Frido Wenten

Does it matter what workers do? The role of workers' relational agency in the hybridisation of TNC subsidiaries in China and Mexico Article (Accepted version) (Refereed)

Original citation: Wenten, Frido (2017) Does it matter what workers do? The role of workers' relational agency in the hybridisation of TNC subsidiaries in China and Mexico. International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management, 17 (2). p. 190. ISSN 1470-9511

DOI: 10.1504/IJATM.2017.084803 © 2017 InderScience This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86957/ Available in LSE Research Online: March 2018 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.

CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Provided by LSE Research Online

1

Doesitmatterwhatworkersdo?Theroleofworkers’relationalagencyinthehybridisationof

TNCsubsidiariesinChinaandMexico

FridoWenten1fw4@soas.ac.uk

1. Abstract

Thisarticlequestionsiftheissueofhybridisation–orconvergenceanddivergence–intheoperationsofglobalcarproducersissufficientlyaddressedonthelevelofidealtypical“productivemodels”orotherformsofstaticidealtypes.Arguingthattherearedifficulties inaccounting fordynamicchangeandprocess, Isuggestashiftinattentiontoprocessesofrelationalagencybetweensocialagentsonandbeyondtheshopfloor.BasedonempiricalevidenceontheChineseandMexicansubsidiariesofoneofthelargestglobalcarmanufacturers,Iarguethatintheserelationalprocessesworkeragencyhastobeconsideredasafactorthatshapesinstitutionalchangeandvariety,aswellastheactualperformanceofshopfloorinstitutions.

2. Keywords

automotiveindustry;hybridisation;convergence;divergence;workers;labour;agency;China;Mexico.

3. IntroductionIn1990theMITstudyTheMachinethatChangedtheWorld(Womacketal.1990)proclaimedtheinevitableconvergenceoftheglobalautomotiveindustryina“leanproduction” paradigm. At the same time, a parallel German research project(Jürgens et al. 1989) more cautiously suggested that the differences betweenglobalautoproducers’productionandsalesstrategiesmightnotbeovercomesoeasily.Overtimethe“leanproduction”hypothesiswouldbechallengedbytheideaofpersistentdivergenceincompany-specific“profitstrategies”and“productivemodels” (Boyer & Freyssenet 2002; Freyssenet 2009). Rather than a uniformdriving force towards convergence, the core assumption behind these twin-

1 FridoWenten is ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow of the “Global Challenges Research Fund“ at theDepartmentofDevelopmentStudies,SchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies(SOAS);andFellowattheDepartmentofInternationalDevelopment,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience(LSE).

2

concepts was that automotive manufacturers develop their internal rules,organisationalprinciplesandmarketorientationinaccordancewiththenationalinstitutional incentive structure, or “matrix”, of their respective home country(apartfromBoyer&Freyssenet2002;andFreyssenet2009;particularlyStreeck1992;Streeck&Kenworthy2005).Consequentlyarisingfromthisassumptionwasthepuzzleofwhatoccurswhenatransnational company with internal institutions modelled after the matrix ofhome country A opens a subsidiary within the different matrix of destinationcountry B. This question triggered research interests beyond the “productivemodel”approachproper,inparticularonJapaneseTNCs(e.g.Abo1994;Boyeretal.1998;Kumon&Abo2004).Thesharedconclusionwasthatasaruleratherthanfullapplicationof theparentcompanymodel,someformofadaptationtolocalspecificitiesoccurs,whichresultsinahybridisedmodelforthesubsidiaryplant.Dominantintheaforementionedstudieshasbeenaninterestindecipheringtheactualelementsthatconvergeordivergebetweenparentandsubsidiaryplant,inordertoconstructfromtheirdifferentcombinationcertainpatterns,modelsortypes.Thisprocedurehasenabledconstructiveandincreasinglycomplexcross-andwithin-companycomparisons(e.g.Boyeretal.1998;Freyssenet2009).Whathas attracted less attention though is the role of agency in the hybridisationprocess–forexampleinstrategicdecision-makingortheday-to-dayoperationsofaplant–thatcouldhelptomovefromcomparativestaticmodellingtocausalexplanation.Whatismore,theadvancesthathavebeenmadeinthisdirection–for example byKostova andRoth (2002) orBecker-Ritterspach (2009) –haveintroduced a perspective on processes of agency that focuses on verticalinteractionsbetweenmanagementofparentandsubsidiaryplant,and/orontheinteractionofmanagementand(local)policymakers.Whathasremainedlargelyabsentisananalysisoftheagencyofnon-elites–inthiscase:workers.2InthisarticleIarguethatworkeragency–inrelationtothatofotheragents–hasthepotential todeflectmanagerialstrategy intounintendedconsequences;anddefythepurposeofshopfloorgoverning institutions.Ontheonehand,certaincataclysmic eruptionsof relational agency evoke institutional changes that areinexplicable within an institutionalist framework alone. And on the other,divergingformsofeverydaypracticesofworkersandmanagersontheshopfloorcan alter the actual performance of institutions, helping us to explain actualconvergingordivergingdynamicswithoutequatingthesetofunctionaleffectsofa particular institutional design. In other words, the actual performance ofinstitutionsor“productivemodels”–beyondtheirpurposivedesign–hingeupon

2Thisisnottosaythattheneedtotakeworkeragencyintoaccountonatheoreticallevelhasnotbeenacknowledged(e.g.Boyer1998).Empiricallythough,theimpactofworkeragencyhasrarelybeenresearched–andifso,hasmostlybeensubstitutedforananalysisoftheagencyofunionorworkcouncilrepresentatives(e.g.inJürgensetal.1989).

3

how horizontal and vertical relations between managers and workers areconstitutedandpanoutinreality.After a revision of the shortcomings of the “productive model” and similarapproaches, the remainder of the article contrasts comparative statics ontechnologicalcomposition;remunerationsystems;theorganisationofworkandtime; and training processes at one of the largest global car producers’subsidiariesinChinaandMexicotopastandpresentagencywithinandbetweentheirworkforce andmanagement. It descends via three sections from amoresignificant instance ofworker agency shaping institutional change; to the lessvisibleimpactofeverydayformsofrelationalagencyontheshopfloor;andtothecontrasting case of absent worker agency in shaping the technologicalcomposition of the production process. The information it draws on has beenobtainedthroughshopfloorobservationsandover80interviewsduringtwosix-monthsperiodsoffieldworkineachMexicoandChinabetweenSeptember2012and September 2013. Problem-centred interviews were carried out withparticipantschosenthroughpurposivesampling,accordingtofunctionandstatus:managers,unionpersonnel,permanent,andtemporaryworkers.Thischoicewasmade due to restricted access, at the cost of a statistically non-representativesample. To approximate analytical representativeness of factual information,interviewswereundertakenuptoapointofsaturation,whencommonthemesbecame visible and information overlapped significantly; and the informationwas,wherepossible,triangulatedwithcompanyorotherofficialrecords,aswellassecondarydataandexistingstudies(e.g.Luthjeetal.2013;Zhang2014;JuarezNunezetal.2005).

4. Limitationsofideal-typicalmodellingProfit strategies and productivemodels are the result of decades of inductiveresearchandshouldbetakenas“alargelyunintentionalprocessforcreatinganexternal relevancy and internal coherency for […] technical, organisational,managerial and social changes” (Boyer & Freyssenet 2002, p.23). Onceconceptualised, they are essentially ideal types – or “heuristic devices”(Hollingsworth&Boyer1997,p.20)–thatgivemeaningtoacomplexrealitybyproviding a template against which historical analogies and deviance can, inWeber’s terms, be “comparatively measured” (Weber 1988, p.199). AsWeberrecognised,thisprocedurebearsthedangerof“telescopingtheoryandhistory”(ibid.p.204),thatis,oftailoringhistorytothepropertiesoftheidealtype.Andwhathesuggestedasasolutionwastoemphasisethatlogicalconceptualisationandempiricalrealityaretworadicallydifferentandincommensurabledomains.3

3This notion seems to be shared by at least someproponents of the institutionalist tradition.Hollingsworth andBoyer for example argue that ideal types “are notmeant to be descriptive

4

On this basisWeber suggested a procedure shared by the “productivemodel”approach – and the institutionalist tradition more generally – that I calltypologism: “comparativemeasuring” results in the construction of new ideal-types,oratleastsub-types,ineachcaseofhistoricaldeviation.4Realityisorderedthroughanever-increasingnumberoftypes,modelsandregimes,whichcombinecommon elements in different ways. Surely thismethod is a powerful tool todebunkmythsofconvergenceinonesingleidealtype–suchasthepredictionofthehomogenousspreadofleanproductionacrosstheentireautomotiveindustry(Womacketal.1990).Anditalsogivesusacertain“roadmap”astowheretolookforsignificantelementsaffectingtheoperationsofacertaincompany.However,as inWeber’smethodof ideal type construction, there is aseriousdifficulty toexplain causality and process from the static character of a productivemodel.Even if we had the most complete list of elements that in their differentialcombinationmakeupindividualidealtypes,itwillneverbepossiblefromwithinthislogic(alone)toactuallyfindexplanationsastowhyandhowthistypeemergedortransformedinthewayitdid.Takingthisbacktotheinitialquestion,thereisarangeoffactorsthatsuggesteitheratendencytowardsconvergenceortowardsdivergenceofproductivemodelsbetweenaparentcompanyanditssubsidiaries.Table1listsafewofthesefactors,whichcouldhoweverbeextendedatwill.Convergence DivergenceTechnologicalRigidities CostandProfitabilitySharedPlatforms/ModularProduction

Quantity/Quality

Globalstandards(e.g.ISOnorms) OwnershipStructure(JointVentures?)

FreeTradeAgreements LocalMarketStructureHomeCountryInstitutions LocalInstitutionsGlobalSuppliers LocalSuppliersOpenCapitalMarkets LabourSupplyandSkills

Table1:Factorssuggestingconvergenceordivergence

Factors such as shared platforms, technological rigidities (e.g. operationsrequiringparticularmachinery), globalnorms, the impactof thehomecountryinstitutionsoncorporategovernanceetc.suggestthatcompanieswillreproduce

statementsaboutspecificfirms,industrialsectors,orindividualfirmsatspecificperiodsoftime.Rather,theyareheuristicdevicestosensitizeustopossibleinterrelationshipsthatmightexistamongabroadsetofvariablesorsocialcategories.”(Hollingsworth&Boyer1997,p.20)4Inanotherself-criticism,Hanckéhaspointedout: “Oneof theproblemswithsuchexpandingtypologiesisthatultimatelyonecouldclaimthateverycapitalistcountryhasproduceditsown‘variety’,inwhichatleastoneinstitutionorcombinationofinstitutionsishistoricallyspecific,andthereforedifferentfromotherrelatedtypes.”(Hancké2009,p.15)

5

theproductivemodelof theirheadquartersabroad.Costdifferentials,differentmarketstructureandsize,localregulationsandnorms,adifferentmodelrange,differentownershipstructureincaseofjointventuresetc.ontheotherhandarefactorsthatsuggestahighdegreeofdivergenceintheproductivemodelofforeignsubsidiaries.Naturally,themostlikelyoutcomeinanyempiricalcaseissomeformof hybridisation that combines converging and diverging elements (Abo 1994;Boyeretal.1998;Kumon&Abo2004;Becker-Ritterspach2009)–butitisnotfromestablishingalistoffactorsitself,orfromtheirparticularcombination,thatwecandrawconclusionsastowhyandhowahybridproductivemodelemerges.Ifthesemodelsarestrictlyspeakingthefinalresultandnotthestartingpointofhistorical-empiricalinquiry,thenfactorsexternaltotheproductivemodelmustexist that explain its emergence and transformations.This paper suggests thathumanagency,particularlyinarelationalformbetweensocialgroups,becomesan important analytical issue for (at least) two reasons. On the one hand, todemonstratea causal relationshipbetween institutions/productivemodelsandbehaviour, the effects of the institutional matrix require occasional empiricalreference towhat social agents “actually do”with the constraints and optionsprovidedtothem.Ontheotherhand,inordertoexplaintheemergenceandchangeof institutions/productive model, the reverse relation needs to be examined,namelyhowwhatsocialagents“actuallydo”transcendstheinstitutionalmatrix,which might lead to unintended dysfunctionalities or trigger institutionaladaptation.

5. ThecaseGermanCompanyXdevelopedintooneofthelargestglobalproducersoflowandmedium-pricedpassengercarsafterWorldWarII.Withsalesof5.04millionunitsinthefirsthalfof2015itwasbrieflytheworld’slargestcarmanufacturer(Cremer&Funakoshi2015),unitingtwelveindependentmotorvehiclebrandsunderonecompany group and running production facilities in 21 countries. In theproductivemodelapproach,CompanyXhasbeensaidtopursuea“volumeanddiversity”profitstrategy,characterisedbythemassproductionofawiderangeofmodels.Thisinturnrestsona“productivemodel”ofpolyvalentlyskilledworkers,quickly adaptable machinery, a high degree of outsourcing, and the ability toquickly integrate innovations developed elsewhere (Boyer& Freyssenet 2002,chap.6). Due to its public-private ownership structureat the headquarters, itscooperativeindustrialrelationsandextensivecollectiveagreementsCompanyXhasalsobeen heraldedas an archetype of German “neo-corporatism”(Streeck1992;Jürgens2009).

6

Company X opened its first Mexican and Chinese plants in 1964 and 1984respectively,mainlywiththeaimofaccessingtheshieldeddomesticmarketsofthetwocountries(Bennett&Sharpe1985;Thun2006;Chin2010).In2015thecompany group operated three manufacturing plants in Mexico and fifteen inChina,allofwhichhadbeenopenedafter2009(Figure1).

Figure1:CompanyXcorporatestructureinChinaandMexico,2015

BoththeMexicanandChinesemainplantsarecomparablylarge,withmorethan10,000directand5,000indirectemployees–theMexicanmainplantemployedatotal of about 18,000 workers in 2012, while the main plants of the two joinventuresofCompanyXinChinahadworkforcesofaround(JV1)andabove(JV2)20,000in2013.AroundaquarterofdirectemployeesweretemporaryworkersinMexico and at JV2, with no data being available for JV1.5TheseworkersweredirectlyhiredbyCompanyXinMexico,whileinChinatheywere“dispatched”bylabouragencies.6Theshareoffemaleworkersinproductionwaslow,between5%inMexicoand2%atJV2,butinadministrativeandservicejobsitwasaroundtwiceas high in the Chinese JVs as inMexico (24/21%versus 12%). The subsidiaryassemblyplantsinChinawereallsignificantlysmaller,withprojectedworkforces

5OfficiallyJV1doesnotemploytemporaryagencyworkers.This,however,isonlypartlycorrect,astheChinesesideofthejointventurerunsitsownlabouragency.Duetotheparticularownershipstructurethedispatchworkersithiresdonotappearassuchinofficialstatistics.6TospeakofpermanentemploymentfortheChinesecaseisslightlymisleading,becausedirectlyemployedworkersalsoonlypossesstemporary(onetothreeyear)contracts,whicharehowevercustomarilyrenewed(seealsoJürgens&Krzywdzinski2015).

7

ofaround6,000to8,000directworkers–noneoftheseplantsranatfullcapacityyetin2013.Similarly,thenewMexicanassemblyplantthatbegantobestaffedin2016, would have a smaller workforce. The majority of the workforce wascomposed of residents from the surrounding areas, while in China temporaryworkerscouldalsobehiredfromdistantprovincesviarecruitmentagencies.7ThemostsignificantdifferencebetweentheMexicanandChineseventures,however,was the age composition of theworkforce, with an average age of over 45 inMexicoandaroundorevenbelow30inChina.ThiswasmainlyduetothematurityoftherespectiveplantandcontinuousexpansionandhiringinChina.Temporaryworkers were in both cases in their early twenties, as they were hired fromvocationalschoolsorhighschools.8ConcealedintheChinesecaseishoweverthefact that at least JV2 made extensive use of student interns from vocationalschools,whoworkedattheplantforeithersixmonthsorayearandwereintheirlateteensorearlytwenties.Zhang(Zhang2014,p.70)estimatesthatinternscanmakeupaboutathirdoftheworkforceinlabourintensivedepartments,whichwasconfirmedinmyinterviews.9Thereweretwofurtheraspectsthatsetthecasesapart.First,verticalrelationswithinmanagement differed, due to the jointventure structure in the Chinesecase. While the Mexican plant was staffed with single (usually Mexican)departmentheads,eachdepartmentintheChinesejointventureswasheadedbybothaChinesemanageroftherespectiveSOE,andaGermanmanagerofCompanyX.ExemptedfromthisrulewereHumanResources.ThismeantthatmanagerialdecisionsinChinadidnotmirrorCompanyXdecisionsinaone-to-onefashion–andthat theareaofemploymentrelations inparticularwasbeyond immediateinfluence (but also responsibility) of the German side. Second, Company X inMexicohadanindependententerpriseunionwitharichtraditionofrankandfileactivism,strikesandcampaigns–aswellasunioninfightingandconflictsbetweengrassrootsmovementsandunionleaders.TheChinesetradeunionontheotherhand was tightly controlled by party and management, which is typical forbranchesoftheAll-ChinaFederationofTradeUnionsinstateownedenterprises.Neither workers nor union leaders, who held former or parallel managerialpositions, had any interest in using the union as a vehicle for interestrepresentationorworkeragency.10TheserelationsdidneitherdiffersignificantlybetweenthetwoJVsnorbetweensubsidiaryplantsindifferentgeographicareasofChina.WhilemostplantsofJV1areconcentratedinthesameprovince,JV2hassubsidiaries inWestandSouthChina.Because it is a large centrally controlled

7ThetradeunionchairmanofaJV2subsidiaryestimatedthataround90%oftheworkforcewerelocalresidents;JV2U1.8Thisisnotastatisticallyrepresentativeresult,butanestimatefrominterviewswithworkers.9Itwasnotpossibletoclarifyhowtheseinternscounttowardstheoverallemploymentfigures.10 Interviews with workers JV1DW1,4 JV1FW2,3,5 and JV2FW1,2; interviews union officialsJV2U1,2.

8

SOE,itstradeunionleadershavesufficientleveragetorefuseadaptationtothemore reform-oriented environment in South China. 11 If over time regionaldifferencesinworkeragency–forexamplehigherlabourturnoverandahigherpropensity to strike in South China (Pringle 2011; Chan 2014; Elfström &Kuruvilla2014)–willhaveanimpactontherecentlyopenedSouthernsubsidiaryofJV2remainstobeseen.

6. Institutionalchangeandrelationalagency–The1992strikeinMexicoasawatershed

BeforeIshedmorelightontheshopfloorinstitutionsandtheirperformanceinCompanyX’splants inChinaandMexico formore recent times, it is crucial tomention the inmany regards decisive turning point in the organisation of theMexicanmain plant. In 1992 a newly elected union leadership signed a secretagreement with Company X to experiment with meritocratic remunerationschemes,teamwork,andoutsourcing.Thissparkedamonth-longwildcatstrikeagainstmanagementandunionleadership,duringwhichtheenterprisefiredtheentireworkforce.Afterblacklistingover1,000activistsitrehiredtheremaining12,000 workers under a new collective contract that introduced theaforementionedinstitutionsacrosstheboard.Italsoimposednewunionstatutesthat eliminated the layer of shop stewards, who had been the backbone ofprecedingunionstrength.Crucialtotheescalationoftheconflictwasthatforthepreceding five years labour struggles had prevented the implementation ofstructural and institutional changes, which the enterprise envisioned inpreparationforNorthAmericanexportsaftertheclosureofitssoleUSproductionsitein1987andthedawnofNAFTA.12The analytical relevance of this event resides in two interrelated aspects thatdemonstratetheexplanatoryrelevanceofrelationalagency.First,theeventitselfwasneitherpredictablebythepre-1992institutionalmatrix,norcouldthelatterexplainthebehaviourandstrategiesofdifferentstakeholdersduringtheconflict(i.e.structures/institutionsfailtoexplaineventandbehaviour).Andsecond,theactualinstitutionalchangethatwasimplementedaftertheconflict–discussedinmoredetail in thenextparagraphs– isnotexplainableposthocasa functionaltransition, but instead as a result of the strategic interaction of the differentstakeholdersinvolved(onthispointIsharemuchoftheargumentationofPries1993).Someoftheoldinstitutionswhereabolished,otherstransformed,andnewonesestablished–whythisoccurredintheformitdidcanonlybeexplainedfrom

11Interviewscity-andprovince-levelunionleadersSouthChina,SCU1,2.12This conflict has beenwell documented,with different analytical conclusions (JuarezNunez1993;2006;Pries1993;Healy2008;Wenten2016).Unfortunatelythedetailsoftheconflictarebeyondthescopeofthisarticle.

9

theinteractionsofpolicymakers,managersandworkers(i.e.institutionalchangeisdrivenbyrelationalagency).13While we can therefore speak of an impact of worker agency on institutionalchange in theMexican case, there is no equivalent event in the history of theChineseJVs.TheinitialimplementationofshopfloorinstitutionsintheChinesecase has for themost part been at puremanagerial discretion14–which doeshowevernotprecludethatworkeragencymighthaveanimpactontheiractualday-to-dayfunctioning.

7. Divergence–Conflictandcomplianceintheorganisationofproduction

Beyond the occurrence of watershed events, I will emphasise that theperformanceoreffectsofshopfloorinstitutions,onceimplemented,dependonhow everyday forms of relational agency unfold. Essentially I suggest thatdivergent formsof thisagencycauseadivergence in institutionalperformance.The particularways productionwas organised in the two cases depended theactualpowerofmanagersandworkerstoinfluencestrategicdecisionsandday-to-dayoperationsintheirfavour.Onthebasisofacloseranalysisofremunerationsystems,trainingpracticesandtheorganisationofworkontheshopfloor,Iwillstress threeobservable formsofworkeragencydeflectingmanagerial interestsintounintendedresults.Theseformsareroutinizedbargainingpracticesthroughestablishedunionstructures;openorsilentnon-cooperationandrefusal;andexitstrategies.These formscorrespondroughlyto thematicareasofremuneration;theorganisationofworkandtime;andtraining.

7.1. Contractsandremuneration

In both China and Mexico, Company X had implemented meritocratic wagesystems. However, wage setting was a unilateral decision of the ChinesemanagementinJV1andJV2–althoughtheunionleadershipwasconsultedinthedecisionmakingprocess–whileinMexicocollectiveagreementsandunion-ledwage bargaining remained important institutions. The 1992 conflict, however,hadseverelyalteredandcurtailedunionpower.Inbothcases,therealworkings

13The emphasis on awatershed event differs from the leitmotiv of “punctuated equilibrium”(North&Weingast1989;Weingast2002)or“path-dependency”approaches(Mahoney2000)inthattheeventisnotcontingent,andneitherisitsresultarbitrarynor“relativelydetermined”–butinstead,it istheoutcomeofaspecificbalanceofforcesbetweendifferentsocialagentsandtheprocessesofrelationalagencybetweenthem.14That thishasworked itselfout rathersmoothly–at least in thepost-WTOperiod,when therestructuringofSOEsandrelatedprotestshadbeenconcluded–canalsopartlybeattributedtothe fact that in an expansive dynamic of opening new facilities new institutions can beimplementedintheabsenceofanyworkerinfluence(inChina).

10

ofmeritocraticremunerationdependedontheirimplementationintheparticularforcefieldofmanagement-workerrelations–andasthesediffered,sodidtheuseandeffectsofbroadlysimilarremunerationsystems.Wages, working hours and tasks in Mexico were directly regulated by thecompany-specific collective agreement, which was subject to annualrenegotiation.In2012workersweregroupedinto23bandsoftwelvepaygrades,ranging from $5,280 to $18,156 per month, depending on work area, status(worker, specialist, team leader) and performance. 15 These wages were thesecondhighestintheautomotiveindustryinMexico(Covarrubias2014),andwellabovethe2012Mexicanminimumwageof$1,911permonth.16In the Chinese case, collective agreements had the status of a non-negotiatedbaseline formanagement-union relations, established at the foundation of theenterprise.Wages at both JV1 and JV2were regulated in individual contracts,whichsubdividedthemintobasepay,benefitsandallowancesandtheso-called“floatingwage”–thelattermainlyreferringtoefficiencywagesandpremiums.17Blue collarworkers at JV1were subdivided into ordinary and skilledworkers(Facharbeiter); and at JV2 into five separate,butpartlyoverlappingpaybandsincreasingwithrisingskilllevelandcomplexityoftasks(foradetaileddiscussionseeJürgens&Krzywdzinski2016,p.209ff.).Inthesummerof2013,thebasewageforordinaryworkerswas¥2000atJV1;and¥1,300atJV2,whichinbothcaseswasabout¥200abovethelocalminimumwage.Theaveragemonthlynetincomeat JV1was¥4,000 to¥5,000 (USD 650-810) for ordinary formalworkers and¥3,000to¥4,000(USD485-650)fordispatchworkersin2013;atJV2thefigureswere ¥3,500-4,500 (USD 565-730) and ¥2,800-3,200 (USD 450-515),respectively.18This implies that up to 50% (JV1) or even 60% (JV2) of formalworkers’monthly net earnings could depend on potentially variable overtime

15CompanyXinMexicodividestheworkforceintothreecategories:ordinaryworkers(técnicos);“specialist” workers (especialistas, similar to the German Facharbeiter), such as maintenanceworkers;andteamleaders.Ordinaryworkerscanclimbupascaleofsixteenlevels;andtheirteamleaders an additional four. Specialists have an entry salary equivalent to the tenth level forordinaryworkersandcanincreasetheirsalaryalonganotherelevenlevels.Specialistteamleadersaregroupedintotwolevelsatthetopofthepaygrade.Thelowestlevelsalaryforanordinaryteamleaderis2.3timesthatofthelowestlevelsalaryforanordinaryworker;forspecialiststheratiois2:1.16DifferentfromChina,itisnotmerelydifficultbutsheerimpossibletosurviveontheMexicanminimumwageasasinglesourceofincome.17Insomecases“floatingwage”alsoincludesaspectsofa“functionalwage”,i.e.premiumsbasedon aworker’s rank (Luthje et al. 2013, p.67). The term “floatingwage” dates back to China’seconomicreformsinthe1980sthatallowedSOEstoretainacertainpercentageoftheirprofitsforredistributionamongsttheworkforce.Thepercentageofthefloatingwageintheoverallwagebillwassupposedtobefixed–initiallyatnomorethan5%,whichby1993hadalreadyincreasedto23.3%onaverage(Meng2000,p.83f.).18Informationgatheredfromworkers’payslipsandinterviewswithworkersandmanagers.

11

benefits,individualorcompanyperformance.19Duetothehighnumberoforders,thisshareinitselfwashoweverrelativelystable.WagesatCompanyXcomparedfavourably to Asian (i.e. Japanese and Korean) joint ventures with workers’medianannualcashincomebeing¥42,732,butwereratherlowifcomparedtoother European and American companies (¥62,354) (Puxin ManagementConsultingCo.,inZhang2014,p.76).AlthoughbothChineseandMexicanremunerationsystemswerestronglybasedonperformanceevaluations,theiractualfunctioningcomparesquitedifferently.In Mexico workers’ climbing the pay grade depended fully on individualappraisals, but the daily wage associated with each pay grade/band waspredeterminedbythecollectiveagreementandwasre-negotiatedeachyear.Anyadditionalbenefits,allowances,premiumsandbonuseswerecalculatedasratiosoftherespectiveworker’sdailysalary.Thissystemwastheresultoftheunion’sdefeat in the 1992 conflict and the consequential abolition of senioritywages.While the allocationof individualworkers to their respective grade/bandwassubjectto(monthly)meritocraticevaluations,collectivebargainingoverannualwage increases and the number and spread of pay grades was institutionallyretained.Unlesstheenterprisewasabletoimposeapayfreeze,allworkerswouldreceiveanannualnominalpayriseasaneffectofcollectivebargaining.In China, most premiums and overtime pay were similarly calculated aspercentagesof thebasepay,but the latterwasnotsubject toregularcollectivenegotiations.Uponhiring,workerswereplacedincertainpaygradesaccordingtoskill level,tasksandemploymentstatus.Inadditiontopremiumsfrommonthlyindividual appraisals and overtime benefits, a major part of workers’ incomedependedoncompanyperformance-basedbonusesdistributedatthediscretionof the enterprise in the form of double wages and/or mid-year or year endbonuses(thelatteralonecanaccountforupto25%,Luthjeetal.2013,p.55).20DifferentfromtemporaryworkersinMexico,dispatchworkersinChinawerenoteligibleforthefullamountofpremiumsandbonuses.Asaconsequence,salariesamongstindividualworkersshowedawidespread(apointstressedaswellbyJürgens&Krzywdzinski2016,p.214ff.);andtherewasnoautomaticprogressioninincomeofanysort.The implications were twofold. On the one hand, workers in both casescomplainedaboutnepotismandalackoftransparencyintheappraisalprocess,19Calculationsbasedonworkers’payslips;author’sfieldnotes;interviewswithChineseworkersJV2FW1,JV2DW2,3;ChinesemanagersJV2CM1,2,3;GermanseniormanagerJV1GM.20Hereitisimportanttodistinguishbetween“premiums”thatdependonindividualappraisals;and“bonuses”dependingoncompanyperformance.Bonusesweredistributedtotheworkforceintimes of high sales, without transparent procedure and without workers having a formalentitlement to them. Complaints at JV1 arose during the financial crisis, when the enterprisereducedthesebonuses,interviewworkerJV1FW4;onlineforums.

12

although these grievances were more widespread amongst older Mexicanworkers that had experienced the seniority system than amongst Chineseworkers.21Andtemporaryanddispatchworkerscriticisedthe limitedprospectforpermanencyorcareerprogression.Ontheotherhand,thesegrievanceswerepartlychannelledintocomplaintstotheunionadministrationinMexico;whileinChinaworkerseitheraccepted thesepracticesorsoughtother formsof copingstrategies,suchasaventingtheiranger in internalandpubliconline forums,areductionofeffortand, inthecaseofdispatchworkers,exit.However, that theunioninMexicohadtheinstitutionalleveragetoinfluencetheoverallpaygradesdid not necessarily translate into benefits for theworkforce either: in 2002 itagreedtoanintroductionoffivelowerpaygradesthatcutthebasicentrysalaryby50%.This,again,wasadeliberatechoicebytheuniontopre-emptareplayofthe1992events:“Huge conflicts have not occurred since 1992, because with us the enterpriseachievedanewagreement–thenewwagelevelsthatallowedittolowerlabourcosts.Whydidwesignthisagreementin2002?Becausewethoughtitwasbettertomakeadealthantoriskanotherconflict.”22Insum,inMexicothecontinuousrelevanceoftheunionincollectivebargainingprocedurescreatedaco-determinedmechanismforregularwageincreasesthatran parallel to an otherwise individualisedmeritocratic system. However, thecrucialpointisthatthisinstitutionallegacyinitselfwasmerepotentialityoridlecapacity–itstilldependedontheactualconstellationbetweenunionleadership,rank and fileworkers andmanagement towhat effect these institutionswereactually mobilised. In China, on the other hand, management retained fulldiscretion over wage setting and rather chose to keep workers motivated byredistributingbonusesatwill.Thissystemseemedtohaveworkedconsiderablywell,giventhatCompanyXinChinahasgrownnearcontinuouslyandisusuallyoneofthebestpayingemployersintheregion.Itremainsspeculativeifamajoritydecision-makingpoweroftheGermansideinthecasesofJV1andJV2wouldhavealteredthisarrangement.

7.2. Organisationofworkandtime

Althoughwithin theglobal automotive industry teamworkhasbeenapplied inmanifoldforms(Babson1995;Kochanetal.1997;foraconceptualoverviewon21My interviews andevaluation of onlinemessage boards suggest that therewerecomplaintsabout the way performance evaluations were carried out in Company X’s Chinese JVs. Thiscontrastswith the analysis of Jürgens and Krzywdzinski (2016, p.209ff.), who stress that thetransparent and fair nature of these evaluations led to widespread acceptance within theworkforce. It would require better, unrestricted access and larger sampling sizes of workerinterviewstoanswerwithmoreconfidencehowworkersactuallyviewedtheappraisalsystem.22InterviewformergeneralsecretaryCompanyXunionMexico,MU2.

13

teamworkseeSchaper2014),inidealtypicaltermstheteaminaleanproductionparadigmshouldbetheresponsibleunitnotonlyforthefulfilmentofimmediateproductive operations, but also for task assignment (including job rotation),quality control (including responsibility for mistakes), self-evaluation, and“continuous improvements” (CIP) of the production process. This is based onpolyvalent task ranges and multi-skilled workers within each team; and acooperative“clientandsupplier”philosophybetweenindividualworkers,teamsandmanagers.Onthesurface,workorganisationinMexicoandChinaresembledtoleanproductionphilosophiesofteamworkandCIP.However,inpracticetheseruleswererarelyappliedbythebook.InbothMexicoandChinateamworkwasintroducedandorganisedinatop-downfashion,eitheragainstexplicitunionresistanceasinMexicoin1992–orwithoutworkerinvolvementthroughoutthegradualenlargementofproductivecapacityduringthe1990s,asinthecaseofJV2.23InbothMexicoandChinateamswereofvariable sizes (usually 1:10 or 1:15) depending on the department andworkstation.Eachteamhadaskilledworkerasateamleader,who,unlikeintheGermanplants,wasinbothcasesnotelectedbytheteammembers.InMexico,theteamleaderwastheworkerwiththehighestpaygradeinhisteam,giventhathefulfilledcertainperformancecriteriaandwasapprovedbytheenterprise.InChinaadvancedworkerswhopassedallperformancecriteriacouldsitexaminationstoqualifyaspotentialteamleaders,tobeappointedbytheshopmanagerifavacancyopened up (described in detail in Zhang 2014, p.110). In both cases the teamleaderwasaccountabletoagroupleader,whosupervisedmultipleworkteamsandrepresentedthelowestlevelofmanagement.Qualitycircleswereformallyinplace; and workers were asked to submit monthly suggestions for processoptimisations,whichcountedtowardstheirregularperformanceevaluations.24The team leader supervised, instructed and evaluated the team members’individual performance – the latter having an immediate effect onwages andpromotions.Healsohadthe freedomtore-assigntaskswithinhisgroup,whilehigherlevelsinthehierarchycouldre-assigntasksacrossgroupsandoverrulethedecisions of team leaders. Neither in Mexico nor in China was job rotationscheduled by a transparent procedure. It occurred on an informal basis at thediscretionoftheteamleaderafterconsultationwith,orordersfrom,higher-levelmanagers.Inaddition,andagainsttheprincipleof“wastereduction”,teamsatJV2were usually staffed with a higher number of workers than required forimmediateproductiveoperations,sothattherewascertainflexibilityformutualhelporsubstitution.Thiswaslikelyaresultofthelargeramountofinexperiencedworkersontheproductionline.

23InsufficientdataisavailableonhowthisprocessunfoldedatJV1.24Author’sfieldnotes;seealsoL.Zhang2014,p.138;Montiel2001,p.175ff.

14

Formally,inbothChinaandMexicoweretimeregimesdeterminedunilaterallybythe enterprise – the union in Mexico had lost its right to co-determine theallocation of overtime or intensification of work in 1992 – including workinghours and days, shift length and rotation, and cycle time. The regularworkingweekinMexicowas44hoursforthedayshift,42hoursfortheafternoonshift,and40hoursforthenightshift.Dayandafternoonshiftincludedahalfanhourbreak;thenightshiftwasthirtyminutesshorter;andshiftsrotatedonamonthlybasis.JV1followedtwodifferentshiftsystems:athreeshiftsystem;andatwo-shiftsystemwithregularworkingdaysofvariablelengthbetweeneighttoelevenhours,inwhichworkersalternatedbetweentwodayshifts,twonightshiftsandtwo rest days. JV2 had a three-shift systemwith eight working hours and bi-weeklyrotationandaworkingweekof6.5days–thatis,workershadonedayoffeverytwoweeks.Cycletimeswereunilaterallydeterminedbytheenterpriseandvariedbytaskcomplexity.InnewerplantsinChina,however,allprocessesweresetupforacycletimeof60seconds.Exhausting work rhythms were the most pronounced complaint amongst myintervieweesinbothChinaandMexico.InMexico,however,workersIinterviewedalsostronglycriticisedtheparticularworkorganisationfortwobasicreasons:ageneralsenseofincreasingcompetition,andamorespecificfrustrationwithjobrotation and alteration of work rules being at the sole discretion of theenterprise.25BecauseteamworkwasintroducedinMexicoagainstthewillofthemajorityoftheworkforcetherewaspersistentdiscontentwiththesystem.Theunioncommitteeelectedin2000proposedtomanagementtotackletheissuebyinvolvingunionpersonnelintheco-determinationofworkrulesagain.Therefusaltoevenconsidertheproposaltriggeredastrike,whichresultedinanenlargementof the number of section stewards, and a de facto re-vitalisation of grassrootsinstitutions,suchasthegeneralassembly,whichtheenterprisehadabolishedinitsrewritingoftheunionstatutesin1992.However,noinstitutionalresponsetoworkers’demandofcontroloverworkruleswasmade,whichratheraggravatedthesituationofsilentdissentontheshopfloor–afactthatwasnotonlyconfirmedin interviewswithworkers and academic experts, but also by the existenceofclandestinegroupsofworkerdissidentswithin theplant.26The resultwas thatmanagementhadtodealwithrecurringinstancesofworkerrefusal(intheformsofwildcatovertime refusals and/or complaints to theunion/HR) toaccept jobrotations;longworkinghours;forcedvacationintimesofloworders;andcycletime reductions. For the latter the union tried to negotiate a compensatoryincrease in workers’ salaries in an ad-hoc manner; but no new formalarrangementemerged.Theactualfunctioningofteamworkandtimeallocationin

25InterviewsworkersMPW2-12.26InterviewsworkersMPW3,6,7,8;InterviewHubertoJúarezNúñez;author’sfieldnotes.

15

Mexico is probably best characterised as a dysfunctional stalemate, in whichauthoritarianism from above and evasion or resistance from below preventinstitutionalchangeeitherintheinterestofworkersorofmanagers.Forexample,despite incidentsof overtime refusals and complaints didmanagement not re-integratetheunionindecisionsontimeallocation–butneitherhasit(atthemainplant)beenable to implement itsdesired introductionof timeaccounts,duetosternoppositionfromtheworkforce.InMexicotherecurringbackandforthbetweenmanagerialauthoritarianismandworkers’strategiesof compliance, evasion,orresistancewere thedeterminingfactorinhowtheinstitutionaleffectsofteamworkandCIPactuallymaterialised.The enterprise thwarted workers’ proactive contribution to CIP throughinsufficientmonetaryandcareerincentivesandinparticularthroughsustainedauthoritarianhierarchies,whichresultedinreducedeffortandparticipation.Inpractice this counteracted ideal typical institutional effects and implied thatCompanyXinMexicochosetooperateunderconditionsofpersistentdiscontentand pressure from below, while refraining from installing union- or othermechanismsthatcouldfunctionassafetyvalves.In China an assessment of the role ofworker agency in shop floor relations isambivalentatbest.WhileZhangdocumentsasmallnumberofinstancesofworkerrefusalandsuggestsanimageofwidespreadgrassrootsresistance(Zhang2014),JürgensandKrzywdzinski emphasiseworkforce complianceanddescribe shopfloor relations at CompanyX in China as “almost a paradise formanagement”(Jürgens&Krzywdzinski2016,p.256).MyobservationsandinterviewsinChinasuggest that a reduction of effort amongst ordinary production workers,particularly internsand temporaryworkers,waswidespread,but that thisdidrarelytranslateintoopenlyvoiceddiscontentorworkstoppages.27Qualitycircles,however,wereaccordingtobothworkersandmanagementlargelydysfunctionalduetoalackofparticipation,whichwascompensatedforbyunion-organisedskillcontestsandprizesforparticularlyproductiveworkers.Overall,labourrelationsin the Company X’s Chinese plants were rather stable, although they werehierarchical,unilaterally top-downorganisedandoffered littleparticipationorautonomousworkorganisationtoworkers.

27 At JV1 a two-hour strike occurred in 2011 to demand improved pay for dispatchworkers(interviewJV1DW1,2);protestwasopenlyvoicedinonlineforumsafterthelethalaccidentofaworkerontheshopfloorin2009(Onlineforumsbaidutieba;interviewsJV1FW2;JV1DW1,2);andatJV2workersprotestedagainstexcessiveovertimein2009(interviewJV2FW1,2).

16

7.3. Training

InbothMexicoandChinaCompanyXwasconfrontedwithanincompatibilityofthe respectivenational education systemandthe skillsdemandedon the shopfloor.AndinbothcasesdiditadopttrainingschemesbroadlymodelledaftertheexperienceofitsoperationsinGermany.InMexicotheplanthadestablisheditsownon-the-jobtrainingprocessesandavocationalschool.InthelatterCompanyXtrainedspecialistsinan80%technical,20%theoreticalschemeadoptedfromtheGermandualeducationsystem.In2012CompanyXhadextendeditsfacilitiesbyanotherlargetrainingcentreforworkerstobeemployedatnewlyopenedproductionsites,inparticularitsupscalebrandplantthatopenedin2016.StudentsofthevocationalschoolwerepartlytrainedforCompanyX’sowndemandinhigh-skilledworkers,andpartlyforitssuppliersofthenearbyindustrialpark.OnlyrecentlyhasCompanyXjoinedacertificationscheme of the German Chamber of Commerce that makes these degreestransferrable.28TherewereessentiallytwooptionstobecomeaspecialistworkeratCompanyXinMexico.Newentrantscouldbehiredasspecialistsiftheyweregraduatesfroma (preferably Company X’s) vocational school. To this end Company X offeredscholarships to graduates of (the better) high schools in the area. Ordinaryworkersontheotherhandwereusuallyrequiredtohaveahighschooldegreeandreceived a basic training on the job, under rules stipulated in the CollectiveContract andmonitored closely by union personnel.However, if they receivedgoodperformanceevaluationsandqualifiedforacompany-internalscholarship,they could train to become a specialist concurrent with their (reduced)participation innormalproductiveoperations.Workers couldalsoaccessnon-comprehensive individual courses if they gained particular premiums throughgoodworkperformance.29In China, Company X did not establish its own vocational schools, but hiredgraduatesfromChinesepolytechnichighschoolsandcollegesandtrainedtheminin-house processes. Separate rooms on the shop floor of the respectivedepartmentsshouldallowfortraininginbasicskills;andinadvancedskillswherea “professional training room”was available. The training range at JV2’smainplant, for example, covered product and automation technology, projectmanagement,leantraining,design,managementtrainingandforeignlanguages.30

28IthankJudithWiemannandananonymousreviewerforclarifyingthispoint.29InterviewworkerMPW4. 30AtJV1certaintrainingaspectshavebeenconcentratedatparticularlocations–oneofthenewerplantsintheEast,forexample,isresponsibleforallaspectsofleantraining.

17

Jürgens and Krzywdzinski (2015) describe in detail the pathways open toordinaryworkersandskilledprofessionalsinpursuitofan“expert”careerwithintheenterprise.Myobservationsandinterviewsconfirmthattheshortageof–andrelated need to retain – skilled personnel explains the development of expertcareertracksforaminorityofworkers.However,thisshouldnotmisleadtotheassumptionthattherewaswidespreadgeneraltrainingorstrongimperativesof“leanproduction”.TheaspectsofaleansystemthatwouldhavedemandedworkerinvolvementwereonlypartiallyappliedatCompanyXinChina(indicatedabovebytheteamworksystem).Activeparticipationbeyondfollowingjobinstructions,aswellashighskilllevels,weredemandedfromasmallsectionoftheworkforceonly. Instead, Company X’s rapid expansion in China necessitated a constantintake of new workers for simple manual tasks associated with the stronglyTaylorised production process and limited model range that allowed forproductionlinesbeingusedforoneortwomodelsonly.Allnewworkersreceivedabasictraininginmotoricfunctions;theoperationofcertaintools;techniquestoavoidproductionmistakes;how to fill inoperative sheetsetc.But fordispatchworkersandinternsitcouldbedrasticallyreduced.DispatchworkersatJV2weresupposed to be trained for two to four weeks before they were successivelyintegrated into regularworkteams,dependingonmodels,particular tasksandlearning capacityof the individualworker. In fact,however, their trainingwasoftencutshorttoafewdays,beforetheywereusedinnormaloperations.31AsaGermanseniormanagersimplyputit:“itislearningbydoing.”32Thisissueenteredaviciouscircle,becausenotonlydidworkerscomplainaboutthemonotonyofwork,butmigrantdispatchworkers,whostillhadaccesstoaplotof land in the countryside,where likely to leave the plant after receiving theirannualbonuses.33Thissectionof theworkforcewasaminorityonly,whichdidnotdrivetheturnoverrateamongstdispatchworkersbeyond10%,butitfosteredthesegmentationofskilldevelopment.Moreover,andmoregenerally,thecontentof basic training schemes was not comprehensive, but geared towards thedemandedproductiveoperations.Thisallowedforthereductionoftrainingtimesforworkersdesignatedforsimpleroperations.Inotherwords,CompanyXinbothcases,butparticularlyinChina,triedtokeeptraininglimitedforthosesectionsoftheworkforcethatweremostlikelytoleavevoluntarilyand/orfunctionedasabufferintimesofeconomicdownswings.

31InterviewsmigrantdispatchworkersJV2MDW5,6;GermanseniormanagerJV2GM3(1).32InterviewJV2GM3(1).33InterviewsJV2MDW5,6;JV1DW3.

18

8. Convergence–Managerialprerogativesonthetechnologicalcompositionoftheproductionprocess

Finally,therearealsoareasoftheproductionprocess,whereworkeragencywasvirtuallyabsentoroflittleeffect.Thisconcernedinparticularthetechnologicalcompositionoftheproductionprocessthatwasinbothcasesfullydeterminedbymanagerialdecision-making,withlittlepossibilityforworkerstoalterit,onceithadbeenimplemented.CompanyXmakes extensive use of shared platforms andmodular production,withtheaimofachievinghighereconomiesofscaleandtheabilitytoproduceeachmodelateverylocation.Thepressureonahomogenisationoftechnologicalandoperationalprocessesacrossdifferentplantsisthereforehigh.Ontheonehand,certainmachinery,suchalaserweldingfortheroofofthecar,hastobe–andwas–presentatallplantsproducingstateoftheartmodels.Thedefinitionofthesameweldingpointsacrosssheetmetalpartsofdifferentsizeandshapeontheotherhand allows for a further standardisation of tasks thatworkers have to fulfil.Overall, employed technology and tasks were very similar between differentfactoriesandbetweenMexicoandChina–withtwoexceptions.First,plants inChinathatcontinuedtoproduceoldermodels,whichwouldsellduetothecloseddomesticmarketandlargepublicorders,wouldmanufacturethesemodelswithoutdated technology. In 2013 the first press line that was relocated from theclosedUSproductionfacilityinthelate1980swasjustbeingdismantledatJV2–ithadbeenusedtoproducea1980smodeluntil2012.Secondly,automationwashandledmuchmoreflexiblyinChinathaninMexico,althoughtheseadaptationstookplaceinessentiallyonedepartmentonly:thebodyshop.AutomationratesinthebodyshopforsomeoldermodelsinChinacouldbeaslowas29%,anddidnotexceed70%evenforstateoftheartmodels.34Thisconvergence,aswellasthelowerandmorevariedautomationratesinChina,wasexplicablebyunilateralmanagementdecisions, as itsprerogativeover theimplementationoftechnologicalchangeswasunchallengedinbothcases.Inthe1992conflicttheMexicanunionhadlostbothitsinstitutionalisedrightandtherankand filepower tode facto veto transformationsofproduction technology.Afterthisdate,decisionsontechnologicalchangewere,asintheChinesecase,atthe unilateral discretion of management; and my interviews with unionrepresentativesandworkersgavenoindicationofapoliticalchallengeofthisfact.Thisalso implies that thedivergence inautomationratesbetweentheMexicanandChinese casehas less todowith industrial relations thanwithmanagerialconsiderations of cost, quality, quantity, model range etc. – and with theconstructiondateoftherespectiveplant.Indicatedbythedeploymentofstateof

34Author’sfieldnotes.

19

theart technologywiththeerectionofnewplants,youngerChineseplantswillmostlikelyseeanincreaseinautomationovertime,withthephasingoutofoldermodels,risingwagesandgrowingpressureonproductivity.ThesedynamicshadalreadybeenpresentfordecadesintheMexicancase,andintensifiedwithNAFTA.

9. ConclusionI have argued that hybridization or convergence and divergence between theactualoperationsofsubsidiariesoftransnationallyoperatingcarmanufacturersare not mere expressions of different structural factors and institutionalconstraints,butessentiallydependonthequestionofwhatsocialagents“actuallydo”withthem.Ihavemadetwointerrelatedarguments.First,thewatershedeventofthe1992conflictinMexicodemonstratesthatapproachesbasedonideal-typeconstruction lackthecapacity toproperlyexplain institutionalchange. Instead,thenew institutionalmatrix that emergedafter1992 isbetterunderstoodandanalysed as a specific outcome of processes of relational agency betweenmanagers/policymakersandworkers.Second, I have acknowledged the virtue of static typologies in comparing thedifferentshopfloorarrangementsthatcharacterisetheproductionprocessandemploymentrelations in theMexicanandChinesesubsidiariesofCompanyX. Ihavethen,however,shownthattheinstitutionsthemselvesaremerepotentiality,realisedonlywhenacteduponbymanagersandworkers.Thedirectionof theeffectsofthisagencyishoweverlessclearandnoteasytopredict–meritocraticremunerationsystemsinChinaandMexicoworkeddifferentlyduetoroutinizedwagebargaininginthelattercase;astalematebetweenworkersandmanagersovertaskandtimeallocationemergedinMexicoduetoa“stateofinconformity”in the workforce; and in China exit strategies of dispatch workers and thesegmentationof trainingschemesentered intoamutuallyreinforcingdynamic.These outcomes in institutional functions were not deducible from theinstitutionaldesignperse–whichimpliesthatthereisnowayaroundanalysingtheactualagencyofallstakeholdersinvolvedinmoredetail.Thiscouldonlybedonetoalimiteddegreehere–inparticulartheshort-andlong-termeffectsofthe1992conflictwarrantmoreattention.Finally, the argument established should not bemisunderstood as voluntarist:institutions and structures do matter, because they can provide the mediumthroughwhichrelationalagencyunfolds–theycanbeconceivedas“idlecapacity”for agency. Similarly, the argument of this article is not a claim to reducehybridizationorconvergence/divergencetothe impactofworkeragency– theagencyofmanagersandpolicymakersclearlymatters,andislikelytostillhaveamoredecisiveimpactontheoutcomeofprocessesofrelationalagency,duetoa

20

higherabilitytomobiliseinstitutionsandstructuresintheirinterest.Thepointremains, however, that this agency does not unfold in a social vacuum, but inrelationtothatofnon-elitesocialgroups–andthatanadequateexplanationofsocial and institutional change in their concrete forms therefore requires theinclusion of these forms of agency. While the virtues of comparativeinstitutionalist approaches are undeniable, a more agency-centric theory ofinstitutionalchangeanditsmethodologicalmirrorimageintheformofalabour-inclusiveresearchagendaappearaspromisingavenuesforfuturetheoreticalandempiricalresearch.

10. BibliographyAbo,T.ed.,1994.Hybridfactory.TheJapaneseProductionSystemintheUnited

States,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Babson,S.ed.,1995.Leanwork:empowermentandexploitationintheglobalautoindustry,Detroit:WayneStateUniversityPress.

Becker-Ritterspach,F.A.A.,2009.HybridizationofMNESubsidiaries.TheAutomotiveSectorinIndia,Basingstoke,NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

Bennett,D.C.&Sharpe,K.E.,1985.Transnationalcorporationsversusthestate:thepoliticaleconomyoftheMexicanautoindustry,Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Boyer,R.etal.eds.,1998.Betweenimitationandinnovation:Thetransferandhybridizationofproductivemodelsintheinternationalautomotiveindustry,Oxford,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Boyer,R.,1998.HybridizationandModelsofProduction:Geography,History,andTheory.InR.Boyeretal.,eds.Betweenimitationandinnovation:Thetransferandhybridizationofproductivemodelsintheinternationalautomotiveindustry.Oxford,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.23–56.

Boyer,R.&Freyssenet,M.,2002.Theproductivemodels:theconditionsofprofitability,Basingstoke,NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

Chan,C.K.-C.,2014.ConstrainedLabourAgencyandtheChangingRegulatoryRegimeinChina.DevelopmentandChange,45(4),pp.685–709.

Chin,G.T.,2010.China’sautomotivemodernization:theparty-stateandmultinationalcorporations,Basingstoke,NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

Covarrubias,A.,2014.ExplosióndelaIndustriaAutomotrizenMéxico:Desusencadenamientosactualesasupotencialtransformador,MexicoCity:FriedrichEbertStiftungMéxico.

21

Cremer,A.&Funakoshi,M.,2015.VolkswagenovertakesToyotaasworld’sbiggestcarmaker.Reuters.Availableat:http://www.reuters.com/article/us-toyota-sales-idUSKCN0Q805F20150803[AccessedDecember7,2015].

Elfström,M.&Kuruvilla,S.,2014.TheChangingNatureofLaborUnrestinChina.IndustrialandLaborRelationsReview,67(2),pp.453–480.

Freyssenet,M.ed.,2009.Thesecondautomobilerevolution:trajectoriesoftheworldcarmakersinthe21stcentury,Basingstoke,NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

Hancké,B.,2009.IntroducingtheDebate.InB.Hancké,ed.Debatingvarietiesofcapitalism:areader.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,pp.1–17.

Healy,T.,2008.GenderedStrugglesagainstGlobalisationinMexico,Aldershot,Hampshire:Ashgate.

Hollingsworth,J.R.&Boyer,R.,1997.CoordinationofEcomnomicActorsandSocialSystemsofProduction.InJ.R.Hollingsworth&R.Boyer,eds.ContemporaryCapitalism:TheEmbeddednessofInstitutions.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,pp.1–47.

JuarezNunez,H.,2006.GlobalProductionandworkerresponse:ThestruggleatVolkswagenofMexico.WorkingUSA,9(1),pp.7–28.

JuarezNunez,H.,1993.Lossindicatosfrentealaspolíticasempreserialesdeelevacióndelaproductividad.InE.delaGarzaToledo&C.García,eds.Productividad:distintasexperiencias.MexicoCity:UniversidadAutónomaMetropolitana,FriederichEbertFoundation,pp.139–147.

JuarezNunez,H.,Bueno,C.&Rivero,A.A.L.eds.,2005.ElAutoglobal:desarrollo,competenciaycooperaciónenlaindustriadelautomóvil,Puebla:ConsejoNacionaldeCienciayTecnología.

Jürgens,U.,2009.TheFinalChapterofthe“VWModel”?TheVWTrajectory,1995-2005.InM.Freyssenet,ed.Thesecondautomobilerevolution:trajectoriesoftheworldcarmakersinthe21stcentury.Basingstoke,NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,pp.225–245.

Jürgens,U.&Krzywdzinski,M.,2015.Competencedevelopmentontheshopfloorandindustrialupgrading:casestudiesofautomakersinChina.TheInternationalJournalofHumanResourceManagement,26(9),pp.1204–1225.

Jürgens,U.&Krzywdzinski,M.,2016.NewWorldsofWork.VarietiesofWorkinCarFactoriesintheBRICCountries,Oxford,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

22

Jürgens,U.,Malsch,T.&Dohse,K.,1989.ModerneZeiteninderAutomobilfabrik:StrategienderProduktionsmodernisierungimLänder-undKonzernvergleich,Berlin:Springer.

Kochan,T.A.,Lansbury,R.D.&Macduffie,J.P.eds.,1997.Afterleanproduction:evolvingemploymentpracticesintheworldautoindustry,Ithaca:ILRPress.

Kostova,T.&Roth,K.,2002.AdoptionofanOrganizationalPracticebySubsidiariesofMultinationalCorporations:InstitutionalandRelationalEffects.TheAcademyofManagementJournal,45(1),pp.215–233.

Kumon,H.&Abo,T.eds.,2004.TheHybridFactoryinEurope.TheJapaneseManagementandProductionSystemTransferred,Basingstoke,NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan.

Luthje,B.,Luo,S.&Zhang,H.,2013.Beyondtheironricebowl:regimesofproductionandindustrialrelationsinChina,Frankfurta.M.:Campus.

Mahoney,J.,2000.Pathdependenceinhistoricalsociology.Theory&Society,29(4),p.507.

Meng,X.,2000.LabourmarketreforminChina,Cambridge,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Montiel,Y.,2001.Unmundodecoches:Nuevasformasdeorganizacióndeltrabajo.Estudiosdecaso,MexicoCity:CIESAS.

North,D.C.&Weingast,B.R.,1989.ConstitutionsandCommitment:TheEvolutionofInstitutionsGoverningPublicChoiceinSeventeenth-CenturyEngland.JournalofEconomicHistory,49(4),p.803.

Pries,L.,1993.Volkswagen¿Unnudogordianoresuelto?Trabajo.Sociedad,TecnologíayCultura,(9),pp.7–23.

Pringle,T.,2011.TradeunionsinChina:thechallengeoflabourunrest,Abingdon,NewYork:Routledge.

Schaper,N.,2014.GruppenarbeitinderProduktion.InArbeits-undOrganisationspsychologie.Berlin,Heidelberg:Springer,pp.393–417.

Streeck,W.,1992.Socialinstitutionsandeconomicperformance:studiesofindustrialrelationsinadvancedcapitalisteconomies,London:Sage.

Streeck,W.&Kenworthy,L.,2005.TheoriesandPracticesofNeocorporatism.InT.Janoskietal.,eds.Thehandbookofpoliticalsociology:states,civilsocieties,andglobalization.Cambridge,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

23

Thun,E.,2006.ChangingLanesinChina:ForeignDirectInvestment,LocalGovernment,andAutoSectorDevelopment,Cambridge,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Weber,M.,1988.GesammelteAufsätzezurWissenschaftslehre,Tübingen:Mohr.

Weingast,B.R.,2002.Rational-choiceinstitutionalism.InI.Katznelson&H.V.Milner,eds.Politicalscience:stateofthediscipline.NewYork:Norton.

Wenten,F.,2016.Reinventingthewheel-Labour,developmentandglobalcarproductioninpost-1970sChinaandMexico.London:SchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies(SOAS).

Womack,J.P.,Jones,D.T.&Roos,D.,1990.TheMachineThatChangedtheWorld:HowJapan’sSecretWeaponintheGlobalAutoWarsWillRevolutionizeWesternIndustry,NewYork:RawsonAssociates.

Zhang,L.,2014.InsideChina’sautomobilefactories:thepoliticsoflaborandworkerresistance,Cambridge,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.