DEVELOPING POLICE CRIME PREVENTION:MANAGEMENT AND ORGANISATIONAL

CHANGE

VALERIE JOHNSTONJOANNA SHAPLAND

PAUL WILES

POLICE RESEARCH GROUPCRIME PREVENTION UNIT SERIES PAPER NO. 41LONDON: HOME OFFICE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Editor: Gloria LaycockHome Office Police Research Group

50 Queen Anne’s GateLondon SW1H 9AT

© Crown Copyright 1993First Published 1993

Crime Prevention Unit Papers

The Home Office Police Research Group (PRG) was formed in 1992 to carry out andmanage research relevant to the work of the police service and Home Office PolicyDivisions. One of the major Police Department divisions which acts as customer forthe PRG is the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit which was formed in 1983 topromote preventive action against crime. It has a particular responsibility to dissemi-nate information on crime prevention topics.

The object of the present series of occasional papers is to present research material in away which should help and inform practitioners, whose work can help reduce crime.

ISBN 0-86252-910-7

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Foreword

The last five years have seen a considerable change in the approach the Police Servicetake towards crime prevention. Some forces now devote far more time to planningeffective crime prevention measures and these are increasingly being incorporatedinto an overall crime reduction strategy combining both prevention and detection.

The role of the Crime Prevention Officer (CPO) in this new order has been thesubject of much discussion. It is now generally accepted by the Home Office, HMInspectorate of Constabulary and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)that the majority of the time of specialist crime prevention staff cannot be devoted topurely reactive tasks such as domestic security surveys and burglar alarm problems.The work of CPOs must be directed towards supporting a local strategy for crimereduction.

The Home Office Police Research Group, with consultants from Sheffield University,have been working with the Metropolitan Police in Enfield to examine ways in whichthe work of the CPO might become more creative and proactive. With the support ofsenior management within the Division a transition has been accomplished movingthe CPOs from a largely reactive role, little known or appreciated by most otherofficers, to being an integral part of the process of managing crime.

By the end of the project crime prevention had become far more visible andinfluential, many more officers contacted CPOs for advice and crime prevention wasaddressed regularly at crime management meetings. The result was a greatly increasedsense of status and worth amongst Crime Prevention officers and a more effectivecontribution from them to the work of the Division. I hope that the lessons outlinedin this report will be of benefit to the many forces now undergoing or considering thistype of organisational change.

I M BURNSDeputy Under Secretary of StateHome OfficeDecember 1992

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Acknowledgements

This study, of course, owes its existence to the officers of the Division in which it tookplace. They were not only constantly helpful and co-operative, but also took a deepinterest in the project and went to great trouble to ensure its success. Particular thanksare due to the Chief Superintendent, the Detective Chief Inspector and the Sergeantand Constables of the Divisional Intelligence and Information Unit. It is, however,the Crime Prevention Officers themselves who deserve the most thanks. They werealways helpful and always cheerful, despite the numerous demands made on them.

Thanks must also go to the staff of the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre atStafford who provided a great deal of information and an insight into the training ofCrime Prevention Officers.

The Home Office Police Research Group provided both funding and partnership forthe project and we would like to thank them for this, especially George Houghtonwho spent a great deal of time dealing with computers and computer companies. Wewould also like to thank the Steering Committee who provided new ideas andguidance.

The Authors

Valerie Johnston is Senior Research Officer, Joanna Shapland is Senior Lecturer andPaul Wiles is Professor of Criminology in the Centre for Criminological and LegalResearch, Faculty of Law, The University of Sheffield

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Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgements

List of Figures

1. Introduction

2. The Work of the CPOs Prior to the ProjectThe structure of crime preventionCPO work before the research beganTime spent on each activity

3. Developing CPO workPre-requisites for new CPO structuresDifferent possible modelsThe Organisational Initiatives

4. The Work of the CPOs at the End of the ProjectThe structure of the crime prevention officeThe specialisationsTypes of work doneMore CPOs: greater quantity or greater quality of work?Devolution of crime prevention workCPOs move into the mainstream

5. The Development of Crime PreventionCPOs and the CPO teamCrime prevention in the DivisionOrganisational factorsProject factorsHow significant was the change?The role for criminologistsSpecialists within the police service

Annex: The Crime Prevention Design AdvisorsEvaluation and expansion of CPDA workDemand for CPDA adviceThe growth in demandTypes of plans considered

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What the CPDA doesBack-upConclusion

References

Crime Prevention Unit Papers

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List of figures

Figure No. Caption Page

1 Crime Prevention Activities at the Beginning of theProject. 4

2 Divisional Crime Management Structure. 83 Crime Prevention Activities at the Beginning and End of

the Project. 12

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1. Introduction

In early 1990 three researchers at the Centre for Criminological and Legal Researchof the University of Sheffield began talks with the Home Office which led to thedevelopment of a project on the ‘Role of the Crime Prevention Officer’. TheMetropolitan Police expressed interest in the project early on and eventually it wasdecided in spring 1990 that a project would be carried out by three partners – theHome Office Crime Prevention Unit, the Centre for Criminological and LegalResearch and the Metropolitan Police. A division of the Metropolitan Police

(’Enfield’) was selected as the site for the project. The role of the Sheffield researcherswas to undertake action research – both to stimulate the project and to evaluate it.However, it has remained a joint project involving all three organisations.

The goals of the project, as part of a more general aim of developing a new morecreative and proactive role for the Crime Prevention Officer, were:

– to encourage the use of Crime Prevention Officers (CPOs) as consultants to policemanagement and other agencies on all aspects of crime prevention;

– to develop a framework by which crime prevention might become a standard factorin police decision making about crime problems;

– to devise a model by which police forces might design, run and evaluate crimeprevention initiatives, with the prime measure of effectiveness being to reduce crime;

– to test this model by implementing a series of initiatives;

– to initiate this change and to consolidate it within the Division so that it becameroutine and would continue to develop after the project finished.

Two sorts of activities were encompassed within the project:

(a) Crime Prevention Oriented Initiatives: to set in motion crime prevention activityand to evaluate that activity in terms of its potential for reducing crime, i.e. to test outthe new structures and new ideas:

(b) Organisational Initiatives: to develop, implement and evaluate organisationalchange in respect of the CPOs and crime prevention in the division in general.

This report describes and evaluates the second set of activities, the OrganisationalInitiatives. Other reports in this series describe the progress of the crime prevention–orientated initiatives (Johnston et al, 1992a) and the implementation for a model ofdesigning crime prevention initiatives through crime analysis (Johnston et al,1992b).

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2. The work of the CPOs prior to the project

The aim of the project was to change both the work of the Crime Prevention Officers(CPOs) and the way in which crime prevention was organised in the Division. Toevaluate this, it is necessary to have a picture of crime prevention within the Divisionbefore the project started.

The structure of crime prevention

Within the Metropolitan Police, crime prevention falls under the general heading ofCommunity Involvement and is administered by a unit at headquarters. This is thesource for some of the materials used by CPOs on division and it also organisesconferences and force training for Crime Prevention Design Advisor (CPDA) work.

Within divisions, however, CPO work is organised within the CID. The projectDivision had three police stations. The Crime Prevention Office and thus CPOs weresited at one of these, though Divisional CID and the Divisional Intelligence andInformation Unit - DIIU (computers) and the Crime Desk (CID Administration)were at another, due to a major lack of office space. There were, therefore, potentiallogistical problems in ensuring day-to-day contact and planning between CPOs andCID.

At the time research began there were two CPOs in the Division. As divisional CrimePrevention Officers they came under the general heading of CID and reported to theDetective Chief Inspector in charge of Divisional CID. However, they were alsorequired to work certain Saturdays as ordinary uniformed officers at football matchesetc. and thus also came under the Chief Inspector Personnel and Operations for theseoccasions. In general, however, they were left much to themselves as regards day today business.

One of the two CPOs had trained for a year with a CPO who had since retired. He hadalso attended the Home Office Crime Prevention Centre at Stafford and had taken aone week course given by the Metropolitan Police on Crime Prevention Design. Theother CPO was new in the job and, at the time the research commenced, had yet totake the Stafford course.

CPO work before the research began

The research began with an analysis of the work done by the CPOs. This was basedprimarily on observation, supplemented by analysis of the worksheets filled in daily byeach CPO. Basically the workload of the CPOs during this period fell into thefollowing categories:

O residential surveysQ commercial/industrial surveys

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l alarm problemsl firearmsl displaysl talksl designing out crimel initiativesl crime panelsl training.

Most of these tasks are well known enough to those interested in crime preventionnot to need detailed description here except for a few particular aspects of the work inthe Division.

Most surveys, both domestic and non-domestic, were done in response to a requestfrom a member of the public, frequently after a burglary had occurred, and as a result ofcontact with the reporting officer. Given the similarity in house construction, advicein domestic surveys was fairly standard. Many of these interviews also required adegree of reassurance for the victim and the CPO would give further advice aboutpersonal safety etc.

Problems with alarms fell into three categories - warnings, withdrawal of response andrestoration to the alarm response system. Warnings were given to companies whichhad five false alarms in 30 days. Companies which continued to have false alarms hadthe police response to their alarm withdrawn. The withdrawal notice was deliveredpersonally by the CPO, who tried in most instances to arrange a date for a reinstal-lation survey as soon as possible after the obligatory three months withdrawal ofresponse. Finally CPOs were present at re-installation meetings along with represen-tatives of the Alarms Inspectorate, the company involved and the alarm company.The procedures for alarms work were, therefore, prescribed in terms of personalattendance of a CPO and could be very time-consuming, without necessarily needingmuch new input by the CPO.

Firearms made up a relatively small part of the daily workload. Normally firearmsinquiries were handled by Home Beat Officers or the Firearms Inspector. However,the CPO might be called in to advise if the HBO had problems with storage ofweapons or if several weapons were being stored.

The senior of the two CPOs had been trained as a Crime Prevention Design Advisorand acted as the advisor for the Division. This involved receiving lists of planningapplications and selecting sites for crime prevention advice. At the beginning of theresearch, the CPDA specialist generally received plans from only one of the two maincouncils in the Division.

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As well as their general work on crime prevention within the Division, the CPOs alsohad to keep up their technical expertise. They received considerable numbers ofbrochures and letters from security and alarm companies and also occasionallyattended displays and talks by private companies involved in crime prevention.Knowledge of other aspects of crime prevention came via twice yearly conferences ofCPOs within the Metropolitan Police and occasional cross-border conferences withother areas and constabularies.

Time spent on each activity

Figure 1 provides a rough analysis of the workload of the Crime Prevention Officersover a one month period. It omits – a very big omission – times spent on collectingmessages from the three stations, times spent daily on correspondence and phoningand much of the in-office work done by the CPDA specialist (some of this work wasdone out of office hours at home).

In 1979 the Association of Chief Police Officers recommended a list of 68 tasks whichthey thought should be done by CPOs (see Weatheritt, 1986 for a summary). Of thesethere were some which the CPOs in the Division did not do to any great extent, or didnot do at all, notably liaising on community relations and ‘co-operating with socialagencies concerned with the welfare of children and young persons’ (though it shouldbe noted that there was a separate youth crime prevention panel). However, theirwork was not entirely concerned with physical security. A considerable amount ofcommunication with the public involved talks, displays and meetings with a widerange of people representing both private and public concerns. In particular, it isperhaps worth mentioning that CPOs are often the main interface between police

Figure 1. Crime prevention activities at the beginning of the project

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and private security: a relationship which will become more valuable as the size of theprivate security industry grows.

The description of CPO work given above indicates that both of the CPOs were keptbusy responding to demands from the public and occasionally initiating preventiveaction or events. However, it also shows the relative isolation of crime preventionwork from other forms of policing. There was little formal contact or liaison with thework being carried out by CID or uniformed officers, though there was considerableinformal communication.

The crime prevention activity was largely reactive, responding to the demands of thepublic to do surveys on residential or commercial/industrial property, or responding tothe need of the service in general to try to reduce the time spent on false alarm calls.Obviously there was a demand from the public for such services. The system forpolicing alarms, however, had been centrally organised within the force and did notappear necessarily to be making the most effective use of the relatively scarce andexpensive resource of CPOs.

CPDA work, talks, displays and other initiatives were, of course, more proactive innature. They were informed by CPOs’ knowledge of crime problems in the Division,but there was no systematic tie-up between crime problems and such activity.

We concluded that almost all the CPO workload was justifiable and that much of itwas responding to legitimate demands from the public. However, the delivery of thisspecialist crime prevention service was not co-ordinated with the rest of the policingservice, nor was it necessarily planned to focus on the Division’s main priorities forcrime reduction. This is not a criticism of the CPOs – there could be no suchco-ordination under the then structures and systems of working. In fact, the work theCPOs were doing was relatively similar to that done in many other forces: Harvey etal. (1989) have described crime prevention as being ‘ghettoised’ within policing.

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3. Developing CPO work

Pre-requisites for new CPO Structures

The starting point for thinking about development of the CPO’s role was thateffective crime prevention effort in a division should be related to the overall policingpriorities and crime priorities of that division. The overall model was that crimeprevention activity should flow from crime analysis and informed discussion amongstthose with local knowledge or knowledge about offenders/crime patterns. The keytask for this project was to start to create a system in which this could heaccomplished.

From analysis of the existing CPO workload and crime prevention structure, all thepartners in the research agreed that any new structure would need to fulfil certainpre-requisites:

i. Existing CPO reactive workload could not simply be ignored. Where it stemmedfrom the public, major damage would be done to police-public relations if theservice were withdrawn; moreover, the demand was legitimate, and if new wayswere to be found to carry it out, then those would need to be in place before thepublic was switched to the new system.

ii. Nonetheless, space had to be created for CPOs to be able to do more proactivetasks. Whilst the new initiatives were being set up, there would be a need forgreater resources than when the new system was in a steady state (implementingchange requires time and effort). People whose time is already full are also unlikelyto be happy to contemplate change.

iii. CPOs needed to be brought together with the crime analysis potential in theDivision (largely situated in the DIIU). Crime problems affecting the Divisionhad to be identified through computerised crime analysis, using variables andanalyses developed during the project to highlight areas and kinds of crime whichare a continuing major problem or show rising rates of incidence.

iv. The resulting ideas and suggestions must be able to be fed into management

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decisions about operational policing and strategies for the future – into seniormanagement, into CID planning, and into planning how to tackle crime inparticular beats. This must be not just a two-way process from CPO to other groupsand back again, but an interactive process in which discussion about possibilitiesfor crime prevention took place with those other officers. It implied CPO presencein relevant meetings, rather than paper communication.

The resulting system should aim to raise the status of crime prevention and thus ofCPOs from what Harvey et al. described as ‘a sort of pre-retirement course forexperienced but tired detectives’ (not a characterisation of our CPOs, but certainly

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the national stereotype of such work) to a central task for the division as a whole.Senior management in the Division were keen to place the aim of reducing crimeand ‘reducing victims’ at the forefront of their strategy. This might well involveother officers becoming part of such work, and the challenge then was to see howthe CPOs, as constables, could relate in such a scheme.

The difficulties in creating any such change were well-known to all the partners: theproblem of using specialists in policing, the difficulties of transferring expertise andcommunicating across rank structures in what is a very hierarchical managementsystem, the current lowly status of CPO work and whether constables could be used inwhat was effectively a consultant role to senior management, and simply the problemof creating any change in policing practice. Most initiatives in policing have hardlyaffected the way in which policing is done. At most they create a blip of change whichswiftly and thankfully returns to normality when the project finishes or the relevantsenior officer moves. We wanted to attempt the seemingly impossible: to createchange and then to routinise it so that it could continue to develop and mould itself tochanging circumstances, hut retaining its essential characteristics. We had no highexpectations that we would achieve all this within a two-year project.

Different possible models

We discussed a number of different models. Each had its advantages anddisadvantages.

We could:

i. Create an entirely new specialism for the ‘new’ CPO work, and leave existingCPO work to the existing CPOs. This would certainly symbolically show the‘new crime prevention’, and might resolve the status problem, but it wouldcreate artificial distinctions between different kinds of crime prevention workand also make it very difficult for other divisions or forces to consider adoptingour model if it were to prove interesting. It would just be assigning moremanpower to crime prevention and starting again.

ii. Give existing CPO work to other officers as far as conceivably possible, and

develop the work of the existing CPOs. We thought that though there werepossibilities in this approach, it would, if carried to extremes, lose thetraining and expertise in technical security of the CPOs and also effectivelybe undermining their pride in their job. However, the idea of using CPOs as a

resource to train, act as advisor on difficulties, and generally ‘supervise’ somecrime prevention tasks to be done by other officers came out of this. Ifextending that expertise to the other officers would also give added value totheir work, then this should be done. Whilst the scheme was starting,

however, there would be an increased demand on CPOs (for training, etc.).

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iii. Work with existing CPOs, but increase, at least temporarily, the manpoweravailable, so that it was possible to create the change as well as keeping upexisting work. This would have the maximum utility in terms of transfer-ability to other divisions/forces, but would obviously put quite a strain onthe existing CPOs, who would have had no idea that they would be creatinga new role when they first took on the job.

After considerable discussion, we decided to adopt the third model. We do not claimthat this would be the best choice in any force, but, in the circumstances in ourDivision, it seemed the most appropriate.

Initially, the Sheffield and Home Office partners in these discussions concentratedupon the role of the CPOs themselves, with some consideration of the DIIU’S place.However, the senior management of the Division very quickly realised that thismodel of crime prevention implied not only change for CPOs, but change for thewhole structure of crime prevention and crime management for the Division. Toensure that crime prevention was not only seen to be, but actually was, fully includedin the structure for crime management the Division re-defined the line commandstructure for all crime management matters (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Divisional Crime Management Structure

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As will be explained later, this system provided both management and support for theCPOs and ensured they had an input at the crime tasking meetings etc. After a shortsettling-in period the object of these structural changes was accepted by all parties. Itwas also accepted that the project should not only evaluate the role of the CPO butthe role of crime prevention and the whole crime management structure.

The Organisational Initiatives

Five organisational initiatives were established to develop the new structure of crimeprevention within the Division. These were:

i. Team budding and skills development: The number of CPOs was enlarged to four, withtwo additional (initially untrained ) officers joining the original two. For variouspersonnel reasons, it was decided to increase by two, rather than by the one officerdeemed necessary to cope with the effects of the change. This also brought inresponsibility for Neighbourhood Watch to add to CPOs’ responsibilities. How-ever, having four officers made it crucial to take more formal steps to create a team,including job descriptions, and sorting out management needs (see Section 4).Equally, CPOs needed to gain additional skills relating to analysing crime patterns,co-ordinating more proactive work, etc. Not only was there a need for team buildingbetween CPOs, but also across the wider group of officers to he involved in crimeprevention (this included Home Beat Officers, CID and DIIU, as well as seniormanagement).

ii. Evaluation and extension of CPDA work: CPDA work was already a major proactiveaspect of crime prevention in this particular Division, due to the skills of the seniorCPO. However, it was decided to examine this aspect of crime prevention in moredetail [see annex for more information].

iii. Routinise crime analysis: Crime prevention activity was intended to follow prior-ities revealed by crime analysis and discussion. A prerequisite for such activity wastherefore to improve and then routinise crime analysis for crime preventionpurposes in the Division, working with the DIIU (see Johnston et al, 1992a).

iv. Train other officers to do some crime prevention work: The analysis of CPO workloadhad led to the conclusion that there were two areas in which CPO work mightprofitably be devolved to other officers. One was physical surveys of residentialdwellings. It was obvious that some such move was essential, since it was suspectedthat if the increased emphasis on crime prevention succeeded, the demand forsuch surveys might well increase beyond the capacity of the CPOs. In addition, itwas felt that this might in fact give HBOs another skill and service they could offerto people on their beat, particularly if they were visiting recent burglary victims.However, the CPOs quite rightly were insistent that standards for such surveysshould remain high, which is always a possible difficulty when services are given by

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a greater number of generalists, rather than specialists. On the other hand, HBOscould tailor their advice according to their greater local knowledge of burglaryoffenders’ tactics etc. on their beat. The answer was to devise a special trainingcourse for HBOs, together with a monitoring system.

A further aim was to try to reduce the demands on CPO time taken up by alarmwork. However, this was centrally organised within the force and althoughdiscussions took place with headquarters no change was possible during thelifetime of the project (although changes may ensue).

v. Evaluation of the new divisional crime management structure: Essentially, this involvedfollowing the progress of the new management structure devised for crime manage-ment, in relation to its implications for crime prevention. In practical terms thecentral pivot of the structure was the crime tasking meetings, at which crimeproblms were reviewed and decisions taken as to which methods to adopt andwhat resources to allocate. Meetings were attended and those involved wereinterviewed. In a sense, this initiative set the context not only for the crimeprevention initiatives associated with this project but also for the way in whichcrime was managed across all the Division’s activities.

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4. The Work of the CPOs at the End of the Project

The work of the CPOs was re-examined at the end of the project, by which time theywere still not in the same station as the Divisional Intelligence and Information Unit,but did have a new, rather more central office. They had also gained an extratelephone and their own answering machine, which were heavily used, and clearlyessential for proper communications.

The structure of the Crime Prevention Office

Changes had taken place in the crime prevention staff. Two extra CPOs had beenappointed, with a Sergeant to administer the Crime Prevention Office, and theyreported to a new Detective Inspector in charge of intelligence (who was also incharge of the DIIU). Within the Division as a whole, the framework within which theCrime Prevention Office operated had changed considerably and a much morestructured chain of command had been developed.

Crime prevention work had been split into categories and Neighbourhood Watch co-ordination added to the workload of the Crime Prevention Office. The new specialis-ation’s were:

CPO 1 – Crime Prevention Design AdviceCPO 2 – Commercial/industrial surveysCPO 3 – Residential surveysCPO 4 – Neighbourhood Watch.

Categories were not cut and dried. Officers covered for each other in case of illnessand holidays. However, generally the CPOs had become specialists in individual areasrather than jacks of all trades.

The specialisations

i. CPDA work: The first CPO was responsible for CPDA work and Secured by Design.By the end of the project regular liaison was taking place with two local authorities.CPDA work was the subject of an organisational initiative and is described in theAnnex.

ii. Commercial/industrial surveys: The second CPO was in charge of industrial/com-mercial surveys, effectively covering all non-domestic premises, ranging from homesfor the aged, to factories and workshops. He was also mainly responsible for alarmwork, unless this concerned a residential dwelling. On complex surveys CPO1 andCPO2 tended to work together, as there is a fine line between CPDA work andcommercial/industrial surveys if extensive changes are planned.

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iii. Residential surveys: The third CPO was in charge of domestic surveys. During thecourse of the project Home Beat Officers had been trained to do this type of surveyand the third CPO was in charge of administering this.

iv. Neighbourhood Watch: The fourth CPO was in charge of handling NeighbourhoodWatch and car crime initiatives. He maintained liaison with the 90 NeighbourhoodWatches within the Division, generally via Home Beat Officers and NW co-ordina-tors. He was also responsible for providing each HBO with a list of crimes which hadoccurred in Watches in their beat. He obtained this list from the DIIU.

v. The CPO Sergeant: The CPO Sergeant was in charge of the Crime PreventionOffice. He acted as the main liaison with senior management in the Division andattended regular three-weekly tasking meetings. He also did some of the work oninitiatives and supervised work in the office generally.

Types of work done

Much of the work was of the same type as before but the amount had increased, or theway in which it was done had changed. There were several types of work which hadnot been obvious during the first evaluation (see Figure 3).

As before, this work measure does not take account of time spent in the office.However, for inter-agency and consultative work, such administrative activity is ofconsiderable importance, As Harvey et al. ( 1989) comment, we can count surveysdone, etc. – but we must not then assume that these are the only important tasks incrime prevention. If we think, for example, of senior officers’ workloads, it is preciselythese administrative and facilitative tasks which dominate their schedule. Much ofthe work involved in setting up the Crime Prevention Oriented Initiatives was also ofthis nature.

Figure 3. Crime prevention activities at beginning and end of project

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The demand for domestic surveys had increased dramatically. This was largely due toan Area operation to counteract residential burglaries, which also took place duringthe period of the project. The contact with residents and the survey were not,however, done by the CPO but by the HBOs. The CPO workload did not rise,therefore, as dramatically as the number of surveys. On average 170 domestic surveyswere done per month during the project, of which 147 were completed by HBOs. TheCPO in this instance carried out an administrative function: he collected details of allresidential burglaries and sent these to the appropriate HBO administrator andreceived copies of the advice given by the HBO via a form, which was devised toensure that HBOs covered all relevant matters.

The CPOs were also involved in a considerable amount of new work: training sessionsfor probationers; co-ordinating the setting up of a new Divisional Crime Panel;arranging to set up a Crime Shop; arranging activities for Car Crime Prevention Year;the day to day running of the Vehicle Watch Scheme; setting up a Hospital Watchtogether with surveys of the hospital sites; and, with a school, establishing a SchoolCrime Panel. Though it falls outside the month being studied, the CPOs had alsobeen involved in three major new initiatives concerning domestic surveys, work onan industrial estate, and advice for people parking cars in car parks. These weresequels to the Crime Prevention Oriented Initiatives described in other reports in thisseries.

More CPOs: greater quantity or greater quality of work?

The number of CPOs had increased by two constables and a sergeant (as from 14months into the project). To what extent had crime prevention work increased? If wecompare those aspects of crime prevention work that can be easily counted (surveysetc.), then there was a doubling of days worked on crime prevention. This equated(see Figure 3 above) to a doubling of surveys of dwellings by CPOs (in addition tothose done by HBOs), an increased number of surveys of commercial/industrialbuildings, and a major increase in numbers of meetings, which comprised bothmeetings with other agencies and (to a much smaller extent) meetings with otherofficers. Work related to firearms remained constant, whilst alarm work went down1.

Is it the case, then, that if one increases the number of CPOs they merely performmore of the same kinds of work as before? Do the public just demand more of the same?

The evidence from the project suggests that this is not primarily what happens. Theincrease in surveys of dwellings was partly due to the somewhat greater likelihood ofthe public being able to get hold of a CPO by the end of the project (due to theanswering machine and efficient message taking), but mainly to the project’s and the

1 The reasons for the reduction m alarm work were not related to the project’s attempt to reduce such worksince, as reported earlier, the project failed to modify the headquarters driven alarm reconnection policyduring the period of the project and so this was the only aspect of crime prevention work in the Divisionwhich was outside the control ot the project. The number of alarm re-connection referrals from head-quarters was simply less during the month monitored at the end of the project.

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Area’s initiatives on burglary which were planned to increase survey work. Theincrease in survey work, therefore, was a planned part of the five crime prevention-orientated initiatives, and an Area initiative, and not just the CPOs doing more of thesame in an unplanned way.

More importantly, the increase in numbers of meetings and the increase in adminis-trative work (shown in Figure 3) reflect the substantially increased role of the CPOs inenergising crime preventive work by other agencies and officers. The move towards agreater number of proactive initiatives, as opposed to reacting to individual anduncoordinated requests for surveys, is not a move towards CPOs carrying out all theseinitiatives themselves. It is rather a move towards CPOs providing the energisingspirit and the technical expertise for Divisional enterprises involving other officers, orinter-agency work.

This was shown in the five crime prevention-orientated initiatives which were part ofthe project, but it reached much wider into what had become routine parts of CPOwork. So, for example, the development of the Crime Panel widened contact withlocal businesses. The CPOs, via architectural liaison requests, had become involved much more with local hospitals. The Crime Prevention Shop will mean much moreinter-agency work, as it is planned not only for crime prevention displays but also tohost ‘surgeries’ both for other branches of the police and various parts of localgovernment.

Equally, the CPOs continue to be involved in training, both of probationers, and inrelation to devolution of crime prevention work to other officers. Courses have beeninstituted for Special Constables along the same lines as those for HBOs. Furthercourses will be put on in the future as HBOs and Specials are replaced.

Devolution of crime prevention work

The concept of using HBOs instead of CPOs to do residential surveys is not new, but itwas new to the Division. How was this devolution carried out? The groundwork waslaid in a presentation by the research team and the CPOs early in the project. HereHBOs were shown a crime analysis of the Division and the five crime preventioninitiatives which formed a large part of the project were described. Two of theinitiatives were planned to involve HBOs in residential surveys and it was hoped thatthey would also provide supplementary training for HBOs.

The second step was to teach the HBOs to do residential surveys. A Chief Inspectorand two CPOs began a series of short courses in the late spring of 1991. The coursedescribed how a survey should be done and what the HBO should look for. There wasdiscussion and descriptions of various types of security hardware. Each group was alsotaken out and shown a house and a flat (loaned by a local authority) so that they couldsee how surveys were done in practice. They were also each given a copy of the HomeOffice Crime Prevention Centre booklet on domestic surveys.

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Efforts were made to ensure that the quality of domestic surveys was maintained. Thusspecial forms were created on which the HBO could note advice given to the client.The top sheet went to the client while the second sheet was returned to the CPO incharge of residential surveys. The CPOs arranged to provide the HBOs with a list ofalarm companies and other providers of security hardware from which the HBOscould supply a minimum of three names to householders.

A few of the HBOs were given an early chance to practice what they had learned bydoing residential surveys as part of the project’s five crime prevention initiatives, butthe decision to start the major Area initiative on burglary meant that many had onlythe training courses prior to starting surveys on a fairly large scale. Nonetheless, fewproblems were encountered, and satisfactory liaison was maintained between CPOsand HBOs. The increase in workload for HBOs was probably about 1096, most ofwhich was a consequence of the Area initiative.

HBOs interviewed at the end of the project felt the surveys were not too much of aproblem, since they were fairly well spread out in time and were a good way to meetthe public. A proactive Christmas initiative in which teams of CPOs, HBOs andSpecial Constables were involved was very rewarding and popular with the public.

CPOs move into the mainstream

Finally, the changes in the structure of crime prevention within the Division weremost important. From the point of view of the Crime Prevention Office, the increaseof the CPO staff to five and the appointment of a Sergeant meant that it became lessof an appendage to CID and more a department in its own right. This, they feel, hasmeant an increase in the status of the Crime Prevention Officer.

The new structure also means that the Crime Prevention Office is much better placedto be considered as a component of decision making. Divisional Tasking Groupmeetings are now regularly attended, usually by the CPO Sergeant. This means thathe can now not only receive taskings put forward by senior management but canrecommend strategies which the CPOs would like to see done. As the head of a groupof experts he is in a much better position to do this than a CPO representing onlyhimself and a colleague.

We consider the organisational and structural implications of the changes in CPOwork in Section 5. It is worth at this point, however, bringing in the comments ofdivisional senior management made in the interviews at the end of the project. Theysaid that, before the project began, CPOs had essentially been left on their own by thepolice organisation, whilst the organisation got on with what was considered the mainjob of policing. Now, within the Division, CPOs and crime prevention had come intothe mainstream.

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5. The Development Of Crime Prevention

The overall aim of the project was to develop a new more creative and proactive rolefor the Crime Prevention Officer and, through this, enhance crime prevention in theDivision. The focus was, therefore, on the CPO, though it was always intended thatcrime prevention should attain a greater presence and moment in the work of theDivision as a whole.

It was realised, very early on, that effective crime prevention meant that the projectwould need to encompass far more than the CPOs. It is not possible to regard the CPOand his or her role in a capsule. The implications of whatever model of the CPO isadopted must be followed through in the whole geographic unit within which he orshe is based. The model recommended in the report has implications for crimeanalysis and for the work of Home Beat Officers. It also has the potential substantiallyto affect the work of CID. Thus it has implications in tasking and in senior manage-ment policy planning. It also has implications for the interaction between police andother agencies and for that between police and the community.

This section sets out how the role of the CPO has developed, and how the structure ofcrime prevention in the Division has changed.

The new crime prevention has implications beyond the Division itself. It exposes theneed for the dissemination of criminological expertise and evaluated crime preven-tion initiatives. It changes the way in which the response to crime is thought about ina division. It raises questions about the use of specialists within policing.

CPOs and the CPO team

At the start of the project, there were two CPOs – at the end, four CPOs and a CPOsergeant (although the scope of the work had also broadened with the addition ofNeighbourhood Watch). As described in Section 4, the CPOs had specialised indifferent kinds of work, although there was some back-up facility for each ‘job’. AllCPOs are expected to answer messages, liaise with the different stations, and under-stand the basics of crime prevention through crime analysis, and to be able to promoteinitiatives in their areas and to give presentations to different external and internalaudiences.

It is agreed both by the CPO team and by senior management that some functionalspecialisation by CPOs is important. In particular, CPDA work is seen as requiringspecial training and expertise, since without that training/knowledge/experience, it isvery difficult to offer proper advice to councils and others.

However, the other functional specialisms are roles, rather than requiring specialisttraining additional to that given to CPOs generally. Hence it would be possible forCPOs to swap ‘jobs’ periodically, to gain more experience, or in response to personnelchanges.

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It is not claimed that this particular functional division is the only possible one – but itis a practical arrangement, which works well in both day-to-day terms of coping withboth reactive and proactive workload, and in allowing expertise to develop over amanageable range of tasks. It allows a team structure to develop within a participativemanagement strategy, and for the space to be there to develop proactive initiatives.

There are some implications. One is that when personnel change there needs to be ashort hand-over period between old and new staff member, so that expertise is notlost. This is, in fact, a general recommendation for the police service: it is extraordi-nary that there is normally no hand-over period or planned induction programme inany job, so that new post-holders are assumed to be immediately competent!

There is also a possible conflict between role specialisation for CPOs and the need toliaise with more than one police station or with sectors (as in sector policing). We aresure that this conflict is far more apparent than real – and that mechanisms can bedeveloped to ensure proper liaison with all police geographical units. These include:

– ensuring that messages are both taken and acted upon: an answering machinesystem is essential;

– planning roles and workloads so that there is someone in the office who can giveadvice for some of the time – the image of the Crime Prevention Office must not bethat it is only populated by a ringing phone (or an answering machine)!

– ensuring that each station/sector team is visited periodically by a CPO who candiscuss ongoing initiatives and problems and can pick up the local intelligence onwhat is happening in crime terms in that area.

Creating a larger team has also had implications in terms of supervision. Initially, theCPOs reported to and were supervised by a Detective Inspector, who had responsi-bility not only for the project but also for other investigative work. He played aconsiderable part in setting some initiatives going and in promoting the team withinthe tasking meeting structure of CID and senior management (see below). However,the expansion of the team caused some difficulties with supervision. Constables wereunused to reporting directly to an Inspector. Detective Inspectors were seen in thatforce as mainly investigators to take on big jobs, which then naturally reduced thetime they had to act as, say, day-to-day project management on crime prevention. Asa result, a Sergeant was appointed to head up the team of four CPOs.

The CPO Sergeant was not trained as a CPO and the consensus of opinion at the endof the project was that this was not necessary. He acted as a general administrator andfacilitator, manning the office, filtering and arbitrating on priorities within the team,representing the team at tasking meetings, helping out with presentations andinitiatives in the community, acting as project manager, and generally attempting toco-ordinate what had become a large operation involving many different kinds of

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officers. He needed to understand the whole model of crime prevention, but his skillshad to be in organisation and management.

Have we merely recreated the police rank structure, with an Inspector, Sergeant andfour Constables? In fact, very sadly, the Inspector had to go on sick leave for anextended period six months or so before the end of the project, so leaving the Sergeantreporting directly to the Detective Chief Inspector in charge of CID. Reflecting backover the project, all ranks came to the conclusion that it was not necessary to haveboth Sergeant and Inspector in day-to-day operation, once the project was up andrunning (though both may be necessary initially). One or the other is essential, and infuture, given possible changes in rank structure in the police, the Sergeant rank maybe the more sensible. However, it would be possible for four Constables to reportdirectly to an Inspector, if one were to be seen as the leader of the team. As a memberof senior management said: “PCs can be experts and advise others providing the rightstructure is in place.” Or, as someone else commented: “What you need is a facilitator.You don’t need a DI if you’ve got a Sergeant with the ear of senior management.”

By the end of the project, there were clear signs that the necessary team building andskills development had taken place. CPOs spoke of the team, and others referred tothem as such. There were mechanists to solve the challenges others threw to them,to initiate work themselves, to assign work to the person most suitable, to resolve theniggles, and to work forward towards the goal that everyone subscribed to: makingcrime prevention a much more central part of the Division’s reaction to crime.Through much hard work, significant progress had been made.

Crime prevention in the Division

By the end of the project, crime prevention had also become much more visible in theDivision – and much more influential. Quoting again from interviews at the end ofthe project:

“CPOs used to be men in grey suits – now it’s Glasnost. More people comein to ask advice. I have more contact with senior officers now than in mywhole service.” (CPO)

“The CPOs status in the eyes of the rest of the Division has gone up.Others are beginning to go to them for advice and input into the unit.”(senior management)

“CPOs have a much higher profile than before. A lot of trainees come andask about crime prevention and we get lots of queries prior to (promotion)boards. I’m much more enthusiastic now.” (CPO)

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“Our status has gone up. We get lots of phone calls from PCs to get advice.Now it’s not seen as a soft number, because people are being trained by us– it’s seen as expertise.” (CPO sergeant)

“CID now acknowledge that crime prevention is their baby. Crimedetection used to be the ‘in’ thing – now it’s changing.” (seniormanagement).

What factors created this greater status for CPOs and the enhanced role for crimeprevention in the Division? It is difficult to separate out the organisational factorsfrom those due to the fact that this was a special project, with Sheffield researchersand the Home Office involved. We shall try to consider each separately, and thenpose the question whether this was in fact merely due to its special project status(often referred to as a ‘Hawthorn’ effect), and whether it will now wither away.

Organisational factors

i. The major organisational mechanism for ensuring crime prevention strategieswould be considered at Divisional level was the tasking meetings. These had beenrunning for some time before the project began, but were expanded and promoted bysenior management as part of the Division’s overall crime management strategy (seeFigure 2). They were attended by senior management from both uniformed and CIDsides (including Inspectors from each station, and the Inspector in charge of HBOs),the DIIU Sergeant, the CPO Sergeant, the Local Intelligence Officer (collator),Scenes of Crime, the Divisional Support Group and other specialist squads/branches.In these meetings, the crime problems affecting the Division were considered andstrategies proposed and adopted to deal with them, including allocation of theresources necessary.

Over the period of the project, these tasking meetings started to consider not justshort-term strategies for dealing with crime (investigation, extra patrols, targetingetc.), but also medium and long-term strategies, including crime prevention initiat-ives. Slowly, crime prevention came to be seen as an integral part of crime manage-ment, and the Crime Prevention Office came to be seen as the source of ideas andexpertise for this.

ii. The status of CPOs has, however, also considerably been enhanced by their role intraining other officers to do domestic surveys. It is this that has made them visible toHBOs and to uniformed supervisors. We must not overstate this visibility – there is nodoubt that uniformed shift officers out on patrol would be highly unlikely to knowabout CPO work or the project. However, as crime prevention initiatives are beingcarried out throughout the very considerable geographical area covered by theDivision, more officers are becoming aware.

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iii. Crime analysis and the role of the DIIU has also been vital to the ability of theDivision to contemplate medium or long-term strategies of crime prevention:

“Crime analysis is essential. The more knowledge you have the better you can dealwith the problems, but you come back to the short/medium/long term. You have toprioritise. Analysis should be on a regular basis so you can judge over time. Analysis isalso useful for going to the public – you can allay fears. And there must be continualevaluation of initiatives. The immediate problem we have is short term versus longterm – getting that right. CID have to deal with the immediate knee jerk reaction. Inthe medium term there are things which come up quite often like the cinema car park.The longer term – more input from CPOs. There are a number of priorities in thetasking meeting.” (senior management)

We should like to stress that crime analysis is, in both our view and that of theDivision, an essential prerequisite for effective crime prevention (Johnston et al,1992a).

iv. The expansion of CPDA work has substantially raised the profile of crimeprevention with outside agencies, particularly the local authorities. The initiativesundertaken in partnership with other agencies have also created or cemented linkswith those agencies. The publicity from the initiatives and presentations, togetherwith the involvement of senior officers, has indirectly reflected back onto the CPOoffice and its staff.

v. By the end of the project, the Crime Prevention Office was more centrally situatedand had acquired an answering machine. Together with an increase in the number ofCPOs, this made crime prevention a more visible, accessible, and substantial presencein the Division.

vi. None of these initiatives or organisational changes would have been possiblewithout consistent support and encouragement from senior management and particu-larly the Chief Superintendent. The continuity of supportive senior managementthroughout the project was an extremely important factor and one which contributedgreatly to the overall success of the work. In the early stages of the project inparticular, and as difficulties appeared (especially with the crime analysis), suchsupport was crucial. As has been remarked in every analysis of organisational change,the ‘tone from the top’ is a vital component. Senior management in the Division wereconvinced of the need for a change in crime management before the project started –the project provided a model and a catalyst.

The changes are in fact, we believe, now part of the structure of the Division andwould require considerable dismantling, though it could be done given a change insenior management with new priorities and a less commitment to crime prevention.Other policing initiatives have fallen because of just such a change in managementstyle.

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Project factors

i. The spur to change provided by being the site of a demonstration project isconsiderable – and has been noted several times. The effect in this instance wouldhave been magnified because this was a national project, with outside Home Officeand university involvement. In addition, funds were made available to augment tosome extent the Division’s computing base, so that the basics of crime analysis couldbe carried out Support was clearly demonstrated at the Area level as well, withgreater Area attention being paid to crime prevention and senior Area managementobviously being aware of the project. Its existence soon became known among thelocal CPO community and the status of the Division’s CPOs probably rose as a result.We would expect a considerable effect simply by virtue of being a special project.

ii. Some of the project activities were also evaluated by officers as helping the processof change – and these could be duplicated in other sites. In particular, it is importantto:

– get senior management together to plan the projector change at the beginning andget agreement/develop ownership;

– explain the project to other officers likely to be affected and get their reactions;

– feed back the results of the initiative to all those involved.

A visit to Sheffield for the CPOs at the beginning of the project may also have beenhelpful, not only in dispelling something of what was described as the ‘strange world’of the researchers, but also in making a mark for other officers that something wasabout to happen.

How significant was the change?

We cannot separate out the relative effects of the organisational and project factorslisted above. The judgement of senior officers (at the end of the project) was:

“We would have done it ourselves but not in this time scale. It opened people’seyes, made them think.”

“The Sheffield project was needed to push things along and get people to takenotice.”

What seems undeniable is that change has taken place and that everyone thinks thatit was for the better. At the Sheffield end, we must admit that we are somewhatastonished at the extent of and acceptance of change. Immersed for so long in theminutiae of initiatives and statistics (Johnston et al, 1992a), we had failed to realisethe overall size of the project until the end of the evaluation. We hope that we haveaccurately portrayed people’s views. We did not expect the degree of unanimity

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expressed in the final interviews, and were in fact far more dubious about the successof the project than the officers involved!

Will the change persist? Or is it merely the flavour of the month, to be thankfullyabandoned when the researchers leave (a feature of the successful projects in theNetherlands)? We cannot know the ultimate answer, but encouraging signs arepresent in the expansion and extension of the initiatives, their adoption into alonger-term burglary strategy, and the continuing development of analysis, differentkinds of initiatives, and the use of CPOs. The Division essentially thinks that, thoughthe original projects were a start, they can do far better themselves now withoutSheffield; that is perhaps the best sign of continuance.

The role for criminologists

In this project, we were action researchers, with a dual role to help implement and toevaluate. As implementers, our major inputs came in:

– working out the implications of the crime analysis, and translating them intopossible crime prevention initiatives, or

– project management, in advising on organisational change.

Project management skills are being developed rapidly in the police service and donot necessarily need to be external inputs. Criminological expertise, however, is notyet widespread and it is quite possible that the development of crime analysis forpreventive purposes and the development of innovative methods for crime preven-tion will founder on the lack of such an input.

At the end of the project, it was suggested to us that the Division expected to havereceived even more such input from us. The initial process, which produced the fiveCrime Prevention Oriented Initiatives, was fine, but there was a need for continuinginput on subsequent developments. We agree with that criticism – but we had toremark that we were not brought in and told that such an input would be welcomed.

It illustrated the nub of the problem – the difficulty is not necessarily in the supply ofcriminological expertise (although there are not very many criminologists in Britainspecialising in crime prevention), but in recognising when such expertise would bebeneficial.

One solution lies in training CPOs and in providing a good database of evaluatedcrime prevention projects (both within a division and nationally). As crime analysisand targeted crime prevention activity becomes more common, CPOs will be able to

apply and develop solutions initiated elsewhere. However, there is a need for a fargreater emphasis on evaluation in crime prevention before such a database could beproperly developed.

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Another solution may lie in centres of expertise, which could act as a resource whichCPOs and others could contact to find out how to analyse and whether to adoptothers’ initiatives. A very similar discussion on how to deliver criminological exper-tise on prevention has been taking place in France, where one idea is the setting up ofregional ‘observatories’ – centres of expertise based in university departments orinstitutes, which could be contacted by agencies requiring criminological expertise orhelp in evaluation.

Specialists within the police service

The original aim of the project was to consider making CPOs into advisors orconsultants to senior management on crime prevention. As the project has devel-oped, the CPOs have become crime prevention energisers, rather than just advisors.In some ways, they have occupied a similar place to that of a co-ordinator in amulti-agency crime prevention project. In so doing, CPOs have marked out a role forthemselves as specialists.

The police, being primarily a generalist body, have always had some difficulty inplacing and using specialists. Using specialists effectively means enabling them tocommunicate across rank structures, so that it is their expertise, and not theirposition, which gives them status. If specialists are transferred into other jobs, theirspecialist skills may be under-used or lost – they will certainly become rusty.Similarly, new people transferring in will have to be trained up, with considerablecosts being incurred.

Crime prevention has tended to attract older officers, who are happy to stay as CPOsfor some time. If crime prevention becomes an important plank in crime reductionand crime management strategies for policing generally, as we argue it should and will,then younger and perhaps more ambitious officers will look to become CPOs. Thequestions of training and retention of skills will become more acute.

We would argue that one of the implications of the model of crime prevention andcrime analysis developed in this project is that the specialism of crime prevention willneed to be developed further. This has implications for career planning and forpromotion within the field. They are questions which affect all significant specialismin policing. It is now time to consider seriously how policing should promote andfoster the specialism it needs as a modern service.

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Annex: The Crime Prevention Design Advisor

Within the Metropolitan Police there are currently forty officers who are designatedas Crime Prevention Design Advisors (CPDAs). They have counterparts in otherforces who are known as Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs). CPDAs try toencourage developers and planners to take account of those features which makebuildings vulnerable to crime within the context of the use likely to be made of thepremises and that of the surrounding environment. Ideally they prefer to operate atthe planning stage, but they are also frequently called upon to advise on renovations.

Evaluation and expansion of CPDA work

CPDA work was clearly already an important part of crime prevention effort in theDivision prior to the start of the project. It had several aspects, however, which madeit a helpful focus for development.

– the inter-agency nature of the work;

– the possible link-up with crime analysis and proactive crime prevention initiatives;

– the use of the CPO as a consultant;

– exploration of the extent to which such expertise could be disseminated to otherCPOs, or whether it should be regarded as a specialism within crime prevention,with consequent implications for allocation of responsibilities within the team,training, etc.

As a result, it was decided to set up a specific initiative on CPDA work, with theobjectives of:

a. trying to ensure that the CPDA had access to all relevant planning applications forthe council in which most work had already occurred;

b. strengthening relations with the second council to move towards a similar positionthere;

c. attempting to describe the day-to-day advice such that the main parameters ofchoice of applications to be reviewed and situations in which to intervene wouldbecome clearer.

Demand for CPDA advice

The description given below relates only to the sources of work for CPDA in theDivision and should not be taken as representative of all ALO work.

i. Planning applications: Much of the work that the CPDA did in the Division came tohim via local authorities’ planning offices. At the beginning of the project the CPDA

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maintained regular liaison with one borough and received lists of all planningapplications submitted. The other borough did not have regular contact with theCPDA. Both CPDA and senior management made a determined effort to open upmore regular contact with the second borough and by the end of the project theCPDA was receiving a list of planning applications from this local authority as well.

ii. Other council contacts: The CPDA did not deal solely with planning departments:he was also called in by local authority housing and education departments.

iii. The Division: A considerable amount of work also came via the Division. It mightcome from tasking meetings: for example, when a local car park which was causingproblems, the CPDA was asked to find out if there were any changes planned for thecar park and to try and ensure that such changes would take crime prevention intoaccount. The Divisional Licensing Inspector also might seek the CPDA’s advice,particularly in cases where there was an application for a different type of licence. TheCPDA was also likely to come across areas which he thought could benefit from hisadvice when doing other duties as a CPO.

iv. Private interests: Commercial concerns also asked for the CPDA to view plans fornew factories or stores or to make recommendations on plans for major renovations.

The growth in demand

There are thus a lot of different sources for potential work and the demand for advicefrom CPDAs is growing as they become more recognised.

Outside developments have probably assisted this growth. One of these has been thePartnership Approach. Many local authorities now list crime prevention as one oftheir goals. It is becoming accepted that planning departments and housing depart-ments in particular should consider crime prevention as a factor in design. It is,therefore, quite natural that they should be willing to accept advice from a policeofficer who is not only trained, but who also has access to information about specificcrime problems in their area.

Another factor which is likely to be of influence in the future is Secured by Design.Secured by Design is a scheme by which builders can acquire a Secured by Design logowhen their plans have been approved by an ALO/CPDA. By 1992, 31 forces wereinvolved in the scheme and 9,000 houses had been granted the logo. In May 1992,Secured by Design Commercial and Secured by Design Refurbishment were alsolaunched.

Types of plans considered

In the Division the CPDA received weekly lists of the planning applications for thetwo local authorities. From these lists he would select those applications which he

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thought might benefit from advice about designing out crime. It was apparent that atone time or another CPDAs had looked at almost all types of application. However,no CPDA has the time to look at every set of planning applications. How does hechoose?

One criterion was size of project. Generally the CPDA would ask for plans for all verysubstantial developments. A second criterion was the type of premises. Recreationalfacilities such as amusement arcades, cinemas or shops might be examined becausethey would attract a lot of people. Premises where money was likely to be brought in,stored or dispersed might be selected because extra security might be needed. Schoolsmight be examined because they are known to be targets of crime. Areas wherealcohol was likely to be served would be pulled out, both because of their implicationsfor public order, and because the CPDA would, in any case, be likely to be asked tolook at them by the police licensing inspector. In addition, if the new or renovatedpremises were in an area where the CPDA knew there had been problems he mightrequest the plans.

The CPDA was by no means always able to choose the sort of premises on which towork. Much of his time would be taken up by looking at plans which local authoritiessent to him directly or which senior management told him to examine. He would alsogenerally give priority to any plans where there was a specific request for CPDAadvice.

What the CPDA does

Once he received plans for a property the CPDA would basically look for those areasin the plans which might encourage opportunist criminals. Generally he would visitthe site. The CPDA stressed that what conditioned all he did was the way the buildingworks, so he would attempt to look at the proposed structure and weigh it against thesite and the surrounding area, the people using or likely to use it and the purpose.Depending on the type of building and its use he might request figures on crime in thearea from Divisional Intelligence and, depending upon these, add extra types ofsecurity. He would also make an effort to ensure that physical security was asunobtrusive as possible.

Having viewed the plans and possibly the site, the CPDA, unless he was fully satisfiedwith the plans, would begin negotiations. These might start with the planning officeand architects but might also include very many other parts of the local authority. Ifprivate interests were involved the CPDA would try to contact the developer, thearchitects, the owners or the site crew. Developments might involve negotiationswith other agencies involved in the same sort of work: for example, the Fire Brigade,Health and Safety Executive or private security companies. On a development of anysize negotiations were likely to be long, sometimes over a period of years.

It should also be stressed that the CPDA and, indeed, the police in general, have nopower to stop a development which did not meet with the CPDA’s standards for

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crime prevention. He could recommend and advise but that was all. Negotiations,therefore, took considerable amounts of diplomacy and also considerable resources.

Back-up

The CPDA/ALO within any division (or force) is a fairly unique individual. Gener-ally he is the only person within his division with training or even much knowledge ofdesigning out crime. Not many other officers – with the exception of senior manage-ment – even know what he does. No other officers are in the position to give himmuch advice or assistance with technical problems.

For general back-up the CPDA in the Division relied largely on CPDAs in otherdivisions. Within the area of London of which the Division is a part the CPDAs fromthe various divisions maintained regular contact and provided an extremely usefulpeer group network.

Conclusion

The whole development of the CPDA/ALO appears at first a fairly radical departurefrom what is considered normal policing. It represents a step into what might beconsidered the business of government, planning or private development and isrelated to regulation, rather than intervention after an offence has taken place.Secured by Design goes even further by introducing police approval as a factor in themarket place. However, it is very much in step with the ‘Partnership Approach toCrime Prevention’ and it is not totally unprecedented - police approval for licensingapplications has long been accepted.

Within the police force the CPDA/ALO is a novelty. He is an expert, partly throughtraining, more perhaps through experience. He is also generally a constable. Thisparadox runs throughout the daily work of the CPDA/ALO. Outside the force he istreated as a consultant by managing directors, by planners and by developers. Withinthe force he is very much a subordinate. This is of course one of the paradoxes ofCrime Prevention Officers generally, but it is accentuated with the CPDA bothbecause of the status of the people he deals with and, indeed, by the political andmonetary implications of his advice.

In order to be effective the CPDA must be accepted as an expert and a professional.Most CPDAs, therefore, sign reports not as a police constable but as ‘Crime Preven-tion Design Advisor’. They also take considerable care to dress and act as professionalconsultants rather than as police constables. This can create problems in divisions ifmanagement and other officers are less than sympathetic. Within the Division seniormanagement were well aware of the expertise of the CPDA and efforts were made touse this effectively.

Within the police service in general, designing out crime is of increasing significance.A sign of the importance placed upon it is the recent decision by the Association of

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Chief Police Officers to form a sub-committee on designing out crime. The CPDA/ALO is therefore likely to become an increasingly influential officer in the years tocome.

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References

Harvey, L., Grimshaw, P. and Pease, K. (1989) ‘Crime prevention delivery: thework of crime prevention officers’ in R. Morgan and D. Smith (eds) Coming to termswith policing. London: Routledge.

Johnston, V., Shapland, J. and Wiles, P. (1992a) Developing crime prevention initiat-ives in a police division. Report to the Home Office. Sheffield: Centre for Criminologi-cal and Legal Research.

Johnston, V., Shapland, J. and Wiles, P. (1992b) Developing the role of the crimePrevention officer. Report to the Home Office. Sheffield: Centre for Criminologicaland Legal Research.

Johnston, V., Shapland, J. and Wiles, P. Developing Police Crime Prevention: CrimeAnalysis. Forthcoming Crime Prevention Unit Paper, London: Home Office.

Johnston, V., Shapland, J. and Wiles, P. Developing Police Crime Prevention: CrimePrevention Initiatives. Forthcoming Crime Prevention Unit Paper, London: HomeOffice.

National Audit Office (1992) Reducing crime in London: a study of the Partnership andother methods used by five Metropolitan Police Divisions. Report by the Controller andAuditor General. London: H.M.S.O.

Weatheritt, M. (1986) Innovations in Policing. London: Croom Helm.

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Police Research Group Crime Prevention Unit Series

1. Reducing Burglary: a study of chemists’ shops. Gloria Laycock. 1985. v+7pp(0 86353 154 8).

2. Reducing Crime: developing the role of crime prevention panels. Lorna J. F.Smith and Gloria Laycock. 1985. v+14pp. (0 86252 189 0).

3. Property Marking: a deterrent to domestic burglary? Gloria Laycock. 1985.v+25pp. (0 86252 193 9).

4. Designing for Car Security: towards a crime free car. Dean Southall and PaulEkblom. 1986. v+25pp. (0 86252 222 6).

5. The Prevention of Shop Theft: an approach through crime analysis. PaulEkblom. 1986. v+19pp. (0 86252 237 4).

6. Prepayment Coin Meters: a target for burglary. Nigel Hill. 1986. v+15pp.(0 86252 245 5).

7. Crime in Hospitals: diagnosis and prevention. Lorna J. F. Smith. 1987. v+25pp.(0 86252 267 6).

8. Preventing Juvenile Crime: the Staffordshire Experience. Kevin Heal and GloriaLaycock. 1987. v+29pp. (0 86252 297 8).

9. Preventing Robberies at Sub-Post Offices: an evaluation of a security initiative.Paul Ekblom. 1987. v+34pp. (0 86252 300 1).

10. Getting the Best out of Crime Analysis. Paul Ekblom. 1988. v+38pp. (0 86252307 8).

11. Retail Crime: Prevention through Crime Analysis. John Burrows. 1988.v+30pp. (0 86252 313 3).

12. Neighbourhood Watch in England and Wales: a locational analysis. SohailHusain. 1988. v+63pp. (0 86252 314 1).

13. The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project, Rochdale. David Forrester, MikeChatterton and Ken Pease with the assistance of Robin Brown. 1988. v+34pp.(0 86252 333 8).

14. The Prevention of Robbery at Building Society Branches. Claire Austin. 1988.v+18pp. (0 86252 337 0).

15. Crime Prevention and Racial Harassment in Asian-run Small Shops: the scopefor prevention. Paul Ekblom and Frances Simon with the assistance of SnehBirdi. 1988. v+54pp. (0 86252 348 6).

16. Crime and Nuisance in the Shopping Centre: a case study in crime prevention.Susan Phillips and Raymond Cochrane. 1988. v+32pp. (0 86252 358 3).

17. The Prevention of Fraud. Michael Levi. 1988. v+19pp. (0 86252 359 1).18. An Evaluation of Domestic Security Surveys. Gloria Laycock. 1989. v+33pp.

(0 86252 408 3).19. Downtown Drinkers: the perceptions and fears of the public in a city centre.

Malcolm Ramsey. 1989. v+23pp. (0 86252 419 9).20. The Management and Prevention of Juvenile Crime Problems. Barrymore

Cooper. 1989. v+63pp. (0 86252 420 2).

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21. Victim Support and Crime Prevention in an Inner-City Setting. Alice Sampsonand Graham Farrell. 1990. v+27pp. (0 86252 504 7).

22. Lagerland Lost? An experiment in keeping Drinkers off the street in centralCoventry and elsewhere. Malcolm Ramsey. 1990. v+38pp. (0 86252 520 9).

23. The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project: Phase II. David Forrester,Samantha Frenz, Martin O’Connell and Ken Pease. 1990. v+51pp. (0 86252).

24. Probation Practice in Crime Prevention. Jane Geraghty. 1991. v+45pp.(0 86252 605 1).

25. Lessons from a Victim Support Crime Prevention Project. Alice Sampson.1991. v+41pp. (0 86252 616 7).

26. The Prevention of Cheque and Credit Card Fraud. Michael Levi, Paul Bisselland Tony Richardson. 1991. v+52pp. (0 86252 633 7).

27. Making Crime Prevention Pay: initiatives from business. John Burrows. 1991.v+50pp. (0 86252 629 9).

28. The Influence of Street Lighting on Crime and Fear of Crime. Stephen Atkins,Sohail Husain and Angele Storey. 1991. v+59pp. (0 86252 668 X).

29. The Effect of Better Street Lighting on Crime and Fear: a Review. MalcolmRamsay with the assistance of Rosemary Newton. 1991. v+48pp. (0 86252 670 1).

30. Reducing Crime on the London Underground. Barry Webb and Gloria Laycock.1992. v+30pp. (0 86252 688 4).

31. Assessing Crime Prevention Initiatives: The First Steps. Geoff Berry and MikeCarter. 1992. v+46pp. (0 86252 823 2).

32. Tackling Car Crime. Barry Webb and Gloria Laycock. 1992. v+32pp. (0 86252832 1).

33. Car Theft in England and Wales: The Home Office Car Theft Index. GeorgeHoughton. 1992. v+36pp. (0 86252 712 0).

34. Preventing Car Crime in Car Parks. Barry Webb, Ben Brown and KatherineBennett. 1992. v+40pp. (0 86252 708 2)

35. Closed Circuit Television in Public Places. Terry Honess and ElizabethCharman. 1992 v+41pp. (0 86252 711 2).

36. Multiple Victimisation. Racial Attacks on an East London Estate. AliceSampson and Coretta Phillips. 1992 v+33pp. (0 86252 736 8).

37. Theft and Loss from UK Libraries: A National Survey. John Burrows and DianeCooper. 1992. v+56pp. (0 86252 777 5).

38. Safer Cities and Community Safety Strategies. Nick Tilley. 1992. v+41pp.(0 86252 763 5).

39. Community Service and Crime Prevention: the Cheadle Heath Project.Mary Barker, Ken Pease and Barry Webb. 1992. v+36pp. (0 86252 769 4).

40. Car Crime and Young People on a Sunderland Housing Estate. Eileen Spencer.1992 v+34pp. (0 86252 790 2).

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