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Karolinen Adam Ludvig Lewenhaupt

Hans Krigsföring I Kurland och Litauen 1703-1708 I

1703-1704 by

Hugo E. Uddgren, Uddevalla 1919

The Battle of Jacobstadt 26th July 1704

(Translated by Dan Schorr) This translation is intended for private use.

No publication or sale is allowed (Translation © 2006 Dan Schorr)

The little town of Jacobstadt is located on the left bank of the Düna River in a distinctly flat plain-type of terrain. The plain, which is bordered in the west by the so-called Upper Courland hilly landscape, has along the Düna’s long drainage area a length of 80 to 100 kilometers and in line with Jacobstadt a width in direction east-west of around 10 to 15 kilometers. It is made up of an earlier sea bottom and contains within it marshland and sandy plains. West of the town the terrain is relatively open to view, one can dimly see for instance the cut at Pljausche. In the south and southwest, on the other hand, the view is obstructed by the vast wooded areas that begin here. The importance of the terrain details of the region nearest Jacobstadt will clearly be pointed out in the following description of the battle. The town is located on the edge of a smaller sandy plain that is bordered on the east and north by the Düna’s 300 meter-wide main channel and its branch, which 1,500 meters from the town makes a bow to the west enclosing the large Holmhofön. This branch, which here has an average width of 30-40 meters, is called “die Sacke” by the local inhabitants. In the west, 8 kilometers from Jacobstadt begin extensive marshland and in the south 3 to 4 kilometers from the town the already mention, partly marshy wooded areas. The sandy terrain is passed through in the direction south – north of the two streams, Pelit and Sussei that both empty into “die Sacke”. Of these, the former in its lower course is about 15 meters wide, and in its last 500 meters nearest its mouth cannot be waded. Three main roads head off from Jacobstadt, one in a westerly direction over Makne, Rudsit and Pljausche towards Friedrichstadt (Neustädtchen), one in a southerly direction over the Pelit to Buschhof and one in a southeasterly direction and the river bank towards Dünaburg. The first named road, which for this account is of the greatest interest, passes over the Pelit 500 meters from Makne on a stone bridge, which was probably not there at this time when Lewenhaupt fought his battle with Wisniowiecki in this area. The crossing of this stream happened, judging by everything, 1,000 meters south of the bridge where at

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that time there was an easy-to-cross ford, and where today a smaller road leads from the main road. Concerning the terrain covering, it is not possible to determine its extent and character 200 years ago. The triangular patch of woods, which is located immediately southwest of Jacobstadt on the 1913 map sketch, is, however, on older special maps, and judging by what the local inhabitants say, is the fruit of the cultivation of woods in the last 50 years. However, in relation to the battle it is clear at the same time that this terrain was not completely open. Faber’s illustration indicates that the battle was fought immediately to the west of Jacobstadt, between the town and Holmhofön. This is confirmed by available reports and relations concerning the battle, which unequivocally show, that Lewenhaupt’s and Sapieha’s troops formed their final deployment immediately after crossing the Pelit Stream and less than a contemporary cannon shot distance from the stream struck their opponents…. The Swedish troops who took part in the Battle of Jacobstadt totaled in all 3,080 men including officers, and the various arms amounted to the following: 1,597 infantry, 1,406 cavalry and dragoons, and 77 artillerymen. It is not possible in a definitive way to give the strength of the different regimental contingents. A comparison of the strength reports that are preserved concerning the standing troops in the field, however, provides some direction in answering this question. The results of the comparison are presented in the following table in which the contingent’s commander is given in parenthesis.

Infantry Hälsinge regemente (K.v. Brüchner) ……………........................................300 – 400 men Upplands, Västmanlands och Dalarnas (consolidated with Södermanlands och Östrgöta) tremänningsregemente (J. Von Mentzer)..... ca. 200 men Smålands tremänningsregemente (Törner).............................................................100 men Finska (Åboläns) tremänningsregemente (G.G. Lode)...........................................100 men Närkes och Värmlands tremänningsregemente (J.K. Sass)....................................150 men B.O. Stakelbergs detachement Rigas garnison..................................................ca. 400 men K.F. Meijerfelts detachement.............................................................................ca. 300men

Cavalry and Dragoons

Åbo-Björneborgs läns kavalleri (H.J. Schauman)...........................................600-700 men Upplands ståndsdragoner (A. Wennerstedt)...........................................................240 men K. Schreiterfeldts och W.W. von Laurentsens dragoon units.................................300 men Södra Skånska kavalleriet (v. Tiesenhausen)......................................................ca. 50 men Svenska Adelsfanan.............................................................................................ca. 50 men Nylands och Tavastahus kavalleri.....................................................................ca. 125 men

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Estniska Adelsfanan..........................................................................................ca. 25 men Artillery...................................................................................................................77 men Participating on the Swedish was Sapieha with between 2,000 and 3,000 [Lithuanian] troops of which around 100 were infantry. In overall command on the Swedish side was Major General Lewenhaupt assisted by Colonels Stackelberg and Wennerstedt, and Kasimir Sapieha with Zawiscza leading the Lithuanian troops. The division of command, which in the last moment before the battle began was altered, will be explained in the description of the battle itself. Concerning the strength proportions on the Russian-Lithuanian side, details vary. The strength of Major General Korsak’s Corps, which already at the beginning of June was marching towards Courland, in Russian sources is given as 5,000 men*. In reliable Swedish sources, however, Korsak’s troops advancing from Russia are given as only 3,500 men, together the total sum of all the Russian troops participating in the battle, also including the previous garrison of Birsen, they amount to 5,000 men, and much speaks to the fact that these figures are truthful. The main part of Korsak’s Corps consisted of infantry, but at least a Russian dragoon regiment ought to have been part of it. Wisniowiecki’s and Oginski’s troops are reported universally in contemporary Swedish sources as amounting to between 10,000 and 12,000 men, of which a few were infantry. No confirming numbers from Lithuanian sources have been found. According to reports on the trophies taken by the Swedes in the battle, the artillery consisted of at least 23 pieces. The overall commander was Prince Michael Wisniowiecki with Starost Oginiski and Russian Major General Korsak, former commander in Smolensk, as subordinates.

* * * * * Even after his arrival at Selburg on 25th July, Lewenhaupt show that he was determined to quickly complete the operations by aiming at forcing his opponents to the showdown. They tried to avoid this by the lifting of the siege, and he made this decision despite the

* Translator Note Korsack’s Corps consisted of the following units:

- Reitar Regiment Grigori Rydvanski (old-styled, pre-Petrine unit from Smolensk) - Dragoon Regiment Samoilo Stankevich (old-styled, pre-Petrine unit) - Dragoon Regiment Grigori Sukhotin - Streltzy Regiment Yuri Nechaev - Streltzy Regiment Mikhail Protopopov

Information provided by Vlad Velikanov from Russian sources.

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fact that the Lithuanian announced the arrival of Korsak’s Russian Corps with a salute that same day and the following morning. In his account, Lewenhaupt states that the same day as his arrival at Selburg his intention was already to continue the march to Jacobstadt, where his infantry would be mounted on the train’s draught horses. Sapieha at first accepted this, however, when his men refused to accept the idea of giving up their horses, he withdrew his promise, and the matter ended. In other sources, however, there is no mention that such a plan was a foot. No matter how it occurred, the departure did not take place before the following day, which was a Wednesday, at 11:00 in the morning. The main reason for the late departure was that the troops needed considerable rest after the exertions of the previous twenty-four hours. Besides, it is said that Lewenhaupt that morning “had to write for the mail”, which he in fact appears to have done, to judge from a note in a report from 26th July that mentions that it was written a half hour before the departure from Selburg. The army set off marching from the left, which is why the advance guard was taken from the foremost marching left flank units and the rear guard from the right. The commander of the advance guard was Lieutenant Colonel Meijerfelt. According to Lewenhaupt’s account, in the beginning the march went through “continuous woods and mountainous roads”, which is in agreement with the actual conditions. They were in the so-called “upper Courland hilly terrain”. Which of the leading roads between Selburg and Jacobstadt, the one over Pljausche and Rudsit or the one over Mister and Sture, that was taken, is not mentioned in contemporary sources. Judging from everything, however, it appears as if the former was used. When one arrived about 10 kilometers from Jacobstadt, a significant reconnaissance result was achieved. A considerable number of them, who during the march found themselves in Lewenhaupt’s “following”, in other words belonged to his staff, rode up on a height near the road, from which there was an unobstructed view all the way to Jacobstadt, where the enemy’s camp could be seen with the naked eye. When the report on this was sent to the commander, the order to halt was given and he hurried up on the height, where he by means of a telescope he had with him was not only able to study the camp but also the intervening terrain. Concerning the latter, Lewenhaupt says that because of the surrounding “tight woods” and “many morasses” “right into a small cannon shot of the enemy’s army” was restricted. As a result, he decided to alter the march order which had been taken in the morning, and put the right flank instead of the left in the lead. Judging from his previously mentioned report of 30th July this appears to have taken place in this manner. The whole army halted and then formed in “a very long line”, in other words formed into line of battle, and then from the right flank with a new advance guard began the advance again. This time demanding maneuver was motivated as explained in Lewenhaupt’s account by the fact that he had to solve a difficult task, which as a result of the enemy’s position immediately behind a pass and the appearance of the terrain in front it was his duty, “that the first element be from the right flank”. This flank consisted of his own, confident troops, who previously had met and won advantages over the enemy, and that the left flank for the most part was made up of garrison troops from Riga, together with cavalry and dragoons from Schlippenbach,

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which “as yet had not faced any enemy”. The commander of the new advance guard was Colonel Berent Otto Stackelberg with the talented Major from Wennerstedt’s Dragoons, Joakim Danckwardt, as second in command. It consisted of 400 men of which 300 were mounted. Whether this regrouping of the march column occurred before the passage of the marshy defiles between Pljausche and Sillen is not mentioned. In Lewenhaupt’s report of 30th July as well as “Umbständliche Relation” it is mentioned that since it was accomplished, “3 large defiles” through which “at the most 20 men wide could defile” were passed. It was pointed out that two of these defiles had “two small streams with mills, not over a cannon shot distance from the enemy’s line”. Without a doubt, this refers to the streams Sussei and Pelit, even if it the statement on the distance from the enemy’s line could only apply to one of them, namely the Pelit. The third pass can be either the defile between Pljuasche and Sillen or the stream crossing at Rudsit. One had, however, not come far forward in the pass terrain before a unit of Lithuanian horsemen appeared in front of the advance guard and threatened to block their way. However, the advance guard was immediately reinforced with so much artillery, as it was possible to move forward quickly on the poor road, and this had the desired effect because the Lithuanians evacuated the pass and withdrew back to Jacobstadt’s immediate vicinity. However, the appearance of enemy horsemen in the fore terrain had such an effect that it caused Lewenhaupt, when they departed, to undertake a time and energy consuming deployment. In spite of this, the hard 20-kilometer stretch of road between Selburg and Jacobstadt was covered in around 6 hours. Around 5:00 in the afternoon, they found themselves in the immediate vicinity of the enemy. One of the Swedish Army’s most difficult tasks that day was the passage of the Pelit Stream, which as mentioned had to occur within shot distance of the enemy artillery and completed in column not more than 20 men wide. It is not to wonder that especially the advance guard, as long as this capability existed, had to secure this passage, in so doing encountering a difficult situation. In different sources, it is also recalled that its cavalry came so close to the enemy that they dared to neither go forward nor back. They faithfully held their position, better off, without being attacked, and so it appears without once being fired on. The crossing place ought to have been 1,000 meters south of ford located at the present day road bridge, which lies so much lower than the part of the sandy plain in front of it, that it was out of sight from the deployed enemy. In addition, Lewenhaupt speaks in his report of 30th July that one in the situation, when the Swedish deployment began, hade a “very thick little woods” between them and the enemy in which the deployment was completed, and which partly ought to have concealed the deployment, and partly masked the stream crossing. In the original order of battle drawn up for the day, with reference to the Swedish troops, the infantry and cavalry units were deployed in alternating fashion along the whole front.

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This arrangement, which was the one used in fighting Eastern European irregular cavalry, was regarded by Lewenhaupt, considering that the deployment would occur in difficult terrain, as unsuitable and changed it in conjunction with the deployment, putting the cavalry on the flanks, where according to Lewenhaupt’s report of 30th July and “Umbständliche Relation” it was divided equally. Opposed to this statement concerning the cavalry’s grouping is that of Colonel Wennerstedt. In a report dated 30th July, which states that on the left flank in the battle he commanded six of the Åbo-Björneborgs läns Cavalry Regiment’s eight companies, 300 men, that is the complete participating strength of Schreiterfeldt’s and von Laurentzen’s dragoons, together with his own Swedish Stånds Dragoons that consisted of 240 men. Subtracting the latter, Wennerstedt’s flank had at least 700 men, and if his statement is correct, he should have had on his flank around 1,000 men of the 1,400 that made up all of Lewenhaupt’s mounted troops. The difference between this statement and the commander-in-chief’s, however, can be explained. As mentioned above, the final advance guard’s 300 cavalrymen were taken from the right flank. Second in command over this force was Major with Wennerstedt’s Dragoons Joakim Danckwardt under Colonel Stackelberg. This indicates that the dragoons from this regiment partly or completely went in the advance guard and as such belonged to the right flank; they were to return there once their task to shield the army’s deployment was accomplished. This answer, as we shall see, is not completely true, in that Lewenhaupt came to dispose them in another task, especially in the final phase of the battle, that is the showdown with the Russian infantry, coinciding with the left cavalry flank’s, as a result Danckwardt and his troops could very well have come under Wennerstedt’s leadership. In this way, at the beginning of the battle, as the sources indicate, half of the disposable cavalry and dragoons were on the left flank. Colonel Stackelberg only had around 400 men on the right flank, and 300 men first found themselves in front of the infantry and then about in the middle of the infantry line. Of the infantry, Lieutenant Colonels von Brüchner’s, contingent from Hälsinge Regiment, and von Mentzer’s troops stood furthest to the right and Lieutenant Colonel Meijerfelt’s furthest to the left. Sapieha’s one hundred infantrymen were placed approximately in the middle of the infantry line, and his horsemen were a rear line. The main reason probably was that one saw the need for some troops in reserve, and the small number of Swedes were more than needed in the first line. Another motive for the same measure can possibly understood from the order for the battle, which Lewenhaupt in his account states that he had given the same horsemen namely, “that by no means should come from out of our lines, before the enemy with God’s help was defeated, so that they do not cause any confusion among our troops, but when the enemy was in flight they could go by us after the enemy because they were much faster on horseback they we”. The artillery was placed between the infantry battalions. The division of command was the following. Colonel Stackelberg, who returned from the advance guard, received at his own request command over the right cavalry flank and Colonel Wennerstedt over the left. No special commander appears to have been named over the infantry, so the respective battalion (regimental) commanders were directly under the commander-in-chief.

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Lewenhaupt says, if one can believe his account written several years later, that when the battle line was completed, he allowed a psalm to be sung and thereafter ordered his troops “to advance slowly in line towards the enemy, who stood in order of battle, and before everything our line was to be on guard, so that nothing would get through, either the enemy stood or yielded”. In order to make easier keeping the alignment during the advance through the thickets the pikemen or the right flank were to carry their pikes high, which, however, did not have any better effect than in short order a gap opened approximately in the middle of the infantry line. As this occurred behind the place where Major Danckwardt was still holding with the advance guard cavalry, Lewenhaupt was ready to allow it to fill the gap. Because of the absence of all Russian and Lithuanian relations, one knows little on Wisniowiecki’s deployment and dispositions. The illustration of the battle in Faber shows that his first line was made up of the Russian troops and the second line of Lithuanians. What the grouping otherwise was for that matter, an interesting piece of information was left by Colonel Wennerstedt, who in his report of 30th July mentions that he found the enemy “ in a complete battle order in a very advantageous place arranged having the Düna on one side and half the rear. In addition, if one takes into account the contemporary information that the distance between Wisniowiecki’s line and the crossing point of the Pelit Stream was not over the range of a cannon shot, one can assume that his troops were grouped with their left flank against the Düna, approximately midway between Jacobstadt and the Pelit Stream, and with their front facing west. The battle was begun on the Swedish side when Colonel Stackelberg with his weak right flank, except for 50 men who probably by mistake remained next to the infantry, attacked the enemy’s opposing flank on his own initiative. In “Umbständliche Relation” it is said, “After this began Colonel Stackelberg, who had returned from the advance guard and ranged himself with the right flank of the cavalry, had courageously engaged with the enemy”, which, if one disregards the judgment “courageously”, is a faithful rendering of what Lewenhaupt’s report of 30th July says about the same episode. Various details from the Stackelberg attack do not appear in the sources, but, on the other hand, its results are unmistakable, when in “Umbständliche Relation” it is stated, “the enemy’s left flank began to waver a great deal, and to it came more and more to be drawn to his right flank”. Wennerstedt says on the same subject in his report of the 30th, that the enemy, “during the fighting continually drew from his left to his right flank”. Stackelberg, who while earlier commanding the advance guard had the best opportunity to get an overview of the situation on the enemy’s side, seems to have chosen to encircle the enemy’s left flank by just attacking with his much too small force. Because of the enemy’s deployment, “with the Düna on the side and half of the rear” Wisniowiecki’s line of retreat was behind this flank. Judging by everything, he at least partly succeeded in this. On this, the entire succeeding course of the battle as well as the information in the reliable “Umbständliche Relation” indicates that the opposing enemy flank wavered and withdrew to the north. The only source that provides differing information is Lewenhaupt’s account, which, however, cannot always be relied upon. According to it, Stackelberg, before the attack was begun, would have requested permission to “go loose

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on the enemy” and motivated this with that “otherwise would be too late”, whereupon Lewenhaupt supposedly said, “ I pray you for God’s sake let me advise you. There will be enough time”. However, Stackelberg did not give in. Shortly after the advance began, the commander-in-chief, who was at another part of the battle line, and a moment before had given the order to the advance guard to fill the gap in the infantry line, heard “quite a number of salvos” on the right flank. He hurried there and found that that flank’s cavalry, except for fifty men, had broken from the battle line. What way it had taken he could partly understand, when a few individual horsemen in “a full run” were seen returning over the field in front of the position, and partly by the earlier “quite a number of salvos” heard far out to the right. Stackelberg had, as “the account” correctly reported, “taken the entire right flank of cavalry, left the infantry, and attacked the enemy”. This far the description in “Lewenhaupt’s Account” agrees fairly well with the other sources, which as mentioned is not the case, when in continuation it says, “…but as fast as he (Stackelberg) arrived and began to meet the enemy with the cavalry, as quickly had he to retreat, and I neither saw nor heard anything more of this entire flank that he led, before the enemy by God’s help was completely over thrown and defeated”. The circumstances that Wisniowiecki’s opposing flank in fact fell back to the northern part of the battlefield is explained in Lewenhaupt’s account with the fact that they were drawn there by Sapieha’s horsemen who had appeared in the area and went over to the attack. According to Lewenhaupt’s account, the outflanking attempt by Stackelberg had been a complete fiasco and during the main battle sentenced a considerable part of the few Swedish cavalry to inactivity. Yes, they had not even been able to tie up any appreciable part of the opponent’s force. Judging by everything, this account, as stated, is not in agreement with the facts. The right cavalry flank’s attack had its counterpart even on the left. Here, Sapieha’s second in command, Christoffer Zawiscza, took the initiative and with troops in the left flank’s second line went to the attack against the enemy’s right cavalry flank, which at first was able to overcome and succeeded in breaking through. This attack, however, achieved a bad result, in that the participating troops, who it appears, were met by strong enemy artillery fire, were repulsed and at least partly fell into disorder. Colonel Wennerstedt, commander of the Swedish left cavalry flank, who probably with his own eyes saw Zawiscza’s attack, says that “quite few” of Sapieha’s troops took part in the battle, and that one of “their aristocratic generals at the beginning of the artillery firing turned his back on the enemy along with two hundred men, did not stop before he arrived at 12:00 at night at Neustadt (Neustädtchen) 50 kilometers from Slabodden (Jacobstadt) and from there to Riga with the unpleasant news that our whole army was beaten, as a result of which Riga and Mitau were in great consternation for two days”. However, during this time the army’s attacking main force, Wennerstedt’s cavalry flank, the previous advance guard’s cavalry, the infantry in the center of the Swedish battle line, and the small remainder of the right cavalry flank, which did not follow it, continued their advance. Of the main force it was Wennerstedt’s cavalry flank and the nearby infantry under Meijerfelt that first came under fire. During their advance they hit the

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main strength of Wisniowiecki’s Lithuanian cavalry, who partly because of their pursuit of Zawiscza and partly because of their left flank’s set back, appears at best to have been in the process of leaving the battlefield. That the fighting was quite violent is evident in Wennerstedt’s report, where it says, “… as the enemy’s left flank was drawn to their right and consequently everything was unleashed on our left, so that it was for us quite urgent and a hot bath”. However, it appears the trial of strength between the Lithuanian horsemen on one side and Wennerstedt’s and Meijerfelt’s on the other quickly was over. Then came the turn of the Russian infantry and artillery, who found themselves opposing part of Wennerstedt’s battle line. The combat with these opponents is described by Wennerstedt in this way, “When we with the left flank survived the first salvo, with sword in hand so quickly went loose on them at full speed that they did not have time to load either the pieces or muskets before we threw them over”. “The left flank”, Wennerstedt continues, “maintained itself well and consequently went after the one regiment then the other until darkness separated us”. Judging by everything, the left flank movements were followed along on the right by Meijerfelt’s standing troop units, which were made up of Colonel Stackelberg’s detachment from Riga and Major Sass’ from the Bauske garrison, together with Major Danckwardt’s, formerly the advance guard cavalry, and made a similar effort to that made by that flank. A hint that especially the last unit fulfilled an important mission is in Lewenhaupt’s remarks that this cavalry put in the gap in the infantry center “later through God’s help had an overpowering good effect”. The Wennerstedt Dragoons, which as said ought to have been part of the advance guard, is described as overthrowing two Russian infantry regiments. Even the artillery that was deployed along the whole infantry front intervened in short order in the fighting, and is described as creating large gaps in the ranks of the Russian troops with their fire. Furthest out on the infantry’s right flank stood the infantry taken from Mitau’s and Libau’s garrisons under Lieutenant Colonels von Brüchner and von Mentzer. Lewenhaupt was also located here, and personally led this infantry in the later attacks. According to what was reported, they arrived, delayed by the march through the “thick woods”, later than their comrades in the other parts of the battle line already in contact with the enemy. Seeing the fighting further north well underway, while they themselves were delayed in entering the fight, these units began to become impatient, and their impatience increased the more when Lewenhaupt in accordance with the practice in the Swedish Army tried to prevent opening fire before one was close to the enemy. Full of fighting zeal, Mentzer’s and Brüchner’s troops began “in full run and with their weapons in front of them to rush the enemy, who even fired, so that I”, says Lewenhaupt, “had the greatest difficulty in the world to hold them in their lines”. “The effect”, it is further stated in “Umbständliche Relation” of these hardy attacks was so desirable and emphatic that the enemy finally lost all composure, and began from all sides took to head over heels flight, and sought their salvation with their feet”. Lewenhaupt’s account gives another description of the same fight, which without contradicting what is said in other contemporary sources, gives us a more vivid picture of its course. “Our left flank had

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already begun to drive the enemy in earnest, and we came as far on the field as the thicket, where it as well as the remaining enemy could be seen, that the infantry of our right flank began to be impatient, saying: it is a dishonor that we have not fired, let us run at the enemy, to which I answered: No, dear children, you should not run, but keep your order and attack him, be calm, I will in good time help you on the way. The two Muscovite regiments of foot, which stood in front of us, had, however, seen so much of our left flank that had even reached them, that I scarcely believed it would be worse for us, who came at them frontally, so much less that we had the woods and the setting sun in our back, which shined directly into their faces. They turned completely away from us, and as they stood 6 men deep in files and ranks gave a general salvo on our left flank, which was well over 500 or 600 paces away from them, and therefore could cause little damage. As soon as I saw this, I said: Now we have won with Jesus’ help, give fire and run on to them. This was barely said, before it happened with a general salvo from our right flank, so that we because of the muskets and our pieces, which likewise played on them, at first we absolutely could not see, but a short while thereafter, when the smoke had lifted, we saw on the place, where they had stood, filled with dead and wounded bodies, flags, weapons and quite a number of nice metal pieces, but as far as we could see not one individual of the enemy was in a position to defend himself”. In Petre’s journal it is mentioned that Lewenhaupt, when he the next day thanked his troops, turned to the contingent from the Hälsinge Regiment, which under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Brüchner took part in the right flank’s attack, with the following words, “I have next to God, you to thank that I remain a Major General, imagine even that I also this time by means of your help and bravery, through which I won this victory, learned was reprieved with Lieutenant General responsibility”. Even if these words, assuming that Petre correctly repeated the, imply a certain underestimation of the efforts that was made to the winning of victory by the other Swedish troops participating in the battle, one can give proper credit in that Lewenhaupt’s personally led infantry attack was definitively bound the victory with the Swedish flag and represented the battle’s climax. The Russian troops, judging by everything were particularly poorly support by the Lithuanians, as mentioned, completely disintegrated. Of Major General Korsack’s fleeing infantry, 200 to 300 men sought safety in a quickly arranged wagon fort in the woods to the south or southeast of Jacobstadt. Lewenhaupt, who considered that an assault on it, especially now that night had fallen, would cost more than to take it was worth, was satisfied with allowing 8 small mortars to be brought forward, with which the defenders, who, however, under cover of darkness later escaped, were to be brought under grenade fire. Of the Russian dragoons who had taken part in the battle, a few appeared after the end of the battle in the rear of the Swedish Army without, however, attacking. They were quickly enough chased away when they were seen by the proper authorities. During this time pursuit of the fleeing army was on going. Primarily, it was Sapieha’s light cavalry who hunted after the enemy 20 kilometers from the battlefield. But even the Swedish cavalry did its part, since it concern reaping the greatest possible result from the hard won victory. There is nothing in contemporary sources from the battle, which indicate that Lewenhaupt intervened to hinder this activity. What limited the pursuit

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activity was the coming darkness, the battle had lasted 1 ½ hours and the time was approximately 8:00 in the evening before the pursuit could begin. The of the pursuit was, however, that the enemy’s entire train, around 2,000 wagons, in addition to a few prisoners, fell into the pursuer’s hands. The losses on the Swedish side were 2 officers, 3 noncommissioned officers and 52 men dead, 8 officers, 6 noncommissioned officers and 167 men wounded. Reliable information concerning the losses for the others participating in the battle is lacking. However, one can believe that the 2,300 dead opponents of the Swedes were collected and buried on the battlefield. It is mentioned that there were even a few who drowned, which probably occurred because at the beginning of the battle Wisniowiecki’s and Korsak’s troops had the Düna partly in their rear, and as the battle progressed, they were pressed further against the river. In addition, taking into consideration that the number of wounded must have been in a certain proportion to the dead, one can assume with good reason that the losses of the defeated were considerable, and that the Russian infantry, who were principally thrash by them, were particularly roughly treated. Concerning the number of prisoners, information is lacking in the Lewenhaupt sources. Others speak of 230 and 287. The war booty taken was considerable. Besides the enemy train, which before it was taken in charge, was partly plundered by Sapieha’s horsemen, 23 cannon were taken, of which two that had previously belonged to Sapieha were returned to him, 2, 12-pounders, 1, 10-pounder, 2, 6-pounders, etc., 23 barrels of powder and close to 8,000 hand grenades, together with 305 muskets were collected. Solely from the participating Russian regiments, 6 large and 11 smaller flags, together with 4 dragoon standards were taken, to which was added 13 infantry flags and 7 standards that belonged to Lithuanian units.