jimenez calida political law review doctrines (arts.2, 6-12,17)

P a g e | 1ARTICLE II

• DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES & STATE POLICIES •

SEC. 1ACCFA V. CONFEDERATION – Functions such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations are traditionally called constituent functions. These are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people which are ministrant functions.

However, the growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if wants to meet the increasing social challenges of the times.

REPUBLIC V. CFI OF RIZAL – Governmental agencies are exempt from paying legal fees and posting an appeal bond. The mercantile activity of a government agency (i.e. buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn) is only incident to its primary governmental function which is to carry out some government policy to serve the well being of the people (i.e. policy of subsidizing and stabilizing the price of palay, rice and corn in order to make it well within the reach of average consumers).

MAQUERA V. BORRA – Imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run for a public office is inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in the Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same.

Republicanism is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn implies

necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.

SEC. 12PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS – The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State. Those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.

SEC. 16OPOSA V. FACTORAN – Minors can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for other succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which includes the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. This right carries

with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Timber licenses may be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause. It is merely a permit or a privilege.

ARTICLE VI • LEGISLATIVE •

SEC. 1ABAKADA V. PURISIMA – Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

The Supreme Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: public interest; justice and equity; public convenience and welfare; simplicity; economy and welfare. The optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and BOC is infused with public interest.

PEOPLE V. ROSENTHAL – Public interest is a sufficient standard. The criterion may be found in the purpose of the act, the requirements imposed and the context of the provisions itself. The protection of the public against speculative schemes is a sufficient standard.

AGUSTIN V. EDU – In order to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard set by the legislature itself which determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. The standard may be expressed or implied and does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DOCTRINES | ATTY. JACK JIMENEZ | MARK JOREL O. CALIDA

P a g e | 2A standard: (1) defines legislative policy; (2) marks its limits and maps out its boundaries; (3) specifies the public agency to apply it; (4) indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command it to be effected; (5) is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.

CHIONGBIAN V. ORBOS – A legislative standard need not be expressed, it may be implied. It need not be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject matter as that of the challenged legislation.

While the power to merge regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power traditionally lodged with the President, in view of the power of general supervision over local governments. There is no abdication by Congress of its legislative powers in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. “To promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government, to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for acceleration socio-economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of public business” is a sufficient standard.

RUBI V. PROVINCIAL BOARD – The legislature may delegate legislative powers to LGUs. Who else but these officers, as the official representatives of the province are better qualified to judge when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order.

PEOPLE V. VERA – A law which grants boards roving commission which enables them to exercise arbitrary discretion is invalid. Congress may not leave the entire matter to boards to determine.

YNOT V. IAC – There is invalid delegation of legislative powers when there is unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. A law may not grant a roving commission or a wide sweeping authority, a sufficient standard must be provided.

U.S. V. PANLILIO – There can be no delegation of power to criminalize when the law itself does not define a crime nor provided a penalty.

SEC. 5ANG BAGONG BAYANI V. COMELEC – Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. They cannot be disqualified from the party-list election merely on the ground that they are political parties. The Constitution provides that the members of the House may be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organization.

RA7941 or the Party List Law enumerates those sectors which are marginalized and underrepresented (CODE: WHY FIVE POPUL): Women, Handicapped, Youth, Fisherfolk, Indigenous, Veterans, Elderly, Peasants, OFWs, Profesionals, Urban poor, Laborers. Nevertheless, this enumeration is not exclusive.

It is not enough for a candidate to claim representation among those enumerated groups because it is easy to claim and feign. Party list groups must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.

Guidelines to determine qualifications of political parties to join party-list elections (CODE: DIRRT Nom Nom Nom)(1) Must not be Disqualified under RA7941 (*NOTE)(2) Must be Independent from the government (not adjunct, funded or assisted)(3) Religious sector may not be represented, but a religious leader may be a nominee(4) Major political parties allowed but they must still Represent the marginalized(5) Political parties must Truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors(6) Nominees must be themselves qualified (**NOTE)(7) Nominees must belong to the marginalized(8) Nominees must be able to contribute to appropriate legislation

* NOTE: Disqualified groups under §6 of the Party List Law:

(CODE: V2 For2 CUPS)(1) Violates or fails to comply with election law, rules and regulations(2) Advocates Violence or unlawful means to seek its goal(3) A Foreign party or organization(4) Receives support from a Foreign government, political party, foundation or organization(5) Ceased to exist for at least 1 year(6) Declares Untruthful statements in its petition(7) Fails to Participate in the last 2 preceding elections or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the 2 preceding elections(8) Religious Sect or association organized for religious purposes

** NOTE: Qualifications of party-list nominees under §9 of the Party List Law: (1) Natural-born citizen(2) Able to read and write(3) At least 25 years old on the day of the election (Youth sector: at least 25 but not more than 30 years old on the day of the election)(4) Registered voter(5) Resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election(6) Bona fide member of the party for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election

BANAT V. COMELEC – Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is against the Constitution and the Party List Law. Major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes.

The operation of the 2% threshold for the allocation of additional seats is unconstitutional for frustrating the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the lower house shall constitute party-list representatives. It prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the lower house.


P a g e | 3In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved less the guaranteed seats.

* Procedure in allocating seats for party-lists:STEP 1: Rank the parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

STEP 2: Determine the total # of seats available to the party-list system.

# of seats available to # of seats reserved legislative districts X (0.20) = for party list (0.80)

STEP 3: Apply the 2% threshold – the parties receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to 1 guaranteed seat each.

STEP 4: Determine the additional seats bearing in mind that each party may not get more than 3 seats.

# of seats reserved for party list― # of guaranteed seats = Additional seats

Ratio = # of votes of party list concerned total # of votes in party list system

RatioX Additional seats = Additional seats of party list concerned

STEP 5: Even if you did not get 2%, you can still get a seat depending on the number of votes you garnered – assign 1 seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed.

STEP 6: No rounding off. Fractional seats are disregarded.

SEC. 11JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG – The Constitution protects utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of: (1) their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress and while the same is in session; (2) bills introduced in Congress, whether or not in session; (3) other acts performed by Congressmen whether or not in its premises in the official discharge of their duties.

To be protected, the utterance must be made in the performance of an official duty, either as a member of congress or a member or any committee thereof.

POBRE V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO – Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes also a violation of his oath as a lawyer. Parliamentary non-accountability granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.

SEC. 14PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN – Acquiring a mere P200 worth of stock of only 10 shares is an obvious circumvention of the rule prohibiting the appearance of a member of congress before an administrative body. There was an indirect appearance. What the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection. The acquisition of minimal participation in the “interest” of the client and then the act of “intervening” in the proceedings makes the constitutional prohibition ineffective.

SEC. 16 (1)AVELINO V. CUENCO – A minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving the session hall, prevent the majority of 12 other senators from passing a resolution with their unanimous

consent. There is a difference between a majority of ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE, and a majority of THE HOUSE. “The house” does not mean all the members; a majority of the members constitute “the house.” For example, there are 23 senators present and 1 absent for a surgery in the U.S., an absolute majority of all the members of the Senate is 12. If there are 12 senators there is quorum to do business.

SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA – Majority is defined as the number greater than half or more than half of any total. The Constitution does not delineate who shall comprise the majority, much less the minority. While the Constitution provides the manner of electing the Senate President, it does not however provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority. No law or regulation states that the losing candidate shall be the minority leader.

History indicates that “majority” refers to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while “minority” refers to a party with a lesser number of members. There could also be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified as the “dominant minority.”

The rules of Senate do not provide for the positions of majority/minority leaders. In the absence of any specific rule, the Court has no basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate.

SEC. 16 (2)PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS – The privilege to be free from arrest applies only if the offense is punishable by less than 6 years of imprisonment. Members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties of a public officer has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Election does not free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The voters were fully aware of the limitations of his freedom of action. They voted him


P a g e | 4with the knowledge that he could discharge his legislative functions within the confines of prison only.

SEC. 16 (3)ARROYO V. DE VENECIA – The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It is a continuous power beyond the challenge of any other body. The failure to regard the rule is not a subject matter of judicial inquiry.

The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver by the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the court has no concern. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action, when the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN – Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression before the courts or any other forum. But this is only outside the congressional halls. It does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. The House is the sole judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour.

SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANBAYAN – Suspension under Art. VI § 16(3) is punitive and a penalty. Preventive suspension under RA3019 is preliminary and not a penalty.

Preventive suspension applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information, whether appointive or elective, permanent or temporary, career or non-career. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.

RA3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts. The word “office” applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, not only the particular office under which he stands accused.

SEC. 16 (4)U.S. V. PONS – Courts can take judicial notice of legislative journals. Records of the judiciary are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of legislature, when they are already clear and explicit, would be to violate the doctrine of separation of powers. They are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. Extraneous evidence cannot be admitted.

CASCO V. GIMENEZ – The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress, and approved by the President. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not judicial legislation.

ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS – The enrolled bill doctrine is based mainly on the respect due to the co-equal and independent departments, which requires the judicial department to accept as having passed by Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated. If the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of the statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of the Congress for proof of its due enactment.

The law making process ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. The approval by congress, and not the signatures of the presiding officers, is essential.

When the Senate President declares his signature on the bill to be invalid, and issued a subsequent certification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had earlier signed had never been approved by the Senate. This declaration has more weight than the attestation which it invalidated. Absent such attestation and there being no enrolled bill, the Courts may examine the journal to determine whether or not the bill is duly enacted.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES V. PRADO – The Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approved bill from the presiding officers of Congress.

ABAKADA V. ERMITA – If a change is desired in the practice of the Bicameral Conference Committee, it must be sought in Congress since it refers to an internal rule of Congress.

It is incorrect to conclude that there is no difference in the bills of each house merely because such provision exists in the House version while it is absent in the Senate version. It is precisely the absence of such provision in the Senate bill and the presence thereof in the House bill that causes the conflict. The absence of the provision shows the disagreement in the intention.

SEC. 17VERA V. AVELINO – An election contest relates only to statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not only to out the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the office. The power to defer oath taking belongs to Congress, and not the electoral tribunal. It is an inherent power of Congress as a measure of self-preservation. Congress also has the power to inquire into the credentials of any of its members.

ABBAS V. SET – In providing for the SET to be staffed by both SC Justices and Senators, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all electoral contests. The legislative component cannot be totally excluded from participation. Nevertheless, a senator-member may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in the SET when he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of objective and impartial judgment.

BONDOC V. PINEDA – Electoral tribunals are bodies separate and independent of the legislature. They were created to function as nonpartisan even if 2/3 of its members are politicians. Political parties cannot use the electoral tribunal as a tool for the aggrandizement of the party in


P a g e | 5power. Disloyalty to the party is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a member of the electoral tribunal. Members enjoy security of tenure; membership may not be terminated except for just cause.

SEC. 18DAZA V. SINGZON – The manner of filling up the Commission on Appointments as prescribed in the Constitution is not a political question. The House has the authority to change its representation to reflect at any time, the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. Such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation.

COSETENG V. MITRA – A lone member of a party is not entitled to one of the twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments. The endorsement of other congressmen is inconsequential if they do not belong to the endorsee’s political party.

GUNGONA V. GONZALES – By adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation. The Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must always include twelve senators and twelve congressmen. What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership.

SEC. 21ARNAULT V. NAZARENO – The power of inquiry is essential and auxiliary to the legislative function. Legislature cannot legislate wisely and effectively in the absence of information about the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. When the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Once inquiry is established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer a question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The question must be

material to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The test of materiality is the direct relation to the subject matter of inquiry and not by indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

The fact that the Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to punish members does not imply exclusion of the power to punish non-members for contempt. Nevertheless, no person can be punished unless the testimony is required in a matter over which Congress had jurisdiction to inquire.

SABIO V. GORDON – The Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of Congress but also of “any of its committees.” Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. An executive order exempting members and staff of an agency from the Congress’ power of inquiry cannot be countenanced.

SENATE V. ERMITA – An exemption to the power of inquiry of Congress is executive privilege. It is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. The validity of a claim thereof depends on the ground invoked and the context in which it is made. Executive officials are not exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials.

The requirement to secure presidential consent is valid with respect to appearances in the question hour, the appearance of the department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. However, it is invalid to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President or by the Executive Secretary.

Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

NERI V. SENATE – Elements of presidential communications privilege: (1) the communication protected must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power; (2) operational proximity, the communication must be authored or received by a close adviser of the President or the President himself; (3) information sought likely contains important evidence

For the claim to be properly invoked there must be a formal claim of privilege requiring a precise and certain reason for preserving confidentiality. Pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, Congress may not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.

NERI V. SENATE – There are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters and that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers, by which the court meant presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussion in closed-door cabinet meetings.

While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.


P a g e | 6The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive. “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance. “Non-delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor.

A member of the Cabinet is properly within the term “advisor” of the President. The operational proximity test is not conclusive in every case. The main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President not only by reason of their function but also by reason of their position in the Executive’s organizational structure. Diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation may be the basis of presidential communications privilege.

SEC. 24TOLENTINO V. SOF – The power of the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete. Thus, because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House, the Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically rewrite a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill.

A committee to which a bill is referred may do any of the following: (1) endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering its language; (3) make and endorse an entirely new bill as substitute.SEC. 25 (2)GARCIA V. MATA – A provision referring to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP

in an appropriation law is a rider which is prohibited by the constitution.

SEC. 25 (5)PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ – Members of Congress are given the power to determine the necessity of realignment of the savings in the allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there are savings, or deficiencies in appropriation. However, only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.

These conditions must also be met: (1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings; (2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer is to be made.

SANCHEZ V. COA – The power to transfer savings pertains exclusively to the President, Senate President, House Speaker, Chief Justice and the heads of constitutional commissions and no other. The Deputy Executive secretary is not authorized to transfer funds.

Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The word “actual” denotes that something is real or substantial, or exists presently in fact. Savings may generally be determined at the end of the year, or earlier in case of completion, discontinuance or abandonment of the work for which the appropriation was authorized but not as early as January 31. It is even more ridiculous to claim that savings may be presumed from the mere transfer of funds.

Augmentation denotes that an appropriation was determined to be deficient after the implementation of the project or activity for which an appropriation was made or after an evaluation of the needed resources. SEC. 26 (1)PHILCONSA V. GIMENEZ – The purpose of the requirement that the subject of an act should be expressed in its title are: (1) to prevent surprise, fraud upon the legislature;

(2) to fairly appraise the people through such publication of legislation; (3) to prevent a law with several subject matter.

The requirement is satisfied when all parts of the law relate to the subject expressed in the title. It is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the content. There is sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject but the provisions of the statute are germane to the general subject.

INSULAR LUMBER V. CTA – A law increasing funds which grants a partial exemption does not deviate from the general subject of the law. The purpose of the constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES V. PRADO – If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. The withdrawal of the franking privilege is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of law creating a more efficient and effective postal service system.

SEC. 26 (2)TOLENTINO V. SOF – The presidential certification dispenses with the requirement not only of printing but also that of the reading of the bill on separate days.

The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is two-fold: (1) to inform the members of Congress of what they must vote on; and (2) to give them notice that a measure is progressing through the enacting process thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to prepare their positions.

SEC. 27 (2)GONZALES V. MACARAIG – The power given to the president to disapprove any item in an appropriations bill does not


P a g e | 7grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

An item refers to the particulars, details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is the indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law.

A distinct and severable part of a bill may be subject of a separate veto. Any provision in the general in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular provision therein, and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. Even assuming that provisions are beyond veto powers, a provision may still be vetoed following the doctrine of inappropriate provisions

BENGZON V. DRILON – The general rule is that the president must veto the bill in its entirety. Item vetoes are allowed to avoid riders being attached to appropriation measures but only a particular item (meaning the particulars, details, the distinct and severable parts) may be vetoed.

PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ – The repeal of a law should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. The scope of item veto should be any provision which: (1) does not relate to any particular item; (2) extends the operation beyond the item of appropriation; (3) an unconstitutional provision intended to amend other laws.

SEC. 28 (1)CIR V. LINGAYEN GULF – A tax is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike.

TOLENTINO V. SOF – Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What the Constitution requires is to evolve a progressive system of taxation. This is a directive to Congress and was placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not judicially enforceable rights.

SEC. 28 (3)ABRA VALLEY V. AQUINO – The test for exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to or reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purpose (e.g. residence for director and president, but not commercial purposes).

SEC. 29 (1)PASCUAL V. PUBLIC WORKS – The right to appropriate funds is correlative to the right to tax. Since taxing powers must be exercised for public purposes only, then money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes as well. Legislature is without power to appropriate public funds for anything but a public purpose.

It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity and not the magnitude of interest to be affected. Incidental benefit or advantage to the public does not justify the use of public money. The test of constitutionality is whether the statute is designed to promote public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, even if each advantage to individuals incidentally serves the public.

PLANTERS V. FERTIPHIL – An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons.

GUINGONA V. CARAGUE – The amounts in automatic appropriation for debt servicing are made certain by legislative parameters. There is no unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges, and as when they shall become due. Automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management policies. Also, the amount needed to cover the payment of principal,

interests and taxes should be made available as they fall due, without necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws, since both the period and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.

ARTICLE VII • EXECUTIVE •

SEC. 1PHILCONSA V. ENRIQUEZ – The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used “for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries.” It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation. Executive function under the said fund involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law.

WEBB V. DE LEON – The prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department, whose principal power and responsibility is to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.

SEC. 8ESTRADA V. DESIERTO – For there to be resignation, there must be intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. A proposal for a snap election where the president would not be a candidate is indicia of intent to resign.

SEC. 13CIVIL LIBERTIES V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY – There is a sweeping, all-embracing prohibition imposed on the President, members of Cabinet, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by executive officials: (1) without additional compensation; (2) in an ex-officio capacity; (3) as provided for by law and (4)as required by the primary functions of said official’s office.


P a g e | 8Additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official’s primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent incompatible, or alien to the primary function, then it would prohibited.

SEC. 15IN RE: APPOINTMENT OF VALENZUELA – Art. 8, §4(1) provides that the vacancy shall be filled within 90 days contrasts with the prohibition under Art. 7, §15 is couched in stronger negative language that the president shall not make appointments.

§15 is directed against appointments for buying votes (within 2 months prior to election) and those made for partisan considerations (midnight appointments). The narrow exception to this rule is temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies would prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointment during the period of the ban. In fact, there is a strong public policy against appointments made within the ban period.

DE CASTRO V. JBC – The prohibition under §15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments in the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the framers reveal that the arrangement of the allocation of powers among the three departments is a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers.

The Valenzuela ruling did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Also, the use of the word “shall” imposes a duty which should not be disregarded. Thereby, §4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

§15 doesn’t apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary. The establishment of the Judicial and Bar Council and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process ensures that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. The creation of the JBC was to depoliticize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments.

SEC. 16RAFAEL V. EMBROIDERY BOARD – For the chairman and board members to qualify, they need only be designate by their respective department heads. They all sit ex-officio, in order to be designation they must already be holding positions in the office mentioned in the law. No new appointments are necessary and there is no attempt to deprive the President of his power to make appointments.

BERMUDEZ V. TORRES – Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing power. It is the prerogative of the appointing power; the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint.

The recommendation of the SOJ for the appointment of prosecutors should be interpreted as essentially persuasive in character, not binding, nor obligatory, upon the President.

SARMIENTO V. MISON – The Constitution provides for four groups whom the president shall appoint:(1) Head of executive departments, ambassadors, consuls, officers of the AFP with rank of colonel or naval captain and above, other officers whose appointment are vested in him in this Constitution (members of the JBC, chairman and commissioners or CSC, COMELEC, COA and members of regular consultative commissions) – Requires consent of the Commission on Appointment(2) All other officers of Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law – No confirmation(3) Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint – No confirmation

(4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may vest in the President alone (in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards) – No confirmation

CALDERON V. CARALE – The appointment of the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A law requiring the confirmation of the said officials is unconstitutional because it amends by legislation §16 by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation. It also amends by legislation the second sentence by imposing the confirmation on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only to the President.

RUFINO V. ENDRIGA – With respect to “(2) All other officers of Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law” which does not require confirmation, this applies when the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.

The grant of power to appoint to the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation. This is in contrast to the President’s power to appoint which is a self-executing power and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.

The officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint. Also, the power to appoint can only be vested in the heads or chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members.SEC. 17ANG-ANGCO V. CASTILLO – The President does not have blanket authority to remove any officer or employee of


P a g e | 9the government, but that power must still be subject to the law that may be passed such as the Civil Service Act. The power of control is defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgement of the officer for that of the subordinate. The President’s control over the executive department refers only to matters of general policy or any definite course or method adopted and followed by a government or body. The removal of an officer cannot be said to come within the meaning of control over a specific policy of government.

The power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers who belong to the executive, under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. However, this applies only if they are presidential appointees. As to those officers who belong to the classified service that power cannot be exercised.

NAMARCO V. ARCA – A GOCC partakes the nature of government bureau which is administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, whose rank is equivalent to a head of an Executive Department, and is responsible to the President under whose control his functions shall be exercised. The right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President the power of control over executive departments.

All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, whereby the heads are agents of the Chief Executive.

ANGELES V. GAITE – The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the exercise of pardoning power demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is not exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

The power of the President to review the decision of the SOJ dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. SEC. 18LANSANG V. GARCIA – Two conditions must occur for the valid exercise of authority to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus: (1) the existence of invasion, insurrection, and rebellion; (2) public safety requires such suspension. Nevertheless, the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of the factual bases in order to determine the constitutionality thereof.

Under the Constitution the President also has three options: (1) to call out the Armed Forces; (2) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and (3) to place the Philippines, in its entirety or only partly, under martial law.

ABERCA V. VER – The suspension of the privilege does not destroy a person’s right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedier means of obtaining his liberty.

DAVID V. ARROYO – Judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court, not that the President’s decision is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily. The standard is arbitrariness, not correctness.

PP1017 is an exercise of the President’s calling out power and not a declaration of martial law. The President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.

PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the authority to promulgate decrees. Under the Constitution, neither martial law, nor a state of rebellion, nor a state of emergency can justify the President’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

The President cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws (i.e. customs, family and property relations, obligations and contracts). The President can only order the military to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. The framers of the Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions: (1) there is a war or emergency; (2) the delegation is for a limited period only; (3) the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; (4) the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Absent such delegation of emergency powers, the President cannot take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. The President also has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.

SEC. 19DRILON V. CA – A person’s sentence which has already been commuted can no longer be reinvestigated. The commutation of sentence need not be in a specific form. It is sufficient when a person is voluntarily released with no terms or conditions, except that he should remain in house arrest. House arrest cannot be considered as a continuation of his sentence, because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere means of taking a person into custody.

CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR – There are three limitations on the exercise of pardoning power: (1) power must be exercised after conviction; (2) cannot be extended to impeachment cases; (3) in election cases, it may not be granted without the favourable recommendation of the COMELEC. The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It can only be subject to


P a g e | 10constitutional limitations. An absolute pardon erases not only the crime committed but also removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. Thus it extends to accessory and resultant disabilities.

TORRES V. GONZALES – The grant of pardon and determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon are purely executive acts, and are not subject to judicial review. The determination of the breach of conditional pardon may either be: (1) purely executive act under the Revised Administrative Code – not subject to judicial review and does not require conviction by final judgment; (2) a judicial act for violating the Revised Penal Code – consists of trial and conviction of conditional pardon.

MONSANTO V. FACTORAN – Pardon implies guilt and looks into the future. While it relieves the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, it relieves him from nothing more. It does not erase the fact of commission of crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain, it involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

Even if a person was pardoned, he is not entitled to backpay for lost earnings. There is also no automatic reinstatement because pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction. Pardon merely restores eligibility for appointment to that office. He must reapply and undergo the usual procedure for a new appointment.

LLAMAS V. ORBOS – Except for cases of impeachment, the Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President. If those adjudged guilty criminally may be pardoned there is no reason why the same benefit may not be extended to those adjudged guilty administratively. The President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. Also by virtue of the power of supervision and control, the President may reverse or modify a ruling issued by subordinate against an erring public official.

SEC. 21GONZALES V. HECHANOVA – Although the President may enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statues enacted prior thereto. He many not defeat legislative enactments by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by the said laws. The Constitution authorizes the nullification of an executive agreement, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but also when it runs counter to the act of Congress.

USAFFE V. TREASURER – Executive agreements are of two classes: (1) agreement made purely as executive acts affecting external relations and independent of or needs no legislative authorization (presidential agreements) and (2) agreement entered into in pursuance of acts of congress (congressional-executive agreements).

ARTICLE VIII • JUDICIARY •

SEC. 1SANTIAGO V. BAUTISTA – It is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made. The judiciary will not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.

A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions: (1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination; (2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision; (3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary.

NOBLEJAS V. TEEHANKEE – There is no inherent power in the executive or legislative to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfilment of judicial duties. A law cannot charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, which simultaneously reduces the control of the president over such officials, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

DIRECTOR OF PRISONS V. ANG CHO KIO – The matter of whether an alien who violated the law may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the President, under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an action by the President, which are purely political in nature. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law.

IN RE: LAURETA – The court must act to preserve its honor and dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession. Supreme Court resolutions are beyond the investigation from other departments of the government because of the doctrine of separation of powers. The correctness of a Supreme Court decision is conclusive upon the other branches of government.

ECHEGARAY V. SOJ – The power of the president to grant reprieves cannot be interpreted as denying the power of the courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The suspension of death sentence is an exercise of judicial power and is essential to jurisdiction. An accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights, and there is no higher right than the right to life.

SEC. 5 (2)LINA V. PURISIMA – It is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not it should take


P a g e | 11cognizance of any given case involving the validity of the acts of the Executive purportedly under the authority of martial law proclamations. Marcos has publicly acknowledged that even if there was martial law, it is still subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

TAN V. MACAPAGAL – Any person who impugns the validity of the statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Taxpayers can nullify laws upon the theory of misapplication of public funds. So long as any proposed amendment is still unacted, there is no room for judicial oversight. It is a pre-requisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed before the court may inquire.

TELEBAP V. COMELEC – A citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when: (1) he can show that he has personally suffered or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.

No interest as registered voters if the case does not concern their right to suffrage. No interest as taxpayers if it does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement. No standing as corporate entity if the substantial relation to the third party is not shown or that the third party can assert his constitutional right.

KILOSBAYAN V. MORATO – The “law of the case” is not applicable if the case is not a continuation of the previous case. A prior case wherein petitioners had standing to challenge a contract does not preclude their determination of their standing in the present suit. Legal standing has constitutional underpinnings. It requires partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader

public policy concerns. The question is whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpen the presentation of issues the court depends in difficult constitutional questions.

It is different from questions relating to whether a party is the real party in interest or the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In an action for annulment of contracts, the real parties in interest are those who parties to the contract.

Requisites of transcendental importance: (1) Public funds are involved; (2) Utter disregard for the constitution; (3) lack of party who can bring a suit.

FRANCISCO V. HR – Judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere spectre of the political question doctrine. There are two species of political questions: (1) “truly political questions” and (2) those which “are not truly political questions.” The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on power or function conferred upon political bodies. If there are, the courts are duty-bound to examine whether the government properly acted within such limits.

The possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis, embarrassing conflicts between the congress and the judiciary and political stability are not reasons for the Supreme Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

PACU V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION – Mere apprehension that the Secretary might under the law withdraw the permit of the petitioners does not constitute justiciable controversy. An action must be brought for a positive purpose, to obtain actual and positive relief. Courts do

not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, no matter how intellectually solid the problem may be.

DAVID V. ARROYO – The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decided cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) paramount public interest is involved; (3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

DE AGBAYANI V. PNB – The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it suffers from infirmity cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. However, prior the declaration of nullity, it must have been in force and had to be complied with. The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.

PEOPLE V. MATEO – The Constitution is not preclusive in character and does not necessarily prevent the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused, a procedural matter. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment.

SEC. 5 (4)PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ – The Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard, it violates the separation of the Executive and Judiciary. One of the incidental and inherent powers of the courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank, whenever the imperative of securing a fair


P a g e | 12and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice so demands.

SEC. 5 (5)PNB V. ASUNCION – Under the Civil Code, the creditor has the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The choice is left to the creditor. To require the creditor to proceed against the estate would deprive him of these substantive rights under the Civil Code. Substantive law cannot be amended by procedural law.

SANTERO V. CFI – Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule.

DAMASCO V. LAGUI – Prescription of a crime is the loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited by law. While it is a rule that an accused who fails to move to quash the information before pleading is deemed to waive all objections, it does not apply to the defense of prescription, a substantive right under the RPC which extinguishes criminal liability.

PEOPLE V. LACSON – Requirements to the application of the time-bar of Rule 17: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or the accused, or both moves for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) offended party is notified of the motion; (3) court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal.

The time-bar rule should be applied prospectively and not retroactively. A retroactive application would violate the right of the people to due process and unduly impair the State’s substantive right to prosecute the accused. It does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the RPC, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after

the information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed.

A procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impart the independence of the Court.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL V. NLRC – Ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. There is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties.

SEC. 6MACEDA V. VASQUEZ – In the absence of any administrative action taken against a judge or court employee, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Where a criminal complaint arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether the said judge or court employee has acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

SEC. 10NITAFAN V. CIR – The clear intent of the constitutional commissioners is to delete an express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of judiciary. Salaries of justices and judges are properly subject to the general income tax law.

SEC. 11

VARGAS V. RILLORAZA – Congress may not pass a law adding disqualifications to those adopted in the Constitution. The phrase “unless otherwise provided by law” does not authorize any legislation that would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, no matter how brief a time it may be imagined. A “temporary member” is a misnomer not contemplated by the Constitution. It is clear that the chief justice and the justices have to be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Mere designation does not satisfy this requirement.

ARTICLE IX-A • COMMON PROVISIONS •

SEC. 5CSC V. DBM – The “no report, no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. By parity of construction, “automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to the CSC, should be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. Shortfall of revenues does not justify non-compliance with the mandate.

Agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall. Even assuming that there was a revenue shortfall, it could not withhold full release of the CSC’s funds without violating the Constitution.

Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of the CSC, COA and COMELEC below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.

SEC. 7FILIPINAS ENGINEERING V. FERRER – COMELEC’s powers may be classified as administrative in character and pertaining to adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Awarding a contract does not come within the purview of final order


P a g e | 13which is exclusively and directly appealable to the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no direct and exclusive appeal to the Supreme Court may lie. Any question arising from said order may well be taken in an ordinary civil action before trial courts.

SALIGUMBA V. CA – The power of the Supreme Court to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel. Even assuming that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the administrative matter, the Supreme Court cannot do so on factual issues because the Supreme Court’s power is limited to legal issues only.

ARTICLE IX-B • CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION •

SEC. 2 (1)NASECO V. NLRC – GOCCs which are organized as subsidiaries under the General Corporation Law will not be covered by the Civil Service Law.

MWSS V. HERNANDEZ – Both regular and contractual employees are covered by the Civil Service Law. The NLRC has no jurisdiction over money claims of contractual employees of the government. They are still governed by the Civil Service Law and not the Labor Code.

CSC V. SOJOR – A university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university is a non-career civil service officer who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

SEC. 2 (2)DE LOS SANTOS V. MALLARE – The phrase “for cause” means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal. Not merely causes which the appoint power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. The cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something or a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.

Positions which are policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution.

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. It denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

A position is policy-determining if he formulates a method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions.

A position is highly technical if the appointee is required to possess technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree.

CSC V. SALAS – There are two instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) when the President, declares a position to be such (upon CSC recommendation); (2) when by the nature of the functions of office, there exists a close intimacy between the appointee and the appointing power, which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust, or confidential matters of the state.

A law specifying the nature of the position is merely an initial determination that is not conclusive in case of conflict. It is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical. The Supreme Court has the final say.

According to the Proximity Rule, a position is deemed not confidential where the position of the appointee is remote from that of the appointing authority since the

element of trust between them is no longer predominant. CSC V. JAVIER – Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; (3) security of tenure.

Non-career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; (2) tenure is limited to a period specified by law; or which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made; (3) no security of tenure.

In classifying a position as primarily confidential, its functions must not be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character. The loss of such trust and confidence could easily result in the termination of services of the employee. A body could not be expected to function freely with a suspicious officer in its midst.

GRINO V. CSC – A city legal officer and a provincial attorney are both primarily confidential positions. They serve as legal adviser and legal officer for the civil cases of the province and the city that they work for.

However, their legal assistants and subordinates are employed due to their technical qualifications. Thus, the positions are permanent and they enjoy security of tenure. There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the legal staff and subordinates which assist the confidential employee.

SEC. 2 (3)BRIONES V. OSMENA – While the abolition of the office does not imply the removal of the incumbent, the rule is true


P a g e | 14only when the abolition is made in good faith, that the right to abolish cannot be used to discharge employees in violation of civil service laws nor can it be exercised for personal or political reasons. The merit system will be ineffective if no safeguards are placed around the separation and removal of public employees. The removal shall be made only for cause in the manner provided for by law. This means there should be bona fide reasons and they must be given fair hearing. This is to afford public employees security of tenure.

ABAKADA V. PURISIMA – The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for cause other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee. A law that lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (i.e. when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection is a standard analogous to inefficiency and incompetence of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws.

CSC V. SOJOR – While the Board of Regents has the sole power of administration over the university, this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials. The CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a state university. While the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.

All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove him from the ambit of the CSC.

SEC. 2 (4)SANTOS V. YATCO – The position of Secretary of National Defense and other heads of executive departments is not

embraced and included within the terms “officers and employees in the civil service.” The question of the impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign is not justiciable.

SEC. 2 (5)DELA CRUZ V. CA – Public school teachers must exercise their constitutional right to assembly within reasonable limits. They may not commit acts prejudicial to the best interests of their service by staging mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back to work even after they have been order to do so. These produce adverse effects upon the students for whose education they were responsible.

SEC. 7FLORES V. DRILON – §7 expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services.

While ¶2 authorizes the multiple offices by an appointive official, when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, ¶1 appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against the appointment of an elective official to other government posts.

The only exceptions recognized by the Constitution for elective officials are: (1) President – head of the economic and planning agency; (2) Vice-President – member of cabinet; (3) member of congress – ex-officio member of the JBC.

An incumbent elective official, who has been appointed to another government post does not automatically forfeit his elective office. His appointment is invalid since he is ineligible. He can still be appointed to that office, provided he first resigns from his elective office. On the other hand, incumbent national legislators (senators and representatives) will automatically forfeit their elective

post after they have been appointed to another government office.

SEC. 8PERALTA V. MATHAY – Public office is a public trust, he is there to render service. He is entitled to be rewarded for the performance of his functions entrusted to him, but that should not be the overriding consideration. Thus, an officer or employee of the government may receive only such compensation as may be provided by law. The Constitution also prohibits additional, double and indirect compensation. Bonuses intended by way of incentive to spur him to more diligent efforts partake the nature of additional compensation.

*NOTE: Additional compensation – When for one and the same office for which compensation has been fixed there is added to such fixed compensation an extra reward in the form, for instance, of a bonus. This is not allowed in the absence of a law specifically authorizing such extra reward.

**NOTE: Double compensation – This more properly refers to two sets of compensation for two different offices held concurrently by one officer. In the instances when holding a second office is allowed when an officer accepts a second office, he can draw the salary attached to such second office only when he is specifically authorized by law to receive double compensation.

ARTICLE IX-C • COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS •

SEC. 1 (1)CAYETANO V. MONSOD – The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to give notice or render any kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. As long as the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions, then


P a g e | 15it is a practice of law. Experience as a lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, etc. more than satisfy the constitutional requirement.

SEC. 1 (2)MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO – An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of congress. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment by a by-passed appointee. He can be considered again if the President renews the appointment.

The prohibition on reappointment does not apply to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final. However, a by-passed ad-interim appointment can be revived by a new ad-interim appointment because there is no final disapproval.

An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office.

The prohibition on reappointment, common to the three constitutional commissions, was intended by the framers

to: (1) prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously appointed and confirmed, even if they served for less than seven years; (2) insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.

SEC. 2PANGILINAN V. COMELEC – The COMELEC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials. It has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House, it is the HRET who is the sole judge of all such contests. Pre-proclamation controversies should be construed as referring only to those falling within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of COMELEC.

SEC. 3SARMIENTO V. COMELEC – Election cases included pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc does not have authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.

ARTICLE IX-D• COMMISSION ON AUDIT •

SEC. 1 (1)MISON V. COA – A Manager of the Technical Services of the COA does not have the power to render or promulgate a decision for the COA. Hence, such decision is void ab initio. That power is lodged in the COA as a collegial body composed of a Chairman and two commissioners. Ratification cannot validate an act void ab initio because it was done absolutely without authority.

SEC. 2 (1)

PHILIPPINE OPERATIONS V. AUDITOR – The Auditor General has no jurisdiction for unliquidated claims. An account is something which may be adjusted or liquidated by arithmetic process. Treasury officials cannot pass upon accounts where the amount is not the result of a numerical computation.

Claims for unliquidated damages require for their settlement the application of judgement and discretion sustained by extraneous proof. In such cases, it is not merely an account which is determined by arithmetic process. When the liability or non-liability of the government is put in issue, the question involves judicial determination. The Auditor General, an executive officer, cannot assume this jurisdiction.

EURO-MED V. BATANGAS – The scope of the COA’s authority to take cognizance of claims refers only to liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers. When parties agree that the transactions are governed by implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COA, such matters are not within the usual area of expertise of most judges but are within the special competence of COA.

RAMOS V. AQUINO – Congress itself is not in a position to oversee and supervise the actual release of each and every appropriation made by law. It is the responsibility of the Auditor General to exact obedience to any law that allows the expenditure of public funds. He serves as the necessary check to make certain that no department of the government exceeds the statutory limits of the appropriation. That is the purpose for the creation of such office, certainly not the enforcement of criminal statutes.

Nowhere in the law does it appear that such a statutory grant of authority of the Auditor General to open revised accounts (in case of fraud, collusion, error of calculation, new and material evidence) carries with it the power to


P a g e | 16determine who may be constituted in the event that in the preparation thereof a crime has been committed.

BLUE BAR V. TANTUICO – The Constitution provides that the COA shall have the power on post-audit basis over non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from the government or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. Private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors.

NHA V. COA – The COA has the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Since the COA is responsible for the enforcement of the rules and regulations, failure to comply with them is a ground for disapproving the payment of the proposed expenditure.

According to a COA Circular, unnecessary expenditures are those: (1) which could not pass the test of prudence or the diligence of a good father of a family; (2) not supportive of the implementation of the objectives and mission of the agency; (3) incurrence of expenditure not dictated by the demands of good government; (4) not essential or that which can be dispensed with without loss or damage to property.

ARTICLE X• LOCAL GOVERNMENT •

SEC. 4GANZON V. COA – The Constitution did not intend to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, particularly discipline. Congress, through the Local Government Code, has delegated to the President the exercise of the power of removal.

Supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. Supervision is overseeing or the power of an

officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. Investigating is not inconsistent with overseeing, although it is a lesser power than altering.

Local autonomy means a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. It does not usher a regime of federalism.

Decentralization of administration – Delegation by the central government of administrative powers to political subdivisions, it relieves the central government the burden of managing local affairs. The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. The President has no power of control and cannot substitute his own judgment.

Decentralization of power – Abdication or handing over of political power in favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

SEC. 8BORJA V. COMELEC – The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected (i.e. continues the service of the official by succession), such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between the case of a vice mayor and a member of the house. The vice mayor succeeds by operation of law. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can set it. On the other hand, a representative is elected to fill the vacancy and in a real sense serves a term for which he was elected. That is why his service of an unexpired term is correctly counted as his first term.

SOCRATES V. COMELEC – The prohibited election refers only to the next regular election for the same office. A recall election (even if subsequent to the third term), is not covered by the prohibition. The prohibited election refers only to an immediate re-election, not to a subsequent one.

A recall election is an interruption in the continuity of service, not because of voluntary renunciation, but because of legal prohibition. The term is not a seamless continuation of the three previous terms. An involuntary interruption occurred which broke the continuity of service. The Constitution does not require that the interruption should be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that any interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service.

MONTEBON V. COMELEC – Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. The Local Government Code provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the high ranking Sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. The assumption of a councilor as vice mayor can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of office because it was by operation of law.

ALDOVINO V. COMELEC – Preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. It is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term. Term limitation is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in office without any break. Interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.

A preventive suspension is not a term interruption since the suspended official continues to stay in office although barred from exercising the functions of the office within the period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent


P a g e | 17replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Preventive suspension, by its very nature is the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office.

SEC. 10TAN V. COMELEC – The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration on the boundaries of the parent province and the adverse economic effects it might suffer justify the participation of the inhabitants of the parent province in the plebiscite. It is inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is divided or its boundary substantially altered, only some and not all the voters in the whole unit suffers dismemberment or substantial alteration of its boundary affected.

In the absence of factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province, there is no justification for holding another plebiscite.

LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC – The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law. The intention of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of political subdivisions follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code which does not contain any exemption from the income requirement. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law.

The criteria (land area, population and income) must be strictly followed because such criteria are material in determining the “just share” of LGUs in national taxes. The criteria in creating LGUs must be uniform and non-discriminatory; otherwise, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes.

SEMA V. COMELEC – The creation of any of the four LGUs (province, city, municipality, barangay) must comply with the following conditions: (1) the creation must follow the criteria fixed under the Local Government Code; (2) such creation must not conflict with the Constitution; (3) there must be a plebiscite for the units affected.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter since the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

The allowable number of membership of the House of Representatives can be increased and new districts can be created only through a national law passed by Congress. A regional or local legislative body cannot create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. The creation of ARMM and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. The Regional Assembly’s power extends only to its regional territory. To allow the Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside its territorial jurisdiction.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOP – The concept of association is not recognized under the Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship with the national government. The concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government.

It also implies the recognition of the Bangsamoro Juridical entity as a state. The entity is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention (government, capacity to enter into relations with other states, defined territory and permanent population). The Constitution does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine state, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine territory for independence.

Assuming arguendo that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand Art. X, §20. The mere passage of a new law pursuant to §20 ¶9 would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the said entity the powers found in the MOA-AD must comply with the other provisions of the Constitution (i.e. a law may not be passed granting the entity treaty-making powers since only the President has that power).

ARTICLE XI• ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS •

SEC. 3ROMULO V. YNIGUEZ – The dismissal by the Batasan of the impeachment complaint is an exercise of legislative powers. Neither can the Supreme Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct impeachment proceedings.

The provision in the Constitution requiring the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of all members for conviction is not violated by the provision in the Rules of Procedure authorizing the dismissal of the petition by a majority vote of the Batasan since with such number of votes, it is obvious that the 2/3 vote necessary for conviction can no longer be obtained.

Also, the provision in the Constitution providing that an impeachment complaint may be initiated by a vote of 1/5 of the members is not violated by the provision in the Rules of Procedure authorizing the dismissal of


P a g e | 18IN RE: GONZALES – A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him cannot be charged with disbarment during his incumbency. He cannot be changed criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or are other court, with any offense which carries with it the penalty of removal from office. Members of the Supreme Court are removed only by impeachment. They are not entitled to immunity from liability. They must first be removed, via the constitutional route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (including disbarment), for any wrong.

FRANCISCO V. HR – The House has exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment, no other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be followed to arrive at a conclusion.

The impeachment proceeding takes place not in the Senate but in the House, and consists of several steps: (1) Filing of a verified complaint by either Member of the House, or by a private citizen (endorsed by any Member of the House)(2) Processing of the complaint by the proper committee of Justice (may reject or uphold the complaint)(3) Forwarding of the resolution to the house for further processing (whatever the action of the committee)(4) Similar processing of the complaint by the whole House which either affirms or overrides the decision of the Committee, by a vote of 1/3 of all the members (if at least 1/3 of the members upholds the complaint, the Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate)

The impeachment proceeding is not initiated: (1) When the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding which is the trial. (2) When the House deliberates on the resolution on to it by the Committee because something prior to that has already been done.

The proceeding is initiated or begins when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. The one year ban simply means that no second verified complaint may be accepted or referred to the Committee on Justice for action more than once within the period of one year.

ESTRADA V. DESIERTO – When impeachment proceedings have become moot and academic due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal cases may now be filed against him. Since the impeachment court was now functus officio, it would be unreasonable to demand that he be first impeached then convicted before he may be criminally prosecuted. The judgment in an impeachment case extends only to the removal from office and disqualification to hold any other office. A conviction in the impeachment court is not a condition sine qua non for criminal prosecution. Presidents are immune from suit during their period of incumbency and tenure, but not beyond.

SEC. 7ZALDIVAR V. SANDIGANBAYAN – It is the Ombudsman that has the duty to investigate on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of a public official when such appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) is without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. The Special Prosecutor is merely a subordinate of the Ombudsman, and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the Ombudsman’s authority and instruction.

MACALINO V. SANDIGANBAYAN – The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as co-principal, accomplice, or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

ARTICLE XII• NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY •

SEC. 2LA BUGAL V. RAMOS – Agreements “involving either technical or financial assistance” does not indicate the intent to exclude other modes of assistance. There is no hint of desire in the Constitution to prohibit foreign involvement in the management or operation of mining activities, or to eradicate service contracts. By specifying such agreements involving assistance, the framers necessarily gave implied assent to everything that these agreements entailed or that could reasonably be deemed necessary to make them tenable and effective.The framers discussed agreements involving technical or financial assistance in the same sense as service contracts and used the terms interchangeably. They were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors, but with safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm established which reserves or limits to Filipino citizens and corporations at least 60% owned by such citizens the exploration, development and the utilization of mineral or petroleum resources (Art. XII §2 ¶1).

Such new service contracts are between foreign corporations acting as contractors (providing capital, technology and technical know-how and managerial expertise in the creation and operation of the large-scale mining/extractive enterprise) and the government as principal or owner (actively exercising full control and supervision).

“Full control and supervision” does not mean that the State controls and supervises everything down to the smallest details and makes all required actions, since this would render impossible the legitimate exercise of the contractor of a reasonable degree of management prerogative in authority. Control must be taken to mean a degree of control sufficient to enable the State to regulate the conduct of affairs and restrain activities deemed not desirable or beneficial.


P a g e | 19The Constitution did not intend to fix an iron-clad rule of 60% share, applicable to all situations, regardless of circumstances. To avoid compromising the State’s full control and supervision over the exploitation of mineral resources, there must be no attempt to impose a “minimum 60%” rule. It is sufficient that the State has the power and means, should it so decide, to get a 60% share (or greater) and it is not necessary that the State does so in every case.

SEC. 5CRUZ V. SENR – Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain. The Regalian Theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

A distinction must be made between ownership of land under native title and ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of owner since time immemorial. It is not acquired from the State, there has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. Ownership by acquisitive prescription involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from State to a private person.

“Private but community property” is merely descriptive of the indigenous people’s concept of ownership. It does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous.

In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources in Art. XII §2 ¶1, the Constitution itself states in ¶3 that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. Through the imposition

of certain requirement and conditions for the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources under existing laws, the State retains full control over such activities, whether done on small-scale basis or otherwise.

SEC. 10MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS – §10 is self executing, it is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws for its enforcement. When the Constitution mandates that the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the Sate shall give preference to Filipinos, it just simply means that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.

The patrimony of the nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to natural resources but also the cultural heritage of our race.

§10 embodies the so-called Filipino First Policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges, and rights covering national patrimony.

SEC. 11TELEBAP V. COMELEC – All broadcasting whether by radio or by television stations is licensed by the government. A franchise or any right granted shall be subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by Congress when the common good so requires. The amendment of a franchise is not a taking of property without just compensation. Broadcasting companies do not own the airwaves and frequencies; they are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. As a privilege, it may be reasonably burdened with the performance by the grantee of some public service.

SEC. 12TAÑADA v. Angara – While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the

bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

The GATT itself has provided build-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these measures.

SEC. 16LIBAN V. GORDON – The essential elements of a GOCC are ownership and control by the government. A law creating a private corporation with a special charter is unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law.

A GOCC must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members must be government officials holding such membership by appointment or designation by the government. It will not suffice that the GOCC was created by a special law.

SEC. 19TATAD V. SOE – The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade and unfair competition, as well as the regulation of unmitigated monopolies. In a competitive economy, the market system relies on the consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on competition, among procedures to determine who will manufacture it. It requires the presence of not one, not just a few, but several players.


P a g e | 20ARTICLE XVII

• AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS •

SEC. 1LAMBINO V. COMELEC – The two essential elements of an initiative are: (1) the people must sign the entire proposal and (2) the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such proposal in a petition.

An initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment and not to revision. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks and balance.

SEC. 4GONZALES V. COMELEC – The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. When exercising the same, Senators and Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state. They are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself.

There is nothing in the Constitution indicating that amendments thereto must be ratified in a special election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

TOLENTINO V. COMELEC – The Courts may review the validity of an act of the Constitutional Convention, proposing a particular amendment to the Constitution. Once convened, the Constitutional Convention became endowed with extraordinary powers generally beyond the control of any department of the existing government. Nevertheless, such powers are coextensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called for and that the amendments it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people. It necessarily follows that the acts of the convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds.

The Constitution states “such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.” Either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purposes may propose amendments to the Constitution, thus there is no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. However, there can be no multiple or piecemeal plebiscites, but only “an election.”


jimenez calida political law review doctrines (arts.2, 6-12,17)

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