CO V. ELECTORAL TRIBUBAL

Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:

 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:

WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.

Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.

There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.

Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.

 In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The

Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1.             Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2.             Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3.             Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

4.             Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.

He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.

In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old

In Re: Florencio Mallare:  the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.

SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest

DYUMANTAN V. DOMINGO

FACTS:

Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez, arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them.As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.

The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to petitioner, the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings. YES

RULING :

Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable 2) determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the

right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country.

However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises". Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.

BENGSON III V. HRETFACTS:

The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE:

WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.YES

RULING:

petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:1. by naturalization,2. by repatriation, and3. by direct act of Congress.**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:1. desertion of the armed forces;2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

MERCADO V. MANZANO

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

RULING:

Yes. Private respondent Manzano was qualified to run for the position of vice mayor of Makati. The COMELEC en banc held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship since he did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.

According to Article IV Section 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship is not dual allegiance; as such dual allegiance and not dual citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of American citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION V. GO CALLANO

FACTS:

On July 13, 1962, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of Immigration that, on the basis of the findings made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the signatures of former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them authorizing the documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic. The Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant of exclusion commanding the deportation officer "to carry out the exclusion of the above-named applicants (the Go Callano brothers) on the first available transportation and on the same class of accommodation in which they arrived to the port whence they came or to the country of which they are nationals."

The warrant of exclusion, for one reason or another, was not served immediately upon the parties ordered deported, who, on November 16, 1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for injunction to restrain the Board of Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner of Immigration from executing the order.

They based their action on the following grounds:

(1) that the Board had no jurisdiction to exclude them from the Philippines because they were not aliens but Filipino citizens, and

(2) that the order of exclusion was issued by the Board without due process and in violation of the Constitution.

Months later, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondents in the case from deporting the petitioners.

After trial, the Court rendered judgment finding that, according to petitioners' undisputed evidence, "the petitioners herein are the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with her common-law husband — a Chinese citizen," and concluding that "until the petitioners left for China in 1947, they must be considered as citizens of the Philippines as they were born of a Filipino mother and an alien father who, however, was not married to their mother."

Notwithstanding the above finding and conclusion, however, the Court dismissed the case holding that the petitioners are citizens of the Republic of China and not being properly documented for entry into the Philippines as found by the Immigration Commissioner.

The grounds upon which the Court based its decision were:

(1) because petitioners stayed in China for a period of fifteen years before returning to the Philippines, they must be considered as citizens of the Chinese Republic;

(2) as petitioners were recognized by their alien father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the Chinese law of nationality.

While the Court also found that the cable authorization mentioned heretofore was a forgery, it held that, for the purpose of the petition before it, "it was immaterial to determine the genuineness or falsity of the cable authorization. For if the petitioners are Filipino citizens, they are entitled to remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic in whatever way they might have entered."

After the denial of herein respondents' motion for re-consideration, they appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals found that herein respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen.

That Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano a Filipino, lived maritally in several municipalities of Leyte since 1934 and that out of their union the four private respondents were born, are facts found, after appropriate proceedings, first, by the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong; second, by the Board of Special Inquiry who investigated their case in Manila upon their arrival thereat in 1961; third, by the Court of First Instance of Manila, and lastly, by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents are Filipino citizens?

HELD:

Before it can be said that the questioned signature is a forgery there must be competent proof that the specimens are the genuine signature of the Secretary. Even if the competent proofs were presented showing that the questioned signature is a forgery, the forgery of the signature on the cable authorization would not have nullified the documentation of the petitioners by the consulate in Hongkong. 

It must be stated in this connection that the petitioners became Philippine citizens because of their relation with their mother who is a Filipino. Their status was conferred on them neither by the documentation by the consulate in Hongkong nor by the finding of the Board of Special Inquiry in Manila. Consequently, whatever defects there are in the proceedings before the consulate and the board of inquiry cannot affect their status. Therefore, even assuming that the petitioners were not properly documented, there is no basis for the finding of the respondent Board that they are aliens who can be excluded.