I

Breaking the ImpasseForging an EU Leadership Initiativeon Climate Change

A policy paper by

Hermann E. Ott and Sebastian Oberthür

I HEINRICH BULL FOUNDATIONWORLD SUMMIT 2002 JOHANNESBURG

Papers No. 3

BR

EA

KIN

GT

HE

IMP

AS

SE

forg

ing

anE

UL

eadersh

ipIn

itiative

onC

limate

Change

4’A

policypap

erby

,;

Herm

ann

E.

Ott

andS

ebastianO

berth

ür

1

Pu

blish

edby

theH

einrichB

ollF

ou

nd

ation

Thanks

CO

NT

EN

TS

The

authorsw

ouldlike

tothank

Bill

Hare,

Reinhard

Loske,

$aschaM

üller-Kraenner

andT

homas

Gehring

forcom

menting

onan

earlierversion

ofthe

paper.R

esponsibilityfor

thecontent

andany

errorsrem

ains,of

course,solely

with

theauthors.

Many

thanksgo

furthermore

toH

aukevon

SehtE

xecutiveS

umm

ary5

andB

erndB

rounsfor

theirassistance

andto

JohannahB

ernsteinfor

herinvaluable

editingw

ork.

We

alsogratefully

acknowledge

thesupport

ofthe

Heinrich

Boll

Foundationin

theproduction

ofP

reface7

thispaper.

Break

ing

the

Impasse:

Forg

ing

anE

UL

eadersh

ipIn

itiative

on

Clim

ateC

han

ge

-

1.Introduction

10

2.T

heL

andscapeof

InternationalC

limate

Politics

atthe

Turn

ofthe

Century

11

2. 1T

heD

omestic

Clim

ateP

olicyof

theM

ajorP

layersafter

Kyoto

12

2.2T

heP

ost-Kyoto

InternationalA

rena16

2.3C

onclusion:T

heS

tateof

Clim

ateP

olicyand

some

Underlying

Factors

1$

.

3.T

heE

uropeanU

nionm

ustlead

onC

limate

Change

19

3. 1T

heR

ationaleof

aL

eadershipInitiative

onC

limate

Change

20

3.2T

heF

irstE

lement

ofa

Leadership

Initiative22

3.3T

heS

econdE

lement

ofa

Leadership

Initiative24

3.4T

heT

hirdE

lement

ofa

Leadership

Initiative26

4.C

onclusion28

The

Authors

30

World

Summ

it Papersof

theH

einrichB

ollFoundation,

No.

3:B

reakingthe

Impasse:

Forgingan

EU

Leadership

Initiativeon

Clim

ateC

hange.A

policypaper

byL

iterature31

Herm

annE.

Ott

andSebastian

OberthU

r.Published

bythe

Heinrich

Boll

Foundation

Notes

33Printed

inG

ermany

©H

einrich-Boll-Stiftung,

Berlin,

June2001

All

rightsreserved

Production:trigger,

Berlin

The

following

publicationdoes

notnecessarily

representthe

views

ofthe

Heinrich

Boll

Foun

dation.T

hepublication

may

bereproduced

inparts

providedthat

thesource

istm

entioned.

This

policypaper

ispreviously

releasedin

1999.

To

orderthis

publication:H

einrich-Boll-Stiftung,

Rosenthaler

Str.40/41,

10178B

erlin,

Tel.

0049-30-285340, Fax:0049-30-28534

109, E-m

ail:info

@boell.de

Internet:w

ww

.boell.de

2

EX

EC

UT

IVE

SU

MM

AR

Y

The

Kyoto

Protocol

hasthe

potentialto

providean

important

basisfor

thefurther

develop-

ment

ofinternational

climate

policyin

thenext

millennium

.F

ullim

plementation

byin-

dustrialisedcountries

oftheir

differentiatedtargets

would

notonly

leadto

astahilisation

of

emissions

at1995

levels,but

itw

ouldalso

ensurea

reversalof

currentem

issiontrends.

How

ever,tw

oyears

afterits

adoptionthere

continuesto

bem

uchuncertainty

aboutthe

potentialeffectiveness

ofthe

Protocol.

Concerns

regardingeffectiveness

arein

largepart

relatedto

thehigh

thresholdfor

itsentry

intoforce.

The

more

progressiveindustrialised

countries(prim

arilyE

UM

ember

States)

arenow

waiting

forthe

US

toexercise

responsibilityand

joinforces

with

themin

fulfillingtheir

obligations.H

owever,

theU

Sand

otherlaggard

countriessuch

asA

ustraliaare

attempting

tostall

actionin

theinternational

arenain

orderto

extractm

oreconcessions

within

the

ongoingnegotiation

process.F

romtheir

perspective,the

longerthe

delayin

reaching

agreement

andcom

mencing

action,the

easierit

will

befor

themto

arguefor

weaker

obligationson

thebasis

thatexisting

onesare

nolonger

realisticnor

viable.

Ithas

become

patentlyclear

thatinternational

climate

policyat

theturn

ofthe

millennium

lacksboth

mom

entumand

leadership.It

istherefore

criticalat

thisjuncture

fora

strong

playerto

takethe

lead.A

tthis

point,the

EU

isthe

onlycandidate

who

couldreasonably

forgea

Leadership

Initiativeon

climate

change.L

edby

theU

nion,a

coalitioncould

be

formed

among

thosecountries

who

areactively

comm

ittedto

strongclim

ateprotection

policy.M

oreover,the

EU

couldsuccessfully

buildsupport

aroundspecific

issuesfrom

countriesw

itheconom

iesin

transition(including

Russia),

fromseveral

comm

ittedde

velopingcountries,

andas

well,

fromJapan

(asthe

hostof

theK

yotoconference).

This

approachw

ouldlead

tothe

creationof

anew

criticalm

assof

supportthat

isabsolutely

necessaryfor

breathingnew

lifeinto

theinternational

climate

policyprocess.

The

EU

Leadership

Initiativecould

focuson

thefollow

ingcore

elements.

First,

theearly

andp

rom

pt

ratfIcation

ofthe

Kyoto

Protocol

shouldbe

atop

priorityto

ensureits

timely

entryinto

force.G

iventhe

currentS

enate-drivenresistance

ofthe

US

towards

ratification,

itis

absolutelyessential

thatthe

EU

,Japan

andR

ussiaratify

theP

rotocol.T

heircom

bined

ratificationis

requiredin

orderto

meet

them

inimum

thresholdof

55%of

thetotal

CO

2

emissions

ofA

nnexI

Parties

(at1990

levels).T

heU

nionm

usttherefore

initiatea

process

toitself

ratifythe

agreement

assoon

aspossible,

without

waiting

forother

countries,in

particular,the

US.

Itm

ustalso

startexploring

possiblew

aysin

which

agreement

couldbe

reachedw

ithR

ussiaand

Japanto

engagetheir

comm

itment

toratify

theP

rotocolas

well.

This

will

requirea

carefullydesigned

diplomatic

effortinvolving

comprom

iseon

allsides.

As

partof

thisbargaining

process,the

EU

might

haveto

demonstrate

increasedflexibility

with

regardto

theK

yotoM

echanisms.

As

aresult,

itshould

bepossible

toagree

ona

fee

onall

tradingtransactions,

asw

ellas

strictm

onitoring,reporting

andverification

pro

ce

dures,w

hichensure

theenvironm

entallyeffective

useof

theinstrum

ents.If

aco

mp

rehen

siveplan

canbe

established,the

EU

shouldalso

beable

toprevent

afurther

dilutionof

the

sinkcategories

underthe

Protocol.

5

Second,

anE

UL

eadershipInitiative

shouldintroduce

measures

fordom

esticim

plemen

tationof

theK

yotoobligations

andshould

encouragethe

internationalco-ordination

of

suchm

easures.N

umerous

studieshave

providedevidence

ofthe

vastpotential

oflow

-cost

andno-cost

optionsfor

reducinggreenhouse

gasem

issionsin

theE

Uand

elsewhere.

Concerns

aboutreduced

economic

competitiveness

couldbe

minim

isedby

aco-ordination

ofpolicies,

most

importantly

with

Japan.T

heE

Uand

itsM

ember

States

havea

wealth

of

experiencein

policyco-ordination

which

couldprovide

asound

basisfor

pursuing

internationalco-operation.

The

co-ordinationshould

notconsist

ofcom

mon,

bindingm

easuresbut

shouldfocus

ona

transparentand

accountableprocess

ofco-ordination,

which

couldstand

upto

ahigh

standardof

publicscrutiny.

thorder

tobe

successful,the

initiativeshould

concentrateon

a

limited

setof

measures

uponw

hichagreem

entis

most

likely.A

leadershipgroup

of

comm

ittedcountries

couldthus

demonstrate

thatecological

protectionand

sustained

economic

growth

arenot

onlycom

patible,but

alsom

utuallyreinforcing

targets.P

otential

areasof

fruitfulco-ordination

couldinclude

‘greentaxation”,

alarge-scale

R&

Deffort

for

renewables

andthe

efficientuse

ofenergy,

dismantling

climate

adversesubsidies,

energy

efficiencystandards

and,finally,

climate

friendlypublic

procurement.

Third,

theinvolvem

entof

developingcountries

inthe

climate

processis

ofutm

ostim

portancefor

them

ediumand

longterm

effectivenessof

climate

protectionand

forthe

futuredevelopm

entof

theinternational

climate

regime.

Developing

countries’needs

and

interestsm

ustbe

addressedfirst.

Imm

ediateem

phasism

ightfocus

onan

adaptationstrategy.

This

shouldinclude

them

obilisingof

additionalresources

foradaptation,

e.g.

throughthe

establishment

ofan

adaptationfund

financedby

atransaction

feeon

allK

yoto

Mechanism

s.F

urtherefforts

shouldbe

directedat

theco-operative

elaborationof

the

Clean

Developm

entM

echanism(C

DM

)under

Article

12of

theK

yotoP

rotocol.T

hisw

ill

ensurethat

theneeds

ofdeveloping

countriesare

dulyrecognised

without

comprom

ising

onthe

ecologicaleffectiveness.

And

finally,the

European

Union

andits

alliesshould

enter

intoa

constructivem

edium-term

dialoguew

ithdeveloping

countrieson

thefair

and

equitableallocation

ofem

issionrights.

Ifthis

proposedE

UL

eadershipJiiitiative

canbe

successfullyestablished,

itw

illcatalyse

numerous

opportunities.It

will

reinvigoratethe

Kyoto

Protocol

andw

illcreate

further

incentivesto

governments

toim

plement

effectivepolicies

andm

easuresto

mitigate

climate

change.It

will

alsogenerate

much

neededpublic

awareness

todem

onstratethat

economic

well-being

canbe

improved

without

havingto

bumincreasing

amounts

offossil

fuels.A

nE

UL

eadershipInitiative

within

theclim

ateregim

ew

ouldthus

ensurethe

pro-

gressneeded

toprotect

theE

arth’sclim

atefor

thebenefit

ofhum

ankind.

PR

EF

AC

E

Ratify

ing

the

Kyoto

Pro

toco

lfo

rE

arthS

um

mit

2002

InD

ecember

1990,the

United

Nations

General

Assem

blyasked

anInternational

Neg

otia

tingC

omm

itteeto

developa

newinternational

climate

treaty.T

heU

NF

ramew

orkC

on-vention

onC

limate

Change

was

signedat

the1992

Earth

Sum

mit

inR

io,but

lackedsp

ecifics

ongreenhouse

gasreduction

numbers

andtim

eframes.

More

thanfive

yearslater,

inD

ecember

1997,the

firstlegally

bindinginstrum

entto

reducegreenhouse

gasem

issionsw

orldwide

was

agreedupon

inK

yoto,Japan.

The

Kyoto

Protocol,

despiteits

apparentflaw

sand

modest

targets,is

am

ilestonein

thehistory

ofenvironm

entalpolicy.

Now

theP

rotocolhas

tobe

ratifiedand

implem

ented.In

consecutivebudget

periods,its

targetsshould

bestrengthened

stepby

step,new

countriesshould

joinits

comm

itments

tolim

itand

consequentlyreduce

theirem

issions,and

com

mon

andcoordinated

measures

shouldbe

approved.T

heK

yotoP

rotocolis

aw

orkin

progress,but

itis

theonly

game

intow

n.T

hosew

horeject

theK

yotoP

rotocolreject

theachievem

entsof

tenyears

ofinternational

cooperationto

combat

climate

change.

Ten

yearsafter

Rio,

atthe

JohannesburgW

orldS

umm

itfor

Sustainable

Developm

entin

Septem

ber2002,

theK

yotoP

rotocolshould

finallyenter

intoforce.

Until

then,55

coun

triesw

illhave

toratify

theP

rotocolcovering

atleast

55percent

ofem

issionsof

industria

usedcountries

basedon

1990levels.

How

ever,one

countrythat

will

notbe

aparty

when

theK

yotoP

rotocolenters

intoforce,

isthe

United

States

ofA

merica.

The

U.S.

were

oneof

severalcountries

thathave

contin

uously

slowed

down

thenegotiating

process.T

heU

.S.S

enatew

hichhas

toratify

inter-national

treatiesbefore

theycan

become

law,

haddem

onstrateda

stronghostility

toward

theK

yotoP

rotocoleven

beforeits

contentw

asknow

n.R

atificationby

theU

.S.

Senate

ofany

internationalagreem

entthat

setslegally

bindingreduction

comm

itments

forgreen-

housegases

remains

highlyunlikely

forthe

coming

years.

At

the6

thC

onferenceof

theP

artiesto

theC

limate

Convention

inT

heH

ague,N

etherlandsin

Novem

ber2000,

theoutgoing

Clinton-G

oreadm

inistrationw

asunw

illingto

agreeon

aprecise

definitionof

theK

yotoP

rotocol’sso-called

flexibilitym

echanisms,

likeem

issionstrading,

carbonsinks

andthe

Clean

Developm

entM

echanism.

The

European

Union

didnot

rejectthe

notionof

flexibilityand

cost-effectiveim

plementation,

butrightfully

dem

anded

aprecise

quantificationof

which

amount

ofthe

Kyoto

Protocol’s

reductioncom

mit-

ment

couldbe

offsetby

theflexibility

mechanism

s.T

heoutgoing

U.S.

administration

didnot

demonstrate

thenecessary

politicalstrength

toagree

onany

quantitativerestriction

onthe

useof

them

echanisms.

Now

,that

theB

ush-Cheney

administration

hasdeclared

theK

yotoP

rotocoldead,

theE

uropeanU

nion,R

ussia,Japan,

developingcountries

andothers

havethe

taskof

ratifyingand

implem

entingthe

Kyoto

Protocol

alone.

67

The

reasonfor

theU

nitedS

tates’sfailure

toprovide

leadershipin

internationalclim

atepolicy

isthe

lackof

anyserious

domestic

climate

policyprogram

.B

oththe

Clinton-G

oreand

theB

ush-Cheney

administrations

havebeen

slowin

implem

enting

climate

policym

easuresdom

estically.T

henew

administration

hascut

fundingfor

energyefficiency

andrenew

ableenergies,

challengedexisting

andproposed

Federal

standardsfor

carsand

householdappliances

andhas

broughtforw

arda

nationalenergy

planthat

focusseson

thesupply

ofcoal,

oiland

gas,not

onefficiency,

demand

sidem

anagement

andrenew

ables.

The

Am

ericanlove

affairw

itheven

biggercars

standsem

blematically

fora

development

paththat

leadsthe

U.S.

continuouslyaw

ayfrom

fulfillingits

comm

itments

underthe

Rio

Clim

ateC

onvention.O

nthe

questionw

hetherP

residentB

ushw

ouldcall

ondrivers

tosharply

reducetheir

fuelconsum

ption.W

hiteH

ousepress

secretaryA

nF

leischerrecently,

onM

ay7,

2001,answ

ered:“T

hat’sa

bigno.

The

presidentbelieves

thatit’s

anA

merican

way

oflife,

andthat

itshould

bethe

goalof

policymakers

toprotect

theA

merican

way

oflife.

The

Am

ericanw

ayof

lifeis

ablessed

one.”

But

thereason

why

internationalclim

atepolicy

hasbeen

moving

ata

snail’space

isnot

som

uchthe

laggards,but

theabsenceof

leaders.

In1999,

theH

einrichB

ollF

oundationhad

thereforeasked

two

expertsto

developa

newleadership

initiativeto

getinternational

climate

policym

ovingagain.

Herm

annO

tt,scientist

atthe

Wuppertal

Institutefor

Clim

ate,E

nergy,E

nvironment,

andcurrently

working

forthe

Planning

Departm

entof

Germ

any’sF

oreignM

inistry,and

Sebastian

Oberthür,

Senior

Fellow

ofthe

Ecologic

Institute,a

Berlin

basedthink-tank

forE

uropeanand

internationalenvironm

entalresearch,

proposethe

following

threeelem

entsfor

suchan

initiative:

.A

combined

effortof

theE

uropeanU

nion,together

with

Eastern

European

countries

includingR

ussiaand

otherC

ISstates

pluskey

developingcountries

toachieve

earlyratification

ofthe

Kyoto

Protocol,

ifnecessary

without

initialU

.S.

participation..

Acoordinated

effortto

jumpstart

nationalclim

atepolicy

programs.

Credible

nationalim

plementation

iskey

toconvince

othersthat

theK

yotoP

rotocolw

orks.International

coordinationof

policiesand

measures,

likeeconom

icinstrum

ents,technical

standards

ortrade

rules,w

illhelp

tofacilitate

nationalim

plementation

andsm

oothconflicts

with

othereconom

icdevelopm

entgoals.

.N

ewincentives

toinvolve

Southern

countriesinto

theC

onventionprocess:

The

Kyoto

Protocol

foreseesa

number

ofnew

fundingm

echanisms

andeconom

icinstrum

entsfor

North-S

outhcooperation.

Those

instruments

must

becreated

ina

way

thatallow

s

broadand

equalparticipation,

transparencyand

am

aximum

ecologicalbenefit.

Even

ifthe

Kyoto

Protocol

will

enterinto

forcew

ithoutU

.S.

participation,the

doorfor

the

U.S.

andothers

hasto

remain

open.A

nycountry

shouldbe

legallyand

technicallyable

to

joinduring

laterbudget

periods,provided

theenvironm

entalintegrity

ofthe

Protocol

is

preserved.T

heU

.S.

hasa

lotto

contributescientifically,

technically,financially

andpolitically

tosolve

theglobal

environmental

crisis.In

otherphases

ofits

history,the

U.S.

hasbeen

aleader

oninternational

environmental

cooperation,the

Montreal

Protocol

toprotect

theozone

layerbeing

aprim

eexam

plethat

would

nothave

beenpossible

without

strongU

.S.initiative.

Last

butnot

least,U

.S.

emissions

continueto

contributesignificantly

tothe

problem.

U.S.

policiesshould

thereforealso

contributeto

thesolution.

At

theeve

ofE

arthS

umm

it2002,

thew

orldhas

totake

stockof

what

hasbeen

achievedsince

Rio.

The

Fram

ework

Convention

onC

limate

Change

thatprom

isesto

“achieve...

stabilisationof

greenhousegas

concentrationsin

theatm

osphereat

alevel

thatw

ouldprevent

dangerousinterference

with

theclim

atesystem

”w

assigned

inR

io,am

ongstothers

bythen

U.S.

President

George

Bush

Senior.

Ten

yearslater,

itis

time

tofulfil

itscom

mitm

ents.T

heK

yotoP

rotocolis

afirst

butnecessary

stepto

coordinatethe

globaleffort

tom

eetthis

globalchallenge.

When

headsof

statem

eetin

Johannesburg,they

shouldcelebrate

theK

yotoP

rotocol’sentering

intoforce,

butalso

lookahead

anddo

more.

Sascha

Mütler-K

raennerH

einrichB

oll fou

ndatio

nW

ashingtonO

ffice

June,200]

89

This

will,

however,

dependon

thedom

esticim

plementation

ofthe

treatyand

onthe

ratificationby

atleast

55P

artiesto

theC

limate

Convention

representingat

least55%

of

industrialisedcountry

emissions

in1990

(seeC

hapter3.1).

As

well,

thedesign

ofthe

so-called

Kyoto

Mechanism

sthat

formpart

ofthe

Protocol

(Em

issionsT

rading,Joint

Imple

000CD

2.T

he

Lan

dscap

eof

Intern

ational

Clim

ateP

oliticsat

the

Tu

rnof

the

Cen

tury

The

futureprospects

forinternational

co-operationon

climate

changedepend

onw

hetherand

when

theK

yotoP

rotocolw

illbe

ratifiedand

implem

entedby

them

ajorplayers.

The

following

sectiondescribes

theinternational

landscapeof

climate

politicsthrough

an

BR

EA

KIN

GT

HE

IMP

AS

SE

:F

OR

GIN

GA

NE

UL

EA

DE

RS

HIP

INIT

IAT

IVE

ON

CL

IMA

TE

CH

AN

GE

By

Herm

ann

E.

Oft

and

Seb

astianO

berth

ür

1.In

troductio

n1

The

Kyoto

Protocol

tothe

United

Nations

Fram

ework

Convention

onC

limate

Change

(FCC

C)

was

-and

stillis

-a

remarkable

achievement

forinternational

climate

policy.2N

egotiatedin

littlem

orethan

two

yearsand

concludedin

1997,this

extremely

complex

treatyhas

thepotential

toconstitute

thefoundation

ofthe

climate

regime

forthe

nextcentury.

Itsm

ostim

portantcornerstone

isundoubtedly

thequantitative

obligationfor

industrialisedcountries

toreduce

emissions

ofa

setof

greenhousegases

(GH

G5)

bya

specifiedpercentage

inthe

periodof

2008—2012

(Article

3and

Annex

Bof

theP

rotocol).3T

heim

plementation

ofthese

differentiatedtargets,

rangingfrom

minus

8%for

theE

Uand

some

Eastern

European

countriesto

plus10%

forIceland

(seeT

able1)

would

leadto

astabilisation

ofem

issionsat

1995levels

andthus

constitutea

deviationfrom

presentem

issiontrends

(seeF

igure1

).

Table

1:T

heD

ifferentiatedQ

uantitativeO

bligationsofA

nnexB

Parties

mentation

andthe

Clean

Developm

entM

echanism)

andthe

futuretreatm

entof

sinksw

illno

doubthave

adecisive

impact.

How

ever,the

Kyoto

Mechanism

sare

inherentlycontra-

dictory.W

hilethey

providefor

thecost-effective

implem

entationof

thereduction

targets,they

canalso

beused

byP

artiesto

evadeeffective

actionat

thenational

level.5A

con

struc

tivedialogue

onthe

environmentally

andeconom

icallyeffective

designof

thesein

strum

entsis

thereforeof

utmost

importance.

At

present,the

paceof

theclim

atenegotiations

isfar

tooslow

andthe

prospectsfor

itsentering

intoforce

remain

ratheruncertain.

The

negotiatingprocess

hasbeen

marked

bya

lackof

meaningful

discussionon

thestrategies

neededfor

effectiveclim

ateprotection,

notto

mention

theabsence

ofm

uch-neededconstructive

co-operationin

thedevelopm

entof

policiesand

measures

toim

plement

theK

yotoP

rotocol.Instead,

post-Kyoto

negotiationshave

concentratedon

theK

yotoM

echanisms

andhave

generallybeen

characterisedby

battlesof

retreat.B

ecausem

omentum

isso

clearlylacking,

aL

eadershipInitiative

isurgently

needednow

more

thanever.

This

paperaim

sto

developthe

designfor

suchan

initiative.T

hefirst

substantivepart

analysesthe

stateof

affairsof

internationalclim

atepolicy

atthe

turnof

thecentury

(Chapter

2).S

ubsequently,a

concreteresponse

tothe

ongoingproblem

sin

thenegotiating

processis

presentedin

theform

ofa

Leadership

Initiativeon

climate

changeto

revitaliseinternational

climate

policyand

re-energisethe

Kyoto

Protocol

process(C

hapter3).

Fig

ure

1:Projected

Impacts

oftheK

yotoProtocol

onE

missions

ofGreenhouse

Gases

fromA

nnexI

Parties

6.5-

Target

(percentageP

artyreduction

frombase

yearor

period)

-8%

Austria,

Belgium

,B

ulgariaa,C

zechR

epublica,D

enmark,

Estonia’,

European

Com

munity,

Finland,

France,

Germ

any,Ireland,

Italy,L

atvia’,L

iechtenstein,L

ithuaniaa,L

uxembourg,

Monaco,

Netherlands,

Portugal,

Rom

aniaa,S

lovakiaa,S

loveniaa,S

pain,S

weden,

Sw

itzerland,U

nitedK

ingdomof

Great

Britain

andN

orthernIreland

-

7%U

nitedS

tatesof

Am

erica-

6%C

anada,H

ungary

a,Jap

an,

Po

land

a

-

5%C

roatiaa

Stabilisation

New

Zealand,

Russian

Federationa,

Ukrainea

+1%

Norw

ay

+8%

Australia

+10%

Iceland

6.0-

OEC

DG

reenM

odel

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

aC

ountriesthat

areundergoing

theprocess

oftransition

toa

market

economy

Source:A

nnexofD

ecision1/C

P.1in

FCC

C/C

P/1997/7/Add.1.

EIAH

ighG

rowth

Scenario

2n

dN

ationalC

omm

unications

3.0

2.5

19901995

20002005

20102015years

Source:

OE

CD

1993;E

IA1999;

2”

National

Com

munications

ofAnnex

IParties,fC

CC

ICP/199811

1/Add.2.

1011

analysisof

thecurrent

stateof

implem

entationand

ratificationof

theP

rotocolby

them

ajorplayers.

And

inlight

ofthe

ever-growing

influenceof

civilsociety,

newdevelopm

entsin

theclim

ateN

GO

arenaare

alsoexam

ined.T

hisis

followed

byan

analysisof

thestate-of-

playof

theinternational

negotiatingprocess.6

2.1T

heD

omestic

Clim

ateP

olicyof

theM

ajor

Players

afterK

yoto

Dom

esticclim

atepolicy

isthe

basisof

anational

government’s

internationalposition

with

progressat

theinternational

levelthus

requiringeffective

domestic

measures.

Unfortunately,

effortsto

implem

entthe

Kyoto

obligationsand

toprepare

forthe

entryinto

forceof

theP

rotocolhave

beeninsufficient

inthe

two

yearsfollow

ingits

adoptionin

Decem

ber1997.

Em

issiontrends

underbusiness

asusual

scenariostherefore

continueto

risew

ithcontinued

uncertainratification

prospects.

Low

Expectations

for

theE

Uan

dthe

Ap

plican

tC

ountries

As

regardsthe

internationalprocess,

theE

Uhas

continuedto

strivefor

internationalleadership

inthe

post-Kyoto

phase.In

particular,it

hasattem

ptedto

maintain

pressureon

theU

Sand

otherlaggard

countriesto

adoptan

environmentally

effectivedesign

forthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

s.F

urthermore,

theE

Uhas

made

some

effortto

respondto

criticismof

itsinw

ard-lookingfocus

duringthe

Kyoto

negotiations.A

spart

ofthis

effort,it

hassucceeded

instrengthening

itsties

with

countriesw

itheconom

iesin

transition(C

ET

Ts)

anddeveloping

countries.7

InJune

1998,the

EU

reachedan

agreement

onan

internalburden-sharing

arrangement.

This

will

formthe

basisof

itsdeclaration

onjoint

fulfilment

underA

rticle4

ofthe

Kyoto

Protocol

(i.e.the

redistributionof

itsoverall

comm

itment

among

EU

Mem

berS

tates)upon

itsratification.8

Despite

thisagreem

ent,how

ever,the

EU

hasnot

yettaken

thenecessary

stepsfor

earlyratification

ofthe

Kyoto

ProtocoL9

This

appearsto

bedue

primarily

tostrategic

considerations(see

alsoC

hapter3.2).

Until

theE

Uratifies

theK

yotoP

rotocol,how

ever,it

will

hardlybe

ableto

achieveany

realprogress

indeveloping

itspolicies

forlim

itingG

HG

emissions.’°

The

main

post-Kyoto

achievement

hasbeen

anagreem

entw

ithE

uropeancar

manufacturers

in199$

tolim

itaverage

CO

2em

issionsof

newcars

to140

mg

perkilom

etreby

200$.T

hisrepresents

a25%

reductionfrom

currentlevels

andcould

contributeabout

one-sixthof

thereductions

neededto

achievethe

Kyoto

targetfor

theE

U.’

‘Nevertheless,

anddespite

strengthenedefforts

bysom

eM

ember

States

likeG

erm

any,according

tothe

European

Com

mission’s

estimates

ofM

ay1999,

EU

totalG

HG

emissions

arestill

expectedto

increaseby

some

6%from

the1990

levelby

2010if

furtherm

easuresare

not12

There

hasalso

beena

notablelack

ofprogress

ona

number

ofinternal

policyinitiatives.

By

mid- 1999,

along-aw

aitedproposal

forlegislation

supportingthe

feed-inof

electricityproduced

byrenew

ableenergy

sources,had

stillnot

evenbeen

tabledby

theE

uropeanC

omm

ission.N

egotiationson

aproposal

forthe

taxationof

energyproducts

appearedto

bedeadlocked

asw

ell.’3In

addition,the

EU

hasbeen

slowto

developpolicies

and

measures

forthe

non-C02

GH

Gs.

Regarding

thefluorinated

gases(H

FC

s,P

FC

s,SF6),

theU

nionhad

notelaborated

astrategy

untilm

id-1999.’4F

urthermore,

internaldivergence

with

respectto

theK

yotoM

echanisms

hasbecom

eincreasingly

obviousas

some

Mem

berS

tatescontinue

toexplore

thefull

potentialof

them

echanisms.

For

example,

theN

ether-lands

areplanning

torealise

50%(com

paredto

abusiness

asusual

scenario)of

theirtarget

underthe

burden-sharingagreem

entof

1999by

drawing

onE

missions

Trading,

JointIm

plementation

(II)and

theC

leanD

evelopment

Mechanism

Close

tieshave

developedbetw

eenthe

EU

andC

entralE

asternE

uropeanC

Effs,

partlyas

aconsequence

ofthe

EU

enlargement

process.T

hisis

expectedto

leadto

theaccession

ofthe

Czech

Republic,

Estonia,

Hungary,

Poland,

andS

loveniaearly

inthe

2y

Stcentury.

More

CE

llsw

illfollow

insubsequent

years.A

spart

ofthe

enlargement

process,the

accessioncountries

will

berequired

toadapt

theirnational

legislationand

administrative

structuresto

theE

Ustandards

andrequirem

ents.A

sa

result,these

countriescan

beex

pec

tedto

largelyfollow

theexam

pleof

theE

Uand

itscurrent

Mem

berS

tates.T

hereis

littledoubt

that,once

theE

Uand

itsM

ember

States

ratifythe

Kyoto

Protocol,

thesecountries

will

followsuit.

The

“Um

brellaG

roup”:

Flig

ht

intothe

Mechanism

s

Inthe

post-Kyoto

period,the

“umbrella

group”has

beenthe

main

counterpartto

theE

Uin

internationalclim

atepolitics.

The

mem

bersof

thegroup

areA

ustralia,C

anada,Iceland,

Japan,N

ewZ

ealand,N

orway,

theR

ussianF

ederation,U

kraine,and

theU

S.T

heum

brellagroup

encompasses

allm

ajorG

HG

emitters

among

theindustrialised

countriesexcept

theE

U.

Itincludes

thetw

oC

Ells

with

thehighest

GH

Gem

issionsand

thegreatest

interestin

trading“hot

air”,i.e.

thesurplus

emission

allowances

thatare

availableas

aresult

ofthe

steepfall

inem

issionsthat

hastaken

placein

thesecountries

since1990

(butw

hichrem

ainedunaccounted

forin

thedeterm

inationof

theK

yoto16

Little

haschanged

inU

Sclim

atepolitics

sinceK

yoto.T

heU

SG

overnment

hascontinued

tom

akethe

“meaningful

participationof

keydeveloping

countries”a

preconditionfor

consideringthe

ratificationof

theK

yotoP

rotocol.F

urthermore,

ithas

worked

forcefullyduring

internationalnegotiations

toprevent

anyquantitative

restrictionson

theuse

ofthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

s.D

omestically,

littleprogress

hasbeen

achieved.T

othe

contrary,the

Senate

Budget

Com

mittee

deletedclim

ate-friendlytax

incentivesand

researchgrants

in199$,

anda

number

ofR

epublicanspledged

toblock

anyadm

inistrationbudgetary

orregulatory

moves

towards

implem

entingthe

US

‘sK

yotoU

SG

HG

emissions

areprojected

toincrease

by23%

from1990

lQvels

by2010.18

The

longerthe

internalU

Sclim

atepolicies

remain

instalem

ateand

thelonger

legislativeaction

ispostponed,

them

oredependent

theU

Sw

illbecom

eon

theK

yotoM

echanisms

forreaching

itstarget

ofm

inus7%

.It

may

alreadybe

toolate

forthe

US

toexecute

itscom

mitm

entby

domestic

actionalone,

althougha

number

ofdevelopm

entspoint

ina

more

positivei’9

Overall,

however,

US

ratificationprospects

arevery

uncertain.

Japan

hasa

strongdiplom

aticinterest

inthe

successof

theK

yotoP

rotocol,since

theagreem

entw

asreached

inK

yoto.R

egardingdom

esticim

plementation,

Japanhas

seriously

1213

investigatedits

optionsfor

reachingthe

Kyoto

targetof

minus

6%and

hasdeveloped

anoverall

strategyfor

meetings

thattarget.

This

strategyaim

s,am

ongother

things,at

astabilisation

ofC

O2

emissions

andincreased

useof

J120and

Em

issionsT

radingto

con

tribute

1.8%tow

ardsits

total6%

GH

Gem

issionreduction

target.2’A

ssuming

thatthe

finaldesign

ofthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

sw

illallow

Japanto

make

useof

JIand

Em

issionsT

rading

tosom

eextent,

Japancan

beexpected

tojoin

theP

rotocolearly

inthe

nextcentury

(ifthe

EU

doesso

asw

ell).

The

prospectsfor

Russian

climate

policyare

most

uncertain,reflecting

itscurrent

econom

icand

politicalsituation.

Since

climate

protectioninterests

arebarely

representedin

Russian

politics,ratification

ofthe

Protocol

will

mainly

dependon

thedesign

ofE

mis

sionsT

rading,since

thisw

illbe

decisivefor

Russia’s

abilityto

sellits

excessem

issionallow

ances(otherw

isereferred

toas

‘hotair).

The

ratificationof

othernon-E

Uindustrialised

OE

CD

countriesis

notas

decisivefor

theentry

intoforce

ofthe

Kyoto

Protocol,

sincetheir

shareof

thetotal

Annex

IC

O2

emis

sionsis

relativelysm

all.T

hesm

allerem

itterscould,

however,

tipthe

scalesfor

reachingthe

necessary55%

ofthe

totalA

nnexI

CO

2em

issionsin

1990for

theP

rotocolto

enterinto

force.N

ouniform

development

isvisible

inthat

respect.N

orway

andS

witzerland,

bothhaving

ahistory

ofconstructive

participationin

internationalefforts,

succeededin

reachingtheir

objectivesin

Kyoto

toa

largeextent.

They

may

thusbe

expectedto

become

mem

bersof

theaccord

eventually.O

thers(A

ustralia,C

anada,N

ewZ

ealand)m

ayratify

soas

to“join

theclub”,

butare

likelyto

allowothers

tolaunch

theP

rotocol.O

verall,these

countrieshave

takenlittle

domestic

actionto

revertG

HG

emission

trends.

Developing

Countries:

Wait

andSee

Because

am

inimum

of55

ratificationsare

requiredfor

theP

rotocolto

enterinto

force,developing

countriesm

ustbe

includedin

thegam

e.T

heirinvolvem

entin

severalaspects

isdecisive

forthe

futuresuccess

ofthe

internationalco-operation

requiredby

thefram

ework

ofthe

Protocol.

ththe

shortand

medium

term,

theirconstructive

inputw

illbe

neededto

reachagreem

enton

theK

yotoM

echanisms,

inparticular

Em

issionsT

radingand

theC

DM

.ln

thelong

term,

thedeveloping

countriesw

illthem

selveshave

tolim

itand

reducetheir

own

GH

Gem

issions.

1nthe

post-Kyoto

phase,AO

SIS

hasbeen

tornbetw

eentw

opartially

competing

objectives.O

nthe

onehand,

theyhave

strivento

maxim

isesupport

forthose

countriesw

hichare

particularlyvulnerable

toclim

atechange,

which

couldim

plythe

possibleextensive

useof

theC

DM

.O

nthe

otherhand,

thishas

partiallyconflicted

with

AO

SIS

’intention

toensure

thatindustrialised

countries’obligations

arefulfilled

bytaking

domestic

action.O

verall,A

OS

ISw

illrem

ainthe

moral

conscienceof

theinternational

climate

negotiations.Indeed,

asof

16June

1999,7

AO

SIS

mem

bersw

eream

ongthe

first10

countriesto

haveratified

theP

rotocol.O

therA

OS

ISm

embers

canbe

expectedto

followin

orderto

contributeto

the55

ratificationsneeded

forthe

entryinto

forceof

theP

rotocol.

OP

EC

countriesstill

havethe

potentialand

capabilityto

slowdow

nthe

process,although

theK

yotoprocess

hasshow

nthat

theirinfluence

islim

itedw

henthe

otherbig

playersare

determined

tocontinue.

Ifthe

Kyoto

Protocol

entersinto

force,they

canbe

expectedto

jointhe

club,if

onlyto

beable

toinfluence

thefuture

game.

After

all,these

countrieshad

thepolitical

insightto

joinw

ithall

othercountries

inadopting

theP

rotocol.

Overall,

littleeffort

hasbeen

made

byother

developingcountries

toratify

theP

rotocol.H

owever,

interestto

doso

isexpected

toincrease

onceentry

intoforce

becomes

likely.A

tthis

pointhow

ever,the

0-7

7and

China

havebecom

eincreasingly

dividedinternally.

One

ofthe

most

controversialissues

concernsthe

matter

ofvoluntary

comm

itments

ofdevelop-

ingcountries.

This

issuew

ascatalysed

byA

rgentina’sdeclaration

toannounce

sucha

comm

itment

atthe

fifthC

onferenceof

theP

arties(C

OP

5).T

hisdoes

notnecessarily

mean

thetotal

breakdown

ofG

-77solidarity

(which

hasbeen

declaredm

anytim

esin

thepast).

But

otherlarge

andpow

erfuldeveloping

countries,India

andC

hinain

particular,have

voicedprincipal

concernsabout

theallocation

anddistribution

ofem

issionrights

underthe

Protocol.22

“Grey

”B

usinessN

GO

s:B

eginningto

Rise

tothe

Challenge

At

firstglance,

businesshas

continuedin

thepost-K

yotophase

much

inthe

same

way

asit

haddone

before.In

theU

nitedS

tates,the

“Carbon

Club”

launcheda

campaign

toobstruct

theK

yotoProtocol.23

The

fossilfuel

lobbycontinued

itsw

orkboth

internationallyand

domestically

toprevent

effectiveaction

andratification

ofthe

Protocol.

How

ever,a

num

herof

developments

reinforcethe

expectationthat

thebalance

ofpow

erin

thebusiness

comm

unitym

ayw

ellshift

towards

them

orem

oderateand

progressiveforces.

InA

pril1998,

theoil

giantS

hellfollow

edthe

example

ofB

Pand

severedits

tiesw

iththe

Global

Clim

ateC

oalition.24

Inaddition

totheir

strategicre-positioning

in1997

byinvesting

heavilyin

solarenergy,

Shell

andB

Phave

declaredplans

toreduce

theirow

nG

HG

emissions

by10%

from1990

levelsby

2002(S

hell)and

by2005

(BP).

As

anotherexam

ple,D

uP

ontannounced

ata

conferenceorganised

bythe

Pew

Centre

onG

lobalC

limate

Change

inlate

1999that

itw

ouldreduce

GH

Gem

issionsby

65%from

1990levels

by2010,

would

holdtotal

energyuse

flatand

userenew

ableenergy

sourcesfor

10%of

itsoverall

energyuse.25

Furtherm

ore,a

number

oftransatlantic

mergers

exposedtheir

newU

Sbranches

topressure

fromtheir

more

moderate

European

partners.F

orexam

ple,B

PA

moco,

hassince

adoptedthe

more

progressivestance

ofB

P.26A

tthe

same

time,

theprogressive

lobbygroups

within

busi

ness,like

Cogen,

theB

usinessC

ouncilfor

aS

ustainableE

nergyF

utureand

itsE

uropeancounterpart

(e5),have

sinceconsolidated

andstrengthened

theirow

ninfluence.

“Green

”E

nviro

nm

ental

NG

Os:

InD

ang

erof

Losing

their

Message

Environm

entalN

GO

shave

continuedto

work

onthe

internationalprocess

andthe

do-m

esticim

plementation

inindustrialised

countries.U

Sgroups

inparticular

haveshifted

theirfocus

fromthe

internationalto

thedom

esticlevel,

inlight

ofthe

importance

ofcongressional

supportto

thepotential

ratificationof

theP

rotocol.E

nvironmental

NG

Os,

15

14

co-operatingw

ithinthe

framew

orkof

theC

limate

Action

Netw

ork(C

AN

),have

worked

forearly

ratificationof

theP

rotocoland

anenvironm

entallyeffective

designof

theK

yotoM

echanisms.

How

ever,green

NG

Os

havefaced

two

particularproblem

sin

thepost-K

yotoperiod.

First,

theim

portanceof

climate

changehas

generallydeclined

onthe

politicaland

publicagendas

ofindustrialised

countries.S

econd,N

GO

shave

haddifficulties

conveyingclear

messages

tothe

publicbecause

ofthe

increasingtechnical

complexity

ofthe

issues.W

iththe

adoptionof

theK

yotoP

rotocol,the

environmental

lobbyhas

appearedto

havelost

itsrallying

point,w

hichin

turnhas

reinforcedthese

problems.

2.2T

heP

ost-Kyoto

Intern

ational

Aren

a

Inthe

imm

ediateperiod

following

Kyoto,

exhaustionprevailed

andinternational

climate

policyw

ascharacterised

bya

lowlevel

ofactivity,

thusreflecting

theslow

implem

entationof

domestic-level

obligations.G

overnedby

am

andateadopted

byC

OP

3,and

reinforcedby

CO

P4

inB

uenosA

ires,the

Kyoto

Mechanism

sand

theissue

ofsinks

havesince

be-com

ethe

currentfocus

ofclim

atediplom

acy.F

urthermore,

theparticipation

ofdeveloping

countrieshas

remained

highon

theinternational

agenda.

Focus

onthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

s

The

Kyoto

Mechanism

s(Joint

Implem

entation,C

DM

,E

missions

Trading)

havebeen

theprim

aryfocus

ofattention

inthe

post-Kyoto

process.M

anydesign

featuresw

ereleft

un

resolvedin

theP

rotocol,including

theinstitutional

set-up,m

onitoringand

verification,responses

tonon-com

pliance,eligibility

criteriafor

projectsam

ongothers.27

Inaddition

tothe

many

technicalissues

concerningthe

concreteterm

sof

them

echanisms,

onehighly

politicallycharged

questionthat

remains

relatesto

whether

upperlim

its(“caps”)

shouldbe

seton

theuse

ofthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

sin

orderto

ensurethat

thepurchase

ofem

issionallow

ancesabroad

remains

‘supplementaF’

todom

esticaction.

The

political‘cam

ps’confronting

eachother

onthe

designof

theK

yotoM

echanisms

haverem

ainedvery

much

unchangedsince

Kyoto.

On

theone

hand,the

US

andother

mem

bersof

the‘um

brellagroup”

preferas

littleregulation

aspossible

soas

notto

constrainthe

availabilityof

them

echanisms

and,above

all,E

missions

Trading.

On

theother

hand,the

EU

proposeda

rathercom

plicatedform

ulafor

aquantitative

“ceiling”on

theuse

ofthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

sin

1999.2

8

The

work

programm

eon

theK

yotoM

echanisms,29

which

forms

partof

theB

uenosA

iresP

lanof

Action

adoptedat

CO

P4,

specifiesthat

detailedrules

forall

mechanism

sshould

beadopted

inone

packageat

CO

P6,

scheduledto

takeplace

inlate

2000or

early2001

(probablyin

theN

etherlands).B

yconsolidating

therules

ofall

threeK

yotoM

echanisms,

industrialisedcountries

successfullypressured

developingcountries

toagree

notonly

onthe

rulesof

theC

DM

,for

which

many

hadshow

na

particularinterest,

butalso

onE

mis

sionsT

radingand

JI.T

hereis,

however,

thedanger

thatconcerns

regardingthe

environ-m

entaleffectiveness

ofthe

instruments

will

receiveinadequate

attention.30

Another

potentialthreat

tothe

effectivenessof

theregim

ew

ouldbe

ahasty

expansionof

thesink

categoriesunder

theK

yotoProtocol.3’

After

lengthydiscussions

in1998,

Parties

atC

OP

4linked

boththe

treatment

offorest

sinksand

theinclusion

offurther

categoriesof

sinksto

aspecial

reportby

theW

CC

tobe

adoptedafter

theyear

2000.32A

lthoughthe

issuew

asthus

effectivelypostponed,

theU

Sand

othernon-E

Uindustrialised

countries,tried

topush

thedebate

atthe

politicallevel

duringthe

Subsidiary

Body

meetings

inB

onnin

Junel9

99

.T

hisbehaviour

was

feltto

bequestionable,

sincethe

US

was

ineffect

tryingto

expandsink

categoriesin

advanceof

thepublication

ofthe

WC

Cspecial

report.U

nfortunately,the

EU

seemingly

demonstrated

limited

interestnor

effortin

resistingthese

attempts.

The

Dem

andfo

rE

arlyD

evelopingC

oun

tryP

articipatio

n:

Stifling

Progress

Although

thequestion

ofdeveloping

countryparticipation

inthe

Kyoto

Protocol

isnot

currentlyon

theofficial

agenda,it

hasrem

ainedone

ofthe

most

prominent

issuesthrough-

outthe

post-Kyoto

discussions.34T

herehave

beencontinuing

callsfrom

theU

Sand

othernon-E

Uindustrialised

countriesfor

the“m

eaningfulparticipation”

ofdeveloping

countriesin

combating

climate

change.In

response,C

hinaand

Indiahave

made

theper

capitadistri

butionof

emission

rightsone

oftheir

centraldem

ands.T

heresult

hasbeen

deadlockin

thenegotiations.

The

eventthat

triggeredand

deepenedthe

debateat

CO

P4

inB

uenosA

iresw

asthe

an-nouncem

entby

Argentina’s

President

Menem

thathis

countryw

ouldadopt

avoluntary

quantitativecom

mitm

entby

CO

P5,

coupledw

itha

callfor

equalaccess

toE

missions

Trading.35

To

many

observers,these

typesof

voluntaryem

issionlim

itscould

threatento

furtherdilute

industrialisedcountries’

reductionobligations.

Inparticular,

ahigh

Arg

entinean

voluntarytarget,

basedupon

a(strategically

increased)business-as-usual

energyscenario,

couldintroduce

alarge

quantityof

excessem

issionallow

ancesinto

thetrading

system.

Som

eprogress

inthe

post-Kyoto

phasew

asachieved

with

respectto

thestrengthening

ofthe

provisionsrelated

tothe

transferof

financialresources,

technologyand

know-how

.D

ecisionson

thetransfer

oftechnology36

andthe

financialm

echanism37

were

approvedas

partof

theB

uenosA

iresP

lanof

Action.

The

GE

Fw

asentrusted

with

theoperation

ofthe

financialm

echanism,

which

will

bereview

edevery

fouryears.

The

GE

Fw

illalso

financem

easuresdesigned

toassist

vulnerabledeveloping

countriesin

adaptingto

climate

changeim

pacts,such

asrising

sealevels.

At

thesam

etim

e,com

pensationfor

potentiallynegative

effectsof

climate

protection,such

asa

reduceddem

andfor

fossilfuels

andraw

materials,

will

remain,

asa

resultof

therequest

byO

PE

Cm

embers,

onthe

agendaof

theC

onventionorgans

asw

ell.

Slow

Progress

onO

ther

Issues

The

number

ofother

topicson

theinternational

climate

policyagenda

hascertainly

notdecreased

inthe

post-Kyoto

phase.S

ome

activitiesfrom

thepre-K

yotoperiod

continueto

beaddressed,

suchas

theelaboration

ofa

non-compliance

procedureand

thedevelopm

ent

1617

ofpolicies

andm

easures(P

AM

s)for

them

itigationof

climate

change.38In

addition,cop

4endorsed

thew

orkprogram

me

onm

ethodologies,as

well

asthe

nationalco

mm

un

ications

andem

issioninventories,

which

hadbeen

elaboratedat

thesessions

ofthe

sub

sidiary

bodiesin

thesum

mer

of1998.

These

items

will

befurther

addressedduring

thepreparations

forthe

firstsession

ofthe

Conference

ofthe

Parties

servingas

them

eetingof

theP

arties(C

OP

/MO

P)

tothe

Protocol.

Inanother

field,the

laggardsclearly

gainedsom

epoints.

The

firstreview

ofthe

adequacyof

comm

itments”

ofindustrialised

countriesunder

theF

CC

Cat

CO

P1

inB

erlinresulted

inthe

Berlin

Mandate,

which

inturn

ledto

theK

yotoP

rotocol.In

viewof

theim

portanceof

suchprovisions,

Article

4.2(d)of

theC

onventionhad

mandated

asecond

reviewby

31D

ecember

1998at

thelatest.

This

review,

however,

didnot

takeplace

inB

uenosA

ires,in

partbecause

ofthe

deadlockbetw

eenindustrialised

anddeveloping

countries.O

fparti

cularnote

andconcern

inthis

contextis

thefact

thatthe

Parties

tothe

Convention

ap

parentlydo

notfind

ittroubling

todisregard

concretedeadlines

thatare

setout

inthe

treaty.E

quallyserious

was

theinability

ofthe

Parties

atC

OP

4to

agreeupon

adate

fora

thirdreview

.40

2.3C

onclusion:T

heS

tateof

Clim

ateP

olicyan

dsom

eU

nderlyingF

actors

Developm

entsin

civilsociety

regardingclim

atepolicy

havebeen

characterisedby

contra-dictory

trends.O

nthe

onehand,

theim

portanceof

climate

changehas

diminished

onthe

publicagenda

inm

anyindustrialised

countries,despite

ahigh

levelof

publicaw

areness.O

nthe

otherhand,

businessand

industryhave

increasinglyaccepted

theneed

toact.

How

ever,G

HG

emissions

havecontinued

toincrease

inalm

ostall

countries.

The

internationallandscape

ofclim

atepolitics

hasrem

ainedrelatively

stablein

thepost-

Kyoto

period.T

heB

uenosA

iresP

lanof

Action

setthe

stagefor

thefuture

internationalprocess.

How

ever,the

internationalprocess

haslost

considerablem

omentum

inthe

post-

Kyoto

period,w

ithprogress

havingbeen

seriouslythreatened.

Various

laggardsappear

to

graspevery

opportunityto

undermine

theK

yotoagreem

entand

toretreat

fromtheir

obligations.

Several

underlyingtrends

helpto

explainthis

situation.F

irst,dom

esticim

plementation

of

theP

rotocol,the

keyto

andbasis

forprogressive

positionson

theinternational

level,con-

tinuesto

besuperficial

atbest

(seeC

hapter2.1).

Second,

thedom

esticpolitical

conflictsof

theU

Shave

beenreplicated

atthe

internationallevel,

with

many

problems

createdby

the

US

inits

callfor

the“m

eaningfulparticipation”

ofdeveloping

countries.

Third,

theinstitutional

capacityof

theC

OP

andthe

CO

P/M

OP

ofthe

Protocol

todeal

with

theseproblem

sappears

tobe

woefully

inadequate.T

heC

onventionprocess

stilllacks

formally

agreedvoting

rulesand

thisshortcom

inghas

similarly

affectedthe

Kyoto

Pro-

tocol,threatening

tofurther

stifleprogress.

The

consensusrequirem

entw

illlead

toeven

more

decisionsbased

onthe

lowest

comm

ondenom

inator,since

itenables

individual

countriesand

small

groupsof

countriesrepresenting

specialinterests,

likeO

PE

Cor

Australia,

toexercise

undueinfluence.

Fourth,

thepost-K

yotonegotiations

havebeen

characterisedby

imm

ensecom

plexity.B

y

insistingon

dealingw

ithseveral

Kyoto

Mechanism

sat

once,and

byincluding

GH

Gsinks

inthe

Kyoto

Protocol,

thelaggards

managed

tooverload

theprocess

with

am

ultitudeof

technicalproblem

s.A

sa

result,it

hasbecom

eincreasingly

clearthat

noindividual

can

graspthe

overallpicture

inthe

post-Kyoto

phase.

As

aconsequence,

theN

GO

comm

unitynow

findsitself

caughtup

inthe

complexity

trap.

Not

onlyhave

theybecom

etrapped

inthe

minutiae

oftechnical

details,they

havealso

become

partlydeprived

oftheir

roleas

intermediaries

tothe

media.

Once

theK

yotoP

roto

colhad

beenagreed,

NG

Os

lostthe

centralcom

pellingm

essagethat

hadbeen

usedto

mobilise

publicpressure.

Under

thesecircum

stances,the

prospectsfor

theentry

intoforce

andim

plementation

of

theK

yotoP

rotocolrem

ainuncertain.

thtemational

climate

policyhas

arrivedat

acritical

junctureat

theturn

ofthe

millennium

.A

ftera

decadeof

internationaldiscussions,

thetim

e

isripe

fora

leadershipinitiative

basedon

strongdom

esticim

plementation

ofthe

Kyoto

targets.A

tpresent,

theE

uropeanU

nionis

theonly

industrialisedplayer

who

couldprovide

suchleadership.

3.T

he

Euro

pean

Unio

nM

ust

Lead

onC

limate

Chan

ge

Follow

ingthe

thirdC

onferenceof

theP

arties(C

OP

3)at

Kyoto

inN

ovember

1997,the

Kyoto

Protocol

was

regardedw

ithsom

edegree

ofaw

eand

characterisedas

a“koan”

inthe

Zen

tradition.41S

incethen,

theinternational

processhas

become

entrenchedin

battlesof

retreat,m

ostnotably

asregards

theconcrete

designof

thevarious

flexibilityinstrum

ents,

theso-called

“Kyoto

Mechanism

s”(see

Chapter

2.2).

Tim

e,how

ever,is

runningout

andw

itheach

yearthat

implem

entationof

theK

yototargets

isdelayed,

thepotential

fortheir

fullrealisation

becomes

thatm

uchm

oreunlikely.

Ifthe

entryinto

forceof

theK

yotoP

rotocolis

notachieved

by2003/2004,

thechallenge

ofsa

vingthe

Kyoto

Protocol

fromcom

pletefailure

will

bea

giant’stask,

ifnot

anunattainable

one.42this

case,it

will

beim

possibleto

reachthe

domestic

targetsestablished

bythe

Kyoto

Protocol

(inparticular

forthe

US

andJapan),

inlight

ofthe

considerabletim

eit

takesto

reverseem

issiontrends.

According

toprojections

made

bythe

InternationalE

nergyA

gency,C

O2

emissions

inall

major

industrialisedcountries

will

riseconsiderably

by2010

ifno

additionalm

easuresare

taken.D

rasticpolicy

changesare

thusrequired

soonin

allm

ajorindustrialised

countriesin

orderto

achievethe

Kyoto

targets.If

thesechanges

arenot

realised,the

much-needed

re

orientationof

industrialsocieties

towards

climate-friendly

economies

with

lowfossil

fuel

consumption

will

bedelayed.

Astagnant

climate

policyon

thepart

ofthe

Western

in-

dustrialisedcountries,

behindw

hichm

ostcountries

follow,

would

onlyserve

toreinforce

theconventional

economic

development

pathnow

followed

bythe

developingcountries.

This

inturn,

would

presentconsiderable

impacts

onfuture

globalem

issions.

1819

The

internationalprocess

thuslacks

freshm

omentum

,vision

andleadership

andsuffers

froma

dangerouslevel

ofinertia.

While

them

oreprogressive

industrialisedcountries

(essentiallya

number

ofE

UM

ember

States)

wait

forthe

US

toexercise

itsresponsibility

andjoin

forcesw

iththem

,the

US

andother

laggardcountries

likeA

ustraliaare

strivingto

delayaction

furtherin

orderto

extractm

oreconcessions.

The

longerit

takesto

reachagreem

entand

tostart

action,the

strongerthe

casefor

thelaggard

countriesto

attempt

todilute

existingobligations

onthe

spuriousgrounds

thatexisting

onesare

nolonger

realisticnor

viable.

3.1T

heR

ationale

ofa

Lead

ership

Initiativ

eon

Clim

ateC

han

ge

The

EU

hasrem

ainedcom

mitted

rhetoricallyto

leadershipon

climate

changein

thepost-

Kyoto

phase,but

itsactions

havenot

reflectedits

statedcom

mitm

ents.T

heE

U’s

post-K

yotostrategy

ofattem

ptingto

persuadethe

US

intoan

agreement

atall

costshas

provento

beineffective.

By

contrast,experience

with

otherregim

eshas

shown

thatleadership

canbe

bestm

obilisedthrough

acom

binationof

threecom

ponents.F

irst,the

leaderm

ustm

ake.use

ofgeneral

politicaland

economic

weight.

This

isreferred

toas

structuralleadership.

Second,

leadershipin

internationalnegotiations

requiresthe

skilfulbuilding

ofcoalitions,

otherwise

referredto

asinstrum

entalleadership.

Third,

andperhaps

most

importantly,

credibleleadership

ism

osteffectively

advancedby

demonstrating

solutionsto

others,i.e.

directionalleadership.

Dom

esticaction,

inthe

formof

leadershipby

example,

isa

decisiveelem

entof

thisthird

factor.43

The

emergence

ofthe

Montreal

Protocol

onS

ubstancesthat

Deplete

theO

zoneL

ayerin

them

id-1980sis

aprim

eexam

pleof

strongenvironm

entalleadership

onthe

partof

theU

S(an

unlikelypossibility

inthe

1990s).44S

imilar

leadershipstrategies

provedhighly

suc

cessfulin

thenegotiation

ofthe

Land

Mines

Treaty.

Apioneering

groupassum

ingleader-

shipon

climate

changew

ouldreceive

massive

supportfrom

non-governmental

org

ani

sations,as

couldbe

observedduring

theestablishm

entof

anInternational

Crim

inalC

ourtin

Rom

ein

June1998.

Given

thereluctance

demonstrated

bythe

US

andJapan,

theE

Uis

theonly

candidatethat

might

reasonablybe

expectedto

forgea

Leadership

Initiativeon

climate

change.L

edby

theU

nion,a

coalitioncould

beform

edon

theinternational

level,w

hichactively

andpublicly

pursuesclim

ateprotection.

With

some

potentialfor

success,the

EU

couldaim

atw

inningsupport

ondifferent

issuesfrom

anum

berof

CE

ll’countries,

fromcom

mitted

developingcountries

and,possibly,

fromJapan

asthe

hostof

CO

P3.

Inthis

manner,

thecritical

mass

ofcountries

necessaryto

breathnew

lifeinto

internationalclim

atepolicy

couldbe

achieved.

The

Initiativew

ouldhave

tobe

pursuedw

ithinthe

framew

orkof

theclim

ateregim

e,albeit

independentlyof

thelaggard

states.45A

sstated

before,independent

actionis

requiredat

thispoint,

sincew

aitingfor

thelaggards

would

ultimately

paralysethe

process.A

tthe

same

time,

however,

itis

important

thata

leadershipgroup

remains

firmly

comm

ittedto

theclim

ateregim

e,since

divergencefrom

theexisting

regime

couldseverely

jeopardisethe

climate

processas

such.A

sfragile

asthis

approachm

ayseem

,it

isthe

onlycredible

andviable

way

tosave

theintergovernm

entalnegotiating

processin

theshort

andlong-

term.

The

FC

CC

andthe

Kyoto

Protocol

haveconsiderable

potential,since

theyprovide

much

ofthe

structureneeded

tom

obilisethe

necessaryinternational

co-operation,w

hich

inturn

isneeded

foreffective

climate

protection.T

heclim

ateregim

efurtherm

oreenjoys

wide

publicattention

andapproval.

Weakening

theF

CC

Cand

theK

yotoP

rotocolcould

thusplay

intothe

handsof

thoseinim

icalto

theconcept

ofrestraints

onthe

useof

fossil

fuels.

AL

eadershipInitiative

shouldhelp

givem

omentum

tothe

internationalclim

ateprocess

throughconcurrent

actionon

theinternational

anddom

esticlevels.

Should

itadopt

this

role,E

uropem

ustliberate

itselffrom

theinfluence,

paceand

positionof

theU

S.M

any

considerU

Sparticipation

tobe

vital,a

resultof

fearsconcerning

competitive

economic

disadvantages.Y

et,by

exploitingthe

availablelow

-costpotentials

forreducing

GH

Gem

issionsand

byinvesting

instrong

ecologicalprotection

measures

thatw

illeventually

leadto

economic

benefits,there

ism

uchroom

foracting

without

theU

S(see

Chapter

3.3

below).

Itis

important

torecognise

thatthe

EU

andothers

havebeen

waiting

forthe

US

fornearly

adecade

now.

Rum

ourssuggest

thatC

OP

6m

ightbe

postponeduntil

early2001

inorder

tow

aitfor

theoutcom

eof

thenext

presidentialelections

inthe

US

inN

ovember

2000.C

limate

protectionw

aspostponed

ina

similar

way

bythe

US

presidentialelections

in1992

andin

1996.A

lthoughthe

candidatesupported

byenvironm

entalistsw

onboth

times,

theU

Shas

notaltered

itsposition

much.

The

time

hasdefinitely

come

forthe

EU

to

takethe

lead.

Inm

anyrespects,

theU

nionhas

aconsiderable

potentialfor

forginga

newL

eadershipInitiative.

Itis

without

doubtone

ofthe

most

influentialplayers

ininternational

affairs,clim

atepolicy

inparticular,

andhas

comm

andover

significantpolitical

andeconom

icresources

(structuralleadership).

Itcould

usethese

resourcesto

pressureits

negotiatingpartners

andto

buildeffective

coalitions.M

oreover,its

diversediplom

aticcapabilities

are

enhancedby

thecom

binedexperience

ofthe

Mem

berS

tatesin

foreignrelations

(instru

mental

leadership).T

heU

Kand

France,

butalso

Germ

anyand

otherE

Um

embers,

have

long-establishedclose

relationsw

ithm

anyparts

ofthe

world.46

Ifthese

advantagesw

ereto

becom

bined,the

EU

couldinitiate

astrong

andeffective

leadershipcoalition

onclim

ate

change.A

ndfinally,

boththe

diverseexperiences

with

implem

entationin

theM

ember

States

andthe

existingsystem

forco-ordinating

policieson

theE

uropeanlevel

givethe

Union

exceptionaltools

fortaking

domestic

action,and

thusfor

leadingby

example

and

increasingthe

pressureon

theU

Sand

others(directional

leadership).

The

envisionedL

eadershipInitiative

might

focuson

thefollow

ingcore

elements.

First,

it

shouldaim

forthe

earlyrat/Ication

ofthe

Kyoto

Protocol.

This

shouldbe

toppriority.

Second,

theinitiative

shouldintroduce

measures

fordom

esticim

plementation

ofthe

Kyoto

obligationsand

make

aconcurrent

effortto

co-ordinatesuch

measures

internationally.T

hird,since

theinvolvem

entof

developingcountries

inthe

climate

processis

ofutm

ostim

portancefor

them

ediumand

longterm

effectivenessof

climate

protection,special

effortsneed

tobe

undertakento

integratethese

countriesinto

theform

ationof

inter-national

climate

policy.E

achof

theseelem

entsis

exploredin

thefollow

ingsections.

2021

3.2T

heF

irstE

lement

ofa

Lead

ership

Initiativ

e:E

arlyR

atification

Ratification

prospectsand

theentry

intoforce

ofthe

Protocol

arerather

bleakat

thispoint

(seeC

hapter2).

Since

almost

allof

thoseA

OS

IScountries

thatare

Parties

tothe

Co

nv

ention

willjoin,

the55

ratificationsrequired

forentry

intoforce

ofthe

Protocol

will

most

likelybe

met.

Aserious

obstacleis,

however,

presentedby

therequirem

entthat

thera

tifying

Annex

IP

artiesrepresent

atleast

55%of

thetotal

CO

2em

issionsof

1990allocated

toA

nnexI

Parties.

Therefore,

atleast

two

ofthe

threem

ainem

itters(the

US,

EU

andR

ussia)m

ustratify

(seeT

able

Tab

le2:

Em

issionP

ercentagesof

Parties

or

Gro

ups

ofP

arties

Party

IG

rou

pof

%ofA

nnex

Iem

issionsin

1990P

arties

EU

24.2C

EFFs

7.4(w

ithoutR

ussia)R

ussia17.4

JUS

SC

AN

NZ

50.8U

SA

36.1Japan

8.5C

anada3.3

57.5E

U+

Russia

+Japan

+C

EJT

s

Source:

FC

CC

/CP

/1997/7/Add.1,

Annex.

Note

thatsince

Ukraine

hadnot

submitted

afirst

comm

unication,its

emissions

in1990

ofro

ug

hly

5%o

fAn

nex

IP

artiesare

notconsidered

forratification

purposes.

First

andforem

ost,this

requiresan

internalstrategy

fora

synchronisedratification

ofthe

Union

andits

Mem

berS

tates,as

proposedby

theC

omm

issionin

mid-1999.48

To

date,the

EU

andits

Mem

berS

tateshave

donelittle

toaccelerate

ratification.O

fficially,the

EU

maintains

thatit

must

knoww

hatit

will

besubscribing

beforeit

actuallyratifies,

andthereby

continuesto

levelpressure

onthe

US

andthe

“umbrella

group”by

threateningw

ithnon-ratification.49

The

Union

shouldrealise

thattrying

toforce

reluctantparties

with

threatsof

inactionis

anineffective

strategy.T

akingthe

leadby

initiatingratification

would

alsoexpose

thelaggards

tothe

publicat

largeas

thetrue

forcesw

hichare

responsiblefor

preventingthe

Kyoto

Protocol

fromentering

intoforce.

Finally,

strongerE

Uleadership

would

inturn

generatem

uch-neededpressure

onM

ember

States

tofinally

implem

enteffective

policiesand

measures

toreduce

GH

Gem

issionson

thenational

andE

uropeanlevels.

Such

leadershipcould

provethat

effectiveclim

atepolicy

isa

realisablegoal

andthat

theK

yotoP

rotocolis

arobust

andeffective

instrument

forachieving

thatgoal.

Furtherm

ore,E

Uratification

must

beseen

asthe

firststep

ofa

strategyfor

ensuringthe

entryinto

forceof

theK

yotoP

rotocol.B

ecauseof

thefierce

oppositionto

thetreaty

inthe

US

Senate,

entryinto

forcew

illprobably

haveto

beachieved

without

theU

Sand

possiblyC

anada,A

ustraliaor

New

Zealand.5°

Thus,

theU

nionshould

attempt

toinduce

Russia

and

Japan(and

theU

kraine)out

ofthe

“Um

brellaG

roup”and

obtainthe

supportof

otherco

un

triesw

itheconom

iesin

transition.5’In

thecase

ofthose

CE

llcountries

thatare

planningto

accedeto

theE

Uin

them

ediumor

longterm

,joiningforces

with

theE

Uon

climate

changeshould

bean

obviouscom

ponentof

theaccession

process.M

anyof

theaccession

candidateshad

tendedto

alignthem

selvesw

iththe

EU

duringthe

1990s.T

herefore,for-

gingcontinued

andgreater

collaborationon

theclim

ateissue

with

theaccession

countriescould

bean

important

component

ofa

largerstrategy

ofbuilding

strongerE

ast/West

co

operationw

ithinE

urope.A

sregards

Russia,

aP

rotocol-focuseddiplom

aticinitiative

bythe

EU

couldlikew

iseunderlie

alarger

effortaim

edat

improving

co-operationw

iththat

country.

The

roleof

Russia

iscrucial

inthe

effortto

ensurethe

Protocol’sentry

intoforce

(seeT

able2).

Regarding

climate

change,R

ussia’sm

ajorinterest

isto

sellas

much

ofits

hotair

(i.e.its

excessem

issionallow

ances,w

hichresulted

fromthe

transitionprocess)

asp

os

sible.H

owever,

sinceR

ussia’sability

tosell

thishot

airdepends

onthe

entryinto

forceof

theP

rotocoland

ona

tradingsystem

,R

ussiahas

astrong

interestin

anoperational

climate

regime.

While

itw

ouldlike

tohave

theU

Sas

apossible

buyeron

board,it

would

bem

oreprofitable

forR

ussiato

sellat

leastsom

eof

itsem

issionallow

ancesto

interestedE

uropeancountries

(andJapan)

thanto

sellnone

atall,

asw

ouldbe

thecase

shouldthe

Protocol

notenter

intoforce.

Alignm

entw

iththe

US

asa

probableoutsider,

which

might

preventthe

entryinto

force,therefore

entailssom

edegree

ofrisk

forR

ussia.

The

Union

couldexploit

thissituation,

butthis

will

requirea

carefullydesigned

diplomatic

efforttow

ardsR

ussiaand

Japan.T

hiseffort

must

takeinto

accountthe

specialinterests

ofthese

countriesand

thefact

thatpast

conflictsw

erein

factm

ainlyrelated

tothe

designof

theK

yotoM

echanisms.52

Asustained

diplomatic

initiativetow

ardsR

ussiaand

Japanm

ightthus

requirea

more

proactivestance

onthese

Mechanism

s.53Just

asU

SV

iceP

resident

Gore

chargedhis

negotiatingteam

atC

OP

3to

“showincreased

negotiatingflexibility

ifa

comprehensive

plancan

beput

intoplace”,54

EU

negotiatorsshould

besim

ilarlyin-

structed.C

omprom

iseon

allsides

will

benecessary

ifagreem

entis

tobe

reached.

Without

suchan

effort,entry

intoforce

ofthe

Protocol

will

bedelayed

alongw

ithin

creasing

pressureto

widen

the“loopholes”.

Moreover,

itw

illbecom

eincreasingly

difficultfor

many

industrialisedgovernm

entsto

meet

theirtargets

inthe

absenceof

domestic

imple

mentation.

This

isalso

thecase

fora

number

ofE

UM

ember

States,

which

areintending

torely

heavilyon

Em

issionsT

rading,JI

andthe

CD

Mfor

thefulfilm

entof

theirobligations

(seeC

hapter2.1).

As

aresult

ofthis

potentialdiplom

aticinitiative,

itm

ightalso

bepossible

forthe

emerging

leadershipgroup

toagree

upona

feefor

allactivities

underthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

s(p

articularly

onE

missions

Trading),

asis

thecase

forthe

CD

M.

This

would

levelthe

playingfield

between

thedifferent

mechanism

s,thereby

increasingthe

chancesof

obtainingthe

approvalof

many

developingcountries

thatare

interestedin

theC

DM

.It

would

alsoraise

thetransaction

costsof

Em

issionsT

radingand

therebyprovide

domestic

measures

with

acom

parativeadvantage.

And

finally,this

might

providethe

necessaryfinancial

resourcesfor

theestablishm

entof

anadaptation

fundas

partof

thethird

pillarof

theL

eadershipInitiative

(seeC

hapter3.4).

2223

Furtherm

ore,the

Union

shouldcontinue

toinsist

onclear

definitions,strict

monitoring

andreporting

andthe

effectiveenforcem

entof

therules

ofthe

mechanism

s.T

hesem

easuresare

ofprim

eim

portancefor

theenvironm

entaland

economic

effectivenessof

theem

ergingclim

ateregim

e.F

inally,an

inflationaryaddition

ofnew

categoriesof

sinksunder

theP

ro-tocol,

which

areonly

quantifiablein

therarest

ofcases,

might

undermine

thebasis

ofthe

Kyoto

Protocol.

The

Union

would

standto

gainconsiderably,

andw

ouldput

itsopponents

onthe

defensive,if

itinsists

upona

sounddesign

forthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

sand

forthe

ruleson

sinks.A

greement

uponthese

issuescould

pavethe

way

forthe

formation

ofa

strategicalliance

with

Russia

andJapan.

This

inturn,

would

securethe

emission

percen

tagesrequired

toenable

theentry

intoforce

ofthe

Protocol.

Japanhas

aprofound

dip

lom

aticinterest

inthe

successof

theK

yotoP

rotocoland

thisw

illprovide

itw

itha

furtherincentive

tojoin

thisnew

alliance.T

hisalliance

would

endthe

stiflingconfrontation

between

theblocks

(i.e.the

EU

versusthe

Um

brellaG

roup)by

forgingnew

coalitions.It

would

havesubstantial

influencein

theelaboration

ofthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

sand

couldachieve

anearly

entryinto

forceof

theP

rotocolafter

CO

P6,

duringthe

firstyear

ofthe

newcentury.

This

would

increasethe

pressureon

othersto

joinso

asto

beable

toin-

fluencefuture

decisions.It

might

evenfacilitate

theratification

processin

theU

Sas

itw

ouldprove

thatthe

Kyoto

Protocol

is,despite

assertionsto

thecontrary,

alive.In

anyevent,

itw

ouldend

thede-facto

vetopow

erof

theU

Sin

theinternational

processand

itw

oulddem

onstrateagain

thatthe

world

canact

independentlyof

thelast

remaining

superpower,

asit

hasdone

inother

cases.

3.3T

heS

econdE

lement

ofa

Lead

ership

Initiativ

e:M

easuresfo

rD

omestic

Imp

lemen

tation

andth

eirC

o-o

rdin

ation

Dom

esticim

plementation

ispossibly

them

ostfundam

entalbasis

forexercising

leadershipon

climate

change.D

espiteall

itsw

eaknessesduring

thenegotiations

ofthe

Kyoto

Pro-tocol,

EU

leadershipw

asm

ostcredible

when

itstarted

tolay

theground

fordom

esticim

plementation.

How

ever,in

thepost-K

yotophase,

thepace

ofdom

esticim

plementation

hasslow

edconsiderably.

This

isdue

toseveral

factors,including:

lackofpolitical

will;

thefear

ofcom

parativedisadvantages

within

globalm

arkets;serious

resistanceon

thepart

ofsom

eindustrial

sectors;and

anoverall

lackof

publicpressure.

Asecond

pillarof

aL

eadershipInitiative

couldtherefore

bethe

implem

entationof

policiesand

measures

among

alarger

groupof

countriesin

orderto

beginthe

longprocess

ofstm

ctural

decarbonisationof

theeconom

y.E

venbefore

Kyoto,

anum

berof

studieshad

pro

vi

dedevidence

ofthe

vastpotential

oflow

-and

no-costoptions

forreducing

GH

Gem

issionsin

theE

Uand

elsewhere.

This

evidencehas

sincebeen

confirmed

andreinforced

inthe

post-Kyoto

period.A

nanalysis

ofthe

European

Com

mission

in1999

concludedthat

theE

Ucan

indeedachieve

two-thirds

ofits

targetof

minus

8%for

thefirst

comm

itment

pe

nodby

implem

entinglow

-costm

easuresof

upto

5E

uroper

tonneof

CO

2equivalent.55

Another

studyconcluded

thatthe

averagenet

annualsavings

dueto

measures

toreduce

CO

2em

issionsin

theU

Sby

7%below

1990levels

by2010

amount

toU

S$

46billion

orU

S$

393per

household.56

Given

thiscost-saving

potential,it

isvery

clearthat

itis

notthe

economic

costsper

Se,but

ratherthe

politicalopposition,

which

preventsim

plementation

ofthe

Kyoto

targets.W

ithin

thefram

ework

ofan

EU

Leadership

Initiative,such

impedim

entscould

beaddressed

throughthe

exertionof

comm

onpolitical

will

ofthe

EU

Mem

berS

tatesand

otherallies.

Rem

ainingconcerns

aboutcom

petitivenesscould

bem

inimised

throughthe

co-ordination

ofpolicies,

forexam

plew

ithJapan.

The

EU

andits

Mem

berS

tateshave

aw

ealthof

ex

periencein

policyco-ordination

which

theycan

easilyem

ployfor

thispurpose,

inlight

of

thepreparatory

work,

which

hasbeen

doneby

theE

uropeanC

omm

issionand

othersin

pastyears.

Experience

with

therather

unsuccessfulattem

ptsof

theE

Uto

establishbinding

policies

andm

easuresin

theProtocol57

suggeststhat,

first,em

phasisshould

notbe

placedon

bindingm

easuresbut

ona

transparentand

accountableprocess

ofco-ordination.

Second,

dueto

thebenefits

thatcan

beexpected

fromco-ordination,

theL

eadershipInitiative

shouldconcentrate

ona

limited

setof

measures

uponw

hichagreem

entcan

most

likelybe

reached.A

leadershipgroup

ofcom

mitted

countriescould

thusbe

formed

todem

onstratethat

ecologicalprotection

andan

efficientand

strongeconom

yare

notonly

compatible,

but

alsom

utuallyreinforcing

targets.

Fiscal

policyis

oneof

them

ostim

portanttools

ofclim

atepolicy.

Even

minor

taxdifferen

tiationscan

bevery

effective,as

theexperience

with

thephasing

outof

leadedpetrol

inE

uropeshow

s.58A

number

ofcountries

(especiallyin

Europe)

havealready

successfullyim

plemented

energy/carbontaxes

andthere

issufficient

experiencein

successfuldesign

anddevelopm

ent.59T

hiseconom

icinstrum

entdoes

havea

directim

pacton

theco

mpeti

tivesituation

ofvarious

businesses,and

many

ofthe

relevantcountries

havetherefore

grantedtax

exemptions

ofvarious

degreesto

relevantindustries.

Because

ofthis

com

peti

tivenessaspect,

thecase

fora

European

andinternational

co-ordinationof

relatedefforts

is

compelling.

Taxation

ona

globallevel,

however,

appearsto

bepolitically

unfeasible,in

largepart

dueto

fierceU

Sopposition.6°

Japanis

generallym

oresupportive

ofthe

useof

sucheconom

icinstrum

entsand

assuch,

itcould

bean

allyfor

theco-ordinated

national

implem

entationof

carbon/energytaxes.6’

Furtherm

ore,structural

decarbonisationin

thenext

centuryw

illrequire

therapid

develop-

ment

oflow

-or

no-carbonenergy

sources.62A

secondfocus

ofthe

leadershipgroup

could

bedirected

towards

alarge-scale

co-ordinatedeffort

inresearch

anddevelopm

ent(R

&D

)

forrenew

ableenergy

sourcesand

forthe

promotion

ofenergy

efficiency.63T

heco

ord

i

nationof

suchefforts

certainlyhas

asignificant

potentialfor

producingm

uch-neededsynergies.

And

byrelying

partlyon

existinginternational

institutionsand

researchnet-

works,

sucha

co-ordinatedR

&D

strategycould

bringabout

substantialprogress

within

the

next10

years,if

fundedappropriately.

Athird

focusshould

beon

forginginternational

agreement

onguidelines

fordism

antling

climate

adversesubsidies

inorder

tom

obilisenew

resources.N

umerous

studieshave

shown

thatvast

amounts

offinancial

resourcesare

flowing

intocarbon

intensiveand

un

sustainableindustries

andactivities.

For

example,

subsidiesfor

fossilfuels

andnuclear

energyin

OE

CD

countriesam

ountto

some

US

$65

billionannually

(US

$145

billion

2425

world-w

ide).64T

herationale

forsuch

subsidiesis

frequentlythe

protectionof

relevantindustries

frominternational

competition.

Internationallyco-ordinated

actioncould

thushelp

addressthis

concern.S

uchan

initiativecould

belinked

toefforts

within

theW

orldT

radeO

rganization.A

tleast

partof

thosesubsidies

couldthen

bediverted

intoR

&D

andinto

temporary

supportfor

thedevelopm

entand

introductionof

renewable

energysources

intothe

market.

fourth,there

isa

needto

co-ordinateefforts

tostrengthen

theenergy

efficiencystandards

existingin

allm

ajorindustrialised

countries.Im

provingthe

efficiencyof

energyuse

isnot

onlyof

major

strategicim

portancefor

asignificant

reductionof

globalG

HG

emissions.

Co-ordination

ofefficiency

standards(for

householdappliances,

etc.)should

alsobe

ofinterest

tom

ostindustrialised

countriessince

itw

ouldultim

atelyfacilitate

internationaltrade

byrem

ovingor

avoidingpotential

tradebarriers

(e.g.w

hereefficiency

requirements

area

preconditionfor

entryinto

foreignm

arkets).F

inally,reaching

agreement

onclim

ate-friendly

publicprocurem

entand

emission

reductionm

easuresfor

thepublic

sector65should

bepolitically

feasibleas

well.

The

publicsector

accountsfor

alarge

shareof

do-m

esticdem

andand

canthus

exerciseform

idableinfluence

onthe

market.66

These

proposedE

UL

eadershipInitiative

activitiesdirected

towards

theco-ordination

ofdom

esticm

easurescould

bothdecisively

assistthe

mem

bersin

implem

entingtheir

ob

ligations

underthe

Kyoto

Protocol

andcould

catalyseof

publicaw

arenessand

education.It

shouldbe

complem

entedby

strongpublic

statements

forratification

andim

plementation

bythe

groupof

Parties.

Such

astrategy

was

highlysuccessful

inthe

ozonenegotiations,

where

variousleading

countries,in

theabsence

ofa

consensualagreem

enton

furtherm

easures,

annexedresolutions

anddeclarations

ofsupport

tothe

reportson

theM

eetingsof

theP

arties.It

isinteresting

tonote

thatthe

majority

ofthese

demands

were

actuallym

etin

thenext

roundof

negotiations.67

There

arenum

erousadvantages

toproceeding

ina

co-ordinatedm

annerin

theafo

rem

entionedareas.

Inaddition,

andirrespective

ofbroader

internationalco-ordination,

thereis

ample

roomfor

unilateralaction

toim

plement

theK

yotocom

mitm

entsboth

within

theE

Uand

elsewhere.

Such

unilateralefforts

will

beessential

forensuring

thesuccessful

implem

entationof

theP

rotocoland

forthe

mobilising

ofleadership

onclim

atechange.

3.4T

heT

hird

Elem

entof

aL

eadersh

ipIn

itiative:

En

han

cedInvolvem

entof

Developing

Countries

For

along

time,

indeedsince

thehistorical

alliancethat

was

forgedbetw

eenthe

EU

andm

anydeveloping

countriesat

CO

P1

inB

erlin,68the

EU

hasneglected

itstraditionally

closerelations

with

thesecountries.

Increasedparticipation

ofdeveloping

countriesin

theclim

ateregim

eshould

thereforebe

athird

goalof

theL

eadershipInitiative.

Although

thedem

andof

theU

Sfor

“meaningful

participation”is

inappropriateat

thispoint

andcould

well

undermine

thepresent

stageof

development

ofthe

internationalclim

ateregim

e,there

canbe

nodoubt

thatthe

longterm

sustainabilityof

ourplanet

will

requirethe

substantialinvolvem

entof

thosecountries

inthe

not-too-distantfuture.69

Because

theforceful

demands

ofthe

US

andothers

beforeand

afterK

yotohave

increasedthe

sensitivityof

developingcountries,

anysuch

diplomatic

effortm

ust beconducted

with

greatcare

ifit

isto

succeed.

The

needsand

interestsof

developingcountries

must

beaddressed

first.A

primary

interestof

many

developingcountries

liesw

ithadaptation,

sincethey

areparticularly

vulnerableto

changesin

theglobal

andregional

climate.

For

thisreason,

anadaptation

component

was

includedas

partof

theC

leanD

evelopment

Fund

proposedby

Brazil

inthe

mn-up

toK

yoto.7°A

fterK

yoto,the

participantsat

theA

fricanM

inisterialC

onferenceon

Environ-

ment

(AM

CE

N)

inO

ctober1998

recomm

endedthe

establishment

ofan

“adaptationfund”

anda

“seedfund’.7’

At

present,lim

itedfunds

areavailable

throughthe

GE

Ffor

adap

tation.

Article

12.8of

theK

yotoP

rotocolfurtherm

orerequires

that“a

shareof

theproceeds”

fromC

DM

activitiesis

tobe

usedto

assistdeveloping

countriesto

meet

thecosts

ofad

aptation.

How

ever,these

resourcesare

ratherlim

ited,and

will

continueto

beso

evenafter

theC

DM

becomes

operational.72

Afirst

emphasis

ofthe

Leadership

Initiativem

ighttherefore

beon

theelaboration

andim

plementation

ofan

adaptationstrategy

ledby

theE

Uand

some

keydeveloping

coun

tries.T

hisshould

includeboth

thefinancing

ofstudies

relatedto

impacts

andadaptation

andthe

mobilising

ofadditional

resourcesfor

adaptation,e.g.

throughthe

establishment

ofan

adaptationfund.73

The

resourcesneeded

tofinance

anadaptation

strategycould

begenerated

bya

fee(sim

ilarto

theone

alreadyapplicable

underthe

CD

M)

onactivities

underall

threem

echanisms

(seeabove),

which

couldbe

used,at

leastpartly,

forsuch

afund.

As

abeneficial

side-effectof

thisinitiative,

thetrue

costsof

adaptingto

climate

changecould

well

become

visible.A

ndthis

inturn

would

putcost

estimates

form

itigatingclim

atechange

intoperspective.

Such

aninitiative

onadaptation

would

generatem

uchsupport

within

andoutside

ofthe

climate

regime.

Itw

oulddem

onstratethat

thespecial

situationof

developingcountries

isbeing

takeninto

account,w

ithoutraising

fearsof

ahidden

agenda.A

ndit

would

freeA

OS

IScountries

fromtheir

dilemm

aas

regardsthe

CD

M(see

Chapter

2.1).

Asecond

short-termcom

ponentof

theL

eadershipInitiative

couldconsist

ofa

diplomatic

collaborativeeffort

todesign

theC

DM

inan

environmentally

effectiveand

economically

efficientm

anner.T

heissues

tobe

addressedinclude

theproper

functioningof

thisin

stmm

ent,for

example

throughthe

definitionof

verifiableand

strictbaselines,

comparable

methodologies

forverification

etc.,but

alsothose

thatare

primarily

emphasised

bydev

eloping

countries,such

asthe

“financialadditionality”

with

regardto

othersources

offunding

(Official

Developm

entA

ssistance)and

theintegration

ofsustainable

development

objec

tives.74A

trulycollaborative

effortto

designthe

CD

Min

am

utuallybeneficial

manner

couldserve

asa

confidence-buildingexercise.

Third,

theL

eadershipInitiative

couldbegin

adialogue

with

developingcountries

onthe

fairand

equitableallocation

of“em

issionrights”.

The

allocationof

“assignedam

ountsof

emissions”

onthe

basisof

1990em

issions(“grandfathering”)

inthe

Kyoto

Protocol

was

perceivedby

many

tobe

inequitable.A

number

ofalternative

proposalshave

beenm

ade

2627

forthe

distributionof

emission

rights,including

thepre-K

yotoB

razilianproposal

toallo

cateem

issionrights

onthe

basisof

historicem

issions(

i.e.“effective

emissions”).

The

most

prominent

proposalis

theone

which

aims

atconvergence

towards

equalper-capita

emissions,

asadvocated

byIndia

atC

OP

1in

Berlin.

Others

haveproposed

totake

GD

Pper

capitaand

otherfactors

intoaccount

toallocate

emissions

allowances.75

This

isan

extremely

sensitiveissue.

Em

phasisshould

thereforebe

placedon

buildingconfidence

andcom

mon

understandingthrough

adiscussion

processseparate

andapart

fromthe

officialnegotiations.

Such

adiscrete

processm

ightalso

remove

some

tensionfrom

theinternational

negotiatingprocess

ifthe

EU

(andits

allies)carefully

avoidplacing

pressureon

theirpartners.76

Apart

fromaddressing

thedifficult

issueof

allocationof

emission

allowances

between

industrialisedand

developingcountries,

thesediscussions

might

alsopave

thew

ayfor

am

oreconstructive

approachtow

ardsdifferentiation

between

developingcountries.

The

problemis

partlyrooted

inthe

binaryclassification

ofP

artiesas

Annex

I/non-Annex

Icountries

inthe

Convention.

Annex

Bof

theK

yotoP

rotocolperpetuates

thisartificial

division.T

hedividing

linein

economic

andecological

terms,

incontrast,

runsthrough

thesecategories.

Som

eof

thosecountries

labelledas

developingcountries

arem

oreafflu

entthan

theircounterparts.

For

example,

theG

DP

percapita

ofS

ingapore,S

outhK

orea77and

Israelis

equalor

higherthan

thatof

some

mem

bersof

theE

uropeanU

nion,such

asG

reece,S

painand

Portugal.78

Aprocess

fordifferentiating

comm

itments

fordeveloping

countriesappears

thereforeto

bea

reasonablegoal.

The

Kyoto

Protocol

itselfrecognises

theneed

fordifferentiation

throughthe

specifictargets

listedin

Annex

Band

throughthe

join

tfulfilm

ent”m

echanismunder

Article

4,w

hichallow

sthe

EU

Mem

berS

tatesto

reachtheir

reductiontarget

byw

ayof

internalburden-sharing.

During

the1990s,

anum

berof

countriessought

toestablish

dif

ferentiatedtargets

basedon

avariety

ofpossible

criteria.79A

considerablenum

berof

Latin

Am

ericanand

AO

SIS

countriesare

amenable

tosom

eform

ofspecific

comm

itments

fordeveloping

countries.80

The

failureof

industrialisedcountries

torespond

adequatelyto

thechallenge

ofclim

atechange

sofar

hasnot

enhancedthe

willingness

ofdeveloping

countriesto

contributeto

mitigation

effortsin

thenear

future.8’N

evertheless,m

ajordeveloping

countrieshave

effectivelyde-coupled

economic

growth

andem

issionsof

GH

Gs

toa

largerextent

thanm

anyindustrialised

countries.82U

nderthese

circumstances,

athoughtfully

developedeffort

isneeded

tocom

mence

theprocess

forinvolving

developingcountries

ina

fairand

equitablem

anner.

4.C

onclusion

After

adecade

oftalk,

itis

imperative

thatthe

internationalcom

munity

entersthe

newm

illenniumw

ithrenew

edm

omentum

andcom

mitm

entto

driveinternational

climate

policytow

ardsaction

toreduce

GH

Gem

issions.T

heE

Uis

theonly

industrialisedplayer

insight

with

theability

toundertake

aL

eadershipInitiative

aimed

at( 1)ratifying

theK

y-oto

Protocol

andbringing

itinto

force,(2)

initiatingbroad

domestic

implem

entationof

theK

yototargets

andinternational

co-ordinationof

measures

inthat

respectand

(3)starting

aninternational

processof

discussionw

iththe

longterm

goalof

involvingdeveloping

countriesm

oreclosely

andm

oreequitably

inthe

internationalefforts.

Ifthe

envisionedL

eadershipInitiative

canbe

establishedsuccessfully,

itw

illopen

upa

vastarray

offuture

opportunities.It

will

re-invigoratethe

Kyoto

Protocol

andw

illprovide

furtherincentives

togovernm

entsw

orld-wide

toim

plement

effectivepolicies

andm

easures

tom

itigateclim

atechange.

Itw

illalso

setinto

motion

aprocess

ofm

uch-neededpublic

awareness

raisingto

demonstrate

thatoverall

well-being

canindeed

beim

provedw

ithoutburning

everincreasing

amounts

offossil

fuels.T

hiscould

decisivelyfacilitate

thenext

stepsof

theinternational

process.In

thisrespect,

quantifiedtargets

forindustrialised

countriesfor

thesecond

comm

itment

periodfrom

2013—2017

will

beon

theinternational

agendain

them

iddleof

thenext

decade.A

substantialstrengthening

ofexisting

comm

it-m

entsw

illbe

requiredin

orderto

directindustrialised

countriestow

ardsthe

longterm

goalof

anem

issionreduction

inthe

orderof

80%.

Ifan

equitableschem

ecan

bedevised,

comm

itments

bythe

biggestem

ittersam

ongstdeveloping

countriescould

alsobecom

ea

realityin

thesecond

decadeof

the21st

century.A

fternearly

10years

ofdevelopm

entof

theclim

ateregim

e,the

Leadership

Initiativew

ouldthus

providethe

opportunityfor

dynamic

progresstow

ardsprotecting

theE

arth’sclim

atefor

thebenefit

ofhum

ankind.

2829

The

Auth

ors

Literatu

re

Dr.

Herm

ann

E.

Ott

was

trainedas

aprofessional

lawyer

andpolitical

scientistin

Munich,

London

andB

erlin.A

sA

ctingH

eadof

theC

limate

Policy

Division

ofthe

Wuppertal

Institute,he

works

extensivelyon

thelegal,

politicaland

economic

aspectsof

climate

changeas

well

ason

otherfields

ofenvironm

entalprotection.

E-M

ail:herm

ann.ott@w

upperinst.org

The

Wuppertal Institutefor

Clim

ate,E

nvironment and

Energy

was

establishedw

iththe

aimof

systematically

addressingboth

theglobal

environmental

challengesand

thecom

plextask

ofecological

structuralchange.

Itw

orkstow

ardsovercom

ingw

hatare

oftenperceived

asthe

conflictingdem

andsof

economy

andecology.

Increasedprosperity

with

areduction

inconsum

ptionof

naturalresources

isthe

paradigmfor

eco-efficientinnovation

andfor

anew

generationof

technology.T

ohelp

achievethose

aims,

theW

uppertalInstitute

draws

upconcrete

conceptsin

almost

allfields

ofthe

environment

andprovides

tangiblevisions

fornew

models

ofprosperity.

Dr.

Sebastian

Ob

erthü

rw

astrained

asa

politicalscientist

inM

arburgand

Berlin.

He

isa

Senior

Fellow

atE

cologic,bstitu

tefor

Internationaland

European

Environm

entalP

olicy.H

isw

orkfocuses

onissues

ofinternational

environmental

andclim

atepolicy

with

specialem

phasison

internationalenvironm

entalagreem

entsand

institutions.E

-Mail:

oberthuer@ecologic.de

Ecologic

isa

not-for-profitinstitution

forapplied

environmental

researchand

policyconsultancy,

seatedin

Berlin.

Itsparticular

areasof

expertiseinclude

newapproaches

inenvironm

entalpolicy,

ecologicallysustainable

resourcepolicy,

internationalenviron-

mental

agreements

andinstitutions,

environmental

planningand

theintegration

ofenvironm

entalconcerns

intoother

policyrealm

s.E

cologic’sw

orkfocuses

inparticular

onanalyzing

theenvironm

entalpolicy

ofthe

European

Union

andits

mem

berstates

andenhancing

theeffectiveness

ofinternational

environmental

regimes.

Literatu

reS

ebastianO

berthürand

Herm

annE

.O

tt:T

heK

yotoP

rotocol,International

Clim

ateP

olicyfor

the21st

Century.

1999.X

X,

359pp.

14figs.,

15tabs.,

3-540-66470-X,

DM

9$,-(R

ecomm

endedR

etailP

rice)

Bail,

Ch

ristop

h1998:

Das

Klim

aschutzregime

nachK

yoto.E

uropäischeZ

eitschrzfl für

Wirtschaflsrecht,

Vol.

9,N

o.15,

457—464.

Bau

mert,

Kevin

A.,

Ruch

iB

liand

arian

dN

ancyK

ete1999:

Whatm

ightaD

evelopingC

ountryC

limate

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Washington,

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ichard

Elliot

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iplomacy.

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ambridge

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1999:A

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James

W.

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1998,3

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andE

nviro

nm

ent

1998:The

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hat itsays?N

ewD

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CS

E.

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Rein

hard

andG

erhard

Sard

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n199$:

Das

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oderM

ijierfoig?K

arlsmhe:

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ichard

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1998:T

oward

aR

ealG

lobalW

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Foreign

Affairs,

Vol.

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66—79.

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Peter

G.G

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heInternational

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omparative

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Quarterly,

Vol.

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pril1998,

446-461.

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1999:International E

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dm

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mission

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oftheK

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theP

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and

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Tol

(eds.)1998:

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onM

ethodsfor

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ateC

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entandA

daptationStrategies.

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New

Delhi.

3031

Notes

IThis

paperis

theresult

ofm

anyyears

ofparticipation

inthe

internationalclim

atenegotiations

bythe

two

authors.It

isfurtherm

orethe

quintessenceof

abook,

publishedin

earlyO

ctober1999,

onthe

historyand

contentof

theK

yotoP

rotocol;see

Oberthür/O

tt1999.

2F

oran

assessment

ofth

eP

rotocolsee

OberthU

r/Ott

1999;G

rubbet

al.1999;

Centre

forS

cienceand

Environm

ent1998;

Yam

in1998;

Ott

1998;S

meloff

1998;C

oenenlSardem

ann1998;

Bail

199$;S

imonis

1998;B

reidenichet

al.1998;

MU

ller-Kraenner

1998;D

avies1998.

3F

ora

detailedaccount

seeO

berthür/Ott

1999,pp.

115et

seq.and

Grubb

etal.

1999,pp.

115et

seq.4

According

toprojections

ofthe

InternationalE

nergyA

gency,em

issionsof

CO

2from

thecom

bustionof

fossilfuels

will,

undera

business-as-usualscenario,

riseby

32%relative

to1990

until2010,

forO

EC

DE

uropethe

figureis

slightlylow

er,see

lEA

1998.5

This

problematique

isdiscussed

inm

oredetail

inO

berthür/Ott

1999and

Grubb

etal.

1999.6

Seein

more

detailO

berthür/Ott

1999,pp.

287et

seq.7

Seealso

European

Com

mission

1998b.A

sa

firstpositive

result,the

EU

andseveral

CE

ITs

(asw

ellas

Sw

itzerland)have

presenteda

number

ofcom

mon

positionson

relevanttopics

inthe

post-Kyoto

process;see

e.g.F

CC

C/C

P/1

9981M1SC

.7;F

CC

C/S

B/l998/M

ISC

.1/Add.3IR

ev.1and

Add.6.

8See

Oberthür/O

tt1999,

pp.147

etseq.

9See

therem

inderin

European

Com

mission

1999,p.

11.10

SeeW

WF

1998.II

EW

WE

,V

ol.7,

No.

15,7

August

1998,pp.

35.2

SeeE

uropeanC

omm

ission1999,

p.3.

‘3E

ND

SD

aily,26

May

1999.14

SeeE

uropeanC

omm

ission1999.

‘5E

ND

SD

aily,23

June1999;

seealso

thew

ebsiteof

theD

utchE

nvironment

Ministry

(VR

OM

)at

<http://w

ww

.minvrom

.nl/milieulbroeikaseffecU

f.htm?41901

.htm>

asof

24June

1999.16

SeeO

berthür/Ott

1999,pp.

197et

seq.17

“Global-W

arming

Debate

Gets

No

Consensus

inIndustry”,

Wall

Street

Journal,16

April

1998.g

FC

CC

/CP

R998/1

l/Add.l.

‘9First,

ithas

become

increasinglyevident

thatthe

climate

skepticsrepresent

aninfinitely

small

minority

among

scientiststhe

influenceof

which

isset

todecline.

Second,

growing

sectorsof

thebusiness

comm

unityappear

toaccept

theneed

foraction,

atrend

thatm

ightbe

reinforcedby

theentry

intoforce

ofthe

Protocol

(seeS

meloff

1998,p.

67).F

urthermore,

President

Clinton

hasordered

allfederal

government

agenciesto

improve

energyefficiency

ingovernm

entbuildings

by35%

from1985

levelsand

toreduce

GH

Gem

issionsfrom

energyuse

ingovernm

entbuildings

to30%

below1990

levelsby

theyear

2010(G

lobalE

nvironmental

Change

Report,

Vol.

XI,

No.

11,11

June1999,

p.3).

As

regardsratification

prospects,the

presidentialand

congressionalelections

inN

ovember

2000m

ayprovide

anopportunity

forchanging

theinternal

balancein

favourof

climate

policies.A

stypical

ofU

Spolitics,

publicopinion

will

havea

decisivesay

inthe

end.20

Already

in199$,

itstarted

exploringpossibilities

forii

projectsin

Russia;

see“Japan

andR

ussiaC

oncludeL

andmark

Greenhouse

Gas

Sw

ap”,R

eutersN

ews

Service,

19A

pril1998.

21Japan

haspassed

some

legislationto

thisend,

includinga

lawfor

theprom

otionof

measures

toprevent

globalw

arming

(October

1998),and

plansto

expandthe

useof

nuclearpow

ergreatly

inorder

toachieve

itstarget;

see“A

nalyseson

Japan’sP

ost-Kyoto

Policy

Measures

toA

chievethe

Kyoto

Target”,

31

May

1999,B

onn(on

filew

ithauthors);

seealso

“Law

Concerning

theP

romotion

ofM

easuresto

Cope

with

Global

Warm

ing”,in:

JapanE

nvironment

Quarterly,

Vol.

3,N

o.4,

Decem

ber1998.

22See

Oberthür/O

tt1999,

pp.233

etseq.

23“Industrial

Group

Plans

toB

attleC

limate

Treaty”,

The

New

York

Tim

es,26

April

1998.24

SeeD

owJones

New

swires,

21A

pril1998,

“Shelloil

withdraw

sfrom

powerful

U.S.

energylobby

group”;G

reenpeaceP

ressR

elease,“Shell

pullsout

ofU

.S.

Anti-C

limate

lobbygroup”,

21A

pril1998,

availableat

<http://w

ww

.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/1998apr21

.html>

.25

Washington

Post,

14S

eptember

1999.26

“BP

Clashes

with

Esso

overA

ctionon

Global

Warm

ing”,T

heG

uardian,15

April

1999.27

SeeO

berthür/Ott

1999,C

h.13-15.

28F

orthe

EU

capproposal

seeC

ouncilC

onclusionson

aC

omm

unityS

trategyon

Clim

ateC

hange,E

UD

oc.8346/99,

18M

ay1999.

How

ever,the

EU

hasbecom

eincreasingly

dividedinternally

onthese

issues.29

SeeD

ecision7/C

P.4

inF

CC

C/C

P/1998/16/A

dd.1.30

Cf.

Grubb

etal.

1999.31

SeeO

berthür/Ott

1999,pp.

130et

seq.32

Decision

9/CP

.4in

FC

CC

/CP

/1998/1

6/Add.I.

33O

nthese

meetings

seeE

arthN

egotiationsB

ulletin,V

ol.12,

No.

I10,14

June1999.

34T

heissue

attainedutm

ostprom

inencein

thecorridors

andbackroom

sof

CO

P4

inB

uenosA

iresand

was

partlyresponsible

forthe

sluggishprogress

atthe

conference.

Jacob

y,

Hen

ryD

.,R

onaldG

.P

nn

nan

dR

ichard

Schm

alensee1998:

Kyoto’s

Un-

finishedB

usiness.F

oreignA

ffairs,V

ol.77,

No.

4,54—

66.K

inzig,A

nnP

.and

Daniel

M.

Kam

men

199$:N

ationalT

rajectoriesof

Carbon

Em

issions:A

nalysisof

Proposals

tofo

sterthe

Transition

toL

ow-carbon

Eonom

ies.G

lobalEnvironm

entalC

hange,V

ol.8,

No.

3,183—

208.K

oplow,

Douglas

andA

aron

Martin

1998:F

uelingG

lobalW

arming.

FederalSubsidies

toO

ilin

theU

nitedS

tates(a

reportfor

Greenpeace).

Loske,

Rein

hard

1996:K

limapolitik.

ImS

pannungsfeldvon

Kurzzeitinteressen

undL

angzeiterfordernissen.M

arburg:M

etropolis.M

eyers,N

.an

dJ.

Ken

t1998:

Perverse

Subsidies:

Tax

$sU

ndercuttingO

urE

conomies

andE

nvironment

Alike.

Winnipeg:

IISD.

Moor,

An

dré

deand

Peter

Calam

i1997:

SubsidizingU

nsustainableD

evelopment.

Underm

iningthe

Earth

with

Public

Funds

(comm

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theE

arthC

ouncil).M

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urU

msetzung

undW

eiterentwicklung

desK

ioto

Protokolles.Z

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mw

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115.

Oberth

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and

Herm

ann

F.

Ott

1999:The

Kyoto

Protocol.

InternationalC

limate

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the2jst

Century.

Berlin:

Springer.

Oberth

ür,

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andH

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nF

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tt1995:

UN

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onC

limate

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The

First

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ofthe

Parties.

Environm

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dL

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144—156.

OE

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ubsidiesand

theE

nvironment

Exploring

theL

inkages.P

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EC

D.

Ott,

Herm

ann

F.

199$:T

heK

yotoP

rotocol.U

nfinishedB

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nvironment,

Vol.

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o.6,

16—20,

41—45.

Ott,

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ann

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1998a:U

mw

eltregime

imV

Olkerrecht.

Eine

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überneue

Form

eninternationaler

institutionalisierterK

ooperationam

Beispielder

Vertrage

zumS

chutzder

Ozonschicht

undzur

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grenzuberschreitenderA

bfallverringerung.B

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Nom

os.R

eid,W

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old

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reD

evelopingC

ountriesA

lreadyD

oingas

Much

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Countries

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lowC

limate

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Clim

ateN

otes,July

1997.W

ashington,D

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orldR

esourcesInstitute.

Reid,

Walter

V.

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Gold

emberg

1998:D

evelopingC

ountriesare

Com

batingC

limate

Change.

Energy

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ol.26,

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237.S

chlegelmilch,

Kai

1999:G

reenB

udgetReform

inE

urope—

Countries

atthe

forefront,B

erlin:S

pringer.S

chneider,S

tephenS.

1998:K

yotoP

rotocol:T

heU

nfinishedA

genda.C

limatic

Change,

No.

39(1998),

1—21.

Sm

eloff,E

dw

ardA

.199$:

Global

Warm

ing:T

heK

yotoP

rotocoland

Beyond.

Environ-

mentalPolicy

andLaw

,V

ol.28,

No.

2,63—

68.S

mith,

JoelS.,

Megan

M.

Law

sonan

dS

tephanieS.

Len

hart

1999:C

ompendium

of

Decision

Tools

toE

valuateS

trategiesforAdaptation

toC

limate

Change.

Bonn:

UN

FC

CC

Secretariat/S

tratusC

onsulting.W

WF

199$:A

Review

oftheS

tageoflm

plementation

ofE

uro

pean

Union

Policies

andM

easuresforC

O2

Em

issionR

eduction(edited

byD

ianP

hylipsen,K

omelis

Blok

andC

hrisH

endriks).U

trecht(N

etherlands):W

WF

.Y

amin,

Farh

ana

1998:T

heK

yotoP

rotocol:O

rigins,A

ssessment

andF

utureC

hallenges.R

eviewofE

uropeanC

omm

unity&

mt.E

nvironmental

Law

,V

ol.7,

No.

2,113—

127.

3233

35See

Annex

Iof

FC

CC

/CP

/1998/16.36

Decision

4/CP

.4in

FC

CC

/CP

/1998/16/Add.1.

37D

ecisions2

and3IC

P.4in

fCC

C/C

P/1998/16/A

dd.1.38

Regarding

theform

er,C

OP

4established

ajoin

tw

orkinggroup

oncom

pliance,w

hichis

toreport

toC

OP

5.T

hism

ightresult

inthe

elaborationof

anon-com

plianceprocedure

byC

OP

6.W

ithrespect

toP

AM

s,P

artiesat

CO

P4

mandated

theS

ecretariatto

reporton

relevant“best

practices”in

late1999

andto

organisea

workshop

onthe

matter

in2000.

39D

ecision8/C

P.4

inF

CC

C/C

P/1998/16/A

dd.l;on

thelatter

aspectsee

alsoF

CC

C/S

BS

TA

/1998/9and

FC

CC

/SB

I/l 998/7.40

SeeO

berthür/Ott

1999,pp.

253et

seq.41

Earth

Negotiations

Bulletin,

Vol.

12,N

o.76,

13D

ecember

1997,p.

14.42

Seealso

Grubb

etal.

1999,pp.

253et

seq.43

SeeG

uptalGrubb

1999.44

Benedick

1998a;F

lavin1998.

45T

hisis

differentfrom

theapproach

proposedby

Christopher

Flavin,

who

suggeststhe

formation

ofa

leadershipgroup

ofcom

mitted

countriesoutside

ofthe

climate

regime, joined

byregional

governments,

citiesand

companies;

seeflav

in1998.

46See

European

Com

mission

1998b.47

SeeO

berthür/Ott

1999,pp.

261et

seq.48

SeeE

uropeanC

omm

ission1999,

p.11.49

Furtherm

ore,the

Union

appearsto

bespeculating

internallyon

theaccession

ofthe

firstE

asternE

uropeancountries.

Ifthis

happensprior

toratification,

thisw

ouldenable

theE

Uto

incorporatesom

eof

the‘hot

air’available

fromthese

countriesinto

itsbubble

agreement.

SeeO

berthür/Ott

1999,pp.

141et

seq.50

Although

itshould

benoted

thatA

ustraliabecause

ofits

growth

targetprobably

hasa

stronginterest

to:O

flthe

Protocol

andsell

itsexcess

emission

allocations.IT

heU

mbrella

Group

was

formed

inK

yotoand

comprises

theU

S,Japan,

Canada,

Australia,

Norw

ay,N

ewZ

ealand,R

ussiaand

theU

kraine.U

nitedby

thecom

mon

goalto

designthe

Kyoto

Mechanism

sas

flexiblyas

ossible,this

grouphas

effectivelyplayed

thecounterpart

tothe

EU

inthe

post-Kyoto

negotiationsto

date.-2

Inthe

past,R

ussiaand

Japanw

ereable

topoint

outthat

theE

Uadvocated

strictlim

itationsfor

theK

yotoM

echanisms

while

atthe

same

time

securingfor

itselfthe

possibilityto

jointlyfulfil

itsobligations

underan

EU

bubbleunder

Article

4of

theP

rotocol.F

oran

analysisof

Article

4of

theP

rotocolsee

Oberthür/O

tt1999,

pp.141

etseq.

53T

heattem

ptby

theE

Uto

establisha

quantitativecap

onthe

useof

theK

yotoM

echanisms

was

unsuccessfulin

Kyoto

andthe

US

thereforeaccused

theE

Uof

tryingto

“rewrite

theK

yotoP

rotocol”; see

thequote

byJam

esF

oleyofth

eS

tateD

epartment

inG

lobalE

nvironmental

Change

Report,

Vol.

XI,

No.

10of

28M

ayI999,

p.1

; seealso

“Clinton

accusesE

Uof

Trying

toR

ewrite

Global

Warm

ingPact”

,Wall

Street

Journal,18

May

1999.54

SeeR

emarks

byV

iceP

residentA

lG

ore,T

heU

nitedN

ationsC

omm

itteeon

Clim

ateC

hange(m

istakein

theoriginal),

Conference

ofth

eP

arties,8

Decem

ber1997,

Kyoto,

Japan.55

European

Com

mission

1999,p.

10.56

Bernow

etal.

1999.57

SeeO

berthür/Ott

1999,pp.

103et

seq.5$

SeeE

uropeanC

omm

ission1999,

p.7.

59See

Schlegelm

ilch1999.

60See

forexam

plethe

callby

Cooper

1998and

Schneider

1998.61

According

toa

recentpoii

releasedby

theJapanese

Environm

entA

gency,the

majority

ofJapanese

firms

supporta

taxon

fossilfuels

tocurb

CO

2em

issions,<

http://biz.yahoo.com/ rf/990527/u.htm

l>as

of27

May

1999.62

SeeJacoby

etal.

1998,p.

61.63

Seealso

theB

attelleG

lobalE

nergyT

echnologyS

trategyP

rojectto

Address

Clim

ateC

hange,<

http://gtsp.pnl.gov/gelhome.nsf/w

ebpage/>for

atechnology-based

initiative.64

Meyers/K

ent1998,

pp.55-78;

seealso

OE

CD

1995;M

oor/Calam

i1997;

more

specificallyon

climate

seeK

oplow/M

artin1998.

65See

“Clinton

ordersgovernm

entto

reduceenergy

useand

emissions”

,Global

Environm

entalC

hangeR

eport,V

ol.X

I,N

o.I1,

1 1June

1999,p.

3.66

Benedick

I998a,p.

20;see

alsothe

Clim

ateT

echnologyInitiative

ofthe

TEA:

“Enhancing

Markets

forC

limate

Friendly

Technologies:

Leadership

Through

Governm

entP

urchasing”; June

1998,available

at<

http://ww

w.iea.org/clim

ate.htm>

.67

Seefor

example

Ott

1998a,pp.

200et

seq.68

SeeO

berthür/Ott

1995;L

oske1996,

p.250.

69See

Oberthür/O

tt1999,

pp.233

etseq.

70See

FC

CC

/AG

BM

/1997/M

ISC

. I/Add.3.

71See

UN

EP

pressrelease

1998/11.72

For

some

relevantsupport

material

thathas

beendeveloped

with

respectto

adaptationso

farsee

Feenstra

etal.

1998;Sm

ithet

al.1999

andS

outhP

acificR

egionalE

nvironmental

Program

me

(SP

RE

P),

The

Developm

entof

Adaptation

Guidelines

inthe

Pacific

at<

http://ww

w.sidsnet.org>

(asof

Septem

ber1999).

73See

alsoH

umphreys,

StephenlS

okona,Y

oubafl’homas,

Jean-Philippe:

“Equity

inthe

CD

M”,

EN

DA

TM

,D

akar,<

http://ww

w.enda.snlenergie/cdm

equity.htm>

asof

15O

ctober1998;

Mathur,

Ajay:

“Clim

ateC

hange:P

ost-Kyoto

Perspectives

fromthe

South”, T

ER

I,N

ewD

elhi,<

http://ww

w.teriin.org/clim

ate/cp4/contents.htm

l>as

of7

July1999.

74H

umphreys

etal.,

seefootnote

above.75

See“C

ontractionand

Convergence:

AG

lobalS

olutionto

aG

lobalP

roblem”

,Global

Com

mons

Institute,18/07/1997

<http://w

ww

.gci.org.uk/contconv/cc.html>

asof

9June

1999;see

alsoF

riendsofth

eE

arthInternational

1998;IN

FR

AS

AG

/TE

RI

1997;K

inzig/Kam

men

1998;B

aumert

etal.

1999.76

By

presentingits

“Annex

X”

beforeK

yoto,the

EU

didgive

theim

pressionthat

itw

asopen

fornon-O

EC

Ddeveloping

countries,w

hichseverely

strainedits

relationsw

iththese

countries.77

OE

CD

mem

bersince

1996.7$

Incom

parisonw

ithrecent

OE

CD

countrieslike

Mexico,

Turkey

andH

ungarytheir

figuresare

upto

ninetim

esas

high;see

Fischer

1998;C

IAW

orld-Factbook

199$<

http://ww

w.odci.

ov/ciaJpublications/factbook>as

of6

April

1999.9

Their

proposalsw

ereissued

asF

CC

C/A

GB

M/M

ISC

.3and

MIS

C.3/A

dd. Ito

3.80

For

example

Argentina,

Kazakhstan

andC

ostaR

icahave

alreadyannounced

theirw

illingnessto

takeon

bindingcom

mitm

ents.S

outhK

oreais

consideringthis

asw

ell,see

“Tow

ardsG

lobalP

articipation”,P

resentationby

Mr.

Raeckw

onC

hungon

behalfof

theK

oreanM

inistryof

Foreign

Affairs

andT

radeat

theO

EC

D/IE

AC

limate

Change

Forum

inP

aris,10

March

1999(on

filew

iththe

authors).$1

Inthe

United

States,

netem

issionso

fallG

HG

increasedby

21.54%from

1990to

1997(E

PA

draftU

SG

HG

inventories,3

February

99,<

http://ww

w.epa.gov/globalw

arming/

inventory/l999inv.html>

asof

9June

1999);ofth

e24

countrieslisted

inA

nnexII,

onlyseven

areexpected

toem

itC

O2

ator

below1990

levelsby

theend

ofth

em

illennium(F

CC

C/C

P/199$/1

1/Add.2).

82See

Reid/G

oldemberg

1997;1998

3435

The

Hein

richB

ollF

ou

nd

ation

The

Heinrich

Boll

Foundation,

affiliatedw

iththe

Green

Party

andheadquartered

inthe

Hackesche

Höfe

inthe

heartof

Berlin,

isa

legallyindependent

politicalfoundation

working

inthe

spiritof

intellectualopenness.

The

Foundation’s

primary

objectiveis

tosupport

politicaleducation

bothw

ithinG

ermany

andabroad,

thusprom

otingdem

ocraticinvolvem

ent,sociopolitical

activism,

andcross-

culturalunderstanding.

The

Foundation

alsoprovides

supportfor

artand

culture,science

andresearch,

anddevelopm

entalcooperation.

Itsactivities

areguided

bythe

fundamental

politicalvalues

ofecology,

democracy,

solidarity,and

non-violence.

By

way

ofits

internationalcollaboration

with

alarge

number

ofproject

partners—

cur-rently

numbering

about130

projectsin

60countries

—the

Foundation

aims

tostrengthen

ecologicaland

civilactivism

ona

globallevel,

tointensify

theexchange

ofideas

andexperiences,

andto

keepour

sensibilitiesalert

forchange.

The

Heinrich

Boll

Foundation’s

collaborationon

sociopoliticaleducation

programs

with

itsproject

partnersabroad

ison

along-term

basis.A

dditionalim

portantinstrum

entsof

internationalcooperation

includevisitor

programs,

which

enhancethe

exchangeof

experiencesand

ofpolitical

networking,

asw

ellas

basicand

advancedtraining

programs

forcom

mitted

activists.

The

Heinrich

Boll

Foundation

hasabout

160full-tim

eem

ployeesas

well

asapproxim

ately300

supportingm

embers

who

provideboth

financialand

non-material

assistance.

Ralf

Fücks,

Dr.

Claudia

Neusüf3,

andP

etraS

treitcom

prisethe

currentE

xecutiveB

oard.

Tw

oadditional

bodiesof

theF

oundation’seducational

work

are:the

“Green

Academ

y”and

the“F

eminist

Institute”.

The

Foundation

currentlym

aintainsforeign

andproject

officesin

theU

SA

,in

Cam

bodia,the

Czech

Republic,

El

Salvador,

Israel,the

Arab

Middle

East,

Kenya,

Pakistan,

South

Africa,

Turkey,

andan

EU

officein

Brussels.

New

foreignoffices

inB

osnia-Herzegovina,

Brazil,

andT

hailandare

currentlybeing

established.

For

2001,the

Foundation

hadalm

ost70

million

DM

publicfunds

atits

disposal.