designing for crime

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Designingoutcrime


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CrimepreventionseriesGeneralEditorPaulR.WilsonCrimeprevention:theoryandpracticeSusanGeasonandPaulR.Wilson

MissingChildrenPaulWyles

ForthcomingPreventingclientaggressiontowardsstaffPreventingcartheftPreventingvandalismandgraffiti

CrimepreventioninshoppingcentresPreventingfraudPreventingarmedrobberyPreventingarsonCrimepreventionformigrantcommunitiesCommunitycrimeprevention


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DesigningoutcrimeCrimepreventionthrough

environmentaldesign

SusanGeasonandPaulR.Wilson

AustralianInstituteofCriminology


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Firstpublishedin1989byAustralianInstituteofCriminology,CanberraAustralianInstituteofCriminology

This book is copyright. Apart from any fairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy,research,criticism or review, as permitted under theCopyrightAct,nopartmaybereproducedbyanyprocess without written permission. Enquiriesshouldbemadetothepublisher.Cataloguing-in-publicationinformationGeason,Susan.,1946-

Designingoutcrime.

Bibliography.ISBN0642143072.1.Crimepreventionandarchitecturaldesign-Australia.I.Wilson,PaulR.(PaulRichard),1941-.II.AustralianInstituteofCriminology.III.Title.(Series:Crimepreventionseries).

Typeset and printed inAustralia by

RenwickPridePtyLtd,Albury,NSW.DesignedbyAdrianYoungMCSD


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Introduction

Thisbookletcontainsstraightforwardandsensibleadvice,directedmainly to Australian home-owners and builders, about ways ofavoiding or minimising the risk of becoming a victim of certaintypesof crime. It is abooklet which forms part of a series beingproduced by the Australian Institute of Criminology designed toassistallcitizenstomakeournationasaferplaceinwhichtolive.Inthepastwehavetoofrequentlyviewedcrimepreventionas

something dealt with entirely by the police. That view is nowundergoing rapid change. As this series demonstrates there is a

greatdealwhichcanbedonebyindividuals,neighbourhoodslocalauthorities,plannersandotherstoreducetheincidenceandfearofcrime.Wewelcomeyourcommentsaboutthisbooklet,andyourideas

andadviceaboutothertopicswhichmightbeincludedintheseries.

DuncanChappellDirector


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Contents

PartITheory:Crimepreventionthroughenvironmentaldesign1TheoryofCPTED3ArgumentsforCPTED7ArgumentsagainstCPTED8ProblemswithimplementingCPTED8Conclusion9

PartIIPractice:designingoutcrime11ImplementingCPTED12Territoriality13Spacehierarchies15Transitionalfilters16Penetrability16Image18Managementforsecurity18Publichousingcarparks20TheHartfordNeighbourhoodCrimePreventionProgram22

Surveillance23Naturalsurveillance23Formal,organisedsurveillance28

Closed-circuittelevisioninSurreyUniversitycarpark33CrimeinCanberracarparks33

Accesscontrol35Howimportantisaccess?35AreceptionserviceatGloucesterHouse36WalkwaysonLissonGreenEstate37EntryphonesandfencesatSouthActon38


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viii

Targethardening39Inprivatedwellings39Inpublichousing39U.K.WorkingGrouponresidentialburglary45

HammersmithandFulhamScheme45DoorsandwindowsinBristol46ShieldofConfidence,Canada46

Protectingyourhome:somepracticaladvice47SensibleSurveillancepractices47Twelvetipsforbeatingtheburglar48Safetytipsforapartmentdwellers48

ChecklistforasuccessfulCPTEDProgram49

Broaderplanningstrategies51

PartIIIBibliography53


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PartI

Theoryofcrimepreventionthrough

environmentaldesign


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2Designingoutcrime

Over ninety per cent of all crime reported to theNew SouthWalespolice is property related, and residential burglary constitutes aboutsixteen per cent of this crime. Relatively few offenders are caughtbecause spur-of-the-moment property crimes are quickly committedand seldom witnessed. Thus the police clear-up rate for residential

burglary is only about six per cent. Although much of this crimeinvolves little financial loss, people, particularly the elderly, fearburglary.

Thepolicealonecannotprovideallthesolutionstopropertycrimehouseholders and communities must learn to help themselves andregaincontrolovertheirneighbourhoodsthroughforminggroupssuchasNeighbourhoodWatch.The literatureon crimeprevention is convincing in theclaim that

propertycrime can beprevented throughmanipulating the designof

individualdwellings,and their relationshiptooneanotherandto thesurrounding neighbourhood. This process is called crime preventionthroughenvironmentaldesign-CPTED.Thisbookletbrieflyoutlinesthegenesisofcrimepreventionthrough

environmental design, and provides practical guidance onimplementingthevariousstrategiesthatconstituteasuccessfulCPTEDcampaign.Argument in crime prevention circles has long raged over the

relativemeritsoftryingtopreventcrimethroughalleviatingthesocial

problems which are thought to encourage crime, versus treating thesymptoms-thatis,reducingtheopportunitiesforcriminalstocommitcrimesorasitiscalled,situationalcrimeprevention.Underlying this debate is the conflict of opinion over whether

criminalsactrandomly-andthereforeuncontrollably-orwhethertheyoperate through a process of rational choice, and can therefore bedeterredfromcrimeifitismadetoodifficultordangerous.This booklet operates on two assumptions: criminals do make

rational choices and can therefore be deterred from crime; it is

worthwhile initiating situational crimepreventionprogramseither intheabsenceof,orinconjunctionwith,measurestoalleviatetheallegedsocialcausesofcriminalbehaviour.Oneofthemajorcriticismsofsituationalcrimepreventionisthatit

"displaces"crime-thatis,criminalsthwartedfromcommittingacrimein a particular place simply go elsewhere or turn toanother type ofcrime.Researchseemstoindicatethatsituationalpreventioncanreducecrimebyinfluencingthefinaldecisionofsomepotentialoffenders;and


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TheoryofCPTED3

that evenwheredisplacementoccurs, only aproportionof the initialpotential offenders willpursue their intent to commit crime (Heal&Laycock1986).Thisindicatesthatcrimepreventionmeasuresstopsomecriminals

fromcarryingoutacrimeinaparticularplace,andnotallofthemwill

go elsewhere and commit a crime. To minimise the likelihood ofdisplacement, we suggest that police and government agenciesconcentrate their crime prevention efforts and funds in less affluent,morevulnerableareas.The first publication in this Crime Prevention Series Crime

Prevention:TheoryandPracticediscussesthesetheoreticalaspectsoftheproblemindetail.OneofthemajorcomponentsofCPTEDisthenotionof"defensible

space" and this booklet uses the theory as the basis for a situational

crimepreventionprogramemployingdesignchangestoresidencesandtheirenvironmentsinbothprivateandpublichousing

TheoryofCPTED

Environmental crime prevention emerged in the 1960s with JaneJacob'sTheDeathandLifeofGreatAmericanCities(1961)andElizabethWood's Social Aspects of Housing in Urban Development (1967). Jacob'sbookwasthefirstinfluentialworktosuggestthatactivestreetlifecouldcutdownopportunitiesforcrime.The early 1970s saw a surge of interest in the possibilities of

manipulatingthebuiltenvironmenttopreventdelinquencyandcrime.Two works were particularly influential - C. Ray Jeffery's CrimePrevention Through Environmental Design (1971), and OscarNewman'sDefensibleSpace(1972).In Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Jeffery

suggested urban design, including the design of streets, parks,terminals, super highways, etc, could prevent crime by reducing the

"opportunities".This "opportunity theory" of crime prevention and control wasexpandedbyMayhew,Clarke,SturmanandHough(1976)andClarkeandMayhew (1980) in theirwork for theUKHomeOffice ResearchUnit, and by Canadian researchers Brantingham and Brantingham(1981).OscarNewman'sstudyofpublic housing and crime inNewYork

City, Defensible Space, established a definite relationship between


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4Designingoutcrime

This women's lavatory is an example of poor design. It is badly lit andsurrounded by high walls and hedges, making surveillance by passers-byimpossible. Photographer Marie Colvill, Science Photography Unit,ANUPS,AustralianNationalUniversity

A laneway in Canberra linking a public carpark and a theatre complex ispoorly litandoffersno opportunity for surveillance atnight.PhotographerMarieColvill,SciencePhotographyUnit,ANUPS,AustralianNational

University.


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TheoryofCPTED5

urbandesignandcrimerates.Hefoundthathigh-risebuildingswithlobbies,elevators,fireescapes,roofsandcorridorsisolatedfrompublicviewhadmuchhighercrimeratesthanlow-risebuildings.Hissolutionwastoredesignapartmentblockssothatareasinpublicusewouldbeunderpublicsurveillanceatalltimes.Inhisanalysisoftherelationship

betweendesignand crime inpublichousing,Newmancameupwiththree crucial factors: territoriality, naturalsurveillanceand imageandmilieu.

Territoriality: Newman's defensible space theory assumed that peopleneedtomarkoutanddefendtheirterritory.Hebelievedagooddesignwouldencouragepeopletoexpresstheseterritorialurges;thatis,theywoulddefendtheirterritoryfromoutsiders.Awell-designedhousingproject,therefore,wouldmakeclearwhichspacesbelongedtowhom-

some would be completely private, some could be shared withpermissionfromtheowner,andotherswouldbepublic.An important aspect of this is household allocation. This requires

management to assign groups in a housing project to environmentstheycanbestuseandcontrol,takingintoconsiderationages,lifestyles,backgrounds,incomesandfamilystructures.

Natural surveillance: in which residents casually observe andmonitorpublicandsemi-publicspacesintheirenvironmentandinterceptthosewhodonotbelong.Residentswouldonlydothisiftheyhaddeveloped

aterritorialinstinctabouttheirhousingprojectandfeltresponsibleforitssafetyPractically,peoplemustbeabletoseeallthenon-privatepartsofthehousingdevelopmentiftheyaretohelppreventcrime.

Image and milieu: Newman believed defensible space design couldcounteract the negative effects on residents of the bad image thathousingprojectsoftenhaveinthecommunity.Thenotionof"milieu"ispart of this, as it insistson theneed forharmonybetweenahousingestateanditsimmediateneighbourhood.

Social surveillance following on Newman's natural surveillanceRubensteinetal.(1980)developedthenotionofsocialsurveillance.Aswell aswatching theirenvironment for intruders, residentswould beconfidentandinvolvedenoughtochallengethemandevenintervene.Thistheoryassumedthatchangestophysicaldesigncouldaffectsocial


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6Designingoutcrime

interaction and cohesion, which in turn effect crime and the fear ofcrime.

Employeesurveillance: Mayhewetal.(1979)pointedoutthesurveillancepotential of employees working in public places-bus conductors,

carpark attendants, receptionists, caretakers in schools or housingestates, and shop owners, managers or assistants. The authors citedcases where the presence of employees had improved security, forexampletheLambethInnerAreaStudyofvandalismonhousingestates(Great Britain Department of the Environment 1977), which showedthat estates with resident caretakers had fewer vandalism problems;andaHomeOfficeResearchUnitstudyofvandalismtodouble-deckerbuseswhichshowedmuchmoredamageonone-manoperatedbusesandinthereartopdeckwherepassengerscouldnotbewellobserved

(Mayhewetal.1976).CPTEDplus:bythemid-1970sresearchersworkingondefensiblespacehadlostfaithintheabilityofdesignchangesalonetoreducecrimeandnow regarded design measures as only one component of a crime-reduction package; other crime-reduction measures would be thecreation of groups dedicated to preventing crime among residents,betterpolicing,andimprovedrelationshipsbetweenthepoliceandthecommunity(Murray1983).

Manageable space: Donald Perlgut (1981, 1982) believes the scope ofdefensiblespaceistoolimitedandstressestheroleofmanagementinthe security of a housing project. The two most important crimeprevention strategies in what he called "manageable space" aremanagementpoliciesandpractices,andtheprocessofcreating,throughphysicaldesignandsitelayout,spacewhichcaneasilybemanagedbyresidents.Manageable space combines "soft" architecture with "soft"

management practices. Soft architecture responds to people, and the

design welcomes and reflects the presence of human beings. Softmanagementassumesmostresidentscanlearntoaccept,andevenseekout, responsibility and exercise high degrees of imagination andcreativity in participating in their environment. This is also stronglyemphasisedbyWilson(1976).Perlgutstressestheimportancetosecurityofdesignconsiderations

such as the definition of territorial zones, surveillance opportunities,


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TheoryofCPTED7

properhardware,provisionofcommunityfacilities,adequate lighting,controlled access to housing estates, the avoidance of spaces no-one"owns"andspaceswhichpeoplemightquarrelover.Managementcaninfluencecrimethroughthewayithandlesthefollowing:maintenance;its response tocrime; its coordinationwithpolice andotheragencies;

tenant screening; the way people are allocated to buildings; tenantorganisation; personalisation of units; intervention in neighbourdisputes;andevictionpolicies.In his Physical Design and Kinetic Management theory, Marcus

Felson(1987)believesin"theprincipleofleasteffort"articulatedbyZipfin1950,namelythatcriminalsandvictimsfindtheshortestroute,spendthe least time and seek the easiest means to accomplish something:thereforewecanpredictwheretheywillcomeintocontact.Conversely,bymanipulatingtheenvironment,weshouldbeable tominimisetheir

contacts.Felsonchartsashiftinthemainunitofecologicalorganisationfrom

thecommunityviathestreettowhathecallsthe"facility".Thisfacility,a social organisation rapidly gaining popularity, is a developmentlinkingseveralindependentbusinessesordepartmentsinonecomplex,with responsibility for security, litter, parking, etc. falling on themanagement of the facility Thus, he says, when the community isdominant,crimeispreventedbylargelyunaidedinformalsocialcontrol(thefamily,theneighbours);whenstreetsaredominant-astheynoware

inAustralia-crimecontrolislargelycarriedoutbyhit-and-misspublicpolicing;whenfacilitiesbecomedominant,architects,securityplannersandfacilitymanagerswillbecentralactorsincrimeprevention.Therefore,saysFelson,weneedtothinkintermsofphysicaldesign

and kineticmanagement.For example,designers should try todivertflowsoflikelyoffendersawayfromlikelytargets,orkeepthoseflowsrestricted towhere they can bemonitored.Aswell, potential victimsshouldbechannelledawayfromrisk.

ArgumentsforCPTEDR. E. Moffatt (1982), a crime prevention specialist with the RoyalCanadianMountedPolice,hasputthefollowingcaseforincorporatingCPTEDintotheoverallcrimepreventioncampaign.

Even though police might not wish to sit on planning boardsdesigning crime-free environments, it is more cost-effective in the


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8Designingoutcrime

longrun,aspolicewillneedfewerresourcestopolicethearea.

CPTED changes are permanent and do not need costly supportprogramsinvolvinglotsofpeopleandmoney.Defensivedesigncanbesupported by inexpensiveprograms (such asNeighbourhoodWatch)andgoodmanagementpractices.

ArgumentsagainstCPTED

Those who regard crime as the result of social conditions such aspoverty,unemployment,etc.believethatmanipulationofthephysicalenvironment and behaviour modification programs are no substituteforimprovedsocialservicesprovidingdaycare,rapecrisiscounselling,alcoholic treatment, and enhanced education and employmentopportunities.SomepeoplebelieveCPTEDmerelydisplacescrimetootherareas.

Thatis,onceatargetishardenedbytheinstallationofdoorlocksandbarredwindows,orisprotectedbyimprovedsurveillance,thecriminalsimply moves on to an easier building or takes up another form ofcrime. When the New York city police increased surveillance onsubways, for example, bus robberies increased. This problem isdiscussed inGeason andWilsonCrimePrevention: Theory and Practice(1988).

ProblemswithimplementingCPTED

Implementing CPTED is not without its problems. Moffatt lists thefollowing:

Strikingabalancebetweensecurityandpracticalityontheonehandand aesthetics on the other is themain problem. Toomuch securitypromotes a fortress mentality. Environmental design must reducecriminal activity while maintaining aesthetic standards sought byarchitects.

Becausevoluntaryorcompulsorysecuritycodesandstandardsfor

maintenance do not generally exist, because competition amongproprietors has not generally extended to security, and because theessentialroleofthearchitectinsecurityplanninghasnotbeenwidelyrecognised,landlordsdonotrequestthatarchitectsdesignforsecurity,nordobuildingpermitofficialsinsistonit.


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TheoryofCPTED9

Architects do not always knowwho is going to be living in thebuilding they design and cannot therefore involve residents in thesecurityplanningprocess.Aswell,architectstendtobemoreconcernedwithidealaestheticsthancrimeprevention.

Policeoftenregardresidentinvolvementintheplanningprocessas

meddlesome. Thereareproblemswithsomecitizenpatrolsthatareoftenpartofcrime prevention programs, e.g. participants losing interest, lack ofvolunteers at the most vital times Such as late at night, andfactionalisation.

Conclusion

Aswe have shown, crime prevention through environmental design

poses some problems for the community, most notably thatpolicymakers, town planners, developers, architects and individualhouseholders have to take greater responsibility for protecting thecommunity-andthemselves-fromcrime.Traditionally, the community has turned to the police and the

judicial system to protect themby deterring criminalsand punishingoffenders. And traditionally, more resources have been allocated toapprehending criminals and punishing them after the event than topreventingtheoffence.

Thegeneralpublic'sapathyaboutself-protectionarisesmainlyfromignoranceofthemeansofprotection,andaperceptionthatsomebodyelse"theGovernment"orinsurancecompanies-bearsmostofthecostof theft and vandalism. The community is beginning to realise,however, that crime rates are rising despite increasingpenalties, thatthe judicial system cannot cope, and that it is the individual whoeventuallyfootsthebillforcrimethroughincreasedtaxesforexpandedpoliceforcesandmorejails,andthroughhigherinsurancepremiums.The purpose of this booklet is to raise the consciousness of

developers, architects, town planners, policy-makers and individualhouseholders; to convince them that,whatever thearguments againstCPTED, its benefits outweigh its drawbacks, and to give practicaladviceonpreventingcrime.We are not advocating crime prevention through environmental


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10Designingoutcrime

designssituationalapproach-asapanaceaforburglary,vandalismandassault;wearepresentingitasapartialsolution,andonethatiswithinthe scopeof all themajoractors.Until such time as aperfect societyexists, or until social programs can be devised which reduce themotivationofpeopletocommitsuchcrimes,CPTEDcanhelpmakeour

homesandstreetssafer.


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PartIIPractice:designingoutcrime


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12Designingoutcrime

ImplementingCPTED

Experts in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's Crime Prevention

Centre have put together some practical advice on implementingCPTED (Moffatt1982).There aresixConditions considerednecessaryforthesuccessfulimplementationofCPTEDprogramswhichare:

Citizensmustfeelthatacrimeproblemexistsintheirarea.

The parties involved, e.g. residents, police, managers, citizens'groups,intheCPTEDprogramcannotbehostiletoeachother.

Fromthestarttheremustbesomeagreementongoalsamongthepartiesinvolved.

Government agencies involved must be prepared to delegateresponsibilitytocommunitygroups.

Theremustbeajointefforttoidentifyareasoffriction,andmutualagreementsmustbeworkedouttosolvethoseproblems.

Citizensmustbewillingtoacceptresponsibility.

MoffattalsooffersthefollowingsevenstrategieswhichcanbeusedtoformtheplanningmodelofCPTED,warningthattheyMustbeadaptedtothe needsof individualneighbourhoods. Ingeneralthe greaterthenumberofstrategiesused,themoresuccessfultheCPTEDprogram.

Defensible space: a residential community must look as if it isdefendingitself,andresidentsmusthavemaximumcontrolovertheirneighbourhood.Thesetwoelementscreatea"defensible"environment.

Territoriality: outdoor spaces should be redesigned to foster astrongersenseofownership.Residentsneedtofeelthatpublicspacessuchashallsandelevatorsbelongtothem,forexample.

Naturalsurveillance:surveillancecanbethenaturalby-productofnormal and routine residents' activities. One sample would bepositioningwindowsforclearsightlinessoparkingandplayareascanbewatched.

Formal organised surveillance: equipment such as cameras ormonitors can provide surveillance. In residential areas, surveillance


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Practice:designingoutcrime13

can beprovidedbyNeighbourhoodWatch, tenant and senior citizenpatrols,etc.

Targethardening:improvingbuildingsecuritystandards.Obstacles

suchaslocksandsecurityscreensshouldbeinstalledtodeterthieves.Doors,windowsandhallsshouldbemademoresecure,andthequalityofexteriordoors,doorframes,hingesandlocksmustbehigh.Exteriorlighting,alarmsystemsandkeycontrolcalladdtosecurity.

Access control: uses real or psychological barriers to discourageunwarrantedintrusion.Realbarriersincludeapicketfence.abrickwallorahedge.Psychologicalbarrierscanbecreatedbyarowofstories,aflower garden or a change in ground level. Inside a building,

psychological barriers can be created by something as simple as achangeinfloorcolour.Accesstoneighbourhoodscanbecontrolledbytrafficre-routing(though itmustbe rememberedthat too little trafficcanencouragecrime).

Activityprogramsupport:includesthecreationofon-sitefacilitiesSuch as daycare centres and organised playgrounds. Care should betakentoavoidconflictingactivitiesoverlapping,however.Programsonhow todiscourage crime should be run for residents, and additionalsocialservicessuchasyouthemploymentprogramsarehelpful.

The following sections of this bookletprovidepractical adviceonimplementing the six strategies outlinedbyMoffatwhich fallwithinour situational crimeprevention approach: activityprogram support,whileahighlydesirablecomponentofanycrimepreventionprogram,isbeyondthescopeofthiswork.AlsoincludedarecasehistorieswhichseemtoprovetheeffectivenessofvariousCPTEDstrategies.

Territoriality

Problemsariseinpublichousingestatesbecauseofcrowding,thelargenumbersofchildren,unemploymentandahighproportionofwomenas head of the household. Such conditions can give rise to conflictwithinanddrawcrimefromoutside-consequentlyvandalismandcrimearerifeinsomeestates.Addingtotheseproblemsareofteninadequateorpoorlymaintainedcommonfacilities,andtoogreataspreadofage


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14Designingoutcrime

groups,ethnicoriginsorlifestyles.As Newman points out, a well-designed housing project makes

quiteclearwhichspacebelongstowhom.Whenresidentsidentifywiththeirspacenotonlytheirprivateareas,butthesemi-publicandpublicspacesthatarepartoftheirenvironmenttheyaremorelikelytoshareinlookingafterthatspaceandkeepingintrudersout.In his 1976 study, Paul Wilson described three of Newman's

physicaldesignmeasuresasparticularlyrelevanttoAustralianpublichousing.First,hecautionedagainstprovidinglarge,openrecreationalspaces which are meant to be shared by all residents of an estatebecausesuchareasarerarelyused,areconsideredtobe"noman'sland"andare oftencentres ofcrime.Residents relate better tosmaller landspaces attached tospecificbuildingsorclustersofbuildings, andusethemmoreoften.Secondly, subdividing housing estates into small enclaves,

recognisableandidentifiablebytheresidents,contributestoafeelingofcommunityandhelpsfosterasenseofterritorialityinaproject.

Public, semi-public and private spacesmust be clearly delineated in Publichousingestatesiftenantsaretoestablishasenseofterritoriality,andrecogniseand challenge intruders. Reproduced with the kind permission of theCanberraTimes.Thethirdimportantdesignfeatureismodifyingdwellingentrances

sothatpeoplecominginhaveasenseofmovingfrompublictoprivatespace. In both walk-ups and single-dwelling residences this helpscommunicate directly to the resident, neighbours and potentialcriminalsthat"outofbounds"areasbeginbeforetheyreachanentranceor apartment door. This allows residents to observe - and perhapschallenge - intruders early. Modifications such as these can also


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enhanceresident'ssenseofprivacyandindividuality,eveninthemostdenselypopulatedproject.

Spacehierarchies

The first prerequisite, then, for the development of territoriality inresidentsistodelineateclearlypublicspacesuchasstreets,communityspace(e.g.sharedopenspace,playareas,communallaundries),privatespace such as the actual dwellings and private open spaces such asyards. One method of delineating space is to allow a private zonearounddwellingstoprovidevisualprivacy,abufferzonetostopnoise,andaplaceforchildrentoplay,forclothesdrying,etc.Spacehierarchiescanbespelledoutasfollows:

Make sure private spaces on the estate look different frompublicstreets.

Communal facilities on housing estates should be built in placeswhich quickly communicate to non-residents that they are not forPublicuse.

Ensure that residents' leases specify rights, responsibilities andmaintenance arrangements for every category of space - public,communalandprivate-onthesite.

Buildavisualbufferintheformofprivateyardorpatiobetween"public"pathways, courtyardsorstreets, and the "private" areaofthedwellinginterior.

The following strategies help build a sense of territoriality inresidents.

Divide the site into clusters ofbuildings so residents get toknoweachotherandcanrecognisenon-residents.

Makesureeachclusterhasuniquedesignfeatureswhichgiveitanidentityandasenseofplace.

Open space should belong indisputably to a particular group ofdwellings.

Erectrealorsymbolicbarrierstodiscouragestrangersfromenteringresidents'territory.


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Use shrubbery, building features, changes of leveland fencing tocreate semi-private entrances to communal and open spaces. whileensuring these do not become a securityhazard themselvesor createbarriers for old or disabled tenants. This can be done by providingadequatelightingandmakingsurelandscapingcannothideintruders.

TransitionalFilters

One method of marking out territory is to provide a series oftransitionalfiltersforpeoplemovingfrompublictoprivatespaces.Thislets people know that out-of-bounds areas begin well before allapartmentdoor.InastudyofpublichousingintheUnitedStatesandAustralia,Paul

Wilson (1976) examined layout techniques recommended by OscarNewman for defining transition from public to private spaces andfoundthefollowingthemosteffective:

Increasedlightingat the entrance or justprior to it. In addition,ahierarchyof lighting intensitiesanddifferent typesof lighting shouldaccompanyandarticulatesequentialmovementthroughwhatNewmanwouldcallpublictoprivatespace.

Change in texture.For example,public footpathsmay beconcrete

andprivatepathsbrick.Alternatively,patternsonpathsmaychangeinsizeasthepathgetsclosertotheentrance.

Changeinlevel.Footpathsofaprivatenaturemay,forexample,beone or two steps higher than public footpaths or gradually slopeupwardstothedoorway.

Landscaping or fencing using shrubbery or flowers defineindividualterritoryoralternatively,transparentfencinguptoametrehighcouldachievethesameeffect.

Extensionof building structure toavoid immediate entry into thelivingroomarea-insteadthereshouldbeanopen,semi-privateareaorlobby-differentiatingprivatefrompublicspace.

Penetrability

A space is ambiguous when it lacks symbolic, functional or verbal


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cuesonhowitshouldbeused,whoitisfor,whoshouldcontrolitsuse,andwhoshouldmaintainit.Anambiguousspaceisoftenairinsecurespace.Methodstomakethefunctionofspacesquiteclear(Sarkissian1984)

include:

Employ real or symbolic barriers to stop intruders enteringlandscapedspacesintendedforresidents.

Minimisethenumberofentriestoasite.

Design vehicular and pedestrian circulation so it is obvious howpeopleandvehiclesaresupposedtoenterandleavethesite-one-wayispreferable.

Put entrances to the site in places where they can be watched

formallyorinformally Donotbuildnarrowpassagesorunderpassesforenteringorleavingasite,astheyarefavouredbymuggers.

Where a real barrier to entry is needed, but visual privacy is notimportant,installwroughtironortubularsteelfencesandgateswhichlookgoodbutarehardtovandaliseandeasytomaintain.

Avoid fencing the whole site and creating a fortress. If this isnecessary,afenceisbetterthanawall,butthefenceshouldbelowandopeninstyletohelpsurveillanceandaircirculation.

Make sure landscaping features such as bushes do not create ahidingplaceforintruders.

Eliminate short-cutting throughasite,perhapsusingbollards1 to1.5maparttoseparateandcontrolpeopleandcars.

Ifsymboliclevelchangesareusedasbarriersagainstvehicles,makesuretheydonotbecomeimpassabletowheelchairs,shoppingtrolleysorprams.

Makesurenoneofthesedesign features stopsemergencyvehiclesgettingontothesite.

If the estate provides playing areas needed by the wholeneighbourhood, either locate them on the perimeter and make thempublic,orlocatethemintheinterioroftheestatetodiscouragepublicuse.


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18Designingoutcrime

Image

A central premise of defensible space theory is that the security and

livability of a housing project is bound up with the residents' andsurroundingneighbourhood'sperceptionsoftheestate.Iftheestatehasabadimage,itismorelikelytomanufactureorattractcrime.Newmantherefore recommends making public housing fit in better with itssurroundingstominimisethissenseofdifferenceandisolation.Some strategies for giving public housing a positive image

(Sarkissian1984)include:

Buildsomeuniqueelementsintoeachsub-unitonanestate.

Orienthousingestatesoutwards soresidentscan joininthe lifeof

nearby streets. To help the estate fit into its environment, design ofbuildings and landscaping on the outer edge of new developments,shouldbeconsistentwithlocalstandards.

Avoidlargepavedareas.

Makesurepublichousingdesignfitslocalarchitecturalnorms.Thedesign should not be either too extreme nor institutionalised, andbuildingmaterials should be of comparable quality to those in localowner-occupieddwellings.

Incorporatelocalstreetsintothesiteplansofnewdevelopments.

Sitedwellingssoresidentscanentertheirownfrontdoorfromthestreet,andallowvehicular-accesstodwellingsfromstreet.

Restrictaccesstoentrancestoasfewfamiliesaspossible.

Give preference to types of housing with direct street access -townhouses,forexample.

Managementforsecurity

Management can help create a community bykeeping intruders out,encouraging a sense of ownership and responsibility among tenants,providing meeting and recreational rooms, developing a system forwelcomingnewtenantsandintroducingthemtotheirneighbours,andgenerallyfosteringcontactamongresidents.Security education programs: management can also help reduce

crimeandvandalismbyrunningsecurityeducationprograms,perhaps


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inconjunctionwithpolice crimepreventionunits, local authoritiesortenants' groups. Security education programs emphasise some basicprecautions:

General precautions: keeping doors and windows locked andinstalling appropriate locking systems; making sure newspapers,garbage and mail are looked after when tenants are away; andprovidingduplicatekeysincaseofloss.

Security procedures: information on how to use entrance keys,storageareasandletterboxestominimisecrime.

Reportingprocedures:tellpeoplehowandwhentoreporttroubleorsuspiciousbehaviourtomanagementorpolice.

Protectingpersonalproperty:byinsuringit;keepingsalesslipsandserial numbers; marking valuable property with drivers' licencenumbers,etc.

Information about the neighbourhood: stressing areas which areunsafe.

Self-protection:forexamplehowtoreactduringanassault,first-aidtraining,etc.

Developing defensible space: management can, however, play amuch more specific and important role in reducing crime in publichousing. Some effective management strategies outlined by WendySarkissian(1984)forthethenNewSouthWalesHousingCommissionare:

Encouragetenantorganisationstodevelopself-help approaches tosecurityissues,includinglandscapingandmaintainingcommonspaces.

Useexistinglocalcrimepreventionprogramsorhelpsetthemup.

Setuptenantsecurityeducationprogramsinconjunctionwithlocalpolice. A door-to-door program, supplemented by displays in localcentresandusingmobilefacilities,isaneffectivemethod.

Develop a system of orientation (including handbooks, verbalinstructionandintroductiontoneighbours)fornewtenants.

Encouragetenantstobeneighbourlyandputthepersonaltouchontheirdwellings.


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20Designingoutcrime

Developspecialescortprograms,e.g.foroldpeopleorfemales.

Allocateresidents todwellingunits in such away as tominimiseconflict,andtransferhouseholdsfromdwellingsofinappropriatesize

orlocation.

Useevictiononlywhenreallynecessary.

Coordinateallsecurityeffortswithtenantsafterconsultation.

Contactpolicedirectlyandnegotiatetoalterorincreasepatrolandotherservices.

Use police and other outside security experts to inspect plans fordevelopments and the developments themselves for possible security

problems.

Use any available outside sources to supply funds for securitypersonnelandotherstrategies.

Develop a comprehensive crime reporting system, encouragereportingofallcrimes,andkeepaccuratestatistics.

Provide informal surveillance, and maintain high visibility ofmanagement and maintenance workers around the housing

development.

Actively coordinate security planning with neighbouringdevelopments, local government, government departments andotherrelevantparties.

Ensurethat adequate funds are available tomaintain allbuildingsand grounds at a high level of repair and to modify obvious designfaultsatanearlystage.

PublichousingcarparksCarparkscanbethesourceofmanyproblemsonpublichousingestatesnotonlycartheftandtheftfromcars,butvandalismanddangertoresidentsfromintruders,especiallyatnight.However,therearecrimepreventionstrategies:Theft and vandalism: wherever possible, provide each dwelling

with its own locked garage within the property boundaries. Lockedgaragesoutsidetheboundariesorwell-litandvisiblecommoncarparks

arethenextbestthing.


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Carparksshouldbewelllit,closetoresidences,andvisiblefromnearbyhousestominimisecrime.ReproducedwiththekindpermissionoftheCanberraTimes.

Coveredgarageswhicharenotvisiblefromthestreetorfromnearbyresidencesareanopeninvitationtomuggers,thievesandpossiblerapists.Carsparkedin

openviewaresafer. ReproducedwiththekindpermissionoftheCanberraTimes.


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22Designingoutcrime

Where private garages are not feasible, a car port or drivewayparkingispreferabletogroupedparkingawayfromdwellings.Asageneralrule,undergroundormulti-storeycarparksshouldbe

avoided. They are breeding grounds for vandalism and crime. If acomplexalreadyhasmulti-storeycarparks,dangercouldbeminimisedbylimitingentrypointsandprovidingtheentranceswithsturdylockedgates.Alternatively, each resident could beprovidedwith a lockablegarage in their own space, with robust, vandal-proof metal doors -garageswithingarages,sotospeak.Oruserscanbeprovidedwithasecurelockoraplastickeycardwhichoperateselectronicdoors.Grouped carparks should be avoided in high-crime areas. If they

cannot be avoided, they should be within view of some dwellings,shouldbeequippedwithsturdygatesortiltadoors,andshouldneverbesitednearalleyways.

Opencarparksshouldbesmallandwithinviewofdwellingswithvisitors' carparks clearly identifiable, well lit, and visible fromdwellings.Rape,assaultandrobbery:tomakecarparkssafer,plannersshould

providedirectaccessfromparkingareastotheentranceofdwellings.Carparks should be no further than 60 m from dwellings, the pathshouldbewelllitandfreefromshrubberyand,ifitisdesirabletolimitaccesstodwellings,makesureaccessviacarparksismonitored.In high-crime areas, advanced technological surveillancemethods

maybeneededincarparks.Forexample,aninfra-redunitisavailablewhichdetects the presence of intruders - but not catsanddogs - bybodyheat,andautomaticallyswitchesonalllightsinthecarparkandturnsthemoffafterfifteentotwentyminutes.

TheHartfordNeighbourhoodCrimePreventionProgram

Acrimepreventionprograminoperationfrom1973to1976inAsylum

Hill-adeterioratingneighbourhoodinHartford,Connecticutshowedquite clearly that changes to the built environment, together withincreasedpolicesupport,reducedburglariesandfearofburglariesandnipped a growing purse-snatching industry in the bud. The programwasdesignedtoincreasesurveillance,tomaketheareamoreattractivetoresidents,andtostimulatepeople'sdesiretohelppreventcrime.Threemajor physical design changes were made in AsylumHill:

cul-de-sacswere created tostop through traffic; outsidemotor traffic


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was diverted to define neighbourhoods better; and residents wereencouragedtoputupfences.Andtopromoteasenseofterritorialityandcontrolinthearea,residentswereencouragedtousetheareamorewhileoutsidepedestrianswerediscouraged.Besiderevealinga substantialdrop incrime and fearof crime, an

evaluationoftheproject(Fowleretal.1979)concludedthatthethreecomponents of the project - changes in physical design, policeoperations and community responses to crime - were essential inproducing the positive results, but that the physical design changeswerecrucialinmakingtheothercrimepreventionstrategieswork."A physical environment which encouraged informal efforts of

individual residents (such as using neighbourhood spaces andwatching one another's homes) appears to have been the key to thereductionthatoccurred"(Fowleretal.1979,pp.56-7).

Surveillance

Accordingtoastudyofburglars'attitudesbyTrevorBennett(1986),thetwo factorswhichweremost likely tostop themburgling adwellingwere:signsofoccupation,andsurveillanceofthedwelling.Burglars also confirmed the importance of groups like

NeighbourhoodWatch,andreportedthattheneighbourswerethemost

important group to avoid after the owners. However, later studies(Bennett1987,Mustofa1988)areshowingadeclineintheeffectivenessofNeighbourhoodWatchprogramsbecauseofdesign,administration,and implementation problems - in the overall organisation of thescheme(seepp.29-30fordetails).There are two major types of surveillance which are likely to

discouragecriminalactivity:

naturalsurveillance

formal,organisedsurveillance.

Naturalsurveillance

Naturalsurveillanceisachievedbysitingdwellingsinsuchawaythatresidents inside cankeep an eyeon both theirownspaces and semi-publicandpublicareas.Fortheprivatehomeowner,thismeansbeingabletoseetheyard,thegarageorcarpark,andthestreet.Fortenantsinpublic housing, it means being able to watch children playing in


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26Designingoutcrime

communalplaygrounds,beingabletoseewhocomesinentrancesandwhoisusingcarparksaswellasbeingabletomonitortheirownprivatelivingspaces.Inpracticalterms,itmeanseffectivelighting,keepingshrubberyout

ofthelineofvision,sitingwindowsinsensiblelocationsandlocatingcarparksinclearview.Lobbies in public housing projects: Research on crime in multi-

familyhousingshowsthatinteriorpublicspacesofbuildings,suchaslobbies, corridors, stairwells and elevators, are most vulnerable,especially for crimes such as assault, robbery and rape. These areas,thoughopentothepublic,areoftenwithoutsurveillancebypassers-byorpolice.Lobbiescanbemadesaferinthefollowingways(Sarkissian1984):

Shared entrances shouldhave lockeddoors, buzzers, intercomsorentryphonesmade of strong, vandal-proofmaterials. They should beeasyenoughforsmallchildrentouse.

Closedcircuittelevisionmaybeneededinhigh-crimeareas.

Residentsshouldbeabletoseeintolobbiesbeforetheyenter.

Hiddenareasandblindcornersshouldbeavoided,butwheretheyalreadyexist,providemirrors,windowsandimprovedlighting.

Encourageresidentstolingerinlobbiesforsocialreasons.

Distinguishtheareaaroundamainentrancefrompublicwalkwayssopeople enteringwillknow theyare entering anarea controlledbyresidents.

Time lights with automatic switch-off are adequate in lobbies ofbuildingsinlowtomedium-crimeareas,butstairwellsand lobbiesinhigh-crimeareasshouldbepermanentlylitfromacontroldeviceaway

fromthelobby.Toencouragesurveillancebyneighboursinpublichousing:

Without violating privacy, site windows and orient entries tomaximisenaturalsurveillance.

Wherepossible,ensureeachdwellingentryisvisiblefromasmanyotherdwellingsaspossible.

Locate windows so that casual surveillance of entries, open


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Ensure some degree of homogeneity within a community. Site windows fornaturalsurveillance.

carparks,openspaces, children atplay inrearyardsand footpaths is

possiblefromfrequentlyusedrooms,withoutsacrificingprivacyfrompassers-bybeingabletoseeinfrompublicareas.

Providesolid fencingoramixoffencingtypestoenablepeopletoseeoutbutlimitviewsintodwellingsandprivateopenspaces.

Avoidlowwindowsinblockswheretherearecommunaldecks.

Situatelightstoilluminateentriesandapproachestothemwithoutsuchlightsshiningdirectlyintowindows.

Ensuresomedegreeofhomogeneitywithinthecommunity. Link all design initiatives to security education and publicinformation programs to ensure that residents know how to use thesecuritymeasures.

Enclosures of private spaces should not prevent surveillance,therefore:

Fenceprivateopenspacesosurveillanceintoandoutofthespaceisenhanced,withoutinterferingtoomuchwithprivacy.

Locate private yards away from public spaces or shield them by


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28Designingoutcrime

usingfencesorwallsoradjoiningprivateyards.

Footpathsurveillancemeasuresinclude:

Lighting on paths should be adequate anddirect, and should not

castdark shadows, especially onstairs. Itshould bebright, evenandvandal-proof.

People onpathsshould beable tosee others coming, and shrubs,seats,etc.shouldnotbelocatedsothatintruderscanhideinorbehindthem.

Pathsshouldnotpasstooclosetowindows.

Footpathsshouldbevisiblefromdwellings.

Avoidtheuseofunderpasses.

Letterboxesinhigh-crimeareasareoftenvandalisedandpriedopenonpensiondays.

Individualmailslotsshouldbelocatedinpropertyfences.

Individualorgroupedletterboxesshouldbevisiblefromdwellings.

Letter boxes should be sturdy, fireproof and fitted with a strong,key-operatedlock.

Socialactivitiescanassistinnaturalsurveillance.

Casualuseofpublicandsemi-privateopenspacesbyresidentsandtheir friends should be encouraged to increase surveillanceopportunities.

A simple meeting or multi-purpose room should be located nearother heavily-used areas, but it would have to have substantial use,otherwiseitcouldbecomeatargetforvandals.

Indoor communal recreation facilities should be provided only ifsupervisionbysalariedpersonnelispossible.

Formal,organisedsurveillance

Neighbourhood Watch (NW) is the best-known form of organisedsurveillance aimed at reducing crime-not only property crime, butpersonalandsexualattacks,alargepercentageofwhichtakeplaceinor


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nearthevictim'shome.NWoperatesontheassumptionthatresourcesareinsufficienttoprovideadequatepoliceprotectiontoallthepeopleallthetime,andthatpartoftheanswerisforthecommunitytoprotectitselffromcrime.Theprogramfocuseson:

Encouraging people to note suspicious activity and immediatelyreportseriouscrime.

Minimising preventable crime through improved personal andhouseholdsecurity.

Deterring burglars by marking property and displaying stickersaroundthehouseasawarning.

NeighbourhoodWatch isnot a vigilante group, andmembersarediscouraged from becoming physically involvedwith intruders.Aftersome initial successes overseas and in Australia, there is now somedoubt as toNeighbourhoodWatch's ability to reduce crime (Bennett1987,Mustofa1988).Bennett'sevaluationoftwoNWschemesinLondonshowedthatthe

prevalenceofcrime(thetotalnumberofhouseholdsvictimisedat leastonce)hadnotchangedsignificantlyovertheexperimentalperiodinone

area and increased in theother,and the incidenceof crime (the totalnumber of victimisations) increased in both areas. Mustofa's study,whichcontrastedanareainMelbournewhichhadaNWschemewithan area which did not, found little evidence to show that the NWprogramwaseffectiveinpreventingcrimeinNorthCarlton.In termsofpublicattitudes, however, one area inBennett's study

showedadecreaseinfearofhouseholdcrimeandanincreaseinsocialcohesion,whiletheotherareashowedimprovedresidentcooperation

inhomeprotectionandareductioninfearofcrimeamongsomesub-groups.


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30Designingoutcrime

BennettconcludedthatthemajorproblemofimplementingNWdidnotlieinthespecificeffortsofresidentsandpoliceresponsibleforthetwo programs, but in the general design and administration of thescheme inLondon. Some requirements for a successfulNWprogramcanbeextrapolatedfrom thedesign andadministrative shortcomingsuncoveredinLondonNWprogramsbyTrevorBennett.

Localpoliceneedinformationonthespecificdetailsofthescheme,plus guidelines from headquarters on acceptable levels ofimplementationofthevariouselements.

Regular formal, as well as informal, meetings of all residents areneeded.

Residents displaying stickers and looking out for suspiciousbehaviourandactivitiesisnotenoughtodeterburglars.

IfbeatpolicearetoobusytorespondtoNWcalls,theschemewillfail.

Residents will not mark property unless sufficient equipment ismadeavailable.

If home security surveys are advertised as part of NW schemes,policemustbemadeavailabletocarrytheseout.

The lesson for Australian police and community groups is clear:unless thedesign and administrationofNWprogramsare constantlymonitoredandevaluatedforeffectiveness,NWschemeswilleventuallyfail. Early results showed that NW can work, however, so the ideashouldnotbeabandonedyet.To be effective, Neighbourhood Watch programs must be well

organisedandrunalonglinesdrawnupbypolicedepartments.Ifyouwant to startNW in your area, first contact the police through their

CommunityRelationsBureau.Thenumbersare*:ACT (062)457288NSW (02)3395013NT (089)223618Qld (07)2266001SA (08)2181212Tas (002)381101Vic (03)3203333WA (09)222111


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Police require evidence of substantial community support for theidea before theywill initiate aprogram.Thepolicewill call apublicmeeting andwill ask for volunteers to help run theprogram.Groupcoordinators will be appointed from this group, and an areacoordinatorwillbeelected,responsibleforliaisonbetweenpoliceandresidents.Thereareotherwatchprograms.Forexample, theSydneyMorning

Herald5May1988carriedthefollowing:NowASlipperyDipsPatrol

Couples who take their pleasure under the slippery dips inLiverpool'sparksmaysoonbeobligedtoexercisemorediscretion.In an attempt to curb anti-social behaviour and to encourage

community involvement in parks, the Liverpool City Council isexpectedtoset upaParkWatch scheme, similar to the successfulNeighbourhoodWatchschemes.Residentslivingnearparksandreserveswillbeaskedtobecome

"honoraryparkrangers"andtoreportvandalsandotheroffendersona24-hourcounciltelephonenumber.Alderman Mark Latham said the council, like most others in

Sydney, spent "tens of thousands of dollars" each year on parkrepairs.He said residents had complained of "fornication under the

slipperydips",wildparties,trailbikeriders,andsmashedwindows.After a call to the 24-hour service, the councilwould ring the

policeorsendoutaparkranger,dependingonthecomplaint.The Park Watch scheme is expected to be approved by the

councilaftertheplangoesbeforeaworkscommitteemeetinglaterthismonth.

MarineWatch:accordingtotheABCNewsof9May1988,boatownersin the South Coast resort of Merimbula were considering a MarineWatch, to prevent vandalism and theft on boats moored at localmarinas.


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32Designingoutcrime

RuralWatch: was setup in ruralNewSouthWales in 1988 to try topreventtheftoffarmanimals,ascattleduffinginparticularwascausingserious losses to graziers. Stock Watch, part of a rural version ofNeighbourhoodWatchwaspilotedinArmidaleandGlenInnesandhasbeenexpandedthroughouttheState.

SchoolWatch:anextensionofNeighbourhoodWatch,SchoolWatchisoperating in New South Wales. The new security plan for schoolsincludes increasing night patrols, linking all metropolitan schools toelectronic alarm systems and setting up caretaker units in high-riskschools.Lighting will also be improved around high-risk schools and

rewards of $25,000 will be offered for information about schools

vandalismandarson(SydneyMorningHerald6June1988).

Hospital Watch: the New South Wales Health Department pilotedHospitalWatchin1988inanefforttocombattheftofequipmentandpilferingbystaff.According to the Sun-Herald newspaper (I 9 June 1988), property

stolen from Sydney's major hospitals during the first five months of1988 included specialisedmedical equipment such as heart monitorsand electroscopes, cars, computer terminals and printers, slideprojectors, typewriters, VCRs, televisions, microwave ovens,dictaphones,push-button telephones, calculators, stethoscopes, powertools, battery rechargers, radiocassetteplayers,mirrors, light fittings,andexpensiveofficefurnituresuchasspecialtablesandchairs.

Citizens' Patrols: in some neighbourhoods in theUnited States wherecrimeisaparticularproblem,residentshavesetuptheirownsecuritypatrols. Studies of citizens' patrols have found them to beavaluableadditiontopoliceprotection.Localpeopleknowbetterthanpolicewhothestrangersandtrouble-makersare,andcanmonitorprivateorsemi-

privateareasmoreeasily.Aswell,becausemembersofcitizens'patrolsdon'twearuniforms,theyhavetheelementofsurprise.Astudy(Yinandassociates1976)ofmorethan200suchpatrolsin

sixteen areas of the United States found they were most successfulwhen they focused on specific and limited situations.Another study(Curtis&Kohn1980)foundthesmallertheterritorypatrolled,themoresuccessfultheprogramandconcludedthatapublichousingproject-


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with its clear boundaries and relatively homogeneous constituency -wasagoodcandidateforasuccessfulcitizens'patrol.Butlikemanycrimepreventionmeasures,citizens'patrolsaremore

likely to be effectivewhen they form part of a package of strategiesprobablyincludingincreasedpolicepresence,someformoforganisedsurveillancesuchasNeighbourhoodWatch,designmodifications,andinthecaseofpublichousing,improvedmanagementpractices.

Closed-circuittelevisioninSurreyUniversitycarpark

Surveillancecanbeeffectiveinopencarparks,andcanbeimprovedbymodern technologyOne closed-circuit television camera (CCTV) andmonitoringequipment reducedthefts fromcarsparkedonthe Surrey

University campus by 66 per cent by greatly extending the abilityofexistingsecuritystafftosuperviselargeopenparkingareas(Poyner&Webb1987).The University had four main carparks around its perimeter, all

some distance from buildings and residences. Thefts from thesecarparkswerethemajorcrimeproblemoncampusin1984and1985.First, hedges bordering carparks and the perimeter road were

trimmed to increase surveillance, and lights were left on longer. As

well,30,000worthofCCTVwasinstalled.Camerasweresethighto

minimise interference orvandalism and tomaximise their rangeandsweep.Theyalsohadinfra-redvisionfornight-timesurveillanceandwereconnectedtoloudspeakers.AsCarpark4wasthefocusofmuchoftheautocrimeoncampus,oneCCTVcamerawaspositionedontopofatoweroverlookingitandCarpark3.

CrimeinCanberracarparks

Inresponsetocommunityconcernaboutaspateofviolentattacksonwomenininner-Canberraearlyin1988,theMinisterfortheAustralian

Capital Territory issued instructions to improve surveillance incarparks inCivic by trimminghedges and shrubbery and improvinglighting. Seven areas in the inner city have been targeted forimprovement,includingthreecarparksandlanesleadingfromcarparkstoentertainmentcomplexes.


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34Designingoutcrime

ThesephotographsshowapubliccarparkinCanberrabeforeandafterhedgeswere removed to improve surveillance from surrounding streets.Photographer Marie Colvill, Science Photography Unit, ANUPS,

AustralianNationalUniversity


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Accesscontrol

Howimportantisaccess?

Thievesandvandalsaremorelikelytohittargetswhichareeasytogetin andoutof,wherea fast getaway is possible. For example, studieshaveshownthatcrimeratesarehigherinareaswhereparkinglotsarelocated close to housing developments (Moffatt 1982). Not only cancriminals get away more easily, but they can pass from carparks tohousesunobserved.Aswell,therearefewerbreakingatresidenceswithlimitedaccess-at

theendofculdesacs,forinstance-thanatthosewitheasyaccesssuchashousesonintersections.Otherstudieshavefoundthathousesontheedgesofneighbourhoodsweremoreoftenvictimisedthanthoseintheheartofneighbourhoods.AliceColemanfoundthatthenumberofaccesspointsintothesite

perimeterofhigh-riseblockswascrucialtotheincidenceofproblemsinBritishhousingestates.Herstudy(1985)showedthatifthereweregatesorgapsoneachside,outsiderstookshortcutsacrossthegroundswiththe result that housing estates became full of anonymous strangers,creating the sort of atmosphere in which crime flourished. Colemansuggeststhatifthenumberofaccesspointscouldbereducedfromfiveto one - often a simple and inexpensive matter - the percentage ofblocksaffectedbycrimecouldfallbyuptotwo-thirds.

Thequestionoftrafficflowisnotsoclear-cut,however.Ifthereistoomuchstreettraffic,thecriminalcanblendintothecrowd;ifthereistoo little, pedestrians and residences can become targets of criminalattack.Criminals'accesstovictimscanbelimitedinanumberofways:

Increasingnaturalsurveillanceandpeople'ssenseofterritorialitysothat strangers are noticed and suspicious behaviour challenged andreported.

Installingelectronicsurveillancesuchasclosedcircuittelevisioninlobbiesandcarparks.

Installingentryphonesandreceptiondeskservicesandpayingcloseattentiontothesitingofwalkwaysinpublichousingestates.

Target hardening, that is, the fortification of doors andwindows


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36Designingoutcrime

withstrongframesandlocks,theinstallationofpeepholesandchainsondoors tomonitorvisitors, buildingwalls and fences, and insomecasestheinstallationofalarmsystems.

Channellingpotentialcriminalsoutofvulnerableareasbysensibleplanning, for example not siting a pinball parlour next to an oldpeople'sresidence;andclosingoffstreets.

Territorialityandsurveillancehavebeencoveredpreviously(pp.13-33)andtargethardeningandplanningforcrimepreventioniscoveredonpp39-47.Thissectionwilldetailsomecasestudiesshowinghowtheestablishmentofareceptionservice,thecontrolofaccesstowalkways,and the installation of entryphones have reduced crime in publichousingprojects.

AreceptionserviceatGloucesterHouse

AreceptionserviceestablishedincouncilhousinginLondonwasveryeffectiveagainstvandalism,graffiti andmess incommunalareas,butless effective against burglaries. On closer examination, however,Gloucester House's reception service was found to have specialcharacteristics which, while contributing to its success, might bedifficulttorecreateelsewhere.

AservicewassetuponthissouthKilburnpublichousingestateinnorthwest London in 1984, the impetus for action coming from anofficer in the local Community Law Centre, and the idea for thereceptionservicearisingoutofconsultationswithtenants.Theservicewasstaffedbytwopeople,oneonthe8amto3pmshift,

andoneforthe3pmto11pmshift.Itdidnotoperateatnightnoronweekends.The service ran in conjunctionwithanentryphone systemwhich was switched off when the receptionist was on duty andswitchedonwhenthedeskwasnotstaffed.Besidevettingvisitors,the

receptionist took deliveries, messages, keys, housing queries andcontactedtheresidentcaretakerwhennecessary.Anevaluationoftheprogram(Poyner&Webb1987)showedthat

the establishment of the reception service had improved livingconditions for tenants and reduced maintenance costs for the localhousing authority Damage and graffiti disappeared from communalareasonthegroundfloor,corridorswerecleanandliftswereinpristinecondition.Butalthoughthe effectsonvandalismwereunarguable, the effect


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ofthereceptionserviceonburglarywaslessclear.CrimestatisticsforGloucester House did riot show a significant reduction in burglariesafteritwasestablished.Thismaybepartlybecausereceptionservicestendtobeineffectiveagainstburglariescarriedoutby-residentsinsidejobs.

PoynerandWebbattributedmuchofthesuccessoftheGloucesterHousereceptionservicetothefortunatechoiceofareceptionistonthelateshift.Shewasthewifeoftheresidentcaretaker,andtookastronginterest inthewelfare of the tenants; she and her husband tended toregardtheblockasasortoffamilybusiness.TheresultWasarelaxedandproductiverelationshipwiththetenants.Otherreceptionserviceshaverunintotroubletryingtofindstaffforthelateshifts,andbecausethework is boring, staffwillsometimesneglect the job and go homeearly.

WalkwaysonLissonGreenEstate

AliceColeman(1985)identifiedwalkwaysasamajorsourceofcrime,andfearofcrime,onpublichousingestatesbecausetheypromotedallthreeimpedimentstoagoodcommunitystructure:anonymity,lackofsurveillanceandescaperoutes.The Lisson Green Estate in England comprised nearly 1,500

dwellingsinmedium-riseblocks,allofwhichwerelinkedbyasystemofwalkways-analmostuninterruptedrunof1.2km,evencrossingamain road. Lisson Green's problems included annoying children,rubbish disposal problems,muggings, concern over asbestos in flats,inadequate heating, blocked sewers, leaking roofs, lift problems,flooding in flats, tenant squabbles, speeding cars, congested carparking,drugsandconcernsoverstructuralsafetyofblocks.In 1987 Poyner and Webb evaluated the effects on crime of the

removal of seven walkways and found that muggings had been

reduced on the estate, and that burglary and damage to flats haddecreased,butairanalysisofcrimestatisticscollectedbetween1982and1984showedasignificantreductioninmuggingssevenmonthsbeforethewalkwayswereremoved.Thekeyseemstohavebeenentryphones,a number of which had been installed before the walkways wereremoved.TheremovalofthewalkwayshadnotreducedcrimeontheLisson

GreenEstate, the researchers found: instead, thepositiveresultswereachievedbyblockingaccesstothewalkwaysbytheuseofentryphones.


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38Designingoutcrime

When thewalkways were broken up in four places by entryphones,walkwaymuggingsstopped.Theinescapableconclusionisthatthecouncilwastedthe100,000it

spentonremovingthewalkways.Whattheevaluationshowedclearlywas that a professional crime survey could have prevented theinitiation of costly crime prevention measures aimed at the wrongproblemorputintoplaceafter theproblemhadbeensolvedbyothermeans.

EntryphonesandfencesatSouthActon

Entryphoneshavebecomeapopularremedialmeasureforproblemsinmediumandhigh-risehousing,e.g.,abuseanddeteriorationofinternal

communal areas such as entrances, lobbies, lifts, stairwells andcorridors.Poyner andWebb's case study (1987) was conducted on a large,

post-warhousingestate inWestLondon between1980 and 1985 andexaminedpolicecrimedatatoassessthecontributionofentrycontrolsystems to crime prevention. Police had identified South Acton ashaving "ahighpotential fordisorder".The estatehad2,000dwellingsbuiltinphasesfromthe1960sthroughtothemid-1970sandcomprisedblocks of flats with a fewmaisonnettes, some houses, twenty-storey

towers,largemedium-riseslabblocksandsmalllow-risebalcony-accessblocks.Afour-stageimprovementprogrambeganin1980.TheCommunity

centreandcommunalaccessareaswererefurbishedandtwoofthefourblocks were physically improved and provided with entryphones.Groundsaroundtheblocksweretidiedandenclosedwithsubstantialtimberfencing,creatingcommunal-andinthecaseofthelow-riseblock,individual-gardens.Ananalysisofcrimestatisticsfortheestateshowedthatresidential

crime inareaswithentryphonesand fences decreased slightly,whilecrime increased considerably in the unimproved blocks.Entryphonesandfencingalsoreducedvandalismtoflats,withlessdamagetodoorsinoneof the blocks and fewer flatwindowssmashed. Entry controlsdidnot,however,seemtoreduceburglaryandbreak-insinsideblocks,indicatingthattheywerepossiblycrimescommittedbyresidents.


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Targethardening

Targethardeningmeansimprovingbuildingsecuritystandardstokeep

intruders out-tougherdoors, windows, locks-and installing alarms. Itcan alsomean redesigning objectswhich are commonly vandalised -rubbishtins,lights,lavatorystalls,walls,etc.-makingthemhardertodefaceorsmash.

Inprivatedwellings

Responsibilityfortargethardeninginprivatedwellingsislargelylefttothebuyer.Majorbuildershavenotfounditcost-effectivetoinstallanysecuritymeasuresotherthandeadlocks,forthemostpart.

It may be that their market research needs updating (or it maymerely reflect a greater security problem in the United States), foraccordingtoFultonResearchInc.ofVirginia,securityratesveryhighlywithprospectivehomebuyers.Fultonaskedvisitorstomodelhomestorate desirable features on a one to five scale, with five the mostappealing. A fireplace rated 4.58, but deadbolt locks came a closesecond, rating 4.57.Acomplete home security systemwas rated at 4(CrimePreventionNews1988).It is suggested homeowners consult a security firm to carryout a

securitysurveyonthehouseandadviseonthemosteffectivemeasures.TheNewSouthWalesPoliceDepartment (forone)will carryout freesecurityreviewsofprivateandpublichousing,butwillnotrecommendprivatesecuritycompanies.

Inpublichousing

SomeAustraliangovernmentauthoritiesprovidingaccommodationfordisadvantaged people or government personnel have responded toactual or potential security problems by using target hardening

measures.Homeswest - theWestAustralianGovernment's housingagency -

choosesfromanumberofstrategiesfordealingwithsecurityproblemsin its dwellings. These include relocating tenants, providing orincreasing security lighting, providing security doors and screens,installingwindowlocks,andbuildingextraorbetterfences.In Tasmanian public housing, very little of which is over three

storeys high, security is notas greataproblem as it is inNewSouth


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42Designingoutcrime

WalesandVictoria.Housingauthoritiesareawareofthepotentialforsecurityproblemsinpublichousing,however,andhavebeenapplyingdefensible space/ surveillance practices since the mid-1980s. In theirnewdesigns,theyareincorporatingwiredglassonsidelightsoffrontdoors,andaremakingfrontdoorsstrongeronoldunitsaspartoftheirmaintenanceprogram.Political events overtook the former NSW Labor Government's

policy-announcedon22November1987-toallocate$25moverseveralyearstoimprovesecurityinpublichousing.Theschemewasworkedout in consultation with public housing tenants' groups, and wouldhave included installing deadlocks, window locks, security screendoors, alarm systems, better outdoor lighting, stronger doors andwindows,andimprovedhouse/apartmentdesign.AmongtheCommonwealthDefenceDepartment'sspecificationsfor

security for defence personnel quarters-outlined in their manualSecurityofGovernmentFacilities(PhysicalSecurity)-are:

Zinc-plated steel security doors, hinged to door frame by fixeddoublepinhinges.Locksarekeyedalike,keybothsides.

Security doors have infill grille, steel diamond pattern, withaluminiumflywirescreenattached.Doorshavedoublecylindermortiselockspositionedathead.Thewholeassemblyispowdercoated.

Providesturdylocksonallexteriordoors.

Ensurealllocksareproperlyandsecurelyinstalled.

Doorframematerialsshouldbestrong.

Installkey-in-doordeadboltordeadlocks,atleast25mmlongonfront and rear doors. Two ormore locks are often recommended bysecurityexperts,withthesecondaryonebeingaverticalboltor38mmhorizontalboltlock.

Fit locks on bedroomwindows used for ventilation. Do not openthesemorethan120mm.

Toallexteriorswingingdoors,includingstorageshedsandgarages,intermediate cylindrical locksets are attached, with exterior lockingdeadlatch,keyedalike.

Toallexteriorslidingdoors,shortbacksetcylindermorticeslidingdoor deadlocks for wood are attached, fitted with double cylinders,

keyedaliketoexteriorswingingdoors.


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Key operated security locks with locked open vent position areattachedtowindows.

In her 1984 report into crime prevention through environmental

design in public housing, carried out for the then NSW HousingCommission, Wendy Sarkissian made a number of commonsenserecommendations on target hardening strategies. Many of these arerelevantforprivatehousingandindividualhouseownersaswell.

Doors Adoorshouldbeabletowithstandeffortstoforceentry,retainitsattachedlockingdevicesandbefireproof,andthedoorframemustbestrong.

Exteriordoorsshouldbeaminimumof45mmthick,preferablyofsolidcorewood.

Usesteelframesinhigh-crimeareas.

Install anodisedaluminiumsecuritydoors, especially forsingleoragedtenantsorinhigh-crimeareas.

Slidingdoors In high or medium-crime areas, avoid sliding patio or balconydoors.Usestandard-sizeswingingdoorswithakeyholeontheinsideonly.

If sliding patio doors are already in place, install dead bolt key-operatedlocks,laminatedglass,andsturdyframes.Forextrasecurity,providesafetybarandlockboltedtothefloor.

Alengthofdowelatthetopofthedoorwillpreventitbeingliftedoutofthebottomofthetrack.

Upperwindows

Avoiddetailingdesignswhichhelpoffendersgetinviatherooforupper story windows, e.g. porches, attached car-ports, concreteplatforms outside windows, low-level balconies with horizontal sideslots, staggered brickwork or bricks laid in a vertical checkerboardpattern which provides toe-holds, continuous private balconies,awnings, car ports or adjoining fences which would provide access,skylights,highslattedfences,externalpipeworkwhichcouldbeusedasaladder,glasslouvrewindows.


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44Designingoutcrime

Inhigh-crimeareas,considerroofalarmsystems,andsecuritygrillesoverwindowsinstalledinthebrickwork.

SurveillanceItshouldbepossibletoseewhoisatthedoorbeforeyouopenit. When building a dwelling, site windows so that entry-ways arevisiblefrominsidehouses/dwellings.

Installfish-eyesorpeepholesonallsolidexteriordoors.

AlarmsIfyouliveinahigh-crimeareaorownvaluablepossessions,youmightwant to install a burglar alarm. If you are building a new house, itwould be wise to investigate installing an alarm at the constructionstage, but discuss it with a reputable security firm first. TheNRMArecommends using companies belonging to the Australian SecurityIndustryAssociation, and theNRMA's BurglaryPreventionUnitwillgiveyoufreeadviceonalarmsandlocks.Devicestodetectintruderscomeinfivetypes:

Electromechanicaldevicessuchaspressuremats,magneticswitchesforperimeterdoorsandwindows,andvibrationdetectors.

Space/movementdetectors-ultrasonic,microwaveorpassiveinfra-red.

Personalactivatingdevicessuchaspanicbuttonsandmedicalalert.

Specialiseddetectors-todetectsmokeorheat,forexample,and

Property perimeter devices, e.g. video for gate and grounds, andvideointercomsforhousesorflats.

InsuranceincentivesSome insurance companies have specially low premiums forhouseholders who fit specific types of deadlocks, window locks,security door screens etc. GRE Insurance, for example, givespolicyholderswhoinstallLockwooddevicesa7.5percentdiscountonhomecontentsinsurance.Checkwithyourinsurancecompany


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FurtherreadingDetailsaboutdoors,locks,windowsandalarmsavailableinAustralia

are to be found in Bruce Stannard'sHow to Beat the Burglar availablefrom The Building Centre at 525 Elizabeth Street South Broadway,NSW, 2007 - phone (02) 699 5435. The Building Centre also hasselectionsoflocksetc.ondisplay.As well, Who's Afraid of Burglars, a comprehensive guide to all

aspects ofhomesecurity, is now available through bookstoresand isdistributed by Bookwise International in Sydney whose toll- freenumber is (008) 888 538. Its author, Hugh Richards, spent ten yearsworking for the Australian division of an international security

company.U.K.Workinggrouponresidentialburglary

The U.K. Home Office's Working Group on Residential Burglaryprepared a list of recommendations designed to help tenants protectthemselves,aswellastoassistlocalcommunityself-helpgroupssuchasNeighbourhoodWatch.Thisconstitutedasimplebutpracticalguidetowhatpeople-especiallythoselivingininner-cityareas-coulddotoprotecttheirhomes.

Asstatistics showed that 20per centofentries by burglars inonecityweremadetoinsecurepremises,theWorkingPartyconcentratedon raising the public's awareness of simple safety precautions usingexisting hardware. They also wanted to show that additional simpleprotectivemeasuresneednotbeexpensive.The resultwas a leafletdesigned to raise awareness and curiosity

without frightening people. As well, the Working Party compiled atable of high, medium and economy standard security measures fordoors and windows of inner-city flats and houses. The cost of the

packagetheyrecommendedwasdeliberatelykepttoalevelwithinthereach of most households. The Working Party stressed the securityaspectofmaintenancework,pointingoutthatsecuritycanbeimprovedat very little additional cost in the course of routine repair andmaintenancework.

HammersmithandFulhamScheme

In a pilot scheme in Hammersmith and Fulham, funded under theHome Office's Urban Program, grants of up to 40 were made to

vulnerable households for mortise and rim deadlocks, door viewers,


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46Designingoutcrime

door chains,window locksand door reinforcingstrips.Police visitedapplicants and recommendedappropriatemeasures, andprofessionalfittersinstalledthedevices.Eighty-fivepercentofthefirst1,000grantswenttoelderlypeople,themajorityofwhomwerepublictenants.The Council arranged for the police to monitor crime on certain

housingestatesinordertoassesstheeffectoftheschemeinpreventingburglariesandreducingfearofcrime.

DoorsandwindowsinBristol

Anevaluation of a building program to improve the effectiveness ofdoors and windows in a 750- dwelling housing estate in Bristol,England, showed that, while burglaries on the police beat which

includedthehousingestatedoubledbetween1980and1986,thehouseswith improved door andwindow security remainedvirtually freeofcrime(Poyner&Webb1987).Whentheworkwastobedone,thecouncilcontactedtheAvonand

Somerset Constabulary's crime prevention department for securityspecificationsforthereardoorsandwindowsandtooktheadviceofitsArchitect Liaison Officer, namely that the major factor influencingsecurityofdwellingswaswindowdesign.Thenewdoorsandwindowsconformedtoguidelinespublishedin

a March 1986 British Standards guide for the security of dwellings(BritishStandards Institution1986). The relevantBritish Standard,BS8220(Part1:Dwellings),isavailablefromtheStandardsAssociationofAustralia, 80 Arthur Street, North Sydney, NSW, 2060, for $114.40,phone(02)9634111.

ShieldofConfidence,Canada

In 1980, the Crime Prevention Branch of the Hamilton-WentworthRegional Police inOntario,Canada-in consultationwith the localreal

estate board, the local society of architects, the home buildersassociation,thecitybuildingdepartmentandtheInsuranceBureauofCanada-agreedonavoluntarybuildingstandardsconsistingofthirty-twovitalcrimepreventionmeasureswhichwouldbeincorporatedintotheconstructionphaseofnewhouses.This CPTED program was called Shield of Confidence. Homes

which passed a police inspection were issued Shield of Confidencestickers, identifying them to consumers and potential burglars. The


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police tested the Shield of Confidence houses with an experiencedburglar,who rated themsevenout of ten for security,comparedto aratingoftwoforothernewhomes.A kit is available from the Hamilton-Wentworth police for police

forces wanting to set up Shield of Confidence security programs. Itcovers doors, windows, lighting, garage security and house numberidentification.Aswell as specifying target hardening techniques, thepolice encourage home buyers to keep site lines clear of shrubbery,fencingandother barriersproviding cover forburglars, participate inOperation Identification in which they mark property, and joinNeighbourhoodWatch.

Protectingyourhome:somepracticaladvice

Inthissectionwehavecompiledalistofsimpleprotectivemeasurestohelpyouavoidbeingburgledandtominimisedangertoyourpersonifyou suspect someone has broken into your home or a neighbouringproperty.

Sensiblesurveillancepractices

There are some general rules for maintaining surveillance over yourterritoryandyoudon'thavetobeamemberofNeighbourhoodWatch

tofollowthem. Ifyou see someonebreaking into a neighbour'shouseorhangingabout,callthepoliceemergencynumber-000.

Ifyounoticeasuspiciousvehicleinaneighbour'sdrivewaycalltheneighbourstoseeifthevehicleislegitimate.Iftheyarenothome,makeanoteofthevehicle's registrationnumber,and ifnecessary, callyourlocalpolice.

Ifyouthinksomeonehasbeeninsideyourhouseinyourabsence,

don't go in, as the thief might still be there. Call the police from aneighbour'shouse,andwatchyourhousetilltheyarrive.

Never let strangers inside your home without checking theircredentials:ifnecessary,calltheOrganisationthepersonissupposedtoberepresenting.Ifyouaresuspicious,callthepolice.

Ifaneighbour'sburglaralarmgoesoff,callthemtoseeifit'safalsealarm. If nobody is home, call the police in case there has been an


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48Designingoutcrime

attemptedbreak-in.Ifaneighbour'shouseisopenwhentheyareaway,callthepolice.

TwelvetipsforbeatingtheburglarTheAustralianInsuranceCouncilhasdrawnupalistofadozentipstoprotectyourhomewhileyouareaway:

Don't advertise your absence by allowing milk, newspapers andmailtoaccumulate.

Don'thidekeysoutsidethehouse.

Don'tleaveblindsorcurtainsclosedifyou'reawayforsometime.

Don't forget to inform police of your absence and address whileyou'reonholidays,andtoadviseyourinsurancecompanyifthehousewillbeunoccupiedforlongerthanyourpolicyallows.

Don'tleavenotesforthievestoread.

Don't relyonoutdated locks. Fitmoderndeadlockson all outsidedoors.

Don'tleaveladdersandtoolsaroundforthievestouse.

Don'tgooutwithout lockingalldoorsandwindowsof thehouse,garageandoutbuildings.

Don't forget to arrange for a neighbour to collect free deliverynewspapers,parkacarinyourdriveandmowthelawn.

Don't let shrubs grow beyond window level - they can providehidingplaces.

Don'tforgetto switchonexternal lightingatduskandleaveonas

usual if out for the evening. Consider installing a time-switch forinternallights.

Don't forget to keep a record-make, model, serial number andphotograph-ofallvaluableskeptathome.

Safetytipsforapartmentdwellers

When choosing an apartment, try to rent or buy in a securitybuilding,thatis,onewithacaretaker,orentryphones.Ifyouownaunit


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inaninsecurebuilding,workthroughthebodycorporatetoinitiateasecuritysystem.

Installreliabledeadlocksonallexteriordoorsandifyouareonthe

groundfloor,installsecuritylocksonwindowsandbalconydoors.

Installapeepholeinyourfrontdoorsothatyoudon'thavetoopenyour door to strangers. And always check the identification oftradespeopleorpublicutilityworkerswhopresentthemselvesatyourdoor.

Haveachainonyourdoorsoyoudonothavetoopenitcompletelyuntil youhave checked the credentialsof strangers. Italso givesyouprotectionatnightwhenyoumightnotwishtodeadlockyourselfin,in

caseoffireoremergency.

Keepalistofemergencynumbers-police,firebrigadeetc.-nearyourphone.

Make friendswithyourneighbours.Surveillancebyneighbours isthemosteffectivedeterrentforthievesaftersignsofoccupancy.

Donotindicateyoursexonyourmailbox:writeJ.BrownratherthanJaneBrown.

Make sure lobbies, stairwells and the area outside the apartmententrancearewelllit.Workthroughtheownersorthebodycorporateifnecessary.

Do not buzz in strangers throughyour entryphone system, or letstrangersinwhenyouarecominginthefrontdoorofthebuildingeveniftheysaytheyhavefriendsinthebuildingorthattheyaretradesmen.Manyburglarsgetinthisway.

Bodycorporatesshouldinitiateasecurityinformationprogramfornewownersortenantssothatsecuritystandardsaremaintained.

Organise a Neighbourhood Watch for your apartment building.Contact the PolicePublic RelationsDepartment for details,orconsultpp28-31thisbooklet.

Checklist for a successful crime prevention throughenvironmentaldesignprogram

The following factors are characteristic of a CPTED program. The


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50Designingoutcrime

greaternumberinoperationinyourneighbourhoodorhousingestatethemoresuccessfultheprogramwillbe,andthelesslikelyitwillbethatyouwillbeburgledorassaulted.

Houses and apartments are situated where they are easilyobservable.

Exitsandentrancescanbeseenfromthestreet.

Thereissufficientlightingtodeterintruders.

Solidcoredoorshavebeenusedonallexteriorexits.

Allresidenceshavesecuritylocksandone-wayviewers.

Children'splayareascaneasilybeseenfromwindows.

Roomsforfamilyusearepositionedforsurveillanceoftheoutside.

Streets arewide and straight enough to givepatrolling police anunobstructedview.

Housesandapartmentsareclearlynumbered.

Residentshaveoff-streetparkingandcanseeitfromtheirhouses.

Cul-de-sacscontrolthewayinandoutoftheresidentialareas.

Garagesaretotallyenclosed.

Chainlinkfencesratherthanprivacyfencesareused.

Landscapingisdesignedsointruderscannothidebehindshrubbery.

Policepatrolcarscaneasilyreachallsidesofabuilding.

Keys,orentryphones,controlaccesstobuildings.

Inapartmentbuildings,therearesufficientsecurityguards,building

maintenanceisadequate,andthelandlordhasafairevictionpolicy.

Tenantstorageareasarelocatedinsecureplaces.

The building, house or apartment expresses a sense of defensiblespace,e.g.:

buildings are set far enough back from the street to create asemi-privatespacethancandeteranintruderfromentering;


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houseshavebeenclusteredandbuildingsaresmallenoughtocreatesocialcohesionanddefensiblespaces;

theintendeduseofspacesisclear;

theincompatibleuseofspaceshasbeenavoided;

landlords and town planners have provided enoughrecreationalfacilitiestocreatesocialcohesion.

Recreationalareasareenclosedbychainlinkfencing.

Adequate social services and crisis and intervention services areavailable.

Sufficientself-helpactivitiessuchastenantassociationsexist. Sufficient security surveys and inspection programs have been

carriedout.

Adequatecrimepreventionprogramsexist.

Broaderplanningstrategies

Anumberofcriminologistshavelookedatthewiderplanningaspectsof crimeprevention through environmentaldesign. InDesign AgainstCrime:BeyondDefensibleSpace(1983),forexample,BarryPoynermakesthefollowingsuggestions:

privatisingresidentialstreets;

limitingpedestrianaccess;

separatingresidentialfromcommercialuses;

limitingaccesstotherearofhouses;

blockingaccessfromopenland; arrangingapartmentdoorsandwindowscarefully;

allocatingresidentialchilddensity;

favouringpedestrianoverpassesratherthanunderpasses;

makingsureschoolsarevisiblefromotherbuildings;

keepingschoolbuildingscompact;


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52Designingoutcrime

encouragingresidentcaretakersinschools.

BrantinghamandBrantinghamininterviewswithMarcusFelsonill1987alsodescribedplanningstrategiestopreventcrime,including:

sitingayouthhangoutinviewofanall-nighttaxistand;

lettingrecreationcentrecaretakerslivein;

buildingcrime-impactplanningintoearlydesignstages;

inhigh-risebuildingsfortheelderly,sitingrecreationroomsonthefirstfloorwithadirectviewofthedoors;

regulatingtheflowofadolescentsbycarefullysitingfastfoodshops

andelectronicgamesarcades.FelsonalsoreportedthefollowingsuggestionsfromJamesWise:

Minimising obstructions and using bright pastel paints to protectflowsthroughparkingstructures.

Carefullypositioningbanktellers,doorsandflowsofcustomerstodiscouragebankrobberies.

Siting bars and pubs in such a way as to create informal socialcontrol.

Providingspecificcrimepreventiontrainingforfacilitiesmanagers.

OtherideascitedbyFelsoninclude:

Designing parks and parking lots in long strips to maximisevisibilityfrompassers-by.

Doingawaywithopen-campusdesigns.

Using telecommunications and computers to reduce the size of

officesandtodevelop"scatteredsite"businesspractices. Reducingthesizeoffacilitiescateringtoyoungmales-highschools,forexample-tomaximiseadultsurveillance.


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PartIII

Bibliography


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54Designingoutcrime

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Bennett,Trevor1986,"SituationalCrimePreventionfromtheOffenders'Perspective",inHeal&Laycock,pp.41-52.

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Brantingham, Paul J. & Brantingham, Patricia L. (eds) 1981,EnvironmentalCriminology,SagePublications,BeverlyHills,CA.

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designing for crime

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