huss cultural differences and the law of noncontradiction

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY, VOL. 17, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2004

Cultural differences and the Law ofNoncontradiction: some criteria forfurther research

BRIAN HUSS

ABSTRACT Recent psychological research on the connection between culture and thought could havedire consequences for the idea that there are objective standards of reasoning and that meaningfulcross-cultural discussion is possible. The problems are particularly acute if research shows that theLaw of Noncontradiction (LNC) is not a universal of folk epistemology. It is extremely difficult toprovide a non-circular justification for the LNC, and yet the LNC seems to act as a basic standardfor reasoning in the West. If non-Western cultures do not believe the LNC holds, then meaningfulcross-cultural discussion and debate will be very difficult, to say the least. In this paper it is arguedthat the distinction between belief and acceptance is important in analyzing cross-cultural studies onthe way people reason. Studies conducted by Richard Nisbett and Kaiping Peng concerningdifferences between East Asians and Westerners are analyzed. The distinction between belief andacceptance is used to demonstrate that the empirical data currently available fail to show that theLNC is not a universal of folk epistemology. A brief proposal for further research is presented.

1. Logical relativism

Recent research done by Richard Nisbett and his colleagues suggests intriguingcultural differences with respect to methods and principles of thought (Nisbett et al.,2001). Some of their conclusions are particularly important because they mightreasonably be thought to entail an unavoidable form of cultural relativism regardingstandards of good reasoning. The very possibility of this form of cultural relativismis bound to be troubling to logicians and scientists alike. For if our foundationalstandards of reasoning are nothing more than cultural and historical byproducts, ifthey are not universal, then perhaps serious questions arise concerning the legiti-macy of those standards [1].

Cultural relativism of this variety might appear to be supported by a series ofstudies conducted by Peng and Nisbett designed to determine whether Chinese andAmerican subjects think differently about contradictions (1999). Their conclusion isthat the two groups do indeed treat contradictions differently. They claim that East

Brian Huss, York University, Department of Philosophy, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, OntarioM3J 1P3, Canada, email: [email protected]

ISSN 0951-5089/print/ISSN 1465-394X/online/04/03037515 2004 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/0951508042000286730

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Asians do not have the same commitment to avoiding the appearance of contradic-tions as do Westerners (Nisbett et al., 2001, p. 9). In what follows, I will first brieflyindicate why a difference between East Asians and Westerners with respect to theirbelief in the Law of Noncontradiction would be important and perhaps worrying.Next I will explain why the distinction between belief and acceptance might beuseful in interpreting the results of cross-cultural studies of the way people reasonand the standards they use. Then I will turn to an analysis of Peng and Nisbettsstudies and conclusions. I argue that although Peng and Nisbett have indeedprovided evidence of interesting cultural-specific habits of thought, there is as yetnot enough evidence to warrant the conclusion that East Asians believe contradic-tions any more or less readily than do Westerners.

Although I question some of their methods and conclusions, I want to make itvery clear from the start that my primary intent is not to offer a criticism of Peng andNisbett. Whereas my concern is with belief in contradictions and the Law ofNoncontradiction, Peng and Nisbett seem to be primarily interested in determiningwhether there are cultural differences in habits of thought, regardless of whetherthose habits of thought are directly related to belief in the Law of Noncontradiction.To a large extent, my issue is not their issue. Insofar as this paper takes the form ofa criticism, it is primarily a criticism of particular ways in which their findings mightbe interpreted. My worry is that it might be tempting to think the Peng and Nisbetthave demonstrated that East Asians believe contradictions to a greater degree ormore frequently than do Westerners. I hope to show, in part by appealing to thedistinction between belief and acceptance, that we lack the evidence needed tojustify this strong conclusion [2]. In so doing, I will try to provide some criteria forfurther research in this area. To this end, I will also attempt to give a very briefsketch of experimental methods that might be used to determine whether there is areal difference between East Asians and Westerners with respect to whether theybelieve the Law of Noncontradiction.

2. Aristotles first principle

Why exactly might cultural differences with respect to belief in the Law of Noncon-tradiction (LNC) be taken to imply a worrying form of logical relativism? For ananswer to this question, let us turn to Aristotle. He is usually credited with being thefirst writer to explicitly state the LNC, and in what follows I will assume hisformulation of it. In the Metaphysics he says that a thing cannot at the same timebe and not be (Bk III, Ch 2, 996b, 2930). But Aristotle goes far beyond sayingmerely that it would be nice if everyone obeyed the LNC in their reasoning. Hethinks that one must adhere to it in order to know anything:

For a principle which every one must have who understands anything thatis, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who knowsanything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidentlythen such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, letus proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time

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belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.(Metaphysics, Bk IV, Ch 3, 1005b, 1520; quoted in Ross, 1941)

Aristotle even goes so far as to say that nobody can consciously and honestly violatethe LNC: [I]t is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to be and not tobe, as some think Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he does not necessarilybelieve (Metaphysics, Bk IV, Ch 3, 1005b, 2324; quoted in Ross, 1941). Since hethinks the LNC is not a hypothesis but rather the most certain of all principles,it is perhaps not surprising that insofar as Aristotle can properly be said to givearguments for the truth of the LNC, those arguments are terribly question begging(see Priest, 1988). But he also seems to give an argument for the claim that anargument in support of the LNC is not needed:

Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they dothrough want of education, for not to know of what things one shoulddemand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want ofeducation. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration ofabsolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that therewould still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which oneshould not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what principlethey maintain to be more self-evident than the present one. (Metaphysics, Bk IV,Ch 4, 1006a, 412; authors emphasis)

The argument begins with the rather obvious claim that not every principle can beproven true and hence that we must begin any line of reasoning with at least one(and presumably a few) unargued-for assumption(s). The italicized portion of thispassage points to the second premise of the argument, which says that the bestcandidate for the unargued-for assumption with which we should begin is noneother than the LNC. Why? Because more than any other principle it is self-evi-dent. Because everyone agrees with it and therefore it is impossible to beg thequestion against someone by assuming the truth of it. So we dont need an argumentthat supports the LNC directly. Because we must bring some unargued-for assump-tions to any discussion, and because of all the possible unargued-for assumptions wemight bring to the table, the LNC is most likely to be believed by all participants,we are stuck with it.

This second premise is susceptible to empirical findings. For if our empiricalfindings suggest that Chinese people, for example, do not typically believe the LNCis true, then apparently it is not self-evident. Apparently it is possible to beg thequestion against someone by assuming its truth. So apparently it is not a principlewe are entitled to merely assume. But if not the LNC, then which principle shouldwe use? Again, it sure seems like we need at least one unargued-for assumption inorder for any meaningful discussion to be possible. And the LNC seems like the bestcandidate for a legitimate unargued-for assumption to a lot of people (a lot ofWesterners, anyway) [3]. But its not a very good candidate at all if a very largepercentage of the worlds population doesnt believe that its true. Matters are evenworse if Westerners use the LNC and similar principles of logic as their unargued-

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for assumptions while East Asians use other assumptions that are incompatible orincommensurable with the LNC. For then East Asians and Westerners are doomedto talk past each other in very problematic ways.

It is worth noting that this worry about logical relativism can be generatedwithout making use of the very questionable premise that disagreement, all by itself,threatens objectivity. Let us assume that the LNC is either true or false, regardlessof how Westerners, East Asians, or all human beings think about it. Let us assumethat there is a fact of the matter with respect to whether the LNC holds. Still, thereis a potential problem and it is not just that different cultures might disagree aboutthe LNC. The problem stems largely from our epistemic position. Aristotle seemedto be well aware of the difficulties associated with providing a justification for theLNC itself, and it seems reasonable to think that there is no way to construct asound argument for the LNC that does not assume its truth from the start. Theassumption that the LNC is true is a fundamental assumption indeed. Likewise, thebelief that the LNC is false seems impossible to support in a non-question beggingway. But presumably we need some fundamental assumptions to act as standards forreasoning and discussion. Furthermore, no matter which assumptions we choose, atleast one of them will be impossible to justify in a non-question begging way, sincejustifications must come to an end somewhere.

Now, if everyone or nearly everyone agrees that the LNC holds, then the factthat we cannot support the LNC is not a huge problem. We can just assume itstruth, use it as a standard, and at the same time acknowledge that we cannot justifyit. We can in effect say, This is our standard because its the one were stuck with.If everyone agrees that the LNC is true, then there is nobody to beg the questionagainst in assuming its truth. If, on the other hand, there is widespread disagreementabout the LNC, it is not a very good candidate for a useful standard of reasoningand discussion. Assuming its truth when there is widespread disagreement involvesbegging the question against a lot of people. In short, if neither the LNC nor itsdenial can be justified, then even if it is an objective fact about the world that theLNC holds, it nonetheless cannot serve as an objective standard for reasoning ordiscussion unless everyone or nearly everyone agrees that it holds.

So it would be nice if there were a universal of folk epistemology and perhapsvery unfortunate if there were no such universal. Aristotle thought there had to bea universal and that it had to be the LNC. He says it is naturally the starting-pointeven for all the other axioms (Metaphysics, Bk IV, Ch 3, 1005b, 3334; quoted inRoss, 1941). But psychological research might show that the LNC is not universallybelieved, or worse yet that there are no universals of folk epistemology in the firstplace. Arguably this second possibility would be bad news for those who like the ideathat there are objective standards for good reasoning. It might also pose a problemfor the view that of course people from different cultures can have meaningfuldiscussions and debates and can always, with enough patience and tolerance, arriveat some kind of understanding on any issue whatever. So let us proceed with thesetwo questions in mind. First, does the evidence gathered thus far from psychologicalstudies suggest that East Asians are not as likely to believe the LNC holds asWesterners? Second, if the evidence does suggest a difference with respect to beliefs


about contradictions, does the available evidence also suggest that there is noprinciple or heuristic to take the LNCs place? In other words, does the evidencealso suggest that there is probably no universal of folk epistemology at all?

3. Belief versus acceptance

Before moving on to a consideration of Peng and Nisbetts findings, it will be helpfulto consider briefly the distinction between belief and acceptance. This distinction istoo often ignored in discussions of epistemology and psychology. At first glance thedistinction might appear to be one with which only pedantic philosophers might beconcerned, but there are important differences between believing a proposition andaccepting it. There are some fairly unproblematic assumptions one might makeabout belief that one could not make about acceptance without thereby committinga category mistake, and vice versa.

One very good explanation of the distinction is provided by L.J. Cohen (1992).Briefly, the distinction Cohen makes is this: to believe that p is to be disposed to feelthat p is true. To accept that p is to deem p true, whether or not one feels it to betrue that p. In part because it is a feeling, belief is involuntary. Acceptance, on theother hand, is an act of the will. Belief is aimed at the truth of the matter.Acceptance may or may not be. Cohen suggests that the best test for determiningwhether you believe that p is to introspect and decide whether you are normallydisposed to feel that p. In order to determine whether you accept that p, you shoulddecide whether you intend to use p as a foundation of your arguments anddeliberations. Accepting p involves, in Cohens words, premissing that p as a basisfor decision (1992, p. 12).

Note that belief that p is neither necessary nor sufficient for acceptance of p. Forexample, a lawyer might for professional reasons accept that his client is innocenteven though he believes his client is guilty. Note too that there is no contradictioninvolved in believing that p and accepting that not-p. Belief and acceptance aredifferent things. For the same reasons that the LNC is not violated when you desirethat p but know that not-p, it isnt violated when you accept that p but believe thatnot-p.

Finally, note that if belief is involuntary then, assuming the ought-implies-canprinciple, it is not possible to believe rightly or wrongly. But because acceptance isvoluntary, it might make sense to say that it is right or wrong, rational or irrational,wise or ill conceived to accept a certain proposition in certain circumstances. Thisfeature of the distinction is particularly important to the current issue. Those whoare inclined to defend the idea that there are objective standards of reasoning mightbe tempted to use the belief/acceptance distinction to dismiss from the outset theclaim that empirical evidence might undermine their view. It may seem fairlyirrelevant, with respect to objective standards, whether members of one culture tendto form beliefs that comply with the LNC and members of another culture formbeliefs that violate the LNC. Beliefs are involuntary, so it is hard to see how onemight reasonably apply standards to belief-formation and revision. To do so wouldbe as pointless as trying to apply standards to peoples urges and deeming some

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urges good and others bad. So proponents of objective reasoning standards mightsay that the standards apply only to what people (voluntarily) accept, not what they(involuntarily) believe. Furthermore, they might add, the LNC is one of theobjective standards. It doesnt matter if the Chinese believe contradictions; the factremains that they shouldnt accept them.

In my view this attempt to dismiss the empirical evidence fails. Its not as ifwhat you believe has nothing at all to do with what you accept. In fact, you usuallyaccept what you believe and believe what you accept. This is especially true whenyour goal is to find out what is the case, i.e. when your goal is to arrive at true beliefs.When the goal of a deliberation is to determine the truth of the matter, you are notvery likely to premise your deliberation with propositions that you accept but do notbelieve. The lawyer who believes his client is guilty does not accept his innocencebecause he is trying to find out the truth. Rather, he accepts his clients innocencebecause he wants to defend his client to the best of his ability, because he wants tomake partner in his firm, because he wants to uphold the rule of law, etc. If his onlygoal were to declare the truth to the jury, he would not accept his clients innocence.Or to use another example, consider how you ought to go about evaluating anargument. In order to determine the arguments validity you might accept itspremises and determine whether the conclusion follows from them. But in order todetermine whether the argument is sound, you must also consider whether youbelieve the premises to be true. You wont be at all inclined to believe the conclusionof an argument merely because its valid. The reason is that belief, unlike accept-ance, is always aimed at truth. And if you dont believe the premises, you wontbelieve the conclusion, even if the argument is valid and even if you accepted thepremises in order to determine the arguments validity.

So, if we are concerned with the possibility of objective standards of reasoningor the possibility of cross-cultural deliberation aimed at truth, it wont do to say thateveryone must accept the LNC even if not everyone believes it. For when the goalis truth, a demand that everyone accept and obey the LNC is going to lacknormative force unless everyone already believes the LNC holds. Suppose youbelieve the LNC holds and I dont. Then for many (or all?) of the arguments youpresent to me to support any of your views, I will be in the position of the personwho appreciates the validity of an argument but rejects one or more of the premises.And if you insist that I accept the LNC, my response is likely to be something likethis: Why should I? We are trying to get at the truth, but I dont think the LNCalways holds. So I see no reason to think that we are going to get any closer to thetruth if I accept the LNC. In fact, we might get further away from it. At this pointit seems you would be obligated to present an argument for the truth of the LNC.But it is exceedingly difficult to give a non-question begging argument for it and youprobably wouldnt be able to produce one that would satisfy me. So, again, yourclaim that I should accept the LNC even though I dont believe it would lacknormative force. Furthermore, unless one of us changes our mind about the LNC,it seems unlikely that we will be able to come to agreement on anything that we donot already agree on.

My claim is that if the empirical findings suggest that the LNC is not very


widely believed, then the implications are bleak both for the idea that the LNC is alegitimate objective standard of reasoning and for the idea that meaningful cross-cul-tural deliberation aimed at the truth is possible. Still, the distinction between beliefand acceptance might lend itself to some happy conclusions nonetheless. Thedistinction cannot be used to dismiss the importance of empirical findings from theoutset, but it might prove invaluable in interpreting the data and determining whatthe empirical findings really are. It is possible that in many of the instances whereEast Asian subjects are said to accept contradictions, they are doing just thatac-cepting contradictions, perhaps for pragmatic reasons. It does not follow that theybelieve any contradictions or that they reject the LNC. Furthermore, if both EastAsians and Westerners believe the LNC holds, if the LNC is universally held ornearly so, and if most or all individual belief webs do not typically violate the LNC,then meaningful EastWest deliberation aimed at the truth is possible and the LNCmight indeed be a very good candidate for an objective standard of reasoning. Ifeveryone believes it, then it seems fair to demand that everyone also accept it, whenthe stated goal is to arrive at true beliefs.

4. Analysis of Peng and Nisbetts studies

In their article Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction, Peng andNisbett claim that The rational foundation of Chinese dialectical thought is quitedifferent from the rational foundation of Western thought (including Westerndialectical thought) (1999, p. 744). They say that Western thought is based in largepart on three principles of Aristotelian logic: the LNC, the Law of Identity (A equalsA), and the Law of Excluded Middle (A is either B or not-B) [4]. Chinese dialecticalthought, on the other hand, is said to be based on three very different principles.One is the Principle of Contradiction (Mao Dun Lu), according to which reality isnot precise or cut-and-dried but is full of contradictions (1999, p. 743). Anotherprinciple is the Principle of Change (Bian Yi Lu). Peng and Nisbett say thataccording to Chinese folk belief, existence is not static but dynamic and change-able (1999, p. 743). The final Chinese principle is the Principle of Relationship orHolism (Zheng He Lu), which says that nothing is isolated and independent, buteverything is connected (1999, p. 743).

Although they say that the foundations of the two schools of thought are quitedifferent, it is unclear whether Peng and Nisbett think that the three Westernprinciples conflict with the three Chinese principles. As they characterize it, theChinese Principle of Contradiction clearly conflicts with the LNC, but it is doubtfulwhether any of the other Chinese principles conflict with any of the Westernprinciples. A great many Western thinkers have advocated the three Westernprinciples and also accepted something very much like the Principle of Change andthe Principle of Holism. And there does not seem to be anything incoherent aboutaccepting all five principles. Peng and Nisbett talk of the contrast between dialec-tical thinking and formal logic (1999, p. 743) so perhaps they think there is a realtension between the set of Western principles and the set of Chinese principles.Whether this is their view or not, it is worth noting that with the exception of the

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LNC and the Chinese Principle of Contradiction, there are no other clear-cut caseswhere any two of the principles conflict [5]. I mention this only because it issometimes easy to fall into the trap of treating two views as incompatible simplybecause they are different. It is extremely important to avoid this trap when ourconcern is to determine which principles people believe and which principles theyreject. If Peng and Nisbett show that Chinese subjects tend to rely more heavily onthe Principle of Change and the Principle of Holism, whereas American subjectstend to rely more on something like the Law of Identity and the Law of ExcludedMiddle, then they have provided us with some intriguing and important findings.Nonetheless, because none of these principles are clearly incompatible with eachother, there is no obvious reason to think that such findings would cast doubt on thepossibility either of the existence of legitimate objective standards for reasoning or ofmeaningful cross-cultural discussion and debate. For this reason I will henceforthfocus on the issue of whether Peng and Nisbetts studies demonstrate a differencebetween Chinese and Americans in how they deal with contradictions.

Peng and Nisbett conducted five studies that they take to demonstrate differ-ences between American and Chinese thought patterns. In the first two studies,subjects were asked to react to dialectical and nondialectical proverbs. Dialecti-cal proverbs were those thought by the experimenters to constitute or implycontradictions, whereas nondialectical proverbs were not thought to imply contra-dictions. In the first study, both Chinese and American subjects were presented withboth Chinese and Western proverbs. In the second study, Yiddish proverbs wereused in order to control for familiarity biases. In both studies subjects were asked toindicate how well they thought they understood each proverb and how well theyliked each proverb. In the first study a statistically significant effect of culture wasfound, such that American participants tended to dislike Chinese proverbs whetherthey were dialectical or not, whereas Chinese subjects rated the Western proverbs asfavorably as the Chinese proverbs [6]. However, in the second study it was foundthat Chinese subjects preferred dialectical Yiddish proverbs more than Americansubjects (no statistically significant difference was found in responses to the nondi-alectical Yiddish proverbs).

Do the results of the second study suggest a difference between the Chinese andAmerican subjects in how they deal with contradictions? The answer is that itdepends on which Yiddish proverbs were counted as dialectical and which weredeemed nondialectical. Peng and Nisbett do not give any examples of the Yiddishproverbs used, but they do mention a couple of Chinese proverbs that they deem tobe contradictory. One is beware of your friends but not your enemies. Thisproverb is said to contradict the very definition of friendship (1999, p. 744).Another proverb deemed dialectical is too humble is half proud, which explicitlycontradicts the very meaning of the word humble (1999, p. 744). As David Hopoints out, proverbs like these are not logical contradictions and certainly do notviolate the LNC (2000, p. 1065). There are many ways to interpret these kinds ofproverbs such that they neither consist of nor imply contradictions. For example,perhaps you should beware of your friends and not your enemies in the sense that itis wise to be careful of those who purport to be your friends because they are in a


good position to harm you (and they might not be true friends), whereas you areprobably already suspicious of those who you think of as enemies and hence thereis less of a need to be more vigilant in dealing with them (the awkwardness of mygloss demonstrates why the original proverb, which may have the appearance of acontradiction, is much better). Too humble is half proud can perhaps be under-stood as the claim that those who pretend to be very humble are in fact overlyprideful. Or, maybe this proverb refers to the same idea Aristotle endorsed withrespect to the virtues, namely, that they are the mean between two extremes, andhence that being too humble is just as bad as being too prideful. Anyway, regardlessof whether these proposed interpretations are right, it is clear that there is no reasonto conclude that those who like dialectical proverbs believe contradictions or rejectthe LNC.

Furthermore, even if subjects understand such proverbs as consisting of orimplying contradictions and even if subjects report that they like the proverbs sounderstood, it does not follow that they believe contradictions or reject the LNC.Here the distinction between belief and acceptance comes into play. It may be usefulto accept something like a contradiction and use it as a heuristic device, even if onedoes not believe that any contradictions are true. It might be helpful to premisethe idea that friends are not friends or the idea that being humble is the same as notbeing humble in order to deal with an ever-changing world in which things are notalways what they seem. Still, even if one adopts such a strategy it doesnt follow thatone believes (deep down) that these premised contradictions really are true. Partic-ularly when dealing with proverbs, it is plausible to think that people might treatthem as if they were true even though they are not believed to be true. This is asmuch the case for Western, nondialectical proverbs such as money is the root of allevil or what goes around comes around as it is for proverbs that are considereddialectical.

Peng and Nisbetts third study was designed to determine whether Chinesesubjects were more likely than American subjects to prefer dialectical resolution ofsocial contradictions (1999, p. 746). Subjects were asked to respond to twoeveryday-life scenarios. One involved value conflicts between mothers and daughtersand another had to do with college students who come to think the value of theircollege education might be outweighed by tests, essays, and the like which tend takethe fun out of learning. Subjects were asked what the mothers and college studentsshould do. Responses were coded as dialectic if they both addressed the issues fromboth sides and involved an attempt to reconcile conflicts through compromise.Responses deemed dialectical tended to reconcile the contradiction (1999,p. 746). A very strong difference was found between Chinese and American re-sponses. Only 26% of American responses were considered dialectical (and 74%nondialectical), whereas 72% of Chinese responses were dialectical (and only 28%nondialectical).

More than any of the other studies conducted by Peng and Nisbett, this oneclearly fails to touch on the issue of whether Chinese subjects are more likely tobelieve contradictions or reject the LNC. And there is no good reason to think thatPeng and Nisbett think otherwise. Still, it is worth pointing out that what they call

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social contradictions are nothing like formal contradictions. To consider bothsides of an issue or to reconcile a conflict is not to believe a contradiction. Its notentirely clear how the characters in the stories might be thought to be dealing withcontradictions at all, unless one understands contradictions so broadly that evensocial conflicts and personal struggles may be called contradictions.

The fourth study dealt with differences in preferences for particular argumentforms. Chinese and American college students were given two types of argumentsfor the same conclusion. The argument types were similar in length and style, exceptthat one type relied on the LNC to yield a conclusion (the logical argument type),while the other type made use of the Principle of Holism (the dialectical argumenttype). Each argument type was used to support the conclusion that Aristotle waswrong to think that heavier objects fall faster than lighter objects, and each type wasalso used in an attempt to prove the existence of God. Results suggested thatChinese participants were more inclined to like and more often persuaded bydialectical arguments than were American participants.

This study is perhaps the most convincing as evidence for the view that Chineseand Americans think differently about contradictions and the LNC specifically. But,again, the devil is in the details. Particularly striking is Peng and Nisbetts use of theFirst Cause Argument as the representative of the logical argument type for theexistence of God. This argument is said to rely on the LNC, and indeed somethingvery much like the LNC is explicitly referred to in the argument that was presentedto subjects. But many formulations of the First Cause Argument involve at least onepremise that comes dangerously close to contradicting the conclusion. One of thepremises usually involves some claim to the effect that nothing can come to bewithout a cause, but the conclusion of the argument is that there must existsomething without a cause. The formulation used by Peng and Nisbett is notunusual in this regard. One of the premises is Whatever exists must have a causeor reason of its existence, since it is absolutely impossible for anything to produceitself or be the cause of its own existence (1999, p. 753). But the conclusion of theargument is that there is a necessarily existent Being who carries the reason of hisexistence in himself (1999, p. 754). If it is absolutely impossible for anything toproduce itself or be the cause of its own existence, then it is hard to see how therecan be a being who carries the reason of his existence in himself, unless contradic-tions are true. Hence it is very questionable to think that American preferences forthis logical argument demonstrate a greater reliance on the LNC. For the logicalargument seems to violate the LNC, or at least might appear to [7].

Moreover, whereas the logical argument for the existence of God might bethought to violate the LNC, the dialectical argument clearly does not [8]. It is aBerkeley-style argument that says that (1) since there must be an ultimate truth,and (2) since this ultimate truth must be known, and (3) since God is the only onein a position to know it, God must exist. When two people look at a cup, forexample, they see it from different perspectives. One sees the handle, perhaps, whilethe other does not. Each individual sees only a part of the cuponly part of thetruth. So there must be God in order to see the whole truth (1999, p. 754).

Regardless of what one might think about this argument, it clearly does not


contain or imply a formal contradiction. Neither does it violate the LNC. Peng andNisbett try to introduce a contradiction in the premises by saying, Whatever existsmust exist in its own time and location and with unique properties. Because of thesefacts, any particular entity would have entities competing with it and contradictingit in terms of viewing the truth (1999, p. 754). The phrase in terms of viewing thetruth qualifies the sense in which there is a contradiction and it is clear that thissense of contradiction is not of the formal variety. As was the case with the proverbstudies, it is rather difficult to see how it is plausible to suppose that there is any kindof contradiction present at all, formal or otherwise. For here it seemscontradiction is used to mean difference.

Similar considerations hold for the dialectical and logical arguments for theclaim that Aristotle was wrong to think that heavier objects fall faster than lighterobjects. While the logical argument does explicitly make use of the LNC, thedialectical argument does not rely on a rejection of the LNC. Neither does it containwithin it any contradictions. It is a holistic argument to the effect that Aristotleignored contextual factors (such as weather conditions), which always exist in thereal world (1999, p. 753).

Let us now return to the distinction between belief and acceptance. Let usassume that this study shows conclusively that American subjects are more inclinedto make use of premises that appeal to the LNC and that Chinese subjects are moreinclined to make use of premises that do not explicitly refer to the LNC. This wouldbe an interesting and important result, to be sure. Still, a difference betweenAmerican and Chinese inclinations to premise arguments with the LNC does notdemonstrate a difference in belief with respect to contradictions. Even if Chineseparticipants premised their arguments with principles that violate the LNC (theydidnt), that would not be enough to show that they believe contradictions or believethe LNC is mistaken. So the LNC remains a viable candidate for a universal ofthought, since it is prima facie plausible to suppose that nearly everyone believes itholds and no empirical evidence to the contrary has yet been found [9].

Peng and Nisbetts fifth and final study involved presenting apparently contra-dictory research findings to Chinese and American participants in order to deter-mine whether there might be cultural differences in dealing with contradictions inscientific matters (1999, p. 748). Unlike the other studies, in which the Chineseparticipants were students at the University of Michigan, the Chinese participants inthis study were students at Beijing University. Brief descriptions of opposing andseemingly incompatible pairs of scientific studies were presented. Here is one of thepairs of studies used (subjects deemed the first study more plausible):

(2A) A sociologist who surveyed college students from 100 universitiesclaimed that there is a high correlation among college female studentsbetween smoking and being skinny. (1999, p. 754)

(2B) A biologist who studied nicotine addiction asserted that heavy dosesof nicotine often lead to becoming overweight. (1999, p. 754)

Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In two of the conditions

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subjects read only one of the studies in each opposing pair. The responses fromthese two conditions were used to determine baseline judgments. In the thirdcondition subjects read both studies in each opposing pair. All subjects were askedto indicate how much they believed each of the statements to be true on a nine-pointscale. Results from the first two conditions suggested that American and Chinesesubjects agreed on which of the studies in each opposing pair was more plausible.But a pronounced cultural difference was found in the third condition. Americansubjects presented with contradictory studies tended to find the more plausiblestudy to be more plausible than those subjects who were not presented with anopposing study. In other words, Americans presented with evidence against aplausible state of affairs actually judged it to be more likely than if they saw nocontradictory evidence (p. 749). In contrast, Chinese subjects in the third con-dition actually found the less plausible study in each pair more plausible than didtheir counterparts in the first two conditions. In other words, Chinese participantspresented with evidence against a rather implausible state of affairs actually judgedit to be more plausible than if they had not seen the evidence (1999, p. 749).

The conclusion Peng and Nisbett draw from this interesting data is ratherquestionable: The results of Study 5 clearly indicate that American and Chineseindividuals can have very different approaches to dealing with contradictory infor-mation (1999, p. 749). The problem with this conclusion is that the scientificstudies presented to subjects were not contradictory. Peng and Nisbett themselvesacknowledge this when they say that the statements contained in the opposing studieswere superficially incompatible but were not true contradictions of one another(1999, p. 748). Given this qualification, it is somewhat difficult to interpret theirconclusion. In a reply to Peng and Nisbett, Shui-fun Chan (2000) points out thatthere is a difference between two contraries (statements that cannot both be true butmay both be false) and contradictories (statements that cannot both be true andcannot both be false). Peng and Nisbetts opposing studies are perhaps contraries ofeach other, but they are not contradictories. So if the concern is whether there is adifference between cultures with respect to believing contradictions or believing thatthe LNC holds, then the results here are not obviously relevant. Note that the resultsof this particular study do not suggest even that American subjects accepted the LNCin their deliberations or that Chinese subjects accepted anything like a contradiction(or even a contrary for that matter). When Chinese subjects lower their estimation ofa plausible view in light of competing evidence, that doesnt show that they reject theLNC or believe any contradictions. Likewise, when American subjects raise theirestimation of a plausible view in light of competing evidence, that is not enough toshow that they are relying on the LNC. Neither is it enough to show that Americansubjects rely too heavily on the LNC or that they have a fear of the appearance ofcontradiction, as Peng and Nisbett claim (1999, p. 751).

5. A proposal for further research

If we want to gather evidence about whether something like the LNC is a universalof folk epistemology, we must develop research methods that test what people


believe, not what they merely accept for pragmatic reasons. This fact makes for amajor obstacle in designing psychological studies, since it is very often possible tointerpret empirical results so that they demonstrate only a difference in acceptance,and not in belief. If our goal is to investigate the possibility of folk epistemologicaluniversals, then we need to develop studies that can get at peoples beliefs directly.Some work has been done to this end. For example, Weinberg et al. (2001, 2003)have conducted studies which suggest that there are statistically significant cross-cul-tural differences with respect to intuitions about what does and does not count asknowledge. Nonetheless, there is a conspicuous lack of evidence regarding cross-cul-tural differences with respect to the basic beliefs, e.g. the belief that the LNCalways holds.

One rather unsophisticated way to try to determine peoples beliefs aboutcontradictions is to simply ask them directly what they think about contradictions.This is the method I propose. There are perhaps many problems with such anapproach, but it might be useful in that it should eliminate any confusion as towhether subjects reports are reports of belief or mere acceptance. For example,researchers could make use of Russells Paradox or the Liars Paradox in order todetermine whether people believe that some contradictions are true. Participantscould be presented with the Liars SentenceThis sentence is false, and thenasked to indicate whether they think the sentence is true, false, both true and false,neither true nor false but meaningful, or meaningless. (Controls of various typesmight be needed. For example, to ensure that participants understand self-referen-tial sentences, they might be asked whether the following sentence is true, false,both, neither, etc.: This sentence is six words long.) Cross-cultural studies ofresponses to the Liars Paradox should be interesting. Might Western respondentssay that the Liars Sentence is false, neither true nor false, or meaningless? MightEast Asian respondents say that it is both true and false? Arguably results from asimple study like this one would shed some light on the issue of whether the LNCis a universal of folk epistemology, and hence whether there might be universals offolk epistemology. For the reasons given at the beginning of this paper, the resultsmight be terribly important.

6. Conclusions

If it is true that the basic standards of reasoning differ from culture to culture, thenit seems we are left with a worrying form of cultural relativism. If the LNC, forexample, is not widely believed, then it seems likely that people will talk past eachother very often. It is difficult to see how those who believe the LNC can havemeaningful discussions with those who do not believe the LNC. For this reason itis important that more research be done to determine whether there are culturaldifferences when it comes to standards of reasoning. This research must be done inaccordance with certain criteria. Specifically, it is important that researchers workingin this area pay attention to the distinction between belief and acceptance. Whethera cross-cultural study demonstrates differences in belief or differences in acceptanceis important in analyzing the results of the study and drawing conclusions from those

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results. For example, widespread differences with respect to what people believemay well support logical relativism whereas differences with respect to mere accept-ance are not very likely to bolster the relativists position. Peng and Nisbetts studiesdo not show that there are cultural differences with respect to belief in the LNC orother basic standards of reasoning. Still, these studies do suggest that people fromdifferent cultures think differently in at least some ways, and the intriguing resultsserve as another reason for why more research should be done.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Kristin Andrews for her comments on earlier drafts of thispaper. I would also like to acknowledge two anonymous reviewers for PhilosophicalPsychology, who also provided very helpful comments.

Notes

[1] The term foundational standards might suggest to some philosophers that here I am assuminga foundationalist framework of epistemic justification. I am not. Or at least I am not assuming thetruth of any theory that epistemologists are likely to label with the term foundationalism. Thefoundational standard I will investigate in this paper is the Law of Noncontradiction. Thisstandard is assumed not only by foundationalists, but also by coherentists and externalists: thevery idea that a belief web ought to be coherent seems to assume that the Law of Noncontradic-tion is true and that it is a legitimate standard. And it seems that reliablists, for example, assumethat if a belief-forming process tends to yield contradictory beliefs, then it is not a reliable processand hence not one that ought to be employed. In short, the mitigated form of foundationalism Iam assuming here is common to the theories of epistemic justification that are most prominent inanalytic philosophy.

[2] For evidence that Peng and Nisbett themselves do not draw this conclusion on the basis of theirfindings, see their reply to objections, and, in particular, where they say that they are concernedwith psychological definitions of contradiction, and that these definitions are not necessarilylogical ones but semantic or interpretive ones (2000, p. 1067). They go on to say, Ourcontention is not that Chinese are illogical but rather that they rely on heuristics for assessingeveryday life events, which prompt them to seek the middle way between extremes and leave themless concerned by apparent contradictions than are Westerners (2000, p. 1067). Given thisqualification, it seems fair to say that Peng and Nisbett do not think their studies establishconclusively that there is a difference between East Asians and Westerners when it comes tobelieving in LNC.

[3] It should be noted that there is an entire branch of logic in the West, called dialetheism, whichconstitutes a denial of the LNC. Unfortunately a fair analysis of dialetheism would take this papertoo far afield. Suffice it to say that dialetheists tend to be professional logicians who accept theview for reasons that may not be part of a folk understanding of the world. If we are concernedwith folk epistemology, it is perhaps unlikely that dialetheism is directly relevant. I say this withsome hesitation, but again any decent consideration of dialetheism and how it relates to thepresent issue would be too lengthy to present here. For more on dialetheism, see Priest (1987,2001).

[4] At one point Peng and Nisbett mischaracterize the Law of Excluded Middle. They say, this lawexpresses the rule that any statement is either true or false; thus, A or B, and not A and B (1999,p. 744). The first part of this gloss is fine, but the example that follows does not have anythingto do with the Law of Excluded Middle. As we will soon see, some of Peng and Nisbetts


conclusions might be thought to rely on similar misapplications of the principles of Aristotelianlogic.

[5] Arguably, even the Principle of Contradiction and Law of Excluded Middle need not be thoughtto be incompatible.

[6] Peng and Nisbett point out that this culture effect may have been due to the fact that the Chinesesubjects were students at the University of Michigan who, perhaps, were self-selected for liking orbecoming used to American culture and its proverbs.

[7] Of course, it might be the case that subjects simply did not detect the appearance of acontradiction in the First Cause Argument. And, again, there is an explicit appeal to the LNC inthe premises of the formulation used by Peng and Nisbett. So one might conclude that the resultsdo indeed suggest a greater reliance on the LNC on the part of American subjects. Still, for thereasons cited this conclusion would be tenuous.

[8] In fact it is easy to come up with a very plausible gloss of Peng and Nisbetts dialectical argumentfor the existence of God, which makes it so that the argument relies on the LNC. I am temptedto present the argument this way, but will resist the temptation, since the premises of theargument presented to subjects in the study do not explicitly refer to or apply the LNC.

[9] There are other candidates for universals. The Principle of Relationship or Holism, which Pengand Nisbett attribute to the Chinese tradition, is another good candidate (after all, it seems thata great many Westerners, and in particular a great many American philosophy undergraduatestudents, believe in what Douglas Adams calls the fundamental interconnectedness of allthings)

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