france and the rise of fascism in italy 1919-23

8/9/2019 France and the Rise of Fascism in Italy 1919-23

1/21

France and the Rise of Fascism in Italy, 1919-23Author(s): William I. ShorrockSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Oct., 1975), pp. 591-610Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260103

Accessed: 10/02/2010 01:36

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltd.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toJournal of

Contemporary History.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260103?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sageltdhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/260103?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/21

France and the Rise ofFascismin Italy, 1919-23William I. Shorrock

Most discussions of French foreign policy in the early post-wareraconcentratequite rightlyon the 'Germanproblem'and the consequentconfrontation betweenEnglandand Franceon how best to dealwith it.Undoubtedly,securite - especially alongthe German rontier- formedthe most conspicuousleitmotif runningthroughoutFrenchdiplomacy.France'spolitical leaders,andnot only those of the right-of-centreBlocnational,were extremelyreluctantto co-operatewith Britishappeals oappeasethe WeimarRepublic. This field has been well ploughedbutthat of Franco-Italian elationsis relativelyvirginterritory.It must beconsideredfor the light it sheds on the main thrustof Frenchpolicy inthe twenties.France's initial diplomaticreactionto the rise of fascism in Italy isimportant for several reasons.Firstly, the evidence will suggest that,whereas French leadersrejectedthe appeasementof WeimarGermany,they were anxious to take a tolerant and indulgentview of the Italianfascists, who might well be enrolled in a common front againsttheGermans and thus act as a convenient counterweightto the Britishdetermination o appease.But, it should also be stressed that France'sstrategy for dealing with Italy came to be predicated, n part, on thestate of Anglo-Frenchrelations. In reviewingthe brilliant twenty-sixyear career of Camille Barrere, France's influential ambassador oRome, Albert Pinguad,a permanentofficial at the Quaid'Orsay,madethe followingobservationon 1 January1925:

He [Mussolini] had never exhibited more hostility to France than when thelatter was at odds with Great Britain and more complaisance than when theentente between London and Paris seemed complete. In this sense, the state ofFranco-Italian relations, according to M. Barrere, was and must remain con-ditioned by that of Franco-English relations.1591


3/21

William. ShorrockThese views prevailedin the Ministryof Foreign Affairs only in themid-1930s and help to explainthe Frenchthrustin those yearsto erecta common Anglo-Franco-Italianront againstGerman reatyviolations.But the foundation for these views was laid in the immediatepost-firstworld war era,when the ThirdRepublicwas forcedto dealdiplomatic-ally with the new political phenomenonof fascism.

Although France and Italy had fought side-by-side o defeat theCentral Powers and did share a common interest in preservingtheindependence and integrity of Austria, there were, nevertheless,anumber of issues that hindered cordial relations between them. TheItalians were disgruntledat receivingno mandatesoverformerGermancolonies in Africa and dissatisfiedat the minorcolonialcompensationsoffered them by Britain and France as requiredby Article 13 of theTreaty of London. Many Italians also believed that their country wasentitled to the Adriaticport city of Fiume and to furtherterritorialgains along the Dalmatiancoast. They held Francelargely responsiblefor their frustration,leading Frenchmento fear that Italy would be-come a jealous rival of France in the Mediterranean,an adversarydeterminedto stir up trouble amongfriends of France n south-centralEurope,notably the Yugoslavs.2Perhaps he most serious ssuedividingthe two countries, so far as the Italians were concerned,involvedtherights of Italian immigrants o the French colony of Tunisia,wheretheirnationalityandrightshad been protectedby a conventionof 1896that ironicallyhad markedone of the first stepstowardFranco-Italianrapprochementbefore the first world war. In 1918, Francedenouncedthe convention as a firststep towardthe naturalization f all foreignersliving in Tunisia.3The Italians,sufferingfrom limited resourcesand arapidly expanding population, had long regardedtheir countrymenliving in Tunisia as a major national resource. Their resentment atFrenchactionwas considerable.4

But, in spite of these diplomatic tensions and the obvious anti-French bias of the Italiangovernment,Barrere uccinctlyunderscoredthe importanceof Italy to France in a long dispatch to the ForeignMinister,AlexandreMillerand,on 3 May 1920. He pointed out howgood relationswith Italy had served France well in the period from1902 to 1918, but since the armistice,Frenchpolicy 'has committedthe greatestconceivableerror- that of seemingto be moreanti-Italianthan it is in reality.' Barrereobservedthat France'smain task, for theforeseeablefuture, would be to build and consolidate the new Euro-pean order. Italy could performuseful servicesin this enterprise,but,above all, she could hinderthe Frencheffort if she were to remainin

592


4/21

France and the Rise of Fascism

opposition: 'It is thusbeyond doubt,'he argued, that our best interestslie in not alienatingher, in not abandoningher to the manoeuvresofour rivals,nor even sometimes to her own inclinations.'Barrerecon-cluded his dispatchby outlininga reasonablestrategyfor dealingwiththe Italians, advocatinga close Anglo-Frenchentente, to which Italycould then be attached, as the best means of 'discipliningItaly' andresolvingthe thorny problemssurroundingGermany,the Adriaticandthe Middle East. If such a policy were followed with regard o Italy,Barrerepredicted that it would 'ameliorateour presentrelationswiththis countryand render t relativelyamenable o ourdesigns,during heperiod when the allies are unhappily becoming less united than onewould like to admit.'5 Barrere'sdispatchnot only placesthe problemof Franco-Italianrelations in the context of Europeanpolitics, it alsodemonstratesthat some influential voices were anxious to bury thebitterness of the peace conferencesand initiate a rapprochement.Oneof the most serious obstaclesto such a development,however,wasthevirtuallyanarchical ocialandpoliticalclimatein Italy in the immediatepost-warperiod,when the fear of growingbolshevik nfluencetherewasa source of concernto Frenchstatesmen,as well as the governmentalinstabilitywhich was severeevenby French standards.Barrereviewed the new Italiangovernmentwith seriousmisgivings.The wartime Orlando ministry was replaced in June 1919 by oneheaded by Francesco Nitti and TommasoTittoni, both of whom hadbeen neutralist during the war, but whose sympathies lay withGermany.Barrerenotified the Quaid'Orsayon 23 June 1919 that theNitti Cabinetsymbolizedthe state of mind in Italy in recentmonths-'resentment against the Allies, explosion of germanophilesentimentsconceived by pique as well as by inclination, awakeningall of theneutralist and anti-warelements whose tendenciesare favourableo theGermans.'6The Frenchambassador lso blamedNitti for encouragingbitter anti-Frenchpresscampaign n Italy. The French ambassadorwasparticularly suspicious of the apparentlyclose working relationshipestablishedbetween the Italian premierand DavidLloyd George,theEnglishprimeminister- a cordialitythat Barrere earedwould isolateFranceon the Germanquestion.7The anti-French one of the Italianpressprovideda constant sourceof annoyanceto Barrere,who was inordinantlysensitive to newspapercriticism.He and other Frenchofficials were also concernedabouttheefforts of German propaganda o capitalize on the tone of Italiannewspapers n orderto divide the wartime allies. The FrenchEmbassy,located in the historic Palais Farese, noted on severaloccasionsthe

593


5/21

William Shorrock

irony of Germany'shaving so little money to pay her reparationsyetsufficient quantities to bankroll opposition to Francein Italy.8 On 9August 1921, the Frenchcharged'affairesin Rome wrote privatelytoBarrere,who was vacationingin Paris,that: 'The Germansand Ger-manophiles are gaining here every day. Little by little, finance, in-dustry, press, everything. . . is falling into their hands.' He suggestedthat Barrere contact Philippe Berthelot, the secretary generalof theQuai d'Orsay,to urge that France counter the pro-German ropagandaby subsidizingfavourablecommentary n the Italianpressor by exer-cising some economic pressureon Italy.9 The ForeignMinistryrejectedboth suggestions.The extreme anti-French attitude abatedsomewhatwith the fall of the Nitti government n June 1920, whichwasreplacedby that of Giovanni Giolitti, the grand old man of Italian politics.France's concern aboutthe returnto powerof this old pro-German ndneutralist premier was somewhat appeased by the appointment ofCount Carlo Sforza to the Consulta. The latter's pro-Frenchattitudewas well-known;he told the Frenchcharged'affaireson 12 September1920 that his sole 'raisond'etre in the [Giolitti] Cabinet is for havingbeen an interventionist and for being a partisanof the alliance withFrance andEngland.'"This more favourablepolitical climate, however,must be consideredagainstthe backdropof an alarming xpansionof social unrestthrough-out the Italian peninsula in the years from 1918 to 1922. Strikesparalysedthe principalpublic servicesandseverelyaffectedindustryaswell as commerce.These activitieswere accompaniedby the growthofthe Italian socialist and communist parties. French officials watchedthese developments with considerable apprehension; hey tended toplace the blamefor the socialcrisison the activitiesof the 'maximalists'and 'anarchists'.The Italian Communist Party, founded in January1921, was to be directly financedby Moscow, and French ntelligencereportsindicatedthat Russianmoney was financingstrikesand distur-bances in the large cities and industrialcentresof Italy. 1 The resur-gence of socialiststrengthandactivitydismayedFrenchmenworking oameliorate Franco-Italianrelations. The socialists, the French chargeinformed Foreign MinisterLeyges on 12 October 1920, had formallydisavowedthe Treaty of Versaillesand identified Paris as the centreofreaction par excellence. They are 'the declared and implacable ad-versaries of French policy . . .Their arrival in power, which they areworkingtoward, is thus not desirableforus; and their influenceon thepresent Government,which is looking at them more favourably...would not be favourable or us .. .12

594


6/21

Franceand the Rise of FascismThe factor that compounded the socialist dangerwas the apparent

inability of the Italiangovernment o cope successfullywith the socialcrisis. Barreredenouncedthe Nitti regimeasweak andvirtuallyhelplessin combatingthe constant strikes.He refusedto take a strongstand,asthe press and the majority of the country demanded, and insteadpreferred to grant 'concessions and accommodations while eventsdemonstratedaily the uselessness of his efforts.13 By October 1920,the economic outlook had darkenedconsiderably: ndustrywas para-lysed; agriculturewasplaguedby peasant andoccupations;exportshaddropped.The Italiangovernment,under both Nitti andGiolitti, arguedthat political and social discontent was the result of this prolongedeconomic crisis, a view rejectedby the French.In a lengthy reviewofthe Italianinternalsituation on 9 October 1920, the FrenchchargeinRome, FrancoisCharles-Roux,nformedthe ForeignMinister,Leyges,that the agitationof socialistsandanarchistswasrendering he develop-ment of normal economic life virtuallyimpossible.Charles-Roux ut-lined the prioritiesvery clearly:'Since it is socialistagitation,orbetter,revolutionarycommunist and anarchistagitation,which has causedtheaggravationof the economic situation, this agitationmust be attackedfirst.'l 4 But, if the Italiangovernmentwas eitherunwillingor unable tocombat the spreadingeftist agitation,what alternatives emained? Theevidenceindicatesthat Frenchdiplomacywaslikely to look favourablyupon any force or movementcapableof re-establishing rder n Italy bychallengingthe left, as it could be expected to harboura more op-timistic view of France than that held by the Italiangovernmentinpower.

The recorddemonstrateswith strikingclaritythat Frenchdiplomatsin Italy, and particularlyBarrereandCharles-Roux, iewed the nascentfascist movement with almost unalloyed favour and enthusiasm. Thetone was set in a dispatchfromCharles-Roux o Leygeson 19 October1920, which contained the firstreference o the fascistphenomenon nthe diplomatic correspondence.He first described the growingsocialagitation in the peninsula,a condition borderingon anarchyand afterritually placing the finger of guilt on the combination of socialistextremismand governmental naction, he notes that the socialistshavebegunto meet systematicoppositionfroma new politicalforce:

These exploits are. . . the work of nationalist counter-demonstrators organ-ized for this purpose into 'fasci di combattimento' (faisceau de combat). Thepeaceful population can look favourably upon them; but since they arepeaceful, they do not participate. Because of this, it matters relatively littlethat the 'fascists,' on occasion, use truncheons, revolvers and hand grenades.' '

595


7/21

William. Shorrock

Similarlysanguineanalysesof the squadristiarrived n Rome fromFrench consulatesin variouspartsof Italy. But, throughout he remain-der of 1920 and on into 1921, the most fulsome and uncriticalappraisalsof fascistactivityarrivedat the Quaid'Orsay rom the pen ofCamille Barrere,who informed Leyges on 10 November 1920 thatrecent administrativeelections had not resulted in the large gainsanticipated by the socialists, largelybecauseof the fascists,who have'drawn [the Italian voters] out of their torpor' as a result of their'protests by word and deed against the incessantprovocationsof theanarchists and bolsheviks'.Thus, he concluded, although the fascistsoccasionallyemployed the same tactics as theiradversaries,hey never-theless 'have rendered the service of jolting those who intended toremain cautious out of their apathy.'16 Again on 1 February 1921,referring o the fascist tactics of violent confrontation,Barrere dvisedthe new foreign minister, Aristide Briand,that the vacillation of theNitti and Giolitti regimes n the face of revolutionfrom the left 'fullyjustifies the energetic and resolute attitude of the fascists .. .'1 7Barrere'sattitude revealeditself further in many other dispatchesand telegramsto Briand.He referredto the fascists at one point asrepresenting the parties of order.'1 Three weeks later, he urgedtheforeign minister to plant a story in Le Tempslaudingthe 'courageousstruggle'of the fascistsagainstthe elementsof disorderanddissolutionand depicting them as 'representingorder, patriotismand security' -such a favourable analysis might encourage francophile Italians tosupportfascistcandidatesat the next election.' 9 A few months ater, na long assessmentof the socialist and fascist movementssince the endof the war,Barrere rgued hat fascismhad been causedby the excessesof the socialists and the deficiency of the Italian government.AfterOctober 1920, when the fascists began openly to challenge thesocialists, they became so effective that the latter requested stateprotection, to no avail; 'the fascists are continuing their work ofpurificationand the government s letting these improviseddefendersofthe publicorderact.'20It is clear, then, that Barrere's nitial admirationfor the fascistmovementwas based largelyupon its anti-socialistactivitiesand that itappeared to represent a force of order and stability, which was aprerequisite to establishing closer relations with Italy. In addition,fascist leadershipappeareddiplomaticallyacceptableto France.BenitoMussoliniwas not an unknown quantity to the PalaisFamese. Duringthe first world war, he hadbeen regardedas an important orce leadingItaly away from her neutralist position and into direct alliance with

596


8/21

Franceand theRise of FascismFranceand England,and evidence demonstrates hat he received inan-cial support from the FrenchEmbassyduringthe interventionistcam-paignof 1914-15.2 Barrereclearlyviewed the fascistleaderas a forcepotentially favourableto French foreign policy goals in Germany,anattitude which emergedin his analysisof Mussolini'smaidenspeechtothe Italian Chamber of Deputies. The Duce became a deputy fromMilan in the election of 15 May 1921. His first speech was stronglycritical of the mild reaction of the Giolitti governmentto Germanpropagandaactivitiesin the Alto Adige andalongthe Brenner rontier.Thus Barrereremarkedon 22 June 1921 in a telegramto Briand hat:

the general anti-German tenor of his speech . . .cannot be displeasing inFrance, any more than the fact that one cannot find here (this time at least)any word of criticism against our policy.2 2The FrenchEmbassy'sratherpositive view of Mussolinias a skilfuland controlled leader of a powerful but disorganizedpolitical forcereceivedreinforcement n later months. The disparatecharacterof theearly fascist movement occasionallyled to outbreaksof violence whicheven Barrerehad to admit exceeded the limits of good sense,althoughMussolini himself was increasinglydepicted as the leader who mightcurb the violent elements within the movement and direct it into acreative political force. Barrere noted on 18 November 1921 in adispatch to Briandthat the Duce's efforts to transform ascism into aunified political party demonstratedhis concern aboutinjectingseriouspolitical content into its programmeand eliminating he excessive andviolent elements of disorderfrom the movement.23 Six months later

Charles-Roux ent a telegramto RaymondPoincare,Briand's uccessoras presidentof the Council of Ministersand Ministerof ForeignAffairs,which described in admiringterms Mussolini'sskill at manoeuveringwithin the Italian parliamentary tructure.24 These documents formearly indications of the future tendency on the part of Frenchpolicy-makers to view Mussolinias the most moderateman of his party,whoseleadershipwas essential to discipliningthe movementand directing tinto creativeandpeacefulchannels.The Italianpolitical crisisdeepenedthroughout he lasthalf of 1921and the first half of 1922 - electoral gains were registeredby thesocialists and the rural-basedCatholic Popular Party, both of whichwere strongly anti-fascistand inclined towarda pro-German nd anti-French stance in foreign policy. In July 1922, Giolitti declined aninvitation to form anotherministryon the groundsthat the composi-tion of the Assembly made any stable governmentimpossible. His

597


9/21

William. Shorrock

public letter to II Mondo indicated that any governmentwhich con-tinued to oppose the fascists would encouragecivil war. Barrerere-peated these views to Poincareon 28 July 1922, and indicated that itwas likely that the fascistswould have to be broughtinto the govern-ment.25 He expressedno alarmat this prospect; n fact, he indicatedtoPoincare the followingday that the Frenchpress oughtto be instructedto abstainfromany criticalanalysisof the activityof the fascistsduringthe Italian ministerialcrisis,since they, afterall, werethe ones blockingthe anti-FrenchNitti from returningto power, and 'we are going tohave to adjust to them in the near future.' Besides, Barrereadded,fascistorganshad abstained romattackingFrance or overthreemonthsand had supportedFrenchpolicy in Germanyand London.26 Barrerewas by no meansthe only one to take such a benignantview of fascistforeign policy. The French consul-generalin Milan wrote, on 12September 1922, that, although the fascists were divided betweennationalistextremists and 'pure fascists'whose programmewas aimedat the reconstitution of national life in Italy, the latter were by nomeansunfavourableo France.Thisgroup,into whichhe placedMusso-lini, mightwell be a useful element 'towardconsolidatinggood relationsbetween the two countries.'2

Barrere's avourabledisposition toward the fascistscontinued rightup to the eve of the 'march on Rome' in spite of the increasinglybelligerent domestic stance adopted by the movement.On 7 October1922, he informed Poincareabout an article fromLa Patria,a fascistsheet strongly critical of Germanpolicy in Italy, which condemnedGermany'ssupportforIIPaese, a strongly pro-German, nti-Frenchandanti-fascistnewspaper.The latter'seditorialpolicy was ill-advised, hefascist organ emphasized, because the fascists would shortly be inpower- Barrere ommentedsimply:

We thus can only be pleased that a fascist organ is levelling such a frank attackon a newspaper like Paese and, behind it, those who are paying it with moneyfrom across the Rhine and who up to the present have not yet been un-masked.28

The French ambassadoreven deplored the appearanceof an articlecritical of the fascists which was publishedin Le Temps,maintainingthat the effect of such articles was unfortunate, since for severalmonths 'not only have we not had to complainabout the fascists,butwe have noticed that in matters of foreignpolicy they have declaredthemselves for us.' Given the fact that the fascistswere by that timeone of the most importantelements in Italianpoliticsandweregetting

598


10/21

Franceand theRise of Fascism

stronger every day, it was foolhardy to publish articles which couldonly prejudiceMussolini'spartyagainstFrance.29Apart from Le Temps and the socialist press,however,the Italianfascist movement received reasonably favourable treatment fromFrenchnewspaperson the eve of its takeover.EvenLe Tempsmodifiedits views, admittingthat if the fascistscould form a coalition govern-ment with Giolitti, it could be a guaranteeof social order and 'itsprogrammewill work quite naturally oward the rapprochement f ourcountries.'30 Le Petit Parisien,politically moderate, with the largestcirculationin France,applauded he fact that Italy's next governmentwas likely to be composed of those elements which had been in theforefront of the fight againstsocialism.3 Predictably he centre-rightand rightistpress in Francewas more demonstrablyenthusiasticaboutthe possibility of a fascist government n Italy: Le Matin publishedavery favourable review of the movement, depicting it as 'the newnational forces thrown into the struggleagainstsocialism and againstthe old political caste which abandoned the State to the mercy ofsocialism,'32andLe Gauloisrhapsodizedaboutthe accomplishments fthe squadristi,spurredon by the 'magnificent nspiration'of d'Annun-zio and the 'eloquent advocacy' of Mussolini; .... the cause they aredefending is just and the spirit which it provokesis irresistible.'33 tshould come as no surprise hat neitherthe Quaid'Orsaynormanyofthe organsof Frenchpublic opinion were greatlyalarmedwhen, on 28October 1922, the Italianking offered the office of primeministertoMussolini.In fact Mussolini'saccession o powerwas not badlyreceivedin France, providingan occasion for the resurrectionof old clichesabout the two 'Latin sisters,' and there was a greatdeal of optimismabout the Duce as a declaredfrancophileand re-establisher f order nthe peninsula.34 In addition, the Palais Famese stressed in severaltelegrams o Poincar6 he potential diplomaticbenefits to Franceof thechangein regime.Charles-Rouxnformed the presidentof the Counciland the foreign minister that the directors of the fascist party werefavourable o France; he fascistpresshadrecentlysupportedFrance nMiddle Eastern affairs and on the question of reparationsand inter-allied debts. A functionary at the Consulta3 told the Frenchcharged'affaires that Mussolini was inclined to be moderate in his foreignpolicy initiatives,even in regard o Yugoslavia,whichwasa particularlysensitivepoint, since the Quaid'Orsayregarded he Kingdomof Serbs,Croats and Slovenes as a protege,while substantial erritorialdisputesremainedbetween it and Italy. Charles-Roux tressed the anti-Germanfocus of the fascist mentality in his telegram o Paris,pointingout that

599


11/21

WilliamL Shorrockthe blackshirtshad invaded the offices of severalanti-Frenchgermano-phile' and 'Nittian'newspapersn Rome and burnedrecent issues.36The main concern of Frenchdiplomatsin Italywas how the Frenchpresswould react to the commencementof the fascist regimein Italy.But, just as in the UnitedStates,37 the majormass circulationorgansofthe centre and rightin France either endorsedthe new regimewithoutqualificationor took a reasonablyfavourablewaitand see' attitude.38Their editorials of the period from 29 October to 5 November uni-formly emphasized the return of domestic tranquillity, the markeddecline of socialist activity and the potentially favourabledirection offascist foreign policy. So far as France was concerned,the single mostjarringevent of the opening of the fascist era was the suddenresigna-tion of Count Sforza, the Italianambassadoro Paris,on 31 October,because he was bitterly opposed to what he presumedwould be themajorthrust of Mussolini's oreignpolicy; the Duce's maidenspeechtothe Chamberin June 1921 had been scathingly critical of Sforza'stenure as foreign minister, especially his policy of reconciliationwithYugoslavia.39Sforza had long been regardedas a strongpartisanof thealliance with France, and his departureseemed to many to remove amoderatingforce in Italian policy,40 although evidence suggeststhatthe ambassador's eparturewas not as serious as originallyspeculated.Mussolinimade an attempt to keep Sforza at his post as a symbol ofgood Franco-Italianrelations, but the latter rejectedthe Duce's over-tures perhapsmore because of personal antipathythan for any otherreason.Besides,it was stressedthat the unfortunate effects of Sforza'sprecipitate action would be muted in the long run by Mussolini'sdecision to retain SalvatoreContarinias permanentundersecretary fthe ItalianForeignMinistry;his long experienceand favourabledisposi-tion to Francewere well-knownat the Quaid'Orsay.41

The French diplomaticcommunity, nevertheless,continued to har-bour some apprehensionsabout the basic direction of the fascist re-gime. These were momentarilyexacerbatedwhen the Duce presentedhis ministerialdeclarationto the Italian Chamberof Deputies on 17November 1922, a speech with marked dictatorial overtones whichdefined the wartime entente as nothing more than a 'diplomatic ex-pression' and decried the 'inferior way' that Italy had often beentreated in the past. Mussolini enunciated his famous doctrine of'nothingfor nothing' and indicatedthat unless the ententebecame'anegalitarianequilibrium of forces,' Italy would seek her freedom ofaction.42 Thereare some indicationsthat, if alarming, uch rodomon-tade was not taken too seriously in high diplomaticcouncils. Musso-

600


12/21

Franceand the Rise of Fascismlini's firstmeetingwith western statesmenwasscheduledfor 20 Novem-ber 1922 at the opening of the LausanneConferenceon the MiddleEast. The Duce, however, took the initiative of invitinghis FrenchandEnglishcounterparts,Poincareand LordCurzon,to meet privatelywithhim in advance of the regularconference at the smallSwiss town ofTerritet: taken by surprise, hey agreedto go. The resultwas a ratherinnocuous communique alluding to the principle of equality amongpowers. Jules Laroche,a permanentofficial at the Quaid'Orsay,main-tained that no-one took Mussoliniseriously at Territet or Lausanne:'Poincare and Curzon scarcelyhid their disdain. His success was con-sidered ephemeral.'43 But recent scholarshiphas arrived at a morerealistic udgment:Alan Casselsconcludes that Mussolini'saccomplish-ments at Lausannewere considerable. He had mitigated some of thesuspicions in Englandand France about his belligerentspeech of 17Novemberby showing his willingnessto continue the entente in theeastern Mediterranean nd, simultaneously,he had compelled two ofEurope's most influential statesmen to bow to his whim at Territet.'The deferenceshown to Mussoliniby CurzonandPoincareset the tonefor the rest of the Europeandiplomaticcommunity.'44 Such a sweep-ing judgment may be somewhat exaggerated,but it cannot be deniedthat France becameincreasinglymore deferentialto the Italianleaderas tensionswith Englandmountedover the Germanquestion.The prevailing one of the dispatchesfrom the FrenchEmbassy nRome throughout November and December 1922 reveals increasingadmiration or the completely alteredsocial situation in Italy.Charles-Roux remindedPoincare on severaloccasionsthat increasingnumbersof Italians were rallyingto Mussolini'ssupport. To assess the signifi-cance of such a situation for France,he argued,one must compare hepresentcalm and stability with the situation of the previous wo yearsof governmentaldecrepitude,strikes and socialist and communistde-fiance of law and order,when the red flag floated from factory roofs,whose doors were defendedby red guards. . .' In contrast,Mussolini'smovement is describedas one of 'audacity,will, decision,authority.'4The extent of the impactof Mussolini'sarrival n poweron the socialistactivity, which had so upset Barrere,Charles-Rouxand the Quaid'Orsay, can be gauged by the French document collection. Thosedealingwith the ItalianPartispolitiques, socialistes,action pacifiste etrevolutionnaire rom June 1918 to 28 October1922 occupy almost thewhole of five bound volumes. From the day of the fascist takeover,however, until the Law of Exception of November1926 outlawedallother political parties,socialist and revolutionaryactivities formedthe

601


13/21

William. Shorrock

subject of only some seventy-twopagesof documents.46Clearly,thefascists put an end to one of the most serious obstacles to Franco-Italianunderstanding,o faras the Frenchwereconcerned.

Equally important to the French was the renewed possibility ofintegrating Italy into a common policy vis-a-visGermany. Barrereworkeddiligentlyto foster a moreconciliatoryatmospherebetweenthetwo countriesduringthe earlydaysof fascistpower,arranging specialaudienceof the Duce with a groupof exclusivelyFrench ournalists, nwhich Mussolinirespondedto all domestic andforeignpolicy questions'with simplicity and frankness'.Since it was the Italianpremier'susualpractice to meet all foreignjournaliststogether, Barreredescribedthisgesture as 'une gracieusetespeciale pour la France.47 Events such asthese led to favourable comments in the French press along withspeculationthat a new era in Franco-Italian elationswasemerging.LeTemps commented on several occasions about the common desireofboth countriesto cooperatein the MiddleEast,concert their efforts onbehalf of Austrian ndependenceand deal effectively with the Germanquestion. Thus it appeared hat relationscouldbecome even closer andmore friendly.4The diplomatic possibilitieswere stated even more explicitly whenCharles-Rouxrespondedon 18 December 1922 to Poincare'srequestfor detailed biographical nformation on Mussoliniby closing his dis-patch with the observation hat ever since the peaceconference,fascistpolicy 'has takenan anti-German ttitudein the questionof reparationsand disarmamentand of the execution of the Treatyof Versailles.'4The suggestionthat Italy's supportmight be valuable or France n theemergingshowdownwith Englandover the questionof Germanrepara-tions was very thinly veiled. The theme of a possible Franco-Italianentente reappeared n two importanttelegramsfrom Charles-RouxoPoincar6 on 5 and 7 January 1923, the eve of the Franco-Belgianoccupation of the Ruhr.The first of these noted that virtuallyall theRoman and provincial newspapershad commented favourably andextensively on New Year's Day speeches by himself and the Frenchambassadorto the Holy See, which he interpreted as proof of theamelioration n Italianpublic opiniontowardFrance,since some of thenewspapers'have underlined particularly he necessity for a Franco-Italian entente.' Two days later, the French charge reported thatContarini,the Italianpermanentundersecretary f state,hadexpressedhis own personal interest in closer Franco-Italianrelations and alsocommentedthat Francehas 'everything o gainsincethe ... dispositionof fascism [is] currently favourableto the entente between the two

602


14/21

Franceand theRise of Fascismcountries.'

The documentscited above indicateclearlythat Francewasanxiousto welcome the new fascist regime n exchangefor Italianacquiescencein the French thesis on reparations.51 Poincarepresentedhis bill forthe indulgent French attitude at the London Conference on repara-tions, which opened on 7 December1922. JacquesChastenet,a formerofficial of the French Foreign Ministry,maintains that as late as theLondon Conference, Mussolini, a 'parnenuwhose shaved head andgreen-edgedwhite spats bringsmiles to the faces of the correctdiplo-mats of the Foreign Office,' was not yet taken seriously.52 Suchassertions, however, are not consistent with those presentedby theComte de Saint-Aulaire, he French ambassadorn London, who at-tended the conference on reparationsand who maintainedthat Poin-care, as a lawyer, had no sympathy for Mussolini's endency to holdhimself above the law. But the systematic wooing of fascist Italytoward a commonpolicy with Franceon the Germanquestionbegan nLondon. Poincare neglected nothing to consolidate the co-operationwith Mussolini achieved the previous month at the Lausanne Con-ference. Saint-Aulaire maintained that the French foreign ministerhoped, by building a Franco-Italianbloc, to goad the recalcitrantEnglishinto a common allied front on the Germanquestion - or atleast to achievea benevolentneutralityfromEngland.53The London Conference broke up in disarray:the French firmlymaintainedthat Germanymust pay reparations n full voluntarilyorelse be coerced to do so; the English, on the other hand, urged amoratorium.A furtherconference was scheduledfor January1923 inParis. Therewas some concern at the Quaid'Orsayabout the possibleconsequences of alienating England too severely on the matter ofreparationsand the President,AlexandreMillerand, ven suggested ntwo personal etters to Barrere hat Englandmight be broughtaroundto the hard-line French position on reparations n exchange for asolution convenient to her in the Middle East.s4 A deal such as thisnevermaterialized,however,which only served to magnifythe import-ance of the position that the Italianswerelikely to take on this matter.Since Belgiumwas allied to France,the Italianvote in the ReparationsCommission would be decisive. There were those who feared that adirect clash between Englandand Francewould encouragethe Italiansto adopt their historic diplomatic position of alwaysmaintaining loserelations with England.55In general,such fears were well-grounded,but in this particularsituation, the foundations for Franco-Italianco-operation had been well-prepared.Mussoliniwas flattered by the

603


15/21

William. Shorrock

enthusiasticreception his new regimehad receivedin France.In addi-tion several solid Italian interests dictated her alignment with theFrench.Althoughin the long run fascist Italy was not averse o seeingGermany recover some of her strength in order to balance Frenchhegemony on the continent, for the moment Italy appreciatedthatFrance had power and the will to use it. If France should succeed incoercing Germany, Italian interests would clearly be best served bysupportingthe Frenchposition. Hence, the decisionwas takenin Romein December 1922, to support the Franco-Belgianoccupation of theRuhr as a means of forcing Germanyto pay reparations. taly wouldsend no troops, but her presencewas to be assuredby sendingseveraltechnicians and observers. This policy also found approvalamongnorthernItalianindustrialists,who, havinghelped Mussolini o power,were absolutely dependent upon continued coal deliveriesfrom theRuhr. It was felt that if the Frenchwere alienatedon the reparationsquestion, they might use their exclusiveposition in the Ruhrto placepressureon Italyby hindering he flow of coal acrossthe Alps.56The Duce himself indicatedthe final Italianposition on this matterin a conversationwith Charles-Rouxon 26 December 1922, 'My posi-tion is that Germanymust pay.' He went on to denounce Germanyenthusiasticallyand to label the currentxenophobiaof the Germansas'bestial'. Charles-Rouxconcluded: 'I must say that duringthe sevenyears I have been here, I have neverheardan Italianministerspeak insuch a tone about Germany.'59The charge'schronologyincluded thewar years and must have been warmlyreceived n Paris.On the sameday, Louis Barthou,France'sdelegateto the ReparationsCommission,put two motions to a vote before that body. The firstsimplynoted thatGermanyhad not entirely executed her responsibility or the deliveryof timber to Francein 1922; it was adoptedunanimouslyas a simplestatement of fact. Barthou's second motion, however, labelled Ger-many's non-execution of her reparationsresponsibilitiesas a defaultaccording o Paragraph 7 of Annexe II of the Treatyof Versailles.TheBritish delegate strenuously opposed the motion, since its passagewould empower the Commissionto considerthe use of coercivesanc-tions on Germany.The French,BelgianandItaliandelegates,however,supported the motion, and Germany was declared officially in de-fault.58 The ParisConferenceon reparationsmet from 2 to 4 January1923 and failed to resolvethe Franco-Britishdeadlock,and when theReparations Commission met again on 9 January,Italy once againvoted with France and Belgiumto authorizethe latters'joint occupa-tion of the Ruhr: the troops, along with severalItalian technicians,

604


16/21

Franceand the Rise of Fascismentered on 11 January. France had secured Italian support againstBritish opposition in one of the most serious issuesof the immediatepost-warperiod.Although it is quite true that the Italian enthusiasmfor the Ruhroccupation waned in the following months as fascist leadersbegantofear that a German inancialcollapsemight prejudicereparationsalto-gether, there were other strikingexamplesof Franco-Italian o-opera-tion. The most fascinatingwas the behind-the-scenesFrencheffort tosecurea face-savingoutcome for Italy in the Corfu affairof September1923, an incident which however,goes beyond the scope of this essay,although it does justify the observationthat Franco-Italian elationshad rarely been as peaceful and courteous as they were duringtheopeningmonths of the fascistregime.One Frenchobservercommentedthat:

official Franco-Italian relations were ameliorated under the fascist regime andwere no longer troubled by the very frequent coarse demonstrations whichoccurred before October 1922.59Frenchpolicy towardthe Italian fascists n the periodfrom 1920 to1923 representeda first attempt to deal with what John C. Caimshaslabelled the 'Italianenigma'within the Europeanforeignpolicy struc-ture of the interwarperiod.60 The Frenchdocuments illustratequiteclearly that the initial Frenchadmiration or the fascists derivedfromthe anti-socialistactivities of the fasci di combattimento and the ex-

pectation that they would contribute to returning Italy to somesemblance of order, a necessarycondition for the maintenanceof aviable foreign policy. Whenit was perceived n Paristhat fascist Italycould be enrolled in an anti-German ombination with France on thereparations ssue, relations between the two states became even morecordial. But the French attitude towardMussolini'sgovernment,evenamong those who were most enthusiasticabout a close Franco-Italianentente, was based upon more than optimistic expectations. The in-creasingly tepid Italian support for the Ruhr adventureimplied awarningfor France. In the long run, the entire Ruhrepisode, althoughtechnically a diplomatic victory for France, revealedthe dangersofconductingher foreign policy in opposition to that of England.This,coupled with the historically close relationship between Italy andEngland,encouragedthose who were most anxious to bring about aFranco-Italianentente to view it in terms of the state of relationsbetween France andEngland.Barrere,or example,advisedPoincar6on19 February 1924, fifteen months after Mussolini'sadvent to power,

605


17/21

William. Shorrock

that so long as the fascistregimesurvived n Italy:Franco-Italian elationswill alwaysbe conditionedby the state of our rela-tions with England.Witha Franco-Britishntente, if it is solid and basedonthe regulationof politicalinterests, ike the EntenteCordiale, he effect willbe to modify profoundlyour relationswith Italy andlargelyto diminish heimportanceof the differenceswhich could arise in the Mediterraneans aresultof the excessivepretensionsof Italianpolicy.6

Such thinkingwas to form the germof the Locarnocoalitionin 1925,where Englandand Italy served as guarantorsof the Rhinefrontier.Inthis instance the Franco-Italo-British ombination was designed toappease Germany. But Barrere'sformula, after a hiatus of nearly adecade, was retrievedin 1934 and 1935, when France attempted toerect a westerncoalitiondesigned o contain Germanexpansion.

Thus, there were several nfluentialvoices callingfor the continuedappeasementof fascistItaly in the eraimmediately ollowingthe rise ofMussolini. The communications of both Barrereand Charles-Rouxdepict Italian fascismas a stabilizingforce which, if handledproperly,could be enrolledin an anti-Germanront - preferably n combinationwith Englandbut if necessary n oppositionto her. The Italianreactionto the occupationof the Ruhrappeared o bear out their assessments.In addition,political figuresof the statureof Henryde Jouvenel,whowas to become ambassadoro Rome in the 1930s, advocateda numberof economic concessions to Italy in 1923 in order 'to fortify . . .hereconomic resistanceagainstGermany.'He proposed Italianparticipa-tion in the coal and iron wealth of France;expansionof job openingsfor Italiansin French colonies; the maintenanceof Italiannationalityrightsin Tunisia;a Franco-Italian ssociation o exploit oil resources nTurkey and southernRussia;and a customsagreementgivingreciprocaltradingadvantages o Franceand Italy.62 Chastenetmaintainsthat by1923 fascismexerciseda certainattractionon allpartiesof the right nFrance.6 3But despite substantial support for continued efforts to maintainclose relations with Italy, the Quai d'Orsay abandonedthis policy.Throughoutthe late 1920s andearly 1930s, it wasunder the controlofAristideBriandand PhilippeBerthelot,who, assecretarygeneralof theForeignMinistryfrom 1920 until 1934 (except for a periodof disgracefrom 1922 to 1925 during he PoincareandHerriotministries),wieldedenormous influence over French foreign policy: his hostility to Italywas well-known.64 Briand, whose uninterruptedtenure at the Quaid'Orsayextended from 1925 untilhis retirement n 1.932,was obsessed

606


18/21

France and the Rise of Fascism

with seekingsecurite throughreconciliationwith Germany,rather hanthroughbuildinga front againsther. The Briand-Berthelotombination,therefore, tended to ignore Franco-Italianrelations, and the issueswhich had plaguedthe two statesin the pre-fascistera surfacedagain nintensified form. The 'pro-Italians'gained control of the ForeignMinistryonly in 1932, andunder the directionof JosephPaul-Boncour(December 1932-January 1934) and Pierre Laval (November1934-January1936) attemptedto recapture he policies advocatedbyBarrereand instituted by the Poincareministry in the crucialperiodfollowing the inception of the fascist regimein Italy. By that time,however, it was too late for the Anglo-Franco-Britishombinationtowork effectively againstGerman reaty violations.The 'Italianenigma'was moreenigmaticthan ever:althoughthe appealof sucha diplomaticconstruct remainedpervasiven certainFrenchcircles,the 'Stresafront'against Germany created during the Laval stewardshipof the Quaid'Orsaywas short-lived,failing tragicallyto contain the expansionofthe ThirdReich.

NOTES

1. France, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, S6rie 'Europe, 1918-1929',Sous-serie Italie, Z 374-4, 96, 34-38. These unpublished documents, declassifiedin 1972, are located in the Archives of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres inParis. (Hereafter abbreviated: MAE, Italie.)2. Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Politique francaise, 1919-1940 (Paris 1947), 14.Flandin was to become premier twice and foreign minister once during theturbulent period from 1934 to 1936.3. Charles Monchicourt, Les Italiens de Tunisie et l'accord Laval-Mussolini(Paris 1938), 8-16.4. Carlo Sforza, Les Freres ennemies (Paris 1933), 228.5. MAE,PapiersBarrre, VII, 127-133.6. Ibid., 114-117; see also Georges Suarez, Briand, sa vie, son oeuvre, V(Paris 1941), 209.7. MAE, Papiers Barrere, VII, 66-72 (from Barrere's notes on the San RemoConference of April 1920).8. For example see MAE, Italie, Z 375-1, 212, 12, 53-54, 59. In fact this

607


19/21

WilliamL Shorrockentire volume is devoted to German propaganda activities in Italy from 1918 to1929.9. MAE, Papiers Barrere, I, 151-52.10. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 79, 83-88 (dispatch from Charles-Roux to Mille-rand). Barrere also sounded an optimistic note in a letter to Millerand on 22 June1920. MAE, Papiers Barrere, VI, 108.11. MAE, Italie, Z 372-2, 3, 4, 5, 74, 17-19 (Barrere to Briand, 22 February1921); 61 (Communique to Quai d'Orsay from Surete Generale, 3 May 1921); Z374-1, 79, 140-145 (Barrire to Briand, 15 March 1921).12. MAE,Italie, Z 372-1, 60, 20-25.13. Ibid., 59, 56-58 (20 April 1920), 67-69 (10 May 1920).

14. Ibid., 60, 9-12.15. Ibid., 31-35.16. Ibid., 87-89.17. Ibid., 121-23.18. MAE, Italie, Z 372-2, 3, 4, 5, 74, 21 (1 March 1921).19. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 60, 141-42 (22 March 1921).20. MAE, Italie, Z 372-2, 3, 4, 5, 74, 72-75 (4 July 1921).21. William A. Renzi, 'Mussolini's Sources of Financial Support, 1914-1915'in History, LVI (June 1971), 189-206. French subsidies were designed to en-courage Mussolini's interventionist campaign in II Popolo d'Italia after his dis-missal as editor of the socialist newspaper, Avanti! See also Jacques Chastenet,Histoire de la Troisieme Republique, V (Paris 1952), 100.22. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 60, 185-86.23. Ibid., 61, 41-43.24. Ibid., 131-32 (5 June 1922). The telegram describes a deal made byMussolini with other parliamentary leaders regarding the seating of twelve fascistdeputies who had been elected before attaining legal age. It was agreed that thosewho had attained legal age since the election could keep their seats. The fascists,therefore, lost only two seats instead of all twelve.25. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 61, 166-67.

26. Ibid., 169.27. Ibid., 62, 5-6.28. MAE, Italie, Z 374-9, 125, 51-52.29. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 62, 43-44 (Barrere to Poincar6, 11 October 1922).30. Le Temps, 25 October 1922.31. Le Petit Parisien, 28 October 1922.32. Le Matin, 24 October 1922.33. Le Gaulois, 24 October 1922.34. Flandin, op. cit., 90.35. Mussolini was shortly to move the offices of the Foreign Ministry fromthe Consulta to the Palazzo Chigi.36. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 81, 31; Z 372-1, 62, 120, 122, 142-45.37. John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: The Viewfrom America (Prince-ton 1972), 22-29. Diggins shows that a number of leading American newspapers,as well as mass circulation magazines like the Saturday Evening Post, took aninitially favourable view of the nascent fascist experiment.38. For example see leading editorials in the following: La Petite Republique,29 October 1922; Le Temps, 1 and 2 November; Le Matin, 31 October; L'Intran-

608


20/21

France and the Rise of Fascismsigeant, 31 October and 2 and 5 November; Le Gaulois, 31 October and 1November; Le Petit Parisien, 3 November.39. Comte Carlo Sforza, Illusions et realites de l'Europe (Neuchatel 1944),22-24.

40. Paul Cambon, Correspondance, III (Paris 1946), 421; Alan Cassels,Musso-lini's Early Diplomacy (Princeton 1970), 9.41. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 81, 33, 34-35 (two telegrams from Charles-Roux toPoincare on 1 November 1922); Cassels, op. cit., 9; Raffaele Guariglia, LaDiplomatie difficile, Memoires, 1922-1946 (Paris 1955), 4.42. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 62, 252-55 (dispatch from Charles-Roux to Poin-car6, 17 November 1922).43. Jules Laroche, Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincare, 1913-1926 (Paris1937), 167.44. Cassels, op. cit., 15-16.45. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 62, 188-89 (3 November 1922); see also 196-204 (6November 1922), 232-42 (15 November 1922). The theme of governmentalstability in Italy as a desirable prerequisite for the reestablishment of closerItalo-French relations can also be found in Le Temps, 7 December 1922. Thisleading article was written by Ludovic Naudeau, whose advocacy of an Italo-French entente is pursued in his book, L 'Italie fasciste ou l'autre danger (Paris1927), especially chapter V.46. MAE, Italie, Z 372-2, 3, 4, 5, 70-74.47. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 62, 224 (telegram from Barrere to Poincare, 11November 1922).48. Le Temps, 11, 12, 18 November 1922.49. MAE, Italie, Z 372-1, 63, 64-73.50. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 93, 14-15, 22-23.51. Franqois Charles-Roux, 'La France et l'Italie des armistices a Locarno' inRevue des deux mondes (1 March 1926), 194-96; Cassels, op. cit., 16, 47.52. Chastenet, op. cit., 101.53. Comte de Saint-Aulaire, Confession d'un vieux diplomat (Paris 1953),

643-44.54. MAE, Papiers Barrere, III, 218, 219. Letters dated 7 and 12 December1922.55. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 81, 90-95. Charles-Roux expressed this possibilityin a dispatch to Poincare on 13 December 1922. See also: Rene Albrecht-Carrie,France, Europe and the Two World Wars(Geneva 1960), 133.56. Cassels, op. cit., 54-56.57. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 81, 101-05 (telegram to Poincare).58. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923 (London1927), 192-93.59. Naudeau, op. cit., 78-79.60. Professor Cairns used the expression in an article entitled 'March7, 1936,Again: The View from Paris: in International Journal, XX (Spring 1965), 230-46.61. MAE, Italie, Z 374-1, 83, 34-42.62. MAE, Italie, Z 374-4, 93, 48-52. Jouvenel's proposals had originallyappeared in an article in Le Matin. They were reproduced in this Foreign MinistryNote for the Director of Political Affairs with instructions that they be communi-cated to the French Embassy in Rome.

609


21/21

William. Shorrock63. Chastenet, op. cit., 262.64. See for example: Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres: Souvenirs surla troisieme Republique, II (Paris 1945), 337-40; Flandin, op. cit., 94-95.

ANTI-RELIGIOUS PROPAGANDA IN THE SOVIET UNIONA Study of Mass PersuasionDavid E PowellThis study concentrates on the attempts in the Soviet Union to repress theOrthodox, Catholic, Jewish and Moslem faiths through education, propagandaand agitation, giving information based on official Soviet documents, Sovietscholarly research and the insights of Western social science. The book focuses onthe programmed use of the mass media; indoctrination in schools; lectures aimedat older audiences; substitution of secular equivalents for religious concepts,institutions and rites; and efforts of agitators to promote "scientific atheism"through face-to-face contact with individual believers. The author finds that, fromthe Soviet viewpoint, such measures have been at best of limited success and atworst counterproductive. Published September ?13.75.WATCHMEN IN THE NIGHTPresidential Accountability after WatergateTheodore C SorensonIn this examination of what Nixon's reign and resignation mean to the Americanpresidency, Theodore Sorenson refutes some currently popular beliefs. Specific-ally, he attacks the notions that Nixon's departure ended the problem of presi-dential misconduct for another decade or more; that Nixon was a strong Presidentand thus proof of the dangers of a strong presidency; that Nixon's ouster willcause future presidents to be weak; that Nixon's pardon will cause futurepresidents to be reckless. Sorenson sorts out what was new and different aboutWatergate, including some frank admissions about the Kennedy White House.?4.50.THE M I T PRESS 126 Buckingham Palace Road, London SW1W 9SD

610

france and the rise of fascism in italy 1919-23

Documents