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French Policy and the Origins of the Scramble for West AfricaAuthor(s): C. W. Newbury and A. S. Kanya-ForstnerSource: The Journal of African History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1969), pp. 253-276Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/179514 .

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Journal of African History, x, 2 (1969), pp. 253-276 253 Printed in Great Britain

FRENCH POLICY AND THE ORIGINS OF

THE SCRAMBLE FOR WEST AFRICA

BY C. W. NEWBURY AND A. S. KANYA-FORSTNER

THE origins of the partition of Africa have been the subject of much debate in recent years. It is generally agreed that the ratification of the de Brazza treaty and a series of French naval and consular initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea sparked off the 'scramble' for West Africa in the winter of i 882-3.1 But the motives for this intensification of French activity and the reasons for its apparent suddenness have yet to be satisfactorily explained. In the

past, the origins of the scramble have been studied as an episode in the

diplomacy of European imperialism. Our aim in this paper is to examine the questions they raise in relation to the dynamics of French expansion. By taking the development of French African policy since the beginning of the nineteenth century as our frame of reference, we hope to show that the initiatives of I882-3 were a less radical departure from previous policies than has hitherto been assumed, and that they had more far-reaching implications than has hitherto been suggested.

I

Considerations of strategy and trade-some would add prestige-governed the African policies of the European powers during the nineteenth century, and France was no exception. To achieve her strategic and commercial objectives in West Africa, she adopted two distinct techniques. On the coast, from the Senegal to the Congo, limited political commitments were the rule. In the early I84os the threat of British expansion did provoke a French response: the fortified posts at Assinie, Grand Bassam and Gabon were built to combat the growth of British influence, to provide stations for the French navy, and to protect French trade. But they were not intended to serve as springboards for expansion inland. Only external sovereignty was claimed over their sites, and direct interference in local African politics was kept to a minimum. By the i86os, moreover, the failure of this politique des points d'appui could no longer be ignored. The comptoirs on the Ivory Coast, poorly situated, weakly defended and unhealthy, were strategically useless; after the reduction of the West African squadron in 848, even the strategic value of Gabon became more notional than real. Nor could official support do much to further trade when French traders had neither the capital, the experience nor the incentive to compete effectively with

1 See R. E. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1961), 166-75; J. D. Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (London, 1963), 278- 315; J. Stengers, 'L'imperialisme colonial de la fin du XIXe siecle: mythe ou realite?', J. Afr. Hist. III (1962), 469-91; H. Brunschwig, 'Les origines du partage de l'Afrique occidentale', J. Afr. Hist. v (1964), 121-5.

17-2



C. W. NEWBURY AND A. S. KANYA-FORSTNER

their British rivals. Indeed, the most successful commercial house, Regis Freres of Marseille, made its profits without the backing of the state. The most lucrative sector of its activity was the palm-oil trade of the Slave Coast, where the firm operated from an abandoned French fort and relied for protection on the rulers of Dahomey, not on the commandants of the West African naval station.2

In Senegal, however, France had more extensive ambitions. After its reoccupation in 1817, the government drafted plans for transforming the scattered French trading-posts along the river into an important plantation colony and authorized a total expenditure of I I,ooo,ooo frs on the scheme.3 From Senegal, too, it hoped to capture the reputedly vast markets of the West African interior; to this end it ordered the construction of an advance post at Bakel and sent many expeditions to explore the goldfields of Bambuk. These policies also ended in failure. The plantations did not prosper; the economic potential of the interior remained untapped, and the government's early optimism soon evaporated. But Paris did not lose interest completely. In 1831, after the abandonment of the plantation experiment, the Ministry of Marine and Colonies was still urging the local administration to improve 'les relations commerciales du Senegal avec l'interieur de l'Afrique, [car] une extension considerable de ces relations [peut] seul donner a la colonie une plus grande importance...'4

What gave Senegalese policy after I840 a new dimension was the French conquest of Algeria. The North African experience of founding empires by military domination, instead of by influence or trade, was quickly translated into West African terms. During the governorship of Bouet-Willaumez, a more determined effort was made to overcome Senegal's chronic lack of

political stability. In 185 the inter-departmental committee on West African trade called on the government to accept the imposition of political supremacy as the essential precondition for the colony's economic development.5 Ducos, Louis Napoleon's Minister of Marine and Colonies, did so. In 1853 the governor of Senegal was ordered to rebuild the fort at Podor, to build a new fort at Medine, and to break the stranglehold of the Moorish

producers over the gum trade. A year later Paris could declare: 'Nous serons toujours prets a mettre la force a l'appui de notre autorite toutes les fois que [les peuples des deux rives] voudront etre plus maitres que nous dans

2 For French commercial and political activity along the West African coast, see B. Schnapper, La politique et le commerce franfais dans le Golfe de Guinee de 1838 d 1871 (Paris, 1961); idem, 'La fin du regime de l'exclusif: le commerce etranger dans les possessions francaises d'Afrique tropicale (1817-1870)', Annales africaines (1959), I64-9; H. Deschamps, 'Quinze ans de Gabon (I839-I853)', Revue franfaise d'histoire d'outre- mer, LII (1965), 92-I26.

3 Memoire du Roi, 18 May 1816 [Instructions to Governor Schmaltz]; Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies [M.M.C. hereafter] to Schmaltz, 31 Dec. 1818, cited in C. Schefer, Instructions generales donnees de 1763 d 1870 aux gouverneurs et ordonnateurs des etablisse- ments franfais en Afrique occidentale, I (Paris, 1921), 230-76, 280 ff.

4 M.M.C. to Governor of Senegal, I5 Apr. 1831, cited ibid. II, 24-5. 5 G. Hardy, La mise en valeur du Senegal de 1817 d 1854 (Paris, 1921), 331-42.

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FRENCH POLICY AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

le reglement des affaires du fleuve depuis Saint-Louis jusqu'aux cataractes de Felou.'

The French advance south from Algeria also opened a new route into the West African interior and increased the government's interest in the coveted Sudanese markets. By 1847 Paris was aiming at nothing less than their exclusive commercial and political control. 'I1 importe au plus haut degre', declared the Minister of Marine, 'que, sur le haut-Senegal, aucune nation europeenne ne se mette en mesure de nous disputer la preponderance et d'entrer en partage de notre influence et des avantages commerciaux que nous cherchons a y developper.'7 By the i850s ministers were talking hopefully of an immense French empire in north-west Africa, embracing both Algeria and Senegal with the fabled city of Tim- buktu as the lynch-pin between the two.8

But this new conception of empire was not as revolutionary as it appeared. As far as the western Sudan was concerned, the policy-makers of the I850S were still informal imperialists. Since the beginning of the century, their objective had been to exploit the riches of the far interior, to open new outlets for French manufacturers, and so to further 'la cause de la civilisation et de l'humanite... qui ne peut etre mieux servie que par les pacifiques conquetes du commerce et de l'industrie'.9 The emphasis on political control evident in their Senegalese policy was absent from their calculations; the peaceful extension of trade and influence was the limit of their

aspirations. They wanted a loose commercial empire, not a political dominion. And they certainly had no intention of creating this empire by force of arms.

Governor Louis Faidherbe of Senegal was the first to grasp the relevance of the Algerian precedent for the western Sudan. His participation in the conquest of North Africa made him a strong partisan of 'une occupation plus serieuse du Senegal. 10 Like the Algerian officers, he saw the problem of security as his chief concern and the destruction of all opposition by superior military force as the most effective solution to it. On the Senegal, he crushed the Moors, annexed Walo, and successfully withstood the

challenge of the Tokolor leader, al-Hajj 'Umar. His approach to the question of the western Sudan was equally vigorous. Rejecting the cautious pacifism of his metropolitan superiors, he called for a military advance beyond Medine, the destruction of the Tokolor empire, and the construction of a

6 M.M.C. to Protet, 4 Jan. 1853; same to same, 14 Dec. 1853, cited in Schefer, Instruc- tions, II, 216-26, 239 ff.; M.M.C. to Faidherbe, 9 Nov. 1854, Section Outre-Mer des Archives Nationales [ANSOM hereafter] Senegal I 41/c.

7 M.M.C. to Baudin, i6 Nov. 1847, cited in Schefer, Instructions, II, i88. 8 M.M.C to Ministre des Affaires Etrangires [M.A.E. hereafter], I8 Sept. 1852,

Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Memoires et Documents [AEMD hereafter] Afrique 46; M.M.C. to Protet, 28 June I854, ANSOM Afrique III 9.

9 M.M.C. to Gov. Sen., I5 Apr. 1831, cited in Schefer, Instructions, II, 24-5. See also Memoire du Roi, x8 May 1816, cited ibid. I, 258: '[II faut] s'attacher a donner a ces peuples une haute opinion de la richesse, de la puissance et surtout de la bonte des Francais.' 10 Faidherbe, Memorandum, I Oct. I858, ANSOM Senegal I 45/a.

255




chain of forts to the Niger. These measures, he confidently predicted, would lay the foundations of an empire which might one day rival Canada or India.1l In 1863 he drew up still more ambitious proposals. France, he now maintained, must establish her undisputed mastery over the 'Senegambian triangle' by occupying Bamako on the Niger and by securing the Gambia in exchange for French possessions on the Guinea Coast. From Bamako, the French could send gunboats to patrol the river as far as Bussa, and then complete their drive into the Sudan by moving upstream from the delta in concert with the British. 'Le Souverain qui... aura conquis la Cochinchine et le Mexique et ouvert l'Isthme de Suez', he proclaimed when asking for his plans to be submitted to the Emperor, 'pourrait ne pas dedaigner de faire naviguer le premier un bateau a vapeur sur le haut Niger et d'arborer les couleurs frangais a Tombouctou.'2

But Faidherbe's dreams were not to be fulfilled. Although the Minister of Marine, Chasseloup-Laubat, admitted the attractiveness of the plan, he doubted whether the Gambia would be worth the sacrifice of Gabon, and he could not see how the Portuguese were to be compensated for their enclave in Guinea. By i864, moreover, France was fully committed in Mexico and Indo-China, and the minister had neither the money nor the enthusiasm for empire-building in West Africa. He approved the mission of Lieutenant Mage to explore the Senegal-Niger valley and to renew contacts with the Tokolor empire; but, for reasons of economy, he vetoed Faidherbe's proposal to build a new fort at Bafoulabe.3 The governor had to accept the decision, and, after he left the colony in i865, talk of Sudanese empires quickly slipped out of the official vocabulary. Rebellion in southern Algeria had already destroyed hopes for a trans-Saharan union. Mage's pessimistic report about the Sudan's commercial prospects, and his warning of possible Tokolor opposition, confirmed the government's decision to proceed no further from Senegal.l4 The disasters of the Franco- Prussian war made any change in the policy of retrenchment materially impossible. In the aftermath of defeat, all the resources of the state had to be devoted to internal reconstruction, and without money there could be no thought of West African expansion. Once more, Senegal was relegated to the status of 'un agregat de comptoirs coloniaux'.15

11 Ibid. 12 Faidherbe to M.M.C., i8 Jan. 1864, ANSOM, Senegal, I 5o/b. Faidherbe's plans

were outlined in L. L. C. Faidherbe, L'avenir du Sahara et du Soudan (Paris, 1863). See also Deliberations du Conseil d'Administration, Io Aug. 1863, ANSOM Senegal III 9/c; Deliberations du Conseil d'Administration, 2I May 1864 (copy), AEMD Afrique 47.

13 M.M.C. to Faidherbe, 24 Dec. I863, 22 June 1864, ANSOM Senegal I 50/c; same to same, 23 July I864 (copy), AEMD Afrique 47.

14 Mage, 'analyse succincte', 2I July 1866; idem, Rapport, n.d., ANSOM Senegal III 9/c. By 1870 the Ministry was seriously considering the abandonment of Medine. Only Governor Valiere's insistence on the strategic and commercial importance of the fort managed to save it. M.M.C. to Valiere, 26 May 1870, ANSOM Senegal I 56/c; Valiere to M.M.C., 14 Aug. 1870, ANSOM Senegal I 56/b.

15 Note sur... [les] colonies francaises, Rapport de la 3e souscommission, 7 Mar. 1871, Archives Nationales [AN hereafter ] C 2874.

256




Developments along the coast followed a similar pattern. For a time in the i86os the rapid growth of the groundnut trade in the Southern Rivers region of Senegal produced more vigorous policies in support of trade, and by I867 forts had been built at Boffa, Boke and Benty.16 On the Slave Coast, too, the British annexation of Lagos led the French to re- consider their politique des points d'appui and to establish a presence at Porto-Novo. But the initiative was short-lived. Porto-Novo was never

properly secured, and in December 1864 Admiral Laffon de Ladebat of the West African Naval Division withdrew its minute garrison. A few months later the Report of the British Parliamentary Select Committee allayed those fears of British expansion which had long provided the main reason for French interest in the area. Chasseloup-Laubat's successor, Admiral

Rigault de Genouilly, was even more conscious of the need for economy. In 1868 he vetoed the reoccupation of Porto-Novo; by I870 he was con-

sidering the evacuation of the Ivory Coast comptoirs in order to save money. The fortunes of war in Europe accelerated the process of disengagement. Garrisons were withdrawn from Assinie, Grand Bassam and Dabou; expenditure on the coast was slashed, and France's West African Naval Division was disbanded, leaving the Southern Rivers with virtually no means of defence against the encroachments of Sierra Leone.17

Yet the significance of these early years must not be underestimated; by the i870s the broad lines of imperial strategy were clear. On the West African coast, the principle of official support for trade had been tentatively established. On the Lower Senegal, the principle of political control as the

corollary to economic activity had been fully applied. French interest in the future of the African interior had been amply demonstrated. Governor Faidherbe had drafted the blueprint for a Sudanese empire on the Algerian model and had thus planted the seeds of French imperialism in West Africa. So far, these seeds had been kept from sprouting by the reluctance of Paris to pay for a genuinely imperialist programme of expansion. In the years after 1876 this reluctance was to be overcome.

II

The first attack upon the government's policies of retrenchment was launched from Saint-Louis. When Louis-Alexandre Briere de l'Isle took office as governor of Senegal in June 1876, he found the colony in the grip of a serious economic depression. The alarming decline in European prices for West African commodities, the abolition of the metropolitan subsidy to the Senegalese budget, and the adoption of an expensive public works programme for Saint-Louis had thrown a heavy strain upon

16 Hargreaves, Prelude, I29-36. 17 Ibid. I1o-20; Schnapper, Politique, 245-62; Valiere to M.M.C., 22 Jan. 1876, cited

in Y. Saint-Martin, 'Une source de l'histoire coloniale du Senegal: les rapports de situation politique (1874-1891)', Revue franfaise d'histoire d'outre-mer, LII (I966), I7I.

257




the local revenues. Forbidden to raise direct taxation, Briere had either to reduce expenditure or to increase revenue from trade. The first course was unpopular with both administrators and traders,18 so Briere energetically pursued the second. In co-operation with the textile interests of Rouen and French India,19 he mounted a frontal assault on the relatively liberal commercial policies which had been in force since the i84os. After 1877 he pressed for the application of differential duties on foreign imports of cloth, barred the Senegal and the Casamance to foreign traders, and levied extra tonnage duties on foreign ships trading between Senegal and the French ports. By I879 he had even secured ministerial approval for the imposition of a comprehensive system of differential tariffs; only the spirited opposition of the Bordeaux and Marseilles Chambers of Commerce and of the newly created conseil-general of Senegal prevented the adoption of an avowedly protectionist commercial regime.20

The extension of Senegalese customs control was an integral part of the governor's commercial policy. In 1877 the new customs regulations were enforced along the Petite Cote south-east of Goree, and steps were taken to check the spread of British influence into the Southern Rivers. After a tour of the area, Briere sent Captain Boileve to reaffirm French sovereignty between the Pongos and the Melacourie and to occupy the island of Kakoutlaye, to which Sierra Leone laid claim. Two years later he occupied the island of Matacong, also claimed by the British, and began to levy customs duties at Benty and Fouricaria.21

The governor tackled the growing problem of political insecurity along the Senegal with the same determination. Less than six months after his arrival he called for military action to restore French ascendancy over the turbulent Muslim populations of the Futa region. When Paris refused to authorize a campaign, he acted on his own initiative and reimposed effective French control over the provinces of Lao, Irlabe and Futa Toro.22 Next, he turned his attention to the Upper Senegal. In January i878, scarcely two months after the Futa campaign, he warned the government about an imminent Tokolor advance and asked for permission to reinforce

18 Benoist d'Azy, Notes sur les droits de douane au Senegal, January I876, ANSOM Senegal IX 2o/a; Maurel et Prom to M.M.C., 31 May I878, Chamber of Commerce, Bordeaux [CCB hereafter].

19 Textile concerns had a particular interest in Senegalese trade because bolts of cloth, ' blue-bafts'-the famous guinees, were one of the principal commodities of exchange.

20 The relevant documents are in ANSOM Senegal IX 21-29; CCB proces-verbaux, I878-80; Chamber of Commerce, Marseille, MA 76-82. For an account of Briere's tariff policies, see C. W. Newbury, 'The protectionist revival in French colonial trade: the case of Senegal', Economic History Review, xxi, no. 2 (I968), 337-348.

21 Briere to M.M.C., 22 July I876, encl. in M.M.C. to M.A.E., I5 Sept. I876, AEMD Afrique 56; Briere to M.M.C., 7 Apr. I877, ANSOM Senegal I 6i/c; M.M.C. to M.A.E., 24 June, 2I July I877, AEMD Afrique 49; M.M.C. to M.A.E., 9 Apr., 26 Apr. 1879, AEMD Afrique 56; Saint-Martin, 'Une source de l'histoire coloniale du Senegal', 217.

22 Briere to M.M.C., 23 Oct. I876, ANSOM Senegal I 6i/c.; M.M.C. to Briere, I6 Nov. I876, ANSOM, Senegal, I 6i/d; Briere to M.M.C., 9 Dec. I876, 7 Oct. I877, ANSOM Senegal I 6I/c.; Saint-Martin, 'Une source de l'histoire coloniale du Senegal', 2o9-I6.

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FRENCH POLICY AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 259

his allies in Khasso, who were at war with Tokolor-dominated Logo.23 This time, Paris approved his plans. In August 1878 French troops stormed Saboucire, the capital of Logo, and thus secured the eastern frontier of Senegal against the threat of a Tokolor invasion.24

Hitherto, Briere had justified his military actions primarily on the ground of security. But the defence of Senegal was not their only purpose; the campaigns in Futa and Khasso were also intended to clear the way for an advance to the Upper Niger. By 1878 Briere, at least, was convinced that the scramble for Africa had begun. British attempts to establish relations with the chiefs of Bondu and with Sultan Ahmadu of Segu, he warned Paris, made it essential for France to resume her penetration inland. To keep the coveted markets of the Western Sudan out of British hands, she had to sweep the Tokolors out of the Upper Senegal, occupy the Senegal-Niger valley, and take Bamako.25 This was Faidherbe's grand African design, now given a contemporary relevance. Like his predecessor, Briere was aiming at

nothing less than a formal empire in the western Sudan. He too planned to extend political control by constructing a line of forts to the Niger; he too believed in the need for a military advance. But the governor's scheme contained one important new element: a modern system of communications. There had been talk of a Senegal-Niger railway since 1875, and in

1878 its leading proponent, the explorer Paul Soleillet, arrived in Senegal to conduct an unofficial survey of the route. Grasping the importance of

rapid communications for the security of his projected empire, Briere

helped to finance Soleillet's mission and urged the adoption of the railway scheme on the government.26

The revival of Faidherbe's Niger plan heralded a major change in French African policy. In I876, Paris had still been firmly committed to a policy of consolidation, economy and peace,27 but Briere soon demonstrated the metropolitan government's inability to control a determined local subordinate who was astute enough to perceive its weaknesses and bold enough to exploit them. No matter how much ministries may have

opposed territorial expansion, they could not permit the establishment of a

foreign presence on the Upper Niger and they dared not ignore reports of

23 Briere to M.M.C., 23 Jan., 5 June 1878, ANSOM Senegal I 6i/c. The governor had long been worried by the growth of Tokolor influence on the Upper Senegal. Briere to M.M.C., 23 Oct. 1876, 22 Aug. 1877, ibid.

24 M.M.C. to ordonnateur Leguay, 3 July I878, ANSOM Senegal I 62/e; Briere to M.M.C., 22 Nov. I878, ANSOM Senegal I 63/a.

25 Briere to M.M.C., 22 Dec. I877 (copy), AEMD Afrique 49; same to same, 23 Jan., 5 June I878, ANSOM Senegal I 6i/c.

26 Same to same, 21 Apr., 5 June 1878, ibid. For the views of Soleillet and for his mission, see P. Soleillet, Avenir de la France en Afrique (Paris, I876); idem, Voyage a Segou, 1878-1879, ed. G. Gravier (Paris, 1887).

27 M.M.C. to Briere, Instructions, 19 July 1876, ANSOM Senegal I 6i/a: 'La France s'efforce, en ce moment, de concentrer ses forces et ses ressources dans le but de reconquerir la situation qu'une guerre malheureuse lui a fait perdre en Europe; elle ne peut s'epandre au dehors, prendre d'engagement onereux, inscrire a son budget des depenses qui reduiraient ses moyens de defense.'




British action there.28 Whatever their scruples about the use of force, they dared not forbid a military advance when the security of existing French possessions was said to be at stake. And even when they prohibited military action, they could not prevent the fait accompli; the Futa campaign had been proof enough of that.

But local initiative was not enough. Briere's plans involved much more than the extension of French influence to the Niger. The construction of a railway through 600 miles of territory, much of it unexplored, entailed a much higher level of expenditure than Paris had so far contemplated. The establishment of the security necessary for railway-building implied a much greater degree of political control than Paris had so far envisaged. If the creation of a West African empire was to become a serious objective of French policy, Paris itself had to make it so.

III

Historians of French expansion generally dispute the emergence of new themes in official thinking about African questions during the late I87os.29 As far as the West African coast is concerned, this interpretation has much to recommend it. The Ministry of Marine and Colonies, and in particular the commanders of the off-shore naval squadrons charged with the defence of French commercial interests, had long been suspicious of the self- interested motives of the coastal traders and had never been anxious to assume major political commitments on their behalf.30 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was equally determined not to allow local differences to complicate its general policy of maintaining good relations with Great Britain. Since the i86os both departments had favoured a comprehensive settlement involving a territorial exchange as the most satisfactory solution to petty West African disputes, and this remained their policy even after the failure of the Gambia negotiations in I876.31 In 1879 Paris sanctioned the advance into the Mellacourie, partly because it restored control over a potential bargaining counter. When Briere's headstrong actions threatened to provoke serious difficulties with the British, the Quai d'Orsay quickly ordered the withdrawal of the Matacong garrison. Although the La Rochelle trader, Verdier, rapidly expanded his commercial interests along the Ivory Coast, the Ministry of Marine gave him no support and made no attempt to reoccupy the comptoirs. The efforts of the Quai d'Orsay to protect French trade on the Slave Coast during the Dahomey blockade of 1876 were half-hearted at best. In 1878 the Ministry of Foreign

28 Director of Colonies to M.A.E., I9 Jan., 22 Mar. 1878, AEMD Afrique 48:' Depuis que les Anglais de Sierra Leone et de la Gambie font des efforts pour nouer des relations avec le Segou.. .notre attention est plus vivement appelee sur nos rapports avec les indigines du Haut-Senegal.' 29 See esp. Hargreaves, Prelude, I98-200.

30 Ibid. 92-3, 112-14; Schnapper, Politique, I95-6. 31 For the Gambia negotiations, see Hargreaves, Prelude, 125-8, 136-44, I51-65,

174-95; R. Catala, 'La question de l'echange de la Gambie britannique contre les comptoirs francais du Golfe de Guinee', Revue d'histoire des colonies, xxxv (1948), 114-37.

260




Affairs did reaffirm French claims to Kotonou, hoping to use it as another item of exchange; but in order to avoid additional friction, it refused to send a garrison or to renew the Porto-Novo protectorate.32

On the Senegal, however, conventional arguments about French policy are much more difficult to sustain. Admittedly, the expansionist cause did not arouse much popular enthusiasm in the immediate aftermath of a military disaster which many blamed on Napoleon's overseas adventures. But colonial expansion was not universally unpopular; the members of the burgeoning geographical societies, some intellectuals and publicists, a few aspiring explorers, and several deputies as well, saw it as the one source of their nation's regeneration.33 Tales of the Sudan's limitless wealth and the old dream of a north-west African empire had obvious attractions for them.34 Their plans to tap this wealth through railways were equally natural in an age when transcontinental railways were opening up the American west, and when there was talk of a Siberian railway to open up the Russian east. With remarkable persistence and energy, the new colonial enthusiasts published brochures, organized lecture tours and financed exploration of the route for a trans-Saharan railway which was to link Algeria with Senegal and so make their imperial dream come true.35 Their efforts were not unrewarded. Adolphe Duponchel's Chemin defer transsaharien became a minor best-seller, and in May I879 Gambetta's young disciple, Paul Bert, proposed a parliamentary vote of 200,000 frs to cover the cost of preliminary surveys. The response of the Chamber could hardly have been more enthusiastic. France, proclaimed the rapporteur of the Budget Commission, Maurice Rouvier:

plus rapprochee du continent africain que la plupart des autres nations, plus directement interessee qu'elles a l'avenir de ce continent par ses possessions de 1'Algerie, du Senegal, du Gabon, et par les nombreux comptoirs fran9ais etablis sur la cote occidentale, la France ne peut se dispenser de prendre part dans le mouvement qui entraine l'Europe vers les regions africaines dont on commence a entrevoir les richesses. Le souci de la grandeur et des interets de notre patrie ne nous commande-t-il pas de nous placer a la tete de ce mouvement?36

Six months later both the Chamber and the Senate eagerly voted an additional 600,000 frs for the scheme.37

32 The developments briefly summarized above are fully discussed in Hargreaves, Prelude, 201-39.

33 The standard works on this subject are A. Murphy, The Ideology of French Imperialism (Washington, 1948); D. V. McKay, 'Colonialism in the French geographical movement', The Geographical Review, xxxII (I943), 214-32. See also H. Brunschwig, Mythes et realites de l'imperialisme colonial francais, 1871-1914 (Paris, I960), 23-8.

34 The deputy from Senegal, for example, estimated the trade of the Western Sudan at 300,000,000 frs a year (Proces-Verbaux de la Commission du Budget, seance du 25 juin i880 (statement by Gasconi), AN C 3176, pp. 740-I.

35 See, Murphy, Ideology, 75-92. 36 Rouvier, Rapport, Io June I879, Journal Official de la Republique Francaise [J.O.

hereafter], Documents Parlementaires, Chambre, no. I497, p. 6328. 37 J.0. Debats Parlementaires, Chambre, seance du 13 decembre I879, p. I1052; ibid.

Senat, seance du i6 decembre I879, pp. 11199-200.

26I




Colonialist propaganda had an effect upon the policy-makers as well. At first, agitation for the trans-Sahara railway had made little impact upon the ministries, and requests for financial assistance were generally rejected.38 But the government was not completely indifferent to the future of the West African interior. In 1877 the Ministry of Public Works gave Dupon- chel a grant of 4,000 frs as a token of its interest in his work, and when the

publication of his report revealed the popularity of his scheme, the minister, Charles de Freycinet, quickly set up a departmental commission to study its feasibility. In July 1879 a full Commission Superieure was convened to

study all aspects of the programme. Parliament's enthusiastic support for the project, Freycinet admitted, was a major factor in his decision to

proceed.39 But this change in official policy was not simply a response to the pres-

sures of public opinion. Freycinet himself was a passionate railway- builder who had already set his heart upon transforming the whole French railway system. Since I877, moreover, his Department had been at work on the reorganization of the Algerian railways, and it was just completing its studies when Duponchel's report was published. For the minister and his staff the trans-Sahara was an extension of a still more ambitious programme of railway-construction.40 More significantly, Freycinet was also a passionate expansionist, determined to regain in the colonial sphere the primacy which France had lost in Europe.41 And in December I879 Freycinet became prime minister. It was his government's duty, he declared on taking office:

de porter ses regards hors des frontieres et d'examiner quelles conquetes pacifiques il pourrait entreprendre. Le ministre des travaux publiques a un des premiers roles a jouer en semblable occurrence. C'est en effet par les voies de communication que la civilisation s'etend et se fixe le plus surement. II faut essayer de rattacher les vastes territoires que baignent le Niger et le Congo.42

Freycinet's intentions were clear enough. So too were those of the Ministry of Marine. In February 1879 Admiral

38 In 1871 Soleillet had urged the Ministry of Public Works to encourage trade between Algeria and Senegal; his letter was not acknowledged, nor did the Ministry of Commerce respond to his trans-Sahara proposals in I875. In 1872 the Ministry of Public Instruction gave the Dournaux-Dupere expedition 2,ooo frs., but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to make any contribution.

39 Jacqmin, Note sur le chemin de fer transsaharien propose par M. Duponchel, 25 Apr. 1879, An F14 12436; idem, Rapport au Ministre des Travaux Publiques, 7 May 1879, An F14 I2438; Freycinet to Perouse, io May i879; Rapport de la commission preliminaire I2 June 1879, AN F14 I2437; Freycinet, Rapport au President de la Re- publique, 12 July 1879, .O. 14 July 1879, pp. 6633-5.

40 C. de Freycinet, Souvenirs, 3rd ed. (Paris, I912-I3), I, 78-9, 8I; II, 7-12. Jacqmin, Rapport au Ministre des Travaux Publiques, 7 May 1879, AN F14 I2438.

41 See W. B. Thorson, 'Charles de Freycinet, French empire-builder', Research Studies of the State College of Washington, xI (I944), 257-82.

42 Freycinet, Rapport au President de la Republique, 31 Dec. I879, .0. 3I Dec. I879, p. 11700.

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Pothuau had been replaced by Admiral Jean Jaureguiberry, a former

governor of Senegal and as ardent an expansionist as Freycinet. Briere's

plans for an advance to the Niger were now assured of a more sympathetic reception; within weeks of taking office Jaureguiberry had committed his ministry to a more energetic Sudanese policy.43 In July Briere was asked for details about the cost of occupying Bafoulabe and building a connecting road to Medine. In September, taking advantage of the parliamentary recess, Jaureguiberry secured a grant of 500oo,ooo000 frs by Presidential decree. When funds ran out, he authorized a further expenditure, again without parliamentary approval.44 Meanwhile, the minister also approved the Senegal-Niger railway project, and his inspecteur-general des travaux maritimes, N. C. Legros, obtained the support of Freycinet's Commission Superieure.45 By July 1879 the Niger railway had become an integral part of the trans-Sahara railway network.

Freycinet and Jaureguiberry, not the geographical societies or the

explorers, were the true architects of the new African policy. The two men were intimate friends and close political allies.4 They shared a common belief in the Sudan's economic potential and a common determination to

exploit it for their nation's benefit. They were convinced that the race for Africa had begun, and that the state, with all the resources at its command, had to make the running. One of them, a technocrat, placed his faith in French technological expertise; the other, a professional soldier, in forts and strategic communications. Together they set out to establish French sway over the major portion of the African interior. In November I879 the Ministry of Public Works sent three missions to explore routes for the trans-Sahara railway; in January I880 the most important of these was given secret orders to aim for Agades and Sokoto in order to open the Fulani empire to French trade and influence.47 In February i880, after months of feverish activity by Legros, Jaureguiberry was ready to submit the Senegal railway project to Parliament. The total cost of the line, from Dakar to Saint-Louis, Medine and the Niger, was estimated at I20,000,000 frs, of which 54,000,000 frs was to be borne directly by the state. In order that work could begin immediately, Jaureguiberry demanded

43 'Proces-Verbaux de la commission preliminaire, seance du 30 mai 1879' (statement by N. C. Legros), AN F14 I2437.

44 Briere to M.M.C., 9 Aug. i879, ANSOM Missions 15, Mousnier 1879; Decree, 25 Sept. I879, J.O. 28 Sept. 1879, p. 9361; Michaux, Note pour le Ministre, 6 Jan. i880, ANSOM Missions 15, Carrey I880. The Commission Superieure had earlier refused to approve any expenditure without Parliamentary authorization.

45 Legros, Note pour le cabinet du Ministre, ii June i879, ANSOM Afrique XII 2; Soleillet to M.M.C., 2I June 1879, ANSOM Senegal XII 36; M.M.C. to Briere, 30 Aug. 1879 (draft), ANSOM Senegal XII 41; Rapport de la 2e souscommission, 27 Oct. 1879, AN F14 12437.

46 Jaureguiberry had served under Freycinet in the Government of National Defence. Freycinet was to recommend him as Minister of Marine to Gambetta in November I88I, and to reappoint him in February 1882.

47 Projet d'instructions complementaires', encl. in Ministry of Public Works to M.A.E., I6 Jan. i880, AEMD Afrique 75.

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an urgent grant of 9,000,000 frs.48 Urged on by the Senegalese administration, influenced by public opinion, but motivated primarily by its own imperial ambitions, the French government had accepted the financial implications of African expansion.

There remained the question of security. The objective of the railway enthusiasts was the traditional one of an informal commercial empire. 'I1 ne s'agit pas de la conquete militaire', Rouvier told the Chamber in June I879, 'mais d'une oeuvre essentiellement pacifique et civilisatrice qui mettrait en communication nos possessions algeriennes avec le bassin du Niger et par la tracerait, au mouvement des echanges entre l'Afrique et l'Europe, une voie essentiellement francaise au grand profit de notre influence et de notre commerce.'49 Freycinet too spoke of 'peaceful conquests', as his predecessors had done fifty years before, and he gave his Saharan missions strict orders to keep the peace.50 But these were not the views of Jaureguiberry. Although he assured Freycinet that his only wish was to 'prendre part au mouvement general qui porte les nations euro-

peennes a penetrer au coeur de l'Afrique pour y ouvrir de nouveaux debouches a leur commerce', his intentions were political rather than economic. The purpose of the railway was to extend French dominion to the Niger; its commercial profitability was a secondary consideration.51

Although he spoke of the railway's absolutely peaceful character and

piously denied any desire to 'accroitre notre situation militaire dans ces contrees', he was ready to achieve his political objectives by military means. By July I879 his ministry was already considering Faidherbe's old

plans for building forts and placing a gunboat on the Niger.52 When the

Budget Commission rejected the railway project and granted only 1,300,000 frs for continued surveys, Jaureguiberry used part of the money to pay for an extra battalion of tirailleurs senegalais and a new fort at Kita, half-way between Bafoulabe and the Niger.53 Finally, in September he

placed the Sudan under military command, appointing Major Gustave

Borgnis-Desbordes as Commandant-Superieur du Haut-Fleuve with full control over all operations on the Upper Senegal.54 This was the crucial decision. By accepting the political and military implications of an advance to the Niger and by entrusting the execution of his policies to military agents, Jaureguiberry had raised the curtain on the era of French imperialism in West Africa.

48 Legros, Note sommaire, 8 Nov. I879, ANSOM Senegal XII 76; idem, 'evaluation des depenses', Io Dec. i879, ANSOM Senegal XII 41/I; Jaureguiberry, Projet de loi, 5 Feb. x880, J.O. Doc. Parl. Chambre, no. 2266, pp. 2028-9.

49 Rouvier, Rapport, io June 1879, J.O. Doc. Parl. Chambre, no. 1497, p. 6328. 50 Freycinet to Flatters, Instructions, 7 Nov. I879, AN F14 12436. 51 Jaureguiberry to Freycinet, 8 Nov. 1879, ANSOM Senegal XII 76/a; Michaux,

Note pour le Ministre, 6 Jan. I88o, ANSOM Missions S5, Carrey I880. 52 Procis-Verbaux de la 2e souscommission, seance du 21 juillet 1879, AN F14 I2437. 53 Jaureguiberry to Briere, 31 July i880, ANSOM Senegal I 63/b; same to same,

4 Aug. i880, ANSOM Senegal I 99/a, Correspondance Generale. 54 Decree, 6 Sept. I880, J.O. 9 Sept. I880, p. 9876.

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IV

Once more the government's extravagant ambitions were quickly dis-

appointed. Entranced by the vision of their railway, Freycinet and his Commission Superieure ignored the practical and political difficulties of an advance south from Algeria. The massacre of the second Flatters expedition in February 1881 brought them sharply to their senses. As the governor-general of Algeria pointed out, any attempt to build the railway before the Sahara had been solidly and permanently occupied was un- thinkable.55 With the French army already committed in Tunisia, a Saharan campaign was quite out of the question, and in June 1881 the trans-Sahara railway project was indefinitely adjourned.56

But the advance east from the Senegal continued. Although the preliminary surveys demanded by Parliament were not carried out, the Cham- bers were nevertheless persuaded to approve the construction of a line to Bafoulabe as essential for the security of the fort. By 1882, I6,000,000 frs had been voted for the work.57 Because of inadequate preparations, financial

mismanagement and natural disasters, railway-construction soon became an expensive farce. But the project did fulfil its most important function; it

provided the funds necessary for military expansion. Only half of the authorized expenditure was actually spent on the railway; the rest was diverted to pay for military fortifications and diplomatic missions. The new forts alone cost not 300,000 frs as originally estimated, but 3,000,000 frs.58

Meanwhile, the military advance generated its own expansive drive. In October 1880 Jaureguiberry's successor, Admiral Cloue, authorized a

punitive expedition into Beledugu, and Briere instructed Desbordes to establish a protectorate over Bamako. However, Desbordes wanted nothing less than the immediate military occupation of the Niger.59 And when the ministry, fearing parliamentary repercussions, forbade any advance past Kita,60 he disregarded his orders and attacked the town of Goubanko, twenty miles beyond. After Briere's recall in March 1881, Desbordes

55 Grevy to M.A.E., 18 May i88i, cited in H. M. P. de la Martiniere and N. Lacroix (eds.), Documents pour servir d l'etude du nord-ouest africain (Lille, 1894-7), III, 24-5: 'Avant de songer a traverser le Sahara par une voie ferree, il faut, avant de ne rien entreprendre, occuper d'une maniere permanente et definitive le Sahara algerien, y placant des postes qui y assurent d'abord la securite.'

56 Rapport de la Commission Superieure, i8 June i88I, AN F14 12437. The views of Grevy were crucial to its decision.

57 J.O. Deb. Parl. Chambre, seance du 24 fevrier x88I,pp. 36I-2; seance du I3 mars I882, pp. 3I2-5.

58 Peyron, Rapport, 31 Dec. I883, J.O. 4 Feb. I884, pp. 585-622. 59 Cloue to Borgnis-Desbordes, Instructions, 4 Oct. i880; Briere to Borgnis-Desbordes,

Instructions, 23 Nov. i880, ANSOM Senegal IV 73/a, Borgnis-Desbordes to Briere, 25 Jan. i88i, ANSOM Senegal IV 73/b.

60 Michaux, Note pour le Ministre, 3 Jan. I88i, ANSOM Senegal I 99/a Corres- pondance Generale; Cloue to Briere, 4 Jan. x88i, ANSOM Senegal I 63/b. Michaux warned the minister that the instructions as they stood contradicted his solemn declara- tions about the peaceful nature of his policy and might seriously compromise his parliamentary position.

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became virtually impossible to control. He now assumed the governor's position as the ministry's chief African expert and principal adviser on Sudanese affairs. Returning to Paris in July I88I, he cajoled the Colonial Department into approving a limited advance beyond Kita.61 And when the outbreak of a yellow-fever epidemic forced Paris to trim its sails, he again disobeyed orders and led a daring offensive across the Niger against the troops of the imam Samori who were besieging the town of Keniera.62 Governor Canard condemned the action, and for a moment the Colonial Department considered dismissing Desbordes. But nothing more was done. Indeed, Canard was the first to admit that the commander's continued presence was essential for the success of the government's plans.63 By 1882 the military factor in Sudanese policy was supreme.

By 1882 the political implications of military expansion had also been faced. Anxious about the possibility of Tokolor opposition to the French advance, Briere had already sent Captain Gallieni to conclude a treaty of friendship and trade with Sultan Ahmadu. But the real purpose of this diplomatic initiative was to lull the Tokolors into a false sense of security until the occupation of the Senegal-Niger valley reduced them to impo- tence.64 Gallieni shared his governor's sentiments.65 So did the Ministry of Marine. The Director of Colonies, Michaux, rejected the treaty of Nango as too favourable to the Tokolors; by October I88I he too was urging the minister to 'adopter franchement une politique anti-toucouleure'.66 Des- bordes did not want negotiations at all. From the start he advocated and prepared for war, accepting this as the inevitable consequence of the French advance. In July I88I he called for the capture of Segu; in January I882 he again urged the immediate occupation of Bamako. His campaign against Samori forced him to co-operate briefly with the Tokolors; but even as he acknowledged the assistance of their fortress at Murgula, he stressed how easily he could have captured it.67

61 Desbordes, Note pour le Ministre, August I88I, cited in Desbordes, Rapport... I88I-2, n.d., ANSOM Missions 50, Borgnis-Desbordes i88I-2; Michaux, Rapport au Ministre, 20 Aug. I88i; Cloud to Desbordes, Instructions, 3 Sept. I88i; Michaux, Note, 25 Dec. I88I, ANSOM Senegal IV 75/a.

62 Canard [Governor of Senegal] to Desbordes, 28 Jan. i882; Desbordes to Canard, ii Feb., 6 Mar. I882; Desbordes, Rapport, 20 Mar. i882, ANSOM Senegal IV 75/b.

63 Canard to Desbordes, I5 Mar. i882, ANSOM Senegal IV 75/b; Canard to M.M.C., 21 Mar. i882, with minute by Berlet (Under-Secretary for Colonies), ANSOM Senegal I 66/b; same to same, I June I882, ANSOM Senegal I 99/a, Correspondance du Gouverneur.

64 Briere's views emerge from confidential notes attached to his draft treaty with Ahmadu, encl. in Briere to Gallieni, i Feb. I88o, ANSOM Missions I6, Gallieni I880.

65 Gallieni, Rapport, 12 Oct. I88I, ANSOM Missions i6, Gallieni i88o; 'Le traite de Nango ne devra vivre que quelques annees; il disparaltra naturellement le jour ofu nous serons effectivement etablis sur le Niger et oiu nous serons maitres du cours du fleuve. En attendant, il nous permet de parer aux entreprises des Anglais et d'endormir les mefiances du Sultan de Segou.'

66 Michaux, Note pour le Ministre, 31 Oct. I88I, ANSOM Senegal III Io bis/b. 67 Desbordes to Briere, 25 Jan. I88I, ANSOM Senegal IV 73/b; Desbordes, Rapport...

I880-I, pp. 507-27, ANSOM Senegal IV 73 bis; Desbordes to Canard, i8 Jan. 1882; Desbordes, Rapport, 20 Mar. i882, ANSOM Senegal IV 75/b.

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With the formation of the second Freycinet government in February 1882, the final advance to the Niger could begin. Jaureguiberry now returned to the Ministry of Marine and again threw the whole weight of his administration behind the Niger plan. Encouraged by Parliament's continued financial support for the railway, he gave notice of 'les intentions formelles du Gouvernement, d'accord avec les Chambres, de donner une impulsion serieuse a l'entreprise du Haut-Fleuve et toute l'extension possible a l'influence frangaise...dans le bassin du Haut-Niger'.68 When Governor Canard refused to co-operate, he was immediately dismissed, and his successor was strictly enjoined to 'apporter dans la poursuite de cette grande entreprise toute l'activite et tout le zele dont vous etes capable'.69 In the summer, Desbordes again returned to France. With the support of Legros and the Director of Colonies, Paul Dislere ( a personal friend of his), he quickly persuaded Jaureguiberry to authorize the immediate occupation of Bamako.70 In February 1883 the commander and his expeditionary column reached the Niger, having taken the fortress of Murgula on the way, and began to fortify Bamako. The first stage in the creation of Faidherbe's West African empire was complete. The second was already in preparation, for in September i882 Jaureguiberry had approved Dislere's plan for launching gunboats to patrol the Niger as far as Timbuktu and beyond.71

The impact of these changes in Sudanese policy was felt on the West African coast as well. Jaureguiberry fully accepted his responsibility for de- fending French interests wherever they were threatened. Although he suspected the patriotism of the traders and despised their avarice, he sympa- thized with their complaints about high British tariffs and specific duties on spirits and arms. He protested forcefully against the sudden extension of of Sierra Leone customs duties to the Scarcies in February 1879; he supported Briere's proposals for differential tariffs, and he adamantly refused to include Senegal or Gabon in any scheme for tariff equalization. By April I880 he no longer considered the Mellacourie open to exchange, and he allowed the Senegal administration to impose its customs regulations there.72 Although he was still prepared to sacrifice Kotonou on the Slave Coast for the Gambia and concessions in the Pacific islands, he demanded firm guarantees of equal treatment for French trade as the

68 Jaureguiberry to Canard, 4 Apr. I882, ANSOM Dossier Administratif, Canard. 69 Jaureguiberry to Vallon, Instructions, I2 May I882, ANSOM Senegal I 67/a. 70 Legros, Note pour la direction des colonies, 17 Aug. 1882, ANSOM Senegal IV

77/a; Dislere, Note pour le Ministre, 30 Aug. I882, ANSOM Senegal I 99/a, Corres- pondance Generale; decision ministerielle, 2I Aug. I882, ANSOM Senegal IV 77/a. See also: Desbordes, Rapport... 1882-3, Cap. I, I6 Feb. I883, ANSOM Missions 50, Borgnis-Desbordes I882-3.

71 Dislere, Rapport au Ministre, 30 Sept. i882 (approuve), ANSOM Senegal IV 77/a. 72 M.M.C. to M.A.E., 9 Apr., 26 Apr., I3 Aug., 4 Nov. 1879, I7 Apr., I July i880,

AEMD Afrique 56; same to same, 4 Sept. I879 (copy), Public Record Office, London, CO 879/17; M.M.C. to Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, I Nov. I879, AN F12 6460. See also C. W. Newbury, 'The tariff factor in Anglo-French West African partition', to be published in W. R. Louis and P. Gifford (eds.), Britain and France in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule.

AH X

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i8




condition for any exchange. The declaration of a British protectorate over Katanu, near Porto-Novo, further stiffened his determination not to permit the extension of Lagos customs control.73

By I88I the Anglo-French entente no longer had much relevance for West Africa. 'Nous avons des rivaux', Jaureguiberry (now out of office) told the Senate in February, 'des rivaux acharnes, qui luttent constam- ment contre l'influence que nous exer;ons deja au Senegal. Ils cherchent a nous contrarier par tous les moyens.'74 Although the Gouldsbury expedition (sent through the Gambia to Timbo by the governor of Sierra Leone) hardly justified such an outburst, it alarmed the government of the day sufficiently to assert French claims to Futa Jallon. 'Le role de la France dans le Soudan septentrional [sic] s'accentue', proclaimed Jean Bayol after the signature of his treaty of I88I, 'nous prenons decidement un pas sur les Anglais.'75 Hopes for an amicable settlement of Anglo-French disputes were

rapidly vanishing. The fall of the Conservative government in April I880 had already destroyed any prospect of a comprehensive territorial exchange; even the more limited demarcation of influence in the Southern Rivers

proved difficult enough to arrange. Jaureguiberry himself had been doubt- ful about the advisability of negotiations,76 and when the boundary commission was convened, the French delegates refused to discuss Senegal's differential tariffs; the whole conference almost broke down on the issue of tariff equalization.77 In the end, the commissioners agreed on a delimi- tation of influence along the Great Scarcies, and the Ministry of Marine, anxious to protect the Southern Rivers from continued British encroachments, pressed for its acceptance. But Marseille traders with interests in the Scarcies campaigned hard against the agreement, and almost succeeded in defeating it. For in November 1881 Gambetta created a new Ministry of Commerce and Colonies headed by Rouvier, the deputy from the Bouches- du-Rhone and the trading lobby's most influential spokesman.78 In January I882 Rouvier added his voice to the agitation against the settlement and called for more vigorous measures in support of trade all along the West African coast.79

The return of Freycinet and Jaureguiberry did not significantly alter the

general course of French policy. In the interests of the Mellacourie, the Minister of Marine did approve the Sierra Leone boundary settlement, but he refused to make any concessions to Britain over the eastern frontier

73 M.M.C. to M.A.E., 9 Feb., 30 Mar., 17 Apr., 15 May i880, AEMD Afrique 56. 74 J.O. Deb. Parl. Senat, seance du 17 fevrier I88I, p. 107. 75 Bayol to Bareste (French consul, freetown), 17 July I88I, AEMD Afrique 50. 76 Jaureguiberry to M.A.E., 2 Sept. I88o, AEMD Afrique 56: 'Je n'ai pas besoin

d'ajouter que le Gouvernement francais devra toujours rester maitre de repousser les propositions adoptees par la Conference s'il les juge contraire a sa dignite et i ses interets.'

77 The minutes of the Boundary Commission and relevant correspondence are to be found in AEMD Afrique 57 and CO 879/I8.

78 For the influence of the West Coast traders and the role of Rouvier, see J. D. Har- greaves, 'Towards a history of the partition of Africa', Y. Afr. Hist. I (1960), 97-109.

79 Rouvier to M.A.E., 2 Jan. i882, ANSOM Afrique VI 30/b.

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of the Ivory Coast.80 Rouvier remained at the Ministry of Commerce (no longer in charge of colonial affairs), and with his help Jaureguiberry pushed through the renewal of the French protectorate over Porto Novo in

April i882.81 In January 1883 Jaureguiberry called for the occupation of the protectorate and the extension of French influence over the Popos, Ahgwey and Porto Seguro. 'A l'abri de notre pavilion', he declared, 'le commerce franCais deja important prendra de nouveaux developpements... et sera... plus fort pour rivaliser avec le commerce britannique.'82

The minister's plans for the Lower Niger were more startling. French traders had been active there since I880, and in September 1882 Mattei, the agent-general of the Compagnie franfaise de l'Afrique equatoriale, had signed a commercial agreement with Loko on the Benue. On 25 January 1883 Jaureguiberry called for its ratification as part of a determined bid to challenge British supremacy in the whole Delta region. The minister conceded that British influence over the west bank of the Niger was too strong to be effectively disputed; but he was confident that France could negotiate commercial agreements on the east bank and establish political as well as commercial influence along the Benue. Five days later, to round off his politique des protectorats, he ordered the commandant of the South Atlantic Naval Division to negotiate treaties with Bonny and Calabar and with the states of the Cameroons estuary.83

Meanwhile, a new front had been opened on the Congo. The explorer Savorgnan de Brazza, sponsored by the French section of the International African Association, had been on the river since I880, and had signed a somewhat irregular treaty of protectorate with the Bateke tribe on the north shore of Stanley Pool. In November 1882 his treaty was submitted to Parliament and ratified unanimously. In February 1883 de Brazza left for the Congo once more, this time as a government commissioner with orders to organize the new colony.84 In the following months Mattei was sent on a treaty-making expedition along the Niger and Benue; a resident with a small escort occupied Porto-Novo; the gunboat Voltigeur cruised along the Bight of Benin, called at Bonny, renewed treaties with the chiefs of Banoko and signed a new one with Passall of Malimba; and the Orifamme tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a treaty with the chiefs of Brass River.85 The 'scramble' was now well and truly under way.

80 Jaureguiberry to M.A.E., 17, 22, 26 Apr. I882, AEMD Afrique 57; Hargreaves, Prelude, 287-8.

81 Jaureguiberry to M.A.E., 4 Mar. I882; M.A.E. to Jaureguiberry, io Mar., 5 Apr. I882, AEMD Afrique 77; Jaureguiberry to M.A.E., 11 Apr. I882, AEMD Afrique 57.

82 Jaureguiberry to M.A.E., 19 Jan. 1883, AEMD Afrique 78. 83 Same to same, 25 Jan. I883, AEMD Afrique 86; Jaureguiberry to Commandant,

South Atlantic Division, 30 Jan. I883, AEMD Afrique 78. Jaureguiberry's politique des protectorats is discussed in Stengers, 'L'imperialisme colonial', 477-9.

84 For the Brazza episode, see H. Brunschwig, L'avenement de l'Afrique noire (Paris, I963), 133-68.

85 M.A.E. to Mattei, 6 Mar. 1883; Bories to M.M.C., May 1883; Cavalie, Rapport, 29 Aug. I883, AEMD Afrique 86; Colonna di Lecca to M.A.E., 7 Apr. I883, AEMD Afrique 78.

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V

What was the significance of these French moves? What were their motives and the reasons for their timing? One cannot answer these questions by concentrating exclusively upon the immediate origins of the scramble for territory which they provoked. The ratification of the de Brazza treaty, for example, was not a crucial turning-point in French expansion as some have pictured it.86 De Brazza had no official powers to negotiate, and the government was reluctant to accept the results of his unauthorized diplomacy. Jaureguiberry regarded the explorer as a foreign upstart in the pay of a private organization closely linked with King Leopold of the Belgians, and he tacitly opposed the submission of the treaty to Parliament.87 Even after its ratification, both he and the Quai d'Orsay warned their agents: 'La

question du Congo n'est pas la seule importante. L'obligation de concentrer nos efforts sur d'autres points, la situation d'ensemble de notre empire colonial et les complications qu'elle peut amener vous indiqueront les sages limites que vous ne devez pas depasser dans un pays oiu jusqu'ici nos interets sont relativement faibles.'88

As is well known, the pressure of public opinion forced the government to act. But the success of the Congo lobby's propaganda campaign and the popular enthusiasm which it aroused did not reveal 'le visage neuf de l'imperialisme'.89 De Brazza's supporters had done just as well with their agitation over the trans-Sahara railway three years before, and the reasons for their success were the same in both instances. Parliament ratified the de Brazza treaty because it gave France a new route into the vast and

wealthy lands of the West African interior.90 Rouvier's report to the Cham- ber had a strangely familiar ring:

Cet immense mouvement commercial, dont on peut a peine entrevoir l'avenir et dont on ne saurait des aujourd'hui mesurer l'etendue, se developpera certaine- ment au profit de ceux qui les premiers auront penetre dans ces regions a peine entr'ouvertes au commerce du monde. La France, plus voisine de l'Afrique que la plupart des autres nations, plus directement interessee qu'elles dans l'avenir de ce continent par ses possessions de l'Algerie, du Senegal, du Gabon, par les nombreux comptoirs qu'elle possede sur la c6te occidentale, meconnaitrait gravement ses interets les plus certains si elle se laissait devancer dans le

86 Cf. Brunschwig, 'Les origines du partage de l'Afrique occidentale', 121-5. 87 Brunschwig, L'avenement de l'Afrique noire, 149-53. 88 M.A.E. to de Brazza, February 1883, cited in C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Les idees

economiques de Brazza et les premiers tentatives de compagnies de colonisation au Congo Francais, 1885-1898', Cahiers d'etudes africaines, no. 17 (1965), 57. Cf. M.M.C. to Cordier, 14 Jan. 1883, cited ibid. 57, n. 2.

89 Cf. Stengers, 'L'imperialisme colonial', 483. 90 Xavier Blanc, Rapport, J.O. Deb. Parl. Senat, seance du 28 novembre i882,

pp. I089-9I: 'Mieux placee qu'aucune autre nation pour penetrer dans ces immenses et fertiles regions, la France s'est deja acheminee vers le Soudan par les deux grandes voies de l'Algerie et du Senegal. Les decouvertes recentes de M. Savorgnan de Brazza lui ouvrent une nouvelle voie par le Bassin du Congo.'

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mouvement qui entraine le monde civilise vers ces regions hier encore mysterieuses.

Not even the phrasing had been changed since I879.91 The repercussions of the occupation of Egypt also had little significance

for French expansion in West Africa. Certainly, the British occupation had a profound effect upon the general course of Anglo-French relations, and it may have facilitated the adoption of more overtly anti-British policies, just as public reaction to the occupation may have contributed to the success of de Brazza's publicity campaign. But Jaureguiberry's protectorate policy was designed to defend French interests in West Africa, not to drive the British out of Egypt.92 And Anglo-French hostility was no new pheno- menon; fears of British expansion had plagued Jaureguiberry ever since he first came to office in 1879. Even the suddenness of the Minister's actions in January 1883 can be explained without reference to Egypt. There is strong circumstantial evidence that he and his advisers were forced by domestic considerations to activate their plans while they still had the opportunity. At the time, France was in the grip of a serious ministerial crisis over the proposed expulsion of the princes from the armed forces. Jaureguiberry was violently opposed to the measure, and when the Government asked for discretionary powers to deal with individual cases on 19 January, he must have known that his days in the cabinet were numbered.93 On that same day, his proposals for the occupation of Porto-Novo and the extension of a French protectorate along the Slave Coast were sent to the Quai d'Orsay. His orders to the South Atlantic Naval Division, issued without consulting the Foreign Ministry, were actually signed two days after his resignation and the day before he was finally replaced.

Those who emphasize the commercial factor in French expansion have a much stronger case.94 The protection of coastal trade had been a prominent theme since the i87os, and, after the failure to reach a comprehensive settlement, the pressures to assume territorial commitments in its defence became powerful indeed. But coastal trade was not the policy-makers' sole concern. Jaureguiberry himself was much more interested in the future commercial prospects of the interior. The extension of French influence along the Niger-Benue complex was the most important element in his

91 Rouvier, Rapport, 21 Nov. I882, J.O. Doc. Parl. Chambre, no. I406, pp. 2447-8. Cf. above, note 36.

92 Jaureguiberry to M.A.E., 25 Jan. I883, AEMD Afrique 86: 'Je crois...qu'il y a interet d'affirmer notre politique, et que pour le bien de notre commerce, il convient de developper notre influence A c6te de celle des Anglais.' The decision to place gunboats on the Niger was also taken in response to rumours that the British were advancing up-river towards Timbuktu. Cf. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, I63 ff.

93 The progress of the crisis and its effects upon Jaureguiberry's position can be followed in .O. Deb. Parl. Chambre, seances du i6, 19, 27, 29, 30 janvier I883, pp. 52-6, 79-81, 159-60, I63-4, I83.

94 See esp. C. W. Newbury, 'Victorians, republicans and the partition of Africa' J. Afr. Hist. iii (962), 493-501; Hargreaves, Prelude, cap. vI.

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protectorate programme. The Benue treaties were intended to give France 'la route du lac Tchad et les riches marches de l'Adamawa et du Bornou'. The treaties with Bonny and Calabar were intended to give French trade, 'etabli sur le Niger jusqu'a Egga, et aussi sur le Benoue ou il songe a porter maintenant tous ses efforts', an independent outlet to the sea.95 The gunboats operating from Bamako were intended to give France control over the Niger as far as Bussa. Jaureguiberry's protectorates were not simply an attempt to safeguard the coastal trading interest; they were also part of a two-pronged assault aimed at the creation of a vast territorial empire in the West African interior. Admittedly, this was a long-term and a rather vague objective; the minister himself never described the occupation of Bamako and his plans for the Lower Niger as two related elements in a fully developed policy of imperial expansion. But the simultaneous advance on both fronts was clearly more than pure coincidence. Soleillet had talked of such an empire in 1876, and the Colonial Department had noted his views.96 Rouvier's speeches had echoed the same theme after I879. Twenty years before them, Faidherbe had drafted detailed plans for the empire's creation, and his were the blueprints which the Ministry of Marine was using.

Certainly, there had been a revolution in French African policy; but one cannot grasp its significance by studying the diplomacy of imperialism, because this revolution preceded the diplomatic phase of the partition. The French entry into the politics of the Lower Niger and the Congo was not the start but the continuation of a new policy. By then the fascination of Sudanese wealth, the fear if not the reality of foreign rivalry, and the triumph of protectionist sentiment had already whetted appetites for African territory and rendered the old techniques of informal expansion obsolete. The crucial change in French policy was the transition from informal to formal empire; it took place not in 1882-3 but in 1879- 80.

What brought this change about? Local crises in Africa cannot provide the complete answer. The breakdown of the traditional pattern of trade along the coast may have forced the French to intervene politically; but even here their objectives were not limited to the protection of existing trade from British competition. And in the western Sudan no growth of African opposition forced them to adopt the techniques of military conquest. Tokolor resistance did not provoke the capture of Murgula or the occupation of Bamako; the fall of Murgula and the loss of Bamako did not even provoke Tokolor resistance. The conquest of the western Sudan was

95 Jaureguiberry to M.A.E., 25 Jan. 1883, AEMD Afrique 86; Jaureguiberry to Com- mandant, South Atlantic Naval Division, 30 Jan. I883, AEMD Afrique 78.

96 Soleillet, Speech, 3 Jan. 1876 (newspaper clipping), ANSOM Missions 15, Soleillet 1876-9: 'Par ses possessions de l'Algerie et du Senegal, la France devrait voir toute l'Afrique occidentale, de Tripoli au lac Tschad, du lac Tschad au Benin, du Benin au Cap Vert, du Cap Vert au Senegal, du Senegal a Tombouctou, de Tombouctou au Maroc, ouverte a son commerce, a ses mceurs et a sa civilisation.'

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not an involuntary response to the pressure of local African circumstance but a determined European bid for territory.97

Developments in French political life can provide only a partial explana- tion. The stabilization of the republic after the elections of 1877 and 1879 and the resignation of MacMahon, the return of France to the diplomatic stage at the Congress of Berlin, and the new spirit of self-confidence which these developments engendered should all be kept in mind. But they merely provided the back-drop to the process of policy-making. The nationalist and expansionist sentiments of French public opinion are more directly relevant. The popularity of the trans-Sahara railway was one of its most significant characteristics; the popularity of De Brazza was his most powerful weapon. Parliament was sympathetic to all the government's West African schemes. 25,000,000 frs were spent on the Senegal railway before the Chambers finally called a halt, and even the government's sternest critics did not dare to criticize its political objectives or to question the value of its projected African empire.98 But the impact of public opinion was sporadic and selective, and opinion itself was unstable; the agitation in favour of the trans-Sahara railway and de Brazza was more than matched by the furore over the Tunisian campaign. Nor can sudden bursts of nationalist fervour account for the origins of the policies pursued after I879. Public opinion may on the whole have supported African expansion; it did not initiate the process.

Pressure from private commercial interests also played its part. Bordeaux merchants, the most influential group in Senegal, had long coveted the trade of the western Sudan. In 1851 and 1854 they campaigned for the appoint- ment of Faidherbe and petitioned the government to open up the river escales.99 In 1879 the firm of Maurel et Prom supported the railway scheme; in I880 it set up shop at Medine; by 1883 it had two steamers plying between Saint-Louis and Kayes.100 Along the Southern Rivers Verminck and his associates tirelessly demanded official protection and support, as did the C.F.A.E. in the Niger Delta.101 Governments did not remain deaf to their appeals. But ministers like Jaureguiberry were any-

97 Cf. R. E. Robinson and J. Gallagher, 'The partition of Africa', The New Cambridge Modern History, xi, 609-22. Tokolor reactions to French expansion are discussed more fully in A. S. Kanya-Forstner, 'The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism' (Cambridge, Ph.D. thesis, I960).

98 Even the most influential anti-colonialist in the Chamber, Clemenceau, felt obliged to declare his support for the government's policies in principle (J.O. Deb. Parl. Chambre, seance du 3 juillet I883, p. 1572).

99 Petition, 8 December 185I (signed by Maurel, Teysseire, Grange, Herisse, Bancal, Derdeville,) cited in Jean Maurel, Bordeaux et la pacification du Senegal (Bordeaux, I953), 5-6.

100 ANSOM XII 76/bis. Maurel et Prom ran the Richelieu and the Tamesi; Deves et Chaumet of Bordeaux also had a steamer-the Soudan-on the river. See too Marc Maurel to Lt.-Col. Bourdiaux, 8 May I88I (supporting the Niger railway project), Bulletin de la Societe de Geographie Commerciale de Bordeaux, no. 4 (i88i), 409-14.

101 Verminck et al. to Briere, 25 June 1877, ANSOM Senegal VI Io/b; Jaureguiberry to M.A.E., 17 Apr. i880, AEMD Afrique 56; Bareste to M.A.E., 20 Dec. I880, AE Angle- terre (Freetown) 53; Bories to M.M.C., May 1883, AEMD Afrique 86.

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thing but traders' cats-paws. They made a clear distinction between the national and the private interest, and it was the former, not the latter, which they tried to serve. Nor were the traders empire-builders to a man. They were divided on important issues such as fiscal control and admini- strative responsibility.102 Their operations were limited to the coast and the river escales; even the Bordeaux merchants on the Upper Senegal were more interested in the profits to be had from supplying the expeditionary forces and transporting material for the railway than in gum or gold. And those who saw their trade threatened by the increased competition which the railway would bring, actively opposed and obstructed the government's plans.103 In France, moreover, the most influential commercial pressure groups, the Bordeaux and Marseille chambers of commerce, lagged far behind the government in their appreciation of Africa's future commercial importance.

Indeed, it was the local Senegalese administration which often stated -he commercial arguments most forcefully.104 Briere de l'Isle was the most insistent in his demands for the revival of mercantilist principles in French African trade, and the most effective in undermining the government's commitment to peace. Once the military advance began, the military themselves became the focus of local initiative. The agents of expansion exerted the pressures which most affected the policy-makers. But French expansion in Africa was more than a case of 'a little local imperialism'. Senegal alone could not secure the massive capital outlay on which the Niger plan depended. And the decision to introduce the military factor was taken in Paris; Jaureguiberry was the man who sent Desbordes to the Sudan.

Ultimately, the motives for French expansion are to be found within the

policy-making framework itself, within the 'official mind' of French

imperialism. What transformed French policy after 1879 was a change in official thinking on the vital questions of cost and military effort. Freycinet and Jaureguiberry were the ones who broke with the tradition of limited

government intervention in African affairs. Alarmed by the imagined threat of foreign competition, they made the state the principal agent of African expansion. Convinced of Africa's legendary wealth, they invested

public funds in its future profitability. Discarding the old notions of 102 The evidence for this point is clear enough in the minutes of the Bordeaux and

Marseille chambers of commerce for the late i870s, and in commercial correspondence in ANSOM Senegal IX 22 and 27-29 (I875-83).

103 Contracts for transporting material are to be found in ANSOM Senegal XIII 60, I74. For commercial opposition to the railway, see Jaureguiberry to Briere, 3 May I879, 4 Feb. i880, ANSOM Senegal I 63/b; Briere to Jaureguiberry, 7 Feb. I880, ANSOM Senegal I, 63/a; Jaureguiberry to Vallon, 27 Sept. I882, ANSOM Senegal I 67/c.

104 For example J. S. Gallieni, Instructions to Caron and the Beledugu mission, 30 Nov. I886, Bulletin de la Societe de Geographie Commerciale de Paris, x (I887-8), 29I, 295: ' I1 faut. .. que ces etats [du Haut-Niger] soient places sous notre protectorat et que leurs chefs s'engagent h laisser passer les caravanes venant a Bammako. D'une maniere generale, le resultat h poursuivre consiste a diriger sur Bammako le courant commercial etabli entre Tombouctou et le Maroc et Tripoli.'

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informal empire, they made political control the basis for economic development, and they set out to win their empire by military means. This last was the crucial decision, and for it the Ministry of Marine rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the department primarily responsible. Within the Ministry a group of dedicated and energetic officials-Legros, Dislere and the head of the Upper Senegal Bureau, Lieutenant-Colonel Bourdiaux-provided a strong supporting cast; but, on the evidence available, Jaureguiberry himself seems to have acted the leading part.105

French expansion in West Africa had its peculiarities. Its economic objectives were all-important, but these did not derive from any profound changes within the structure of the French economy or even from any serious assessment of Africa's economic potential. The policy-makers of the i88os, like their predecessors of the i82os and i83os, fell victim to the myth of Sudanese wealth. Their calculations were no more solidly based than they had been half a century before. Jaureguiberry's estimate of a Sudanese market of 80,ooo,ooo people was hardly the product of careful study, and Jaureguiberry was by no means unique. More intelligent men like Freycinet and more sophisticated economists like Rouvier talked blandly of markets three times the size.106 When policies are based on myths, they can be as fanciful as the objectives they seek to attain. But this does not make them any the less significant. The age of imperialism was not an Age of Reason, and French policies were nothing if not the product of their age.

Any interpretation of the partition must take this imperialist pheno- menon into account. The policies of Freycinet and Jaureguiberry contained the very essence of late-nineteenth-century imperialism; they were the Gallic 'doctrine of tropical African estates' enunciated fifteen years before Chamberlain came to office. And this difference in timing was vital. By I895 the scramble for West Africa was virtually over; in i880 it had yet to begin. Chamberlain's doctrine may have 'inspired the beginnings of... modern administration' in Britain's African territories; its French counter- part inspired the actual process of expansion. The beginnings of British imperialism in West Africa may have been a consequence of the partition; the beginnings of French imperialism were its cause.107

SUMMARY

This paper is a contribution to the current debate about the origins of the scramble for West Africa. It analyses the internal dynamics of French expansion and argues that the crucial change in French African policy occurred not in I882-3, as

105 Cf. Brunschwig, 'Les origines du partage', 124-5, which argues that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the most important decisions, and Stengers,' L'imperialisme colonial', 479, which speculates about the role of the permanent officials.

106 .0. Deb. Parl. Chambre, seance du 13 juillet i880, p. 8143; Freycinet, Rapport au President de la Republique, 12 July I879, J.O. 14 July 1879, p. 6633; Rouvier, Rapport, Io June I879, J.0. Doc. Parl. Chambre, no. 1497, p. 6328.

107 Cf. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 395-409.

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commonly assumed, but in I879-80. The policies adopted at this time, although their roots can be traced back to the governorship of Louis Faidherbe in Senegal, were distinguished by a new willingness on the part of the government in Paris to establish political as well as economic claims to West African territory, and by its readiness to bear the financial and military burdens of territorial expansion. Changes in French domestic politics or foreign relations cannot adequately account for this transition from informal to formal expansion, nor can it be

explained solely in terms of commercial agitation in France or West Africa. The influence of public opinion and of colonial agents on the formulation of policy was more significant, but the crucial decisions were taken by the policy-makers themselves, and in particular by Charles de Freycinet (Minister of Public Works and later Prime Minister) and Admiral Jean Jaureguiberry (Minister of Marine and Colonies). They, above all, were responsible for inaugurating the era of French imperialism in West Africa. The new imperialism was most apparent in the drive to create a vast territorial empire in the Sudanese interior. But it was also evident in the intensification of commercial rivalries along the West African coast, and the paper argues that French actions there in I882-3 were the continuation of policies adopted three years before rather than immediate responses to the British occupation of Egypt or to the growth of popular support for African

expansion. Accordingly, the beginnings of French imperialism in West Africa are advanced as the principal cause of the scramble.

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