HILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS INC. vs. FASGI ENTERPRISES

FACTSOn 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated ("FASGI"), a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated ("PAWI"), a Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. ("FPS"), an Italian corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the United States of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI then paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with the contract.

On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for breach of contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In the interim, two agreements were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on failing to discharge its obligations therein. Irked by PAWI's persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of California the agreements for judgment against PAWI. On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a complaint for "enforcement of foreign judgment", before RTC Makati. The Makati court, however, dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels. This situation, amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the RTC said, agreements which the California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter's authorization. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

ISSUEShould the Philippine Court enforce the foreign judgment? YES

RULINGIn this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client's authorization, settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will best serve his client's interest. However, PAWI failed to substantiate this complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the foreign judgment must be enforced.

Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court based its judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment. PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the signing of the agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action - such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract - is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.

26

Benguet Consolidated Mining Company was organized in 1903 under the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1886 as a sociedad anonima. It was agreed by the incorporators that Benguet Mining was to exist for 50 years.In 1906, Act 1459 (Corporation Law) was enacted which superseded the Code of Commerce of 1886. Act 1459 essentially introduced the American concept of a corporation. The purpose of the law, among others, is to eradicate the Spanish Code and make sociedades anonimas obsolete.In 1953, the board of directors of Benguet Mining submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission an application for them to be allowed to extend the life span of Benguet Mining. Then Commissioner Mariano Pineda denied the application as it ruled that the extension requested is contrary to Section 18 of the Corporation Law of 1906 which provides that the life of a corporation shall not be extended by amendment beyond the time fixed in their original articles.Benguet Mining contends that they have a vested right under the Code of Commerce of 1886 because they were organized under said law; that under said law, Benguet Mining is allowed to extend its life by simply amending its articles of incorporation; that the prohibition in Section 18 of the Corporation Code of 1906 does not apply to sociedades anonimas already existing prior to the Laws enactment; that even assuming that the prohibition applies to Benguet Mining, it should be allowed to be reorganized as a corporation under the said Corporation Law.ISSUE: Whether or not Benguet Mining is correct.HELD: No. Benguet Mining has no vested right to extend its life. It is a well settled rule that no person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit. Had Benguet Mining agreed to extend its life prior to the passage of the Corporation Code of 1906 such right would have vested. But when the law was passed in 1906, Benguet Mining was already deprived of such right.To allow Benguet Mining to extend its life will be inimical to the purpose of the law which sought to render obsolete sociedades anonimas. If this is allowed, Benguet Mining will unfairly do something which new corporations organized under the new Corporation Law cant do that is, exist beyond 50 years. Plus, it would have reaped the benefits of being a sociedad anonima and later on of being a corporation. Further, under the Corporation Code of 1906, existing sociedades anonimas during the enactment of the law must choose whether to continue as such or be organized as a corporation under the new law. Once a sociedad anonima chooses one of these, it is already proscribed from choosing the other. Evidently, Benguet Mining chose to exist as a sociedad anonima hence it can no longer elect to become a corporation when its life is near its end.

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 122807. July 5, 1996]ROGELIO P. MENDIOLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NHERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:Sometime in December 1987, a certain Ms. Norma S. Nora convinced petitioner Rogelio Mendiola to enter into a joint venture with her for the export of prawns. As proposed by Ms. Nora, they were to secure financing from private respondent Philippine National Bank. The credit line, it was agreed on, was to be secured by collaterals consisting of real estate properties of the petitioner, particularly two (2) parcels of land, situated in Marikina, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27307 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal.On January 27, 1988, the petitioner signed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Ms. Norma S. Nora to mortgage his aforementioned properties to PNB in order to secure the obligations of the joint venture with the said bank of up to Five (5) Million (5,000,000.00) Pesos. The planned joint venture became a failure even before it could take off the ground. But, in the meantime, Ms. Norma S. Nora, on the strength of the special power of attorney issued in her favor, obtained loans from PNB in the amount of P8,101,440.62 for the account of petitioner and secured by the parcels of land hereinabove described.On November 11, 1988, petitioner rather belatedly revoked the special power of attorney in favor of Ms. Nora and requested PNB to release his properties from the mortgage executed by Ms. Nora in its favor. The request notwithstanding, petitioner was notified under a Notice of Sheriff Sale, dated April 20, 1989, that PNB had initiated foreclosure proceedings against the properties of the petitioner.On May 16, 1989, petitioner filed a case for injunction against the PNB, docketed as Civil Case No. 58173, with Branch 162, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, seeking to enjoin the foreclosure of the properties in question. PNB filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the complaint did not state a sufficient cause of action. After hearing, the trial court, in its Order, dated August 17, 1989, granted PNB's motion to dismiss in this wise:"Since the Court finds that the complaint does not state a sufficient cause of action, it follows therefore that the prayer, for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction has no leg to stand on.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the complaint is hereby ordered dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. The temporary restraining order under the date of May 16, 1989 is hereby lifted and set aside."[endnoteRef:1][1] [1: ]

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from said Order, which was noted by the lower court in an Order, dated November 16, 1989.While Civil Case No. 58173 was pending appeal with the court a quo, aforementioned properties were sold in an auction sale on October 3, 1990. The PNB, as the highest bidder, acquired petitioner's properties.On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed an action to annul the auction sale of October 3, 1990, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 60012. The case was raffled to Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.PNB likewise filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 60012 alleging that "another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action." Apparently, PNB was referring to Civil Case No. 58173 then pending with respondent Court of Appeals. Attached to the motion to dismiss was a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. 58173 which had the same allegations as the complaint in Civil Case No. 60012, except that the relief sought in the first case was to enjoin the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties of the petitioner.Petitioner opposed said motion to dismiss.After due hearing, Branch 154, RTC of Pasig, issued an Order, dated February 28, 1991, granting PNB's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 60012 on the ground of litis pendentia. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:"WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, the injunction DENIED and the instant complaint DISMISSED with prejudice, without costs."[endnoteRef:2][2] [2: ]

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied. Petitioner appealed before the court a quo, which rendered its Decision, dated November 15, 1995 in CA-GR. CV No. 37940, affirming the Orders issued by Branch 154 of the RTC-Pasig, to wit:"WHEREFORE, the orders herein appealed from are hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant."[endnoteRef:3][3] [3: ]

Hence, the instant petition submitting the following grounds.ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1991 BASED ON THE ORDER DATED AUGUST 17, 1989 CONSIDERING THAT THE LATTER ORDER SIMPLY RESOLVED THAT THE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK IS BINDING UPON PETITIONER, BUT HAS NOT RESOLVED IN THE DECRETAL PORTION OF SUCH LATTER ORDER WHETHER PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK HAS THE RIGHT TO FORECLOSE SUCH MORTGAGE BASED ON THE DEFAULTED OBLIGATIONS OF NORMA NORA, AND IT HAS NOT LIKEWISE RESOLVED IN THE DECRETAL PORTION THEREOF WHETHER SUCH DEFAULTED OBLIGATIONS OF NORMA NORA ARE SECURED BY THE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK; ANDIIASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT RES JUDICATA HAS SET IN, ITS APPLICATION WOULD INVOLVE THE SACRIFICE OF JUSTICE TO TECHNICALITY.[endnoteRef:4][4] [4: Brief Fact Summary. A Philippine Island mining companys production is halted due to occupation of the islands by the Japanese. The President conducts business from his home in Ohio.Synopsis of Rule of Law. Federal due process is not violated in either taking or declining jurisdiction of a foreign corporation when the foreign corporations supervision of a business is carried on continuously and systematically within a state.Facts. The companys mining properties were in the Philippine Islands. During the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese operations were halted and the president returned to his home in Ohio. He maintained an office where he conducted his affairs and conducted business of the company and its employees (drew salary checks, maintaining bank accounts, hosting Directors meetings, supervising policies to rehabilitate the properties in the Philippines etc.).Issue. At the constitutional level, the fairness to the corporation, and whether as a matter of federal due process, the business done in Ohio by the respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio.Held. Under these particular circumstances it would not violate federal due process for Ohio to either take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation. Vacated and remanded.Dissent. Justice Minton and The Chief Justice dissented on the grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court was essentially issuing an advisory opinion to the Ohio Supreme Court.Concurrence Discussion. Although no mining properties were located in Ohio, the operations and supervision of the company and wartime activities being directed by the president in the State of Ohio are enough not to violate federal due process.]

We deny the petition.The instant petition has now become moot and academic, because the first case, docketed as Civil Case No. 58173, which is an application for injunction filed by herein petitioner before Branch 162 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City against private respondent PNB to prevent the latter from foreclosing his real properties, and which was then pending appeal before the court a quo at the time the second action (Civil Case No. 60012) was filed, has now been finally dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29601, to wit:"WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby declared abandoned and is dismissed pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court."[endnoteRef:5][5] [5: ]

Consequently, the instant petition which prays for the declaration of nullity of the auction sale by PNB of private respondent's properties[endnoteRef:6][6] becomes dismissible under the principle of res judicata. [6: ]

Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides in part:"SEC. 49. Effect of judgments. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:x x xx x xx x x(b)In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and; in the same capacity;(c)In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.Section 49 (b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment," whereas, Section 49 is referred to as "conclusiveness of judgment."There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. When the three identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. But where between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed conclusiveness of judgment.[endnoteRef:7][7] [7: ]

It is res judicata in the first concept which finds relevant application in the case at bar.There are four (4) essential requisites which must concur in order for res judicata as a "bar by former judgment" to attach, viz.:"1. The former judgment must be final;2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;3. It must be a judgment or order on the merits; and4. There must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action."[endnoteRef:8][8] [8: ]

All the foregoing requisites obtain in the present case. The Order of Branch 162, RTC - Pasig, dated August 17, 1989, denying petitioner Mendiola's application for injunction of the foreclosure of his properties in Civil Case No. 58173, had long become final and executory in light of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29601 affirming the trial court's order. Petitioner did not appeal the Decision of the court a quo in CA-G.R. CV No. 29601.The parties do not dispute the fact that Branch 162, RTC, Pasig, had obtained jurisdiction over the subject matter of the first case as well as over the parties thereto.The judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 58173, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections. It is not necessary, however, that there should have been a trial. If the judgment is general, and not based on any technical defect or objection, and the parties had a full legal opportunity to be heard on their respective claims and contentions, it is on the merits although there was no actual hearing or arguments on the facts of the case.[endnoteRef:9][9] In the case at bar, not only was petitioner provided an opportunity to be heard in support of his complaint for injunction; petitioner was given an actual hearing to argue his complaint on its merits.[endnoteRef:10][10] Evidently, the Order of the trial court denying petitioner's application for injunction was rendered only after due consideration of the facts and evidence presented by both parties thereto. The said Order cannot be said to be one on sheer technicality, it actually goes into the very substance of the relief sought therein by petitioner, that is, for the issuance of a writ of injunction against the private respondent, and must thus be regarded as an adjudication on the merits. [9: ] [10: ]

Finally, the fourth element is likewise extant in this case. Required in order to satisfy this element are: (1) identity of the parties and subject matter; and (2) identity of the causes of action. In Civil Case No. 58173, the complaint was filed by herein petitioner Mendiola against private respondent PNB, Norma S. Nora, Eliezer L. Castillo, Norman C. Nora, Grace S. Belvis, and Victor S. Sta. Ana, as Deputy Sheriff-In-Charge. In Civil Case No. 60012, the complaint was filed by petitioner Mendiola against private respondent PNB and Nilda P. Bongat in substitution of Grace S. Belvis. It is to be noted that there is no absolute identity of parties on the two cases. This is of no consequence. We have established jurisprudence to the effect that, in order for res judicata to apply, absolute identity of parties is not required because substantial identity is sufficient.[endnoteRef:11][11] In any case, PNB is a defendant in both cases. The subject matter involved in both cases, the real properties of petitioner covered by TCT No. 27307, are also identical. [11: ]

The similarity between the two causes of action is only too glaring. The test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment.[endnoteRef:12][12] In Civil Case No. 58173, the action is to enjoin PNB from foreclosing petitioner's properties, while in Civil Case No. 60012, the action is one to annul the auction sale over the foreclosed properties of petitioner based on the same grounds. Notwithstanding a difference in the forms of the two actions, the doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same thing, i.e. lands covered by TCT No. 27307, and more importantly, the same contentions and evidence as advanced by herein petitioner in this case were in fact used to support the former cause of action. [12: Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 108089 January 10, 1994ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FILOTEO ALANO, respondents.Ocampo, Quiroz, Mina & Associatesn for petitioner.Pelaez, Gregorio, Sipin, Bala & Robles for private respondent.DAVIDE, JR., J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 33307. The said decision affirmed in toto the order of the trial court dismissing the petitioner's complaint on the ground of res judicata.The factual and procedural antecedents are in the main undisputed.The private respondent is one of several parties named as co-defendants of Dearfield, Incorporated (Dearfield) in a complaint 1 filed by the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati on 25 May 1987, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 16837 (hereinafter the First Case) and raffled off to Branch 149 of the said court. The complaint is based on promissory notes, letters of credit, and trust receipts executed by the principal obligor, Dearfield. On 16 November 1987, the private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it falls to state a cause of action as against him. 2 He specifically averred that a reading of the first to the seventh causes of action will reveal that he is never mentioned therein as having a contractual relation with the plaintiff; that the allegations therein "don't even cite or mention any participation of defendant ALANO in these transactions"; that on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, the court cannot render a valid judgment against him; and that the complaint served on him did not contain Annexes "S", "T", and "U", the alleged copies of the "Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety" documents, thereby violating Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court and rendering the complaint against him defective. The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss. 3In the Order of 20 June 1988, the trial court granted the motion after finding that "on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, there is really no cause of action against defendant Alano." 4 Its motion for reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit in the Order of 15 September 1988, 5 the petitioner filed a notice of appeal on 30 September 1988. 6 Subsequently, on 14 December 1988, it filed an appeal by certiorari 7 with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 86009. It prayed therein that the orders of the trial court be reversed. In the Resolution of this Court of 17 April 1989, 8 the petition was dismissed for having been filed late and for lack of merit.On 31 October 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a new complaint 9 against the private respondent and Feliciana Camara, a surety who was also a defendant in the first complaint. The case (hereinafter the Second Case) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54998 and raffled off to Branch 46 of the said court. The complaint practically restates the causes of action in and involves the promissory notes, letters of credit, and trust receipts covered in the First Case. The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Second Case on the grounds that (a) the issue raised therein against him had already been settled with finality in the First Case, i.e., the case is barred by res judicata , and(b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action against him. 10In its Order of 1 March 1991, the trial court sustained the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case as against the private respondent. 11 The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 33307. The Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the challenged order and affirmed it in toto in its Decision of 25 November 1992. 12The petitioner thus filed the instant petition for review on certiorari on21 January 1993. We gave it due course in our Resolution of 23 August 1993 after the filing of the Comment on the petition and the Reply to the Comment.The petitioner contends that the public respondent erred in holding that the judgment in the First case bars the filing of the Second case. It submits that the judgment dismissing the First case for failure to state a cause of action is not a judgment on the merits and that there is no identity of causes of action between the First case and the Second Case. It argues that the main reason why the First case was dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action was because the copies of the "Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety" agreements were not attached to the First case. The second complaint, on the other hand, is an entirely different complaint for attached to it are the pertinent documents absent in the first complaint. It further avers that by filing a motion to dismiss, the private respondent hypothetically admitted the allegations thereof and that with these admissions, it is clear that there exists a cause of action against the private respondent. Since there is no identity of causes of action between the two complaints, res judicata cannot apply.In his Comment, the private respondent argues that all the elements of res judicata are present in this case and that res judicata operates to bar not only the relitigation in the subsequent action of the issued squarely raised, passed upon, and adjudicated in the first suit, but also the ventilation in a subsequent suit of any other issue which could have been raised in the first but was not. 13In its Reply to the Comment, the petitioner insists that there is a significant difference between the First Case and the Second Case in that the former fails to state a cause of action while the latter does so.The primary issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the ruling of the trial court dismissing the Second Case on the ground of res judicata.A careful deliberation on the arguments of the parties discloses no such error. The instant petition must therefore be denied for want of merit.Well-entrenched is the rule that even at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law and that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issues over again. This is the raison d'etre upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests. 14 Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." 15 This doctrine is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has appropriately said that it is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sin finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis veraxi et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. 16The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. 17The parties do not dispute the fact that Branch 149 of the RTC of Makati had jurisdiction over the First case. Its Order of 20 June 1988 dismissing the said case on the ground that "there is really no cause of action against defendant Alano" had long become final and executory and no less than this Court had affirmed its finality when it dismissed on 17 April 1989, on the grounds of late filing and lack of merit, the petitioner's action (G.R. No. 86009) to set aside the trial court's order. It is likewise undisputed that there is an identity of parties (insofar as the petitioner and the private respondent are concerned) and an identity of subject matter between the First and Second Case. The petitioner however submits that there is no identity of causes of action between the two cases since there was no cause of action against private respondent in the First case as held by the trial court, while there is now a cause of action in the Second Case. He also argues that there was no judgment on the merits in the First Case.The argument that there is no identity of causes of action is meretricious. It betrays the petitioner's misunderstanding of what a cause of action is as component of res judicata. That identity relates to the accuses of action in the prior or latter cases. No elaboration is needed to show that the causes of action both in the First Case the and Second Case are the same enforcement of the rights of the petitioner under the promissory notes, letters of credit, and trust receipts. Although the trial court declared that "on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, there is really no cause of action against defendant Alano," it does not follow that the complaint states no cause of action at all. It must be stressed in this connection that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, the trial court did not primarily base its conclusion of lack of cause of action on the failure of the petitioner to attach to the complaint copies of the alleged "Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety" agreements. Its main bases are the allegations in the complaint. Our own perusal of the complaint clearly sustains the conclusion of the trial court. Indeed, the complaint neither mentions the name of the private respondent in any of the causes of action nor suggests what his liability is. In short, the petitioner itself had shown beyond cavil, through its allegations in the complaint, that with respect to the promissory note, letters of credit, and trust receipts subject of the complaint, the private respondent had incurred in liability whatsoever.Nor is there any doubt that the dismissal of the First Case was a dismissal on the merits. That the dismissal of the First case was not by virtue of a decision but of an order pursuant to a motion to dismiss does not make the dismissal any less an adjudication on the merits. In Escarte vs. Office of the President, 18 we held:While We agree with Medina that in Civil Case No. 83215, there was no trial on the merits because the case was decided on a motion to dismiss, there was no formal presentation or reception of evidence and an order, not a decision, was issued by the trial court, still, the ruling was a judgment on the merits. As a technical legal term, "merits" has been defined in law dictionaries as a matter of substance in law, as distinguished from matter of form, and as the real or substantial grounds of action or defense, in contradistinction to some technical or collateral matter raised in the course of the suit. A judgment is upon the merits when it amounts to a declaration of the law to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objectives or contentions.In dismissing the First Case for lack of cause of action, the RTC of Makati ruled:Considering defendant Alano's Motion to Dismiss complaint and plaintiff's Opposition thereto, as well as the Reply to Opposition filed by defendant Alano, this Court finds that on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, there is really no cause of action against defendant Alano, and the complaint must be dismissed for lack of cause of action against him.In view of the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Alano is hereby granted. Let complaint against defendant-movant Filoteo Alano be dismissed. 19It unequivocally determined the rights and obligations of the petitioner and the private respondent with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case. The order definitely put an end to the controversy between them.All the essential requisites of res judicata are thus present and the dismissal of the Second Case on that ground was not tainted by any error or abuse of discretion. The petitioner cannot evade its application by varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, 20 or by simply adding or dropping parties in the subsequent case. 21 That in the Second Case the petitioner had attached the "Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety" agreements allegedly signed by the private respondent does not help the cause of the petitioner. Those documents were already touched upon in the pleadings relative to the motion to dismiss the First Case. Moreover, if we follow the arguments of the petitioner, said documents are inextricably linked to the promissory notes, letters of credit, and trust receipts which are, in fact, the subject of the two cases. It is settled that as between the same parties, on the same subject matter and causes of action, a final valid judgment is conclusive not only on the issues actually determined by the decision, but on all issues that could have been raised or litigated in the anterior suit. 22WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.]

Petitioner, now argues on equitable grounds. He maintains that, assuming for the sake of argument that res judicata has set in, its application would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.We are not persuaded.Equity, which has been aptly described "a justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.[endnoteRef:13][13] [13: G.R. No. L-25051 September 30, 1968JOSE B. ROXAS and VENANCIA B. ROXAS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PEDRO BERMUDEZ, DOMINGA MARTIN and MR. & MRS. LORETA BERMUDEZ, Defendants-Appellants.Valencia & Francisco for plaintiffs-appellees.Victoriano C. Tolentino for defendants-appellants.ANGELES, J.:chanrobles virtual law library On appeal on purely questions of law from a decision of the trial court declaring, inter alia, that the decision rendered in a prior civil case No. 34498 between the same parties is res judicata to the present case, and in denying the admission of the third-party complaint filed by one of the defendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The facts pertinent to the instant appeal, are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library On December 4, 1957, Pedro Bermudez and his sister, Loreta Bermudez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 34498, against the spouses Joaquin Andrade and Estela Martinez Andrade, the spouses Jose B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas, and Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga. As amended on July 14, 1958, the complaint alleged: that plaintiffs are the children of Apolonio Bermudez who died on March 6, 1943, leaving a parcel of land (described as Lot 13, Block 16-A on subdivision plan Psd-3231) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. No. 36734, issued under his name, "Apolonio Bermudez, widower", by the Register of Deeds of Manila; that on May 23, 1950, defendant Estela Martinez Andrade - by means of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, and talking advantage of the ignorance of their mother Dominga Martin - secured the signature of the latter on an Affidavit of Adjudication of the land prepared by said defendant with the aid of a lawyer, by virtue of which the land was later registered in the name alone of said Dominga Martin; that on November 11, 1951, defendants Andrade spouses, employing the same deceit and misrepresentation on Dominga Martin, obtained the signature of the latter once again on a deed of absolute sale, wherein Dominga Martin purportedly sold the land to Joaquin Andrade; that on 30 January, 1954, Joaquin Andrade then sold the land to the spouses Jose B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas; and that by reason of such fraudulent acts of the Andrades, plaintiffs were deprived of their rights to the property resulting in damage and prejudice to them in the sum of P6,000.00, the equivalent value of the land. For relief, plaintiffs prayed that the defendants be sentenced to pay damages in the said amount of P6,000.00, plus P2,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library With prior leave of court, Dominga Martin filed on January 5, 1959, a complaint in intervention which was amended on July 8, 1959, wherein she made a common cause with the plaintiffs and reproduced the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants. For her own relief, she prayed that defendants be sentenced to pay her P5,000.00 as actual damages, P3,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Defendants Andrade spouses filed their answer traversing the allegations in the complaint. As special defenses, they alleged that the deed of sale executed by plaintiff-in-intervention, Dominga Martin in favor of Joaquin Andrade, was "with the former's full knowledge and realization of the contents thereof;" and that said vendor received valuable consideration therefore from the buyer. And by way of counterclaim, said answering defendants prayed for the sum of P3,000.00 as damages for the malicious prosecution of the action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Defendants Roxas spouses also answered, alleging as a special defense, that they have acquired the land in question in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and that their title thereto is evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35655 issued in their names by the Register of Deeds of Manila on February 13, 1954. They prayed for damages against the plaintiffs by way of counterclaim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Likewise, defendant attorney, Mariano Z. Sunga, filed his answer denying the material allegations of the complaint, with counterclaim for damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library After a protracted trial on the merits of the case, decision was rendered on June 1, 1962, dismissing the amended complaint and the complaint in intervention, as well as the counterclaims of all the defendants. The motion for reconsideration of the decision filed by the plaintiffs and the intervenor having been denied, said parties interposed appeal from the said decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed, however, upon their failure to pay the docket fees and the estimated cost for the printing of the record on appeal. Consequently, the corresponding entry of final judgment was made on February 19, 1963.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Not long thereafter, spouses Jose B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 53732, in the same Court of First Instance of Manila, to recover possession of the very land involved in the former litigation, from Pedro Bermudez, Loreta Bermudez, and Domingo Martin - plaintiffs and intervenor in the former case No. 34498 - alleging that they (spouses Jose B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas) are the owners of the land in question which is occupied by Pedro Bermudez, Loreta Bermudez and Dominga Martin; and that notwithstanding demands on said defendants to vacate the said property, they have refused and failed to do so. Plaintiffs therefore prayed that defendants be ordered to vacate the land and to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P10.00 a month as rent for the use and occupation of the land from February 1, 1954, plus damages and attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The defendants answered the complaint, with counterclaim. They also sought prior leave of the court to file a third party complaint against Estela Martinez Andrade, Joaquin Andrade and Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga - former defendants in Civil Case No. 34498. Plaintiffs spouses Jose B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas - defendants also in the former case - opposed the admission of the third party complaint against their former co-defendants; and the said third party complaint was then disallowed by the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library In their answer, defendants Bermudez and Dominga Martin traversed the allegations in the complaint, alleging by way of special defenses, the same allegations in their complaint in the former case, viz: that Estela Martinez Andrade, Joaquin Andrade and Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga, by means of deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, and falsification, and by taking undue advantage of the ignorance and age of the defendants and the pledge then prevailing over the land in question between Dominga Martin and Estela Martinez Andrade, were able to secure the signature of said Dominga Martin on an Affidavit of Adjudication in her favor, then on an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of Joaquin Andrade, thereby obtaining torrens title in the name of the latter; that said transaction was without consideration; that the plaintiffs "knew very well the aforesaid fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and falsification, together with the fact that the sale of the land by Joaquin Andrade to Venancia Roxas was simulated, as shown, among other things, by the inadequacy of the price in the supposed sale." And they now pray, by way of counterclaim, that the sale executed by Dominga Martin in favor of Joaquin Andrade, and the subsequent sale executed by the latter in favor of Venancia Roxas, be declared null and void; and that plaintiffs together with their co-defendants in the former case (No. 34498) be sentenced to pay moral and exemplary damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library After trial, decision was rendered by the court below, holding that plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the land in question, their title thereto being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35655, issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila on February 14, 1954; that the allegation of the defendants that they cannot be ejected from the land involved because they are the owners thereof, is absolutely without merit, for, being parties in said Civil Case No. 34498, they are necessarily bound by the decision rendered by this Court, which decision is already final and constitutes res judicata. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendants and all other persons living with them "to vacate the land therein described, and to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the reasonable rental thereof at the rate of P10.00 a month from September 26, 1957, until they vacate the premises, and the further sum of P200.00 as attorney's fees."chanrobles virtual law library Defendants have appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals which, in a resolution dated July 15, 1965, elevated the case to this Court, it appearing from the briefs of the parties that only questions of law are raised therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Two main questions of law are posed by the appellants, to wit: (1) Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that the decision in Civil Case No. 34498 constitutes res judicata to the present case; and (2) Whether or not the trial court erred in denying admission of the third party complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library In relation to the first proposition, there can be no debate that the court which had tried and decided the case No. 34498, had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, the decision rendered therein was on the merits, and the same has become final. Neither can it be disputed that the res in said case No. 34498 is the same parcel of land involved in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library It is the contention of the appellants, however, that the cause of action in said case No. 34498, which was for recovery of damages, representing the equivalent value of the land which Bermudez and Martin claimed to have been deprived through deceit, fraud and misrepresentation, is not the same or identical cause of action involved in the present case, which is for the recovery of possession of the same land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Although, primarily, the cause of action in said case No. 34498, was for recovery of damages, representing the equivalent value of the land which the plaintiffs therein, now appellants herein, have lost through the alleged fraud, deceit and misrepresentation practiced on Dominga Martin by the Andrades, nevertheless, it is a fact that the issue of ownership of the land which was claimed by the defendants Roxas spouses was intricately involved in the case, such that the claim for damages could not be awarded without proof that the party claiming them had a right to the land. Proof of ownership of or right to the land is as essential and necessary as that needed to recover damages. In the inter-relation of issues, the resulting damages was the effect, and the loss of the land through deceit and fraud was the cause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library In civil case No. 34498, the defendants, the Roxas spouses, have pleaded in their answer and special defense that they have purchased the land in good faith and for value; that they are the owners thereof; and that their title thereto is evidenced by a torrens transfer certificate of title No. 35655 of the City of Manila. The defendants Andrade spouses also traversed the claim of ownership of Bermudez and Martin, and contended that the sale of the land by Dominga Martin to them was valid. On the other hand, the issue posed by the plaintiffs in said case No. 34498, was that the deed of sale executed by Dominga Martin to Joaquin Andrade, and that by the latter in favor of Venancia Roxas were secured through fraud and deceit. Upon such adverse claim on the land by the opposing parties, the court was called up to determine who was the owner thereof. The court, however, found that the evidence sustained the claim of the spouses Roxas, and, accordingly, dismissed the amended complaint and the complaint-in-intervention. The dispositive portion of the decision could not have any other meaning and effect than to justify the conclusion that said dispositive portion of the decision reflected the merits of the case. The trial court said: From the evidence of the record, the claim of the intervenor, Dominga Martin,that she was made to sign the affidavit of adjudication by defendant Estela Martinez Andrade by means of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation and taking advantage of her ignorance in connivance with defendant Joaquin Andrade and Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga, before whom said affidavit was ratified, is absolutely unfounded. From the testimony of Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga, it has clearly been shown that on May 22, 1959, Dominga Martin, accompanied by Joaquin Andrade and Mrs. Estela Martinez Andrade, came to see him and inquired if she could sell the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila which was in the name of Apolonio Bermudez, widower: Atty. Sunga told her that she could not sell the property as she was not its registered owner; however, she asked if it would be possible to have the property transferred to her name as she was a sister of Apolonio Bermudez on the mother side and she wanted to sell the property to the Andrades; Atty. Sunga suggested that it was necessary to secure an affidavit to that effect, and she left the Torrens Title in his possession and promised that she would come back the following day; Atty. Sunga, accordingly, prepared the affidavit of adjudication and when Dominga Martin came the following day, accompanied again by the Andrades, and after having explained to her the contents of the affidavit in Tagalog, she readily signed it; Atty. Sunga then filed the affidavit of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila for the issuance of a new title in the name of Dominga Martin; Atty. Sunga was able to get a new transfer certificate of title in the name of Dominga Martin which he delivered to her. One year afterwards, Dominga Martin came again and told Atty. Sunga that she would like to sell the lot to the Andrades, but Atty. Sunga said that the property being a Barrio Obrero lot, it was necessary for her to secure the permission of the Mayor of Manila. Atty. Sunga prepared the necessary request which Dominga Martin signed, and it was filed with the Mayor's Office. The request was approved by the City Mayor and Atty. Sunga prepared the corresponding deed of sale in favor of Joaquin R. Andrade. Upon the signing of the deed of sale, Atty. Sunga brought the document to the Office of the Mayor and it was approved. The deed of sale was duly registered and a new title was issued in the name of Joaquin R. Andrade. According to Atty. Sunga, Dominga Martin never mentioned to him the fact that she was the widow of the deceased, Apolonio Bermudez, and that she had children with him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library The evidence further shows that after Dominga Martin had secured the transfer certificate of title of the said parcel of land in her name, on June 11, 1950, she received from Estela de Andrade, mother of Joaquin R. Andrade, the sum of P500.00 as initial payment of the purchase price of said lot. On December 18, 1950, she again received from Estela de Andrade an additional sum of P200.00 as part payment of the consideration for the sale of said lot. On July 24, 1951, Dominga Martin again received from Estela de Andrade still another sum of P1,000.00 as additional consideration for the sale. On July 30, 1951, she sent a letter to the City Mayor of Manila, seeking permission to transfer said property in favor of Joaquin R. Andrade, should the latter be duly qualified to acquire a lot in the said subdivision. On November 7, 1951, Dominga Martin received a further sum of P800.00 from Estela de Andrade, thereby making a total of P2,500.00 as the full consideration for the sale of the lot. She then executed in favor of Joaquin R. Andrade a deed of absolute sale of said lot on November 16, 1951. The deed of absolute sale was duly approved by the then Mayor of Manila, Manuel de la Fuente, and attested by then Secretary to the Mayor, Carmelo S. Mendoza, and was prepared by and acknowledged before the Notary Public, Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga. After the sale, the real estate taxes for the parcel of land in question were paid by the Andrades from the years 1952 and 1953. On January 30, 1954, defendant Joaquin Andrade sold the same parcel of land to the defendant spouses, Jose B. Roxas and Venancia Roxas, which sale was approved by the then Mayor of the City of Manila, Arsenio H. Lacson, attested by the then Secretary to the Mayor, Jesus Marcos Roces. The sale was duly registered and a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35655 was issued in the name of the Roxas spouses. Thereafter, the real estate taxes on said lot from the year 1955 have been paid by the Roxas spouses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library From the evidence then, the Court is convinced that if there was any fraud committed here, the same was perpetrated by the intervenor, Dominga Martin, for she made it appear that she was the sister on the mother side of the deceased, Apolonio Bermudez, in order that the lot in question could be adjudicated in her favor. She concealed the fact that she was the widow of the said Apolonio Bermudez and with children with him, who are the plaintiffs in this case. Undoubtedly, had she revealed such facts, it would not have been easy for her to dispose of the lot as she intended. Her claim that she only wanted to mortgage the lot instead of selling it rests merely on her uncorroborated testimony and inasmuch as the transactions here are all embodied in public documents, the same have in their favor the presumption of regularity as to their due execution and authenticity, and to overcome such presumption, the evidence must not be merely preponderant but must be clear, strong, convincing and conclusive. Moreover, Atty. Mariano Z. Sunga, the notary public before whom Dominga Martin acknowledged the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of absolute sale in favor of Joaquin R. Andrade, assured the Court that Dominga Martin fully understood the nature of the agreements she was entering into, and his testimony is highly credible coming as it is from a notary public who is at the same time a lawyer, who is supposed to act in accordance with the oath of his office. Indeed, such testimony must be given more credence than that of a party denying a contract acknowledged before the same notary public. Upon the foregoing considerations, and it clearly appearing that the connection between the two cases is so intimate and the parties and the subject matter of the controversy being the same in the former as well as in the present, We cannot but conclude that the issue raised herein has really been determined by a competent court in a prior case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Even taking the view that the issue of ownership of the land in said case No. 34498, was only a secondary question in the proceedings before said court, nevertheless, it cannot detract from the conclusive effect of the adjudication of the case, it being an issue therein, whether direct or collateral. (Tolentino vs. Lim Bun Hioc L-6333, May 10, 1956.)chanrobles virtual law library Consequently, the trial court did not err in holding that the decision in civil case No. 34498 constitutes res judicata to the present case. A judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter is conclusive and indisputable evidence as to all rights, questions or facts put in issue in the suit and actually adjudicated therein when the same came again into controversy between the same parties or their privies even though according to the decision of the question, the subsequent proceedings are on a different cause of action, since the law abhors a multiplicity of suits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Another statement of the rule is that any right, fact or matter in issue, and directly adjudicated on, necessarily involved in, the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and privies whether or not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same. (50 C.J.S. pp. 168- 173.)chanrobles virtual law library On the other hand, it is equally well settled that a fact which has been directly tried and decided by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be contested again between the same parties in the same or any other court, and that where some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both actions has been determined in a former suit, and the fact or question is again at issue between the same parties, its adjudication in the first will, if properly presented, be conclusive of the question in the latter suit, without regard to whether the cause of action is the same or not, or whether the second suit involves the same or different subject matter, or whether or not it is the same form of proceeding. In such cases, it is also immaterial that the two actions were based on different grounds, or tried on different theories, or are instituted for different purposes, and seek different relief. (Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. vs. Chua Guan, G.R. No. L-7252, Feb. 25, 1955.) [Emphasis supplied]chanrobles virtual law library The general rule common to all civilized systems of jurisprudence is that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact, or state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this maxim is more than a rule of law, more even than an important principle of public policy; and that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society. (Ponce vs. Macadaeg, 91 Phil. 410.) The second proposition needs no elaborate discussion. A careful perusal of the allegations of facts constituting the cause of action in the third party complaint reveals that they are but reiterations of the allegations in the amended complaint and the complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 34498, and of the special defenses pleaded by Pedro Bermudez, Loreta Bermudez and Dominga Martin in the present case, that is, that through deceit, fraud, and misrepresentation practiced on Dominga Martin by the Andrade spouses, they (herein appellants) lost their lands. But as the issue of ownership of the land, as earlier stated, has been adversely resolved by the trial court in Civil Case No. 34498, against herein defendants Pedro Bermudez and Loreta Bermudez, and their mother Dominga Martin, the trial court was then right when it said: ... it appearing that the allegations contained in the said third party complaint have already been decided and passed upon by this Court in civil case No. 34498, entitled "Pedro Bermudez and Loreta Bermudez vs. Joaquin Andrade, et al.", which decision has already become final, the admission of the third party complaint is hereby denied. For, indeed, the admission of the third party complaint would be superfluous under the circumstances, considering that the issues therein raised had been passed upon by the trial court in Civil Case No. 34498. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying admission of the third party complaint in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance with the law and the evidence, the same is affirmed with costs against defendants-appellants.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 122181. June 26, 1998]JOSE A. LINZAG and the HEIRS of CRISTOBAL A. LINZAG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Mati, Davao Oriental, PATRICIO S. CUNANAN, ORLANDO SALVADOR, MANUEL P. BLANCO, JR., JOSE MANUEL SERRANO and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of Mati, Davao Oriental, respondents.DECISIONDAVIDE, JR., J.:May a party aggrieved by a judgment of a cadastral court and who subsequently obtains an unfavorable judgment in an action to annul the original certificate of title issued pursuant to the former, and then loses both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court in the appeal from the latter, be allowed to file with the Court of Appeals an action to annul the judgment of the cadastral court? The Court of Appeals resolved the issue in the negative on the ground of res judicata. Hence, this special civil action of certiorari.We affirm the Court of Appeals not only because of absence of grave abuse of discretion, but likewise because an action for annulment of judgment was no longer available. Moreover, the instant special action was not the proper remedy against the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals. As gathered from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and the pleadings of the parties, the following are the material facts in this case:Petitioners Jose A. Linzag and the heirs of Cristobal A. Linzag are members of the non-Christian tribe known as the Kalagan tribe of Mati, Davao Oriental. Jose and Cristobal claim to have inherited from their deceased parents, Datu Joaquin Linzag and Regina Agustino, a parcel of land, otherwise known as Waniban Island, designated as Lot No. 1222 of the Mati Cadastre, with an area of 36,575 square meters, more or less.[1]At the cadastral proceeding (CAD CASE No. N-16, LRC Cad. Record N-326) involving Lot No. 1222 before the then Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental sitting in Mati, Davao Oriental, Cristobal Linzag filed his claim over said Lot. Another claimant, one Patricio Cunanan, likewise filed a claim.On 26 July 1971, one Orlando L. Salvador filed a motion[2] to award Lot No. 1222, as an uncontested lot, in his favor. He alleged therein that he had acquired the rights of Patricio Cunanan for sufficient consideration and that the other claimant, Cristobal Linzag, had withdrawn his answer/claim in favor of Patricio Cunanan and/or his successors-in-interest, thereby making said lot as a non-contested lot. At the hearing of the motion, which was not opposed by the Director of Lands, then represented by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, Salvador offered in evidence the following: (a) a Deed of Absolute Sale of Hereditary Rights Over an Unregistered Land covering Lot No. 1222 executed on 29 December 1970[3] by Patricio S. Cunanan, Avelina C. Salazar, Elena C. Abayari, Igualdad Cunanan, Diosdado Cunanan, Lakandula Cunanan, Josefina C. Sibala as vendors and Orlando L. Salvador as vendee; and (b) a verified Withdrawal of Claim/Answer dated 13 July 1971[4] signed by Cristobal and Jose Linzag and executed in favor of Patricio Cunanan and/or his successors-in-interests. On 10 August 1971, the cadastral court, on the basis of the foregoing, issued an Order[5] declaring that Salvador and his predecessors-in-interests had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of Lot No. 1222, in concept of an owner for a period of at least 30 years; that Salvador was the successor-in-interest of original claimant Patricio S. Cunanan; and that the lot was a non-contested lot. The court thus decreed: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby adjudicates Lot No. 1222, together with all its improvements thereon, in favor of:ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, of legal age, Filipino, married to Jovita B. Ramos-Salvador, a resident of Paraaque, Rizal.The Land Registration Commissioner is hereby directed to issue the corresponding decree of registration for said Lot No. 1222, as soon as this Order becomes final and executory.After the Order became final, the cadastral court issued an Order[6] directing issuance of the decree of registration.In due time, Decree No. N-137262 was issued. Then on 13 October 1971, pursuant to said Decree, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-2039[7] covering Lot No. 1222 was issued in the name of Orlando L. Salvador.On 4 February 1977, petitioners herein filed an action for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages[8] against private respondents Patricio Cunanan and Orlando Salvador before the Court of First instance of Mati, Davao Oriental (docketed as Civil Case No. 571). On 10 June 1977, petitioners filed an amended complaint[9] wherein they alleged, inter alia, that they and their predecessors-in-interests had been in actual, lawful, peaceful, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the land since the Spanish regime up to the present; the lot was ancestral land of the Linzags; the lot had been included in a prior land registration case filed by Patricio Cunanan which was decided against him, with the land registration court holding that the land was part of the public domain, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 19 November 1960 in CA-G.R. No. 19594-B; that in the cadastral proceedings, specifically on 13 July 1971 and after the effectivity of said decision of the Court of Appeals, Patricio Cunanan, with the aid and participation of his son-in-law, Atty. Galileo Sibala, procured, through fraud, the signatures of Jose and Cristobal Linzag on a document which turned out to be a withdrawal of their claim to Lot No. 1222 by representing to them that it was a deed of mortgage over the lot in consideration of P3,000.00; and thereafter, Cunanan, together with the heirs of his deceased wife, sold the lot to Orlando Salvador for the sum of P25,000.00. Petitioners further alleged that both the withdrawal of claim and deed of absolute sale were notarized by Atty. Sibala; on the basis of the deed of sale in his favor, Salvador filed a motion with the cadastral court to adjudicate the lot in his favor as an uncontested lot; that the cadastral court granted the motion and as a consequence thereof, OCT No. 0-2039 was issued in Salvadors name; and that it was only on 14 May 1974 that petitioners discovered the fraud. They then prayed for judgment directing the Register of Deeds of Davao Oriental to issue a certificate of title in petitioners names, and ordering defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and transportation expenses.In its decision[10] dated 14 February 1984, the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 571 because the action [was] improper and that the claim of plaintiffs have not been duly substantiated by them. The court likewise ruled that plaintiffs therein were not the true owners of the property; plaintiffs failed to prove extrinsic fraud; there was no evidence that Salvador was a buyer in bad faith; and that the action was filed beyond the prescriptive period.Petitioners appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals (Eighth Division) in CA-G.R. CV No. 03329. In its decision[11] of 25 July 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription.Petitioners thereafter appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 89441. In the resolution[12] of 2 October 1989, this Court (First Division) denied the petition for late filing and decreed that the judgment sought to be reviewed has now become final and executory.Meanwhile, on 9 November 1993, Original Certificate of Title No. O-2039 was cancelled and the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Davao Oriental issued a Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16604[13] in the name of Manuel P. Blanco, Jr. and Jose Manuel Serrano.Undaunted by the foregoing adverse events, on 5 December 1994, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition[14] for the annulment of judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Mati, Davao Oriental in CAD. CASE No. N-16, LRC Cad. Record No. N-326 concerning Lot No. 1222 (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35877). Impleaded as respondents were the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental, which succeeded the former Court of First Instance that decided the cadastral case, herein private respondents Patricio Cunanan, Orlando Salvador, Manuel Blanco, Jr., Jose Manuel Serrano and the Register of Deeds of Davao Oriental. In its decision[15] of 28 February 1995, public respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being barred by the judgment in Civil Case No. 571, i.e., on ground of res judicata. The appellate courts extensive discussion[16] on this issue deserves to be quoted, thus: On the issue of res judicata, the private respondent point [sic] to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental in Civil Case 571 affirmed by this Court in CA G.R. CV. 03329. It was argued that this previous case involved the same parties, subject matter and cause of action as this instant petition, and is, therefore, a bar to this petition.An action is barred by a former judgment if (1) the former judgment is final; (2) the court which rendered it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; (4) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.An examination of the records show [sic] that the first three requirements for the application of the doctrine of res judicata are present in this case.The petitioners themselves related in their petition that they had instituted a complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages against the private respondents, Salvador and Cunanan. The complaint was dated 10 June 1977 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 571 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental.On 14 February 1984, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the petitioners dismissing their complaint and ordering them to pay Orlando Salvador P5,000.00 and Patricio Cunanan, P2,000.00 by way of litigation expenses and attorneys fees (see Decision, Annex J, Petition; Rollo, pp. 50-68).The judgment was affirmed by this Court in CA G.R. No. 03329 (Jose A. Linzag, et. [sic] al. vs. Patricio Cunan, et. [sic] al.) in a decision rendered on 25 July 1989 (see copy of Decision; Annex K, Petition; Rollo, pp. 69-74).The petition for review with the Supreme Court was not filed within the extension period granted to the petitioners. Thus, on 2 October 1989 the Supreme Court issued a Resolution stating that no appeal was taken on time by the petitioners and the judgment had already become final and executory (Annex L, Petition; Rollo, p. 75).The judgment in Civil Case 571 (i.e., the annulment case) having already become final as pronounced in the Supreme Court Resolution, the first requirement for the application of res judicata is, therefore, present.The Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental undoubtedly has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The parcel of land in question is located within the province and as such, lies within the territorial jurisdiction of said court. No question on the jurisdiction of the trial court over the parties appears to have been raised.The judgment was on the merits as it was rendered after a determination of which party is right and was not merely based on a preliminary or technical issue (see Santos vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 238, 245-246). A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it was based on matters of substance and not merely on technical points.There is also an identity between the parties in this petition and that in Civil Case 571. The petitioners in this case, Jose Linzag and the Heirs of Cristobal Linzag are likewise the plaintiffs in Civil Case 571. The defendants in Civil Case 571 are also the private respondents in this case. The inclusion of Manuel Serrano and Jose Manuel Blanco as private respondents does not affect the identity of the parties as these two are successors-in-interest of original defendant Orlando Salvador.The subject matter between the two cases are also identical. It is the parcel of land known as Waniban Island in Mati, Davao Oriental and the certificate of title covering such property.The issue is whether or not there is an identity in the causes of action between this petition and Civil Case No. 571.The test generally applied in determining whether causes of action are identical as to warrant the application of the doctrine of res judicata is to consider whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions or whether the same evidence will sustain both. This is regardless [of whether] the form or nature of the two actions are different. If the same facts or evidence can sustain either, the two actions are considered the same so that the judgment in one is [a] bar to the other. If, however, the two actions rest upon two different state [sic] of facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is not a bar to the maintenance of the other (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732; Aroc vs. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation, 81 SCRA 350; Pagsisihan vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 540).In this petition, the petitioners claim for nullity of judgment and their argument of lack of notice to them in the cadastral case [is] essentially based on allegations of fraud. As narrated earlier, the petitioners also alleged that the documents submitted by the private respondents to support their application for registration were fraudulent. They further alleged that the withdrawal of claim filed in their behalf in the cadastral case was procured through fraud.It is, however, clear from the complaint and the decision in Civil Case 571, attached to this petition, that these issues have already been raised by the petitioners and passed upon by the trial court. This can be shown by the following excerpts of the decision of the Court of First Instance.In any case, even granting arguendo that plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property before 1945, it would appear that at the time of the filing of the action, they had no more right [to] the property. The main thrust of plaintiffs assault on the validity of defendant Orlando Salvador is that the waiver of claim is null and void, did not reflect truly the intention of the parties.An examination of the testimonies of the two (2) witnesses for the plaintiffs, Jose Linzag and Salvacion vda. De Linzag, who were twice presented as witnesses will show that plaintiffs were not able to successfully substantiate their claim on the invalidity of said withdrawal of answer or claim. Nothing was said in their testimonies as would support the contention that the said instrument was not validly executed.x x xOn the second requirement, that the land must be wrongfully registered through fraud, it is clear from jurisprudence that the fraud in securing title must be actual fraud and must be proven and that the said fraud must be extrinsic. It is clear that as earlier discussed, plaintiffs failed to prove any actual fraud. The alleged fraud plaintiffs claimed is not extrinsic fraud, granting that fraud was committed. xxx (See CFI Decision, pp. 10, 15; Rollo, pp. 59, 64)Notably also, the underlying objective or relief sought in this petition and in the earlier case are essentially the same. It is the nullification of the land title in the name of the private respondents and the adjudication of the land in question to the petitioners. The only difference is the form and nature of the two actions; while the earlier complaint is for the annulment of the land title, this present petition is for the nullification of the judgment upon which the title sought to nullified (sic) in the first case was issued.It is readily apparent, therefore, that were this petition to be given due course, the same evidence or set of facts as that considered by the Court of First Instance in the annulment case, Civil Case 571, will be also be [sic] considered in this petition. Applying then the test earlier discussed, this court finds that the causes of action in Civil Case 571 and in this petition are the same as to warrant the application of the doctrine of res judicata.In sum, we find that all the requirements for the application of res judicata are present in this case. This petition should, therefore, be dismissed. The difference in the form of the actions instituted is immaterial. The petitioners may not escape the effect of the doctrine by merely varying the form of his [sic] action (Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 59, 63; Sangalang vs. Caparas, 151 SCRA 53; Ibabao vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 76, 85).The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity in them in law or estate. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated (Ibabao vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at p. 85; Sangalang vs. Caparas, supra, at p. 59).As this petition is already barred by the judgment in Civil Case 571, We see no other course of action but to resolve to dismiss this petition.Their motion for reconsideration[17] and supplemental motion for reconsideration[18] having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution[19] of 3 October 1995, on the ground that there existed no new and cogent ground to warrant reversal or modification, petitioners filed the instant special action for certiorari with mandamus, raising the following issues:(1) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CAN DENY DUE COURSE TO THE INSTANT PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS THAT THERE WAS AN EARLIER CASE FOR NULLIFICATION OF TITLE BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT;(2) WHETHER OR NOT A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF TITLE FILED AND DISMISSED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS A BAR (RES JUDICATA) TO THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS OF AN LRC CASE RENDRED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SITTING AS A CADASTRAL COURT;(3) WHETHER OF NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CAN DENY DUE COURSE TO A VALID PETITION ORIGINALLY FILED BEFORE IT MERELY BECAUSE A CASE FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE WAS ALREADY FILED AND DECIDED BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT;(4) WHETHER OR NOT PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF WHICH THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IS THE SAME AS A PETITION FOR NULLITY OF TITLE WHICH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION.(5) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE EVEN BEFORE RECEIVING EVIDENCE AND WITHOUT DETERMINING THE ACTUAL MERITS OF THE PETITION FILED FOR THE ANNULMENT OF A PATENTLY NULL AND VOID JUDGMENT.Petitioners contend that the decision in Civil Case No. 571, an action for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages, does not constitute res judicata to bar the instant petition for annulment of judgment. Petitioners further insist that the 10 August 1971 decision of the cadastral court is void for violation of due process and extrinsic fraud, stressing that a void judgment never acquires finality and is subject to collateral attack. Petitioners underscore that in the proceedings before the cadastral court they were not informed of the dates of hearing, and as a result, were unable to hire the services of counsel. Thus if they had been afforded their day in court, they could have proved possession of the land for the required number of years that would have entitled them to ownership thereof; and that private respondents procured spurious documents showing a waiver of petitioners claim over the disputed property. Moreover, petitioners were not furnished a copy of the trial courts decision. Finally, petitioners contend that the transfer of the land title to private respondents Blanco and Serrano, who failed to verify true ownership of the land, was part of Salvadors fraudulent schemes and strategies to deprive petitioners of an opportunity to recover the land.Cunanans comment[20] filed on 12 January 1996 does not meet squarely the substantive issues raised by petitioners and, instead, interposes the following defenses: (1) he is not a party-in-interest, having sold all his rights over the subject property to Orlando Salvador; (2) Galileo Sibala has not appeared as counsel on behalf of the other respondents; (3) there is no new and cogent reason to disturb the 28 February 1995 decision as the allegations in the petition are a mere rehash of the issues already passed upon by respondent Court of Appeals; and (4) the petition fails to show that petitioners motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period.In their comment filed on 4 October 1996, respondents Manuel P. Blanco, Jr. and Jose Manuel Serrano contend that: (1) petitioners were not denied due process since they were afforded ample opportunity to present their side of the controversy; (2) the trial courts finding on the issue of possession and extrinsic fraud must be accorded great weight and respect, if not finality, on appeal; (3)the transfer certificate of title evidencing their ownership over the land has become incontrovertible and indefeasible; (4) they are purchasers in good faith and for value and may safely rely on what appears on the face of the title; (5) the instant petition is barred by res judicata; and (7) there is no showing that respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it refused to give due course to the petition.Petitioners filed separate replies to the comments of Cunanan and Blanco and Serrano.In his manifestation filed on 20 September 1996, counsel for private respondent Cunanan informed the Court that Cunanan died on 8 April 1996, and on 20 November 1996, said counsel submitted the names and addresses of the heirs of Cunanan. Upon motion of petitioners, to which the other parties submitted their comment, the Court granted, on 2 July 1997, petitioners motion to substitute the heirs of Cunanan for the latter.The Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their memoranda, which petitioners and respondents Serrano and Blanco did on 4 September 1997 and 26 August 1997, respectively. The parties likewise filed reply memoranda. This petition is devoid of merit.Respondent Court of Appeals did not err, much less, commit grave abuse of discretion, in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 on ground of res judicata. Paragraph (b) of Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which was likewise Section 47(b), Rule 39 of the 1964 Rules of Court, enshrines the doctrine of res judicata: SEC. 47. Effect of judgment or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:xxx(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing under the same title and in the same capacityThe doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation - republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.[21]The requisites of res judicata are: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[22] The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, to wit: (1) the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action; and (2) preclude relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[23] As earlier shown, the Court of Appeals convincingly demonstrated that the decision in Civil Case No. 571 of the Court of First Instance of Mati, Davao Oriental operates to bar, on the ground of res judicata, the case for annulment of judgment -- CA-G.R. SP No. 35877. As stated earlier, the decision in Civil Case No. 571 dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages; and, in effect, affirmed the judgment of the cadastral court. The judgment in Civil Case No. 571 was then affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 03329, while a petition to review the latter was denied by this Court in G.R. No. 89441.The claim of petitioners that the judgment in Civil Case No. 571 does not bar CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 because the former was for annulment of title only, while the latter was for annulment of the judgment, is palpably unmeritorious. There is here a clear case of hair-splitting. It is settled that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case.[24] This is as good a time as any to remind lawyers that any attempt to do so merits the Courts condemnation for being an abuse or misuse of the rules of procedure.We stress in this connection that petitioners may have resorted to the filing of Civil Case No. 571 because they had lost the right to file a petition for review. It is settled that a party deprived of his property in a cadastral proceeding may file within one (1) year from entry of the decree, a petition for review. After the lapse of said period, if the property has not yet passed on to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance may still be filed by the aggrieved party.[25] An action for reconveyance attacks not only the judgment of the cadastral court; it likewise seeks confirmation by the court of plaintiffs title to the land.Another more telling reason why CA-G.R. SP No. 35877 should be dismissed was that the remedy of annulment of judgment allowed in Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 129 was no longer available to petitioners. Such is available only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioners.[26] Here, petitioners had, in fact, availed of an action for reconveyance where they litigated the grounds for annulment of judgment. There would be no end to litigations if parties who have unsuccessfully availed of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault would still be heard in an action to annul the judgment. A final word before ending.The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court (or of its predecessor the Court of First Instance) is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, where only questions of law may be raised. Petitioners, however, have availed of the special civil action for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. No special reasons