forecasting crime development - ukazka

1. A Forecast of Crime Trendsin the Slovak Republic

I.

1.A Forecast of Crime Trends in the Slovak RepublicKvětoň Holcr, Centre of Science, Bratislava School of Law, Slovak Republicand Robert Chalka, Ministry of Justice, Slovak Republic

Unusually dynamic and, at the same time, positive economic, social,legislative, cultural and other changes which are typical of the currentdevelopment in Europe have also a negative aspect – they are abused by crime. Itis in the nature of crime to quickly and very effectively misuse the imperfections aswell as virtues of the ongoing integration processes. The recent enlargement ofthe European Union and, in particular, the enlargement of the area of freemovement of persons and goods among the countries of the Schengen area isvery likely to have an impact (rather a negative one) on the crime scenes of thecountries concerned and to strengthen even more their mutual interaction. Thespace for the workings of criminal organisations will significantly grow in size whichwill facilitate their criminal activities. Likewise, there is a probability that thisenlargement will increase (at least temporarily) their head start ahead of thecriminal justice and the bodies of crime control, in general.

Crime is therefore no longer a burden of particular countries divided byborders and is becoming a serious, long-term challenge, common to all thecountries integrated into supranational structures. There is no doubt that theinternational nature of crime will be strengthened significantly by the enlargementof the Schengen area of free movement of persons, goods and services.

That, however, means that a systematic, intensive and real cooperation incrime control is turning from its (often subjective) beneficial optionality into anobjective must. Therefore it is highly desirable to systematically integrateintellectual and personal potential of particular countries and tackle commonissues within joint international projects. We could assess the possibilities of ourcooperation in the debate.

I am calling for a real cooperation, aware of the fact that there will be a seriesof difficult issues in need of solution. In particular, I am referring to:

a) differences in the definition of crime in criminal law of EU countries,

b) differences in the definition of criminal liability of offenders,

c) different level of willingness to report crime and cooperate with the police,

d) different methods of processing crime statistics, etc.

The above-mentioned as well as other (hopefully, temporary) obstacles canbe overcome if the processes chosen for the cooperation will emphasise commonissues (which are, no doubt, in majority) and minimise or even eliminate more

A Forecast of Crime Trends in the Slovak Republic

99

I.1.

serious differences. An international cooperation of experts in crime forecastingstems from the very substance of forecasting as a specific kind of scientificknowledge.

Whether using its more narrow, legal (criminal law) or a broader (sociological)definition, crime is, above all, a social phenomenon whose examination isinevitably accompanied by disadvantages, typical of investigation of social issuesin general:a) there is, particularly, an absence of exact laws and, as a result, also a lack of

knowledge of causal connections (unlike natural phenomena),b) participants of social activities are humans whose actions are not motivated

exclusively by rationality or socially approved motives, etc.

As a result, crime is also inevitably burdened by a high level of objective andsubjective uncertainty and the aim of crime forecast is not nor it cannot be toeliminate the uncertainty of its development altogether, but to minimise it toa lesser or greater degree.

Correct crime forecasts do not aim to provide categorical, conclusivestatements of its future trends, but their objective is to reduce the scale of thepossible to the more or less probable, all that under exactly defined terms.

The value of criminological forecasts does not lie only in their theoretical,cognitive contribution. Forecasts are not considered an aim but, above all, aninstrument of enforcing crime control, a tool of effective action. Therefore we callthis criminological forecasting “participative” which wants to express an activeinvolvement in influencing future crime trends. Crime forecasting and control aretherefore perceived as two sides of our theoretical and practical activities.

The forecast presented is a partial output of a scientific and research task,carried out by the Faculty of Law of Bratislava School of Law and the Department ofCriminology and Crime Prevention of the Ministry of Justice of the SlovakRepublic. It forms its first part which deals with overall crime, its state, structure,

FORECASTING CRIME DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL OF CRIMEIN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

10

offenders and victims. The time of my speech is limited by our agenda and it doesnot allow even for a brief summary of forecasting trends in particular types of crime(violent, property, sexual, economic, drug and organised) which is the subject ofthe final report of the above-mentioned task.1)

Total crimeTotal crime includes all recorded crimes committed in the Slovak Republic.

A realistic forecast of trends in its state, structure and dynamics is based on thefollowing assumptions: preservation of political stability and social peace,a long-term sustainable economic growth and its more significant reflection inpositive social changes, in particular, a higher standard of living of the majority ofpopulation, preservation of a relatively low unemployment rate, a futher increase ofeducation level and professional skills of the population in line with (above all,national, but also foreign) labour market, possible interventions of criminal law incrime will affect penalisation (depenalisation), not criminalisation (decriminalisation)of merits, but what is more important, the citizens themselves will be able to takecare of their safety and property at least to the same extent. It is these preventiveactivities of citizens which are a decisive factor in the positive (decreasing) trend incrime in general (above all, however, in property, violent and, in part, also sexualcrime).

Naturally, forecasting also counts with a parallel existence of undesirablefactors, in particular: only average performance of the police (decreasing crimedetection, insufficient preparation to detect ever more sophisticated crime,a rather low degree of citizens’ trust in the police), delays in bringing offenders tojustice, weaker formative impact of the family, school, media, inappropriatebehaviour of some public officials, a lower degree of solidarity and honesty amongcitizens, etc.

Nevertheless, factors supporting or, on the contrary, weakening crime asa mass and socially dangerous phenomenon work within its particular types ina specific way and with a different intensity. They are described in more detail inthe introductory parts of forecasts of the already mentioned types of crime.

The overall crime levels are very likely to reflect to a great extent the trends inproperty (and partly also economic) crime. Assuming that citizens will continue toimprove the protection of their property, there is a high probability that total crime willnot be higher than 120 000 crimes, but neither will it fall under 100 000 crimes inthe given time frame (graph 1).

A pessimistic alternative (a crime rise to over 10%) would significantlystimulate factors boosting property or drug crime. It is not very likely to occurbefore 2010.


1111

I.1.

1) The project and the final report of the scientific and research task “A Forecast of Trends in Crimeand Its Control in the Slovak Republic“ are available in the library of Bratislava School of Law.

Even less likely is the optimistic alternative (crime fall by more than 10%). Itwould mean a more significant prevalence of mitigating factors over theaccelerating ones of which there is a very low probability.

Graph 1: Total crime

Crime structureOverall crime structure is very likely to be dominated by property crimes

which will account for over 50% of all crimes. The second and third place willbelong to economic crimes, making up approximately 15%, and violent crimeswith about a 10% share in total crime. Sexual and drug offences are likely torepresent less than 1% of total crime (graph 2).

Typical property crime (thefts) and a proportion of economic crime ofproperty nature (for example, frauds, embezzlement) is very likely to make upapproximately 75% of total crime. If the share of property and economic crime is tochange, economic crime rate will increase in inverse proportion to property crime.

Graph 2: Types of crime (in %)


12

Crime offendersThe number and structure of total crime offenders will be closely related to its

state and structure. The highest proportion will be perpetrators of property (30%),economic (15%) and violent crime (10%). Drug offenders will represent about 2%and sexual offenders up to 1% (graph 3). The data taken into account refer to knownoffenders. It is almost certain that their number is much higher and very probable thatthey are even many times higher (particularly with property, sexual and drug crime).

The proportion of total crime offenders is very likely to change according totheir gender. The evidently high proportion of men (about 90%) is going todecrease moderately while the proportion of women is going to experience amoderate rise. The intensity of this shift is going to reflect a greater involvement ofwomen in public life, particularly employment and more senior working positions.A mass entry of women into the once exclusively male professions and positionswill broaden their opportunities for criminal behaviour and action.

Graph 3: Total crime offenders by gender (in %)

An increase in female offenders is more likely in property and economiccrime, less in violent and drug crime. Their share in sexual crime will remain almostunchanged (graph 4).

Graph 4: Female offenders (in %)


1313

I.1.

Age structure of total crime offenders will be stable in the considered timeperiod but also more distant future. Changes in age structure of offenders will begradual, without any surprising leaps. An unforeseen proportion of offendersaccording to age will feature only in less numerous and not “traditional” crimes (forexample, racially aggravated violence, extremism, etc.)

The number of juvenile offenders is very likely to have an unchanged (ratherdecreasing) tendency. A fall in recorded juvenile crime is visible also inneighbouring countries (for example, the Czech Republic).2)

There is a strong probability that about a half of total crime offenders will beyoung adults (aged 19 to 35). There will be a permanent, however not very strongrise in the proportion of middle-aged adults (aged 36 to 55) as well as older adults(over 55 years) (graph 5).

Graph 5: Total crime offendenrs by age (in %)

Changes in the structure and ways of committing crime will have a significantimpact on the level of education structure of total crime offenders. There isa strong possibility that approximately 75% of offenders will have elementaryeducation or a certificate of apprenticeship and, at the same time, there will bea rise in the number of offenders with secondary education. By the end of the timeframe considered (by 2010) the number of offenders with secondary educationwill have almost doubled (compared to 1997). The number of university graduatesamong offenders will oscillate between 2% and 3% (graph 6).

An increase in the number of offenders with secondary education is highly likelyto be reflected in economic crime and, by contrast, their number will decrease in


14

2) See Marešová, A.: Klesá kriminalita mládeže? In: Karlovarská právní revue. 2/2006, pp. 39 – 44.

violent crime. They will represent about 20% to 30% among property offenders andup to 1% among sexual offenders.

Graph 6: Total crime offenders by education (in %)

The most numerous groups of offenders by education will, however, notrepresent the highest risk. The high number of offenders with a certificate ofapprenticeship (graph 7a) is mainly a result of being the most numerous groupamong the population. In terms of education, the largest proportion of offenders(number of offenders per 100 000 persons of the same education group) willcome from the group with elementary education, then “apprenticeship” followedby secondary education and the least offending group will, as usual, be universitygraduates (graph 7b).

Graph 7a: Total crime offenders (2007) Offenders per 100 000 inhabitants

The structure of offenders according to their specific features is shown ingraph 8. There is a great likelihood that the dominant group will the unemployedwith a more than 50% share. About 20% of total crime offenders will be of theRoma ethnic minority, with significant differences in their proportion in various


1515

I.1.

types of crime (as much as 40% in sexual crime, up to 35% in property crime andthe least, between 12% to 15%, in economic crime). A moderate increase is likelyto take place in the rate of offenders who have not been sentenced before(first-time offenders) whose share in total crime will oscillate around 80%. Thenumber of recidivists will not exceed 20%. Homeless offenders will continue torepresent an insignificant share, less than 1%, in total crime.

Graph 8: Total Crime offenders by specific features (in %)

Victims of crime

There are significant differences among personal characteristics, circumstancesand other conditions of behaving or acting as an offender or a victim of crimeand therefore the structure of offenders will, too, be different. There isa high probability that the changes to the structure of victims of total crime bygender (compared to the structure of offenders) will be less significant. Thediffence in the number of victims of total crime by gender will be much less visiblethan among offenders. The number of male victims of total crime is very unlikely toexceed the number of female victims by more than 10% (graph 9). Concerning thenumber of property crime victims, the difference between men and women will beeven smaller (men will prevail by about 3% to 5%), by contrast, in sexual crime,there will be a markedly high difference (prevalence of women by as much as80%).

Police statistics do not and will not include those persons who becomevictims out of their own will, are not and will not be willing to report criminalactivity, the less so to cooperate with the police in its detection. These are mainlyreal victims of drug crime (drug users), some sexual crimes, bribery, etc.Although they will not have a significant share in total crime even in the time frameconsidered, their implications –social, moral and human, in general– will be veryserious.


16

Graph 9: Victims of total crime

A positive decreasing trend in the number of victims of total crime (above all,property and violent) which started after 2002 is very likely to continue.A decrease in the number of victims of crime in the given time frame will be fasterthan a decrease in the number of committed crimes as well as their offenders(graph 10).

This decrease will not be provoked so much by the total fall in crime but ratherpreventive behaviour of potential victims themselves, particularly in property crimeand, to a considerable extent, also violent crime. The fact that citizens pay moreattention to the protection of their property may be one of the reasons whyoffenders are starting to turn to economic crime.

Graph 10: Decrease in victims of crime – natural persons (years 2002 = 100%)

In terms of gender, there will be a marked difference between the structure ofvictims of crime and structure of offenders. Both men and women will represent


1717

I.1.

about 50% of victims, thus corresponding to their proportion in total population.The tendency will be a moderate rise in the number of men, but the difference willhardly exceed 10% (graph 11).

Graph 11: Victims of crime by gender (in %)

The structure of victims of crime by age will, too, be relatively stable. Almost70% will be aged 19 to 55 and be mainly people of working age who owncommodities interesting to offenders, lead an active social life, are in everydaycontact with strangers, etc. Their prevalence among victims of crime will thereforenot be so much a consequence of their slight majority in population (about 53%)but rather a result of the above-mentioned features.

The structure of victims by age in various types of crime will be very diverse.The most significant differences will be in the lowest age groups. Children (under15 years of age) will account for as much as 70% of victims of sexual offences, butonly about 6% of violence and 8% of property crime. Victims aged 19 to 65 willmake up about 75% of total crime, 80% of violent offences, 72% of property crimeand only 18% of sexual offences. People over the age of 65 will most oftenbecome victims of property crime (about 12%) and violent offences (about 6%).The media-fuelled public opinion of above-average victimisation of people of olderage does not reflect reality and the same applies to the age group of minors(graph 12).

A very probable, however, is the hypothesis on above-average victimisationof minors and older people concerning delinquency. However, a suppositionthat minors and elderly people become victims of small thefts, frauds, aggresiveassaults, etc. (which, however, do not accomplish elements of a crime) moreoften than people of working age is based on unconfirmed and incompleteinformation.


18

Graph 12: Victims of total crime by age (in %)

Losses caused by crime

Differences in the amount of losses caused by total crime in the lastdecade have been so great that their estimate would not be reliable, either.Forecasting the cost of damage caused by total crime is therefore highlyproblematic. A high degree of uncertainty of trends in losses caused by total crimeis caused almost exclusively by the unpredictability of losses caused by economiccrime which ranged from 2.7 bn SKK in 1998 to 57.1 bn SKK in 2003 (graph 13).As a result, they accounted for 38% of total offences in 1998 up to 93% in 2003(graph 14).

Despite great losses caused by economic crime, the broad public willtolerate it more than other types of crime because, in most cases, people do notfeel its consequences immediately. Even many institutions who incurred losses byeconomic crime will not be willing to report it to the police in order not to lose their“reputation” and trust of clients. Dark figures of economic crime will, therefore,remain quite high.


1919

I.1.

Graph 13: Losses caused by economic crime (in bn)

Graph 14: Losses caused by crime (in %)

In the time frame considered, property crime will continue to account for atleast 50% of total crime, thus continuing to distort public opinion on the extent ofdamage caused thereby. The extent of damage caused by property crime is likelyto equal 4 to 4.5 bn SKK (but not exceeding a 20% rise compared with 1998).Damage caused by thefts from the person, of which the public is least tolerant, willmake up only less than 2% of total property crime, that is about 70 million SKK.The citizens will be equally sensible to domestic burglaries, but neither here willthe cost of damage (around 160 million SKK) be among the highest ones. Thehighest losses will be incurred by thefts of vehicles (almost 2 bn per year) despitetheir moderate decrease and thefts from vehicles (around 400 million) whosenumber will remain quite high, with about 11 000 thefts per year (graph 15).


20

Graph 15: Losses caused by property crime (in mln)

For quite a long time (since 2001), however, there has been an unsatisfactorytrend in the detection of crime, of great concern being especially a fall in thedetection of the most serious crime (violent, sexual, etc.) which used to be high,over 80-90% (graph 16). We consider the very detection of crime an auxiliaryindicator of control, however, not an insignificant one. A long-term low detection ofcrime would, no doubt, be its accelerating factor, reassuring the potential offendersof a decreasing risk of being caught and brought to justice. If the decreasing trend inthe detection of crime could not be at least brought to a halt (which is very unlikely),then even the extreme instrument of crime control –harsher punishments– wouldnot act as a deterrent.

Graph 16: Detection of crime


2121

I.1.

ConclusionCrime scene in the Slovak Republic is (without oversimplifying) comparable to

the state, structure and trends in crime in other countries of the European Union,and particularly the Visegrad countries. Its future trends will be conditioned, aboveall, by internal factors which, nevertheless, does not exclude an impact of anexternal factor. Already by the end of the time frame considered (by 2010), newcriminogenic and anticriminogenic factors are likely to affect the trends in crime,brought about by the enlargement of the Schengen area. This will lead tothe further strengthening of mutual interaction of crime scenes in Europeancountries.

Therefore, I call for the consideration of our possibilities to join our human,intellectual and other resources and negotiate our possible cooperation in a jointinternational project. Establishing a permanent or, at least, a long-term researchcooperation would mean that we have accomplished one of the main goals of ourinternational seminar.


22

forecasting crime development - ukazka

Documents

definition of crime

crime forecastingstems

forecast of crime trendsin

bodies of crime control

crime scenes of thecountries

morea forecast of crime

criminal law of eu countries

slovak republici