the conflict.

Nepal- disparity prevails in Nepal in relation to ethnicity, caste, and gender.

Linguistic and Religious Unity

Mindanao- there are big number of diversity prevails with regard to language and religion.

People are diverging among each other linguistically but religiously unity is there because

population comprised 100% with Muslims.

Aceh- more than 98% of the population belongs to Islam and majority speaking language is

Acehnese, unlike the situation in Nepal and Bansamoro in Philippines.

Nepal- more than 92 languages are in practice and multi religious nation by having Hinduism,

Buddhism, and Christianity.

Natural resources

Mindanao- resources has already been taken. Lack of natural resources is a real issue in

Mindanao.

Issue of injustices

Mindanao- number of violation against human rights and international humanitarian law

committed towards Moro people; many massacres, killing, these all are issues still in the conflict

in Mindanao.

Nepal- autocratic king and economic disparity

Trigger moments from Arms to Dialogue

Generally trigger moments are really lead the contending parties to seek for dialogue.

Democratization

All these three cases have a long history of having official democracy. This may be, to some

extent, controversial.

Mindanao- Though the country itself a democratic country, it highly missing transparency, and

accountability in the rule. In this respect, democratization in Bansamoro is rating low compare

with rest of the cases.

Aceh- most triggering moment referring in Aceh case is reforming Indonesia. This reformist era

consisted by democratization and de-centralization, those made them to feel for giving up the

extreme demands. Both parties realized that the arm struggle is not the mean to achieve their

goals. Therefore, it has considered that democratization is very important factor that can make

you to realize the peace talk. Furthermore, this is the clinching point in Aceh; the democratization

came as a main consideration because excessive state repression may be as a factor. For

example, during the 80s, popular support for GAM was in a very lower level. But when the

incidents occurred, such as, State repression, massive open killings by the military, then it

triggers anger among the population as a result GAM got massive popular support. But still it

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needs the qualification of rating since this situation differs time to time.

Nepal- during the monarchy era stagnation of democratic process was prevailing and human

rights also suppressed by monarchy rule.

Change of Policy

Mindanao- first trigger moment from arms to dialogue in Mindanao is changing policy by both

government and rebel organization.

Change of Government structure

This factor is related with the above mentioned democratization.

Mindanao- in other word this can be used as transformation of the government structure. But in

this particular case, there is a change still expected to modify the constitution.

Aceh- nature of the government was changing due to the Presidential election.

Nepal- this also highly realized due to the domination of monarchy issues related to

de-centralization. At last monarchy became as a common enemy for political parties in Nepal.

Multilateral intervention

This is focused here as interventions from multilateral actors from international community on the

one hand, and the influence from the very strong neighboring countries on the other. In general,

this is a very sensitive terminology during the experiences faced by most of the countries. It is

required to classify the term ‘intervention’ instead of ‘influence’ because intervention used to

create thinking as well as it creates problems.

Mindanao- As far as Mindanao is concerned, there was no more interventions, but was invitation.

In this context, rating for invitation is very high because there are international contact group,

countries like United Kingdom, Southi Arabia, Turkey, Japan and further, 4 NGOs, International

Monitoring team composed with Libya, Malaysia, Brunei, Japan, Indonesia, Norway and the EU.

Aceh- After the tsunami, Aceh was opened for international community. Actually, intervention

can be made in positive and negative ways. Therefore, while looking at this, we have to know

that what type of intervention, and at the same, whether it is looked by the out sider as real

intervention. For example, there were up to 60,000 Acehnese gained refuge in Malaysia. This

caused a pressure from Indonesian government on Malaysian government to take actions

against the Acehnese fighters in Malaysia. Is it really looked as intervention by foreign country?

This is actually intervention by Indonesian government against a foreign country. So again it

required qualification in rating.

Nepal- considering the UN operation in Nepal called as “UNPMN”, they faced more difficulties to

perform their activities on the ground. They faced restricted activities and very hard to came to a

settlement through negotiation with regard to their activities due to the political conditions. Here

most appropriate word to use ‘involvement’ instead of intervention.

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Neighboring Countries influences

Mindanao- rating is high because influences backup with ideas and advices.

Aceh- there is no much influence formed from neighboring countries in Aceh.

Nepal- this is very high in Nepal because they are having strong influence from India, US, China.

Their cause of influence related to human right issues and refugee issues, especially Tibetans.

Natural Disaster

Mindanao- Flood is the major natural disaster so it rating as low.

Aceh- tsunami is the one of the triggering moment for peace dialogue in Aceh. After the effect of

tsunami, which created a double effect on Acehnese people after having 30 years of conflict, it is

very clearly realized the necessity for peace dialogue.

Nepal- there are no much natural disasters hit on Nepal. Only in some particular areas effected

but not in a massive scale. Nepal has experiencing with floods and landslides.

Consensus building

This group includes the easiness of difficulties to reach between and among the parties. If you

cannot manage your own conflict and if you cannot get a greater consensus from your society,

then peace dialogue ultimately wouldn’t gain. Therefore, consensus building is most important.

Readiness to accept realities

Structure or related issues of the each competent party also another important part understood

in this discussion. It may highly relate to government structure or structure of the each group. It is

necessary to know and understand the reality. Then it can make consensus within the parties

and outside the parties.

Mindanao- First they claimed independence but now they step back for self-autonomy. Moreover,

they are ready to accept the reality because of the number of population. Moreover, the

consensus building can be divided into two: in the perspective from Mindanao, historical side and

the reality side. Although there are arguments, held across the negotiating table, based on

history; for example homeland. History has put at first and argued the claim. Moreover, there is a

need to decide the claim through historical evidences of the struggle and to show the reality,

especially in the area of land.

Cohesiveness in a rebel group

Mindanao- In fact, there are splits within the rebel group, which is a general feature in the overall

rebel groups functioning in world wide. Though there are problems existing among the rebel

groups, at the end of the day the leadership will take the final decision.

Strong Hierarchical leadership in government

Aceh- due to the strong hierarchical structure of the leadership possibilities created to establish

conscious building among the party members as well as among the government side.

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Balanced exposure to Media

Role of media should also be considered, especially focused here the importance of initiating the

people not always being involved in a conflict. Media is an effective tool that can play negative

and positive roles.

Mindanao- media does not play its role neutrally. It failed to carry a balanced message.

Compare with national media local media presence is quite high. Therefore, broadcasting

balanced in information is rating as low.

Aceh- Negotiation during Helsinki, media reported that government negotiation team has

nothing to do which means not willing to do any progressive actions. Therefore, this statement

highly intervened and MOU would not work anymore. In this sense, balanced exposure of the

media can effectively contribute for the consensus building in the society. In addition, one time

there was balanced reporting by media but in another time military banned any reporting in Aceh.

In sometimes there was one sided reporting and in other time even very balanced reporting

prevailed. So again timeframe plays an important role in rating.

Good communication between contending parties

Mindanao- comparing with Aceh, having direct communication and try to establish substantial

agreement between competing parties are being pravailed. Moreover, there are communications

but not directly. Communication always preferred through facilitators. If anything want to write

and send that also preferred through facilitators. At the same time, in the ground there are

communications directly between each other.

Aceh- it’s very effective. They had direct telephone calls throughout their communication. In

addition, while considering about the communication between the GAM and the Indonesian

government, it again required the specific qualification because in certain time communication

was very good and another time it was not existed at all.

Good communication among themselves

Mindanao- Even in the internal level they have a good communication even through informal

ways as well.

Nepal- lack of trust and understanding prevail between and among the major parties.

Bringing all the main stakeholders

Mindanao- it is medium rating

Necessary environment for successful peace process

Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism

Aceh- this factor is not very much applicable in Aceh case. But when this factor came into

discussion, it highly required the timeframe.

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Nepal- there was a Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism but it was hardly functioning.

Acknowledge the history of the other side

This is very important because the other side of the competent party or people should know and

acknowledge the history. At the same time, the interpretation of the history is also should take in

to account seriously.

Mindanao- Actually the interpretation of the history by both sides is low rating. There is a

necessity to learn about the history of Bansamoro. They can understand the historical reasons

for the claims and their legitimate grievances.

Aceh- this was not a main issue in Aceh.

Issue of Relief, Rehabilitation and Development

Mindanao- this will create a necessary environment for successful peace process. But in the

case of MILF or any other rebel organizations that allowed development projects to launch

during the negotiation process. On the Parallel track putting the political track and economic

track together is quite challenging but in Mindanao it was happened. Therefore, the relief,

rehabilitation and development are being realized necessary for peaceful environment. Japan,

World Bank and EU are being involved in this process. This effort can be rating as medium.

Domestic Support

Mindanao- this also should be mentioned in Mindanao case.

Arrangement of Peace process

Aceh- it is considered as acceptance of rebel groups and the people in Aceh, civil society also to

be counted in this aspect. Civil society can make an impact to create an environment. Moreover,

peace process is created in a social democratic framework/ system. Because it is really a

combination of reconstruction, political settlement, and social development since it is not very

much used in other models. Further, this consisted reconstruction, reconciliation, rehabilitation of

ex-combatants. This combination is quite unique. In addition to this, bringing different agencies

together to rehabilitate the tsunami victims and the victims of the conflict, how these 2 different

issues can be differentiated in the rehabilitation framework is the basic question. Actually, both

issues are totally different and the recipients’ satisfaction level also differs among each other due

to the assistance the victims received and the quality of the assistance they get. By addressing

the all above mentioned, ‘social democratic system’ is unique but this has used in different terms

academically as holistic or comprehensive peace agreement. This system is being applied in

many countries but they adopt that system in different names but the soul is same. Moreover, the

rate and the degree of the application differ in each case due to the context of the conflict

situation.

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Economic Assistance

Usually in the conflict areas economic condition as well as assistance delivered are bad in nature

and deliver at the same time poorly organized. Once the assistance extended through the

government or international organizations, it should deal with effective mechanism and delivering

that assistance to the needy people in an appropriate manner.

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SYNTHESIS

The Result of Analysis and Discussion

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Day 2: CLOSING DISCUSSION

Chair: So this is a proposal from our side as a concluding statement of today’s workshop. And

we regard these five points are those raised and understood as conclusive remarks. Probably I

should read them out first and then try to get your comments, suggestions and any proposals to

change this statement. And hopefully we can reach some conclusions.

Chair: Let me read out statement of HiPeC-II Peace exchange Workshop 2012 draft. We

assembled at Hiroshima, city of peace from second and third of August 2012 to discuss the

issue of the peace process. You see the conflict shifting from arms to dialogue and these

conclusions as follows:

1. The difference of real conditions of different conflicts around the world should be

recognized and there has been no universally applicable formula to solve them.

2. There are some common issues such as self-determination but conditions to achieve or

settle them are not identical.

3. The elements to change the policy of government as well as the levels should be

pursued in particular conditions of the conflict.

4. If there is ever improved communication between and within the contending parties

should be encouraged.

5. Domestic and multilateral supports can create a necessary environment for the peaceful

settlement of the conflict.

The nonexistence of a single formula does not mean that we do not need to compare the

different conflicts for peaceful solutions. Rather, by comparing various conflicts, we can identify

strategies for the dialogue to replace the armed conflict. This is the proposal. It is very short. We

would like to offer this to you and hope to gather any suggestions.

Koirala: In number two there were some comments on some of the conditions in achieving or

settling them are not identical. The words self-determination we have to slightly define because

if I am correct it’s up to the secession also. So there are some combinations such as self-

determination with or without secession, but conditions to achieve or sever them are not

identical.

Chair: Self-determination with or without secession.

Tebay: I want to suggest, number one, a statement saying that we agree that dialogue is a

dignified means to seek just and comprehensive solutions. So this is why we want to shift the

conflict from arms to dialogue. We opt for dialogue. It was the first sentence in number one. So

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we opt to support dialogue. I don’t know how to formulate but just to say we prefer dialogue to

arms solutions.

Chair: In the very first beginning, there is the second line of the first sentence saying, “we

assembled at Hiroshima city of peace from 23 August 2013 to discuss the issue of the peace

process, to shift the conflict from arms to dialogue.” So maybe, doesn’t that cover?

Any more comments or suggestions?

Tanggahma: I don’t know if you know, you insist the words rebels. I was thinking more in terms

of liberation movements. That’s how they usually call themselves, or call ourselves. If you want

your freedom, you want the respect of your right to self determination or your liberation

movement. I don’t know if others have other opinions… because ‘rebels’ might sound a bit

strong.

Chair: Can you suggest any appropriate words to replace the word ‘rebels’?

Iqbal: The use of the term liberation is not good because you are rebelling against an authority

so it’s not good. Meaning, it’s not good so I think revolutionary would make a better term.

Maharjan: Maybe rebels and revolutionary have the same connotation.

Iqbal: When you are rebelling against any established government, or let’s say established

authority then you are rebelling against them and that implication is not good. It implies, not

necessarily but, what you are standing for, what you are fighting for is legitimate. But when

you think you are using the word revolutionary, it means a change from bad to good, so I would

prefer it. I am speaking also for other cases using the revolutionary movement or a

revolutionary organization.

Maharjan: Does that serve your question? Like whether it’s revolutionary? OK may I have some

words from Nepalese delegates?

Djuli: We have always hated the word ‘rebels’. You know it has the connotation that you are

already part of the government and you rebel against it, you know. So as in ‘rebels against low

pay’, you know, that kind of thing. But there were revolutionaries have been good independency

movements, like the French to use independence, things like that, but it’s not popular in English.

So I think I’m open to anything other than rebels.

Iqbal: Can I suggest? Revolutionaries are also good but I have a second thought as my first

proposal, especially when the organization has some alleviating for the Islamic...especially in

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the case of Bin Ladin. So I would be comfortable in using liberation instead of revolutionary.

Liberation front, liberation organization or Liberation front.

Chair: Liberation organizations or movements?

Meg: May I invite Nepalese to the discussion?

Maharjan: Maybe revolutionaries? Is that a good word?

Djalil: It sounds to me that revolutionaries is usually used by the Left movement. In the case of

our friend from Bangsamoro and Aceh I have heard revolutionaries called themselves this in

Aceh. So that you know revolutionaries means in Guatemala, I think in the case of Maoist in

Nepal is right but is not covered in the case of Bangsamoro and Aceh.

Meg: But maybe when the rule ended in the German revolution movement?

Djalil: Yes as a form of revolution to form government I like the word rebel (laughing)

Iqbal: I will offer a compromise. Because using the word liberation can apply to Aceh and

Mindanao, but to our friends in Nepal, the Maoists, that would not capture their whole intention.

So how about using the word ‘liberation slash revolutionary’. Either way it cannot marry. For

liberation can apply to Aceh and Mindanao, ‘revolutionary’ can apply to Nepal. So ‘liberation

slash then revolutionary movement’. I have consumed my time I will not speak anymore.

Djuli: I think that’s a good compromise.

Chair: Probably the levels has some negative connotation, and seen from the government’s

side.

Meg: Yeah, that’s self-defence.

Chair: Revolution means that the ruling elite will be changed from one group to the other. So

this is not what the MILF or GAM try to do

Meg: I have a dictionary. The Oxford dictionary said that revolutionary means connected with a

political revolution.

Maharjan: That’s the meaning of revolutionary

Chair: What is a political revolution? (laughter)

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Humayun: I think the meaning of the dictionary has something to do with the leftist movement,

because revolutionary is much more frequently used for the leftist movement because the leftist

movement wanted to overthrow the existing political system and would like to re-establish a new

political system. That is the meaning. So instead of revolutionary what we can see for example

is liberation is we see from the perspectives of the quote and unquote ‘rebels’ you know I would

not like to say ‘rebels’ so for them it is a liberation movement, and if we see from the

government perspective for them it is a secessionist movement. So liberation or secessionist

movement we can say. If we would like to meet the neutrality.

Meg: Well another meaning in the dictionary: “Involving a greater or complete change” – that’s

revolutionary.

Chair: But in political science, revolution is the change of the ruling community, the ruling party.

So in this sense it is very different from a secessionist movement. Secessionist means that they

claim their own authority in a particular area or over a particular people.

Humayun: So liberations last secessionist movement would be…

Chair: Secessionist is OK?

Meg: They were not secessionist. They wanted independence.

Chair: Liberation/revolution is the point we can reach as a compromise, at least to these three

cases.

Tuladhar: In Nepal, the Maoists, the rebels, the revolutionaries etcetera. There were none

among themselves, or among the left, but officially, our government or non-Maoist parties didn’t

recognize Maoist as revolutionaries, rebels, they just used the address called the communist

party of Nepal: Maoist. And in the agreement it is said there are two sides, one side is

government and another side is the communist party of the Nepal Maoists. And the Maoist used

to say that they did have revolutionary programs to liberate the people from all kinds of

exploitations etcetera. Similarly their army was known you see as “The People’s Liberation

Army” PLA that was not also recognized by the state or the non-Maoist parties so in the

agreement, in the accord it is said you see the combatants of Mao’s army they were not

recognized as the PLA people’s revolution army.

Chair: Mr. Nur, please

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Djuli: Before we start fighting. I think our problem starts from the first sentence with the context

of our discussion. You know, we need to say that we only discussed the cases of the MILF,

Aceh and Nepal. And from the discussion of these three cases, we derived the following

conclusions. Let me start, we can start enumerating. And even number three, it doesn’t have to

be number three. We can say that this one in the case of the MILF and this one in the case of

Aceh and this one in the case of Nepal. We don’t stay away from the context. So we use, it

depends how they use you. What we are trying to do is come up with a common name but it

seems that uh, the difference already is there.

Chair: I have a proposal. Maybe this debate is because of our use of the word government. So

instead of using the word government we may choose a word, say in such a way that, that

elemental change of the policy of both of the contending parties…

Meg: among, or both

Chair: Both of the contending parties.

Chair: Then, any other suggestions?

Tanggahma: With the first point, with the style. Twice the word is different so if we could find a

synonym of the second one. If we could do, when you right click to find a synonym, or, because

it’s twice different, the word. Could you give us some suggestion to change?

Chair: The first line is number one. The difference of the other condition of different conflicts.

The “difference” and “different”.

Tanggahma: (woman speaker) Or various conflicts?

Maharjan: But this difference is of different things. The first difference is differences of the real

conditions and the second one is there are different kinds of conflicts. So, these conflicts have

differences, conditions and the conflicts are different in nature.

Tanggahma: So maybe the second difference can be replaced, because it sounds less….

Humayun: Various?

Tanggahma: Yes, various.

Ladiasan: Can I raise a point? This is one statement I just want to raise the issue of my

understanding to this place, to discuss the issue of peace process, to shift the conflict from arms

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to dialogue. For me it connotes the total abandonment of the party waging an armed force. That

is my understanding, that is the connotation of this phrase to my understanding. And that would

be very contradictory to, on our side because this is not actually the point of discussion. It’s not

actually the principles that we discussed. And to that effect I am suggesting consideration to

state it as this, in this way, to discuss the issue of peace process on the shift from arms to

dialogue.

Chair: On the shift? It’s not “to” shift but “on” the shift.

Ladiasan: On the shift to dialogue. And this conclusion is one of them.

Meg: And also when we were making this I in my mind separated the conclusion and the

findings, so from ah, to me we assembled at the Hiroshima University … blah blah blah…on this

shift of the conflict from our arms to dialogue and reached finding. Is this a conclusion or

finding? And then we can put the conclusion after the five points. Are you thinking this is a

conclusion or these are findings?

Humayun: It’s a conclusion I think. It’s not findings. I mean it’s not that we researched to

explore or something like that, in my view. So it's a discussion, and after the discussion we

come up with some general points and then the conclusion.

Chair: Maybe we should say agreement. Or if the conclusion is not very much appropriate we

can replace it with the agreement. But I don’t think they are findings.

Maharjan: I think conclusion is better than agreement.

Humayun: In my view I think conclusion is better in the sense that we agreed on these points.

Chair: Any objections?

Rodil: My suggestion is there the shift should be number one. There’s a reword introduction,

because our first – whether you call it conclusion or what – Our first item in the enumeration

should be the shift from arms to dialogue. So that should dictate the content or that should

create the framework for the succeeding numbers.

Djalil: Yes that’s true.

Chair: So maybe your suggestion is “we assembled in Hiroshima, conclusion follows number

one: We carry the shift, we encouraged the shift from arms to dialogue. We encouraged the shift

of the conflict from arms to dialogue.”

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Rodil: More or less. I mean, we can reword it much better later on but my point is that the

introduction should notate what we did in the last two days. That we discussed the cases of the

MILF what do you call it Aceh and Nepal, and we arrived at the following conclusions.

Maharjan: But did we discuss about that we encouraged them to shift to the dialogue?

Maharjan: No. we discussed the matters and what we are doing. But did we discuss about the

encouragement? Maybe not.

Humayun: And by the way everyone encouraged the shift from Amsterdam.

Rodil: We have been discussing dialogue for the last two days. Maybe not in those terms. I

mean you may object with whether to encourage it or not.

Maharjan: I’m not objecting. What I was thinking is when we say we are encouraging, maybe

we are pushing too hard.

Rodil: What happened in the peace process in the first place, these were dialogues? I use

dialogue generically. Ah these were peaceful resolutions of conflict by talking. That is exactly

what happened. And look at the results. The results are good. So from that foregoing we can

say it is good. So we are encouraging it.

Chair: What’s your opinion?

Ladiasan: I have a question. I will not make a recommendation. I have a suggestion that will

attend to the issues raised by Professor Rudy. The first issue raised was in the draft statement

we reflect the states Mindanao Ache and Nepal. And that can be addressed with this suggestion

if we find it proper. “We assembled at Hiroshima City of Peace, in fact I am also suggesting to

put Japan. “We assembled at Hiroshima City of Peace, Japan, from 2 to 3 August 2003 to

discuss the peace processes in Mindanao, Aceh and Nepal. It’s keys to shift conflict from arms

to dialogue, and reached conclusions as follows. Because it could not be a conclusion, ah, the

shift from arms to dialogue could not be a conclusion, could not be made part of the conclusion

because this is a theme that this theme bears all the conclusions as stated from one to five. So

that is my suggestion to attend to these recommendations, thank you.

Chair: Could we put the name of the places in alphabetical order? Aceh… Any suggestions?

Meg: Mindanao in the southern Philippines. Because Mindanao might not be popular

enough…but the country is.

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Humayun: So you want to add Mindanao, comma, Southern limits?

Meg: Mindanao in the Southern Philippines.

Humayun: It’s too much. Then we have to put Indonesia islands in.

Meg: Yes Aceh too. Aceh is very famous for us though.

Chair: Mindanao is also very famous.

Djuli: Also add US to the peace process...

Chair: Anything else? So can we agree upon this? Our Japanese researchers, any

suggestions?

Iqbal: As for the item number four, It’s not very clear. The meaning of that. It means you are

working toward communication? What’s the meaning of that? Ever improve communication.

Chair: Maybe this is not very much clear. Improvement of communication?

Iqbal: What is not clear is the use of the word ‘ever’.

Chair: ‘Ever’ means, continuous effort to improve the communication. That’s what we want to

be.

Humayun: So should be like that ‘continuous effort to improve communication’?

Iqbal: Is there a replacement of the word ‘ever’? I think it’s misplaced there.

Rodil: My idea is to remove totally number four. Because if you have a peace process going on

and dialogues here and there between the two contending parties, then you do not state the…

there will naturally be communication between them.

Maharjan: I just want to capture what was said. There was a dialogue but the dialogue was

limited within the leaders. And it was not shared, and when they come back to their respected

parties, the parties have another idea so the dialogue, the promises they make among the

leaders cannot be implemented and that consequently that turns to the loss of trust. So the trust

building is not done. So how to capture that aspect? So that should be remedied for example.

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Rodil: And also, I would like to have the number of dialogue. I need to answer. If we do then we

can talk about dialogue between the leaders and their people, between themselves and the

other party.

Chair: Here we should also imply that the importance of bringing the more inclusive process of

the peace, for peace so that there is a more participant process and more communication

between the leadership and people. Maybe even communication between the leadership on the

one side and people on the other side. That kind of communication in different levels and

different ways. That’s what I mean by ‘ever improve’ or ‘continuously’ for to improve the

communication. I believe that it was discussed very much squarely in this workshop.

Humayun: In the case of Aceh, Aceh speaker mentioned several times that direct and

immediate communications are important, for example, from Ache to Jakarta. And also, for

example, during the negotiation, the member of the negotiation team phoned directly to the

Vice-President. So that kind of direct communication is somewhat, you know, very much useful

to facilitate the peace dialogue. That’s why we captured these things here.

Chair: It’s not just what we mean her by number four. We also try to bring some more effort to

broaden the inclusions.

Tanggahma: It’s very interesting to me. I always uh favor communication. To me it’s a bit

logical that we need to improve it. If it’s wrong then if it’s right we don’t need to improve it. In

some cases ever improve, it might not be necessary. I would just mention the fact that it needs

to be clear, it needs to be effective and unambiguous, so that when you communicate that

people won’t think one thing when it’s actually something else. So just those three things would

suffice to me that it’s a, that clear, effective and unambiguous communication between and

within the contending parties should be encouraged.

Iqbal: You know improving something is very difficult especially when you’ve reached the limit

of your capability. So I would propose that instead of improve, effective.

Chair: Maybe the ‘clear effective’ can be…(writing). When it is effective it covers ‘clear’;

Clearness and unambiguity. So take out the clear and unambiguous, just leave ‘effective’

because if it is effective it is clear and unambiguous.

Koirala: Effective communication between and win the contending parties should be

encouraged.

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Chair: Just leave effective only…So, anything else? Do you have any suggestions? Matsumoto

Sensei, do you have any… so then we have agreed (laugh). Thank you very much for a very

effective discussion for making the final statement.

Chair: So we will print out and bring to today’s reception party in the evening. At that time we’d

like to request you to sign it and we will give you the copies of the signed document to you.

Maharjan: Just one word. Taking the change of the words different conflicts to various conflicts

were one. So the note, the final three lines, instead of different conflicts on the second line it will

be various conflicts.

Chair: So the second line is various conflicts. Please change different with various as we did in

number one. Thank you very much. So this is the end of the workshop and thank you very much

for your very active participation in this workshop. We still have one more event for today, that is

the reception from 7:00 at Mermaid Café, on the other side of the building.

Thank you very much for all the active participation you did during the second-day workshop as

there was the one preliminary meeting on the 31’st of July. Thank you very much and please

come back again to the reception venue at 7:00 in the evening.

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Statement of HiPeC Peace Process Exchange Workshop 2012

We assembled at Hiroshima, City of Peace, Japan, from 2 to 3 August 2012 to discuss the issue

of peace processes in Aceh, Bangsamoro (Mindanao) and Nepal on the keys to shift from arms

to dialogue and reached conclusion as follows:

1. The difference of real conditions of various conflicts around the world should be recognized

and there would be no universally applicable formula to solve them.

2. There are some common issues such as self-determination with or without secession but

conditions to achieve/settle them are not identical.

3. Elements to change the policy of both of contending parties should be pursued in particular

conditions of the conflict.

4. Effective communication between and within the contending parties should be encouraged.

5. Domestic and multilateral supports can create necessary environment for peaceful

settlement of the conflict.

Non-existence of single formula does not mean that we do not need to compare the different

conflicts for peaceful solutions. Rather, by comparing various conflicts we can identify strategies

for the dialogue to replace the armed conflicts. 3 August 2012, Hiroshima University

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広島⼤学平和構築連携融合事業Hiroshima University Partnership Project forPeace Building and Capacity Development


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

During the period of three years of HiPeC-II since then we have developed “Indigenous

Initiative” concept for promote active peace building research through understanding and

learning the peace processes in various conflict affected areas, we invited representatives from

Nepal, Aceh, Philippine and Papua.

I, on behalf of the organizers of this conference, would like to express my great

appreciation to everyone who made this event successful. Foremost, I would like to thank all the

participants from conflict or post-conflict areas. By their participation, this conference was

proved to be to understand our views better and to realize that we share a common goal of

sustainable peace by the approach of “Indigenous Initiative”.

Secondly, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Asahara Toshimasa, the

President of Hiroshima University, Uye Shinichi, the Vice-President of Hiroshima University,

Fujiwara Akimasa, Dean of IDEC, Hiroshima University, HiPeC partners, and other scholars and

officials of Hiroshima University for their strong supports and continuous assistances. Also, Our

deep gratitude from the bottom of heart is offered to Mr. Ken Harada who showed around the

Peace Memorial Park on August 1 for the memorable study tour in spite of having been

scorching heat in that day.

Same acknowledgement of mine also goes to the staff of Hiroshima University

Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Development (HiPeC), Humayun Kabir,

Megumi Kagawa, Haruka Araki, Mie Fujita, Natsumi Kumozu and Yusuke Bessho on various

tasks before, during and after the workshop.

I would also like to acknowledge the remarkable help from our student-assistants,

Yukino Abe, Kazuhiro Itakura, Ranjan Saha Partha, Vaidya Arija, Shamini Chandran, Yang

Xiaoping and Yoshihiko Fujimoto also assisted in the documentation of some parts of this report.

On behalf of the organizers,

TOGAWA Masahiko

Secretary General, HiPeC Executive Committee

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ANNEX 1: List of Participants

(Honorifics omitted) Mindanao / PHILIPPINES Mohagher Iqbal Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel Rudy "Ompong" Rodil Former Vice Chair of the Gov. of the Philippines Peace Panel, Professor, Mindanao State University Timuay Melanio U. Ulama Chairperson of the Organization of Teduray-Lambangian Congress Rasid T. Ladiasan Head of Secretariat of the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities of the MILF Aceh / INDONESIA Sofyan A. Djalil Special Advisor to the Vice President of Indonesia, Government Negotiator during Helsinki Peace Negotiation and Former State Minister for Information and Communication of the Government of Indonesia Muhammad Nur Djuli Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Leader for the Helsinki Peace Negotiation Shadia Marhaban President of the Aceh Women’s League, GAM Member for the Helsinki Peace Negotiation NEPAL Padma RatnaTuladhar Facilitator for the Peace Talk between Gov. and Maoist during People's War, Former-Minister of Health and Labour Shekhar Koirala Former Member of the Constituent Assembly, Member of the Central Committee of the Nepali Congress Krishna Bahadur Mahara (Attended by papers) Former Deputy Prime Minister, Former-Minister of Communication, Govt. of Nepal, Member of the Central Committee in charge of the International Affairs of the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) Observers Papua (INDONESIA) Neles Tebay Roman Catholic Priest and Coordinator of the Papua Peace Network Julianus Septer Manufandu Executive Secretary of PAPUA NGOs FORUM

99

Leoni Tanggahma Liaison officer in Europe, Elsham Papua, the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy JAPAN Akihisa Matsuno Professor, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University Kei Fukunaga Member of International Monitoring Team, The First Secretary of the Embassy of Japan to the Philippines Masako Ishii Associate Professor, Graduate School of Human Science, Osaka University Noriaki Nishimiya Director General of Japan International Cooperation Agency Chugoku International Center Takeo Ishikawa Director of Training Program Division of Japan International Cooperation Agency Chugoku International Center Organizers（from HiPeC, Hiroshima University) Osamu Yoshida Professor, Graduate School of Social Sciences/IDEC, Hiroshima University Chair, HiPeC Executive Committee Masahiko Togawa Associate Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, HiPeC Secretary General Maharjan Keshav Lall Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, Member, HiPeC Executive Committee Yuji Uesugi Associate Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, Member, HiPeC Executive Committee Koki Seki Associate Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, Member of HiPeC Executive Committee Yusuke Bessho Assistant Professor, IDEC, Hiroshima University, Meg Kagawa HiPeC Research Fellow Humayun Kabir HiPeC Research Fellow

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ANNEX 2: Guide to Acronyms

AHJAG Ad Hoc Joint Action Group

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

ARMM Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao

CPC Civilian Protection Component

CCCH Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities

CNAS Center for Nepal and Asian Studies

CPM Communist Party of Nepal

GPH Government of the Republic of the Philippines

HiPeC Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Building

GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)

GPH (or GRP) Government of the Republic of the Philippines

ICG International Contact Group

IDP Internally Displaced People

IMT International Monitoring Team

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

LMT Local Monitoring Teams

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

MOA-AD Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

SSN South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement

UN United Nations

UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research

UP University of the Philippines

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ANNEX 3: The Lumad Concept of Peace and Justice

102

ANNEX 4: Photo Documentation

Workshop Day 1 & 2

Opening Address by Prof. Asahara

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Reception and Excursions

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SECRETARIAT COMMITTEE

Chair:

YOSHIDA Osamu

Secretary General:

TOGAWA Masahiko

Staffs of HiPeC Headquarters:

BESSHO Yusuke

KAGAWA Meg

Kabir Md. Humayun

KUMOZU Natsumi

FUJITA Mie

ARAKI Haruka

Research Assistants:

ABE Yukino

FUJIMOTO Yoshihiko

ITAKURA Kazuhiro

Ranjan Saha Partha

Shamini Chandran

Vaidya Arija

Yang Xiaoping

keys to shift conflicts from arms to...

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