TableofContents

TitlePageDedicationAcknowledgementsAcronymsIntroductionPARTI-PREWAR

Chapter1-THELEGACYOFGENOCIDEGISENYI,RWANDA,JULY17,1994

Chapter2-AIDINGANDABETTINGINERAREFUGEECAMP,ZAIRE,OCTOBER1994

Chapter3-ACOUNTRYINRUINSKIGALI,RWANDA,JULY1994–SEPTEMBER1996

Chapter4-SIXDAYSBUKAVU,ZAIRE,OCTOBER8,1996

Chapter5-ONIONLAYERSMUSHAKI,ZAIRE,ANDKIGALI,RWANDA,OCTOBER1993

Chapter6-MZEEKIGALI,RWANDA,EARLY1996;LUBUMBASHI,CONGO,1960;FIZI,CONGO,1965–1980

PARTII-THEFIRSTWAR

Chapter7-MANYWARSINONEKIRINGYE,LWEBA,ANDABALA,ZAIRE,AUGUST–OCTOBER1996

Chapter8-THEDOMINOESFALLBUKAVU,ZAIRE,OCTOBER1996

Chapter9-ATHOUSANDMILESTHROUGHTHEJUNGLEBUKAVU,ZAIRE,OCTOBER1996

Chapter10-THISISHOWYOUFIGHTBUKAVUANDLEMERA,ZAIRE,OCTOBER1996

Chapter11-AWOUNDEDLEOPARDKINSHASA,ZAIRE,DECEMBER1996

Chapter12-THEKINGISDEAD;LONGLIVETHEKING

KINSHASA,CONGO,MAY1997PARTIII-THESECONDWAR

Chapter13-ONEWARTOOMANYRUHENGERI,RWANDA,ANDKINSHASA,CONGO,AUGUST1998

Chapter14-THEREBELPROFESSORKIGALI,RWANDA,AUGUST1998

Chapter15-THEREBELSTART-UPGBADOLITE,CONGO,JULY1999

Chapter16-CAINANDABELKISANGANI,CONGO,MAY1999

Chapter17-SORCERERS’APPRENTICESEASTERNCONGO,JUNE2000

Chapter18-THEASSASSINATIONOFMZEEKINSHASA,CONGO,JANUARY17,2001

Chapter19-PAYINGFORTHEWARGOMA,ZAIRE,NOVEMBER1996

PARTIV-NEITHERWARNORPEACE

Chapter20-THEBEAREROFEGGSKINSHASA,CONGO,JANUARY2001

Conclusion:TheCongo,OnItsOwnTermsNotesIndexCopyrightPage

ForLusungu

Acknowledgments

My thanksgo to themanyCongolese,Rwandans,Burundians, andUgandanswhohelpedmewrite thisbookandwhosenamesappearinthesepages.Theyweregenerousenoughtositwithmeformanyhoursandexplaintheirexperiences.OthersIcouldnotnamesoasnottogetthemintrouble—youknowwhoyouare,asanteni.IoweaspecialdebttoKizitoMushizi,RaphaelWakenge,ChristianMukosa,andtheirfamilies,whose

warmsupport since I first arrived inBukavumademeappreciate the complexities andbeautyof theircountry. I amalsograteful for thehelpprovidedbyRemyNgabo,GandyRugemintore,BalzacBuzera,Pascal Kambale,Willy Nindorera, Noel Atama, AdelarMivumba, James Habyarimana, Soraya Aziz,Tshivu Ntite, Thomas Ntiratimana, Mvemba Dizolele, Thomas Luhaka, and Michel Losembe inunderstandingtheshiftingsandsofCongolesepoliticsandinopeningdoorsforme.My research relied heavily on the hospitality of friends and strangers. To several generations of

dedicatedjournalistsinKinshasa,thanksforthecouch,theconspiracies,andinsideradvice—especiallytheReuterscrewofDineshMahtani,DavidLewisandJoeBavier,butalsoFranzWild,ArnaudZajtman,ThomasFessy,andMichaelKavanagh.JamesAstillandMarcosLorenzanawereimportantcompanionsthroughtheearlystagesofthebook,andWimVerbeken,EddieKariisa,andJean-JacquesSimonprovidedwonderfulhospitality.FedericoBorello,LouaznaKhalouta,MattGreen,DjoMunga,andJohanPelemanwerealsooftenonhandtohelpmeoutwithsupportandexpertadvice.Great Lakes politics is a minefield of stereotypes and misinformation. I was fortunate to have

experienced scholars and researchers to help me navigate, including David and Catharine Newbury,HerbertWeiss,PeterRosenblum,AnnekevanWoudenberg,andIdaSawyer.MyfriendsSergeMahesheandAlisonDesForgessawmebeginthisprojectandencouragedmealong,but,sadly,neithercouldseeitfinished.Theywillbesorelymissed.Thiswasmy first experienceofwritingandpublishingabook.Manypeoplehelpedme through the

process.Thanks tomyparents,mywife,andmybrother forsopatiently reading thevariousdraftsandprovidingcomments.MichelaWrongbelievedinthisprojectfromthebeginningandprovidedmoralandliterarysupport,asdidmyagent,RobertGuinsler,andeditor,ClivePriddle.This book benefited from the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, whose generous fellowship

allowedme to enjoypeace andquiet at theBellagioCenter for amonth so I couldmake senseofmynotes.

Acronyms

ADF AlliedDemocraticForces(Uganda)

ADM AlliedDemocraticMovement(Uganda)

AFDL AllianceofDemocraticForcesfortheLiberationofCongo-Zaire

AIDS AcquiredImmuneDeficiencySyndrome

BBC BritishBroadcastingCorporation

CIA CentralIntelligenceAgency

COMIEX MixedImport-ExportCompany

COPACO CollectiveofCongolesePatriots

DRC DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo

FAR RwandanArmedForces

FAZ ZairianArmedForces

FDD ForcesfortheDefenseofDemocracy(Burundi)

FDLR DemocraticForcesfortheLiberationofRwanda

FLEC FrontfortheLiberationoftheEnclaveofCabinda(Angola)

FNI NationalandIntegrationistFront(Congo)

FNL NationalLiberationForces(Burundi)

FRPI PatrioticResistanceForcesofIturi(Congo)

ICHEC CatholicInstituteofHigherCommercialStudies

IRC InternationalRescueCommittee

LRA Lord’sResistanceArmy(Uganda)

MLC MovementfortheLiberationoftheCongo

MPR PopularRevolutionaryMovement

MRC CongoleseRevolutionaryMovement

NALU NationalArmyfortheLiberationofUganda

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganization

NRM NationalResistanceMovement(Uganda)

OECD OrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

OSLEG OperationSovereignLegitimacy

RCD CongoleseRallyforDemocracy

RCD-N CongoleseRallyforDemocracy-National

RPA RwandanPatrioticArmy(thearmedwingoftheRPF)

RPF RwandanPatrioticFront

SADC SouthAfricanDevelopmentCommunity

UMLA UgandaMuslimLiberationArmy

UNESCO UnitedNationsEducational,Scientific,andCulturalOrganization

UNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees

UNITA NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola

UNOSOM UnitedNationsOperationinSomalia

UPC UnionofCongolesePatriots(Congo)

UPDF UgandaPeople’sDefenseForce

WNBLF WestNileBankLiberationFront(Uganda)

Introduction

UnderstandingtheViolence

PowerisEatenWhole.—CONGOLESESAYING

Thisishowitusuallyworked:IwouldcalluponeofthepeoplewhosenamesIhadwrittendowninmynotebook,and I’d tellhimIwaswritingabookon thewar in theCongoand that Iwanted tohearhisstory. Most people like to talk about their lives, and almost everybody—Congolese ministers, armycommanders,formerchildsoldiers,diplomats—accepted.Wewouldtypicallymeetinapublicplace,astheywouldn’tfeelcomfortabletalkingaboutsensitivemattersintheirofficesorhomes,andtheywouldsizemeup:athirty-year-oldwhiteAmerican.Manyaskedme,“Whyareyouwritingthisbook?”WhenItoldthemthatIwantedtounderstandtherootsoftheviolencethathasengulfedthecountrysince1996,theyoftenrepliedwithaquestion,“WhoareyoutounderstandwhatIamtellingyou?”The look of bemusementwould frequently appear in the eyes of interviewees.An army commander

spentmostofourmeetingaskingmewhatIthoughtoftheCongo,tryingtoprymyprejudicesoutofmebeforehetoldmehisstory.“Everybodyhasanagenda,”hetoldme.“What’syours?”Alocal,illiteratewarlordwithanamuletofcowries,colonial-eracoins,andmonkeyskullsaroundhisneckshookhisheadatmewhenItookhispicture,tellingmetoeraseit:“You’regoingtotakemypicturetoEuropeandshowittootherwhitepeople.Whatdotheyknowaboutmylife?”Hewasafraid,hetoldme,thattheywouldlaughathim,thinkhewasamacaque,someforestmonkey.Hehadgoodreasontobeskeptical.ThereisalonghistoryoftakingpicturesandstoriesfromCentral

Africa out of context. In 1904, anAmericanmissionary broughtOtaBenga, a pygmy from the centralCongo, to theUnitedStates.Hewasplaced in themonkeyhouse at theBronxZoo inNewYorkCity,where his filed teeth, disproportionate limbs and tricks helped attract 40,000 visitors a day. He wasexhibited alongside an orangutan, with whom he performed tricks, in order to emphasize Africans’similaritieswithapes.AneditorialintheNewYorkTimes,rejectingcallsforhisrelease,remarkedthat“pygmiesareverylowinthehumanscale....Theideathatmenareallmuchalikeexceptastheyhavehadorlackedopportunitiesforgettinganeducationoutofbooksisnowfaroutofdate.”While not as shockingly racist, news reports from the Congo still usually reduce the conflict to a

simplisticdrama.Anarrayofcaricaturesisoftenpresented:thecorrupt,brutalAfricanwarlordwithhissavage soldiers, raping and looting the country. Pictures of child soldiers high on amphetamines andmarijuana—sometimes from Liberia and Sierra Leone, a thousandmiles from the Congo. Poor, black

victims: children with shiny snot dried on their faces, flies buzzing around them, often in camps forrefugees or internally displaced. Between these images of killers and victims, there is little room tochallengetheclichés,letalonetrytoofferarationalexplanationforatrulychaoticconflict.TheCongowarsarenotstoriesthatcanbeexplainedthroughsuchstereotypes.Theyaretheproductof

a deep history, often unknown to outside observers. The principal actors are far from just savages,mindlessly killing and being killed, but thinking, breathing Homo sapiens, whose actions, howeverabhorrent,areunderpinnedbypoliticalrationalesandmotives.

TheDemocraticRepublicof theCongoisavastcountry, thesizeofwesternEuropeandhometosixtymillionpeople.Fordecadesitwasknownforitsrichgeology,whichincludeslargereservesofcobalt,copper,anddiamonds,andfortheextravaganceofitsdictatorMobutuSeseSeko,butnotforviolenceordepravity.Then,in1996,aconflictbeganthathasthusfarcostthelivesofoverfivemillionpeople.TheCongolesewarmustbeputamongtheothergreathumancataclysmsofourtime:theWorldWars,

the Great Leap Forward in China, the Rwandan and Cambodian genocides. And yet, despite its epicproportions, the war has received little sustained attention from the rest of the world. The mortalityfiguresaresoimmensethattheybecomeabsurd,almostmeaningless.Fromtheoutside,thewarseemstopossessnooverarchingnarrativeorideologytoexplainit,noeasytribalconflictorsocialistrevolutiontouseasapeginanewspiece.InCambodia,therewasthedespoticKhmerRouge;inRwandaonecouldcastthegenocidalHutumilitiasasthevillains.IntheCongotheserolesaremoredifficulttofill.ThereisnoHitler,Mussolini,orStalin.Insteaditisawaroftheordinaryperson,withmanycombatantsunknownandunnamed,whofightforcomplexreasonsthataredifficulttodistillinafewsentences—muchtothefrustrationoftheinternationalmedia.Howdoyoucoverawarthatinvolvesatleasttwentydifferentrebelgroupsandthearmiesofninecountries,yetdoesnotseemtohaveaclearcauseorobjective?Howdoyouputahumanfaceonafigurelike“fourmillion”whenmostofthecasualtiesperishunsensationally,asaresultofdisease,farawayfromtelevisioncameras?The conflict is a conceptual mess that eludes simple definition, with many interlocking narrative

strands.TheNewYorkTimes,oneofthefewAmericannewspaperswithextensiveforeigncoverage,gaveDarfurnearly four times thecoverage itgave theCongo in2006,whenCongoleseweredyingofwar-relatedcausesatnearlytentimestherateofthoseinDarfur.1EvenNicholasKristof,theTimescolumnistwhohascampaignedvigorouslyforhumanitariancrisesaroundtheworld,initiallyusedtheconfusionoftheCongoasajustificationforreportingonitless—itislessevilbecauseitislessideologicallydefined.Hewrites:

Darfur is a case of genocide,whileCongo is a tragedy ofwar and poverty....Militias slaughter eachother,butit’snotaboutanethnicgroupinthegovernmentusingitsmilitaryforcetokillothergroups.Andthat is what Darfur has been about: An Arab government in Khartoum arming Arab militias to killmembersofblackAfricantribes.Weallhavewithinusamoralcompass,andthatismovedpartlybythelevelofhumansuffering.IgrantthatthesufferingisgreaterinCongo.Butourcompassisalsomovedbyhuman evil, and that is greater inDarfur. There’s no greater crime than genocide, and that is Sudan’sspecialty.2

WhatistheevilintheCongo?Howcanweexplainthemillionsofdeaths?In1961,thephilosopherHannahArendttraveledtoJerusalemtowitnessthetrialofagreatNaziwar

criminal,AdolphEichmann,whohadbeen inchargeofsendinghundredsof thousandsofJews to theirdeaths.Herself a Jewishescapee from theHolocaust,Arendtwasaboveall interested in thenatureofevil.Forher,themasskillingofJewshadbeenpossiblethroughamassivebureaucracythatdehumanizedthe victims and dispersed responsibility through the administrative apparatus. Eichmann was not apsychopath but a conformist. “I was just doingmy job,” he told the court in Jerusalem. This, Arendtargued,wasthebanalityofevil.This book takes Arendt’s insight as its starting point. The Congo obviously does not have the

anonymousbureaucracy that theThirdReichdid.Mostof thekillingandrapehavebeencarriedoutatshortrange,oftenwithhatchets,knives,andmachetes.Itisdifficultnottoattributepersonalresponsibilitytothekillersandleadersofthewars.Itisnot,however,helpfultopersonalizetheevilandsuggestthatsomehowthoseinvolvedinthewar

harboredasuperhumancapacityforevil.Itismoreusefultoaskwhatpoliticalsystemproducedthiskindofviolence.Thisbooktriestoseetheconflictthroughtheeyesofitsprotagonistsandunderstandwhywarmademoresensethanpeace,whytheregionalpoliticalelitesseemtobesorichinopportunismandsolackinginvirtue.Theanswerstothesequestionsliedeeplyembeddedintheregion’shistory.Butinsteadofbeingastory

ofabrutalbureaucraticmachine, theCongo isastoryof theopposite:acountry inwhich thestatehasbeenerodedovercenturiesandwhereoncethefightingbegan,eachcommunityseemedtohaveitsownmilitia,fightingbrutalinsurgenciesandcounterinsurgencieswitheachother.Itwasmorelikeseventeenth-centuryEuropeandtheThirtyYears’WarthanNaziGermany.

ForcenturiestheCongohasheldafascinationforoutsiders.LyingattheheartoftheAfricancontinent,and encompassing someof the continent’smost impenetrable jungles, it has longbeen associatedwithviolence and injustice. In 1885, during the scramble to divide Africa among colonial powers, KingLeopold IIofBelgiumclaimed thecountryashispersonal fiefdom.He setup theCongoFreeState, aprivateenterprise,andduringtherubberboomofthe1890sthecountrybecameakeysourceoflatexforcar and bicycle tires. Colonial officers created a draconian system of forced labor duringwhich theykilled or mutilated hundreds of thousands and pushed millions of others to starvation or death fromdisease.Thisbrutalitypromptedthefirstinternationalhumanrightscampaign,ledbymissionariesandactivists,

includingMarkTwainandArthurConanDoyle.Underpressure,KingLeopoldcapitulatedandhandedthecountry over to the Belgian government in 1908. Although they established a much more elaborateadministrationwithextensiveprimaryeducation, theBelgians still focusedonextracting resourcesanddidlittletoencourageCongolesedevelopment.Theupperechelonsofthemilitaryandcivilservicewereentirelywhite,pass lawskeptCongolesefromliving inupper-classneighborhoods,andeducationwaslimitedtothebareminimum.Bythetimetheywereforcedtohandoverpower,theBelgianshadsetthenewnationuptofail.Asthe

novelistAchilleNgoyeventsthroughoneofhischaracters:“Idon’tliketheseunclesmayonnaise-fries3fortheirresponsibilityinthedebacleofourcountry:seventy-fiveyearsofcolonization,one[Congolese]priestby1917,five[Congolese]warrantofficersinanarmyofsergeantsandcorporalsin1960,plusfivepseudo-universitygraduatesatindependence;aprivilegedfewchosenbasedonquestionablecriteriatoreceiveahastytrainingtobecomemanagersofthecountry.Andwhomadeamessofit.”4Oneof those sergeants, JosephMobutu, a typist and army journalist by training,wenton to rule the

countryforthirty-twoyears,fosteringnationalunityandcultureandrenamingthenationZaire5 in1971,but also running state institutions into the ground.Mobutu’s rule, although initially popular, paved theground forZaire’s collapse.By the 1980s,Mobutu (by then he had changedhis name toMobutuSeseSeko)wasincreasinglyparanoidanddistrustfulofhisgovernmentandarmy;fearingdissentfromwithinthe ranks of his single-party state, he cannibalized his own institutions and infrastructures. Politicalinterferenceandcorruptionerodedthejusticesystem,administration,andsecurityservices;Mobutuwasonly able to ward off military challenges by resorting to dependence on his cold war allies andmercenaries.Withtheendofthecoldwar,eventhoseresourceshadbecomemoredifficulttomuster.

Then,in1994,camethetrigger:ThecivilwarinneighboringRwandaescalated,resultinginthegenocideof800,000HutuandTutsi at thehandsofHutumilitia and thearmy.When the incumbentHutu regimecrumbled,theTutsiRwandanPatrioticFront(RPF)rebels,ledbyPaulKagame,tookpower,andoveramillionHutufledacrosstheborderintoZaire,alongwiththesoldiersandmilitiamenwhohadcarriedoutthe massacres. The defeated Rwandan army was not the only displaced group seeking refuge. In hisMachiavellianbidtobecomearegionalpowerbroker,Mobutuhadcometohostovertendifferentforeignarmedgroupsonhisterritory,whichangeredhisneighborstonoend.By1996,aregionalcoalitionledbyAngola,Uganda,andRwandahadformedtooverthrowMobutu.Finally,inadditiontonationalandregionalcauses,therewerelocaldimensionstotheconflict,which

resultedperhaps in thegreatestbloodshed.Theweaknessof the statehadallowedethnic rivalriesandconflictsoveraccesstolandtofester,especiallyinthedenselypopulatedeasternregionsontheborderwithRwandaandUganda.DuringMobutu’sfinalyears,heandotherleaderscynicallystokedtheseethnictensionsinordertodistractfromchallengestotheirpowerandtorallysupport.

Thisbooktellsthestoryoftheconflictthatresultedfromtheseregional,national,andlocaldimensionsandthathaslastedfrom1996untiltoday.Thewarcanbedividedintothreeparts.ThefirstCongowarendedwith the toppling ofMobutuSeseSeko inMay 1997.After a brief lull in the fighting, the newpresident,LaurentKabila,felloutwithhisRwandanandUgandanallies,sparkingthesecondCongowarinAugust1998,whichlasteduntilapeacedealreunifiedthecountryinJune2003.Fighting,however,hascontinuedintheeasternKivuregionuntiltodayandcanbeconsideredasthethirdepisodeofthewar.Thebookfocusesontheperpetratorsmorethanthevictims,thepoliticiansandarmycommandersmore

thantherefugeesandrapesurvivors,althoughmanyoftheprotagonistsoscillatebetweenthesecategories.Ratherthandwellingonthehorroroftheconflict,whichisundeniable,Ihavechosentograpplewiththe

natureofthesystemthatbroughttheprincipalactorstopower,limitedthechoicestheycouldmake,andproducedsuchchaosandsuffering.Whatisthissystem?AsaCongolesefriendandparliamentariantoldmeasIwasfinishingthisbook:

“IntheCongo,inordertosurvive,weallhavetobeabitcorrupt,abitruthless.That’sthesystemhere.That’sjusttherealityofthings.Ifyoudon’tbribeabitandplaytopeople’sprejudices,someoneelsewhodoeswillreplaceyou.”Hewinkedandadded,“Evenyou,ifyouwerethrownintothissystem,youwoulddothesame.Orsink.”Therearemanyexamples thatbearouthissentiment.EtienneTshisekedi, thecountry’s formerprime

minister, insisted so doggedly that the government had to respect the constitutional order before hesteppedbackintopoliticsandstoodforelectionthathebrieflymoralizedhimselfoutofpolitics.WambadiaWamba, a former rebel leaderwho features in thisbook,was so idealistic aboutwhat a rebellionshouldbe that hemarginalizedhimself to irrelevance. Itwouldhavebeen an interesting experiment todropayoung,relativelyunknownMahatmaGandhiintotheCongoandobservewhetherhe,insistingonnonviolentresistanceandcivildisobedience,wouldhavebeenabletochangeanything,either.TheCubanrevolutionary CheGuevara spent almost a year in the Congo in 1965 fighting with rebels in the eastbeforeheabandonedthestruggle.Malnourishedanddepressed,heconcludedthey“weren’treadyfortherevolution.”TheCongohasalwaysdefiedtheidealists.EvenLaurentKabila,whoaspresidentwouldbestereotypedbymanyasthequintessentialCongolese

big-man politician, was acutely aware of how deeply entrenched in society the Congolese crisis hadbecome.Aninveteratelecturer,heoftenturnedhisspeechesintomoralitylessons.“Vous,Zairois...,”hewouldbegin, a finger thrustingupward, berating the crowd forhavingput upwith the country’smoraldeclineforsolong.“WhohasnotbeenMobutistinthiscountry?”heaskedduringonepressconference.“Three-quartersofthiscountrybecamepartofit!Wesawyoualldancinginthegloryofthemonster.”6

PapyKamanzi7isanexampleofhoweasyitistobedrawnintothedeepestmoralcorruption.Athirty-year-old,mid-levelarmycommanderfromtheminorityTutsicommunity,hehadfoughtforfourdifferentarmedgroups.Iinterviewedhimalmostadozentimesovertwoyearstotrytounderstandhisexperience.Webecamefriends,andhetookmehometomeethisyoungwifeandtwochildren.Finally,inoneofourlast interviews, hebrokedownand started tellingme about howhehadworked for aRwandandeathsquad in the eastern border town ofGoma in 1997. Togetherwith sixty other soldiers, they had beentaskedwithroundingupdissidents;oftenthedefinitionof“dissident”wasstretchedtoincludeanyHuturefugee.Papycouldkilluptoahundredofthesedissidents—sometimesoldwomenandyoungchildren—aday,usuallyusingaropetocrushtheirwindpipesandstranglethem.“Whydidyoudoit?”“Ihadto.IfIhadn’t,itwouldhavebeensuspicious,”hereplied,butthenlookedatme.“Youknow,you

can’t reallyexplain these things.Forussoldiers,killingcomeseasy. Ithasbecomepartofour lives. Ihavelostfivemembersofmyfamilyduringthewar.Youhavetounderstandthat.Youhavetounderstandthe history of my family—how we were persecuted, then favored by Mobutu, how we were deniedcitizenshipandlaughedatatschool.Howtheyspatinmyface.Thenyoucanjudgeme.”Butitwasclearthathedidn’tthinkIcouldeverunderstand.Nevertheless, thisbook isanattempt todo just that: toexplain thesocial,political,and institutional

forcesthatmadeitpossibleforafamilymantobecomeamassmurderer.Kamanzi,andallthoselikehim,werenotinherentlypredisposedtoevil.Someotherexplanationiscalledfor.

PARTI

PREWAR

1

THELEGACYOFGENOCIDE

BetweenAprilandJune1994,anestimated800,000Rwandanswerekilledinthespaceof100days.MostofthedeadwereTutsis—andmostofthosewhoperpetratedtheviolencewereHutus.

—“RWANDA:HOWTHEGENOCIDEHAPPENED,”BBC

GISENYI,RWANDA,JULY17,1994

TotheeastoftheCongo,intheheartoftheAfricancontinent,liethehighlandsofRwanda.Thecountryistiny,thesizeofMassachusetts,andhasoneofthehighestpopulationdensitiesintheworld.ThisisnottheAfricaofjungles,corruption,andfailedstatesportrayedinmovies.Temperaturesfalltofreezingonsomehilltops, cattle graze on velvety pastures, and the government maintains a tight grip on all aspects ofsociety. On the thousands of hills—in between tea plantations and eucalyptus groves—millions ofpeasantsekeoutalivingbyfarmingbeans,bananas,andsorghum.TheconflictintheCongohasmanycauses,butthemostimmediateonescameacrosstheborderfrom

Rwanda,acountryninetytimessmaller.In1994,violenceunfoldedtherethatwasmanytimeslargerthananythingthemodernAfricancontinenthadeverseen,killingasixthofthepopulationandsendinganothersixthintorefugeecamps.ThisgenocidehelpedcreatetheconditionsforanothercataclysminneighboringCongo,justasterribleintermsoflossoflife,albeitverydifferentinnature.

PaulRwarakabije, a lieutenant colonel inRwanda’spolice force, fled across theborder intoZaireonJuly17,1994.Hewasdejected;afterfouryearsofcivilwar,theHutu-ledgovernmenthadbeendefeatedbysoldiersoftheRwandanPatrioticFront(RPF).Atthebeginningofthewar,hehadsworntohimselfthathewouldneversurrenderoracceptdefeat.Nowhewassittinginanarmytruck,crossingtheborderintotheCongowithhiswife,children,andafewbelongings.Hewasnotalone:Itwasoneofthelargestpopulationmovementsofmoderntimes;overhalfamillionpeoplepackedintoatwo-lanehighwayfortymileslong.Theairwasfilledwiththerumbleofthousandsofflip-flopsandbarefeetonthehottarmac.WhileRwarakabijeandtheelitemovedinafleetofhundredsofcars—theyhadtakenwiththemevery

functioningvehicletheycouldfind—thepeasantrytrudgedsullenlywithchildrenstrappedtotheirbacksandbundlesofclothesandmattressesontheirhead,movinginlockstepwithpanicwrittenontheirfaces.Government trucks with loudspeakers brought up the rear, warning that “anybody who stays will be

massacredbytheRPF.”Armysoldiersfiredsalvosintotheairtokeepthecrowdsmoving.Theroadsidewaslitteredwiththeoldandsick,unabletocontinue.Themasseswereleavingoneofthelargest,quickestslaughtersofhumankindattheirbacks.OnApril

6, 1994, Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down just before landing in thecapitalKigali,endingthefragilecease-firethathadhaltedthecivilwar.1Preyingonthepopulation’sfearoftheTutsiinsurgents,HutuextremistsintheRwandangovernmentdeployedkillingsquadsandpopularmilitias,whoralliedothers,sayingtheymustkillorbekilled.The two largest and most notorious of these youth militias were the Interahamwe and the

Impuzamugambi,ragtagbandsmadeupmostlyofunemployedyoungmen,whichwereaffiliatedwithtworadicalHutupoliticalparties.Theydrewuphitlistsandmannedroadblocks,checkingidentitycardsforethnic identity or just looking for stereotypical Tutsi features: a slender frame, high cheekbones, anaquilinenose. Itmattered little that theHutu andTutsi identities themselveswerehistorically asmuchclass-basedasmorphologicalandthatarich,cattle-owningHutucouldbepromotedtobecomeaTutsi.Or that therehad been extensive intermarriage between the ethnicities,meaning that inmany cases thephysicalstereotypeshadlittlemeaning.Injustonehundreddays,betweenAprilandJuly1994,over800,000TutsiandmoderateHutuwere

killed. Unlike the holocaust ofWorldWar II, which had been carried out by a select group of stateofficials and army officers, largely away from the view of the population, Rwanda’s genocide wasorganizedbytheelitesbutexecutedbythepeople.Between175,000and210,000peopletookpartinthebutchery,usingmachetes,nail-studdedclubs,hoes,andaxes.2Thekillingtookplaceinpublicplaces:inchurches,schools,andmarketplaces,onroads,andinthefields.Theentirepopulationwasinvolvedinthedrama,eitherasanorganizer,aperpetrator,avictim,orawitness.It was paradoxically the Hutu, whomade up around 85 percent of Rwanda’s population, who fled

during the violence, even though the genocidemainly targeted theminorityTutsi community. Thiswasbecausethegenocidespelledtheendofthegovernment’sresistanceagainsttheTutsi-ledRPF.Itwasonelast,finalparoxysmofviolenceasthegovernment’sarmyandpolicefellapart.AmillionHutuciviliansstreamedacrosstheborderintoZaire,accompaniedanddrivenalongby30,000governmentsoldiersandtensofthousandsofmilitiamen.Thearmy’sflightacrosstheborderdidnotendthecivilwarinRwandabutconstitutedahiatusinthe

hostilities. The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), as the Hutu-dominated army was called, used theprotectionprovidedbythebordertoregroup,rearm,andpreparetoretakepowerinKigali.Oneoftheirleaders,ColonelThéonesteBagosora,saidinaninterviewthattheywould“wageawarthatwillbelongandfullofdeadpeopleuntiltheminorityTutsiarefinishedandcompletelyoutofthecountry.”3Crucially,theyenjoyedthesupportofZaire’sailingpresident,MobutuSeseSeko,whohadsenttroops

tosupporttheFARagainsttheRPF,andwhohadbeenclosefriendswithPresidentJuvénalHabyarimana.Inpart,whatwastoplayoutoverthenextdecadeintheCongowasacontinuationoftheRwandancivilwar,asthenewgovernmentattemptedtoextirpatethegénocidairesandtheremnantsofHabyarimana’sarmyonamuchbroadercanvas.

Between1994and2003,PaulRwarakabijecontinuedfightingtheRwandancivilwar.Heeventuallytookcommandof the remnantsof thoseRwandansoldiersandmilitiamenwhohad fled toZaire, commonly

knownastheex-FARandInterahamwe.UnderRwarakabije,theybecameoneofthemostfearedmilitiaintheregion.I met Rwarakabije in Kigali in 2004. After spending a decade fighting a guerrilla war against the

Rwandangovernment,hehadsurrenderedandhadbeengivenahigh-ranking, if somewhatceremonial,job in Rwanda’s demobilization commission.4 Even though he had led a brutal insurgency that hadclaimedthelivesofthousandsofRwandancivilians,hehadnotbeeninvolvedinthe1994genocide,andthegovernmenthadchosennottopresscharges.Overtheyears,Imetthegeneraladozentimes,alwaysinhissparselydecoratedoffice.Heisashort,

avuncularmanwithaproudgutundercutbyhistightbelt,alwaysavailableforachat,alwayspoliteandfriendly.Hetoldmehehaddiabetes,andhetookshort,deliberatestepswhenhewalked,butotherwiselookedasifhewereingoodhealth;hehadputonfortypoundssincehehaddesertedtherebellionandreturned home. His reintegration into the army had gone without problems, he said. He was a majorgeneral, thesamerankasPresidentPaulKagame.Helivedinahouseprovidedbythegovernmentandhadanofficialcarandguard(althoughitwasn’tcleariftheywereprotectinghimorkeepingtabsonhim).Henow taught lessons on counterinsurgency andgave advice onhow to dealwith the remainingHuturebelsacrosstheborder.WhenIaskedhimabouttheflightintoZaireafterthegenocide,allRwarakabijecouldrememberwas

“theconfusion.”Therewaslittlehintofremorseordistress,justthemilitaryman’sdisdainfordisorder.Hewasacareerofficerwhotalkedaboutpastwarsintermsofstrategy,battleplans,andclinicalfigures.Hemadeitseemtherewaslittleideologyatplay;hehadfoughtagainsttheRPF,lost,andnowherehewas,takingordersfromhisformerenemies.“The anti-Tutsi propaganda was part of our military tactics,” he said, smiling affably. “We didn’t

believeit,butinaguerrillawaryouhavetomotivatesoldiersandindoctrinatethepopulation.”Eventhoughthegeneralhadfarlessbloodonhishands,hisattituderemindedmeofHannahArendt’s

descriptionofAdolphEichmann, theNaziofficerwhoordered the transportofcountless Jews to theirdeath in concentration camps, as someonewho had never been a Jew-hater and had neverwilled themurderofhumanbeings.Hisguiltcamefromhisobedience,hismindlessdesiretopleasehishierarchy.5Therewere,however,farmoredifferencesthansimilaritiesbetweenEichmannandRwarakabije.InthecaseoftheRwandancommander,therewaslittleformallawandnodehumanizingbureaucracytojustifyhisactions.Rwarakabijewasnotjustacoginamachinewhosenaturehedidnotquestion.Sowhatdrovehim?

RwarakabijewasfromtheKigacommunityinnorthernRwanda,homeof“themountainpeople,”whohadfought annexation by the central Rwandan court and colonial rulers well into the twentieth century.Warrior folklore ran deep in his family, and he had grown up on tales of his ancestors’ heroism andexploits.Rwarakabije’sfatherhadtoldhimhow,whenhewasachildgrowingup,theircommunityhadrisenupnumeroustimesagainsttheGermanandthenBelgianrulerswhotriedtoimposeforcedlaborandtaxesonthepeasantsthere.Later,colonialadministratorssentTutsi,consideredbytheEuropeanclergyand rulers as genetically superior, to replace theKiga chiefs. Slowly, theKigawere assimilated intoRwandanculture.Oncolonialidentitycards,theywereclassifiedasHutu,astheymetthestereotypeofshort, broad-nosed farmers. Like theHutu, their ambitionswere stymied by the colonial government’s

ethnicprejudice.Allthatchangedwithindependencein1962.RebellingagainstTutsidomination,anewHutuelitetook

powerinthewakeofpogroms,inwhichtensofthousandsofTutsiandmanyothersfled.Over300,000TutsirefugeesemigratedtoneighboringUganda,theCongo,andBurundi,wheremanylivedasrefugeesandsecond-classcitizens.Giventhispoliticalturbulence,Rwarakabijesawlittlesenseingoingtouniversity.Powerwasinthe

hands of the army, a fact driven homeby the 1973military coup that brought JuvénalHabyarimana topower.Rwarakabijewas twenty,andhepromptlysignedupforofficer training in theprestigiousHighMilitaryAcademy.Immediatelyaftergraduating,hewassenttoaspecialforcestrainingrunbyBelgianofficers in Kota-Koli, in the heart of Zaire’s rainforest, where he was taught survival techniques,abseiling,andbasictactics.UponhisreturntoRwanda,hewasplacedinthegendarmerie,asouped-uppoliceforcethatdealtwithinternalsecurityaswellasmattersoflawandorder.Hewasacareersoldierwho took pleasure in describingmilitary tactics and logistics tome, but steered away from questionsaboutpolitics.“Itisstrangetothinkthisgiveneverythingthathashappenedinthiscountry,”hetoldme,“butthearmy

whenIjoinedwasaplaceofdisciplineandorder,wherepeoplewerenotswayedsomuchbyidentityasbyprofessionalism.”Inlate1990,thepoliticalsituationinthecountrydeterioratedrapidly.Arangeoffactorscontributedto

this: The price of Rwanda’smain exports, tin and tea, had collapsed over recent years, leading to acontractionofthenationalbudgetby40percent.Thesameyear,afterseventeenyearsofone-partyrule,Habyarimanadecidedtoopenhiscountrytomultipartydemocracy,promptingaproliferationofpoliticalparties with affiliated radio stations and newsletters, some of which resorted to explicit ethnic hate-mongering.The trigger for the conflict was the decision by the Tutsi diaspora—through the Rwandan Patriotic

Front—to launch a civil war to reclaim their rights as Rwandan citizens. The war provoked manyhardships,especiallyforthepopulationinnorthernRwanda,wheretheRPFwasbased.Uptoamillionpeoplewere displaced.TheRPF’s abuses of local villagerswere reciprocatedwith virulent pogromsagainstTutsithroughoutthecountry,testrunsforthecataclysmthatwouldultimatelyunfold.Thepeasantrywassubjected to rumorsofghastlymassacrescommittedbyRPF troops,propagatedby thenew, rabidpress,mostfamouslytheHutuextremistRadioTélévisionLibreMilleCollines.All of these factors fueled the ethnic tensions, which Rwarakabije saw seeping into his barracks.

“Therewereolderofficerswho thoughtwehad toblame thewholeTutsicommunity for thecrimesoftheirsoldiers.Itwasathrowbacktoindependence,whensimilarTutsiguerrillashadkilledciviliansandviceversa.”Heshookhishead.“Indisciplinecreptintothearmy.”Itwas,ofcourse,notthefirsttimeRwarakabijehadexperiencedethnichatred.Althoughmanyfamilies

hadintermarriedwiththeotherethnicity,andtheyallsharedthesamelanguage,culture,andtraditionalreligiouspractices,theHutu-Tutsirifthadgrownsteadilysinceindependence.“InsecondaryschoolIwastaughtthatHutucomefromChadandNiger,whileTutsiarefromAbyssinia,whatisnowEthiopia.Thiswas the ideology thatwashammered intous, even at themilitary academy:Tutsi aremore intelligent,more beautiful, but also tricksters, unreliable. But,” he laughed, “they said it was the Hutu who haddevelopedthecountry,whohadfarmedthefields!”WhenHabyarimanawas killed on the evening of April 6, 1994, Rwarakabije, then the operational

commander for the gendarmerie, became part of a war council that was supposed to name newcommanders to take the country forward. The commander of the army had been killed along withPresidentHabyarimana,andanewleaderneededtobenamed.Rwarakabijewasinclosecontactwiththe

actingcommanderinchief,whoopposedthekillingofTutsicivilians.“Heusedtocallmeeveryday,”hesaid,“tellingmetomakesurenogendarmeskillcivilians.”Rwarakabije, in themeantime,concentratedon thecivilwar,pushingback theRPFrebels,whohad

launched amajor attackonKigali as soon as thepresident’s planewas shot down.However, parallelchainsofcommandpermeatedthesecurityservices,andhisorderswereoftencontradictedbyextremists.Theactingcommanderlostcontrolofmuchofthearmy;ColonelThéonesteBagosora,acloseconfidantofPresidentHabyarimana,tookcontrolofthemostimportantunitsandbeganorchestratingmassacres.Thepresidential guard and the various youth militia began systematically killing Tutsi civilians. On oneoccasion,Rwarakabije’sownofficers,whomhehadsent toevacuateagroupofeightTutsiwho livednexttohishouse,wereattackedbyamobofmilitiamenwhoaccusedthemofconnivingwiththeenemy.“I knew thatmembers of the policewere also carrying outmassacres, butwhat could I do to stop

them?”WhenIaskedthegeneralwhetherhehadgivenorderstostopthekillings,henodded,thenputhishandsintheair.“Ofcourse.Butwhatcouldwedo?Wewerenolongerincontrol.”Onhiswaytoworkeverymorning,RwarakabijepassedbyroadblockswhereTutsiwerepickedoutandhackedtodeath.ThesmellofrottingfleshhungintheairoverKigali;hischildrencomplainedandcriedintheirbedsatnight.Crowscircledintheskies,andpacksofdogsroamedthestreets,scavengingfordeadbodies.And yetRwarakabije continued to go to the office every day, continued to do his job.Unlike other

officers,whodefectedtotheRPF,Rwarakabijewasdeterminedtowinthewar.HesenthisfamilytohishomevillageinthenorthandonlyfledKigaliwhenitwasclearthefightwaslost.Whentalkingaboutthegenocide,heemphasizedthemilitary,notthehumandimension:“Thearmydeployedmostofitsforcestomassacrecivilians,divertingtrucks,ammunition,andmanpowertoslaughterthem.Thegenocidecausedourresistancetocrumble.Itwasacafouillage,arealmess.”The words “chaos,” “mess,” and “confusion” recurred in my discussions with the general. They

contrastedwithhisrefrainthatallhetriedtododuringthistimewasobeyordersandupholddiscipline.They were two conflicting ways of absolving himself from responsibility, but also means of copingmorallyandpsychologicallywiththekillingaroundhim.Accordingtoeverybodywhoknewhim,Rwarakabijewasnothimselfinvolvedinthekilling.In2009,

hestoodtrialincourtforcrimesofgenocide,buthisformerneighborsandcolleaguesquicklycametohisdefense.“IwasgladIwasputon trial,”he insisted,“so thatonceandforall,myreputationwouldbecleared.”ATutsimanwhomhehelpedbringtosafetytestifiedforhim;oneoftheofficerswhomhehadsenttoevacuateagroupofTutsiarguedonhisbehalf.Hewas,however,partofanorganizationthatcausedthedeathsofover800,000people,andhewasin

apositiontosavelives.WhenIpressedRwarakabijeabouthisloyaltytothearmy,evenwhenitbecameobviousthatmanyofhissuperiorswereinvolvedinthemassacres,heshookhishead,exasperated:“Youaremuchtoologicalaboutthis!Wewereinthemiddleofawar.Wedidn’thavetimetothinkwhetherwewerecomplicitinagenocide—wewerejusttryingtosurvive!”Hethoughttheystillhadachancetowinthewar,hesaid.TheythoughttheirflighttoZairewasatacticalretreat,nothingmore.Manyofhiscolleagues,however,didrun,andcalledhimfromCanadaandBelgium,urginghimtojoin

theminexile.Herefused.Oneofhisfellowpolicecommanders,whohaddefectedduringthegenocideanddidn’twantme torevealhisname, toldme:“Hewasadisciplinarian to thecore.Heneverreallyaskedwhyhewasfighting; thatwasfor thepoliticianstodecide.Andwhenthepoliticiansran,hejustkeptonfighting,likearobot.”Evenifhehaddecidedtodefect,itwouldnothavebeensimple.SeveralofRwarakabije’scolleagues

surrenderedtotheRPFbutwereneverheardfromagain.TherewerestoriesofPresidentHabyarimana’sformerofficers turning themselves inonly tobe found thenextday inabananagrove, theirhands tied

behindtheirbackandtheirbrainsshotout.“Don’tforgetthatthiswasawar,”theavunculargeneralrepeated.“IfIhaddeserted,Icouldhavebeen

killedbymyowncommandersorbytheRPF.”Hepausedandfiddledwithhiswatch.“Thegenocidewasterrible, of course,” he said. “I thought it was a huge mistake.” He saw the killing out of his officewindow,asitwere,disagreedwithit,andgotonwithhiswork.Watchinghimseatedbehindhisalmostemptydesk,Ifoundithardtoimaginethatthismanhadbeenthe

leaderofoneofthemostnotoriousrebelgroupsinAfrica.Heexplainedwithhissteady,glued-onsmilethathehadneverlearnedhowtouseacomputerinthebush.Instead,heoperatedwithpenandastackofprinterpaper,onwhichhemaderandomnotesanddiagrams,asiftoillustratehisthoughtstohimselfashespokewithme.Hewaswritinghisownhistoryofthewar,hetoldme,showingmeastackofwornnotebooks.Heflippedthroughtheirpagesaswetalked,tofinddatesandnameshewasuncertainof.Hehad highlighted important passages in yellowor circled themwith a ballpoint pen.When I asked himwhenhewouldpublishhisownbook,hesmiled.“Notyet.ThecountryisnotyetreadyforeverythingIhavetosay.Itistooearly.”

Ethnic-basedviolence,themostextremeformofwhichwasthegenocide,issooftenassociatedwiththeCongoleseandRwandanwarsthatitisworthtryingtounderstanditscauses.WetendtoseethehistoryofRwandaasthehistoryofastrugglebetweentwoethnicgroups,theagriculturistHutuandthecattleherdingTutsi. An honest interrogation of the past, however, would require us to throw most of these crudeconceptsoutthewindow,oratleasttodeconstructthem.TheRwandanstateinitscurrentgeographicaland political form did not come into existence until the twentieth century, after centuries of fightingbetweencompetingkingdomsandprincelystates.Ethnic identitiesbehind the riftbetweenHutuandTutsiarebeingconstantlycontestedandredefined

withthechangingpolitical,cultural,andeconomiclandscape.Until theeighteenthcentury,forexample,ethnicitywaslessimportantthanclassandclan-basedidentities,whichthemselvescoexistedalongsideseverallayersofregionalandsocialidentities.Thus,eachofthetwentymajorclansinRwandaincludesboth Hutu and Tutsi, and among each ethnic group one can find poor, landless peasants as well aswealthierprinces.TolabelsomeoneaHutuandleaveitat thatneglectsthatshemay,dependingonthesocial context, see herself more as a southerner, a member of the Abega clan, or a follower of thePentecostal church. This is not just hair-splitting; much of contemporary Rwandan politics has beenshapedbythesecompetingandoverlappingidentities.ThepolarizationofRwandansocietyintoHutuandTutsiincreasedwithKingRujugira’sconsolidation

of theRwandanstate in theeighteenthcentury.HeexpandedhisarmiesandbegansubjugatingmuchofwhatistodayRwanda,includingareaswheretheseethnicdistinctionspreviouslyhadlittletraction.Hisarmies’longmilitarycampaignsrequiredmorerevenuesanddeeperadministrativepenetrationofsociety.Themilitary,whichwas led by Tutsi, became the basis for a bureaucracy that administered land andcollectedtaxes.Progressively,theloosedistinctionsbetweenHutuandTutsitightenedandbecamemorehierarchical.By the late nineteenth century,when the first colonizers arrived,manyHutu depended onTutsi chiefs for land to farm and had to pay tithes aswell as provide freemanual labor. Still, ethnicidentityremainedfluid,withintermarriagesbetweenethnicgroupsandthepossibility,albeitrare,forrichHutu tobecome“promoted” toTutsi if theyownedmanycattle andhadpower in society.At the local

level, Hutu remained influential, in particular in the administration of land. Still, social arrangementsvariedgreatlybetweendifferent regions,withsome, likeGisaka ineasternRwanda,notshowingmuchethnicpolarizationuntilmuchlater.TheconquestofRwanda—firstbyGermans,thenBelgians—radicallyalteredsocialstructures.Atiny

groupofwhiteadministratorswasfacedwithrulingacomplex,foreigncountrytheybarelyunderstood.Aselsewhere inAfrica, thenewrulerschose to rule throughwhat they thoughtwerewell-established,existing structures. They thus empowered the Tutsi monarchy, which they saw as the “natural” elite,abolishedchecksandbalanceson the royal family,andstreamlined the localadministrationbyoustingHutuchiefsandvestingallpowerinaTutsi-dominatedadministration.Atthesametime,theyhelpedtheroyal court double the territory under its control, conquering kingdoms and princely states around itsperiphery.Thedelicatesocialbalancebetweenthefarmersandthepastoralists,theroyaleliteandthepeasantry,

therichandthepoorwasbrutallydisrupted.WhereasHutupeasantshadpreviouslybeenabletoappealto their relatives incaseofabusesby thegovernment,orat leastplaydifferentchiefsoffagainst eachother,nowtheywereleftatthemercyofaTutsiadministration.6TheEuropeanrulersgroundedtheirruleinanideologyandethnographyheavilyinfluencedbyracial

theoriespopularintheUnitedStatesandEuropeatthetime.JohnHanningSpeke,oneofthefirstBritishexplorersintheregion,hadwrittenin1863aboutadistinct“Asiatic”sophisticationamongsomeofthepeople,presumablyTutsi,heencountered.“Inthesecountries,”hewrote,“governmentisinthehandsofforeigners,whohadinvadedandtakenpossessionofthem,leavingtheagriculturalaboriginestotilltheground.”Speke,dabblinginhistoryandreligion,conjecturedalinkbetweenthesetribesandEthiopiaandproposeda“historical”basis forwhatheclaimed toobserve:“The traditionsof these tribesgoas farbackasthescripturalageofKingDavid.”Speke’s theorywasnotamereflightoffancy.SincetheMiddleAges,EuropeanshadstudiedAfrica

throughthelensoftheBible,tryingtofinddivinedesigninnatureandhumansociety.Oneofthepassagesofmost interestwasfromGenesis9and10.JustbeforeadescriptionofhowNoah’ssonspeopledtheearthaftertheflood,thetexttellsthestoryofwhenNoah,drunkfromwine,fallsasleepnaked.HissonsShemandJaphethaverttheireyesandcoverhim,buttheirbrother,Ham,staresathisnakedbody.Whenheawakes,NoahisfuriousatHamandcondemnsHam’sson,Canaan,toslavery:“aservantofservantsshallhebeuntohisbrethren.”Although theBible remainsvague aboutHamandCanaan’s destiny,well into thenineteenth century

biblicalscholarsandscientistsalikecategorized thenationsof theworldas thedescendentsofNoah’ssons:theSemiticracesoftheMiddleEast,theJapheticracesofEurope,andtheHamiticracesofAfrica.Turned on its head, this theory explained the advanced civilizations found in Africa: Rock-cut wells,complexpoliticalorganization,andirrigationsystemswereallcreationsofaHamiticracethattraceditslineagebacktotheMiddleEast.InSpeke’sview,thisexplanationplacedthecontinent’sNegroidracesfirmlywheretheybelonged:onthebottomoftheracialhierarchy,incapableofadvancedcivilization,andopengameforslavery.Elsewhere,intheMuslimworld,leadersalsousedtheHamitictheorytojustifytheenslavementofblackAfricans.The first German governor of Rwanda, Count von Goetzen, theorized “the Tutsi are Hamitic

pastoralists from Ethiopia, who have subjugated a tribe of Negro Bantus,” while Catholic prelateMonsignorLeRoyputitdifferently:“Theirintelligentanddelicateappearance,theirloveofmoney,theircapacity toadapt toanysituationseemto indicateaSemiticorigin.”Armedwithrulersandmeasuringtape, craniometric Belgian administrators went about rigidifying with physical measurements thepreviouslymorefluidboundariesbetweenTutsiandHutuidentities.

Thesecolonial fantasies soonbecameengravedon theconsciousnessof the colonized, aswell.TheTutsi elite, long favored under theBelgians, seized on themyths to justify their continued superiority,imbibingthestereotypesofHutu—asespousedbyaBelgianpriest—as“themostcommontypeofblack,brachycephalicandprognathous,withagronomictasteandaptitudes,sociableandjovial...withthicklipsandsquashednoses,butsogood,sosimple,soloyal.”7Hutudissidents,inthemeantime,appropriatedthestereotypesofTutsiasaraceofcraftyherdersfromEthiopiatorallysupportagainst“theforeigners.”

WhereloyaltyandpowerstirredGeneralRwarakabije,themassesweremovedmorebyfear,ideology,andlocalpolitics.Inthepopularimagination,theRPFhadbeencastassubhuman,asdemons.Bythetimethegenocidebegan, thecivilwarhadbeenragingforalmostfouryears.Overamillionpeople,mostlyHutu, had been displaced from the north of the country, andmany of them hadmoved towardKigali,wheretheyspreadthewordoftherebels’abuses.Hutuextremistspreyedonthisparanoiaintheirradiobroadcasts.ATutsiofficer,havingseizedavillage,wasaskedbyoneofthefewHutuwhohadstayedtoliftuphisshirtsothevillagerscouldseeifhehadatail,sosureweretheythathewasadevil.8Eventhesickandfrailmarchedhundredsofmilestothebordertoescapethesuredeaththeythoughtawaitedthemunder theRPF.In thecamps,refugees’reluctance toreturncameat leastasmuchfromtheirfearof theRPF.Theintimidationhadbecomeinternalized.Recent studies of the genocide have also revealed the importance of local politics in determining

whetheranareacarriedoutgenocideornot.Seasonallaborersandthelandless,forexample,weremorelikely to bemanipulated by rural elites who stood to lose if the Hutu regime lost power.9 The localstrengthofmoreextremistpoliticalpartiesreinforcedpressuretocarryoutkillings,asdidthepresenceofBurundianHuturefugeeswhohadfledviolence in theirhomecountry. In total,some200,000probablytook part in the killing formany reasons: 10 Somewere forced to do so by authorities; others soughteconomicgain;stillothersparticipatedoutofamixtureofsocialpressureandthebeliefthattheywouldbekilledthemselvesiftheydidnotcomply.11In southwestern Rwanda, the Hutu flight was stalled by the deployment of a UN-mandated French

militarymission,dubbedOperationTurquoise,intendedtoprotectthefewremainingTutsiinthatregionaswellasaidworkers.ItwasoneofthemanyabsurditiesoftheRwandancrisis:TheFrenchgovernmentanditscontractorshadmadethirty-sixshipmentsofweaponstoHabyarimana’sgovernmentbetween1990and 1994, worth $11million, and had deployed seven hundred fifty French troops, who helped withmilitarytraining,planning,andeveninterrogationofRPFprisoners.12Justmonthsaftertheyhadfinishedhelping to train the Interahamwe, the French, wolves turned shepherds, announced a humanitarianinterventiontobringanendtothekilling.The French troops did save Tutsi lives. They also, however, refused to arrest the Habyarimana

governmentandarmyofficialsintheirterritorywhowereknowntohaveorganizedmassacres.Hateradiocontinued broadcasting unhindered from the area controlled by the French, exhorting the population tocontinue theexterminationofTutsi.Meanwhile,across theZairianborder inGoma, thebaseofFrenchoperations,atleastfiveshipmentsofweaponsfromFranceweredeliveredtotheex-FARleadershipwhohad fled from Kigali.13 To add insult to injury, French president François Mitterrand personallyauthorized a donation of $40,000 to Habyarimana’s wife, one of the most extremist members of thepresident’s inner circle, when she arrived in Paris fleeing the violence in country. The donation was

labeledas“urgentassistancetoRwandanrefugees.”14

WhenRwarakabijecrossedintoZaireandarrivedinGomainJuly1994,hespentafewdayswanderingabout,disorientedanddeflated.Goma,atownof300,000,wasinundatedwithgoats,cars,andateemingmassofpeoplethatsurgedinvariousdirections,confused,withoutbearings.Rwarakabijehadarrivedinatruckwithfellowofficers,buteverybodyhaddispersedtotendtotheirfamilies.Hefinallymanagedtorentahouseontheedgeoftownfromatraditionalchiefforhiswifeandfourchildren.Likeallofficers,hehadbenefitedfromthelootingofstatecoffersbeforeleavingRwanda.Theyneededtheextracash,asthe influxof refugeeshadsentprices in themarkets skyrocketing.Akiloofmeatwasalmost$10, fivetimesthenormalprice.Whereasthepriceoffoodhadpeaked,thevalueofweaponsandammunitionhadplummetedbecause

of theirabundance.At thebordercrossing,withinsightofFrenchtroops, thefleeingRwandansoldierswere supposed to give their weapons over toMobutu’s presidential guard.Machine guns and rocketlauncherspiledup.Behind the customs offices, however, an armsmarket had spontaneously sprung up, where ex-FAR

officers negotiated to buy back their arms. An AK-47 went for $40 to $50, a Russian-made rocketlauncherforjustunder$100.OtherweaponswereneverhandedovertotheZairians.Rwarakabijesawtonsofammunitionsmuggledthroughintrucks,hiddenunderbagsofriceandmaize.“Wegavetheborderguardssomemoneytolooktheotherway.Alltheywantedwasmoney.”Located on the northern tip of LakeKivu,which formsmost of the border between the Congo and

Rwanda,andunderneaththetoweringNyiragongovolcano,Gomahadbeenaprimetouristdestinationinits heyday.The localBelgian elite,Mobutu’s coterie, and adventurous backpackers filled its colonial-style hotels, which featured ceramic tiling, whitewashed exteriors, and lush, manicured gardens. Thefertile hinterlands had provided a cheap supply of vegetables—including such Belgian favorites asbroccoli,sweetpeas,andleeks—andthedairiescreatedbyBelgianpriestshadproducedfamouscheeseroundsthatwereexportedthroughouttheregion.TravelagencieshadorganizedguidedtourstoVirungaNationalParktothenorth,habitatoftheraremountaingorilla.AbeerandsoftdrinksfactoryjustacrosstheborderinRwandakeptthenumerousbarsandnightclubssuppliedwithasteadystreamoflager,Coke,andFanta.ThedecayoftheZairianstateandtheinfluxofrefugeesdrewasombercurtainoverthosedays.Now

thehotelshostedguestsofadifferentcaliber.ThedefeatedRwandanarmycommandersandpoliticiansbegan checking into Hotel des Grands Lacs and Nyiragongo, Karibu, and Stella hotels and rentingsumptuousvillasonthelake.Journalists,freshfromthedeath-strewncamps,satwithpoliticiansandarmyofficersintheirmansionsonfakeleathercouchesbehindbougainvillea-drapedwalls.

After severalmonthsof confusion,Rwarakabije attendedameetingof the formerRwandanarmy’s topbrassinaPentecostalchurchinGoma.Sittingwithhiminthechurch’ssacristy,underalargecross,werethedourfacesofhisremainingarmystaff.Moralehadhitrockbottom.Mostoftheofficerspresenthad

evacuatedtheirfamiliesoncharteredflightstoNairobi,Yaounde(Cameroon),andParis.“Wehadlostthewar,”Rwarakabijeremembered.“Anyonewhohadenoughmoneyeventuallyleft.”Rwarakabijehimselfwasnotsofortunate.Theexiledwarcounciltookurgentmeasures.Itswiftlyreorganizedthearmedforcesintotwodivisions

of7,680and10,240men,basedincampsonthenorthernandsouthernendofLakeKivu,respectively.Supportunitsof4,000soldierspushedtheirtotalto22,000soldiers.RwarakabijebecamethecommanderoftheseveralthousandsoldierswhomadeuptheFourthBrigade.Thequalityofthesoldiersvaried.Theofficerscamefromregulararmyunits,andmanyhadtrainedin

BelgiumandFrance;theysetuprigidadministrativestructureswithcarefullytypedbudgetsandcirculars.But some troops had no military experience. Hundreds of prisoners were recruited; since they wereamong theonlypeoplewhobenefited from themayhem, they tended tohavehighmorale.Primaryandsecondary students, some as young as nine,were coaxed and coerced into training camps, forming theTwenty-SixthReserveBrigade.When I prodded Rwarakabije about the feared Interahamwe and Impuzamugambimilitias, who had

carried outmuch of the genocidal killing, he scoffed, deriding their lack of discipline. “They druggedthemselves onmarijuana and cheap liquor, robbed the population. Theywere thugs,” he remembered.“Manyof themeliminated themselves in thewar.Theywouldstaggeronto thebattlefield likezombies,highanddrunk,andgetpickedoffbytheenemy.”Forhim,therewasaworldofdifferencebetweentheFAR’sdisciplineandobjectiveofoverthrowingthenewgovernment inRwandaandtheInterahamwe’sethnicvendetta.To raise spirits, thewar council authorized the immediate payment of June and July salaries for all

stateemployeesandsoldiers.TheyhadbroughtwiththemtheentiretreasuryofRwanda,$30–40millioninRwandanfrancs,which theystashed inabank indowntownGoma.According tosomereports, theywereabletotransferover$100milliondollarsintheearlydaysofthegenocideintoprivateaccounts;theyhad justcollected theyearly taxes,and thecofferswereflushwithmoney.15Most importantly, thecommanders agreedon immediately launchingguerrillawarfare against the new regime inKigali.Theexpectationsofthepopulationwerenowespeciallypalpable—thehopesofamillionpeople,whoweredying slow deaths in the camps, weighed on them. Since the Tutsi forceswere known as inyenzi, orcockroaches,thisoffensivewasdubbedOperationInsecticide.

Rwarakabijefoundpleasure,perhapssolace,inrecitingtroopstrengths,namesofcommandingofficers,and dates of battles, but he was reluctant to talk about the more human side of history: feelings,motivations,morality.Thetragedyofthepastdecadewasreducedtodesiccatedstatistics.Goingthroughmynoteslater,thevisionoftwogeneralsclashedinmyhead.Onewasofthepleasant

oldmanwhoalwayshadtimeformeandmymanyquestions,whoneverseemedtroubledorbotheredbymyprobing.Thiswasalsothemanhissoldiersknew.InmyinterviewswiththeformerHututroopsunderhis command in demobilization camps in Rwanda, they painted a picture of a respected, caringcommanderwhohadbecomeafatherfiguretomanyoftheofficers.Theyrememberedhimasajudiciousleader,alwaysconferringwithhisfellowleadersbeforemakingdecisions.TheotherRwarakabijeIhadtoinferthroughhumanrightsreportsandinterviewswithvictims.While

hewascommanderoftheHuturebelsbetween1996and2003,histroopswereguiltyofmassacres,mass

rape,androutinepillage inboth theCongoandRwanda.Given the tightdiscipline that reigned, itwasdifficulttoimaginethatthegeneraldidnotknowabouthissoldiers’behavior.Attheveryleast,hefailedtopunishthem.DuringmyfirstjourneytotheeasternCongoin2001,toworkforalocalhumanrightsgroup,Héritiers

delaJustice(HeirsofJustice),inthebordertownofBukavu,IhearddailythestoriesofpeoplewhohadbeenrapedortorturedorhadtheirfamilymemberskilledbytheonestheycalledInterahamwe,thecatch-all term forRwarakabije’s rebels. Individual caseswere then entered into a hardcover blue ledger inclippedterms:

On10/08/2000,Mr.NonoMarandura,fromNkonovillageintheterritoryofBunyakiri,wasshottodeathinhishousebyInterahamwe.Thevictimleftbehindawidowandsixchildrenwhountilnowsufferfromalackofsupport.

On19/09/2000,Mr.PapayiwaKatachiwaskilledby Interahamwe.Thevictimwas17yearsold.Helived inKaloba, in Bunyakiri territory. His brother was injured by bullets and their belongingswerestolen.Accordingtotheinformationcollected,theauthorsoftheseactstargetedthevictimforunknownreasons.

Theledgercontainedhundredsofsuchentries.I turned back to my own notes to reread Rwarakabije’s answers to my questions. I had scrawled

“Abuses?”onthetopofonepagewithanarrowpointingathisanswer:

Atthebeginningwedidn’thavemanyabuses.Weeventaughtcoursesininternationalhumanitarianlawtooursoldiers;someofourofficershaddonethattraining.Butthetroopsgottiredandhungryandstartedtakingfoodbyforcefromthepopulation.Wecalledit“pillageoperations”—youwouldattackavillageandtakeallofitscowsandstealmoney.

WhenIpushedhim,Rwarakabijeconceded:“Youhavetorememberthatwehad10,000soldiersandtheir families to feed. And once the pillage started, soldiers lost control and raped and even killedsometimes. If we caught them, we punished them. At the beginning, we executed several soldiers formurder,butthatgaveusproblems,sowestartedcaning.Irememberwegaveonerapist300strokesofastickonhisnakedbuttocksandexpelledhimfrom the troops.Buthowdidyouknowwho raped?Thevillagerswereafraidofus;theydidn’ttellus.Somostofthecriminalswentunpunished.”

By October 1994, the Inzirabwoba—“those who are not afraid”—were infiltrating Rwanda from therefugeecampseveryweek.Rwarakabijebeganleadingnocturnalraidsacrosstheborder.“Wedestroyedadministrativebuildingsandkilledlocalofficials,”Rwarakabijeexplained,showingnosignofremorse.“Itwasawar;theywerecollaborators.”Asduring thegenocide,everyTutsiwasseenasanaccompliceof theRPF. InOctober1994, rebels

infiltrated across the hills at 3AM, surrounding a village just yards from the border.Theymassacredthirty-sevenpeople,mostlychildren.“SomekilledoutofhatredforTutsi,otherstopreventthesurvivorsof the genocide from speaking out against them,”Rwarakabije remembered.Monitors from theUnitedNations tallied hundreds of killings of Tutsi in the first two years after theRPF drove the FAR fromRwanda.

Itwasnot justTutsiwhosuffered. IfHutu refugeesdared to returnhome from thecamps, theywereconsideredtraitors.AnatoleSucyendorewasaHutudoctorwhohadfledtoGomawiththeotherrefugeesbuthadreturnedtoRwandaseveralmonthslatertoworkintheGisenyihospital,despitenumerousdeaththreats.OnFebruary25,1995,Huturebelsbrokeintohishouse,shotthedoctor,stabbedhistwo-year-oldinfanttodeath,andseverelyinjuredhiswifeandotherchild.AnonymouspamphletsdistributedbyHutumilitiasinthecampsgiveatasteoftherhetoricoftheday:

YouHutufools,whokeepgivingmoneywhichisusedtobuyweaponstokillyourfellows.Yousayyouarestudying.Don’tyouknowwherethosewhostudiedare?HowmanystudiesdidKagameundertake,hetowhomyougiveyourmoney,wholeadsallthemassacres?AndYouTutsi,youhavestretchedyournosesandnecksbecauseyouthinkyouhaveprotectors!And

yousupportyourInyenzi[RPF]fellowsintheirexterminationoftheHutu,insteadoffighting[us].Wewillkillyouuntilyouarenolongercontemptuous,andunderstandthatyoumustcohabitwithothers.16

Thegeneralknew,however,thatguerrillaattacksalonewerenevergoingtowork.“Wewerenettlingthem,harassing them,butnot really challenging theirholdonpower,”Rwarakabije remembered.Theyneededtoresorttoastrongerweapon:blackmail.AleaderoftheformergovernmentboastedtojournalistsfromthecomfortofhisvillainGoma:“Even

if theRPFhaswonamilitaryvictory, itwill not have thepower. It hasonly thebullets,wehave thepopulation.”17Failingtobeattheenemy,theywoulduseblackmail,holdingthemillionrefugeesinZaireforransomtoforceKigalitonegotiate.Theexiledleadersresortedtosimilarorganizationalmodelstothosetheyhadusedintheirhomeland.

TheRwandanadministrationhadbeena tightlywovenmesh that reachedfromKigali to theprovincialauthorities,downtothecommune,sector,andcell,achainofcommandthathadmadepossiblethemassmurder of 800,000 people in just a hundred days. They grafted this grid onto the camps, regroupingrefugeesbytheirplacesoforigininRwandaandplacingtrustedofficialsincharge,oftenthesameoneswhohadbeeninvolvedinthekillingsbackhome.

WhenIaskedRwarakabijeaboutthesepractices,heshookhishead.“It is true.Wewerebrainwashed.And therewerea lotof extremists therewhopreyedonpeople’s

fear.”“Didyoueverusethiskindoflanguage?”Iasked.“Yes, butwe never didwhat the tracts said.We needed to scare them.Therewere extremistswho

wantedtokillTutsi,butthatwaswrong.WehadTutsiwithusinthecamps!TherewereofficerswhohadbeenintheRwandanarmyandhadfledwithus.OneofmybodyguardswasTutsi.Wehadtotellthemnottostraytoofarfromthebarracksorthepopulationcouldkillthem.”“Didyoueverorderthekillingofcivilians?”“No,never.”“Butcivilianswerekilled.”Rwarakabijesighedandfidgetedwithhisloosewatchagain.“Chainofcommand...I’mnotsureyou

canapplythattoourrebellion.”“Youdidn’tcontrolsomeofyourowncommanders?”“Mytroops,yes.Butthecivilianideologues,theextremists,no.Manyofthearmycommandersdidnot

supportthegenocide.Itwassomethingthathadbeenorganizedbytheciviliansalongwithsomeextremistcommanders.”Rwarakabijeduckedandweaved,denyingresponsibility,blamingmassacresonothers,usingendsto

justifymeans.“Whereelephants fight,”he said,“thegrass is trampled.” Itwasaconvenientmetaphor.AlmosteverycommanderImetintheregionuseditwhenIaskedthemaboutabusesagainstcivilians.Inhiscalmserenity,Rwarakabijewasacounterpointtotheimagesofhatedrivenkillers.Accordingto

everyonewhoknewhim,hedidn’thaveanyapparenthatredforTutsi.OneofhisbattalioncommandersintheinsurgencywasTutsi,andhewasmorecomfortablebeingcalledKigathanHutu.Apparentlyhehadn’tjoinedandledtheso-calledHuturebellionoutofethnicchauvinism,evenif themovementwasdeeplybigoted.Hehadjoinedbecausethisiswherehehadendedupandwhatmadesenseforhimtodowhenthecivilwarbrokeout;hecouldhavetriedtochangeit,butitwouldhavebeentoodifficult,toorisky.BacktothedescriptionofEichmann’strial:“Evilcomesfromafailuretothink.Itdefiesthoughtforassoonas thought tries toengageitselfwithevil it isfrustratedbecauseit findsnothingthere.That is thebanalityofevil.”18Thesamewent formany rank-and-file soldiers Imet.Manyhad joinedbecause theywerepoorand

unemployedorbecause theywanted“tobeaman”; agunandauniformwereamong thebest toolsofsocialempowerment.Ethnicitywasfundamental in thisdynamic.Ican’tcount thenumberof timesI’veheard“Tutsiaggression” invokedas the reason for thewar in theCongo,but it isnot theoriginof theconflict,asthequotefromtheBBCatthebeginningofthischaptermighthaveyoubelieve.Bylimitingourselves to the simplistic “Hutumilitia killed half amillionTutsi,”we are suggesting that there is areasonforthatviolenceimplicitinthoseidentities,thatsomethingaboutbeingHutuandTutsicausedtheviolence.Whileethnicityisprobablythestrongestformofsocialorganizationintheregion,weneedtoscratchbehind thatsurface, toseewhat itshistory is,whoisusing itorbeingusedby it,andforwhatreasons.

2

AIDINGANDABETTING

INERAREFUGEECAMP,ZAIRE,OCTOBER1994

BeatriceUmutesiwasoneofthemillionRwandanswhohadfledtoZaire.Shewasmorefortunatethanmost.Bornin1959toaHutupeasantfamilyinnorthernRwanda,shehadbeenagoodstudent,obtainingascholarshiptostudysociologyinBelgiumbeforereturningtoworkinaruraldevelopmentcooperative.When fighting broke out inKigali inApril 1994, she fledwith her ailingmother andmembers of herfamily,andafterseveralweeksofwalking,shecrossedtheborderintoZaireandmadeherselfathomeinInera, a campon the shoresofLakeKivu.There a slumof 55,000 refugees living in squalidhuts hadsprungupovernightonthemuddysilt.Beatrice drewonher professional experience, quickly becoming a leader in a network of nonprofit

groupsworking in thecamps.Sheorganizeda smallmicrocreditprogram toallow refugees tomakealivinginthecamps,andshehelpedpublishtwonewslettersforrefugeewomentoexpressthemselvesandexplaintheirproblems.AlthoughBeatrice had a small salary, she lived in one of theblindés, the tiny, doghouse-size tents

wheretherefugeeslived.Eachfamilywasgivenonetarpaulin,fourmetersbyfive,withtheinsigniaoftheUNrefugeeagency:alaurelwreathprotectingafamilyinside.Theytieditoveralean-tomadeoutofeucalyptussaplings.Iftheywerelucky,theyhadenoughtarpleftovertocoverthecold,wetground.Theygotsomescratchyfleeceblankets,potsandpans,andayellowjerrycantohaulwaterfromthewells.Beatricewasthirty-fivewhenshefledRwanda.Shewasunmarried,andshecrossedtheborderwith

hersixty-seven-year-oldmotherandfoursisters.Otherpeoplejoinedherfamily:Virginie,Assumpta,andMarcelline, three young, abandoned girls shemet in the camps and took in as nieces; andBakunda, athirteen-year-old boy she had taken in when the RPF rebels had invaded northern Rwanda in 1993,displacingthousandsofpeople.BeatriceslowlygatheredunderherwingsamotleybunchofsevenraggedchildrenwhohadlosttheirownfamiliesduringthewarandtheflighttoZaire.

TherefugeecampsweresetupinJuly1994andstayedinplaceforovertwoyears.Somewouldswelltocontainmorethan400,000inhabitants,becomingthelargestrefugeecampsintheworldandlargerthananycityineasternZaire.Togethertheyhousedoveramillionpeople.Inaperverseway,theyprovokedamobilizationofinternationalresourcesthatthegenocideneverhad.Withindaysofthefirstarrivals,aidworkers detected a cholera outbreak; the virulent parasite spread fast in the unhygienic and crampedquarters.Without proper health care, the disease killed theweak refugeeswithin days, emptying their

bodies of liquids through violent diarrhea and vomiting until their organs failed. By July 28, 1994, athousandbodieswerebeingcollectedadayanddumpedunceremoniously intochalk-dustedpitsby thedump-truckload.ForeigntelevisioncrewswhohadnotbeenabletoreachRwandaduringthegenocidenowsetupcamp

inGoma;thepicturesofhundredsofchalk-dustedbodiestumblingintomassgravessuggestedastrangemoral equivalency to the recent genocide, except that this catastrophe was easier to fix: Instead of acomplicatedwebofviolenceinwhichmilitaryinterventionwouldhavebeenmessyandbloody,herewasacrisisthatcouldbeaddressedbyspendingmoney.Overthenexttwoyears,donorsspentover$2billionontherefugeecrisisineasternZaire,morethantwiceasmuchastheyspentonhelpingthenewRwandangovernment. 1 The RPF was furious. Vice President Paul Kagame lamented, “Personally, I think thisquestionofrefugeesisbeingoverplayedattheexpenseofallourotherproblems.Wenolongertalkaboutorphans,widows,victims[inRwanda].We’reonlytalkingaboutrefugees,refugees,refugees.”2In thecamps the livingstretchedoutnext tocorpses,whichnobodyhad thestrengthor themeans to

remove.Medicalworkersranfrompatienttopatient,jabbingintravenousliquidsintheirarmsasfastaspossible,oftenfailingtofindveins.Diarrheastainedpeople’sclothesandrags;everywhere,thesmellofshitanddeathcloggedtheair.Afteronemonth,50,000peoplehaddied.

BeatricearrivedinasmallerrefugeecamptothesouthofGomaandwassparedsomeoftheworstofthecholeraepidemic.Shehadtofaceotherchallenges,however.Herdaysweremadeupoflongstretchesofwaiting for the next food distribution, punctuated bymeetings of herwomen’s group and visits to thehealth clinics. “Feeling useless is the worst,” she later wrote.3 Men would try to make extra moneyworking in local fields or transporting sugarcane and cassava to the market, while women busiedthemselveswashingthefewpansandclothestheyhadtakenwiththemfromRwanda.On the outskirts of the camps, bustling markets appeared, where looted goods from Rwanda were

available alongwith the usual assortment ofChinese-made toothbrushes, soaps, cheap acrylic clothes,and bootleg tapes of Zairian, Rwandan, and western music. A UN official catalogued the amenitiesavailableinfivecampsaroundGoma:2,324bars,450restaurants,589differentshops,62hairdressers,51pharmacies,30tailors,25butchers,5blacksmithsandmechanics,4photographicstudios,3cinemas,2hotels,and1slaughterhouse.4Marketstandsadvertisedbagsofgeneric,oftenexpiredoruselessdrugs,nexttojarswithtraditionalmedicinalpowders,roots,andconcoctions.Thecampsweresowellstockedthattheybecameahubofattractionforlocals.ZairiansfromBukavuandGomatrekkedouttothecampstobuy lootedcars, stereos,and televisions.Youths fromBukavuwentdrinkingon theweekends in theoutdoorbars entrepreneurial refugees set upoverlooking the lake,making sure theywerehomebeforenighttoavoidthehoodlumswhoroamedaboutlookingforeasyprey.MeninBukavustillreminisceaboutthemishikaki,shishkebabsofsizzlinggoatandbeefintroducedbytherefugees,thatweredownedwiththelocalPrimusbeer.Mostrefugees,however,likeBeatrice,hadfledRwandawithlittlemorethantheclothesontheirback

andcouldnotaffordsuchluxuries.Theyateonceadayfromtherationstheyreceived:ahandfulofU.S.-surplusmaizemeal,acupofbeans,afewdropsofvegetableoil,andapinchofsalt.Around Beatrice, refugee life gnawed away at the social fabric. A camp newsletter reported an

alarming increase inchildmarriages,a rarephenomenonbackhomeinRwanda.Youthsandoldermen

marriedgirlsasyoungasthirteenandfourteen,sometimestakingtheminas their thirdorfourthwives.SomeyouthshadbroughtwiththempillagedgoodsandmoneyfromRwandaandwereabletoaffordthedowries of several girls. Often families had broken up, andmarriage allowed youths to rebuild theirfracturedworld. In some cases,wives had to share their tiny shackwith several otherwomen.Thesemarriageswereoftenshort-livedandproducedmanyfatherlesschildren,addingtothehungryandsickinthecamps.5Beatrice,whotraveledfromcamptocampholdingwomen’srightsworkshops,heardstoryafter story of women suffering abuses. Many young girls were forced into prostitution, often sellingthemselvesforthepriceofaplateofbeansoracoupleofmandazi,frieddoughballs.Asrefugeeswerenot, at least in theory, allowed to farm fields or move about freely outside the camps, boredom andinactivity became huge problems, especially for the thousands of unemployed. Men often resorted todrinkingbananabeerandhomemadeliquor.Alcoholism,domesticabuse,andviolencewereaddedtothelonglistofrefugees’woes.ForBeatrice,asformanyothers, lifewasdominatedbyfearanddistrust.Sheandotherwomenhad

denouncedtheRPF’sabusesinnewslettersandstatements.ShethoughtthathernamewasonablacklistinKigali and that shewould be arrested orworse if she tried to return.On several occasions, theRPFstaged raids into the campsbyLakeKivu,killing scoresof suspectedmilitiamenand refugees.On theotherhand,becauseshe tried toorganizewomenintoselfhelpgroups, theHutuextremists in thecampsalsosawBeatriceasachallenge.Soonshewasaccusedofbeingpro-RPFandofhavingTutsifeatures.Thugsattacked severalofher friends for their alleged sympathieswith thenewgovernment across thelake,althoughtherealmotivewasprobablyjusttostealtheirmeagerbelongings.Inherdiaryshewrote,“Suchisthehumanbeing:whenheisafraid,heseesenemieseverywhereandthinkstheonlychancetostayaliveistoexterminatethem.”Thewarhadcreatedanewclassofthugsanddelinquents.Gangsroamedthecamps,harassingwomen

andstealingtosurvive.ARwandanpriestwhohadcometovisithisfamilywasbludgeonedtodeathandleftontheedgeofthecamp;awomanandherfive-year-oldchildwerekilledbyagrenadethrownintotheirtent.6Themeresuspicionthatsomeonewasaspywasenoughtorallyamobwithsticks,hoes,andmachetes.

OnOctober25,1994,inKitukucamp,refugeescaughtfourmenbythewaterreservoirandaccusedthemoftryingtopoisonthewells;threeescaped,butonewasstonedtodeath.Severaldayslater,inanearbycamp, fiveTutsiwerechasedbyamobandkilled.Oneof themmade it toaDoctorsWithoutBordershealth center, where he was beaten to death in front of the medical staff. According to another aidorganization, “fresh bodies [were found] in Mugunga camp every morning in September.”7 A studyestimatedthatatotalof4,000refugeeswerekilledinthecamps,oftenatthehandsofthevariousmilitiasemployedbytheformergovernment.8Thecampswerepressurecookers.Athousandpeoplelivedinthespaceofasoccerpitch.Allintimacy

was banished, as several dozen people could easily overhear the lovemaking, quarrels, and gossip ofeachblindé’soccupants.The tentswere toosmall to standup inand,during thenine-month-long rainyseason,werecakedwithmudinsideandout.Atnight,temperaturessometimesplummetedto10degreesCelsius.Beatrice onlyhadone light blanket and a fewkikwembe that she used for clothes, swaddlingchildren,andlyingon.Inthemorning,shewouldwakeupwithcondensationdrippingonher.Womenhadotherproblems,aswell.Theaidorganizationsrunningthecampsdidn’tprovidesanitary

napkins,andwomenhadtouseragsortearupsheetstouseinstead.Astherewaslittlesoap,thesescrapsofclothbecamehardandcakedwithblood.Totheirhumiliation,womenhadnochoicebuttotrytowashtheseinthesamepotstheyusedforcooking.“Thebloodiedwatersnakedinrivuletsbetweenthetentsand

littlepuddlesofbloodformedhereandthere.”9One of Beatrice’s neighbors was the tiny, malnourished Muhawe, a three-year-old orphan whose

mother had died in childbirth on the trek toZaire.When she first saw him, hewas littlemore than ashriveledbodywithanoversizedhead,unabletowalkmorethanacoupleoffeetbeforecollapsing.Thehealthcenterhadgivenhimnutritionalmilk,buthecouldn’tkeeptheliquiddown,andhisgrandmother,who was taking care of him, didn’t have money to buy more substantial fare. Beatrice began to buymorselsofbeefandpotatoesthatshewouldmashintoporridgeandfeedhim.Somehow,afterhertwo-hundred-mile trek toZaire and the hardships of the camps,Muhawe’s sufferingwas the last straw forBeatrice.Disgustedandoutragedbyherlife,shebeganwritingatnightinherblindé.“WhathadMuhaweandthethousandsofotherRwandanchildrendyinginthecampsdone?Washe,too,agénocidairetohavedeservedthisfate?”Shebeganwritingherownstory, thehorrorsofthemassacreofTutsi,oftencryingherselftosleep.

For thehumanitarianorganizations, thedilemmawasexcruciating.Theformergovernmentofficialshadset up administrative structures in the camps throughwhich aidworkerswere forced to operate.With5,000 people dying a day, they had to act, but unless the innocent civilians were separated from thesoldiersandex-governmentofficials, aidgroupswere left littleoptionother than toworkwithpeopleguiltyofgenocide,bolsteringandfinancingthemintheprocess.Aidgroupslaunchedoneofthelargesthumanitarian operations the continent had seen, bringing forty-five organizations and over 1,600 reliefworkers to Goma alone. In late 1994, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) spent $1million each day on operations in the camps. Its effort was effective: Within weeks of deployment,mortalitydroppedsteeply,savingthousandsoflives.Atthesametime,however,itbecameobviousthattheaidwasalsosustainingtheperpetratorsofthegenocide.AsAlainDestexhe,thesecretary-generalofDoctorsWithout Borders, put it: “How can physicians continue to assist Rwandan refugees when bydoingsotheyarealsosupportingkillers?”And theywere supportingkillers.Camp leaders refused to allowUNHCR to count the refugees for

over half a year, inflating their numbers so as to pocket the surplus food, blankets, and clothes forthemselves.InNgara,Tanzania,foodfor120,000“ghostrefugees”wasbeingskimmedoffthetop,whileinBukavuleaderspocketedaidfor50,000refugeesoversixmonths.10Evenaftercensuseswerecarriedout,leadersstolethefoodofthosemostinneed,pushingthousandsofchildrenintoseveremalnutrition.“Weneverhadtoworryaboutfood,”Rwarakabijetoldme.“TheUnitedNationssupplieduswithplenty.”Asfamiliesstarved,desperatemothersabandonedtheirinfantsatnightatcamporphanages,wheretheyweresuretogetfed.The abject suffering inverted the moral standing of the refugees and even soldiers—they became

victims, not killers. Aid workers and local groups, who spent months living with and talking to therefugees, became influenced by the revisionist concept of a double genocide—that the Habyarimanagovernment and theRPFhadbothkilled in equalproportions.Caritas, aCatholic aidgroup,providedfoodtoFARmilitarycampsinBulongeandPanzi,protestingthatthesoldiers“havetoeat,theyarenotallmurderers.” Groupe Jeremie, a Congolese human rights group affiliated with the Catholic church,publishedacollectionofworksthatincludesstatementsandreportsbythegovernment-in-exile.11Campleadersresortedtomoresubtlemeasures,aswell,tomakemoney.Theytaxedthethousandsof

refugeeswhoworkedwithhumanitarianorganizations in thecamps.Anaidworkerestimated that theymade$11,000permonthfromstaffofoneorganizationinonecampalone.12Theyalsochargedrentforland; controlled markets, bus routes, and hair salons; and ran a lucrative black market in Rwandancurrency.

Between1994and1996theinternationalcommunity,Rwanda,andZairemissedtheirbestopportunitytonipthecrisisinthebud.Afterfailingtoacttopreventagenocidein1994,theynowfailedtoseparatethesoldiersfromtherefugees,despiterepeatedthreatsfromKigali’sgovernment,startinginFebruary1996,thattheywouldtakemilitaryactionsagainstthecamps.AUNofficialrecalled:“Itwaslikewatchingatrainwreckinslowmotion.”13Inretrospect,theonlysolutionwouldhavebeentoseparatethemilitaryandciviliansbyforce.Early

on,inAugust1994,theUNsecretary-general,BoutrosBoutrosGhali,beganresearchingvariousoptionsforsecuringthecamps.Thefirstproposal,draftedbymilitaryexperts,suggestedtransporting30,000ex-FARand their families toZairianmilitarycampshundredsofmiles from theRwandanborder, therebydetachingthemfromtherefugees.Thisrelocationwouldhavelikelyencounteredresistancefromtheex-FAR leadership and would have required at least 8,000 international troops deployed under a UNmandate, costing $90–$125million. Once again, however, the initiative foundered on a lack of will:BoutrosGhali’srequestwasturneddown.Findalternativesolutions,SecurityCouncilmemberstoldhim,even though the cost of such an operation pales in comparison with the billions the internationalcommunityhasspentontheconflictsincetherenewedoutbreakofhostilitiesin1996.14Whatcouldhavebeendonetosolvethesituation?AglimpsewasprovidedonAugust17,when,under

pressure from the international community and domestic opposition,Zaire’s primeminister,KengowaDondo,tookmattersintohisownhands.Thedaybefore,donorshadjustliftedthearmsembargoagainstRwanda,andKengoanticipatedwhatwastocome.Hetolddiplomatsthathewasleftwithnochoicebutto begin the forceful repatriation of refugees. Over four days, Zairian soldiers brought 12,000 Huturefugees to theborder.Theexercisewent surprisinglywell:Many refugees,glad tohaveanexcuse tobreakfreefromtheex-FAR’sgrip,voluntarilyjoinedtheconvoys.Zairianlocalauthorities,eagertoseethe troublesomeguestsgo,helpedensure theoperationwentsmoothly. Insteadofaviolentbacklashbysoldiers in thecamps,20,000refugees,mostlyyouths thought tobemilitiamembers, fled intoadjacentforests, fearing arrest by Zairian authorities. Against all expectations, there was no armed resistance.After four days, however, under pressure from Mobutu and diplomats, who denounced what theyperceivedasforcedrepatriationandaviolationofinternationallaw,theoperationsgroundtoahalt.15What constituted forceful repatriation was, however, up for debate. After all, given the ex-FAR’s

control of the camps, was voluntary return even an option? Even the United Nations’ legal advisors,usuallyrisk-averse,beganaskingwhethertheexceptionalcircumstancesmerited“bendingtherules.”InApril1996,DenisMcNamara, theUNHCRdirectorof internationalprotection, suggested thata forcedreturnhadbecomenecessaryasaresultofpressurefromZaire,aswellasalackofmoney.Hesaid,“Weexpectittobehighlycriticized.Butit’safactoflifebecauseitisunavoidable.”16

Theresponse,assooftenintheregion,wastothrowmoneyatthehumanitariancrisisbutnottoaddressthepoliticalcauses.Thespectaclewasperverse,especiallygiventheinternationalcommunity’sinactionduringthegenocide.TheUnitedStates,whichhadrefusedtointerveneintheRwandanmassacreandhadevenblockedtheUnitedNationsfromdoingso,sent3,000soldierswhosemandatewasstrictlylimitedtoassistwiththereliefeffort;France,whohadhelpedtrainandarmtheRwandanarmyandhadreceivedanofficialdelegationfromtheRwandangovernmentattheheightofthegenocide,alsohadseveralthousandsoldiersineasternZaireleftoverfromtheirhumanitarianinterventioninRwanda,OperationTurquoise.FionaTerry,theheadofDoctorsWithoutBordersintheTanzanianrefugeecamps,putiteloquently:“[Itwas]adramatic,well-publicizedshowofhumansufferinginwhichtheenemywasavirusandthesaviorwashumanitarianaid.Paralyzedduringthepoliticalcrisis,militaryforcesweresuddenlymobilizedforthe‘humanitarian’disaster,transformingthegenocideintoa‘complexemergency’inwhichtherewasnogoodandbadside,onlyvictims.”17After the first year, duringwhichboth the newand the oldRwandangovernmentswere busy taking

stockandconsolidatingtheirpower,thesituationdeterioratedrapidly.Whiletheinternationalcommunitycategorizedthesituationasahumanitariancrisis,inrealitytheRwandancivilwarcontinuedtosmolderunderground,on thevergeofexploding to thesurfaceoncemore.ByJuly1995,Rwandahad launchedthreetargetedstrikesagainstrefugeecampsinZaire,anopenprovocation.Mobutuhadnointerestindisbandingandseparatingtheexiledgovernment’svariousarmedforcesfrom

therefugees.WhenthenewRwandangovernmentdemandedthatKinshasahandoverthestateassetsthatHabyarimana’sgovernmenthadfledwith,Mobutugavethemafewcontainersofrustyammunition,twounusable helicopters, and heavy artillery in equally irreparable condition.18 The refugee crisis hadinjectednewlifeintohisailingregime.TheFrench,who,having“lost”KigalitoEnglish-speakingrebels,wereeager tomaintain their influenceoverAfrica’s largestFrench-speakingcountry,neededMobutu’spermissiontolaunchOperationTurquoise,whiletheUnitedNationscourtedKinshasatosetuptheirhugehumanitarianoperationalongtheRwandanborder.OnSeptember15, theUNSpecialRepresentativetoRwandacalledonhimtodiscusstherefugeecrisis;onNovember8,MobutuarrivedinBiarritzfortheFranco-Africansummit.Thedictatorhadleveragedhiswaybackintothefavorofhiswesternallies.Mobutu’srelationswiththeRwandanexilegovernmentwereevenmorecordial.Hehadbeenaclose

friendofPresidentHabyarimana,sendingabattalionofZairiantroopstohelpdefendRwandaagainsttheinitialRPFinvasion in1990,andhadquicklyevacuated thedeadpresident’sbody tohishometownofGbadolite.Thedeadpresident’swidow,AgatheHabyarimana,whohadbeenashadowypowerbehindthe president, joined Mobutu in Gbadolite as well, using the jungle palace as her base during thegenocide.InOctober1994,sheandherbrotherSeraphinRwabukumbaaccompaniedMobutuonastatevisit to Beijing; press reports suggest they secured $5 million in arms shipments from the Chinesegovernment,circumventingthearmsembargobyshippingtheweaponstotheZairiangovernment.19ThebodyofherhusbandlayrefrigeratedinMobutu’spalace.HerhostpromisedherthatonedayhewouldbeburiedinRwanda.

BetweenJuly1994andNovember1996,theUNSecurityCouncilissuedtenstatementsandresolutionsregarding the refugee camps inZaire, “strongly condemning,” “expressing grave concern,” andmakingother remarks of diplomatic vacillation that stopped short of committing the world body from doing

anything.NumerousUNplanningteamsvisitedthecamps,withCanadianmilitaryadvisorstakingtheleadonapossibleintervention.Theproposedforcewasjokinglycalled“the‘No’force”amongstaffinNewYorkheadquarters.“Theywouldnotgointothecampsandwouldnotdisarmthemilitiabyforce,”PeterSwarbrick,anofficialattheDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,toldme.“Itwasafigleaf.”Bytheend of 1995, Boutros Ghali had given up on military intervention and focused on alleviating thehumanitariansituation.The U.S. Congress had, in the wake of their botched deployment in Somalia in 1993, enacted

legislation that forbid U.S. troops to be placed under UN command. In the run-up to elections inNovember 1996, President Bill Clinton did not want to engage troops in a complicated, unpopularquagmire in centralAfrica.AStateDepartment official involved in the decision-making process,whowantedtoremainanonymous,toldme:“Securingthecampswasjusttoodifficult;therewasnostomachhereforthatkindofoperation.Inretrospect,couldmorehavebeendone?Definitely.”Afterall,morewasdoneinBosnia,wheretheUnitedStatesanditsEuropeanalliesdispatched60,000troopsin1995.Moreover,theU.S.governmentwasatloggerheadswiththeFrenchgovernmentontheissue.Leading

membersoftheFrenchgovernmentsawconflictintheGreatLakes20aspittingtheirsphereofinfluenceagainstanAnglo-Saxonone.Hadn’ttheRPF,anEnglish-speakingrebelmovement,takenpowerinKigalifromaFrenchally,JuvénalHabyarimana,andwasn’t itnowtrying tooverthrowanother,MobutuSeseSeko? As a senior French official was quoted anonymously as saying: “We cannot let anglophonecountriesdecideonthefutureofafrancophoneone.Inanycase,wewantMobutubackin,hecannotbedispensedwith...andwearegoingtodoitthroughthisRwandabusiness.”21TheFrenchandAmericansbattled it out in the Security Council:WheneverMadeleine Albright pushed to get tough onMobutu,Francewouldthreatentoveto;wheneverPariswantedtoincludestronglanguageonhumanrightsabusescommittedbytheRPFinRwanda,theUnitedStateswouldsoftenitup.The RPF, who were already disgusted by international inaction during the genocide, watched in

despair. “By early 1996, it was clear to us that the international community would not take action,”Patrick Karegeya, Rwanda’s intelligence chief, remembered. In August 1996, Vice President PaulKagame visited Washington, DC, where he spoke with the secretary of defense and the head of theNationalSecurityCouncil,warningthemthathewouldbeforcedtoactiftheinternationalcommunitydidnot.A StateDepartment advisorwho attended themeetings said: “We didn’t fully graspwhat hewastrying to tell us.We didn’t realize they would invade.” Despite their remonstrations, it is difficult tobelievethatWashingtonofficials,whohaddeployedamilitarytrainingandde-miningteamtoKigalitoprovide nonlethal assistance to the newgovernment,were in the dark. “Weknewwhatwas up,”RickOrth,theU.S.defenseattachéinKigali,said.“ButIdon’tthinkweevergavetheRwandangovernmentthethumbs-up.”Finally, in October 1996, the Rwandan army invaded in force under the guise of a homegrown

Congoleserebellioninordertostaveoffcriticism.JournalistsandaidworkersdeployedintherefugeecampsalongtheeasternCongoborderbegantoreportattacksby“Banyamulengerebels,”CongoleseTutsiwhohadbeen in conflictwithMobutu’s government.Their first targetswere the refugee camps in theRusizi plain, a broad, hundred-mile-long expanse of savannah and rice paddieswhere the borders ofCongo, Rwanda, andBurundimeet. Some 220,000 refugeeswere in camps there, protected by a fewhundredsoldiersonhirebytheUnitedNationsfromMobutu’sarmy.Theinvadingtroopsquicklybrokeupthesecamps,drivingsomerefugeesintoBurundi,whileprobablyamajorityfledfurtherintheCongo.ByOctober22,thetownofUviraatthetipofLakeTanganyikafellwithoutmuchfightingtotheRwandan-backed coalition. The troops thenmarched northwards along theGreat Rift Valley that connects LakeTanganyikatoLakeKivuandthatseparatestheCongotothewestfromRwandaandBurundi.Bytheend

ofOctober,theyhadtakencontrolofBukavuatthesouthernendofLakeKivu,dispersingsome300,000refugees,whohadnochoicebuttofleeintothehills,awayfromRwanda.Humanitarianofficialswerealarmedasthesicklyrefugeestheyhadbeenfeedingforthepasttwoyears

fled into the inhospitable hinterlands. Emma Bonino, European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid,warnedthat,“500,000toamillionpeopleareindangerofdying.”22Diplomatsrekindledtheideaagainofsendinginaninternationalforcetocreate“humanitariancorridors”toallowrefugees to returnhomeand toprotect aidworkers.However, thedebate soongot boggeddown in anewdiplomatic,Franco-Anglospat.FrenchforeignministerHervédeCharettepushedforthedeploymentoftheforce,focusingontheplightofHuturefugees:“Wearelookingafterournationalinterests...buttherearepeopleindanger,there are amillion.”23 The French exhorted the United States to “stop dragging its feet.” The Britishminister forOverseasDevelopment,LindaChalker, called theFrenchposition“daft.”24AmongFrenchgovernmentofficials,therumormillwasinfullgear,withseniorpolicyadvisorssuspectingtherewasanAnglo-SaxonplottodelayinterventiontoallowtheRwandan-backedinvasiontomakeheadway.InGoma,on thenorthern endofLakeKivu, theRwandanarmycrossed theborderonNovember2,

pushingover600,000refugeesintotheMugungacamp,locatedadozenmilesawayfromtheborderonthelakeside,makingthemakeshiftcampintothelargestcityintheregion.TheCanadiangovernmentsaiditwouldtaketheleadofamultinationaltaskforcetohelpprotecttherefugeesandaidworkers;theUnitedKingdomputaspecialforcesbattaliononstand-by.Finally,onNovember16,astheRwandanarmyandtherebelspreparedtoattackMugunga,theUnited

StatesagreedtopassaUNSecurityCouncilresolutionauthorizing3,000to4,000internationaltroopstodeployintheKivus,theeasternregionofthecountrythatbordersonRwanda,Uganda,andBurundi.The following day,Rwanda attackedMugunga from thewest and the lake, corrallingmost refugees

towardtheeasternroadbacktoRwanda.Halfamillionpeoplereturnedhomeinjustthreedays.AttheUNheadquartersonthewesternshoreoftheEastRiverinManhattan,PeterSwarbrickwrylyrecalledthereactionofCanadiangeneralMauriceBaril,whohadjustbeennamedtoleadthemilitaryintervention:“Itwasrelief,absoluterelief.Theinternationalcommunitywasoffthehook.”Meanwhile, as theCanadian andAmericanmilitary reconnaissance teams began to pack their bags,

anywherebetween400,000and600,000refugeeswerefleeingintothejunglesoftheeasternCongo.

3

ACOUNTRYINRUINS

Africahastheshapeofapistol,andCongoisitstrigger.—FRANTZFANON

KIGALI,RWANDA,JULY1994–SEPTEMBER1996

ThefewvisitorstoRwandainthemonthsafterthegenocidefoundasmoldering,destroyedlandscape.AthirdofthecountryhadfledtoTanzania,Zaire,andBurundi,runningfromtheRwandanPatrioticFront—theTutsirebellionledbyPaulKagame—andshepherdedonbythearmyandmilitiathathadcarriedoutthegenocide.InKigali, thecapital, theinsidesofhouseshadbeengutted,spillingclothes, toiletpaper,stuffedanimals,andtrashontothesidewalks.Notknowingwhentheywouldcomeback,orperhapsoutofspite for the advancing rebels, fleeing militiamen and civilians had stripped doors off their hinges,removed glass panes fromwindows, and unearthed sewage pipes andmiles of electric cable. Emptybulletcasingslitteredthestreets,whichwerepatrolledbyUNcars—theonlyonesapartfromafewRPFpickupsandciviliancarsstillontheroads.In the countryside, crops rotted in the field for want of workers to harvest them, and thousands of

bodieschokedthecountry’swaterways,fillingtheairwiththecloyingstenchofrottingfleshformonths.RedCrossandaidworkers trekkedthehillsonfoot,dousingthecorpseswithlimetopreventdisease,pendingburial.Thenewrulersofthecountrydrearilyinspectedtheshell-pockedgovernmentbuildings.Intheministry

ofjustice,filingcabinetsfloatedinasoupofsewageanddocuments.ThehallwaysofParliamentwerelittered with debris, bricks, and dangling electrical wires. For the meantime, the RPF’s offices werelocated in theMeridien Hotel, where the plumbing didn’t work and sandbags still lined the lightlessreceptionareaandthepoolside,andRPFofficials,UNworkers,andjournalistsworkedside-by-side.Thenewgovernmentfacedbleakdaysahead.NotacentwasleftintheCentralBank.Therewereno

cars, computers, or telephones left for thenewgovernment to use; even the stationery andpaper clipsweregone.Therewasnoelectricityorrunningwaterinmuchofthecountry;generatorsinthehospitalswere turned on just several hours a day for surgery and emergency operations.An estimated 114,000children had been orphaned by the genocide and needed looking after; 150,000 houses had beendestroyed.The most striking absence was people. Kigali had turned into a ghost town: 40 percent of the

populationwasdeadorinexile.Inthecapital,thenumbershadshrunkfrom350,000to80,000,andmanyofthoseweretheRPFandtheirfamiliesormembersoftheTutsidiasporareturnedafterdecadesinexile.Amidtherubble,thenewrulerstriedtocraftasortofnormalcy.TheRPFnamedagovernmentwitha

diverse cabinet. The president and prime minister were both Hutus, and many ministers were from

politicalpartiesotherthantheRPF,althoughthemilitaryandVicePresidentPaulKagamestillwieldedthemostpower.Allacrossthecountry,teamsofcivilservantsandvolunteerssetaboutcleaningupthedebris,buryingbodies,andrebuildingkeyinstallations.Nofamilywassparedbytheviolence.Over90percentofchildrenandyouthshadwitnessedviolence

and believed they would die; only slightly fewer had experienced a death in their family. A studypublishedinapsychiatricjournalestimatedthatone-fourthofallRwandanssufferedfromposttraumaticstresssyndrome.1Theycalledthesepeopleihahamuka,“withoutlungs”or“breathlesswithfear.”Theywould walk through town, catatonic, jumping when a bus honked or someone came up behind themunannounced.Manyfamiliesadoptedorphansofthegenocideortookindistraughtrelatives.PaulKagamehimselftookinfivechildren.2ThegenocideformedthegrimbackdroptothepreparationsfortheRPF’sinvasionoftheCongo.Itwas

thestartingpointforeverythingthatfollowedinRwanda:politics,culture, theeconomy—everything.Ittransfixed society and dominated the government’s vision for the future. More importantly, the emptyhousesandabandonedvillagesremindedthecountry’sleadersthatthewarwasnotyetover.Ontheradiointhewestofthecountry,ontheborderwithCongo,onecouldhearthegovernmentinexilebroadcastingfrom the refugee camps, claiming to be Rwanda’s legitimate government. For the survivors of thegenocide,manyofwhomhadlostmembersoftheirfamilies,thegénocidaires’presenceinthecampswasalivinginsult.

Rwanda’sunquestionablerulerwasPaulKagame.Officially,thethirty-seven-year-oldwasvicepresidentandministerofdefense,buthehadledtheRPFsincetheearlydaysoftherebellionandhadfirmcontroloverthegovernment.Agaunt,bonymanwithwire-rimmedspectaclesandamethodicalstyleofspeaking,Kagameleftanimpressiononpeople.Hedidn’tsmoke,drink,orhavemuchtimeforexpensiveclothesorbeautifulwomen.Hewasn’tgiventofloweryspeechorelaborateprotocol.Hiswardrobeapparentlyonlycontaineddrab,double-breastedsuitsthathunglooselyfromhisthinframe,plainpoloshirts,andcombatfatigues.Theonlyentertainmentheapparentlyindulgedinwastennis,whichheplayedattheSportsClubwithRPF colleagues and diplomats. Passersbywould be alarmed by the soldiers standing guardwithmachineguns.Kagame’s obsessionswere order anddiscipline.Hepersonally expropriated hisministers’ vehicles

when he thought those public funds could have been used for a better purpose. He exuded ambition,browbeatinghisministerswhentheydidn’tliveuptohisexpectations.Hecomplainedtoajournalist:“Inthepeoplehere,thereissomethingIcannotreconcilewith.It’speopletakingtheirtimewhentheyshouldbe moving fast, people tolerating mediocrity when things could be done better. I feel they are notbothered, not feeling the pressure of wanting to be far ahead of where we are. That runs my wholesystem.”3This asceticism had been forged in the harsh conditions of exile.Kagame’s firstmemorieswere of

housesburningonthehillsandhispanickedmotherscramblingintoacarasalocalmobranafterthem.Thiswasin1961,whenanticipationofindependencefromBelgiumhadledtopogromsagainsttheTutsicommunity, which had been privileged by the colonial government. Around 78,000 Tutsi had fled toUganda,with another 258,000 going to other neighboring countries.4 LikemanyRPF leaders,KagamegrewupasarefugeeinUganda,livinginagrass-thatchedhutwhileattendingschoolonascholarship.

“Youwillalwayshearmetalkingabouttheimportanceofdignity,”helatercommented.

Itisreallythekeytopeople’slives,andobviouslyformeitrelatesbacktotherefugeecamp,theliningupforfoodeveryday,therationing.Whenwestartedprimaryschool,weusedtostudyunderatree.Weusedtowriteonourthighswithapieceofdry,hardgrass,andtheteacherwouldcomeoverandlookatyourthigh,andwritehismarkwithanotherpieceofdrygrass.Youdevelopsomesenseofquestioning,somesenseofjustice,saying,“WhydoIlivelikethis?Whyshouldanybodylivelikethis?”5

The squalid conditions of the refugee camps and the animosity of their Ugandan neighbors wereconstantremindersthatthiswasnothisrealhome.HismotherwasfromtheroyalfamilyinRwanda—hisgreat-aunthadbeenthequeen—andtheirstoriesofroyalgrandeurandauthoritywereafarcryfromtheUNhandouts they lived on in the camps.When his schoolmateswent to play, he preferred to sitwithformerTutsiguerrillafightersandlistentostoriesabouttheirbattleagainsttheHutu-dominatedregimeinthe1960s.6Afterhefinishedhighschool,Kagameventuredacross theborder toseeforhimselfwhathis fabled

homeland had become.Hewas harassed for being aTutsi, but he felt exhilarated by being among hispeopleonhisland.Hesatinbars,sippingasoftdrinkandlisteningtoconversations.HespentseveralafternoonswalkingbythepresidentialpalaceinKigali,drawnmagneticallytotheseatofpowerthatwasattherootofhisexileinUganda,untilsecurityguardsgotsuspiciousandtoldhimtoscram.BackinUganda,fellowrefugeestoldhimaboutaUgandanrebellionthatwasbeingformedinTanzania

tooverthrowthedictatorIdiAmin,whohaddiscriminatedagainsttherefugeesforyears.LedbyYoweriMuseveni, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) recruited heavily among the Tutsi refugees. Itseemedperfectforthetwenty-two-year-oldKagame,whowasitchingtoriseupoutofthesqualorofthecamps.His sternanddisciplined temperamentdrewhim towork inmilitary intelligence,abranch thatshaped his outlook on politics. He received training in Tanzania, in Cuba, and, much later, at FortLeavenworthintheUnitedStates.WhentheNRMtookpowerin1986,Kagame’sfiercedisciplineearnedhimapositionattheheadof

themilitarycourts,investigatingandprosecutingsoldiers’breachesofdiscipline.Amongdetractorsandsupportersalike,hebecameknownas“Pilato,”shortforPontiusPilate,becauseoftheharshwayhedealtwithanyviolationofthemilitarycode.Soldierswhostolefromciviliansorembezzledfuelfrommilitarystockswouldbe lockedup;more seriousviolationscouldearnaplace in frontof a firing squad. “Hecan’t stand venality or indiscipline—it provokes an almost physical reaction of disgust in him,” aUgandanjournalistwhoknewhimduringthistime,remembered.7Kagame was soon promoted to become the head of Ugandan military intelligence, a position that

provided a perfect vantage point fromwhich to pursue his true ambition: overthrowing the Rwandangovernment.HeplottedtogetherwithotherRwandanrefugeeswhohadrisentoleadershippositionsintheUgandanarmy,positioningstocksofweaponsandsecretlyrecruitingotherRwandanstotheircause.In1990,theyattacked.TheguerrillastruggleinRwandawasmarkedbyself-sacrificeandharshconditions.Intheearlyyears

of the rebellion, the RPF was beaten back into the high-altitude bamboo forests of the volcanoes innorthwesternRwanda,where temperaturesatnightdroppedtofreezingandtherewaslittlefoodordryfirewood. Kagame enforced draconian discipline, executing soldiers suspected of treason or trying todesert.8Heperfectedhishit-and-runguerrilla tactics,harrying theenemy,attackingconvoys,butneverengaginginlarge,conventionalbattles.People who met Kagame and his RPF colleagues during this time were impressed by the rebels’

dedication.Therefugeecampsandyearsinexilehadsteeledthemandmadethemrelyoneachother.This

ethicwasnotnewtotheirculture.TheprecolonialRwandankingdomhadbeenforgedovercenturiesofwarfare, leading to a central, Tutsi-led royal court with large standing armies. Stories of great Tutsiwarriorswereembellishedandpasseddownthroughthegenerations.ThemostfamousRwandandance,intore,wasawardancethattheRPFthemselvessometimespracticedaroundthecampfire,stampingtheirfeetandmimickingcows’hornswiththeirarms.Kagame’s exploits and discipline earned him praise from around the world. General John

Shalikashvili, theAmericanchairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,studiedKagame’smilitarytacticsandpraisedhimasoneofthebestguerrillaleadersindecades.9“Kagameisanintellectualfigure.Iwouldrate him as a firstrate operational fighter,” a former director of the U.S. Army School for AdvancedMilitaryStudiessaid.“Heunderstandsdiscipline.Heunderstandsspeed.Heunderstandsmobility.”10

After the overthrow of the Habyarimana regime, RPF leaders celebrated victory in Kigali; Ugandanwaragi—astrongginmadeoutofmillet—wasafavorite.MixedwithCocaCola,itwasdubbed“KigaliLibre”byRPFofficers.Kagame, however,was typically reserved. Thewarwas not yet over, he told his army colleagues.

TherewasmerelyatruceenforcedbyaninternationalborderwithZaire.Athirdofthepopulationwasstill living in camps outside the country, and rebels were regularly caught with grenades anddisassembledweaponsinthemainmarketinKigali.Everymonthbroughtassassinationsoflocalofficialsandattacksonarmycamps.In themeantime,Rwandan frustrationswith internationaldonors stewed.Notonlyhad they failed to

interveneduringthegenocide,buttheywerenowfeedingthegénocidairesandallowingthemtorearm.Despiteanarmsembargoonthegovernment-in-exile,armstradersflewover$8millioninweaponstothedefeatedRwandan army inGoma andBukavu in themonths just after the genocide.Hundreds of newrecruitswere being trained on soccer pitches next to the refugee camps, oftenwithin sight of Zairiansoldiers.Despitethehand-wringingandhorrorattheRwandangenocidethathadfinallygrippedwesterncapitals, the international community was once again abandoning Rwanda. Kagame fulminated to thepress:“Ithinkwehavelearnedalotaboutthehypocrisyanddoublestandardsonthepartofpeoplewhoclaimthattheywanttomakethisworldabetterplace.”11In early 1995, Kagame, usually known for his cool, deliberate style, began to lose his temper.

“Wheneverwebroughtuptheissueoftherefugeecamps,hewouldraisehisvoiceandbanghisfistonthetable,”aformergovernmentadvisorrecalled.Kagame was briefed every day by his intelligence services on the situation in Zaire. Rwandan

operatives had infiltrated the camps andMobutu’s army, providing blow-by-blow details about armsshipments,troopmovements,andpoliticaldevelopments.In February 1995, Kagame traveled to his home commune of Tambwe, where he told gathered

villagers, “I hopewith all ofmyheart that they do attack!Let them try!”Severalweeks later, he toldjournalistsinKigalithathisgovernmentwouldpursueanycriminalswhoattackedRwandabyattackingthecountrywheretheywerefound.12“WehadtoldMobutupubliclytomovethecampsfromtheborder.Herefused.WetoldtheUNtomove

the camps. They refused. So we told them we would find a solution ourselves,” Ugandan presidentYoweriMusevenisaid.13

Withinayearofthegenocide,Kagamebeganplanningmilitaryactionagainstthecamps.Butheknewthathewouldhavetoproceedcarefully,andhecouldn’tgoitalone.Inaregionwhereinternationaldonorssupplyonaveragehalfofgovernmentbudgets,andwherethelegacyofFrench,U.S.,andRussianpowerpoliticswasapparent,blatantviolationsofsovereigntyhadtobeplannedcarefully.FortunatelyforKagame,itwasn’tdifficult tofindallies.Mobutuhadangeredenoughgovernmentsto

spawnabroadallianceofAfricanstatesagainsthim.By1995,analphabetsoupofrebelmovementshadtaken advantage ofZaire’sweak security services andMobutu’swillingness to support his neighbors’enemies,creatingacomplexwebofalliancesandproxymovementsintheregionthatcouldconfuseevencloseobservers:REBELGROUPSBASEDINZAIRE

Angolan

NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola(UNITA) 2,000–15,000

FrontfortheLiberationoftheEnclaveofCabinda(FLEC) 1,000–3,000

Ugandan

WestNileBankLiberationFront(WNBLF) 1,000–2,000

UgandaMuslimLiberationArmy(UMLA) 100–1,000

AlliedDemocraticMovement(ADM) 100–1,000

NationalArmyfortheLiberationofUganda(NALU) 100–1,000

Burundian

ForcesfortheDefenseofDemocracy(FDD) 1,000–3,000

NationalLiberationForces(FNL) N/A

Rwandan

Ex-RwandanArmedForces(ex-FAR) 30,000

Interahamweandothermilitias 20,000–40,000

Unfortunately forMobutu, he had become ideologically outdated.The political leadership ofAfricawaschangingasanewgenerationofleaders,mostofwhomhadthemselvesoncebeenrebels,cametopower. Between 1986 and 1994, ideologically inspired rebels ousted repressive regimes in Ethiopia,

Eritrea, Uganda, andRwanda. Coded cables sent to European andAmerican capitals from embassiesspokeofanewbreedofAfricanleaders,apparentlydifferentfromthecorruptandbrutaldictatorswhohadruledmuchofAfricasinceindependence.Althoughtheyallhadbeguntheircareersassocialists,aftercomingtopowertheyinitiallyendorsedtheprinciplesoffreemarketsandliberaldemocracyandwereenthusiastically greeted by western leaders. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright swooned:“Africa’sbestnewleadershavebroughtanewspiritofhopeandaccomplishmenttoyourcountries—andthatspiritissweepingacrossthecontinent....Theyshareanenergy,aself-relianceandadeterminationtoshapetheirowndestinies.”14

Kagame’smostobviousallywasUganda.Hehadfoughtside-by-sidewithPresidentMuseveniforsevenyears,and thenhadservedashischiefof intelligence foranother four.The twohadattended thesamehigh school in southernUganda, andKagame had stayedwithUgandanmilitary officerswhen he tookleavefromthefrontlinesduringtheRwandancivilwar.ManyotherRwandancommandershadalsobeenbornandraisedinUganda.More than justpersonal linkswere involved,however.By theearly1990s,PresidentMuseveniwas

becomingembroiledinalow-scaleproxywarwithhisneighbortothenorth,Sudan.In1993,MusevenihadbegunprovidingmilitarysupporttoSudaneserebels,knownastheSudanPeople’sLiberationArmy,aspartofaregionalstrategy(endorsedbytheUnitedStates)todestabilizetheSudanesegovernment.ThegovernmentinKhartoumreciprocatedbyfundingandarminghalfadozenUgandanrebelgroups,aswellastheRwandanex-FAR.15 Inaddition,Museveni,whowascelebratinghis firstdecade inpower,hadbeen lookingaround the region for economicopportunities forhisgovernment.Foryears,hehadbeendreamingaboutfosteringbusinessbetweennorthwesternZaireandUganda—muchofthelucrativetimber,diamonds,andpalmoilfromthatregionhadtopassthroughUgandatogetontotheinternationalmarket,and theburgeoningUgandanmanufacturingsectorcouldpeddle its soap,mattresses,andplastics to themillionsofZairianslivingthere.Kagamebegantotalktohiscolleaguesandfriendsabouttakingaction.HetraveledfrequentlytoState

House in Kampala and to safari lodges in southern Uganda to speak to his former mentor and boss,Museveni.TheUgandanpresident,moreused to the intrigues andpitfalls of international politics thanKagame,warnedhimnottoactbrashly.HeworriedparticularlyabouttheFrenchgovernment,whichstillhadtiestotheRwandangovernment-in-exileandcoulduseitspowertounderminetheirattack.Theolderman warned Kagame: You need to have the backing of the world powers—the United States, SouthAfrica, theUnitedKingdom—tosucceed indramaticallychanging theconstellationofpower inAfrica.AsbothMuseveniandKagamehad learned in theirowninsurgencies, the internationalcommunitywasinherentlyhostiletoforeigninvasionsbutturnedablindeyetodomesticrebellionsthatcalledthemselvesliberationstruggles.GolookforCongoleserebels,hetoldKagame,whocouldactasafigleafforRwandaninvolvement.

HeintroducedhimtoaveteranCongoleserebelleaderbasedoutofDaresSalaam,Tanzania’sbusinesscapitalontheIndianOcean,whomhehadmetinthe1980s,atalkativeandcorpulentmancalledLaurentKabila.16

Nexton the listwasAngola.This formerPortuguesecolony to the southofZairehadbeen fightinganinsurgencybackedbytheUnitedStatesandSouthAfricaforovertwodecades:theNationalUnionfortheTotal Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi. Since the end of the cold war, U.S.support forSavimbihaddisappeared,buthecontinuedhis rebellion,sustainedbyhugediamondminesclosetotheZairianborder.MobutuwasSavimbi’smainremaininglifeline.HehadallowedtheAngolanrebels to trafficdiamonds throughZaire formanyyears, skimminghandsomelyoff thedeals.When theinternational community imposed an arms embargo against UNITA in 1993, Mobutu provided fakepaperwork tomilitary providers in eastern Europe to allow Savimbi to buyweapons.17 The beardedrebel appeared regularly inKinshasa, landing his aircraft at the international airport andmeetingwithMobutuinfullmilitaryregalia.ThewarwithUNITAwas understandably an obsession for theAngolan government. In 1996, there

were1.2milliondisplacedpeopleinthecountry,amountingto10percentofthetotalpopulation,andthegovernmentwasspendingoverhalfofitsbudgetonthemilitary.18JonasSavimbiwasmakingmillionsofdollars indiamondsalesayear,andhehadhisown impressive, illegalnetworks forsellinggemsandpurchasingweapons.19 Although both sides had signed a peace deal in 1994, neither side believed itwouldhold.Apreviousagreementhadresulted inbloodyclashes in thecapital,Luanda,afterSavimbirejectedelectionswonbyhisrivals.In the fall of 1996, Kagame sent his intelligence chief to Luanda to negotiate the government of

Angola’sparticipationinhisplans.Theresponsewascautious.TheAngolangovernmentcouldn’taffordtogetboggeddowninaprotractedwarineasternCongowhileitfacedSavimbi’sthreatathome.“Theyweren’tsure;theyneededalotofconvincing,”amemberofthedelegationlaterrecalled.20Angolawasheavily dependent on loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; an overtinterventioninaforeigncountrycouldhavejeopardizeditsinternationalstanding.21AngolanpresidentDosSantosofferedacompromise.TheywouldsendtheKatanganTigersandsome

logisticalhelp.TheTigers—ordiabos, theDevils,as they liked tocall themselves—were troopsfromsouthern Congo who had fought for the secession of Katanga Province in 1960. After their defeat,thousandsof these troopshadfled intonorthernAngola,where,over theyears, theyfought first for thePortuguesecolonialgovernmentandthen,afterindependencein1975,fortheAngolangovernment.

Bymid-1996,MuseveniandKagamehadstitchedtogetheranimpressiveallianceofAfricangovernmentsbehindtheirdrivetooverthrowMobutu.ThewarthatstartedinZaireinSeptember1996wasnot,aboveall,acivilwar.Itwasaregionalconflict,pittinganewgenerationofyoung,visionaryAfricanleadersagainstMobutuSeseSeko,thecontinent’sdinosaur.NeverhadsomanyAfricancountriesunitedmilitarilybehindonecause,leadingsometodubthewarAfrica’sWorldWar.Unlikethatwar,however,thebattlefortheCongowouldnotbecarriedoutintrenchesoveryears,leadingtomillionsofmilitarycasualties.Here, thebattleswereshortand thenumberof soldierskilled in the thousands, figuresdwarfedby thenumberofcivilianskilled.UnlikeWorldWarII,theAfricanalliesbandedtogethernotagainstaggressiveexpansionism,butagainsttheweaknessoftheenemy.

Theleaderofthiscoalitionwasitsyoungest,smallestmember:Rwanda.ItwastypicaloftheRPF,whohadplayedDavidtoGoliathseveraltimesbeforeandwoulddosoagainlater.Attheoutset,itseemedtobetheperfectembodimentofajustwar:Kigaliwasactingasalastresortbasedonlegitimatesecurityconcerns.What seemsobvious inhindsight—thatMobutu’sarmyhadbeen reduced toamockeryof itself, that

Mobutu’sholdonpowerhadcrumbled—wasavaguehypothesisinRPFintelligencebriefingsatthetime.WhenKagametoldhisofficers that theywouldgoall thewaytoKinshasa, theynoddedpolitelybut inprivateshook theirheads.Thatwasa journeyofover1,000miles, throughunknownterrain,similar towalkingfromNewYorktoMiamithroughswampsandjunglesandacrossdozensofrivers.Theywouldhavetofightagainst50,000ofMobutu’ssoldiersaswellasperhaps50,000ex-FARandInterahamwe.Itseemedimpossible.“WeneverthoughtwecouldmakeitallthewaytoKinshasa,”PatrickKaregeya,theRwandanintelligencechief,toldme.Itiseasytoforget,nowthatgreedandplunderclaimtheheadlinesasthemainmotivesforconflictin

theregion,thatitsbeginningsweresteepedinideology.TheRwandan-backedinvasionwasperhapstheheyday of the African Renaissance, riding on the groundswell of the liberation of South Africa fromapartheid,andofEritrea,Ethiopia,andRwandafromdictatorships.Itwasanalliancemotivatedinpartby the strategic interests of individual governments, but also by a larger spirit of pan-Africanism.Notsince theheydayof apartheid inSouthAfricahad thecontinent seen this sortofmobilizationbehindacause.Fortheleadersofthemovement,itwasaproudmomentinAfricanhistory,whenAfricansweredoingitfor themselvesinfaceofprevaricationfromthewestandUnitedNations.Zimbabweprovidedtensofmillionsofdollarsinmilitaryequipmentandcashtotherebellion.EritreasentabattalionfromitsnavytoconductcovertspeedboatoperationsonLakeKivu.EthiopiaandTanzaniasentmilitaryadvisors.PresidentMusevenirecalled:“ProgressiveAfricanopinionwasgalvanised.”22TheoptimismofthedaywassummedupbySouthAfricaleaderThaboMbeki,whojustmonthsbefore

thebeginningofthewarhadmadehisfamousendorsementofpan-Africanism:

IamAfrican.IambornofthepeoplesofthecontinentofAfrica.ThepainofviolentconflictthatthepeoplesofLiberia,Somalia,theSudan,BurundiandAlgeriaisapainIalsobear.Thedismalshameofpoverty,sufferingandhumandegradationofmycontinent

isablightthatweshare....

Whateverthesetbacksofthemoment,nothingcanstopusnow!Whateverthedifficulties,Africashallbeatpeace!Howeverimprobableitmaysoundtothesceptics,Africawillprosper!23

Absentfromthesetalks,however,weretheCongolese.Theircountrywastobeliberatedforthembyforeignerswhoknewlittletonothingoftheircountry.Andofcourse,theseforeignerswouldsoondevelopotherintereststhanjusttopplingMobutu.Within severalyears, theCongowas tobecome thegraveyard for this lofty rhetoricofnewAfrican

leadershipaspreachedbyMbeki,Albright,andmanyothers.Freedomfightersweredowngradedtomeremarauding rebels; self-defense looked evermore like an excuse for self-enrichment.LeaderswhohaddenouncedthebigmenofAfricawhostayedinpowerfordecadesbeganappearingmoreandmoreliketheverycreaturestheyhadfoughtagainstforsomanydecades.In1996,however,thefutureremainedbright.

4

SIXDAYS

BUKAVU,ZAIRE,OCTOBER8,1996

AllBanyamulenge rememberOctober 8, 1996.On that day,LwasiLwabanji, the vice governor of theprovince,made hisway to the governor’s office inBukavu in amotorcade, accompanied by a pickupbristlingwithsoldiers.ThetownwasalivewithrumorsoftheimpendingRwandaninvasion.BukavuisabordertownintheeasternCongo,builtonfivehillypeninsulasonthesouthernendofLake

Kivu,separatedonlybyanarrowriverfromRwanda.Fromthemainstreet,onecouldseetheRwandanarmy positions in the hills to the east, low camouflaged bivouacswith soldiersmilling about. A fewweeksbefore, theZairianarmyhadexchangedartilleryfirewith thesepositions,provokingmortarandmachine gun fire into Bukavu’s residential areas. Travelers arriving from the south brought stories ofnightlyinfiltrationsfromRwandaacrosstheRusiziRiverandfightingbetweenZairiantroopsandrebelsthere.Lwabanji was of medium build, with an urbane manner he had cultivated during his studies in

Kinshasa.WiththemilitarygovernorathousandmilesawayinthecapitalKinshasa,thetaskofdealingwiththeday-to-dayadministrationoftheprovincehadfallentohim.Thethreatofanattackdidnotdaunthim; on the radio, he had boasted of the Zairian army’s prowess. “Wewill crush Rwanda if they trysomething,”hepromised,bolsteredbytheanti-RwandansentimentsimmeringinBukavu’sstreets.NooneimaginedthatRwanda,acountryninetytimessmaller,couldseriouslychallengeZaire—intermsofsize,itwouldbelikeSwitzerlandtryingtoconquerallofwesternEurope.1Atthegovernor’soffice,acrowdoflocalandinternationaljournalistsawaitedhim,aswellasseveral

dozen legislators in suitsand ties.Thebuilding’sconference room, likemuchofZaire’s infrastructure,had fallen into disrepair. Windows were cracked or nonexistent, the yellow paint was peeling, andcorridors smelled faintlyof sewage.Thevicegovernorhadcome toaddress the issueoneverybody’smindsandlips:theapproachingrebels,referredtobymostas“theBanyamulenge.”The Banyamulenge are a small community of Tutsi, the minority ethnic group in Rwanda, who

emmigrated from Rwanda and Burundi to the Congo between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,settlingintheremotehighlandpasturestothesouthofBukavu.Onlyafewyearsearlier,mostpeopleinBukavuhadneverheardofthem.Thewar,however,catapultedthemtonationalignominy;itcametobeknownastheBanyamulenge’swar.Lwabanjiresortedtothekindofanti-TutsihyperboletypicalofmanyCongolesepoliticians:“Insome

villagesofthehighlandsinwhichtheBanyamulengeregularlyexterminatecivilianpopulation,thelatterarealreadydefendingthemselveswiththeirbarehands,knivesandsometimestheycapturefirearmsfromtheBanyamulenge.”Heclearedhis throat. “Idemand thepopulation in thehighlands todescend to theshores of the lake.Wewill consider everybodywho stays in the high plateau as rebels.” Striding outthrough the hallway afterwards, a journalist accosted him. How much time would they give the

Banyamulengetopacktheirbelongingsandleave?“Ithinkaweekwillbeenough,”hesaid.“Sixdays.”2Intimesoftension,radioswerealmostlikeanappendageformanyZairians,theonlymeansofgetting

reliable information.The first sound invillages,beforeeven thecock’scrow, isoften thecrackleofashortwave receiver, as people tune in to the 5 o’clock Radio France International or BBC SwahiliServicebroadcast,whichisrelativelystatic-freeintheearlymorninghours.InBukavu,ontheirwaytowork,pedestrianstypicallywalkwiththeirradiosinfrontofthemorclaspedclosetotheirear,listeningtothenews.ManyBanyamulengeheardLwabanji’sspeechhuddledaroundradios.Othersheardof itbywordof

mouth,thedetailsdistortedwitheveryretelling.Withinseveraldays,thenewshadspreadthatthevicegovernor had tendered a six-day ultimatum for allBanyamulenge to leave forRwanda or be attacked.Lwabanji later protested that the regrouping of the Banyamulenge community was for their ownprotection, and in villages in Zaire, not in Rwanda. His explanation was to little avail; for theBanyamulenge,hisnamewashenceforthtiedtoevictionfromtheircountry.3

LwabanjiwasnotaloneinsinglingouttheBanyamulengecommunity.AskarandomCongolesewhattherootofthewarwas,andheorshewillusuallyanswer,“Rwanda,”or“theBanyamulenge.”Asthewardragged on, their notoriety grew, spreading far afield from their home in the highlands of the easternCongo. This despite their size: The Banyamulengemake up only several decimal points of the entireCongolese population, between 100,000 and 300,000 people out of 60 million. However, given theBanyamulenge’s close ethnic ties to the new Rwandan government—both belong largely to the Tutsicommunity—thewarcatapultedtheirleaderstothefrontofthepoliticalscene.Fromcompleteobscurity,theybecamearguablythecountry’smosthatedgroup,attractingvenomfromchurchleaders,humanrightsactivists,andpoliticiansalike.BenjaminSerukizaemergedasaleadingfigureintheBanyamulengecommunityduringthewar.Hewas

vicegovernorofSouthKivuthroughoutthewar,representingthecommunityatthehighestlevelintheirhome province.When I saw him in his apartment in downtownKinshasa inNovember 2007, hewasunemployed,havingleftpolitics.Dressedinanuntuckedpinkshirtandplasticflip-flops,hetoldmehewastiredofpolitics—“thatneverhelpedusmuch”—andwastryingtoleavetheCongotogetajobinaninternationalorganization.4Serukiza’s features conformedwith the stereotypesmanyCongolesehaveofBanyamulenge.Hewas

over six feet tall, with high cheekbones, a thin and hooked nose, and slightly protruding teeth. InCongoleseFrench,somewordsareknowntoilliteratefarmersthateducatedBelgiansandFrenchrarelyuse.Morphologiewasoneofthem;Banyamulengewouldlearnitaschildren,knowingthatitconnotedavulnerability,adanger.“Hismorphologyissuspicious,”onesometimesheardpeoplesayingwhentheysuspectedsomeoneofbeingTutsi.Asifyoucouldtellsomeone’ssubversionbyhisbonestructureortheslantofhisnose.Thepostwarhousingof the former rebelscanbe revealing.Serukiza’s threebedroomflatnext to the

justice ministry was bare and run-down, a far cry from the gaudy interiors of some of his formercolleagues. The windowswere draped with slightly dirty voile curtains, the tables covered in cheapplastic spreads. The toilet—to my embarrassment—did not flush, and the doors were loose on theirhinges, sticking in their frames.Most tellingly, in a countrywhere importance can bemeasured in the

numberofcellphonesandfrequencyofcalls,heonlyhadonephone,whichremainedsilentthroughoutourthree-hourmeeting.When IaskedSerukizaabout thewar,he seemedwearyof thesubject, likeawitness interrogateda

dozen times but with little faith in justice. Instead of beginning in 1996, however, he started fourgenerations earlier, with his ancestors’ arrival in the country. Like other persecuted minorities, theBanyamulengehaveanobsessivesenseofhistory,clingingtonamesanddates.“Thetruthis,wehavenoideawhenweleftRwanda.Accordingtohistorians,itwasinthemid-nineteenthcentury.AllIknowisthat my great-grandfather was born in the Congo. But they still call us Rwandans! Imagine callingAmericansBritish.”

The controversy surrounding the Banyamulenge focuses on when they arrived in the Congo. TheirdetractorsdismissthemasrecentimmigrantswhoaremoreRwandanthanCongolese.Theyoftenrefertocolonialmapsoftribes,pointingoutthatno“Tutsi”or“Banyamulenge”markeristobefounduntilafterindependence in 1960.Most academics, not tomention thousands of Banyamulenge, disagree. IsidoreNdaywel,a leadingCongolesehistorian,writes inhisGeneralHistoryof theCongo: “[TheRwandanimmigration] is confirmed by oral sources from Rwanda that evoke the departure of lineages fromKinyaga(Rwanda) in the19thcenturyto install themselves inMulenge.Thereasonsfor thismovementwasreportedlythesearchforbetterpastures,butinparticularalsotheflightfromattacksbyKingKigeriRwabugiri(1853–1895),whowasdeterminedtobringanendtoKinyaga’sautonomy.”5Itislikelythatroamingpastoralistshadbeenvisitingthehighplateauforcenturies,fleeingthefrequent

fightingbetweendifferentclansindenselypopulatedBurundiandRwandaandtryingtofindnewpasturesfor their cattle to graze. The nineteenth-century wars in Rwanda just fueled these migrations.6 Otherfactorsprobablycontributedtotheirexodus,includingadevastatingrinderpestepidemicthatkilledupto90percentofcattleinsomepartsofRwanda,aswellasthearrivalofEuropeanswithsmallpoxandotherdiseases around the same time.7Most Banyamulenge have only a vague idea, passed on through theirelders,ofwhentheirancestorsfirstcametotheCongo.Beforethewar,almostnonehadknownrelativesinRwanda.TheBanyamulenge’soriginalexodustookthecattleherdersacrosstheRusiziplainintowhatistoday

Congolese territory. There the immigrants and their cattle fled the malaria that is endemic at loweraltitudesandscaledtheItombwemountainrange.TheysettledinthetownofMulenge,fromwhichtheyderive theirname.Tensionswith theirneighborssoonarose.TheTutsiarepastoralists,and theircowstrampled their neighbors’ fields. The newcomers also ate different food, had their own myths, andadheredtoparticularconjugalhabits.TheBanyamulengepoetMuyengezadistilledthesetensions,alongwithhiscommunity’sdefiance,intoastanza:

TheycameacrossTheycameacrosstheshoresofLakeTanganyikaTheywereswallowedbyapythonItfoundthemtoostrongtocrush.8

AsinmuchofAfrica,landintheeasternCongowasmanagedbytraditionalchiefs.WhileinitiallythelocalrulerfromtheFulirotribewashappytoleaselandtothenewcomersinreturnforcows,relations

deterioratedwhen the traditional chief hikedup their tribute in the1920s, promptingBanyamulenge tomovetohigher,lessaccessiblepasturesawayfromhiscontrol.TheBanyamulenge’sresentmentwasalsostokedbytheBelgiancolony’srefusaltogivethemtheirownadministrativeentityforfearofalienatingneighboringcommunities.ThehungerforlandrightsbecameacentralconcerninBanyamulengepoliticsandreligion.Duringthe

upheavalof the1960s, severalevangelicalprophetscameforward,allclaiming that theyhad receivedpropheciesaboutapromisedland,theirownCanaan.In1972,aprayergroupreceiveddivineinstructionthattheyshouldgotoaplacecalledNyabibuye,wheretheyweretoldbyGodtolooktothewest,theeast,thenorth,andthesouth—“thelandsurroundedbyhorizonsthatyoureyesareseeing,Iwillmakeityourdwellingplace.”9

Thepostindependenceperiodwasa tumultuous timefor theCongo,as thecountrycrumbled intochaosfollowingtheassassinationofitsindependenceleaderandfirstprimeminister,PatriceLumumba.InApril1964, the rebellion reached the eastern Congo, led by Lumumba’s followers and fueled by localcommunal grievances against the central state. One of the leaders sent to mobilize the locals fromneighboring Burundi was Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a hitherto little-known youth leader from Katangaprovince.Black-and-whitepicturesshowagrinningtwenty-five-year-oldKabilawithlongsideburnsandabuddingafro,hischubbyfacesomehowtoobigforhisstillrelativelytrimframe,accentuatedbybell-bottomedjeans.ItwasintothistenseenvironmentthatSerukizawasbornin1964.Heremembershismothertellinghim

storiesaboutrebelsstreamingthroughtheirvillagesarmedwithbamboo,machineguns,andmachetesandshouting“Mai!”invokingtheritualwater,ormai,theybelievedmadetheminvincibletobullets.Shealsotoldhimaboutagroupofwhitesoldierswhospokeaforeignlanguageandwereonlyknownbytheordertheyarrivedinthecountry:moja,mbili,tatu(one,two,threeinSwahili),andsoon.Serukizasmiles.“Itwasonlymuch later that she foundout that thesewereCubans and that tatu, the third to arrive in thecountry, was Che Guevara.” In the cold war world of international proxy warfare, the mountains ofMulengehadbecomeabattlegroundbetweenCubaandtheUnitedStates.Therebellionexacerbatedthetensionsbetweenthecommunities,asKabila’srebelsbegantopreyon

theBanyamulenge’scattle.“ItwassomesortofbizarreMarxistapproach,”Serukizasaid,“anyonewithcattlewas rich and therefore bourgeois and close toKinshasa.Butwewere peasants!” Thousands ofBanyamulengefledtotheshoresofLakeTanganyika,wheretheythought theycouldfindprotectionandaid, but many died of malaria and malnutrition, unaccustomed to the hot climate. Desperate, theBanyamulengesentadelegation,includingoneofSerukiza’suncles,toconvinceMobutu’sarmytocometotheirrescue.TheBanyamulenge’ssidingwithMobutumarkedtheirentryintoregionalpoliticsandtheoriginofopen

hostilitieswiththeneighboringcommunities.In1966,Kabila’srebelsattackedaBanyamulengevillage,forcingdozensintoachurchandmassacringthem,promptinghundredsofBanyamulengetojoinMobutu’sForces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) and beat back the rebels from their pastures in the high plateau.10Kabila’stroops’abusesledBanyamulenge,whoattachgreatvaluetocows,todubhim“theonewhocutscows’teats.”Serukiza’smothertoldhimthatnomilkwouldflowwhereKabilahadbeen.“Therearemanyironiesinourhistory,”SerukizaphilosophizedasacoolbreezeblewinofftheCongo

River.“WhowouldhavethoughtthatKabilawouldleadusmanyyearslatertooverthrowMobutu?”

Whenaskedaboutdiscrimination,manyTutsi in theCongo immediatelybringupschoolyard taunts.Aseverywhere, schools were places of socialization, where the ground rules were laid out. The mostcommoninsultwasbor,whichwas localslangfor“thing”aswellas“penis.”“For them,wewerenobetter than objects,” Serukiza remembered.Across the border, inBurundi,wheremanyBanyamulengefled,theywerecallkijujuafteralocalplantthatlookedlikecassavabutcouldn’tbeeaten—auseless,treacherous substance. “They had songs they used to sing about us,” Serukiza said. “They were allvariations on ‘Banyamulenge, go home toRwanda.’They also called us ‘RRR’: ‘RwandansReturn toRwanda,’ or kafiri, uncircumcised—that was a huge insult for us. We aren’t Rwandans.” For manycommunities in the eastern Congo and elsewhere in Africa, elaborate circumcision rituals mark thegraduationtomanhood;Banyamulengeareusuallynotcircumcised.MostBanyamulenge live in the remotevillagesof thehighplateau,where thediscrimination is less

obviousandbiting.Butsincetheydonothavegoodhighschools,hospitals,oradministrativeoffices,allBanyamulengehavetoconductregularpilgrimagestothelakesidetownsofUvira,Baraka,orKalemie,wheretheyaretreatedwithdisdain.“Whenyouwanttoobtainabirthcertificate,takeanationalexam,orgetanID,youhadtowalkthreedaystotown,”Serukizasaid.“There,theythrewstonesatusandcalledusnames.”AsociologistfromtheBembetribe(theneighboringcommunityandthemajorityinthearea),Kimoni

Kicha, distilled this prejudice succinctly: “Bembe consider the Tutsi as no-gooders, weaklings,uncircumcised,aninferiorpeoplewhodonotdoanythingbutdrinkmilkalldaylong,andwhodonotcryovertheirdeadbrethrenbutovertheirdeceasedcows.”11

Sitting on his beige, faux-leather sofa, Serukiza sought out dates like rosary beads, fingering them forreassuranceandcirclingbacktothemastheconversationwenton.April24,1990:Thatwasabigone,henodded. Mobutu, a deeply superstitious man who employed at different points in time West Africanmarabouts (Muslim religious mystics), Indian gurus, and Catholic priests, chose the date because itcontainedthenumberfour,aluckynumberforhim.HehadbeenbornonOctober4,1930;hisfirstcoupd’étattookplaceonSeptember14,1960,hissecondonNovember24,1965.Thisdate,asopposedtotheothers,wasablackdayforMobutu.Aftertwenty-fiveyearsofautocratic

misrule,hisgriponpowerhadslipped.Thecoldwar—inwhichhehadmasterfullypositionedhimselfasanallyofthewest,garneringbillionsofdollarsinaid—hadcometoanend.Severalmonthsbefore,hisfriendtheRomanianpresidentNicolaeCeauşescuwasaccusedofabuseofpowerandput infrontofafiringsquadwithhiswife,anevent thatdeeplyaffectedMobutu.Shocked,hewatchedontelevisionasRomaniansoldiersmanhandledthedictator’slimp,bloodybody.PressurewasalreadycomingfromtheUnitedStates,Belgium,andFrance,whichhadallsupportedhimformanyyears,toreform.Theeconomyhad stagnated. Congolese wages were lower than at independence thirty years earlier. Inflation hadclimbedtoover500percent.

“Comprenez mon emotion,” went his now legendary appeal to the country on national television,wipingatearfrombeneathhisglasses.ArumblewentthroughtherowsofhisloyalistswhohadlinedupintheNselePartyheadquarters:Theycouldnotbelievetheirears.Aftertwenty-threeyearsofone-partyrule—everyman,woman, child, and even corpsewas constitutionally required to be amember of thePopularRevolutionaryMovement(MPR)—helegalizedotherpoliticalpartiesandsteppeddownfromthehelmofhisown.Severalmonthslater,undercontinueddomesticandinternationalpressure,hebowedtothedemandforanationalconferenceofcivicleadersthatwouldnameaprimeministeranddraftanewconstitution,pavingthewayforelections.“Youknow,forwesternersdemocracyisagoodthing.ButIdon’tthinkforyouandusthatwonderful

wordmeansthesamething,”Serukizasaid.Ashispowerslippedinthelate1980s,Mobutubegantopitdifferent communities throughout the country against each other in order to distract from oppositionagainst his regime. The advent of democracy sawmassmobilization, often along ethnic lines, and theautocrat tried to take advantage of these communal cleavages to divide his opposition. For theBanyamulenge,thisdivide-and-rulegambitfocusedontheircitizenshipandthustheireligibilityfortakingpart in elections.Already in 1982, their candidateswere barred from running for office in theMPR’scentral committee because of their “dubious citizenship.” Serukiza laughed. “Oh God, that term hasplaguedus!”ThetransitiontoamultipartydemocracyonlymadethingsworsefortheBanyamulengepopulation.In

1989,playingtoanti-TutsisentimentintheEast,Mobutupromisedtosettlethecitizenshipquestiononceandforallbyconductingan“identificationofcitizens”intheEast.Thisdespitetheexistenceofdozensofother cross-border communities elsewhere in the country—the Kongo people, for example, regularlycrossbackandforthintotheCongofromAngola,andtheNandemigratebackandforthfromUganda.The1989censusended indisaster.WhileTutsi inKinshasaand insomevillages in theKivuswere

givenidentificationcards,otherswereturnedback.ThousandsofBanyamulengeinUvirawererefusedcitizenship.12 According to Serukiza, the authorities tried to force a special identification card on hisvillage,which left themwith an ambiguous status. “It didn’t saywewere foreigners, but itwasn’t theusual ID either.” At the time a fresh graduate from the University of Lubumbashi with a degree ininternationalrelations,heralliedfifteenBanyamulengeleaderstoboycotttheregistration.Theauthoritiescalled in the armyand arrested the chiefs,whileSerukizaonlybarely escaped, jumping froman armytruckandhidinginthehousesoflocalfamilymembers.HethenfledtoneighboringBurundi.The National Sovereign Conference, widely hailed as a success for stemming Mobutu’s

authoritarianism,wasanothersetbackforCongoleseTutsi.UnderpressurefromothercommunitiesintheKivus,allTutsidelegateswerebannedfromparticipatingintheconference,whereover3,000delegatesconvenedtodiscussthecountry’sfuture.Aspecialsubcommissionwascreatedtodealwithcitizenship.Theopposition,initiallysympathetictotheTutsi’sentreaties,backpedaledtogainthesupportofthelargeandimportantKivudelegation.

TheTutsi’swoesmayhavegoneunaddressedifnotfordevelopmentsinZaire’stwotinyneighborstotheeast. Since independence, the fates ofRwanda andBurundi haddiverged.Both countrieswere formerBelgiancoloniesinhabitedbyaHutumajorityandaTutsiminority,butinBurunditheTutsielitehadheldpowersinceindependence,while in itsneighborto thenorthaHutugovernmenthadruled.InRwanda,

HutugovernmentshadledpogromsagainsttheTutsi.InBurundimilitaryjuntasorganizedthemasskillingofHutuin1972and1988.Thesedynamicsreinforcedeachother:FortheRwandanHutu,thekillingsoftheirbrethrentothesouthwasaportentofwhatmighthappenifTutsicametopowerthere;theoppositemindgamewasoccurringamongtheTutsileadersofBurundi.In October 1993, Burundi’s first elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was assassinated just

monthsafterhisinauguration,promptingaspateofethnicviolencethatdrovetensofthousandsofHutuintoZaire.Lessthanayearlater,theRwandangenocidesentanothermillionHutuintocampsacrosstheborder.“Lifebecameunbearable for us,”Serukiza recalled. “TheRusizi plain [forming theborder between

Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda] became white like snow with United Nations High Commissioner forRefugeestents.Therefugees’sloganwas:‘Theyarestillalive?’”ThesizableBanyamulengepopulationinUvirawasharassedandthreatened.Herecalledhismothernotbeingabletoleavethehousetogotothemarketandbeingforcedtoaskneighborstobuyfoodforthem.With over half a million Tutsi massacred in Rwanda, the threat to the Congolese Tutsi was not

hypothetical. Hutu militia posted a sign at the Cyangugu/ Bukavu border as a reminder: “AttentionZaireansandBantupeople!TheTutsiassassinsareouttoexterminateus.Forcenturies,theungratefulandunmercifulTutsihaveusedtheirpowers,daughtersandcorruptiontosubjecttheBantu.ButweknowtheTutsi, that raceofvipers,drinkersofuntrueblood.Wewillneverallowthemtofulfill theirdreams inKivuland.”13The influx of refugees further poisoned relations between the Tutsi and other communities, while

politiciansinKinshasacynicallydrewonanti-Tutsisentiment toboost theirpopularity.AftersendingacommissiontotheKivustofigureoutwhattodoabouttherefugeecamps,Mobutu’sgovernmentvotedonsimultaneousresolutionsonApril28,1995,regardingcitizenshipandtherefugeecrisis.14Theresolutionsdemanded “the repatriation, without condition or delay, of all Rwandan and Burundian refugees andimmigrants.”15 Incase therewasanymisunderstanding,Uvira’smayor issuedacircular tohisofficers,respondingtoaBanyamulengeletterofprotest:“IhavethehonortotransmitthememorandumofacertainethnicityunknowninZairecalledBanyamulenge....Ishouldalsoaddthatatthelatestby31.12.1995,theywillallbechasedfromthenationalterritory.”16Kinshasaaskedadministrativeofficialstocatalogueallpropertyandrealestatebelongingtothisgroup

of“refugeesandimmigrants”—clearlyunderstoodintheKivustoincludetheBanyamulenge—inviewoftheir expropriation. In Bukavu, officials drew up lists of all Tutsi living in their respectiveneighborhoods.Anti-Tutsi sentiment was exacerbated by a small group of Banyamulenge youths who, seeking

adventureandrespondingtothecalloftheirkinacrosstheborder,leftintheearly1990stojointheRPFrebellioninneighboringRwanda.Between300and1,000Banyamulengejoinedthisinsurgency,althoughmostdid so surreptitiously, even stealingmoney from their familiesbeforequietly sneaking across theborder at night.17 To many Congolese the Banyamulenge’s participation in the RPF war smacked oftreasonandreinforcedtheirbeliefthat,intheirheartofhearts,theBanyamulengewereRwandan.In 1994, with the town of Uvira teeming with Hutu refugees from Rwanda and Burundi, Serukiza

decided to leave forRwandawithhiswife and sister-in-law.He smiled, “Wehad togivemysister adifferent name for the bus manifest.” He laughed: “Her real name was Nyira Batutsi—that wouldn’tpass.”TheychangedhernametoChantal.AttheborderinBukavu,Mobutu’ssoldiersstoppedhimandstripped him of his Zairian ID and his briefcase, which contained his only copy of his universitydissertationonBanyamulengehistory.“YouarenolongerZairian.Youdon’tneedthisanymore,”theytold

him.

5

ONIONLAYERS

MUSHAKI,ZAIRE,ANDKIGALI,RWANDA,OCTOBER1993

Likelayersofanonion,theCongowarcontainswarswithinwars.TherewasnotoneCongowar,oreventwo, but at least forty or fifty different, interlocking wars. Local conflicts fed into regional andinternational conflicts and vice versa. Teasing out origins can be a tail-chasing exercise. In myinterviews, I often made the mistake of asking the interviewee to start from the beginning. “Thebeginning?” A look of bemused condescension would follow—what does this young foreigner knowaboutourbeginnings?“Goodidea.Well,in1885,attheConferenceofBerlin....”OtherswouldstartwithMobutu’scoupd’étatin1965orindependencein1960.DeogratiasBugeraofferedaroughdate:October1993.1Thatmonth—hecouldnotremembertheexact

date—in themuddymarket town ofMushaki, in the eastern highlands, he loaded up ten truckloads ofyoungTutsi and sent them to join the rebellion inRwanda to topple PresidentHabyarimana’s regime.Threeyearslater,BugeraandtheyoungCongoleseTutsihemobilizedwouldbecomethevanguardinasecond rebellion, theAllianceofDemocraticForces for theLiberationofCongo-Zaire (AFDL).AfterliberatingRwanda,theynowwantedtodothesamewiththeirhomeland,withthestrongbackingoftheirRwandanallies.Bugerawasoneof thefour foundersof theAFDL,whichwasformed inKigali in thedryseasonof

1996.“Theonlysurvivingfounder,”heremindedmewhenImethimintheSandtonluxuryshoppingmall,oneofthewell-protectedgatedcommunitiesaroundwhichtheJohannesburgupper-classsocialsceneisbased. He laughed: “The last of my cofounders was killed in January 2001.” Several years after thecreationof theAFDL,BugerahadfallenoutwithbothLaurentKabilaandtheRwandansandleft foracozyexileinSouthAfrica,whereherevertedtohispreviousprofessionasanarchitect.Nowbaldingandinhisearlyfifties,hewaswearingabluepoloshirtwithabeigecardigandrapedoverhisshoulders.Hespokeslowlyanddeliberately,andhadadazedlookabouthim.ForBugera,asformanyCongoleseTutsi,politicshadnotbeenhischosenvocation;hehadbeenborn

intoit.“Itwasafactof lifeforus;youwereinvolved,whetheryoulikeditornot.”Hisgrandfather,atraditional chief in North Kivu Province, had died during a hunger strike in 1924, protesting theresettlementpoliciesoftheBelgiancolonizers.WhenBugerawasfiveyearsold,atthetimeofCongoleseindependence, his father was killed during a bout of communal violence, as people from neighboringcommunitiesrebelledagainstRwandanimmigrants.Bugerarememberedseeinghisfatherbludgeonedtodeathandthrownintoalake.Heanddozensofotherchildrenwererushedtothenearbyswamps,wheretheirparentshopedthereedsandwaterwouldmuffletheinfants’criesandhidetheirsmell.“Theyuseddogstohuntusdown,”Bugerasaid.“Icanstillrememberthesoundofthedogsbarkingandhowling.”HeinitiallytriedtoescapetheturmoilofNorthKivu,travelingtoKinshasa,athousandmilesaway,to

study architecture at the national university. Even there, however, he discovered he could not escape

politics.In1982,agroupofMobutuloyalistsfromtheKivuslaunchedOperationR-B,targetingpeoplethey saidwere students fromRwandaandBurundi.ManyTutsiwere forced tohideorbebeatenbyacrowdofangry students.Sympathetic friends smuggledBugeraoutofhishouseon the floorofacar’sbackseat.Bugera returned to theKivus in themid-1980sand triedonceagain to leavepoliticsandpursuehis

careerasanarchitect.HereceivedagrantfromaCanadiancharitytobeginacattleranchingprojectwithpeasants inMasisi, and he became the real estate advisor to one of the large banks inGoma.One ofBugera’s formercolleagues toldme, “Bugerawasnever apolitician.Hewasabusinessmanwhowasforced into politics. But he didn’t have the acumen for it. Politics in the Congo doesn’t work like abusiness ledger,whereyoucanaddup theplusesandminusesandgeta logical result.Youhave tobeabletounderstandpolitical intrigueandoutplayyouropponent.”Bugera,hisformercolleague toldme,thoughtthathecouldforcereconciliationontheCongolese.“Howcanyoustickaguntosomeone’sheadandtellthemtoloveyou?Itdoesn’twork.”2

“Doyoureallythinkyoucangetthisright?”Bugeraaskedmeoverthedinnertable,pointingatthenotesIwas scribbling intomy notebook. Likemany of the people I interviewed,Bugerawas skeptical that Icouldrepresentthecomplexityofhishistory.“It is true that theTutsikilled,”Bugera toldmeatonepoint.“Butweallhadbrothers,schoolmates,

uncleswhohadbeenkilled.It’sallpartofawhole.CanyouportraythattoyourreadersinArizonaorBerlin?Canyoumakethemunderstandwhysomeonewouldkill?”

ThehistoryoftheTutsicommunityinNorthKivuisdrasticallydifferentfromthatoftheBanyamulengeinSouthKivu,althoughbothgroupsarelabeled“Tutsi”byotherCongolese.Bothcommunities,despitetheirtinysize,playedprominentrolesintheCongowars.Theproblems inNorthKivucanbedated to1908,when thenewBelgiancolonialgovernment took

overthereinsfromCongoFreeState.Underthisnewadministration,thousandsofBelgiansescapedtheindustrialdrudgeryoftheirhomelandtosetupcattleranchesandplantationsintheprovince’shighlands.In 1928, the government created theNationalCommittee of theKivus, a charter company that granteditself “allvacant lands” in the region. Inpractice, thismeant that anypieceof land thatwasnotbeingfarmedbelongedtothestate.Inaregionwheretraditionalchiefsownedallland,includingforest,fallowfarmland,andemptyfields,thiswastantamounttomasstheft.Thenewcomersgotmuchofthebestfarmandcattleland,expropriatingachunkoflandlargerthanallofBelgium.3TheBelgianswere then confrontedwith a lack of labor.The localHunde andNyanga communities

wantedtofarmtheirownfields,andtheBelgianswerewaryofpeasantrevoltsiftheybeganexactingtoomuchlaborfromlocals.In1937,theyfoundthesolution:BybringingintensofthousandsofRwandans,whomtheyhadlongadmiredasindustrious,theBelgianswouldcreatealargepoolofloyalworkers.Itwould also alleviate overpopulation and periodic famine in Rwanda. Over the next twenty years, the

Missiond’ ImmigrationdesBanyarwanda imported around175,000Rwandans—mostlyHutu, but alsomanyTutsi—totheKivuhighlands.4

Unrest inRwandaaround its independenceprompteda further100,000Rwandans to flee to theCongobetween1959and1964.TheyweresettledinitiallybytheUnitedNationsbuteventuallyintegratedintolocal communities. This secondwave of immigrants around independence includedmany affluent andwell-educated Tutsi who came to form an important part of the Goma elite. The 1970 census found335,000Rwandans living in theCongo,mostly in the territoryofMasisi,where theymadeupover70percentofthepopulation.5By1990,anestimatedhalfmilliondescendantsofRwandanimmigrantswerelivinginNorthKivu.6ThismassiveinfluxcausedbittertensionswiththelocalHundecommunity,whichhadbeenlivingin

Masisiforcenturies.TheBelgiansleasedlandfromthelocaltraditionalchiefforapittanceandcreatedtheindependentbutshort-livedchiefdomofGishali,whichwasruledbyaTutsiimmigrant.Theleaseoflandbecamepermanent,andHutufarmersandTutsirancherscametodominatethelocaleconomy.ThenewcomersconstitutedastronglobbywithconsiderableinfluenceoverMobutu,whointurnfound

them to be useful allies. From 1969 to 1977,BarthélémyBisengimana, aRwandan immigrant and thepresident’s influential chief of staff, played an important role in promoting his community’s interests.Mobutuadoptedalawin1971thatgrantedblanketcitizenshiptoallRwandansandBurundianswhohadbeen in the Congo since 1960. Perhaps most importantly, when Mobutu expropriated all foreignbusinessesin1973,itwastheTutsieliteinNorthKivuwhobenefited.InMasisi,90percentofalllargeplantations—almosthalfofalltheland—cametobeownedbytheseimmigrantsortheirdescendants.Bycontrast,inSouthKivu,theBanyamulengewerelargelyrural,uneducated,andrelativelypoor.TheascendanceoftheTutsiinNorthKivuhelpsexplainthevirulentbacklashagainstthem.Adiligent

studentofMachiavelli—ThePrincecouldoftenbeseenonhisbedsidetable—Mobutuhadmasteredtheartofdivide-and-rulepolitics.In1981,Mobutureversedthecitizenshiplaw,decreeingthatcitizenshiphad tobeobtainedupon individualapplicationandwasonlyavailable for thosewhocould trace theirCongoleseancestrybackto1885.Intheory,thisnotonlystrippedmostHutuandTutsiinMasisioftheircitizenship but also expropriated much of their property, since only Congolese could own such largeconcessionsunderthenewlaw.7For the“immigrants,”althoughmostdidnot lose their land, this legalbackandforthonlyunderlinedhowtenuoustheirstatuswas.

Aswith theBanyamulenge, thedemocratizationprocessput thecitizenshipquestion frontandcenter inNorthKivupolitics.InMarch1993,goadedonbylocalpoliticianswhoremindedtheircommunitiesofthe land expropriation by the Rwandan immigrants, Hunde andNyangamobs launched attacks againstHutuandTutsi,whofoughtbackwiththeirownmilitiaandbybuyingprotectionfromthenationalarmy.Somewherebetween3,000and7,000peoplehadbeenkilledbytheendoftheyear.8DeogratiasBugerahadbythistimebecomeamemberofthelocalTutsieliteandhelpedcoordinateits

armed resistance. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was involved in a major offensive againstHabyarimana’s regime inneighboringRwanda.Asopposed to theBanyamulenge,whohadmostly lostcontactwith relatives inRwanda, theTutsi inNorthKivu still had family across theborder.AsZairebecame increasingly hostile toward them, the allure of joining a Tutsi liberation army grew. Bugerabecame involved inhelping to recruityoungTutsi to join theRPF,hoping that theycouldcreateasafehaveninRwandaand—perhaps—returntodothesameinNorthKivu.TheRPFrecruitmentwasaslick,well-organizedoperation.Sincetheearlydaysoftheirrebellion,the

RPFRadioMuhabura (“RadioBeacon”)broadcastonshortwave throughoutNorthKivu,providing theRPF’sversionofthewarandencouragingyoungmentotakeuparmstooverthrowHabyarimana.AtthevillagelevelinRwandaandtheCongo,theycreatedumuryango(“family”)cellstomobilizenewrecruitsand finances for their rebellion. “Each of our families gave whatever they could give to sponsor themovement.Weheld folk dances for fundraising and listened toRPF tapes smuggled across the borderwithsongsandspeechesonthem,”Bugeraremembered,smiling.BugerahadhisfirstcontactwiththeRPFthroughanaffluentfriend,whosefamilyhadhelpedfundthe

rebels since theircreation. In1993,Bugerasent the firstbatchof172 recruitsacross theborderalongwithenoughmoneytopayforuniformsandweapons.Hetraveledwiththeconvoytotheborder,wherehebribedtheZairiansoldierswith$11,000toallowtherecruitsthrough.Helaughedwhenhetoldthestory:“Theyarrestedmeonthewayback!Oneofthesoldiershadn’tgottenhiscut.Itwasallaboutmoney,justmoneyforthem.”EveryFriday,thehighlandtownofMushakiheldalargemarketwheremanyTutsibroughttheircows,

milk,andcheesetosell.WiththeRPFrecruitmentdrive,thismarketalsobecametheassemblypointforyoungTutsiwhowanted to join the rebellion. Everyweek,Bugera loaded two or three trucks full ofyoungmenandsentthemontheirwayacrosstheborder.9

InKinshasa,IwaseventuallyabletotrackdownPapyKamanzi,oneofhundredsofyoungTutsiBugerahadhelpedrecruitfortheRwandanrebellionin1993andwhohadlaterjoinedtheAFDL.PapyhadcometoKinshasatobeintegratedintothenationalarmy,andImethimonthesecond-floor

terrace of a bar in a busy, popular neighborhood. “Do they know you are Tutsi?” I asked,motioningtowardthewaitersmillingaround.Hesmiledconspiratorially.“No,theydon’tknow.Peopleherecan’ttell.TheythinkallTutsilooklikePaulKagame,tallwiththinnoses.”By2007,whenImethim,therehadbeen several bouts of anti-Tutsi violence in the capital, and I was surprised at how relaxed he wasmovingaboutthebustlingmarketsandbackstreets.Thenagain,hedidnotconformtothereceivedTutsistereotypes:HewasshortwithabroadnoseandspokerelativelyfluentLingala,thelanguageofCongo’scapital. Nonetheless, he grew quiet when the waiter came close to us, pausing until he had finishedpouring our soft drinks.When Papy did speak, he turned his face slightly away fromme, toward thebubblingstreetnoisetomakesuretheothertablesdidn’thearhim.Papy’s family had come from Rwanda to the highlands of North Kivu in the 1950s, brought by a

BelgianTrappistmonk,whoseFlemishname trippeduphis tongue: JeandeBertersfeld.Papy’s fatherlookedafterthemonks’cattleandplantationandmarriedalocalTutsiwoman.Beingpartofaminoritycommunity in such a turbulent areameans living in a pressure cooker in which family loyaltymeanseverything;Papycouldrecitehisclangenealogysixgenerationsback.

Theinitialtensionswerebetweenthe“immigrants”—bothHutuandTutsi—andtheindigenousHundepeople. Every harvest, Papy’s family had to pay a tithe to the Hunde customary chief, and most taxcollectorsandlandsurveyorswereHunde.Papy’sfatherandrelativeshadbeenwelltakencareofbytheTrappistmonksandwerewealthier thanmanyHundepeasants.Papyrememberedbeingcalled“snake”and“dirtyTutsi”bykidsatthemarketandinschool.By contrast, until the 1990s, relations with the Hutu community were warm. As a child, Papy had

attendedaboardingschoolfiftymilesawayfromhishome.Whenhewalkedhomeforlongweekends,hewould often be taken in and fed by Hutu. “Back then, we were all one community; we all speakKinyarwanda, the common language of all Rwandans. It was politics that got us into this mess.” Hewrinkled his nose. “Bad politics.”Relations between theHutu andTutsi only started to sourwith theeruptionof civilwar inRwanda in1990.Thehysteria there contaminated theKivus, driving awedgebetweenthecommunitiesinNorthKivu.Hutuyoungsters,inparticularthoseclosetotheborder,ralliedtoHabyarimana’sside,whiletheTutsijoinedupwiththeRPF.Papy remembered theRPFmobilizationwitha smile.“Itwasagreat time,”he said.“Weorganized

dancesandbigparties toraisemoney.Eventhewhitepriestswouldcomeanddonatefor thecause.”Iwonderedhowhecouldhavesuch fondmemorieswhen therewassomuchviolence,butheshookhishead. “There’snothing likehavingyourowncountry. Il fallait tupateadresse.Weneeded tohaveourownaddress.”Abruptly,hebegantohumamelody;thewordscamebacktohimslowly:

HumuraRwandanziza,humurangahondaje!Don’tbeafraidgoodRwanda,don’tbeafraidIamcoming!Isokoy’ubumwenamahoro.Thesourceofunityandpeace.

Papy rememberedwith a smile: “I tried to leave in 1991, but Iwas only thirteen, so the recruitersturnedmeback—Iwastooyoung.”Every familywassupposed toprovideonemalechildover fifteen to joinupand fight.Hehad four

older brotherswho had already joined theRPF, andwas eager to go himself. His father berated himconstantlythathewouldneverfindagirltomarry,thathewouldbeconsideredimpotent,ifhedidn’tjoinhisbrothersintherebellion.Frustrated,PapycontinuedhisstudiesbutjoinedthelocalBoyScouttroopthat was being run as a premilitary education course by a local Tutsi leader. He and other Tutsiadolescentslearnedhowtobuildbivouacs,givefirstaid,anddismantleandloadanAK-47.Inhisfreetime,hebakedmandazi,frieddoughballs,andtookthemtothelocalmarkettoraisemoneyforthecause—aCongoleseversionofaneighborhoodbakesale.Finally,whenPapywassixteen,hejoinedtheRPF.Hisparentsrejoiced,andhisfathersoldseveralof

hiscowstogivehimsomecashtotakealong.Hismotherhuggedandkissedhim,tellinghimhowproudshewasofhimandhisbrothers.“Weknewthatwewereleavingtoeventuallycomebackandfreeourcountry.” Sitting in the bed of a truckwith several dozen other youths, he traveled by night toGoma,sailingthroughtheroadblocks,whereMobutu’ssoldiershadbeenbribedtoletthemthrough.Whentheywereoutofearshotofthevillages,theyouthssangRPFsongssottovocetobidethetime.The beginnings of his military career were bittersweet. He was elated, surrounded by like-minded

youths, all humming with purpose and ideals. He had studied and could read and write, gaining himpreferential treatment among the other youngsters.But the hard side ofwar also became apparent.Helearnedofthedeathoftwoofhisolderbrothers,whohaddiedintheRPF’sfinalpushtotakeKigaliin1994. Then therewas the genocide,when the countrysidewas filledwith stinking corpses,when youcouldn’tevendrinkthewaterinthewellsbecausebodieshadbeenthrownintothemandcontaminatedthe

groundwater.Everybodyseemedtobeakilleroravictimorboth.Itwasaworldfulloffuryandpain;theredidn’tseemtobeanythingpureleft.WhentheRPFsenthim

and a friend back to school inRwanda—theywanted some of their young soldiers to catch up on theeducation theyhadmissed—his friendattacked theHutu teacheronenight, stranglinghimwith a rope,sayingthathewasagénocidaire.PapysoughtsolacebrieflyinaPentecostalchurch,whereheandothersoldierswouldspeakin tonguesandsingallnight,butheleftsoonafterwards,findingithardtorelatewithmembersofthecongregation.

BugerastayedinGoma,preparingforanRPFinvasion,evenwhenthetownwasteemingwithex-FARandInterahamwe.“Aslongasyoudidn’tgooutatnightanddidn’tgointotheruralareas,itwasactuallyrelativelysafe,”heremembered.Bugerahadaconstructioncompany,andwiththeinfluxofaidorganizations,hemanagedtowinseveral

lucrativecontracts.BeginninginAugust1994,whentheRPFtookcontrolofthelastex-FARholdoutinnorthwesternRwanda,BugerausedhiscompanyasafronttosetupanelaboratenetworkofRPFspies.“As soon as theRPF conqueredRwanda,” he toldme, “they set their sights on invading Zaire,muchsoonerthanmostpeoplerealize.”Overnight,hereplacedthirtyofhisbricklayerswithHutuRPFsoldiers.Other RPF officers took up jobs as motorcycle taxi drivers, ferrying ex-FAR officers and exiledpoliticiansaroundtheprovinceandcollectingintelligence,orworkedinthemarketsintherefugeecamps.Bugerarememberedoneofhisfriendsexclaimingindisbeliefwhenshesawherbrother,anofficerintheRwandanarmy,onTVposingasatraderinarefugeecamp.“TheRPFcouldtellyouwithtopographicalprecisionwherealloftheirenemy’stroopswerelocated,”hesaidwithadmiration.“ItwaslikehavingGPS.”By1995,youngTutsisoldiershadstartedinfiltratingGoma,armedwithmapsonwhichtheydrewex-FARpositionsandstrategictargets.“ItwaslikeMossad,”Bugerasaid,smilingproudly.“Theseguysweregood.”The RPF’s daredevil efficiency was in stark contrast with the decay of the Zairian state. Bugera

attended nightlymeetings in the house ofGeneral Yangandawele Tembele,Mobutu’s regionalmilitarycommander,wherehewouldreceiveinformationregardingtroopmovementsandpoliticaldevelopments.Tembele,whomaUNofficialrememberedas“famousforbeingafraidofhisownsoldiers”andstealingcars from the refugees, had been bribed by theRwandans and even providedBugerawith one of hislieutenants as a liaison officer, institutionalizing his treason.10 In 1996, with Tembele’s help, Bugeraboarded a plane for Kinshasa, where he bought weapons and ammunition from corrupt officers. Hepackedthegoodsintoachestfreezer,putdinnerplatesontoptoconcealthem,andwrote“Gen.Tembele,Goma,”on the lid.Theportersat theairportgroanedunder theweight,complaining:“What is inhere,boss?Rocks?”Bugeralaughed.

By1995,PapyandhisfellowZairiansoldiersintheRPFweregettingrestless.Thearrivalofrefugeeshadledtoadrasticescalationoftheviolence.Untilthen,therehadbeenafragilealliancebetweenHutuandTutsiinMasisi,asbothcommunitieshadimmigratedtherefromRwandaduringthecolonialperiod

and faced similar discrimination. With the arrival of the ex-FAR, Zairian and Rwandan Hutu alliedtogetheragainsttheTutsi,inordertoloottheirthousandsofheadofcattle.Still,someTutsifamilieswereholdingoutinGomaandinclustersinthesurroundinghills.“Thedecisiontoabandonthesoilonwhichyourfatherandmotherareburiedisnotaneasyone,”Papytoldme.Based on the intelligence they were gleaning through their network of spies and moles, the RPF

realizedtheex-FARwerepreparingamajorattack.11Inearly1996,VicePresidentKagamegaveorderstosetuptwocampsinRwanda’swesternprovincesofGisenyiandCyangugutoregrouptheZairianTutsisoldiers,includingPapy,andtrainthemascracktroopstoformthevanguardoftheimpendinginvasion.“Ihadneverseensomanysoldiersinoneplace,”heremembered.Itwasduringthetrainingthathelearnedthatex-FARandlocalHutumilitiashadattackedhishometownofNgungu,inSouthernMasisi.“Iwassittingaroundthecampintheevening,eatingfromapotofplantainsandbeanswithsomeother

soldiers,whenafriendofminefromNgungucameupcrying,”heremembered.“‘TheyattackedNgungu,theyattackedNgungu,’wasallhesaid.Iknewmyfamilyhadbeenbutchered.”TwoofPapy’sbrothersandseveralcousinswereamongseveraldozenTutsiwhowerekilled.Between1995and1996,atotalof34,000TutsifledtoRwandafromNorthKivu.BarredbytheRPF

fromowningradios,Papyandhisfriendsgleanedbitsandpiecesofinformationabouttheirfamiliesfromrefugeeswhomanagedtomakeitacrosstheborder.

I never knew what to make of Papy. He was friendly and open, but rarely laughed or showedmuchemotion.Hisvoicewasasteadymonotone,hisbodylackingthegesticulationstypicalofmanyCongolese.“Thewarsuckedthelifeoutofme,”hetoldme.Hetoldthestoryofthewarsbywayofscarsonhisbody—ashinysplotchonthebackofhisheadfrom

apieceofZimbabweanshrapnelin1999,alongthickscarthatbunchedupthefleshonhislowerthighfromanex-FARbulletin1996.HelifteduphisT-shirttoshowmeaweltonhisribcagewhereabullethadperforatedhislung.Still,hesmoked.“I’mnotgoingtolivelonganyway,noneedtalkingtomeaboutcancer.”PapyhadleftthearmyandcometoKinshasalookingforajobin2007,eventhoughmanyofhisfellow

TutsihadrefusedtoleaveNorthKivuandhadcontinuedtofightagainstthecentralgovernment.Moneyand war fatigue had lured him out, he told me. When I asked him about his former comrades whoremainedrebels,hesaid,“WeTutsihaveproblems.Wewilldoanythingtoprotectourcommunity,anditistruethatmanypeoplewanttodestroyus.ButtherearealsomanipulatorsintheTutsicommunity,whowillusethatfearintheirowninterest.‘Oh,wemustfightortheHutuwillkillus!Oh,takeupyourgunsorKabilawillexterminateus!’Butyoudiscoverlaterthatitisn’ttrue.Wecan’tspendtherestofourlivesfearingothercommunities.Wehavetomakethatfirststep.”Thenheshookhishead.“ButthestupidthingisthattheCongolesegovernmentdoesn’tseemtowantus.There,too,thereareopportunistswhousetheTutsithreattomobilizepeople.Sowearestuckinthemiddle,betweenextremists.”

It is amazing to what extent the ethnic stereotypes and conflicts that were born in Rwanda have

contaminatedtherestoftheregion.NootherimageplaguestheCongoleseimaginationasmuchasthatoftheTutsiaggressor.NoothersentimenthasjustifiedasmuchviolenceintheCongoasanti-Tutsiideology.Again and again, in the variouswaves of conflict in theCongo, the Tutsi community has taken centerstage, as victims and killers. This antagonism is fueled by struggles over land tenure, citizenship, andaccesstoresources,butalsoandmostdirectlybypopularprejudiceandaviciouscircleofrevenge.The wars that began in the eastern Congo in 1993 acted as a vector to these prejudices, as Tutsi

soldiers and politicians took lead roles in every Rwandan-backed insurgency since then. Whereaspreviouslyanti-TutsiresentmentwasaphenomenonlimitedtosmallareasofNorthandSouthKivu,ithasnow spread across the region. Its expressions crop up everywhere, from pillow talk to bar banter toteleviseddebates.WhenI first lived inBukavu, in2001, I spenta lotof timewitha local family.Themother of the family, a soft-spoken twenty-seven-year-old who was studying development at a localuniversity,was, likemostof the town,bitterlyopposed towhatshecalled the“Tutsioccupationof theeasternCongo.” Itwas in themiddle of thewar, andBukavu and the surrounding areaswere heavilymilitarized.Itwasdifficulttoavoidsomesortofharassment—taxation,verbalabuse,torture,orworse—byRwandan troopsor their localallies.Oneday,whenIwasarguing thatyouhad tounderstandTutsiparanoia,asithaditsrootsinthemassacreofupto800,000TutsiinRwandaduring thegenocide,shereplied,“Eighthundredthousand?Obviouslyitwasn’tenough.Therearestillsomeleft.”Inthemeantime,thetownswerebombardedbyanonymoustracts,politicalone-pagersphotocopiedon

cheap machines intended to rally the population against the Tutsi occupiers. They would be handedaroundinuniversities,atthemarkets,atthecrowdedport.OnefromOctober2000readsinpart:

ATTENTION!ATTENTION!ATTENTION!

PopulationofSouthKivu,Following the barbarous crimes committed in KAVUMU,MAKOBOLA, BURHINYI,MWENGA andBUNYAKIRI, massacres against our peaceful population of Bukavu are already being prepared byKAGAME,MUSEVENIandBUYOYA....History does not contradict us.The terrible atrocities committed shortly before the beginning of the

20th century by the Tutsi kings prove sufficiently to what extent you are descended from CAIN. Justimagine:ATutsiking,everytimehewantedtostandup,hadtoleanonaspearthatwasplungedintothelegofaHutusubject.Thepointwasverysharpandcoveredwithpoison.Whatcruelty!

THESTRUGGLECONTINUESANDTHEVICTORYISCERTAIN!OURCAUSEISNOBLE:

PATRIOTISMANDSELF-DEFENSE!12

Thesetracts triedtooutdoeachother in theirextremism.TheCongolese imagination,flailingaroundforclarityandtryingtounderstandtheviolentupheavalthecountryhasexperienced,haslatchedontothemostbasicbuildingblockofsociety:ethnicity. Insteadofdisabusing itof thesestereotypes,successiveleadersonbothsidesoftheethnicdividehaveonlycynicallyfannedtheseflames.

6

MZEE

KIGALI,RWANDA,EARLY1996;LUBUMBASHI,CONGO,1960;FIZI,CONGO,1965–1980

LaurentKabila’spresenceishardtomissinKinshasa.Inthemiddleoftown,hetowersasaforty-footstatue(thankstoNorthKoreansculptors,experts instate-sponsoredhagiography),hisfingerpointingtothesky,admonishingtheCongoleseforstrayingfromthepathhehadenvisionedforthecountry.Hisheadismountedoncountlessbillboardsaroundthecity,dressedinhischaracteristiccollarlessbrownsafarisuit.Hiseyesareturnedupwards,“tothedazzlingfuture,”accordingtosupporters.Inthecenterof thegovernmentneighborhood,ensconced inamarblemausoleum,hisshinygreycoffin isondisplay, linedwith garish fake flowers and ribbons.Onmany afternoons, schoolchildren in blue andwhite uniformsparadeby,chatteringirreverently,impervioustotheirritablepresidentialguardswithmachineguns.Despitehisomnipresence,however, it isdifficult topenetrateKabila’smyth.His real characterhas

beenshroudedbybothvilificationandidolatry.Forsomeofhisformercomrades—thoseresponsibleforthe statue,posters, andmausoleum—itwashisperseverance thathelped liberate thecountry first fromMobutu’sdictatorshipandthenfromRwanda’scontrol.Formanyothers,Kabila’simagemorphedintoastereotypeofAfricanleaders:thethuggish,authoritarian“bigman,”willingtodoanythingtopreservehispower,amoldcastbyJean-BedelBokassaandIdiAmin,themilitarystrongmenofneighboringCentralAfricanRepublicandUganda,respectively.

Kabilahadbeena rebel sincehisyouth in rural,pre-independenceCongo.Thesonofadisciplinariancivil servant,Kabila distinguished himself as a precocious but difficult student.His father insisted onspeakingFrenchwithhischildrenathome,whichlefthissonwiththesmooth,urbaneaccentofanévolué,anAfricanacceptedintotheexclusivecolonialclique.Hisschoolingwasofteninterrupted,probablyasaresultof the turbulence in thecountryaswellas inhishousehold,wherehis father’spolygamycausedtensionswithhismother.Beforetheageoften,hisparentsseparated,andhedividedtherestofhisyouthbetween his mother’s and father’s houses. It is not clear whether he even finished high school, butaccordingtochildhoodfriends,hecouldoftenbefoundinpubliclibrariesinLubumbashi,thecapitalofthesouthern,mineral-richKatangaProvince,hisnoseburiedinbooks.FrenchEnlightenmentphilosopherssuchasDescartesandRousseauappeartohavebeenfavorites.1According to the few accounts from that period, his blinkered ambition appeared at an early age.

Despite a slight limp that he developedwhen hewas a child, he earned himself the nicknameChuma

(madeof iron) for his strength.A friend’s description of his behavior on the soccer pitch reminds thereader of future traits: “LaurentKabilawas very authoritarian.When he said youweren’t playing, hewouldn’tchangehisopinion.Insoccer,werespectedhimbecausehedidn’tfoolaround.Kabiladidn’tacceptdefeat,hewasresoluteanddetermined,hewasaboveus.Wefearedhim.”2Kabila began his political career during the upheaval that rocked his home province ofKatanga in

1960. The province harbored some of the richest mineral deposits in Africa, prompting Belgianbusinessmen to back a bid for secession of the province when the Congo became independent. Theprovince,however,splitintwowhenthenorth,dominatedbyKabila’sLubakattribe,rejectedsecession.Itwasoneof themanyuprisings thatbrokeoutacross thecountry following independence,sparkedbybothPrimeMinisterPatriceLumumba’sassassinationand localethnicpowerblocs,nowfree fromtheshackles of a strong central state, that were trying to stake out their own interests. Kabila quicklyimmersedhimselfinthiswaveofviolence,becomingacommanderinayouthmilitiaattheageoftwenty.Politicsprovidedafeelingofpurposeandbelonging thathecouldn’t find inhissprawlingfamilyof

nineteensiblingsandhalf-siblingsandatleastfiveparents-in-law.Therebellionalsopittedhimagainsthis father, the diligent colonial administrator. In late 1960, as Lubakat youths across the north of theprovincerebelled,theycaptureddozensofformercolonialofficers,includingKabila’sfather.Thesixty-year-oldwaskidnapped,beaten,andfinallylynchedbythesamemilitiathathissonbelongedto.Whenwordofhisfather’sdeathreachedhim,Kabilaissaidtohavereactedcalmly.Theyoungrevolutionaryspentthenextyearsonthemove,afterSouthAfricanandBelgianmercenaries

put down the rebellion. He traveled as part of a socialist delegation toMoscow and then Belgrade,where,accordingtosome,hebrieflyenrolledattheuniversity.Finally,inJanuary1964,theleadersoftherebellionsentKabilatoBurunditomakecontactwiththeChinesegovernmentandtolauncharebellioninthehighlandsoftheKivus,closetothehomelandoftheBanyamulenge.There,commandersfromthelocalcommunityhadbeenfightingagainstthegovernmentforseveralyears,usingbowsandarrows,colonial-eraMausers,andafewAK-47s.The rebels purported to be nationalists fighting against colonialism and the exploitation of their

country’snatural resources.Marxist ideology,however,washavingahard timegrafting itselfonto theCongoleseinsurgenciesthatproliferatedacrossthecountryafterindependence.Withover80percentofthepopulation livingoff subsistence agriculture, andwith a tiny, unpoliticized, and largelyuneducatedindustriallaborforce,theCongoleserebellionshadlittletruckwithMarxistargumentsofsurpluslaborand the exploited proletariat. Most importantly, the kinds of urban and rural social networks thatcommunismwasabletomobilizeelsewherethroughlaborunionsandpeasants’associationswerelargelynonexistent in theCongo.After conqueringhalf of the countryby early 1964, the rebel groupsquicklyfracturedandsuccumbedtocorruptionandill-discipline.The Chinese were not the only ones to misjudge the strength of socialism. Che Guevara led an

expedition to support Kabila’s insurrection in the eastern Congo in 1965. Fidel Castro’s government,newlyinpower,hadimmediatelyembarkedonexportingtheirrevolutionaryandanti-imperialistideologyelsewhere.TheCongowasanobvioustargetinmanyways.NotonlyhadtheCIAhelpedinLumumba’sassassination, but the United States and South Africa had helped assemble a contingent of whitemercenariestoputdownthevariousrebellionsthathadseizedalmosthalfthecountryin1964.Themercenaries’racismandbrutality,asdescribedbyanItalianjournalist,furtherstokedGuevara’s

determination:“Occupyingthetownmeantblowingoutthedoorswithroundsofbazookafire,goingintothe shops and taking anything theywanted thatwasmovable....After the looting came the killing.Theshooting lasted for three days. Three days of executions, of lynching, of tortures, of screams, and ofterror.”3Picturesofwhitemercenaries smokingcigarettes and laughing, asbehind them rebels’bodies

dangledlooselyfromtrees,filteredout,althoughonlyanAfricanAmericannewspaperwouldprintthem.4An added affront to Castro was the CIA’s hiring of Cuban exile pilots to provide air support to themercenaries.ChetookontheCongocampaignasapersonalchallenge.Forhim,itwasnotjustamatteroffreeingthe

countryfromimperialists.“OurviewwasthattheCongoproblemwasaworldproblem,”hewroteinhisdiary.5Duringathree-monthtourofAfricainearly1965,Chewaspressedbyotherrebelmovementsforsupport, but he kept on coming back to theCongo. “Victory [in theCongo]would have repercussionsthroughout the continent, aswoulddefeat,” hewrote.Ashedescribed an exchangehehadwith rebelsfromothercountries, “I tried tomake themunderstand that the real issuewasnot the liberationofanygivenstate,butacommonwaragainstacommonmaster.”6Nevertheless,Che’sexperience,aswellastheinsurrection,endedindisaster.Thebeginningwordsof

his Congo journal were: “This is the history of a failure.” Suffering from internal divisions, lack oforganization,andlittlemilitaryexperience,therebeloffensivesagainstthenationalarmyfellapartamidnumerousCubanandCongolesecasualties.After sevenmonths,Chewas forced towithdraw, sickanddejected,hisfeetswollenfrommalnutrition.Throughoutthisperiod,Kabilaprovedhimselfawilyandsometimesruthlesspolitician,deftlyriding

the political currents around him. In the conclusion of his diaries from that time, Guevara hadmixedfeelingsabouttheCongoleseleader:

The only man who has genuine qualities of a mass leader is, in my view, Kabila. The purest ofrevolutionariescannot leada revolutionunlesshehascertainqualitiesofa leader,butamanwhohasqualities of a leader cannot, simply for that reason, carry a revolution forward. It is essential to haverevolutionaryseriousness,anideologythatcanguideaction,aspiritofsacrificethataccompaniesone’sactions.Up tonow,Kabilahasnot shown thathepossesses anyof thesequalities.... I haveverygreatdoubtsabouthisabilitytoovercomehisdefectsintheenvironmentinwhichheoperates.7

BetweenGuevara’sdepartureandKabila’srebirthatthehelmofthecoalitionthattoppledMobutu,therewere three decades of obscurity. Kabila never stopped talking about the revolution, sporadicallymobilizingfightersandmakingtheroundsofregionalembassiesandgovernmentforsupport.Buttheélanofhisearlyyearshadwaned;thecharismaticrevolutionaryhadlosthisshineandbegantolookmoreandmore likea commonbandit.Thenadirwasperhaps reached in1975,whenKabila’s forces snuck intoJaneGoodall’schimpanzeeresearchcampinwesternTanzaniaandkidnappedfourAmericanandDutchstudents.TheysubjectedtheircaptivestolecturesonMarxismandLeninismwhiledemandingaransomof$500,000.ThiswasthelaststrawforTanzanianpresidentJuliusNyerere,whohadbeentoleratingtherebelsoutofdisdainforMobutu.Atonepoint,hehadcomplainedtotheCubanambassadorabouttheirbehavior: He described their emissaries as “always drunk, with women, partying all the time, goingfrequentlytoCairo.”8Back in theCongo,Kabila’s activitieswerehardlymorepopular. In the late 1970s,Kabila tried to

consolidate his power by launching a campaign against witch doctors, whom he considered a badinfluenceandachallenge tohis rule.Heordereda strongherbaldrink tobeconcocted,a sortof truthpotionthatwouldtriggerdizzinessandnauseainwizards.Ofcourse,theherbsthemselvesweresostrong

thattheyelicitedthisresponsefromalmostanybody.Accordingtoeyewitnesses,hundredsofelderlymenandwomenweretiedtostakesandburned.9With his prospects of rebellion dwindling and his reputation tarnished, Kabila retreated to Dar es

Salaam,wherehehadgoodcontactswiththeTanzanianintelligenceservice.Theyprovidedhimwithahouseandadiplomaticpassportandallowedhimtotakeonamorelaid-backlifestyle.Hehadavintagetypewriter,onwhichhewouldbangoutletterstoregionalleadersandhiscommandersinthefield.Thefew writings that remain from this time indicate his attempts to establish himself as a revolutionaryintellectual,usingornateproseandMarxistjargon.Itwasthisroleofpoliticaloperativethathefeltmostcomfortablein,travelingthroughouttheregion,

exaggeratinghismilitaryexploits andprowess,writing letters to friendly leftist governments inAfricaandabroad.Hespentlittletimeinthebush,preferringtohopscotchthroughthesocialistworldinsearchofsupportforhisrebellion.HetraveledtoChinaforsevenmonthsandmadevisitstoCairo,Nairobi,andBelgrade.Athome,hisfamilylifewascomplicatedbyhisfondnessforwomen.Hehadaffairswithhistwolive-

inCongolesemaids,VumiliaandKessia,who“werepromoted”towives,andsquabblesbetweenthemandhisfirstwife,Sifa,sparkedtensionsinthehousehold.Intotal,Kabilawouldhaveatleasttwenty-fourchildren with six women, creating endless family intrigue and drama, especially after he becamepresident. He had behaved similarly in the field. According to accounts that filtered out from hiscommanders, Kabila would resort to aMobutist subterfuge, regularly sleeping with his commanders’wivesasadisplayofpowerandhumiliation.10

Inthesummerof1995,Kabila’sstarsaligned.Hewasrestless,followingtheBBCnewsbroadcastsfromRwanda and eastern Zaire several times a day and pestering his friends in the Tanzanian intelligenceservicewithphonecallsaboutwhattheymightknow.NoCongoleserebellioncouldeversucceedwithoutoutsidehelp,heoftentoldthesefriends.ThelastsuchsupporthadcomefromtheChineseandtheCubansinthe1960s.NowitseemedthatRwandaandothersweregearinguptomakethepush.Then,oneafternoon,theRwandanintelligencechief,PatrickKaregeya,turnedupatKabila’shousein

theleafyOysterBayneighborhoodofDaresSalaaminthecompanyofseveralTanzanianofficials.TheveteranCongoleserebelwasinatalkativemood,hisspiritsliftedbythepossibilityofrenewedsupport.HeexplainedthathestillhadseveralthousandtroopshecouldmobilizeintheFiziareaofSouthKivu.“He was just happy that somebody was visiting him and asking him about his ideas,” Karegeyaremembered.The aging rebel, perhaps thinking hewas speaking to someone from the same bloodline,invokedhisanti-imperialiststruggleandlambastedMobutu’slinkstothewest.Hedugamonghischestofpapers to come up with some of his revolutionary pamphlets, and he even talked military strategy,proposingflankingmaneuversoftherefugeecampsandtacticalfeints.ToKaregeya,who,likemostofhisRPFcolleagues,hadbythenendorsedthemaximsoffree-market

capitalism, the “oldman seemed like a relic of the past.” Kabila didn’t convinceKaregeya, but thenagain,“weweren’tlookingforarebelleader.WejustneededsomeonetomakethewholeoperationlookCongolese.”KaregeyalatersentemissariestoFizitofindKabila’srebels.Hismenspentweeksclimbingmountains

andtrekkingthroughforestsonpromisesbytheirguidesthatthefollowingdaytherebelswouldappear.

Afterseveralmonths,theygaveup.AndyetKaregeyapersistedwithKabila.ManyCongolese,especiallythoseclosetoveteranoppositionleaderEtienneTshisekedi,nowaccuseRwandaofhavingdeliberatelychosenaweakandmarginalfigureinordertomanipulatehim.TheRwandangovernmentdid,however,trytoreachouttootherleaders,includingTshisekedi,withoutmuchluck.11KaregeyalaughedatmewhenIquestionedtheirchoiceofarebelleader.“Youactlikewehadalotof

options! By 1996,Mobutu had co-opted or locked up almost all of his opposition, with the possibleexceptionofTshisekedi.Kabilamighthavebeenold-school,buthehadnotbeenboughtoff.Wegavehimsomecreditforthat.”

KabilaarrivedintheRwandancapital,Kigali,fromDaresSalaaminJuly1996withalmostnothing.Heshackedup ina safehouse in theaffluentKiyovuneighborhoodofdowntownKigali,withacoupleofsuitcases.Hisonlycompanionswerehisson,JosephKabila,whofollowedhimeverywhere,andseveralofhisoldrebelcommanders,who“cameinandoutofthehouse,lookinglikejanitorswhohadlosttheirbrooms,”asoneRwandanofficercommented.TheRwandanshadpicked four strangebedfellows to lead the rebellion.BesidesKabila, therewas

DeoBugera,thearchitectfromNorthKivu;AndreKisaseNgandu,abeardedandagingcommanderwhowas leadinga rebellion in theRuwenzoriMountains,onCongo’sborderwithUganda,and likeKabilatracedhisrootsbacktotherebellionsofthe1960s,althoughheatleastcouldstillcountseveralhundredactive rebels under his command; andAnselmeMasasu, a taciturn twenty-some-year-old fromBukavuwhohad aRwandanmother and at the timewas a sergeant in theRwandan army.Years later,Bugeralaughed when he heard Masasu’s name. “You know he ended up being a popular commander, verypopular.Butthen,hewasakid!Theysaidhehadapoliticalparty,buthewastheonlymemberinit.”Bugera rememberedhis firstmeetingwithKabila:“Hewaswearingsandalsandoneof thosesafari

suits.Hehaduncut,blackened—Itellyou,blackened!—toenailsthatstuckoutovertheendofhissandals.What a strangeman, I thought!He didn’t look you in the eyeswhen he talked.”Bugera,who seemedprivatelytohavehopedtobecometherebellion’sleader,hadheardaboutKabilainthe1980sbutnothingabouthimsince then.According toBugera,Kabilawassocash-strapped thatBugeraboughthimsomeshoesandasafarisuitatthelocalmarket.These four men—two overhauled, aging guerrilla commanders, a twentysomething sergeant, and an

architect—weremeanttolifttheCongoupoutofitspoliticalmorass.

InKigali, theRwandansembarkedonsomemuch-neededbondingexerciseswith theirnewly recruitedrebelleaders.“TheRwandans areweird,”Bugera said. “Theymade us stay in a house together for three or four

wholedays,sleepingthere,eatingthere,andpreparingthewar.Theywantedustobecomeateam.”Itmusthavebeenastrangefewdays.BugerarememberedKabilaasalargelysilentman,listeningto

andobservinghisnewcomrades.Likeanoutmodedprofessor,Kabiladistributedgreenpamphletsprinted

on cheap paperwith his seven lessons of revolutionary ideology.Masasu skulked about in his neatlypressed fatigues, speaking mostly with the Rwandan officers who came in and out of the house, andkeepinghisdistancefromthetworebelsthirtyyearshissenior.BugerahuddledwithotherTutsileaders,whomutteredbitterlyaboutKabila’smassacresofBanyamulengein the1960s.Thealliancehadgottenofftoashakystart.Afterseveraldays,theyfinallycameupwiththeone-pagefoundingdocumenttheRwandanshadasked

themtodraft.TheyshareditwithColonelJamesKabarebe,thecommanderoftheRwandanpresidentialguardwhowaspreparingtheCongomission.HehelpedthempolishitandaddedaCongolesedatelinetomaskRwanda’s involvement in theirmovement; the paper became known as theLemeraAgreement.12Kabila’soutdatedverbosityshinesthroughthetext:Itspeaksofthe“imperiousnecessity”fortheirfourpolitical parties to come together to liberate Zaire and names Laurent Kabila as their spokesman. Itlamentstheeconomicsituation,markedby“doldrums,financialmuddle,corruptionandthedestructionofthemeansofproduction.”ThefourleadersmetthreetimeswithVicePresidentKagame,whowasconstantlyinvolvedinthewar

preparationsandseemedwell-informedof thecomplexitiesofCongolesepolitics.TheRPFstrongmanseemedmore enthusiastic about the rebellion than the leaders themselves, exhorting the Congolese tounderstand their responsibilities in the struggle, but also to understand that the RPF and others werehelpingthemliberatetheircountry.Hesaid,“Ifwewinthewar,wewillallwin!It’sourvictory!”

Thus was born the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). AgrandiosenameforagroupthatinitiallyhadlittlepoliticalormilitarysignificanceotherthanprovidingasmokescreenforRwandanandUgandaninvolvement.At the beginning, Kabila felt awkward and marginalized. He had worked with Tutsi rebels in the

1960s,whensomehadfledthepogromsinRwandaintotheCongo,buthehadnotbeenintouchwiththisnew, younger, cosmopolitan generation of rebels. They worked with laptop computers and satellitephones and organized their soldiers on themodel of the British army. Even their marching style wasdifferent,henoticed.He also felt a sense of entitlement.After all, hewas at least twenty years older than theRwandan

officersmillingabout;hehadbeenaguerrillaleaderintheCongowhentheywerestillindiapers.Kabilawasalsosmarterthanmostgavehimcreditfor.Herealizedtherewaslittlehecoulddoatthe

moment other than bide his time and try to position himself.After all, theRwandans’ ambitionswereinitiallystrictlymilitary,andtheyhadgivenlittlethoughttothegovernmenttheywouldsetuponcetheycontrolled theconquered territory.GivenKabila’s seniority, theRwandansallowedhim tobecome themovement’sspokespersonandtobeginsettingupapoliticaldirectorateforit.Hegothishandsona satellitephonehimselfandbegancallingmembersof theCongolesediaspora

whomhehadworkedwithinthepast.Withouthisownsoldiersonthebattlefield,hewouldneedtorallyloyaladvisorsaroundhim.Hecontactedoneofhisformercomradesfromthe1960s,whowasanightclubownerinMadrid.AnotheronewasalawyerinBelgium,whileathirdhadbeenwithhiminTanzania.Astherebellionbecamemorevisible,andKabilabeganmakingappearancesonradioandtelevision,otherdiasporafigurescontactedhim,andhispoliticalcloutgrew.LaurentKabilaemergedasanaccidentalleaderoftheAFDLmovementandeventuallyasthepresident

of a liberated Congo. In an example of Rwandan hubris, the RPF planners desperately tried to foistideology and sincerity upon the Congolese they had handpicked. As ingenious as Kagame’s militaryplannerswere,theirpoliticalstrategyendedupbeingsimplisticandshort-sighted.FormanyCongolesewhohad labored long—andultimatelyunsuccessfully—tooverthrowMobutupeacefully,Kabilawas alivingsymbolofforeignmeddlingintheircountry.ItisoneoftheCongo’shistoricalironiesthatthesamemancametobeseenasabulwarkofpatriotismandresistanceagainstRwandanaggression.

PARTII

THEFIRSTWAR

7

MANYWARSINONE

KIRINGYE,LWEBA,ANDABALA,ZAIRE,AUGUST–OCTOBER1996

OnAugust30,1996,thefirstbattleoftheZairewartookplace.LeavingtheirtrainingcampsinRwanda,asmallgroupofseventyBanyamulengesoldierscrossedtheriverintoZairejustsouthofthecustomspostwhereBurundi,Zaire,andRwandameet.Ithadn’trainedinweeks—theshortdryseasonwastheperfecttimetolaunchtheassault,astheroadswereindecentshape—andthegroupmadeitswayquietlythroughthewaist-highelephantgrass.Ontheothersideoftheplains,theycouldseetheoutlineoftheItombweMountainsrisingintotheclouds,cradlingthehighlandpastureswheretheyhadgrownup.Atdawn, theyhid in abananagroveclose to the smallvillageofKiringye.As theywere resting, a

womanonherwaytofarmhercassavafieldstumbledintotheirmakeshiftcampandbeganscreamingatthesightofTutsisoldiersarmedtotheteethwithKalashnikovsandrocketlaunchers.Theyweretemptedtokillher,butthenlethergo.Sherantothenearbymilitarybase,whereshealertedMobutu’sarmy.Theysurroundedtherebelsandopenedfire,killingtenandcapturingfiveothers.ItwasoneofthefewbattlesofthewarthatMobutuwouldwin.Thewar,stillattheplanningstageinKigali,hadbeenjump-started.1Thearmy’sambushacceleratedthespiralintooutrightconflict.Thecapturedsoldierswereparadedin

frontoftelevisionscreensacrossthecountry.Fivehaggard-lookingyoungmeninmilitaryuniformswereplacedunderspotlights,withcameraflashesilluminatingtheirsunkeneyes.Thiswastheenemy.FormanyZairians,itwasthefirsttimetheyputtheTutsinametotheirdistinctivefeatures.“Rwandainvades!”readtheSeptember1headlineinLePotentiel,Kinshasa’smostreaddailynewspaper.InBukavu,thestateradioreadoutaneditorialtitled“AHistoricChanceforZaire.”Thebroadcaster

exhortedlistenersnottobelievetheTutsi’sliesaboutcitizenship,usingametaphorthathassincebecomeroutinewhenarguingthattheBanyamulengecanneverbecomeZairian:“Atreetrunkdoesnotturnitselfintoacrocodilebecauseithasspentsometimeinthewater.Inthesameway,aTutsiwillforeverremainaTutsi,withhisorherperfidy,craftinessanddishonesty.”2By now, it was obvious that more and more Banyamulenge troops were infiltrating into the high

plateau, where the rebels began stockpiling weapons and preparing for another attack. Farmers andtradershidinthebushesbythesideofmountainpaths,asbandsofrebelswithmetalboxesofammunitionontheirheadsclimbedupthemountainside.Amovement in theotherdirectionwasalsovisible:MoreandmoreBanyamulengeyouthsbegancrossingtheRusiziRiver intoBurundiatnight,where theyweremetbyguideswhowouldtakethemtotrainingcampsinRwanda.

MostCongoleserefertothe1996invasionastheWarofLiberation.ThepopulationhadhadenoughofMobutu;despite thesuspicions regardingRwanda’s involvement,crowdsacross thecountrywelcomedtherebelsasliberators.Atthelocallevel,however,thisimageofheroicpatriotsdoesnotholdwater.Intheeast,theadvancingrebelsbecameembroiledinbitterfeudsbetweencommunitiesoverpower,land,andidentity.Anti-Tutsidemagogueswhippedupmobstokillinnocentcivilians;theBanyamulengerebelsretaliated,blamingentirecommunitiesfortheirvictimization.Thousandswerekilled.AprimeexampleofthiswasAnzuluniBembe,thevicepresidentofZaire’snationalassembly,whohad

createdayouthmilitiacalled,modestly,GrouptoSupportAnzuluniBembe.Theshort,pudgyfirebrandheldralliesalongtheshoresofLakeTanganyika,callingonpeopletotakeuparmsagainsttheinvaders.At a meeting at a local school in Fizi, he called out: “Children of Fizi, are you sleeping? TheBanyamulenge are taking our country! I want you to get weapons and attack them, attack theBanyamulenge!”3InUvira,Banyamulengeleaderswereroundedupandput in jail,while themayormusteredgangsof

youthstokicktheirfamiliesoutoftheirhouses.Severaldaysafterthefirstclasheswiththeinfiltrators,localauthoritiestoldtheBanyamulengetoregroupincamps“fortheirownsafety.”AlocalBanyamulengeleaderlaterwroteabouttheexperienceofbeingarrested:“Theybeatusupandtookustojail....Minuteafterminute,theybroughtinmoreBanyamulengeinthatminusculecellwheretherewasahellishstenchduetotheurineandfecesandnooxygen.[Severaldayslater]theytookoutthelateRukenurwawhotheybeatlikeasnake.Hissobsmadeusallcry.”4HundredsofTutsi ineasternZaire,butalsoinKinshasaandLubumbashi,wereharassedandbeaten.

Thehysteriareachedafeverpitch,inwhichanyonewhohadathinnish,hookednoseandhighcheekboneswastargeted.AtaborderpostwithRwanda,youthsattackedandhackedtodeathaMalianbusinessman.5By1996,socialconditionsinZairewereripeforyouth-ledviolence.DuetoMobutu’spredationand

disastrous economic policies, the country’s infrastructure and industry had collapsed. By 1996, thecountryhadbeenthroughsevenyearsofeconomiccontraction.Zairiansearnedjustoverhalfofwhattheyhadbeenmakingin1990.AccordingtotheUnitedNations,afull27millionpeople,or60percentofthepopulation,were undernourished. Evenwhen peoplewere paid, themoneywasworth little: Inflationsoaredto5,000percentin1996.Thismiseryprovidedfertile terrainforethnicprejudice. In thecrowds,youthswereable tochannel

theirangeragainstavisible,knownenemy.LeaderslikeAnzuluniprovidedaddedincentives,suchasfreealcoholandmodestwagesforsomeoftheirorganizers.TheBanyamulenge,whilepoor,hadattractiveandinflation-freeassets:cows.Soldiersandyouthsrustledthousandsofheadofcattleintheearlydaysofthewar.

Howcanweexplainthiskindofbrutality?Itisdifficulttodescribetheimpactofabuseanddysfunctionalgovernmentonthepsycheofpeopleinwar-tornareas.InMarch2008,Itraveledtovariousmassacresitesintheregion.EverywhereIstopped,peopleeyed

mesuspiciously,andlocalofficialsdemandedtoseemypapers.Eventhoughthewarhadofficiallycometoanendyearsearlier,theregionwasstillverytense;RwandaandtheCongocontinuedtofightaproxywarintheKivus,eachsupportingdifferentmilitiagroups.Onemorning,IwaspackingtoleaveforMakobola,perhapsthemostnotoriousmassacresite,whena

friendfromalocalhumanrightsgroupcalledmeonmycellphone.“Stoppackingandturnontheradio,”hesaid.Iquickly tuned intoadebate showona localProtestant radio station tohear thememberofa local

politicalpartysay,“IwantedtodrawyourattentiontoPresidentGeorgeBush’svisittoRwanda.”BushwasvisitingKigaliaspartofhiswhirlwindAfricatour.“Isitacoincidencethathisvisitcomesat thesame time as Nkunda withdraws from the peace process? At the same time as there is an Americanmercenary by the name of Johnson who is here in Bukavu, recruiting youths for the next Rwandaninvasion?”Hegotmynamewrong,but itwasclearbyhis followingdescription thathemeantme.Hesaidhehadproofofmyactivityandthathewouldprovideit.Friends in local civil society helped debunk this rumor, and the analyst retracted his allegations.

Nevertheless,Ineededagoodjustificationtopreventharassmentintheremoteareas.Anonprofitgroupagreed to provide me with a “mission order,” a hangover from the colonial era confirming that youremployertakesresponsibilityforthetrip.Localofficialssawthepieceofpaper,withitsletterheadandstamp,asapossibleindicationthatIwasnot,assomeapparentlybelieved,workingfortheCIA.Ihad takenasecond,more important,precaution: I traveledwithRemyNgabo,a localhumanrights

activist whowas from the area andwho organized interethnic soccer games as a way of reconcilingyouthsfromtheBembeandBanyamulengecommunities.Onceamonth,theBanyamulengeplayerswouldwalkfivehoursdownthemountaintofaceoffwithalocalBembeteam.Theplayerspairedupandspentthenightattheirrivals’houses.SomeoftheBanyamulengeplayersweresurvivorsofthe1996massacres,andRemyhopedtheywouldopenupandtelltheirstory.

Ourplanswerecutshortbeforethesoccergamecouldstart.Alertedbythepresenceofaforeignerinhersmallvillage,thelocalintelligenceofficialarrestedmeandRemyforsuspiciousbehavior.“Don’tyouknowit’sInternationalWomen’sDaytodayandIhadtoabandonmyimportantactivitiesin

town to come climbing hills, running after you?”Thewomanhuffed, leading us to her office, a benchunderamangotree.“Allactivitiesherehavetobeapprovedbyme!”Shechidedusasweslalomeddownthroughcassavafields.Innegotiatingbribes,thelocalofficial’smainleverageistime.Prudence,ashernameturnedouttobe,

hadnorealreasontodetainus,otherthanthefactthatshewasinchargeofsecurityintown.Withnothingon her hands—except, apparently, aWomen’sDay celebration—she could easilywait us out.Back intown,shesatusdownunderneathamangotreeandsubjectedustoalonglectureontheRwandanthreatandthesuperpowerconspiracyagainsttheCongo.“YouyourselfsayyouarefromtheUnitedStates,”sheglaredatme.“IsitnottheUnitedStateswho

supportedRwandaduringthewartogetatourmineralwealth?Don’tthinkjustbecauseweareblackthatwehaven’tstudied!Well—saysomething,speak!”Shewasclearlyinfuriatedbymysilence,whichsheinterpretedascondescension.“Didn’tyouhearthatGeorgeBushwasinRwandatheotherday?”shesaidtohercolleague,whonoddedhishead.“Wehavetobevigilant!”IfeeblypointedoutthatIdidn’tworkfortheU.S.governmentandshowedhermydocumentation.“That’swhatyousay!”sheretorted.Wehadalmostagreedon“afine”or“arecompenseforherhike”—thetwodifferenteuphemismsfor

thebribe—ofaroundfivedollars,whenalocalvillagechiefturnedup.Ashecametoshakemyhand,Icouldfeelthefetidsmellofthelocalalcoholonhisbreath.Hiseyes

wereglazedoverandspecksofspittlehitmyfaceashespoke.Kotiko,asit iscalledinthisarea,isapalmwinethatistappedfromthetrunkofadecapitatedtreeinthemorningandgrowsstrongerasthedaygoes on and the sugars are fermented into alcohol. Although it was only eleven o’clock,much of thevillagewasalreadyfallingunderkotiko’ssway.“Hapana,hapana,”heslurredinSwahili,shakinghishead.No,no,no.“Whatisthiswhitemandoing

here?Don’tyouknow that I’m thechiefhere?Whyareyou talking to thiswoman?!”Thesituationgotworse.“Haven’tyouheardthatBushwasinKigalilastweek?Isthisacoincidence?”Thechiefplayedwithhisdigitalwatch,whichwasmuchtoolargeforhisboneywristandhadapparentlystoppedworkingalongtimeago.“Andjustaftertheearthquakedestroyedourtowns!”Bukavulayclosetoacontinentalrift and had been hit by a series of bad earthquakes severalweeks before.The chief leaned over andwhispered:“TheUnitedStatesisusingearthquakesasaweaponofwartodestabilizetheprovince!”

Anhourlaterandaroundtwentydollarslighter,wefinallyfoundourselvesinfrontoftwosoccerteamsonbenches in frontofaschool.Our run-inwith theauthoritieshadattractedattention,andourmeetingwasbeingattendedbyseveralpeoplewhomRemyidentifiedasintelligenceagents.ItwasobviouslynotthevenuefortheBanyamulenge,linedupononebenchacrossfromus,totelltheirstoriesofmassacresandabuseatthehandsoftheirneighbors.Remydeftlychangedtheangle,announcingthatIhadcometoinspectthesuccessofhissoccerprojectinpromotingreconciliation.Hewhisperedtome:“Takeiteasywiththequestions.”Afterseveralplatitudesaboutethnicreconciliation,IaskedtheBembesoccerteamwhattheyfeltwhen

theysawaMunyamulenge(singularofBanyamulenge)onthestreet.Thecaptainoftheirteamanswered,“Weareafraid.During thewar,wedidn’tknowwho isacivilianandwho isasoldier.Forus,everyTutsi man was a soldier.Whenever violence broke out, they pulled the guns out from underneath thebeds.”Alex,aMunyamulengeboyinanArsenalT-shirtandjeans,demurred:“Idon’tknowwhywehaveto

inheritthesinsofourfathersandbrothers.Forthem,weareallguilty.”Hepaused,thenadded,“Wearealltargets.”6IaskedAlexwhetherhehadheardofthemassacrescommittedbyRwandanorBanyamulengesoldiers

againsttheBembeintheregion.Henoddedcarefully,glancingattheeavesdroppers.“Ofcourse,weallheartheseallegations.”“Doyouthinktheyaretrue?”Iprodded.Hepaused.“Iwasn’tthere.Idon’tknow.”Hisanswerprovokedsomerumblingontheotherbench.“Thesearenotjustrumors,”theonewiththe

Tanzanianaccentsaid.“WeallhavefamilymemberswhohavebeenkilledorrapedbyBanyamulenge.”“HaveyouheardofmassacrescommittedagainsttheBanyamulenge?”Iaskedthecaptain.“Againstthem?”Helookedaroundathisteammates,whoshooktheirheads.“No,we’veneverheard

aboutthat.”

Afterthemeeting,RemyofferedtodrivetheBanyamulengebacktotheroadblock,fromwherethepathleads into themountains.Hepolitelybutfirmlytold thevillagechiefandthe intelligenceagent thatwedidn’thaveenoughroomfortheminourcar.TheBanyamulengepiledseven-deepintothebackseatandtrunkofourjeep.“Ourproblemiswithleadership,”Remysaidin thecar.“ImaginethatwewereCIAagents tryingto

startanewrebellionhere.Wewouldhaveboughtthemallofffortwentydollars.”Remyfoundanexcusetostopalongthewaytobuysomedrinksfortheplayers,leavingmeinthecar

withAlex.Fromthebackseat,squeezedinbetweenhisteammates,inawhisper,Alextoldmethathewastwenty-five,whichmadehimaroundthirteenat thetimethewarbegan.Several teenagerspressedtheirfacesagainstthejeep’swindowpanes,gigglingatthesightofawhitemantalkingtotheMunyamulenge,butAlexcontinuedinasteadytone,hiseyesfocusedonthedashboardinfrontofme.Ididn’twantthevillagersoutsidethecartooverhearourconversation,soIrolledupthewindows,whichsoonhadbothofussweatinginthemiddayheat,asthecardidn’thaveairconditioning.Alexstartedoffbytellingmenotabouthimselforhisfamily,butaboutMariamKinyamarura.Mariamwas a famous Christian prophet, a legend in the Banyamulenge community and an unlikely

casualtyofthewar.Mariam,Alexexplained,hadgrownupasayoungMunyamulengepeasantinasmallvillageoneday’swalk into thehills fromwherewehadparked thecar. In1956,whenshewasstillayoungwoman,shefellsickandlostthefunctionofherlowerbody.Shenonethelessstayedmarriedtoherhusbandandlatergavebirthtoseveralchildren.Shortlyafterwards,shestartedhavingvisions.Shewasamember of theMethodist Church but had not felt a particular religious vocation before her paralysis.Soon,hervisitorsbegantellingstories.Shecouldreadyourmind,tellyouwhatyouwerethinking,andevenrecountyoursins.Beforeyouevenarrivedatthehouse,shewouldknowwhoyouwereandwhatyou were thinking. The Methodist Church, worried about superstition in their midst, put her underobservation.Afteramonth,theyproclaimedthatshewasindeedanoracleandaskedseveralministerstolivewithandassisther.“Shewouldlieinherbedallday,herheadproppedupagainstherhand,”Alexsaid.Hisparentshad

visitedher,takinghimalongoncewhenhewasachild.Herememberedhermagicalauraandthepeoplemillingaroundinasmall,darkroomtohearherspeak.Bythemid-1970s,thechurchhadbuiltacenteraroundMariam, completewith guesthouses, gardens, and a small chicken farm.At times, hundreds ofvisitors from all across the region and from all ethnic groupswould visit to hear her prophecies andadvice.As with everything in the eastern Congo, it is difficult to separate Mariam’s myth from reality.

Sometime in the late 1970s, she is said to have stopped eating, drinking, and passingwaste. She alsostoppedsleeping,afactthatAlextestifiedto,ashisparentsstayedupallnighttalkingtoherwhileAlexsleptonabananaleafmatonthefloor.In1996,whentheprovincialauthoritiesbegancallingfortheBanyamulengetoreturntoRwanda,the

MethodistChurchaskedMariam’sfollowers,mostofwhomlivedinthehighlands,tocomedowntothelakesideforprotection,thinkingthattogethertheywouldbesafe.Astheyweredeliberatingwhattodo,ZairiansoldiersroundedupAlex’sfamilyintheirclayhouseinthemountainsatdawn,beforetheyhadlefttotakethecowstothepasture.“They toldus theywere takingus toRwanda,”Alex remembered.Theyweren’t given time to pack

theirbelongingsandhadtoleavewithbareessentials:agourdofcowmilkthatAlexcarriedonhishead,abagofclothes,theirfamilyBible.Heleftwithhisparentsandsevensiblings, joiningacaravanofaroundfivehundredBanyamulenge,

escortedbysoldiersdowntoLakeTanganyika.OnSeptember17,theyarrivedatasmall,makeshiftcamp

inatowncalledLweba.Theyweretoldaboatwouldpickthemupthenextdayandtakethem“home,”toRwanda.AlexhadneverbeentoRwandaanddidn’thaveanyfamilythere.Herememberedfeelingveryhungry.Theyhadrunoutoffoodontheroadandsleptwithouteatingdinner,drinkingmuddywaterfromthelake.At3o’clockatnight,shotsbeganringingoutinthecamp.“Ithinktheywantedtogetridofusbeforethe

boatcame,”Alexsaidmatter-of-factly.“TheyneverwantedustoreachRwanda.”Therewasalmostnomoon,andtheyhadn’tbroughtaflashlight.Alexrememberedpeoplescreamingandrunning.Abodyfellagainst their shelter, andhis fathermade themall holdhands andpray.Thebody just lay there, like afallenbranch,againsttheirtighttarp.Eveniftheyhadrun,theywouldn’thaveknownwheretogo—bettertostayandconfrontwhateverwasgoingtohappentogether.Sotheyprayed,raisingtheirvoicesabovethescreams.“Outside,inthelightoflanternswecouldseetheothervillagerswatching.Sometookpartinthekilling.Othersjustwatched.Butnobodydidanythingtohelpus.”According to Alex, a total of 153 people were killed that night.7 Alex’s immediate family was

fortunate. They all survived. Similar massacres took place along the lakeshore that day. In Baraka,fourteenmiles to the south, several hundredBanyamulengewere forced into the compoundof a cottonfactory and attacked. Remy’s daughter, who was ten at the time, remembered people running afterBanyamulenge in the streets, armedwithknivesandmachetes,hacking themas they ran:“She stillhasnightmaresaboutthis.”TheProphetessMariamwasnotspared.Thatsamenight,inherownvillagenotfaraway,sheandher

followerswereroundedupandseparatedintotwogroups:menandwomen.Settinguponthemenwithsticks,stones,andmachetes,themobkilledmostofthem,includingMariam’sdisciplesandrelatives.Thecrowd thenbegan toattack thewomenandchildren,but someofMariam’sBembe followers imploredthemnottokillher.Sheescaped,badlywounded.“ShesaidthatshewasnotmeanttodieintheCongo;shehadhadthisprophecy,”Alexshookhishead.“Theykilledmostofherchildrenandherhusband.Shewasright:Shedidn’tdieofherwoundsuntilshereachedRwanda.”IaskedAlexwherethebodiesoftheBanyamulengewereburied,andheshookhisheadagain.“Who

knows?Theydidn’tgiveustimetoburyourdead.”HehadheardthatMariamhadatombinRwanda,buthedidn’tknowwhereitwas.Hisvoicecrackedslightly,andhelookedathisfeet.“Wedon’tevenhavetombstogoandmournourdead,wecarrythegriefaroundwithus.”Reluctantly,Alexcircledbacktohisownstory.Thefollowingdayalongshipwithanoutboardmotor

pulledintotheharborandtooktheremainingBanyamulengealongthelaketowardRwanda.Therewasnoawning on deck, and the sun beat down heavily for the four-hour journey. That night, they arrived atMboko,asmallfishingvillagewithalong,whitesandbeach.Atdawn,Mobutu’ssoldiersseparatedthemenfromthewomenandchildren.“Wedidn’tunderstand,”Alexsaid.“Iftheywantedtokillus,whydidtheygiveittousbitbybit?Killonepersonatatime?Whynotjustdoitallatonce?”Thesoldiersloadedtheirgunsandshoutedthatallmenovertheageoffourteenhadtocometooneside.As a tall thirteen-year-old,Alexwas a borderline case. Picking himout of a lineup,where hewas

standingnexttohisbrother,asoldiertookpityonhimandpushedhimbrusquelytowardwherehismotherand sisters were waiting, knotting their skirts up between their fingers. They watched together as hisfather and older brotherwere boundwith sisal ropes, their arms tied behind their back and their legstogether.Thesoldiersdumpedthem“likesacksofcassava”intotheboat,whichtheythenpaddledoutintothelake.Itwasabigvessel;Alexestimatedtheretobearoundthirtyorfortycaptivesonboard.Ataroundtwohundredmetersfromshore,stillwithinsightoftheirfranticfamilies,themenwerethrownintothewater.Alexcouldseesplashesofwaterwherethemenfloppedandstruggledinvaintokeeptheirheadsabovewater before they drowned. Somemanaged to keep afloat bywiggling their bodies for several

minutes.Onthebeach,theirfamiliesscreamedoutandcriedbutcouldn’tdoanything.Hismotherfainted.Thesoldierswatched,theirriflesontheirshoulders.The remaining group of children andwomenwas taken toKamanyola, on the borderwithRwanda,

where they joined up with hundreds of other Banyamulenge. The military escort brought five to sixhundred “refugees” in trucks to theborder.Theywere joinedby thirtyhaggardBanyamulenge leaders,who had spent the past month in prison in Uvira. At dusk, once again the women and children wereseparatedfromthemenandtakentoa thirty-meter-longcementbridgethatseparatedthetwocountries.TheRwandanPatrioticArmy(thearmedwingoftheRPF)haddeployeditstroopstotheirongatethatblockedtheroad,andthewomenandchildrenrantowardthesilhouettesofsoldiersandtanks.Alexwaslessfortunatethistime;afterabriefdebateoverhisage,asoldiertousledhisunkempthair

andkepthimon theZairian sideof theborderwith theothermen.Theywerepushed intoamakeshiftprisonclosetotheborder,wheretheywerestripsearchedandbeatenagain.Aroundfortymenpressedtogetherinasmallroom,somebeatensobadlythattheycouldn’twalk.Ayouthwholookedfeverishandfaintaskedasoldierforsomewatertodrink.Thesoldiershookhisheadindisgust,tellinghimhewasbeingdisrespectful.Heyankedhimoutside,leveledhisAK-47,and,asAlexwatchedinhorror,blewhisbrainsout.Theheatinthesmallroombecameunbearable.Theairwasgettingheavy;inthedistancetheycould

hearathunderstormmovingdownthefloodplainfromRwanda.Thestormsfromtheeastweretheworst;Congoleseusedtoquipthat“allbadthingscomefromRwanda.”Thesoldiershadleftalightguard,includingayoungintelligenceofficerfromMobutu’shomeregionin

EquateurProvincewhohadbecomefriendswithmanyBanyamulengeinUvira.Asthestormapproached,he whispered to the prisoners that they would be shot at dawn; this was their only chance. Alexremembered the thunder cracking over them, unleashing a torrential downpour. “Itwas amiracle,” hesaid. “We had never seen anything like it.” The guards outside the houses sought shelter, and theEquateurianyouthpoppedtheboltonthedoor,usheringthemoutandtellingthemtohurryandgettotheborder.“Therainwassoheavyyoucouldn’tevenseetheroadinfrontofyou,”Alexremembered.Seeingtheirprisonersflee,theZairiansoldiersranoutinpursuit.At the border, the Rwandan guards saw the commotion and advanced toward the bridge, over the

border,gunsatready.Throughtherain,theZairiansoldierssawaphalanxofhostiletroopsblockingtheroadandretreated.Backattheprison,theyfoundtheprisonerswhohadbeentooweaktoflee,includingthepresidentoftheBanyamulengecommunity,andkilledthem.8

After thesweatycarmeetingwithAlex,RemyandIcontinuedon toBaraka,ahumidport townon theshores of Lake Tanganyika. I wanted to hear the other side of the story. Remy had told me that themassacre thatAlex had lived through had been triggeredwhenBanyamulenge infiltrators had killed alargegroupofpeopleinanearbyvillage.Couldwefindsomewitnessesofthatmassacre?Remyhithimselfonhisforehead.“Ah!Ofcourse,”hesuckedhisteethloudly.“HowcouldIforget?

Wehave togoandseeMalkiawaUbembe.”When I toldhim Ihadneverheardof thatname,a smiletwitchedacrosshislips,“No?Well,youshouldhave.He’sthephysicalreincarnationofJesusChrist.”Religion isaliveandwell in theCongo.ColonialismandMobutismeroded traditionalauthorityand

createduncertaintyineverydaylife.VariouschurchesvigorouslyproselytizedintheCongothroughoutthe

nineteenth and twentieth centuries; white missionaries still abound in remote corners of the country,putteringaboutinbatteredLandRovers,fluentlybanteringinthelocallanguageordialect.Malkia wa Ubembe is a different kind of church, a small utopian movement that shies away from

politics.ItsheadandspiritualcenterisProphetWahiSeleelwa,abouncyfifty-year-oldmanwhofoundedthechurch in1983.Thenameof thechurchmeans“thequeenof theBembe,” theethnicgroup that theprophetbelongsto.Yearsbefore,aprophecyhadgoneoutfrommembersof theCatholicChurchthatavirginsaintwouldariseamongtheBembe.Insteadofavirgingirl,theygotWahiSeleelwa.WedroveintohiscompoundlateonaFridayafternoon,asthesunwasgoingdownthroughthepalm

treesthatsprouteverywhereinBaraka’ssandysoil.Thecommunity’svillagesareidenticaltoeachother,eachbuiltafteracommonblueprint.Matchinghouses,madeoutofmudbricksandthenwhitewashed,linealongavenuethatleadsuptotheprophet’shouse,whichformsthecenterofthecommunity.Behindthehouses,communalvegetableplotsstretchoutintothesurroundingpalms.TheProphet,asWahiSeleelwalikestobecalled,greetedusonthestepsofhishousewearingawhite

T-shirtwithanimprintofhisownpictureandablackfeltStetsonhat.Threelargeglassdoorstookupthefrontofthehouse,setintowhitewashedwallsandunderneathacorrugatedironroof.Thehouseseemedveryopen;incontrastwithmostbuildingsintheregion,therewerenobarsonthewindowsordoors.Theprophet formed thephysical and spiritual center of the community.Their foundingbelief is that

WahiSeleelwa is the reincarnationof JesusChrist, adistinctionhe inherited fromhispredecessor.AsSeleelwaexplained,afterthedeathoftheirpreviousleader,whosepicturehungonthewallbehindhimashe spoke to us, he was possessed by the spirit of Christ. Over the following years, he received therevelationsofChrist,whichhisfollowerswrotedownintheirdrablynamed“CommunicationNotebook,”which contains themain teachings of the church. Some of the passages would raise eyebrows amongmainstreamChristians:Theyallowpolygamy(theprophethasthreewives),havetheirowncalendarwithtwelve-daymonths,andaregovernedbyaconclaveofeldersdubbedtheFourLivingBeings.Seleelwawaseagertospeakwithusaboutthebeginningofthewar.“Nobodyhasevercometohear

ourstory,”helamented.“NottheUnitedNations,notourowngovernment,nobody.”Hepulledoutsheathsof handwritten letters he had sent to various presidents and UN secretaries-general. “Nobody everanswers,”hesaid,shakingthepapers.Onthewallbehindhimhungablack-and-whitepictureofagroupofpeopleposingtogetherinfrontof

a white church with thatched roofing. In themiddle of the group of around sixty people is a smilingSeleelwa,hisStetsonhat tippedbackwards, looking like ahalo;manyothermenare alsowearing thehats, a sign of “the coming kingdom,” Seleelwa said. Childrenmake up around half the congregation,kneelingandpeeringsullenlyintothecamerafromthebottomofthepicture.“Ofallthemembersofthatchurchthere,”hesaid,pointingatthepicture,“onlyadozensurvived.I’ll

showyouthesurvivors.”Seleelwacalledforanassistantandgavehimthenamesofseveralpeople.TherewasnodoubtthatSeleelwacommandedrespectfromhiscongregation.Minuteslater,weheard

thevoicesofadozenpeoplemillingaroundonthestepsoutside.Threemalesandeightfemales,someofthemstillchildren,hadgatheredtotalktous.Theprophetgrinned:“Heretheyare!”The leader of the group was a forty-eight-year-old man called Neno Lundila. He was wearing an

oversizedgreenblazerandfelthatthatwasconsiderablyshabbierthanSeleelwa’s.

Neno’schurchhadbeenlocatedinAbala,a towninthefoothillsof theItombweMountains,a two-daywalkaway.Itwasacorn-andcassava-farmingvillageinhabitedmostlybyBembewhohadmoveddowntothemainroadthatlinkedthelakeshorewiththehighplateau.Beforethewar,BanyamulengehadsenttheirchildrentoprimaryschoolinAbala,andthelivelytradehadbroughtthetwocommunitiestogetherinmarkets,churches,weddings,andfunerals.By the endofOctober 1996, thewar that had begun twomonths before had reachedAbala.Ragtag

local militias skirmished with Banyamulenge troops, who advanced steadily down the road towardBaraka,promptingamassexodusofthelocalpopulation.InAbala,theentirevillagefled,exceptfortheMalkiawaUbembecongregation.“Weweren’tinvolvedinpolitics,”Nenosaid.“Wewerepreachingthegoodword,nothingelse.Whyleave?”OnOctober28,thecongregationgatheredintheirchurchformorningprayers.Asusual, theybrought

theirwhole familieswith them.Theaislesweremorecrammed thanusual thatmorning.“The troubledsituationhadgivenusgoodreasontopray,”Nenorecalled.Afteranhour,justbeforedawn,astheyweresingingthelastsong—“Wewillnotrun,wewillnotbeafraid,wearewithProphet”—theysawsoldierssurround the church.Their preacher told them to stop singing andwent outside to talk to the soldiers.Throughthewindows,inthehalf-light,NenocouldseethefeaturesofaMunyamulengewhohadgrownup just twohoursawayfromAbalaandwaswell-known to thecommunityasacourteous,politeman.Thatday,however,hewasaggressive.“Whydidn’tyouleave,likeeverybodyelse?”hebarkedatthepreacher.“WearepeopleofGod,”Nenorememberedthepreachersaying.“Wedidn’thaveanywheretogo.”“Thenyouhavetocomeawaywithus!”Thepreacherrefused,sayingtheydidn’tknowanybodywheretheBanyamulengelivedanddidn’thave

achurchthere.The commander lost patience. Words were exchanged, and a scuffle ensued. Through the narrow

window,Neno saw another soldier pull out his rifle, shove it into the preacher’s nostril, and pull thetrigger.Inthechurch,peoplestartedscreamingasthesoldiersadvancedonthedoorsandwindowsandopenedfire.AgrenadehitthegroundnotfarfromwhereNenowas,rippingintoseveralpeople’sbodies.Women took babies off their backs and huddled over them, praying. They tried to hide between thebenchesandunderthealtar,andNenofeltbodiesfallingontopofhim.“Theysavedmylife:Ifeltbulletsgoing into their bodies; they shieldedme.”After severalminutes, the soldiers stopped shooting.Nenocouldhearthemdebatingoutside.Then,thesoundoftindercracklingbrokethesilence.“Itwasstilldarkoutside,butallofasuddentherewasabrightlightIcouldseebetweenthebodies.”Thesoldiershadsetfiretothethatchedroof,inordertokillsurvivorsandgetridofevidence.When

Nenoheardthesoldierssay,“Let’sgo,”heclimbedoutfromunderneaththebodies.Thewholeroofwasonfire,andclumpsofburningthatchandcrossbeamswerefallingdown.Nenomanagedtodraghimselfand seventeen other survivors out of the burning church. A hundred and three others died, includingNeno’stwowivesandsixchildren.Wewentbackoutsidetothefrontsteps,wheretheothersurvivorswerestillsitting.Thewomenwere

sullen but hitched up their worn kikwembe to show me their wounds. One of the girls, now aroundseventeen,hadgrabbedherbabybrotherandputhimonherbacktotrytofleewhenabulletwentthroughbothof them.Twelveyears later,shehasashinyweltonher lowerback,matchinghisscaracrosshisstomach.“Theyare tied togetherby their injury,”Seleelwa toldme.Blushing, thegirlpulledupherT-shirttoshowme.Anothergirlhadhadherlegamputated.“Theotherbodiesarestillthere,buriedunderthecollapsedchurch,”Nenotoldmeaswegotreadyto

leave.“Nobodyhasevensomuchasputamemorialplaquethere.Youcanstillseethecharredremains.”

Heshookhishead.“Wehavenowheretomournourdead.”I asked him if he had ever heard ofBanyamulengewho had beenmassacred.He looked surprised.

“Banyamulenge?No.Never.”9

Itwasnot just inSouthKivuthat thewarbroughtcalamity.Throughout thecountry, the invadingforcespillaged.Thekilling,however,waslargelyconfinedtotheeast,wheretheTutsicommunitieshadlong-standingquarrelswithothergroups.InNorthKivu,theinvadingRwandantroopssystematicallyroundedupandkilledthousandsofHutuvillagers,accusingthemofsupportingthegénocidaires.ManyprominentHutubusinessmenandtraditionalchiefswerealsokilled.Tutsicommunities,ofcourse,nursetheirownmemoriesofpersecutionanddecimationatthehandsofothers.None of the killings has led to prosecutions or even a truth commission that could ease the heavy

burden of the past. Skeletons can still be found, stuffed into septic tanks, water cisterns, and toilets,remindersof thevarioustragedies.InBukavu,massgravesdatingbacktothisperiodarenowcoveredwith the cement of shopping centers. Every new bout of violence summons these spirits up andmanipulatesthepast intoastoryofvictimization,ignoringthewoundsoftheothercommunities.Peace,manydiplomatsandlocalssay,ismoreimportantthanjustice,especiallywhenthegovernmentisfullofyesterday’smilitary leaders. Prosecute those leaders, and theywill start thewar again, the prevailingwisdomgoes. Plus, someCongolese leaders say,war is nasty, and people die.One erudite politicianremindedme:“Didn’tGeneralUlyssesGrantgiveanamnestyforConfederatesoldiersaftertheAmericanCivil War? Didn’t the Spanish do the same for crimes committed under Franco? Why should it bedifferent for us?” Unfortunately, the impunity has thus far brought little peace, and the criminals ofyesterdaybecometherecidivistsoftomorrow.

8

THEDOMINOESFALL

Yolikaku,obebisimbuma,bileinayamoko!Youmonkey,youaredestroyingtheseeds,thatwillbeyourfood!

—KOFFIOLOMIDE

BUKAVU,ZAIRE,OCTOBER1996

LieutenantColonelProsperNabyolwawassentinOctober1996toBukavu,ontheborderwithRwanda,tobethecommanderofoperationsforMobutu’sarmy.“Naby,”ashisfriendscalledhim,knewthetownwell:Hehadbeenborninthehills justoutsideofBukavuandhadgonetotheJesuitsecondaryschoolperchedonahillinthemiddleofthelakesidetown.Theprovincialcapitalofhalfamillionpeoplewasenjoyingtheendofitsthree-monthdryseason;foronce,itshillyroadswerenotcloggedwithmudandpuddles,althoughaslighthazeofdusthungoverthewhitewashedbuildings,gettingintoclothesandfood.Atamileabovesealevel,thenightswerecold,whilethecloudlessdayswerescorchinghot.Theexperiencedparatroopcommander,whohadbeen trainedatmilitary academies inBelgiumand

Oklahoma,surveyedthesituation.Itdidn’tlookgood.TheRwandaninfiltrationsacrosstheRusiziRiversouth of Bukavu were continuing; intelligence reports told of Rwandan troops and their AFDL alliesmassingon theothersideof theborder toattack the refugeecamps that sprawledoutoneithersideoftown.Nabyhadbeentaughthowtodealwithsimilarguerrillathreatsduringhistrainingcourses.Histaskwouldhavebeenfeasible foradisciplinedarmywithadequate resources.But thatwasnotwhatNabyhadathisdisposal.Over the past twenty years, Mobutu had cannibalized his own state, particularly his army. Not

surprisinglyforaleaderwhohadtakenpowerthroughacoup,Mobutufearedhisownofficersthemost,andhemadesure that theywouldnothave thewherewithal tocontesthispower.Heguttedhis regulararmy,deprivingitofresourcesandsalaries,whileheinvestedmillionsinseparate,paramilitaryunits—thepresidential guard and thegardecivile—which he then pitted against each other. Throughout thesevariousunits,henamedcloseassociates,oftenmembersofhisownNgbandi tribe,ascommandersandallowed them to get rich off extortion rackets, gun-smuggling, and illegal taxation.A similar situationprevailed in the intelligence services,whichproliferated and spiedon eachother. “Wedidn’t have anarmy;wehadindividuals,”Nabyolwaremembered.1WhenhearrivedinBukavu,Nabyolwatookstockofthesituation.Therewere800presidentialguards,

1,000guardesciviles,and200paratroopersintownwhoansweredtodifferentchainsofcommand.Theparatroopershadgonetoseed,abandoningtheirpositionstomoonlightforprivatesecuritycompaniesinorder tomake a living.The presidential guards toldNabyolwa that theywere deployed to protect therefugeesunder a deal theyhadnegotiatedwith theUnitedNations.DespiteNabyolwa’s entreaties that

theyhadswornanoath toprotectZairewith their lives, theyrefused tosendanyof their troops to thefrontlines.The lack of intelligence further confused matters. Commanders in Bukavu received exaggerated,

contradictory informationabout thesecuritysituationto thesouthof townin theRusiziplainandin theHighPlateau,whereRwandanvanguardpartiesbeganskirmishingwithNabyolwa’sunitsinAugustandSeptember.“Ididn’tknowwhetheritwasit300or3,000enemytroopsactivethere,”heremembered.HesentreportstothearmycommandinKinshasabutreceivedlittleresponse.PoliticiansinthecapitalweretoobusyfeudingwitheachothertopaymuchattentiontothesituationinBukavu,athousandmilesaway.WhenNabyolwa radioedKinshasa to tell themhe urgently needed one battalion of special forces, thecommanderofthepresidentialguardanswered,“WehaveproblemsinKinshasa,too,youknow.Weneedthe soldiers here.”Mobutu had been in power for so long,Nabyolwa remembered, that no one couldconceiveofhimfailing,leastofalltoaLilliputianneighborlikeRwanda.TheRwandanattackstothesouthoftownsentthousandsofrefugeesandZairianciviliansspillinginto

Bukavu,wheretheysparkedalarmandprotests.OnSeptember18,theCatholicChurchandcivilsocietygroups rallied tensof thousandsofpeople in thestreetsofBukavu inprotestof the“aggressionby theTutsi invaders.”Waving banners and singing songs, they streamed down Avenue Lumumba, the mainthoroughfare.TheydemandedthatthegovernmentinKinshasa“mobilizethemeans...tokicktheinvadersoutofthenationalterritoryandtoresolve,onceandforall,theissueofcitizenship.”2Thisfirebrandrhetoricwas,ofcourse,notwellreceivedontheothersideoftheborder.Thousandsof

BanyamulengehadbeenseekingrefugeinRwandafromtheabusesofMobutu’sarmyandarmedgangs.Aweek after the demonstration, Nabyolwa tuned into Radio Rwanda to hear Prime Minister PasteurBizimungugiveaspeech.“ThereisnodifferencebetweentheInterahamweandtheZairianauthorities,”hethundered.“Eachtimetheymistreatus,Rwandawillgetrevenge....Iftheirgambitistochaseoutthosewhohavelivedinthecountryforfourhundredyears, theonlyBanyamulengewewillwelcomearethechildrenandoldwomen.Theothersmust stay there tocorrectandgivea lesson to thosewhowant tochasethemout.”3

ItwasnotlongbeforeitbecamecleartoNabyolwathathewasinserioustrouble.PerhapsthefirstsignwastheLemerahospitalmassacre.TheclinicwasperchedonthesteephillsoverlookingtheRusiziplain,forminganidealmilitaryoutlook.Ithadbeenfoundedinthe1930sbySwedishPentecostalmissionariesand by the time of the war was the largest hospital in the province, with 230 beds, several foreigndoctors,andadvancedmedicalequipment.Givenitsproximitytothefighting,ithadreceiveddozensofwounded soldiers, both Hutu militiamen and Zairian troops. The hospital had asked the Zairiangovernmentforprotectioninexchangeforprovidingtreatment,andacompanyofaroundahundredmenhadbeendeployedthere.At dawn on October 6, nurses at the hospital were woken by gunfire from themilitary camp. The

generator had been switched off for the night, but the almost full moon provided some light. TheRwandanswereknowntoinfiltratevanguardunitswhiletherearguardshotvolleysintotheair; itwaspossiblethattherebelshadalreadyreachedthehospital.Nursessawfleetingshadowsmovingthroughthenearby banana groves.Havoc broke out in the rows of hospital beds, as thosewounded soldierswhocouldmovetoreintravenoustubesoutoftheirarmsandran,hobbled,orcrawledforsafety.Thenurses

barricadedthemselvesintotheirroomsandwaited.Afewvillagersventureddowntothehospitalthefollowingafternoon.Thescenetheysawturnedtheir

stomachs. Seventeenpatients,mostly soldiers, lay dead in their beds and sprawledon the floor in thewards, bayoneted and shot to death. Broken glass,Mercurochrome, and intravenous fluids lay spilledaroundthem.Theattackershadlootedthestockofmedicines,spillingcartonsofsyringesandbandageson the floor. In the private quarters, they found the bodies of three nurses—Kadaguza, Simbi, andMaganya—intheirwhiteaprons,allshotbyAFDLandRwandantroops.AtthenearbyCatholicparish,several bodies of Zairian soldiers lay twisted in the courtyard. Inside, they found the bodies of twoCatholicpriestsintheirhabits,alsoshotdead.4SimilarattackstookplaceacrosstheRusiziplain,followingthesamepattern:infiltratorsfromRwanda

attacking army positions and refugee camps, scattering the Zairian army and Hutu militia and killingcivilians.Soon,220,000coweringrefugeeswerefloodingintoBukavu,bringingwiththemwordofmoremassacresandspreadingpanic.Nabyolwa decided to go to the Rusizi plain himself to rally the troops. He drove his Land Rover

pickuptoLuvungi,theZairianarmy’smostadvancedposition,onlytofindhissoldierspilingintoatruck,withtheirbelongingsandgunsstackedupoverthecabin.“Colonel,”oneofthementoldhim,hurriedlysalutinghim,“Youareonyourown.”Retreating back to town, he reported to his commanding officer, telling him they urgently needed

reinforcements.“Hecouldn’thaveagreedmore,”Nabyolwaremembered,laughing.“Whenheheardwhathadhappened,hesuccumbedtoasuddenstomachailment.HepackedhissuitcaseandsaidhewasgoingtoKinshasatogetmoretroops.Hewasonthenextplaneout.”Thefollowingday,Nabyolwa’smoodwasliftedbrieflywhenhegotwordthataplanewasarriving

with the promised reinforcements.He hurried to the airport to receive the troops, only to see a cargoplane landing with a company of garde civile troops disembarking with their wives, children, andbelongings.“Thereweretwohundredshabbilydressedsoldierswithpotsandpansontheirheads.Goatswererunningaroundtheairstrip.Theyaskedmewheretheycouldsetupcamp.”Hemoanedindismay,holdinghisheadinhishands.“Goats!”Nabyolwa called headquarters in Kinshasa three times, urging it to deploy more troops and more

resources.Nothingcame.Finally,astheenemytroopswerejustafewmilesfromBukavu,Nabyrangthearmy chief of staff one final time: “General, if you wait any longer you will have to pick us up asprisonersofwarfromtheRedCross!”

If theRwandangenocideandtheexodusof thegénocidairesandrefugees toZairewere the immediatecausesoftheCongowar,thedecayofMobutu’sstateandarmyprovidedtheequallyimportantcontext.By1996,Zairewasateeteringhouseofcards—astheEconomistquipped,“Theycallitacountry.InfactitisjustaZaire-shapedholeinthemiddleofAfrica.”5The army that Nabyolwa joined in 1973 was a jumble of contradictions. Like the rest of the state

apparatus,itwaspresenteverywhere,harassingandtaxingthepopulation,buteffectivenowhere.Ontheonehand,theZairianArmedForces(FAZ)receivedhundredsofmillionsofdollarsofmilitaryassistancefromwesterncountries in theireffort tomakeZaireabulwarkagainst thesocialiststates—Angola, theRepublic of Congo, and Tanzania—that surrounded it. On the other hand, despite their partners’

profligacy,Mobutu’sarmywasrarelyabletodealeffectivelywitheventhemostamateurishchallenge.On numerous occasions, Mobutu had to call on his foreign allies or mercenaries to prop up hisflounderingarmy.Therootsofthearmy’sweaknesslieintheBelgiancolonialstate.TheForcePublique,asthearmywas

then called, was formed to maintain law and order and suppress any challenge to colonial rule. Itconflatedmilitaryandpolicingfunctions,andcontrolofmilitaryunitswasstronglydecentralizedtoservetheneedsof the territorial administrators,whoused the army for civilian tasks aswell as to suppressdissent.TheBelgianauthoritiesneverthoughttocreateastrongarmy;upuntilthelate1950s,theythoughtthatindependencewasstilldecadesawayandthattheywouldcontinuetocontrolthestateanditssecurityforces.TheydidnotallowCongolesetoadvancebeyondtherankofnoncommissionedofficers,leavingathousandwhiteBelgianstomakeuptheofficercorps.Mobutuhimselfwasasergeant,atrainedtypistandjournalist,atthetimeofindependence.WithintwomonthshewaschiefofstaffofthenewlyindependentCongo’sarmy.When the Belgians left, the brash and inexperienced new authorities sacked all Belgian officers,

suspicious that they wanted to keep running the country even after independence. It would have beendifficult to formanewarmyunder thebestof circumstances,butnoonehadexpected the turmoil thatfollowed. Almost immediately, parts of the provinces of Kasai and Katanga seceded, supported bywesterneconomicandpolitical interests.WhenBelgiumand theUnitedStatesconnivedwithKatangansecessionists to assassinate Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in January 1961, the postindependencegovernment and army split, and a new rebellion broke out in the easternCongo. To get these variousuprisingsundercontrol,ColonelMobutu reliedon foreignassistance, first from20,000UnitedNationspeacekeepersandthenfromwhitemercenaries,Belgianparatroopers,andtheU.S.AirForce.Mobutu brought an end to this tumultuous period through a coup in November 1965 and set about

reorganizing the army. The military became the centerpiece of his administration, and he consistentlyallocatedover10percentofhisbudgettodefense.Despitehismeagertraining,hepromotedhimselftofieldmarshallandministerofdefense.Hesucceededinattractingoutsidesupportbypresentinghimselfasthebulwarkagainstcommunismintheregion.HehostedseveralAngolanrebelgroupsonhisterritoryandallowedtheUnitedStatestofunnelmoneyandweaponstothem.Between1960and1991,theUnitedStatesprovided$190millioninmilitaryassistancetoZaireandtrained1,356officers.6France, Israel,andBelgiumalsoprovidedmilitaryaidtotheautocrat,despitetheevidencethathehimselfhaddonelittletoimprovetheperformanceofhissecurityservices.Thedictatorknewthathewastooimportanttothewesttobeallowedtofail.Asaresult,therewasnoshortageoftechnicallyproficientandcompetentmilitaryofficers.Nabyolwa

wasagoodexampleofthis.HewastrainedasaparatrooperbyBelgiansandthentraveledtoBrusselsforartillerytrainingattheroyalmilitaryacademy.Severalyearslater,hestudiedforsixmonthsatFortSealinOklahoma.Atthesametime,ZairebecameaburgeoningAfricanmilitarypower,withcadetsfromothercountriesundergoingparatroop,naval,andartillerytrainingatvariousZairianacademies.MobutusentthousandsoftroopstohelpputdowntheBiafransecessioninNigeria,aLibyan-backedincursioninChad,andrebelinsurgenciesinBurundi,Rwanda,andTogo.Whilehe courtedoutside support, however,Mobutuwasdeeplyafraid thathis armywouldactually

become a professional, cohesive fighting force. Paradoxically, it was Mobutu’s fear of dissent thatweakenedhissecurityforces.Havingrisenthroughacoup,heknewthedangerthatindependentpolesofpower represented, and he sidelined or eliminated competent officers he deemed to be a threat. Themilitary’sdeclinebeganin1975,whenMobutucourt-martialedaslewofU.S.-trainedofficers,includingthreegeneralsandhisownmilitaryadvisor,ColonelOmbaPene,accusingthemofplanningaputschin

connivancewiththeAmericanembassy.ThreeyearslateritwastheturnofofficerstrainedattheBelgianRoyalMilitaryAcademy.DespitescantevidenceregardingtheallegedBelgium-linkedplot,theofficerswerequicklysentencedandexecutedbyfiringsquad.Atthesametime,MobutudismissedallKinshasa-based officers from ethnic communities deemed disloyal, in particular those from Kasai, Maniema,Bandundu,andKatangaprovinces.Thecommanderinchiefreorganizedthearmy,placingmembersofhisown,smallNgbanditribeinkeycommandpositions.Loyalty,inthiscasecementedbyethnicity,trumpedcompetence.Nabyolwa,fromtherestiveKivuProvince,wasbarredfromimportantpositions,despitehistraining

abroad. “They thoughtpeople from theKivuswere rebels,”Nabyolwa remembered.Hewas forced toreceiveorders fromofficerswho, insomecases,hadneverevengraduated frommilitaryacademy.“Ifyouweren’tfromEquateur,youwerenobody.”Drivenbyhisdeeplyparanoidfantasies,Mobutuproceededtobalkanizethearmy,creatingamultitude

ofmilitaryunitsand intelligenceserviceswithdifferentchainsofcommandandoverlappingmandates.Hegavethecommandofmostoftheseunitstorelatives.In1982,hepromotedhisnephewNzimbiNgbalefromcaptaintogeneralandmadehimthecommandofhisnewlyformedpresidentialguard.Severalyearslater,GeneralPhilemonBaramoto,whohadmarriedMobutu’ssister-in-law,wasplacedattheheadofthegardecivile,whichwassupposedtoprotectthecountry’sbordersbutendedupasabloatedparamilitaryunitdeployedthroughoutthecountry.Mobutu’ssonKongolo,whohadtherankofcaptainbutwasnotpartof the official armed forces, set up his ownprivate security company “EagleService” that he used toextortmoneyfromdiamondtradersandcustomsofficials.ThenationalsecurityadvisorHonoréNgbanda,whowasnicknamed“Terminator”forhisbrutality,createdtwoprivatemilitiastotargetenemiesoftheregime.Bythe1990s,halfofthesixty-twogeneralsinthearmedforcescamefromMobutu’shomeprovinceof

Equateur and a third from his small Ngbandi ethnic group. In the ministry of defense, reportedly 90percentofthestaffwasfromEquateur.7Insteadofloyalty,however,thesepoorlythought-outpromotionscreated discord in the army. The various military and paramilitary services spent much of their timefightingamongeachotherandbuildingmafia-likenetworksthroughoutthecountry.Mobutu’sownsecurityadvisor later described the farcical infighting among generals: “All theministers of defense and armygeneralshad,withinthemilitaryorinMobutu’sentourage,arivalthattheyhadtofightordefendagainst.General Bumba suffered attacks from General Molongya; Singa battled with Lomponda; LikuliabackstabbedEluki;MahelegaveElukiahardtime;meanwhileSinga,backattheministryofdefense,wassubjectedtoLikulia’splotting.Thelistislong.”8As loyalty was more important than probity, Mobutu allowed his protégés to enrich themselves.

Officerscompetedforinfluence,juicyprocurementdeals,andpatronage.Almostallhigh-rankingofficerswereinvolvedinbusiness,andthelinesbetweenpublicandprivatebecamecompletelyblurredastheyusedstateassetstofurtherpersonalinterests.Thearmy’schiefofstaff,GeneralElukiMonga,siphonedfuel from military stocks for his fleet of taxis; General Baramoto rented his soldiers out as privatesecurityguardsinKinshasa;GeneralNzimbi,thecommanderofthepresidentialguard,usedarmytruckstosmugglecopperfromKatangatoZambia.9

AsMobutu’sholdonstateandeconomicpowerdeclined in the1980s,hisarmy, too, fellapart.Aside

fromthepresidentialguard,whoweremuchbetterequipped,paid,andfed,mostofthecountry’s70,000soldiersrarelyorneverreceivedsalaries.Mobutufamouslydeclaredinaspeechtothearmy,“Youhaveguns; you don’t need a salary.”10 It was anothermanifestation of his famous “Article 15,” a fictitiousclause in an obsolete constitution that called for the population to do anything they needed to do tosurvive.Débrouillez-vous (“improvise” or “get by”) became the modus operandi for Zairians of allclasses,inparticularthearmedforces.It isdifficult tooverstate the impact thesepolicieshadon thesecurityservices.Asearlyas1979,a

scholartravelinginthenortheastcameacrosssoldiersin“tattereduniforms,thevictimsoflongdeferredpay. A number were reduced to begging for food.” In order to survive, they were forced to hirethemselvesouttolocalfarmerstoworkinthefields.11Inmilitarycampsthroughoutthecountry,soldiershad turned training grounds into vegetable plots, and chickens and goats strayed about the dilapidatedcompounds.Mostsoldiersresortedtolessgallantmeanstoearntheirliving.Bythe1990s,imprompturoadblocks

atwhichsoldierswouldextortmoneyhadbecomeubiquitousfeaturesoftheZairiancountryside.Soldiersbecameknownaskatanyama,aLingalatermmeaning“meatcutters,”becausetheywouldcomeintothemarketandseizethechoicestmorselsofmeatfromthebutchers.Mobutuhimself,inoneofhisperiodicboutsof“self-criticism,”admittedthat,“Thetruthissimplythatthesecadresseemtohavelosttherigorofmilitary lifeanddiscipline in favorofall sortsofcommodities:commerce,beautifulcars,beautifulvillas,bourgeoislife.”12InBukavu,Nabyolwaarrivedtofindtheofficershadbecomebusinessmen.“Theywouldcometostaff

headquarterswearinggoldringsandchains,sometimesevensunglasses,smellingofcologne,”hetoldme,shakinghishead.Mostcommandershadseveralwives;oneofNabyolwa’sdeputieshadaclothesshoponthemainroad,whileanotherranasmugglingracketwithlocalbusinessmen,sendingtrucksthroughtheBurundianborderatnight.

Aswithabankruptedbusiness,whenthearmyceasedfunctioning,itsleadersbegandisassemblingitandsellingitoff—weapons,vehicles,airplanes,generators,andanythingelsethatcouldgetadecentpriceonthe international arms market or on the black market. In June 1994, General Nzimbi and GeneralBaramotosold theair force’s last remainingfighter jets toarmsdealers.Severalmonths later,GeneralElukigaveorders to theair forcecommander to sell the lastC-130 transportaircraft toSouthAfricandealers.Somanysparepartswerebarteredaway that,by theendof the1980s,only70percentof thetanksofthecountry’smainarmoredbrigadewerefunctional.AsimilarstatisticappliedtotheZairianairforce.13TheZairianarmywasunablethroughitsownmeanstotransporttroopsorgoodsanywhereinacountry 1,000 miles wide and with barely any paved roads. They had to resort to using commercialplanes.At the endof thewar, thedefunct state allegedlyowed localbusinessmenover$40million indebtsforairtravelalone.14ThearrivalofthedisplacedRwandanarmyoftheHabyarimanaregimeandtherefugeesalsoprovided

agoodbusinessopportunity for thegenerals.WhenMobutu’s securityadvisor inspected thearsenalofconfiscatedweapons inaGomamilitarycamp, it tookhimawholeday toseeall theequipment:“Thewholecourtyardwascoveredwithheavyandmodernmachinery.Manyofthesehadneverbeenused.Iwas even surprised to see very modern amphibious tanks. Entire hangars were full of hundreds of

thousandsofriflesofallkinds,whilethreebuildingswerefullofammunition.”15Mostoftheseweaponswerebarteredawaybythevariousgeneralsinvolvedinarmstrafficking.Thedestinationoftheweaponsrevealedtheofficers’extremecynicism:someweresoldbacktotheRwandanarmyinexile,whileothersweresuppliedtotheRPFacrosstheborder.TheZairianarmysupplieditsenemywithsomeofthebulletsandgunsitwouldusetokillthemwithlater.Afterdecadesofnepotismandmismanagement,itwasclearthattheonlyloyaltymostcommandersfelt

wastotheirownpocketbooks.GeneralTembele,Mobutu’scommanderontheeasternfront,metregularlywithRPFcommandersacrossthebordertobriefthemonthemilitarysituation.16PatrickKaregeya, theRwandanexternalintelligencechief,spokewithMobutuofficersinKinshasaandintheeastintherun-uptothewar.“Wehadextensiveinfiltration,weusedmoney,weusedfriends.Itwasn’thard.”17

NabyolwawasindowntownBukavuwhentherebelsfinallyreachedtown,enteringacrosstheRwandanborderandfromthesouthatthesametime.HeracedinhispickuptoHotelResidence,alargemonolithon the main strip where the army high command had rented apartments. His commanding officer hadbarricaded himself there, swearing that hewould not abandon his position.Nabyolwa rushed into hisroom,urginghimtoorderatacticalretreat.Hiscommanderrefused,sayingthattheywouldstillbeabletoholdthetown.Exasperated,Nabyolwatookhimouttothebalcony,fromwheretheycouldseeRwandantroops swarming into town.As they stoodon thebalcony, a rocket-propelledgrenadehit thewall justmetersawayfromthem,knockingthembothto theground.Convinced, thegeneral informedhisstaff toprepareahastywithdrawaltoasuburbonahilladjacenttoBukavu,fromwheretheywouldbeabletoprepareacounterattack.Thearmyhighcommandpiledintotheirmilitaryjeepsandscreechedoutoftown,onlytofindthatmost

of the army had already fled to the military barracks to the north. The situation, however, was notfavorable for a counterattack. In the barracks, the terrified soldiersmilled aboutwith theirwives andchildren.Theirbelongings—andalsopillagedgoods,Nabyolwasuspected—laystrewnabouttheparadegrounds.Itwasimpossibletoenvisionacounterattackintheseconditions,hethought.Nonetheless,andagainst his advice, his commandergaveorders for the soldiers to lineup inpreparation for an attack.Theyfinallygot theunitcommanders topresent themselvesat thefrontof theparadegrounds,but theirsoldiersbalked, leaving theirofficers standingalone, lookingsheepish in themiddleof thepitch.“Mygeneralwasconvincedthatwehadanarmy—wedidn’t,”Nabyolwarecalled.TheybeatafurtherretreattotheKavumuairporteighteenmilestothenorthoftown,whereKinshasa

hadpromised to send them reinforcements.There they foundoneof themost formidablepieces left inMobutu’s arsenal, a fifteen-meter-long BM-30 Smerch rocket launcher with twelve barrels. Hiscommander grinned and told Nabyolwa, much to his dismay, “We will use this to bomb Bukavu.”Nabyolwa,whostillhadrelativesandfamilymembersintown,retorted:“Thatdoesn’tmakeanysense.We will just kill civilians and destroy houses!” An order is an order, the general insisted, and theypreparedacolumntodrivetowardBukavutofindanappropriateplacefromwhichtobombthetown.Halfwayintotown,thegeneralpulledupalongsideNabyolwa,whowasdrivinginthemiddleofthe

convoyinapickup,andorderedhimtoleadtheoffensive.“Youwantyouroperationalcommandertobethefirsttodieinbattle?”Nabyolwafulminated.Thatwasit:Hestoppedhisvehicleandhandedthekeysovertohisgeneral.“Iwasn’tgoingtodielikethat,”heremembered.Hedidnotwanttocrosstheline

betweenbraveryandstupidity.“Ifhewantedtoleadtheoffensive,hewasmorethanwelcome.”Nabyolwa began walking back toward the airport on foot. He found the bulk of his troops at a

crossroads together with hundreds of Rwandan refugees, debating whether to head north toward theairportorwest into theequatorial rainforests.Aftersomedeliberation, theyheadedover themountainsinto the inhospitable jungles.Naby joined them, climbing into a jeepbelonging to apresidential guardcommander.Inthemeantime,theBM-30’selectricalsystemshort-circuited,andthehaplessgeneralfledtowardthe

airport. Instead of taking the roadwestward into the jungles, however, he decided to head northwardalongLakeKivutoGoma,wherehethoughthemightstillbeabletojoinotherunitstoresisttheRwandaninvasion.Overhisradio,Nabyolwaheardofhiscommander’sdecisionandfeltapangofremorse.Hewas sure thatGomawould soon fall aswell and thegeneralwould thenbe stuckbetween twoenemycontingents.Inasmallvillagesixtymilesintothejungle,Nabyolwatoldthepresidentialguardunitthattheyneededtoreturntogetthegeneral.Itwasthelaststrawforthesoldiers,whothoughtitwassuicidaltogoback.Theyturnedtheirgunsonhim.“Theydidn’tmake any sense,”Nabyolwa remembered. “First they accusedmeof deserting—which

wasstrangecomingfromabunchofdeserters.ThentheysaidIwantedtokillthembygoingback.Finally,anofficersaid,‘Wethinkyouareatraitor.Everytimeyousendusintobattle,wegetattacked!’“‘Butthat’swhatwarisabout!’“‘Youareasadist!’”Facedwiththiskindoflogic,allNabyolwacoulddowastopersuadethemthat,insteadofkillinghim,

itwouldbewisertoarresthimandtakehimtotheircommandingofficer.

Ontheothersideofthebattlefield,thetroopswerebeingledbymenagenerationyoungerthantheZairiangenerals.On the face of it, the Rwandan-led invasion was an amalgam of different nationalities, chains of

command, and military cultures. There were Ugandan artillery units, Eritrean speedboats, Tanzanianmilitaryadvisors,andCongolesesoldiers.Whenitcamedowntoit,however,thepeoplecallingtheshotswereRwandans,atleastforthefirsthalfofthewar.Thethirty-three-year-oldinchargeofoperationsonthegroundwasColonelJamesKabarebe,theformercommanderofKagame’sguard.Kabarebe’sreputationis legendaryin theregion, to theextentwherepeopleonlyrefer tohimbyhis

firstname,“James”or“Jamesi.”JustasecondlieutenantwhentheRPFinvadedthenorthofRwandain1990,hehadrisentotherankoflieutenantcolonelbythetimetheycapturedKigaliin1994.18AccordingtoCongoleseofficerswhoworkedwithhim,heledbyexample,ofteneatingwithhisofficersandgoingtothefrontlinetoleadoffensives.Intacticalmeetings,hewouldtypicallydefertohiscolleaguesfortheiropinions,andhewasthusabletocultivatealoyalfollowingamongyoungCongolesearmyofficers.Atthebeginningofoperations,KabarebeaskedLaurentKabilawhetherhissonJosephcouldjoinhim

atthefront.JosephwastheonefamilymembertheoldrevolutionaryhadbroughtwithhimtoKigali,andthe twenty-five-year-old began popping up on the periphery of officials’ vision in 1996.An academicremembers being driven fromKigali by amonosyllabic Joseph tomeet his father inGoma; aKenyansecurityofficerrecallsdrinkingwithJosephinabarinKampalaalongwithothermilitaryofficers.KabarebenowwantedJosephtoaccompanyhimtowitnessmilitaryoperationsintheCongo.“I told

KabilathatJosephhadtolearnthemilitaryprofessionandthattheAFDLwasthebestschool.Hefinallyaccepted.”19AccordingtoKabarebe,hisyoungdiscipledidnottakereadilytosoldiering.Whenheheardgunfire,hewouldpanic.“Hehadthehardesttimelearninghowtofight.”Life at the frontwas different fromLaurentKabila’smore languid existence inDar esSalaam.The

Rwandan-ledtroopshadsometentsandtarpaulinsandwouldbivouactheirtroopswherevertheycouldfind cover.But the fightinghad started inSeptember, at thebeginningof the rainy season.Thereweredownpoursalmosteveryevening,drenchingthesoldiersandinfusingafetiddampnessintotheirclothesand belongings. Blow flies and jiggers deposited maggots under their skin, leading to infected,suppuratingwounds.Therainmadeitalmostimpossibletopassalongtheroads.Troopsspentdaysgettingtrucksunstuck

andoverfaultybridges,andsoldierswereforcedtocarrymostoftheirbelongingsontheirheads.Mostthrew their socksawayaftera fewweeksandmarchedon,barefoot inWellingtonboots, accumulatingblistersandcalluses.Atnight,theylashedtogetherlean-tosoutofbananaleavesandsticksoroccupiedabandonedbuildings.Therewaslittletoeat.Thetroopshadtorelylargelyonwhattheycouldfindlocally,andtheirpathhad

beenravagedbyseveralhundredthousandCongoleseandRwandanpeoplefleeingthefighting.Thefieldshadbeenuprooted,thefishpondsemptied,andthehousesplundered.Whentheywerelucky,theywouldstumble on stocks abandoned by humanitarian workers, in particular the UN High Commissioner forRefugees.Then, for severalweeks the staplediet of the soldiersbecameU.S.,FDA-approved surpluscornmeal, vegetable oil, and kidney beans. For officers, dessert might be nutritional milk for infantsmixedwithsugarandcoffee,alongwithsomeenergybiscuits.MostfightingalongtheeasternborderatthebeginningwascarriedoutbyRwandanarmytroopsalong

withCongoleseTutsiwhohadjoinedintherun-uptotherebellion.ByOctober1996,however,thefirstbatch of new Congolese recruits had graduated from the two training camps the AFDL had set up inNyaleke,NorthKivu,andKidote,SouthKivu.Thousandsof teenagers joined therebellion,outfitted inneatly pressed green uniformswithWellington boots.They advanced almost solely on foot—airplaneswere expensive and usedmostly by officers and elite units—singing songs and balancing ammunitionboxesontheirheads.Mobailo,theycalledit,theforcedmarchthatcouldcoverfortyormoremilesinaday.Theyborrowednamestheyheardontheradioforfearedfighters:“BisotozabaTaliban”(weareTaliban), they told villagers. Several of them gave themselves nicknames of international bad guys;Ghadaffiwasapopularone.Later in thewar,Osamasbeganpoppingup.Years later, someCongolesevillagerstoldmethattheleaderoftheAFDLtroopsintheirareahadbeenRamboorChuckNorris.InFebruary, the troopswere joinedbyovera thousandKatanganTigers,oldandyoung,flowninon

cargo planes fromAngola. Themention of theKatanganTigers provokes a great deal of hilaritywithRwandan officers. “Eh! Tigers! Those guys caused us a lot of trouble,” the member of the Rwandancommandtoldme.“Theywereoldmenwhofoughtwithallkindsofmagicamulets,believingtheywouldbemadeinvincibletobullets.”DespitetheRwandans’jokes,however,notallTigersweregeriatricanduseless.Manyofthesecond-generationTigershadbeengiventhoroughtrainingintheAngolanarmyandwereintheir twentiesandthirtiesat thebeginningof thewar.20 Itwas thesePortuguesespeakingexilesthattheAngolangovernmentplannedonsendingtojoinKagame’salliance.

Therewere fewmemorable battles for the rebels as they crossed the country.Bukavuwas one of thefiercerones,astheZairianarmytriedtoputupsomeresistance;later,theyknewbetter.Gomafellquicklyasaresultoftreason,asMobutu’sofficerssoldequipmentandintelligencetotheirenemiesinthemonthspriortotheinvasionandthendidlittletodefendthetown.Simultaneously,UgandantroopshadcrossedthebordertothenorthandtakenthetownofMahagiwithonlythirtysoldiers.Arebelcommandertoldmethat three of his men on a motorcycle defeated two hundredMobutu soldiers in another town in thenortheast.Where therewas resistance, itwasoftenbecauseof foreign troops.Rwandanex-FARwere fighting

alongsidetheZairianarmy,tryingtoprotecttheretreatingrefugees.InKindu,alongtheupperreachesoftheCongoRiver,overathousandex-FARjoinedMobutu’stroops,althoughtheywerepoorlycoordinatedand soon scattered.21Mobutu’s officers, however, had not given up. They decided tomake a stand inKisangani, the country’s third largest city and the gateway to the east, located at a bend in theCongoRiver. The city had a long airstrip and was a major river port. The army’s high command flew inreinforcementsandalsominedtheairportandthemainroads leadingto townfromtheeast.DiplomatsspeculatedthatMobutuwouldbehistoryifthetownfell.Mobutu’sgeneralsbeganfranticallyorganizingotherforeignsupport.UsingtheircontactsinBelgrade

andParis,theymanagedtohirearound280mercenaries,mostlyFrenchandSerbs,underthecommandofBelgiancolonelChristianTavernier,alongwithsomeattackhelicoptersandartillery.22It was too little, too late. The area they had to cover was too large, and the Zairian army too

disorganized for them to havemuch impact.The soldiers of fortunewere also perhaps not of the bestquality.AFrenchanalystdescribedthemasamixturebetween“FrederickForsyth’s‘dogsofwar’andtheKeystoneKops.”HewentontodisparagetheSerbs’performanceinparticular:“Theyspent theirdaysgettingdrunkandaimlesslyharassingcivilians.Theydidnothavepropermaps,theyspokeneitherFrenchnorSwahili,andsoonmostofthemweresickwithdysenteryandmalaria.”23TavernierchoseashisoperationalbaseWatsa,aremotetowninthenortheastthathadlittlestrategic

importance, butwhere he had obtainedmining rights. The colonel himselfwas seenmore often in theupscaleMemlingHotelinKinshasathanonthebattlefield,haranguingforeigncorrespondents,boastingofhisfeats,andcomplainingofgovernmentineptitude.Internal tensions also hampered operations. The French, mostly former soldiers from the Foreign

Legion,werebetterconnectedandpaiduptofivetimesasmuchastheSerbs—upto$10,000permonthfortheofficers.ButtheSerbscontrolledmostoftheaircraftandheavyweaponry,oldmachinesleasedatinflatedpricesfromtheYugoslavarmy.TheFrenchaccusedtheircounterpartsofamateurism;theSerbsretortedthatthelasttimetheFrenchhadwonaseriousbattlewasatAusterlitzin1805.On the battlefield, everything fell apart. The Serbs never provided the air support the French

demanded, complaining ofmissing parts and a lack of fuel. On several occasions, they even bombedMobutu’sretreatingtroops,killingdozens.Mobutu’ssecurityadvisorrememberedtheepisode:“Wehadtwo different delegations from Zaire recruiting mercenaries separately.What was the result?We hadmercenariesfromdifferentcountrieswhospokedifferentlanguages....Weboughtweaponsfromdifferentcountriesthatdidn’tworktogether.ItwasaveritableTowerofBabel.”24Themercenariesbehavedabysmally toward the localpopulation.Eventoday,residentsofKisangani

rememberthederangedSerbiancommanderColonelJugoslav“Yugo”Petrusic,drivingabouttowninhisjeep, harassing civilians. He shot and killed two evangelical preachers who annoyed him with theirmegaphoneblasted prayers. He was sure that AFDL rebels had infiltrated Kisangani, and he arrestedciviliansforinterrogation,subjectingthemtoelectroshocksfromacarbatteryandproddingthemwitha

bayonet.25

Colonel JamesKabarebe remembered thebattle forKisangani asprobably thehardestone theyhad tofight.Surroundedbythickjungle,theRwandantroopsfacedoffwiththeenemyacrossanarrowbridgeoveratributarytotheCongoRiver.Theytriedadvancingbutweremetwithahailofbulletsandwell-calibratedmortarfire.TheysearchedthebanksoftheCongoRiverbutcouldnotfindanyfishermenwhocouldferrythemacrosstoflanktheenemy.Again,itisdifficulttotellhowwellwarstoriesseparatefactfromfiction.“LaurentKabilahadstrange

notionsofmilitarytactics,”JamesKabareberemembered.“InKisangani,whenwewereblockedbythemercenaries,hecametome,urgingmetoputsoldiersupinthetreesand,oncommand,tostartshootinginalldifferentdirectionsatonce.Hesaiditwouldconfusethehelloutoftheenemy!”Fromthenon,everytimeKabarebewasconfrontedwithheavyresistance,hiscolleaguesjokinglytoldhimtoputsoldiersinthetrees.OthertalesaboutthebattleremainpopularwiththeRwandans.BlockedbyheavyfireandtheCongo

River, the Rwandans decided to let the newly arrived Katangan Tigers have a try. According to theRwandans,theTigersrubbedtheirbodiesdownwithmagicsalvesandputamuletsaroundtheirneckstoprotectthemfrombullets.Thentheyadvancedontheenemy.Onebyone,theywerepickedoffbysniperfire.Somejumpedintothewateranddrowned.Othersran.“Itwasamassacre,”Kabareberemembered.26It isunlikelythattheKatanganTigers,professionallytrainedbytheAngolanarmyandnokamikazes,

behaved in such a fashion.Themore likely story is oneprovidedby someof theAFDL soldierswhoparticipatedintheoffensive:TheywerefinallyabletooutflankMobutu’sforcesbytravelingseveraldaysupstream,crossingtheriver,andhittingthemfromtherear.Atthesametime,Ugandantankshadarrivedalongthejungleroadsandprovidedcoverfirefortherebels.27Kisanganifell inMarch1997,soundingthedeathknellforMobutu’sgovernment.Itwasthelastreal

battleofMobutu’swar,withthepossibleexceptionofKenge,someonehundredandtwentymileswestofKinshasa,whenAngolanUNITArebelsrallied tohisdefense,alongwithseveral thousandunemployedanddesperateyouthsfromKinshasawhohadbeengivenahundreddollarseachandsenttothefront.Mbuji-Mayi, the country’s diamond hub, fell onApril 5, 1997. The fact thatMobutu’s army hardly

mountedadefenseof the town,whose state-rundiamondcompany,SociétéMinièredeBakwanga,hadbeenthelastreliablesourceofcashforMobutu,indicatedthatthegovernmenthadprettymuchgivenup.ForLaurentKabila,thecaptureofthetownwasagodsend,asitprovidedhimwithmuch-neededcashtopay the invoices for fuel and airplane rental, the two biggest expenses the rebels had. He asked theLebanesediamondtraderstopayhim$960,000inbacktaxesandseizedalargeshipmentbelongingtoDeBeers, theSouthAfricandiamondgiant,claimingthecompanywasoperatingillegally.Theyreportedlyhadtopay$5milliontogetthegemsback.28The next domino to fallwasLubumbashi, the country’s copper capital, aweek later. Soldiers from

Mobutu’sTwenty-firstBrigade toreupbedsheets, tyingwhitebandanasaround theirheadsandwavingwhite flags to greet theAFDL.Restaurant and hotel owners opened their doors, offering officers freebeersandsoftdrinks.ThiswasthetownwhereLaurentKabilahadbeenraised,andhequicklysetaboutrecruitingnewsoldiersfromlocalyouthgroups.Theoldflagof theCongoFreeState,yellowstarssetagainst a peacock-blue background, was resurrected and unfurled at government buildings in town.

Painters were hired to quickly replace the ubiquitous “Zaire” with “Congo,” and the flaming torch,symbolofMobutu’sparty,waserasedfrompublicmonuments.PerhapsthetruesignthatMobutu’serawascomingtoanendwasthearrivalinLubumbashiofseveral

executivejetsfullofofficialsfrominternationalminingandbankingcorporations.GoldmanSachs,FirstBankofBoston,andtheAngloAmericanMiningCorporationallmetwithLaurentKabila.29AnAmericancongressionaldelegationledbyGeorgiacongresswomanCynthiaMcKinneyarrivedshortlyafterwards.30

ItiseasytomakeamockeryofMobutu’sarmyandgovernment,toreducetheeventsthatledtohisdemisetoacomedyoferrorscarriedonbyabunchofincompetent,bumblinggeneralsinKinshasa.ButitwasnotforlackoftrainingorexpertisethattheZairianarmylostthewar.Thesecurityforcesincludedalegionofintelligentofficerstrainedatsomeoftheworld’sbestmilitaryacademies.Theproblemwasthedecaying,corruptstructureswithinwhichtheyworked.Lackingproperinstitutionssinceindependence,Mobutuhadcorrodedhisownstateinordertopreventanychallengerstohispowerfromemerging,erodingthatverypowerintheprocess.This dry rot that beset the army also had a serious impact on soldiers’morale. Soldierswhowere

rarely paid and could barely feed their wives and childrenwere unlikely to risk their lives for theircorrupt, thieving commanders. “The real challenge in the Congo,”Nabyolwa toldme, “is not how toreform the army, but how to reform the men in the army! There is a serious problem with Homocongoliensis!”It is this legacy of institutional weakness that formany Congolese is almost as depressing as their

physical suffering. Since the 1970s until today, the Congolese state has not had an effective army,administration,or judiciary,norhave its leadersbeen interested increating strong institutions. Instead,theyhaveseenthestateapparatusasathreat,tobekeptweaksoastobettermanipulateit.ThishasleftabitterCongoleseparadox:astatethatiseverywhereandoppressivebutthatisdefunctanddysfunctional.

9

ATHOUSANDMILESTHROUGHTHEJUNGLE

BUKAVU,ZAIRE,OCTOBER1996

BeatriceUmutesi, theRwandan refugeeand socialworker,was inBukavuwhen the fighting started inOctober1996.ShehadcometowaitformoneythataBelgiannonprofitorganizationwassendingtohelpher and her colleagues evacuate their families before the fighting began. The town was on edge; allmorning,thethunderofmortarfirehadbeenaudibleinthedistance.ShewaiteddesperatelyattheIndian-runwholesalestorewherethemoneytransferwassupposedtoarrive.Theshophadbeenclosedforthepast three days out of fear of looting; today seemed to be no different. Around 10:30, the automaticmachine-gunrat-a-tatjoinedthemortars,althoughthiswasnotnecessarilycauseforpanic.Forthepastfewdays,thetownhadbeenexchangingfirewiththeRwandanpositionsacrosstheborder.Thestreetswerefullofpeopletryingtofindfoodatthemarket.AgroupofmenwithcardboardbiscuitboxesontheirheadswaswalkingbrisklyfromtheRedCrosswarehousethathadjustbeenransacked.Suddenly,Beatricesawagroupofsoldiersrunningdownthehill,tearingofftheiruniformsastheyran.

Somebody screamed, “They are at the ISP!” The ISPwas a technical school barely half amile fromwhereshewasstanding.Pandemoniumerupted,aspeoplestreamedoutof theirhouseswithbasketsontheirheadsandbabiesstrappedtotheirbacks.Beatricehadenoughtimetograbheradoptivechildren,BakundaandAssumpta,andrunafterthefleeingsoldiers.Shehadtoleaveherotherrelatives,aswellasher fewbelongings,behind.All shehadwas seventydollars andherRwandan IDcard.Mortar shellspassedovertheirheads,whistlingandthenexplodingofftothesideoftheroad.Everywheretherewerewounded people,moaning, some alone, otherswith anxious familymembers or friendswatching overthem. She pinned her hopes on a refugee camp fifteenmiles away, where she had friends and familymembers.She thoughtshemightbeable to findprotection thereas the internationalcommunity tried tofindasolutionfortherefugees.

Herhopesweremisplaced.AsBeatricewasrunningintothehills,diplomatsaroundtheworldtriedtowish the Rwandan Hutu refugees out of existence. After the initial invasion had brought hundreds ofthousandsofrefugeesbacktoRwanda,theU.S.ambassadortoRwanda,RobertGribbin,concurredwithhishosts’viewthatthose“stillwiththeex-FARandInterahamwe ...werefamilyorsympathizerswhohadnointentionofreturningtoRwanda,”andtheremaining“refugeesappeartobeinthetenstotwentiesof thousandsrather than invastnumbers.”1 In reality,between300,000and600,000Hutu refugeeshadfledintothejunglesandwereatriskofstarvationanddisease.NoneoftherefugeesaroundBukavuhadthechoiceofreturningtoRwanda—itwouldhaveentailedheadingintotheadvancingtroops.2

OnNovember20,U.S.militaryofficerspresentedpicturesofaerial reconnaissance toaidgroups inKigali.TheyhadbeenflyingoverthecountryinPSOrionaircraft,takingpicturesofrefugeeflowsandsettlements.Inthephotoswereclearlyvisiblearoundhalfamillionpeopledistributedinthreemajorandnumeroussmalleragglomerations.ItwasnotclearhowmanyofthesepeopleweredisplacedZairiansandhowmanywererefugees.Just threedayslater, theU.S.militaryclaimedthat theyhadlocatedonlyonesignificantclusterofpeople,which“bythenatureoftheirmovementandothercluescanbeassumedtobetheex-FARandmilitias.”3Alltheothergroupshadmagicallyvanished.TheaidgroupOxfamcriedfoul,accusingtheU.S.militaryof“losing”refugeesonpurpose.“Wefeelboundtoconcludethatasmanyas400,000 refugees andunknownnumbersofZairiandisplacedpersonshave, in effect, beenair-brushedfromhistory.”4

AfterBeatricefledfromBukavu,sheranwithBakundaforadayuntilshecouldnotrunanymore.Fearingtheadvancingrebels,shestayedawayfromthemainroadsandfollowedalineofcowed,silentrefugeesthroughthebananagrovesthatcoveredthehillsides.Theyspentthefirstnightinaschoolthatwasbeingprotected by members of Mobutu’s youth organization, who had banded together to protect theircommunity.TheycheckedBeatrice’sIDbutwereskepticalaboutoneofthechildrenwhohadjoinedheron the way, a child with Tutsi features. Beatrice finally convinced them that he was her son; theygrudginglyallowedhertospendthenightinthehouseofalocalfamily.Thatfamily,shelaterwrote,“waspartof thatchainofZairians,who, throughoutmylong journey,sharedwithmetheir roofand the littlefoodtheyhad.”5Theonly roadof escapewas towardKisangani,Zaire’s third largest townat thebend in theCongo

River,morethanthreehundredmilestothenorthwest.HundredsofthousandsofHuturefugeeswereonthe move now through the forests of the eastern Congo, accompanied by tens of thousands of scaredCongolese.First, theyhadtoclimbthehillsoftheKahuzi-BiegaNationalPark, inmorepeacefultimesfamous for its lowland gorillas and highland elephants. On the narrow footpaths, Beatrice ran into atrafficjamofpeople.Itwasthebeginningoftherainyseason,andeveryeveningheavyrainswouldgushdownover them, turning the soil intoamuddy, slippery torrent.Tensof thousandsofpeople filled theforest;attimes,Beatricehadtostandonthepathandwaitforthesingle-filelinetostartmovingagain.Thehumid,coolairunderthecanopyechoedwiththesoundofthousandsoftiredfeetslappingthroughthemud.Not onlywas this one of the longestmass treks inmodern history, but itwas also one of themost

outlandish. The refugees walked through some of the densest rain forest on the planet, under layeredcanopiestwohundredfeethigh.Beatricewalkedfordayswithoutseeingdirectsunlight.Elsewhere,theyhad to ford deep rivers or cut new paths through the forest.Wasps laid larvae under their skin, longleechesplastered theirbodiesafter theypassed throughstreams,andseveralofBeatrice’scompanionswere killed by snakes.Once in themiddle of the night,Beatricewas awakened by screamswhen hergroupwasattackedbymillionsofdriverants.Theytried,withsomesuccess,tousefiretochasetheantsaway,buteventuallytheyhadtomove.ThebasicneedtosurviveovercamethemanytaboosinherentinRwandansociety.Forcedtoeatraw

rootsand leaves,Beatricedevelopedsores inhermouthandabadcaseofdiarrhea.First,she tried tohideherselfbehindbushestoeaseherdiscomfort,buteventually,whenshenolongerhadthestrength,she

wouldjustsquatdownnexttothepathandlooktheotherwayasothersploddedby.Lackingsoap,shebegantostink,andfleasandliceinfestedherclothes.Rwandanwomen,whoareknownfortheirmodesty,wereforcedtobathetoplessnexttomeninrivers.Death surrounded them. Chronic diseases, such as diarrhea,malaria, and typhoid, were the biggest

killers.Othersdiedofdiabetesorasthma,havingrunoutofmedicinetotreattheirchronicillnesses.Thesmell of rotting bodies filled the air. “In this race against the clock, if anyone fell, itwas rare to seesomeonereachoutahandtohelpherorhim.If,bychance,theywerenottrampled,theywereleftlyingbythesideoftheroad.”6Beatricesawflurriesofwhiteandbluebutterfliesalightonfreshcorpses,feedingofftheirsaltandmoisture.Furtheron,shesawawomanwhohadjustgivenbirthforcedtobitethroughher own umbilical cord and continue walking. In one town, locals by the side of the road held up amalnourishedbabytheyhadfoundlyingbythesideoftheroadafterhermotherdiedandherfatherwasunabletofeedher.Peoplepassedbyinsilence,unwillingtotakeonanotherburden.Aftertwohundredandfiftymilesandfiveweeksofwalking,BeatricereachedTingi-Tingi,“thecamp

ofdeath,”as shecalls it.Mobutu’s soldiershadblocked theiradvancewestward, saying the refugees’arrivalwould help the rebels infiltrate. Tooweak to fight the soldiers, the refugees settled down andprayedforhelptoarrive.Thenameforthetownmeant“swamp,”anditliveduptoitsname;mosquitoesanddirtygroundwater

plagued the refugees.Beatrice had lost over thirty pounds by the time she arrived there; her skinwasleatheryandstiff,hermusclesweresore,andshewassohungrythatthesightoffoodmadehersalivate.Totherefugees’dismay,nohumanitarianorganizationwastheretohelpthem;therewerefewlatrinesandnocleanwater.Adysenteryepidemicbrokeoutshortlyaftertheirarrival,followedbycholera.Soon,aidworkers did arrive, but they were overwhelmed by the needs of 80,000 people. Every day, bodies,partiallycoveredbywhitesheets,wouldbecarriedawayonstretchers.Therefugees lookedas if theyhadagedtwentyyears—theireyessunkdeepintotheirskulls,skinhanginglooselyfromtheirbodies,andtheir feet swollen from malnutrition and hundreds of miles of walking. Children, in particular, wereaffected by the lack of vitamins and protein: Their hair thinned and turned beige or blond. Beatricedescribedwomensufferingfromdysenteryas“oldfleshlessgrandmotherseventhoughtheyweren’teventhirty.... They had lost all their womanly attributes.... We only knew they were women because theylookedafter thechildren.”Beatrice jokedwithhernewlyacquired family that theyshould takeagoodlookatherfeetandtoenailssotheycouldrecognizeherwhenshewascartedawayinashroud,herfeetprotruding.During the twomonthsBeatricespent there,aidworkers registered1,800deaths,abouthalfof them

children.7

Adecadelaterthetownwherethecampwaslocatedisstillnoteasytoreach.IhadtoflyintoKisangani,a hundred and fifty miles away, and rent a motorcycle. In some places the road was completelyovergrown by the surrounding forest. Here and there deep, muddy pits had replaced the asphalt forseveral hundred feet.About twentymiles beforeTingi-Tingi, thewrecks of armored cars belonging toMobutu’sfleeingarmysatabandonedon theirnakedaxels, rustingon thesideof theroad, theirheavy-calibermachinegunspointingintotherainforest.Anoldyellowhighwaysignreading“Tingi-Tingi”wasstillstandingbythesideoftheroad,areminder

ofwhentruckerscouldtravelfromKisanganitoBukavuintwodays.Nowittakestwoweeksifthetruckdoesn’tbreakdown.A ricketyvehicle I saw therehad takenawholemonth to reachTingi-Tingi fromBukavu,twohundredfiftymilesdistant.Inthetownitself, thetarmacwasingoodshape,andvillagersshowedmethestretchofroadaroundwhichtherefugeeshadbuilttheircamp,boastingthatairplaneshaduseditasalandingstriptosupplytherefugeeswithfoodandmedicine.Thewholevillagerememberedthetwomonthstherefugeeshadspenttherein1996.Ithadbecomea

reference point—“he gotmarried two years after the refugees left,” or “I boughtmy house before therefugeescame.”Whenaskedhowmanyrefugeeswerethere,somevillagerssaid,“amillion”;others,“itwasacityofRwandans.”NowTingi-Tingihasrevertedtobeingavillageofseveraldozenhutsscatteredthroughundergrowthoneithersideoftheroad.Localslivebyfarmingcassavaandbeans,supplementingtheirdietbyhuntingmonkeysandsmallantelopeinthenearbyforest.Thelocaltraditionalchiefwasnotthere,sothevillagerstookmetothePentecostalminister,afifty-

one-year-old namedKapala Lubangula. Hewaswearing plastic flip-flops, pleated dress pants, and aplaincottonshirt.WhenItoldhimIwantedtotalktohimabouttherefugees,henoddedgrimlyandcalledagroupoffourotherelderlymenfromhischurch.Itwasdangerousspeakingtoaforeigneraloneinyourhouse;peoplecouldaccuseyouofanythingafterwards.Wesatonricketywoodenchairsinasmallmudhousewithalowceiling.Despitethestewingheat,heinsistedonsittinginside;hedidn’twantpeopletoseeustalking.“Whydopeoplealwaystalkabouttherefugees?”Heblurtedoutalmostimmediately,tomysurprise.

“The local population also suffered! Imagine 100,000 people arrive in this small town. They ateeverythingwehad.Their soldiers rapedourwomenand shot deadour traditional chief.Nobody talksaboutus!”Theothermennodded.Theeldersdescribedsuccessivewavesofsoldiersandrefugeesintrudingontheirsmallvillage.First,

a wave of fleeing soldiers had come to town—Mobutu’s soldiers mixed with ex-FAR. They hadterrorizedthelocalpopulation,taxingpeoplegoingtothemarket,breakingintotheirhouses,andstealingtheirlivestock.Thentherefugeesarrived,“likeabandofwalkingcorpses.”Theywerestarving.Insteadof talking, they just stared and cupped their hands.Theypulledup cassava roots andpeanuts from thefieldsandpickedrawmangosfromthe trees.Asdireas theirsituationwas, if thevillagersshared thelittletheyhadwiththishordeofforeigners,theyknewtheywouldalldieofstarvation.Themenfromthechurchhelpedorganizevigilantegroupstoguardthevillageandthefields.Theypatrolledwithmachetesandsticks.Iftheyfoundsomeonestealing,theywouldbeathimtodeath.Therewerenoprisonsandnocourts.Justicewasswiftanddecisive.Theministerrememberedvividlynewcolleagueswhoarrivedwiththerefugees.TwoCatholicpriests

aswellasAdventistandPentecostalministerssetupchurchesmadeoutofUNtarps.Woodenplanksseton rocks served as benches. They gave sermons almost every day duringwhich they talked about thegenocide.“Theysaid theTutsiwantedtodominateeverything, to take the landawayfromtheHutu.Sowhen Habyarimana was killed, they sought revenge for his death and killed. They admitted they hadkilled!Whatkindofpriestswerethese?”When the white people’s aid groups came, he said, they only thought about the Rwandans. If a

Congolese fell sick, hewould be treated last. ReverendKapala’s voice rose. “First thewhite peoplebringtherefugeeshere;thentheyrefusetohelpus!”WhenIremindedthemthatithadbeenthecivilwarin Rwanda that had brought the refugees, not the United Nations, Kapala sucked his teeth. “Theinternationalcommunityhasallthepower.Youcan’ttellmethattheUnitedStates,thebiggestsuperpowerintheworld,couldnotstopallthisiftheyhadwantedto.Theydidn’tstopitbecausetheydidn’twantto.”Anotherelderchimedin:“DoyouthinkthatRwanda,thispeanutofacountry,coulddefeattheCongo

alone?Noway.”For awhile, it seemed thatTingi-Tingi had become the capital of theworld.Threeweeks after the

arrivalof the firstRwandans, aidgroupsbeganarrivingwithhelicopters, largeand smallplanes, and,eventually,convoysof truckswithfood.Doctorsand logisticiansfromtheUnitedStates, India,France,SouthAfrica,andKenyasetupshopinthelocalhospitalandhealthcenters.EmmaBonino,theEUaidcommissioner, arrived, as did Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. AgatheHabyarimana,thewifeoftheformerRwandanpresident,alsovisitedfromherexileatMobutu’spalaceinGbadolite to deliver bags of cornmeal, rice, andbeans.Theplanes landed in themiddle of the camp,sendingpeoplescurryingforcover.Inonecase,awoman,dizzyanddisorientedfromhungerandthirst,didn’tmoveoutofthewayquicklyenoughandwasdecapitatedbyaplane’spropellers.

LaurentKabila’simprovisedarmy,theAFDL,arrivedinTingi-TingionFebruary28,1997.Manysickorweakrefugeesdidnotmanagetoflee.Dozenswerecrushedtodeathordrownedfollowingastampedeonanearbybridge.Some2,000survivedtheattacksandwereairliftedbacktoRwandabyaidorganizations.Otherswerekilled.AworkerforthelocalRedCross,who,tenyearslater,wasstilltooafraidtotell

me his name, said he had returned several days afterward to find bodies bludgeoned to death in thecamp’s tented health centers. Others had fallen, intravenous needles still in their arms, in the forestsnearby.Alocaltruckdriver,whohadbeencommandeeredbytheAFDLtohelpcleanupthetownaftertheattack,toldmethereweredeadbodieseverywhere,refugeeswhohadbeentooweaktofleeandhadthenbeenbayonetedbythesoldiers.“Theydidn’tusebulletsontherefugees—theyusedknives,”hetoldme.Hiseyesglazedoverasherememberedtheimageofaninfantsuckingonhisdeadmother’sbreast,tryinginvaintogetsomesustenancefromhercoldbody.ReverendKapala,whohadfledintotheforestforonenightandthenreturned,toldme,“Theykilledanymalerefugeeovertheageoftwelve.Theyslittheirthroats.Notthewomenorchildren.Justthemen.”However,whenIseparatelyaskedthetruckdriver,theminister,andtheRedCrossworkerhoweach

hadfeltabouttheAFDL,theyallquicklyresponded,“Itwasaliberation!Wewereoverjoyed.”Iwasamazed. IpressedReverendKapala:“Whatabout theirkillingof refugees?Howcanyoucall

themliberators?”Heshrugged.“ThatwasaRwandanaffair.Itdidn’tconcernus.”Hetoldmethestoryofabravelocal

man,who,duringapublicmeetingshortlyaftertheAFDL’sarrival,askedthelocalcommanderwhytheykilled somuch. “He answered, ‘Showme theCongolesewekilled.There arenone.’And itwas true.Theydidn’tkillanyCongolese.”This isoneof theparadoxesof the firstwar.Thepopulationwasso tiredofMobutu that theywere

readytowelcometheirliberatoronwhateverterms.TheHuturefugeeshadn’tbeenwelcomeinthefirstplace; anymassacrewas their own business. For the local population, this paradoxwas resolved byseparatingtherebelsintotwogroups:theaggressiveTutsikillersandtheCongolesefreedomfighters.

AftertheirflightfromTingi-Tingi,therefugeesmarchedtowardKisangani,onlytofindtheirpathblocked

againbytheZairianarmyatUbundu,asmalltownsixtymilessouthofKisangani.Afterseveraldays,thelocal commander allowed Beatrice’s group to pass, in return for five hundred dollars. Leaders wentaround to the thousands of refugees, collecting tattered and soiled banknotes from different currenciesuntiltheyhadthesum.Mostoftherefugees,however,stayedbehind,tootiredorafraidtocontinue.In themeantime, theAFDL had already conqueredKisangani, the country’s third largest city. Some

85,000refugeeswerestuckinthecampsalongthetrainlinebetweenUbunduandKisangani.Theyknewthatiftheinternationalcommunitydidnotcometotheirrescue,theywouldbeforcedtofollowBeatriceand theothers,crossing themightyLualabaRiverandplungingonceagain into the inhospitable jungle,wheretherewerenovillagesorfoodfordozensofmiles.Humanitarian organizations followed the refugee stream, hopscotching from one camp to the next,

packingtheirbagseverytimetheAFDLapproached.TheysetupshopinvariouscampsaroundUbunduinearlyApril, providing elementary health care and nutrition to the despondent refugees.The conditionsthey found were terrible: In some camps, mortality rates were five times higher than the technicaldefinitionofan“out-of-controlemergency.”8Nevertheless,bythistimetheAFDLsoldiershadarrivedinthecampsandbeganregulatinghumanitarianaccess.Foreignhealthworkerswereonlyallowedintothecampsforafewhoursduringtheday.Finally, onApril 20, theAFDL soldiersmade theirmove.Withoutwarning,Rwandan soldiers shut

downallhumanitarianaccesstothecampssouthofKisangani.Whendiplomatsandaidworkersasked,they were told the security situation had suddenly deteriorated. Then, several planeloads of well-equippedRwandan soldiers arrived atKisangani’s airport and immediately headed toward the camps.Thenextday,theRwandansoldiersattackedthem.Congoleseworkersinthecampsreportedwell-armedsoldiers in uniforms participating in the attack, lobbingmortars and grenades into the dense thicket oftentsandpeopleduringthenighttimeattack.9OnenurseworkingforDoctorsWithoutBordersrecalled:“Oneday,theydroppedbombsonthecamp;everybodyfled,leavingeverythingbehindandscatteringinthe equatorial forest—thereweremany dead. TheAFDL put the cadavers intomass graves and burntthem.”10When journalists and humanitarian organizationswere allowed back to the camps three dayslater,theyfoundthemransacked.Thethousandsofrefugeeswhoweretherehadalldisappeared.DoctorsWithoutBordershadbeenprovidingmedicaltreatmentto6,250patientswhoweretooweakeventowalkshortdistances.Whentheydidn’tfindanytraceofthemafteroneweek,theyassumedtheyhaddied,eitherviolentlyorfromdiseaseandmalnutrition.

HowmanyoftheRwandanHuturefugeeswhofledRwandaduringthegenocidediedintheCongo?Fromthebeginning,therefugeecrisiswasboggeddowninnumbergames.Onemajorproblemwasthelackofastarting figure: Rwandan officials challenged theUnitedNations’ figure of 1.1million refugees in thecampsbefore the invasion,arguingthataidestimateserron thehighsideso thatnoone isdeprivedoffood ormedicine. The ex-FAR and former government officials in the camps had refused to allow acensus, themselves inflating their population in order to receive more aid. DoctorsWithout Borders’estimatewas950,000,althoughRwandanofficialssometimesplaceitevenlower.IntheearlydaysoftheAFDL invasion, between 400,000 and 650,000 refugees returned to Rwanda, and a further 320,000refugeeswereeithersettled inUNcampsor repatriatedover thecourseof1997,a totalof720,000 to970,000refugees.Asthestartingfigureisnotclear,thisnumberisnotveryhelpful:Anywherebetween

zeroand380,000refugeescouldstillhavebeenmissing.11Also,justbecauserefugeesweremissing,theyweren’tnecessarilydead.Somehadrepatriatedspontaneously,withoutUNHCRhelp;manyotherswerehidinginthemountainsoftheeasternCongo,andothershadsettledwithfriendsandrelativesinvillagesandcitiesacrosstheregion.Itismorefruitfultobaseestimatesoneyewitnessaccounts.WheninJuly1997,aftereightmonthsof

walking, a groupof refugees arrivedon the other side of theCongoRiver in neighboringRepublic ofCongo,DoctorsWithoutBordersconductedasurveyof266randomlyselectedpeople,askingthemhowmanymembersof their familieshadsurvived the trek.The resultwasdisturbing:Only17.5percentofpeople in their families had made it, while 20 percent had been killed and a further 60 percent haddisappeared,meaningtheyhadbeenseparatedfromthematsomepointinthejourney.Overhalfofthosekilledwerewomen;itwasn’tjustex-FARbeinghunteddown.Ifthatsurveywasrepresentativeoftherestof the refugees—the sample size is too small tobewholly reliable—thenat least60,000 refugeeshadbeenkilled,whilethewhereaboutsofanother180,000wereunknown.Reports by journalists and human rights groups confirm thismagnitude of the killings.Although the

AFDLrepeatedlydeniedaccesstointernationalhumanrightsinvestigators,makingitdifficulttoconfirmmanyreportsissuedbychurchesandcivilsocietygroups,thereisnodoubtthatmassacrestookplace.TheUN human rights envoy, the Chilean judge Roberto Garreton, received reports from local groups thatbetween 8,000 and 12,000 people were massacred by the AFDL in the eastern Congo, includingCongoleseHutuwhowereaccusedofcomplicitywiththeex-FAR.IntheChimangarefugeecampfortymileswestofBukavu,eyewitnessreportscollectedbyAmnestyInternationaltelloffortyAFDLsoldiersseparatingaboutfivehundredmenfromwomenandchildrenandmurdering them.Closeby,aVoiceofAmerica reporter found a mass grave containing the remains of a hundred people who, according tovillagers,wererefugeesmassacredbytherebels.RwandanBiblesandidentitycardswerescatteredamidhumanremainsandUNfoodbags.12IntheHutuvillagesIvisitednorthofGomaadecadelater,villagersconsistentlyspokeofRPFcommanderscallingmeetingsandthentyingupandexecutingdozensofmen.Theyshowedmecisternsandlatrineswithskeletalremainsstillshowing.Finally,morethanadecadeafterthemassacres,aUNteamwentbacktoinvestigatesomeoftheworst

massacresoftheCongowars,includingthoseagainsttheHuturefugees.Theyinterviewedoverahundredwitnessesoftherefugeemassacres,includingpeoplewhohadsurvivedandsomewhohadhelpedburythe victims. They concluded that Rwandan troops and their AFDL allies killed tens of thousands ofrefugees,mostlyincoldblood.Thesewerenotpeoplecaughtinthecrossfire:Thereportdetailshowtheinvadingtroopssingledoutandkilledtherefugees,oftenwithhatchets,stones,orknives.“Themajorityof thevictimswerechildren,women,elderlypeopleandthesick,whoposednothreat to theattackingforces.”13Controversially,thereportconcludesthattheRwandantroopsmayhavebeenguiltyofactsofgenocideagainsttheHutu,giventhesystematicnatureofthekilling.14

OneofthefewplaceswhererefugeeswerekilledinplainsightofhundredsofCongoleseeyewitnesseswas inMbandaka, where the Congo River separates the Democratic Republic of the Congo from thesmaller,formerFrenchcolony, theRepublicof theCongo.TheRwandanarmyanditsCongoleseallieshadbythistimepursuedtherefugeesforover1,000milesovermountains,throughjunglesandsavannahs.AtMbandaka,therefugeeswereblockedbytheexpanseoftheCongoRiver,whichisoveramilewideat

thatpoint.AcurioussightgreetedtheRwandantroopsandtheAFDL:Throngsoflocalswavedpalmfrondsand

sangjoyously,whilethousandsofrefugeesmadearunfortheriver,tryingtoboardabarge.Othersthrewthemselves into theriver, tryingtoswimacross theswiftlymovingwater,preferringtofacecrocodilesandhipposthanRPFsoldiers.Thewelcomingcommitteewatchedinhorroras their“liberators”drovethe refugeesoff theboat,made themkneelon theembankmentwith theirhandsbehind theirheads,andexecutedoverahundredofthem.Manywerebludgeonedtodeathwithriflebuttsorclubs.AlocalpriestsawAFDLsoldierskillaninfantbybeatingitsheadagainstaconcretewall.InMbandakaandanothernearby town,RedCrossworkersburied someninehundredbodies. “Thealliance fighters toldus theyonlykilledformersoldiersguiltyofmurderingmanyTutsipeopleinRwanda,”aRedCrossworkertoldanother journalist.“YetwithmyownhandsIburiedsmallchildrenwhoseheadswerecrushedbyriflebutts.Buriedthosepoorlittleonesandwomen,too.”15BodiesofotherswhohadprobablydrownedwereseensnaggedinthefloatingclumpsofwaterhyacinthintheCongoRiver.Intotal,between200and2,000werekilledonthebanksoftheriver.Theinescapabletruthisthattensofthousandsofrefugeeswerekilled,whilemoreprobablydiedfrom

disease and starvation as they were forced into the inhospitable jungles to the west. No thoroughinvestigation has ever been carried out.Most of the victims don’t have graves,monuments, or even asimplementioninadocumentorareporttocommemoratethem.

Why did theRwandan soldiers kill somany refugees?Therewere certainly some individual cases ofrevenge,astherehadbeeninRwandawhentheRPFarrived.Afterall,manyRPFsoldiershadlostfamilymembersandwantedpayback.TheRwandanarmy,however,wasknownforitsstrictdisciplineandtightcommandandcontrol.Itis

veryunlikelythatsoldierswouldhavebeenabletocarryoutsuchlarge-scaleexecutionsasinMbandaka,forexample,withoutanorderfromtheircommanders.Attestingtothatpossibility,aBelgianmissionarytoldajournalist:“Thesoldiersactedasiftheywerejustdoingtheirjob,followingorders.Theydidn’tseem out of control.”16 In other words, even if these were revenge killings, they were carried outsystematically, with the knowledge and complicity of the command structure. UN investigators alsoconcluded that inmanycases themassacreswerecarriedout in thepresenceofhigh-rankingRwandanofficersandbythosefollowingordersfromabove.Otherscholars—suchasAlisonDesForges,oneoftheforemostchroniclersofthegenocide—believe

thattheRPFwastryingtopreventanotherRwandanrefugeediasporafrombeingcreatedthatwouldoneday,muchliketheRPFinitsownhistory,returntothreatenitsregime.PapyKamanzi,theTutsiwhohadjoinedtheRPFin1993,wasdeployedinthe“clean-upoperations”

againsttheex-FARtothenorthofGoma.Herecalled:“ThousandsreturnedtoRwandaontheirown.Butthereweresomeremaininginthearea, thosewhocouldn’tfleeandcouldn’treturnhome.Thesickandweak.Weliedtothem.Wesaidwewouldsendthemhome;weevencookedfoodforthem.Butthenwetookthemintotheforest.Wehadasmallhatchetwecarriedonourbacks,anagafuni.Wekilledwiththat.Therewasabriefing,anordertodoso.”Heshowedmetheplaceatthebackoftheskull,justabovethenapeoftheneck.Shortly afterwards, Papy was deployed to Goma, where he worked for the Rwandan army’s

intelligence branch. He considered it an honor. It was an elite group of sixty young soldiers, mostlyCongoleseTutsi,whowerechargedwithhuntingdown“subversives.”Theywere put under the command of theRwandan intelligence chiefMajor JackNziza, a discreet,

sinistercharacter.Hisdefinitionof“subversive”wasbroad:peoplewhowereknowntohavesupportedHabyarimana’s government;members of anyof the variousHutumilitias; people known to oppose theAFDL; people who had personal conflicts with Rwandan officers. Sometimes, just being a Rwandanrefugee—womenandchildrenincluded,Papyspecified—wasenough.Theywouldtakethemtotwositesthey used, a house belonging toMobutu’s former Central Bank governor and a quarry to the north ofGoma.Theretheywouldinterrogatethemandthenkillthem.“We could do over a hundred a day,” Papy toldme. I had a hard time believing him; it seemed so

outrageous.“Weusedropes,itwasthefastestwayandwedidn’tspillblood.Twoofuswouldplaceaguy on the ground, wrap a rope around his neck once, then pull hard.” It would break the victim’swindpipeandthenstranglehimtodeath.Therewaslittlenoiseorfuss.IaskedPapywhyhedidit.Itwasanorder,hereplied.Whydidyourcommanderwanttodoit?He

shrugged. That was the mentality at the time. They needed to fear the AFDL. They had committedgenocide.Itwasrevenge,hesaid.Butitwasalsoawarning:Don’ttrytomesswithus.

Beatrice spent fourteenmonths crossing theCongo, forced tohide formonths in junglevillageswhereCongolesefamiliestookherin.Finally,attheendof1997,aBelgianfriendwhohadbeenlookingforherforoverayearmanagedtofindherwiththehelpofalocalCongoleseorganization.Inearly1998,fouryearsaftershehadfledRwanda,shearrivedinBelgium.Shehadlostmanyofherfriendsandfamily.Ittookyearsforherbodytorecover,althoughshewouldneverbefreefromthenightmaresthatplaguedher.“I still dream of what happened sometimes. I feel guilty for having survived, for leaving my friendsbehind.”17Sixteen years after theRwandan genocide, it remains difficult towrite aboutRwandan history. For

many, themoral shock of theRwandan genocidewas so overpowering that it eclipsed all subsequentevents in the region.Massacres that cameafterwerealwaysmeasuredupagainst the immensityof thegenocide:If80,000refugeesdiedintheCongo,thatmaybeterriblebutnonethelessminorcomparedwiththe800,000 inRwanda.TheRwandangovernmentmayhaveoverstepped,but isn’t thatunderstandablegiventhetragedythepeoplesuffered?Inaddition,manyarguedthataccountabilitywoulddestabilizeRwanda’sfledglingRPFgovernment,so

itwasbetter tosweepa fewuncomfortable truthsunder thecarpet thanundermine its fragileauthority.ThiskindoflogicwouldcropupagainandagainthroughouttheCongowar:Warisugly,andyoucan’tbuild a state on diplomacy alone. If we push too hard for justice, wewill only undermine the peaceprocess.AnAmericandiplomataskedme,“DidwehaveprosecutionsaftertheAmericanCivilWar?No.DidtheSouthAfricansevertrytheapartheidregime?Notreally.Whyshouldweaskthemtodoithere?”The dour shadow that the genocide cast over the refugee crisiswas evident already inApril 1995,

when RPF soldiers opened fire on a camp of displaced Hutu peasants in Kibeho, Rwanda, killingbetween1,500 and 5,000people.At the time, theAmerican defense attaché inKigali remarked, “The2,000deathswere tragic;on theRwandan scene thekillingswerehardlyamajor roadblock to furtherprogress.Compared to the800,000dead in thegenocide, the2,000deadwasbuta speedbump.”18 A

similarlogicdrovetheU.S.ambassadorinKigalitowriteaconfidentialcodedcabletoWashingtoninJanuary1997,withthefollowingadviceregardingtheTingi-Tingirefugeecamp:“WeshouldpulloutofTingi-Tingi and stop feeding the killerswhowill run away to look for other sustenance, leaving theirhostagesbehind....IfwedonotwewillbetradingthechildreninTingi-TingiforthechildrenwhowillbekilledandorphanedinRwanda.”19When Imet her inBelgium,Beatrice seemed tired of this kind of reasoning. “Why do they have to

measureoneinjusticeintermsofanother?”sheasked.“WasthemassacreofthousandsofinnocentpeoplesomehowmoreacceptablebecausehundredsofthousandshadbeenkilledinRwanda?”

10

THISISHOWYOUFIGHT

BUKAVUANDLEMERA,ZAIRE,OCTOBER1996

Kizito Maheshe was one of the thousands of children who made up the bulk of Laurent Kabila’sCongolesefighters.1Whenthewarbegan,hewassixteenyearsoldandlivedinthePanzineighborhoodofBukavu,amuddysuburbofbumpystreetsandloudbars.Likemostofhisfriends,hehaddroppedoutofhighschoolbecausehisfathercouldn’taffordthefive-dollarmonthlyfee.Inanycase,hedidn’tseethepoint in studying. In 1996,Bukavuwas a town of 300,000 peoplewith only a few thousand jobs thatrequired a high school diploma. If youwere lucky, you could get a job in either the nonprofit sector,whichworkedmainlyintherefugeecampsandhadthebest-payingjobs;theprivatesector,includingthebeer factory and the quinine plant, where antimalarial medicine was produced; or the civil service,perhaps the largest employer butwhereworkers relied on bribes and embezzlement tomake a decentliving.Kizito had listlessly followed his friends’ path, without much hope for a decent future. After he

droppedoutofschoolatsixteen,hewanderedaroundtown,lookingforworkbutmostlyjusthangingoutwithfriendsatsoccergames,inneighborhoodbars,andatchurch.Hehadsixsiblingsathome,andhisfather,alow-levelaccountant,wasdeepindebt.Thepowercompanyhadcuttheirelectricitybecauseofnonpayment,andthepipesintheirneighborhoodhadburst,sohehelpedhissistersandmothercarryjerrycansofwaterforcookingandwashingseveralhundredyardsfromthepumptohishouse.WhentheAFDLrebellionarrivedinBukavuinOctober1996,Kizitohidathomelikeeveryoneelse.

ThroughtheirwindowsandcrackeddoorstheysawMobutu’ssoldiersstrippingofftheiruniformsinthestreetsandrunningforthehills.“Forus,soldiershadbeenlikegods.Theyhadallthepower;theywereterrible,”hetoldme.“Whenwesawthemrunninglikethat,wewereamazed.”AweekafterthebattleforBukavu,LaurentKabilaarrivedintown.Overtheradio,thesoldierscalled

thepopulationtothepostoffice,arun-down,fourstory,yellowbuildingthatfilledupawholeblockinthecitycenter.ThousandsofpeopleturnedouttoseeKabila,amanmosthadonlyheardvaguerumorsabout.Afteralongwait,hesteppeduptothepodium,dressedinhissignaturesafarisuitandsandals,andspokeinamixtureofTanzanian-accentedSwahiliandFrench.Kizitorememberedhimasfat,withabigsmileandsweatpouringdownhisneck.Oneofhisbodyguards,aRwandan,carriedawhitetoweltowipeofftheperspiration.HespokeabouttheneedtogetridofMobutuandtoallowtheCongolesepeopletobenefitfromthe

riches that laybeneath thesoil.Thenhespoketo thequestion thatwasoneveryone’smind:WasthisaforeigninvasionoraCongoleserebellion?“IfyouseemeherewithourRwandanallies,”hetoldthecrowd,“it’sbecausetheyagreedtohelpus

overthrowMobutu.”HispodiumwasbeingguardedbyamixtureofTutsiandothersoldiers,allwell-armedandwearingWellingtonboots.“Butnowwehaveachancetobuildourownarmy.Givemeyour

childrenandyouryouths!Giveus100,000soldierssowecanoverthrowMobutu!”AnselmeMasasu, a twenty-four-year-oldhalf-Tutsi fromBukavu,was in chargeofmobilization and

waspopularamongtheyouth.NewrecruitswouldgetahundreddollarsamonthtooverthrowMobutu.Ahundreddollarsamonth!Kizitoremembered.Thatwasfivetimesthemonthlyrentfortheirhouse.Afewmonthswiththatsalaryandyoucouldevenbuyadecentdowryandgetmarried.Masasubeganbuyingoffyouth leaders tomobilizeyoungmen andbring them to recruitment centers.He approachedBoyScoutleaders,karateinstructors,andschoolteachers,givingthemmoneyiftheyagreedtohelpenlistyouthsintherebellion.Hundredsofstreetchildren,unemployedyouths,andpupilsheededKabila’scall.“Itwasobviousforme,”Kizitotoldme.“IhadnofutureinBukavu.Theywereofferingmeafuture.”Likemost youths and childrenwho joined theAFDL, he didn’t tell his parents.He and a group of

friendswenttoHotelLolango,arun-downbuildingclosetothepostofficewheretherebelshadsetuparecruitmentoffice.AsoldierusedanakedrazorbladetoshaveA,BorCintotherecruits’headstomarkwhichbrigadetheywouldjoin.KizitowasputintotheBgroup;hisscalpburnedfromthescrapings.Hehandedoverallofhisbelongings—awatch,afewNouveauZairebanknotes,andhisID—toarecruitmentofficer for safekeepingandgot into awaiting truck. “Itwas like adream,”he remembered. “Iwas soexcited.”

TheAFDL’sfirsttrainingcampwasinKidote,ahamletinthehillsoverlookingtheRusiziplain,justafewmilesawayfromtheLemerahospitalwheretherebelshadcarriedoutthefirstmassacreofthewar.InMarch2007, I convincedKizito to take adayoff fromhis job as adriver for a local developmentorganizationandtakemetotheplacewherehehadbeentrained.Hehadn’tbeenbacksincehehad finishedbootcamp there.Aswecrossed the ridgeand theparish

cameintoview,herolleddownthecarwindowandlookedaroundinadaze.“Thiswholehillwasfullofsentries,” he said, reliving the moment of his first arrival there. “You wouldn’t have been able toapproach—theykeptthewholeareablockedoff.”Kidotewasn’tevenavillage.Aclusterofschoolbuildingsandanabandonedchurch,allwithrusted,

corrugated-ironroofs,weresetintohillsdottedwithbananagrovesandeucalyptustrees.Thebuildingsweresurroundedbyaflatarea,perhapsthesizeoffourfootballfields,withshoulder-high,denseelephantgrass.Therewerenomorethanadozenhutsandnosignofmovementintheschoolbuildings.“Wecutdown all that grass. They gave usmachetes, andwe spent the firstweek just clearing the pitch. Thiswholeplainwasatrainingground,”hesaid.“Thehillsbehindtheschoolwereallfullofbivouacsmadeoutofbananaleavesthatwesleptin.”We parked the car andwalked down to the church. It had been abandoned for a decade. Even the

bencheshadbeenpillaged,probably for firewood.Oneof itswallshadbeen sprayed repeatedlywithbullets.Didtheyexecutepeoplehere?IaskedKizito.“No,”hesaid;hedidn’tthinkso.Hepointedataloneeucalyptussaplinginthemiddleofthemeadowtoourleft.“Itwasdownthere.”

Afterbeing recruited,Kizito’s initialexcitementwanedquickly.The livingconditionswereharsh.The

newrecruitssleptintheopenforaweekuntiltheyweregiventarpswithUNlogos—theyhadbeentakenfrom the dismantled refugee camps—to build small lean-tos they could crawl into and sleep. Theyweren’t given uniforms, and the heavy labor tore their clothes.After severalweeks, fleas infested thecamp,andmanysoldierspreferredtoburntheirclothesthantostayawakeatnight,itching.“Wewouldthrowour rags into the fireand listen to the fleaspop,”Kizito said, smilingand imitating thepoppingsound.Kidoteisaround6,000feethigh,andevenhuddlingtogetherintheirtinyhutsatnight,theyouthsfroze.There were over 2,000 recruits in Kizito’s training camp. They were the first graduating class, he

remembered proudly, almost all under twenty-five, with some as young as twelve. “Some kids wereshorterthantheirguns,”herecalled,laughing.Theycamefromdifferentsocialandethnicbackgroundsbutweremostlypoor,unemployed,anduneducated.Morale,however,washighatthebeginning.“Theytoldusthatwewouldfinishthetrainingandgetmoneyandhavebeautifulgirls,”Kizitoremembered,laughing.“Whatdidweknowaboutbeautifulgirls?Wewereveryyoung.”Theirdietconsistedalmostsolelyofvungure,atastelessmixofcornmealandbeansthatoftendidn’t

haveanyoilorsalt.Soldierscookedthemixtureoverfirewoodinlargesteelvatsthathadbeenusedforboilingclothesatthenearbyhospital.Thefoodmadetheirstomachsknotup;manysufferedfromdiarrhea.Theyateonceaday,at11o’clock,placingbananaleavesinholesinthegroundtouseasplates.Intheevening,theyweregivensometeawithalittlebitofsugar.The commander of the campwas a tall, light-skinnedRwandan officer calledAfandeRobert,2 who

spokeaccentedSwahilimixedwithEnglish.Hewasquietbutruthlessandfearedbytherecruits.TheycalledhimMungu(“God”).Afterclearingthebushforthecamp,Robertbeganthe“introduction.”Kizitorecalled,“Ifyoulivedthroughthat,itwasbyGod’swill.”The introduction was a hazing ceremony that consisted of three days of grueling exercises on the

trainingpitch.Therecruits,orbakurutu inthelocalslang,weredividedintogroupsoftwenty-fiveandsurroundedbycirclesofTutsi soldierswith longcanes.Robertwould thenyell out “Roll around!”or“Snakeforward!”andthesoldierswoulddescendonthemandbeginbeatingthem.Viringitawasoneofthe worst exercises. Next to the pitch was a waist-deep swamp, thick with reeds. The recruits wereordered to get into the water and do somersaults as fast as they could as the soldiers beat them andinsulted them. Kizito saw youths have their eyes poked out and noses broken; some were knockedunconsciousbythethrashing.Partsofthehazingwerebizarre.Inoneexercise,called“drinkingbeer,”recruitswouldstandonone

legandputonearmundertheotherlegandtheirfingerintheirmouth.“Maintainpositionfortenminutes,”theorderwouldcome.Inanotherexercise,theywereforcedtorollaroundonthegroundasfastastheycouldforseveralminutes,afterwhichtheirsquadcommanderwouldyell,“Run!”andtheywouldspurtoffvertiginouslyinalldirections,bangingintoeachother.Inanotherexercise,acommanderwouldtellagroupofsixtyrecruitstofetchastickhethrewinthemiddleofthepitch.“Thefirsttogetitdoesn’tgetbeaten!”Ifyoucouldn’tkeepupwiththestrictregimen,youwerepunished.Aftercommittingaminorinfraction,

Kizitowas told to step in frontofhis fellow recruits anddiga smallhole in thepitch. “‘This isyourvagina,’ the commander said. ‘Take out your dick and fuck it!’”Kizito toldme, blushing and lookingdown.Infrontofallofhisfellowrecruits,hewasforcedtohumptheholeuntilheejaculated.“Infrontofallthosepeople,itwasalmostimpossible,”hemuttered.Atsixteen,hewasstillavirgin.Heoncemadethemistakeofreportingsick.Atthehealthcenter,hetoldthemedichehadaheadache,

joininga long lineofsullensoldierswithvariousailments.Themedicnoddedand turned toasoldier,whothenranatthem,beatingthemovertheheadwithhiscane.Themediclaughedastheyscatteredinto

thebushes.“Youaren’tsick!See—youcanstillrun!”

Afterthethree-dayinductioncourse,AfandeRobertaddressedhisrecruitsonthepitch.Hewaswearingasweatsuitandsneakersandwasholdingacane.Overathousandsoldiersstoodinsilentformationinfrontofhim.“Bakurutu,thearmyisyourfamilynow.Thearmycanbegood,butyouneedtoknowthatyoucandieatanymoment.Haveyoueverseenpeopledie?No?”Hewavedatoneofhisofficers.“Howmanyprisonersdowehaveinjail?Bringmesix.”Theofficersbroughtoutsixweakanddirtyprisoners.Theywererecruitsliketherestofthemwhohad

been captured trying to desert the camp. Robert ordered his men to blindfold one and tie him to aeucalyptustreeontheedgeoftheclearing.Theylinedupina“firingsquad”—KizitostruggledwiththeEnglishwordhehadobviouslyheardmorethanonceinthearmy—andriddledtheprisonerwithbullets.“Good!”Robertbarked.“NowIwillshowyouprecisionmarksmanship!”Theybroughtoutthenextblindfoldedprisonerandtiedhimtothesametree.Suku,aRwandanofficer

knownforbeinganexpertshot,steppedforwardandcountedtwenty-fivepacesfromthetree.Hepulledamodern-lookingpistolfromhisholster,tookaim,andshottheprisonerbetweenhiseyes.“Good!”Robertthengaveordersforfourofficerstopinthenextprisonerdownbyhishandsandlegs.

Anotherofficertookoutahuntingknife,pinnedhischesttothegroundwithhisknee,andslithisthroat—“likeagoat,”Kizitoremembered.Theofficercompletelyseveredtheheadfromthebody,thenbroughtittotherecruits,whoweretoldtopassthebloodyobjectaround.“WhenIheldthehead,Icouldstillfeelhismusclestwitching,”Kizitosaid.“Whoisagoodkurutuandthinkshecankill,too?”Robertcriedout.Afewbravesoldiersputtheir

handsup,eagertoplease.Hecalledthemforwardandgavethemknives.Theyslitthethroatsofthelastthreeprisonersas theirpeerswatched.The inductionwasover.Fromnowon,Robertannounced, theywouldbecalledsoldiers,notkurutu.

The trainingsettled intoakindofexhaustingnormalcy.Kizitospent fourmonthsatKidote,althoughhesaysitfeltlikeawholeyear.Everymorning,theywouldriseat4o’clockandgojoggingforaboutsixmiles, singingsongsas theywent.At6o’clock, theywouldbegin themilitarydrillsbackat thecamp.They would practice deploying in offensive formations, laying ambushes and crawling up hills. “Ourcommanderwouldmountamachineguninthegroundbehindusandshootoverourheadsaswesnakedupthehills.Ifyouraisedyourheadabit,youweredead.”At11o’clock,thesoldierswouldcomebacktocampandeattheironemealofthedaybeforeheading

back into the hills formoremilitary drills.At 4 o’clock, they returned to learn how to take apart andreassemble guns, as well as to learn military tactics. In the evening, the officers gave them time tosocializeandtriedtoteachthemaboutthehistoryandgoalsoftheirstruggle—theycalledthisutamaduni,orculture.Ataround9o’clock,mostofthesoldiersretiredtotheirtents,exhausted,tosleep.Intheirnewlylearnedmilitaryslang,thiswaskuvunjambavu,“breakingyourribs.”Atnight,KizitowouldhearkidsinothertentssobbingorreadingtheBibleinwhispers.

The AFDL made an effort to instill their revolutionary doctrine in the recruits. The Rwandan andUgandanofficerswholedtherebellionallstartedoffasmembersofleftistinsurgenciesinEastAfrica.KnowledgeofMarx,Mao,andFanonhadbeenderigueurfortheirleaders,andtheseteachingsfiltereddowntothelowestlevel.Kizitorememberedthemaskingquestionstherecruitsdidn’tunderstand:“‘Whoareyou?’‘Whatdoyoubelievein?’‘Whydoesasoldierfight?’Itwasthefirsttimewehadthoughtaboutsuch things.” The teachers explained to them howMobutu had ruined the country, how he had madepeoplecorruptandtribalist.Higher-rankingofficersandpoliticalcadresreceivedmorenuancedlectures,ofteninKigaliorGoma,aboutdialecticalmaterialismandplannedeconomies.AllrecruitsreceivedacopyofKabila’sMarxist-inspiredpamphlet,SevenMistakesoftheRevolution,

whichexplainedwhythe1964rebellionhadfailed.Thepamphletwasmoreorlessunchangedfromitsoriginal1967version.

Firstmistake—Duringthefirstrevolution,wedidnothaveprecisepoliticaleducation....Thirdmistake—Wewagedawarwithoutgoalorsense,withoutknowingwhywewerefightingandwhoourrealenemywas.Werushedtoseizelargetownsandforgottofirsttakesmallvillagesandtoworkwithpeasantsandworkers....Fifthmistake—Due to lack of discipline and collaboration,we fought over ranks and fame....Alsoeverybodywantedtobeinchargeandtogetpositionsforhimselfandhisrelatives.

GiventhenatureoftheAFDL,someofthepointsseemedoutofplace.Thesecondmistakewas:“Wereliedtoomuchonexternalsupportandadvice.”Totherecruits,whowerebeingtrainedbyforeigners,thepamphletwasmoreofadiagnosisofthecurrentrebellion’sfaultsthanacritiqueofthepast.“ItwasRwandans teaching us how to be patriotic, telling us to sacrifice ourselves for our country,” Kizitoreflected,shakinghishead.“Itwasweird.”Twelveyearslater,Kizitoseemedtohaverememberedlittleoftheideologicaltraining.Thereasonfor

theirstrugglewasapparentforhimandallotherrecruits:Mobutuneededtogo.Despite themisery, the trainingdidproducecamaraderie.Someof therecruitshadnotevenreached

puberty,andformanyofthemthearmydidindeedbecometheirfamily.BackinBukavu,wegatheredoneeveningatKizito’suncle’shouse,alongwithanotherformerchildsoldierwhohadbeenatKidoteafterKizito.Bothofthemshooktheirheadsandsuckedtheirteethwhentheyrememberedtheextremebrutalityandpainofbootcamp.However,whenIaskedthemtosingAFDLsongsforme,smilesbegantowarmtheirfaces,andtheytentativelystartedtoclap.

Jualimechomoka,wajeshiweee Thesuniscomingout,ohsoldiers

Kimbiamuchaka Goandrun

Askarieeevitaniyeye Asoldier’sworkiswar

Anasongacorporal,sergeant,platooncommander

Hemovesfromcorporal,tosergeant,thenplatooncommander

Anavaakombati,boti,kibuyuyamaji Hewearsauniform,boots,andawaterflask

Theirfavoriteoneappearedtobe:

Kibonge Theyarestrong

Vijanawalihamiamsituni Theyouthshavemovedintothejungle

Watatuwakufe Evenifthreedie

Wannewapone,waliobakiwatajenganchi Fourwillremaintobuildourcountry

Kibonge! Strong!

After four months of training, a column of trucks pulled into camp, each marked with the name of adifferenttown.AfandeRobertcalledthesoldierstogetherforonelastassembly,thentoldthemtheyweregoing tofight theenemy.Thesoldiers linedup infrontof the trucks,whereeachwasgivenanAK-47.Theyweretoldtoloadthegun,fireintheair,andjumpintothetruck.Kizitoclimbedinavehiclewith“Bukavu”writtenontheside.Allhehadwashisgunandanextraclipofammunition.ItwasMarch1997;Kisangani,thethirdlargestcityinthecountry,hadjustfallentotherebellion.In town, thesoldiersarrived in timefor the inaugurationof thenewgovernor in thecourtyardof the

largeJesuitschool,AlfajiriCollege.Theyparadedinfrontofthecrowd.“Itwaslikecomingbackfromanotherplanet,”Kizitosaid,rememberingseeingmanyofhisfriendsandrelativesagainforthefirsttimeinfourmonths.Aftertheceremony,theyfeastedonpotsofbeefstew,rice,andpotatoes.Itwasthefirsttime they had hadmeat in months. Before he gave them leave for the weekend, Kabila gave anotherspeech,tellingthesoldiersthat theywereabouttotastethefruitsoftheir longtraining,thattheywouldnowbeabletohelpliberatetheircountry.Finally,hetoldthemtoshootintheairthreetimesbeforetheyentered their houses to scare away evil spirits. “The old man had funny ideas sometimes,” Kizitoremembered.“Hewassuperstitious—‘Don’twearflip-flopsatroadblocks.’‘Don’trideabicycleifyouhaveagun.’”Thatnight,peopleinBukavuthoughtanotherwarhadbrokenout.Anhourafterthesoldierslefttheschoolyard,shootingbrokeoutallthroughtownastherecruitschasedawayevilspirits.

Kizito’sdescriptionofinductionwasgrislybutconfirmedmuchofwhatotherAFDLrecruitsreportedoftheirexperiencesinKidoteandothertrainingcamps.Therebellionneededrecruitsfast.Theharshbasictrainingwasintendedtoinstilldisciplineandweedoutthosephysicallytooweakfortheupcomingwar.ItwasasthoughtheRwandanofficerswantedtobeatoutthecorruption,idleness,andselfishnessthathadbecome,inMobutu’sownwords,lemalzairois.LikeKizito,manyoftherecruitswhowentthroughthistraining were under eighteen years old—children according to international conventions. Diplomatsestimated that 10,000 child soldiers (kadogo in Swahili) participated in the AFDL rebellion.3 The

rationaleforchildrecruitmentwassimple:Manycommandersconsider thatchildrenmakebetter,moreloyal,andfearlesssoldiers.OnecommanderofalocalMai-Maimilitiatoldme:“Youneverknowwhoyou can trust. At least with the kadogo, you know they will never betray you.”4 Given the lack ofdiscipline,theamountofinfighting,andtheregularinfiltrationsbytheirenemies,itwasunderstandablethatcommanderswantedtohaveaninnersecuritybufferofpeopletheycouldtrust.For themostpart, thekindofcombat thatsoldiersengagedinwasguerrillawarfare, involvingrisky

ambushesandclose-quarterfightingwiththeenemy.Soldiersdidnothaveprotectivegear,andartillerywasinscantsupply.Ifyouwantedtohittheenemy,youneededtobecloseenoughtobeeffectivewithanAK-47—withintwohundredmetersofthetarget.Childrenwereoftentheonlysoldierswhohadthegutstoengageinmanyoftheoperations,whoactuallyobeyedorders,andwhosesenseofdangerwasnotaswelldevelopedasthatofoldersoldiers.Theuseofchildrenasvanguardspecialforcesmeantalsothattheymadeupadisproportionatenumberof fatalitieson thebattlefield.AMobutucommanderwhohadorganizedthedefenseofthetownofKindutoldme:“ThefirsttimeIsawtheAFDLtroops,Ithoughtwewere fighting against an army of children! Throughmy binoculars I saw hundreds of kids in uniformsracingthroughbush,somecarryinggrenadelaunchersbiggerthanthem.”5According toKizito and other kadogo I interviewed, they often formed the first line of defense or

offense.One such interviewee toldme that in the battle forKenge, in thewest of the country, he hadlookedaroundtoseedozensofhisfellowkadogo,smallchildreninoversizeduniforms,sprawleddeadonthebattlefield.6Noonehasconductedasurveyofbattlefieldcasualtiesduringthewar,butitissafetoassumethatthousandsofchildsoldiersdiedduringtheCongowars.

11

AWOUNDEDLEOPARD

Aftermewillcomethedeluge.—MOBUTUSESESEKO

KINSHASA,ZAIRE,DECEMBER1996

ThewarcaughtMobutuwrong-footed,offguard.WhennewsoffightingintheeasternCongobroke,theEnlightenedHelmsman—oneofthemanytitleshehadcoinedforhimself—wasconvalescinginahospitalinSwitzerland.Initially, it was news of their leader’s illness that preoccupiedmost Zairiansmore thanwar in the

farawayKivus.Thefirstrumorsappearedtohavebeeninfluencedbytheofficialpress:Mobutuhadbeenthevictimofasavagetoothache,anabscessperhaps.Conspiratorially,theCIAwrotetoheadquartersthathewassufferingfromAIDS.1Itwastheforeignpressthatmanagedtogettherealstoryfromthehospital:He had been operated on for prostate cancer. Again the rumors boiled up inKinshasa, relegating thefightingintheeasttothebackpagesofthenewspapers.Hehadfallenintoacomaalongwithhiswife,theysaid.Thevoiceontheradio,sayinghewouldsoonreturn,wasreallythatofanactor,impersonatingtheOldLeopardquiteadmirably.Initially,Mobutu was not worried about the fighting. “Kabila? I knowKabila,” he told his French

lawyer.“He’snothing.He’sapettysmugglerwholivesinthehillsaboveGoma.”“Maréchal,”thelawyerresponded,“Ithinkweneedtobeawareofthedanger.Idon’tknowKabila,

buthe’sattheheadoforganized,determinedbattalions.BehindhimaretheRwandans,theUgandans,andIthinktheAmericans!”2

Even his bitterest enemies had a hard time believing that the all-seeingGuidewas fatally sick. Overthirty-oneyearshehad fashionedhimselfas thespiritual,political,andcustomarychiefof thecountry.TwothirdsofZairianshadknownnootherruler.HisfacewasoneverybanknoteandcountlessT-shirts,tablecloths,andalbumcovers.Schoolchildrensanghispraiseseverymorningbeforeclass:Onecountry,one father, one ruler, Mobutu, Mobutu, Mobutu! The evening news on state television began withMobutu’sheaddescendingfromtheheavensthroughtheclouds.Withhissilver-tippedblackcaneandleopard-skinhat,hewasthemodernversionofatraditionalking;

noonecoulddefyorevensupplementhisauthority.“Doesanybodyknowofavillagewithtwochiefs?”

helikedtoask.Hischieftaincywasnotjustsymbolic.In1980,duringhisfiftiethbirthdaycelebrations,hewasnamed

King of theBangala during an opulent coronation ceremony.3 “OnlyGod is above you,” the officiatorannounced.HewashailedasMobutuMoyi,orMobutuSunKing.4ThatwasnothisonlysimilaritywithKingLouisXIVofFrance.Throughthe1974constitution,hebecameheadofallbranchesofgovernmentandcouldlegislatebydecreeandchangetheconstitutionathisdiscretion.Insomeyearshepersonallydisposed of 20 percent of the budget. He was truly the father of the nation: He often presided overceremonieswherehecutribbonsonroadprojectsorbroughtmedicinetoahospital,magnanimousgiftsfromthefathertohischildren.VisitorstoMobutu’spalace—evenforeigndiplomats—couldoftenexpecttowalkawaywiththousandsofdollarsin“presents.”5HishealthbecameanationalconcernonthestreetcornersinKinshasa,wherepeoplegatheredaround

thenewspaperstandsandself-madepunditsdebatedtheimpactofcancertreatmentonthesixty-six-year-old. He had been castrated, some said. No, his penis had now swollen to twice its original size,enhancinghisnotorioussexualprowess.Inreality,theagingautocrathadfallenvictimtohisownbizarrebeliefs.Longanacolyteoftraditional

healingandmagic,hehadallowedhimself tobe treatedwithnaturalherbs and tonicsuntil the cancerspreadthroughhisbodyandforcedhimtoseekhelpabroad.Finally,onDecember17,1996,hispresidential jetarrivedatNjiliairport.Thepoliticaluncertainty

andfearofacivilwar(andprobablycashhandouts)drovetensofthousandstotheairportandthestreetleading into thecity. Itwasa tasteof thegoodolddays:Marchingbandsplayed;aphalanxofwomendanced,theirdressesemblazonedwithMobutu’sface;andpeoplewavedthousandsoftinyZairianflags.“Fatherhascome!Zaireissaved!”theyshouted.DespitethewidespreaddisdainforMobutuandhisrule,theuncertaintyofwhattherebelswouldbring

fueledgenuineacclamationforthedespot’sreturn.Theclergy,thearmy,andevensomeoppositionfigureshailedhis return todefend thenationagainst the “Tutsi conspiracy to create aHimaempire,” as somenewspapersputit.6Mobutuensconcedhimselfinhisresidenceatthecenterofthecapital’slargestmilitarycampandtried

toresuscitatehisregime.Hefiredtheheadofthearmyandreplacedhimwithamorecompetentofficer.Hearranged for severalhundredFrenchmercenaries tocome tohisaid,alongwithSerbianandSouthAfrican soldiers of fortune.His generalsmetwithRwandan ex-FARcommanders,whowere trying toregrouptheirsoldierswhohadbeendispersedwhentherefugeecampsbrokeup.TheOldLeopard,however,nolongerhadthepowerheusedto.Sincehehadliftedthebanonpolitical

partiesin1990,hehadslowlybeenrelegatedtoamoresymbolicroleinpolitics.HespentmostofhistimeinhisjunglepalaceinGbadolite,fivehundredmilesfromthecapital,andlefttheday-to-dayrunningofthecountrytohisprimeminister.Foryears,MobutuhadcarefullypittedZaire’sleadingbusinessandpoliticalleadersagainsteachothertopreventthemfromchallenginghim.Intheend,however,Mobutu’sdivide-and-ruletacticshadlefthimwithasplintered,ineffectiveshellofagovernment.Thismess wasmost apparent in the security forces, where competingmilitias vied for power and

controlofeconomicspoils.AfirefightbrokeoutattheMatadiportwhenashipmentofarmsfromNorthKorea came in. Troops loyal toGeneralNzimbiNgbale,Mobutu’s presidential guard commander andcousin,andthoseunderGeneralMaheleexchangedgunfire.Theformerwantedtosell theweaponsforprofit,whilethelatterwantedtousethemtofighttherebels.Mobutu’shealthbegantofailhimagain.Withinamonth,hewasbackinEuropeforfurthertreatment.

Thevicioustonguesinthecapitalbegantowagwithnewrumorsofhisillhealth.WhentheCentralBankissuedyetanothernewbanknote tokeeptrackofrisinginflation, itwasquicklydubbed“theProstate.”

Justlikethepresident’sgland,itwasinflatingdaily.Justliketheillness,thesebanknotescouldseriouslydamageyourhealth.WhenMobutureturnedtoKinshasathenexttime,inMarch1997,onlyafractionofthepeopleturned

out towelcome him. Theywaited in vain at the airport after the airplane arrived and didn’t open itsdoors.Inside,asicklyMobutuwasstrugglingtostandup,hismuscleshavingseizedupduringtheride.Masseuses rubbed his body as his staff shooed away the spectators and press from the airport.Hourslater, leaning heavily on the arm of his wife, Mobutu exited the plane and headed home through thedesertedstreets.

Mobutu liked towatch television.He used towake early in themorning, around 6 o’clock, to have amassage and watch the news on satellite television. He suffered from insomnia, which had beenaggravatedbyhiscancermedication.Thenewswasnotgood.Kabila’sconquestofthecountryhadbecomeamediafavorite,anddozensof

news organizations flocked to the east of the country, streaming live feed of captured towns, withvillagers celebrating their “liberation,” around theworld.Kabila’s forces had capturedKisangani justdaysafterMobutureturnedtoZaireinMarch1997.Televisioncamerasshowedpeopleliningthestreetsastherebelsmarchedintotown,throwingdownpalmfronds,colorfulcloths,andmattressesforthemtowalk on. In Washington, the White House spokesman announced: “Mobutism is about to become acreatureofhistory.”7Withhisbackagainstthewall,Mobutubeganthinkingaboutnegotiating.Hefiredhisprimeministerandhandedpowerovertohislong-standingrival,EtienneTshisekedi,whopromptlynamedanewcabinet,reservingsomeofthemostimportantministriesforhis“brother”Kabila.TheOldLeopard sent his national security advisor to South Africa to see whether Kabila was open fornegotiations.Mobutu’spride,however,stillshonethrough.Hesaidhewouldmeetwiththerebelleader—butonhis

owntermsandonlyifheaskedpolitely.“Politelymeans,‘Mr.PresidentofZaire,myintentionistomeetyou.’That’spolite,”MobutusaidinararesessionwiththemediainApril.Mobutuspenthisdaysinhisresidence,surroundedbyhisclosestfamily—hiswife,hersister,hisson

Nzanga,andhisgrandchildren.Hetookhotbathsintheearlymorningandeveninganddrankinfusionsoflemongrassandginger.Intheevenings,whenrainstormshadclearedthethickhumidityfromtheair,hewould sit on his balcony, overlooking rapids on the Congo River. Cocker spaniels and a family ofpeacocksplayedontheneatlytrimmedlawns.Justoutsidethegatestohisproperty,hecouldseeasignproclaiming,“WelcomeHome,FieldMarshallMobutu.”Therestoftheviewwaslesspleasing.Hisswimmingpoolwasoverflowingandcoveredwithalgae,

and the military camp was clogged with wrecks of military vehicles, many of which had beencannibalized for spare parts to sell on the black market. In the surrounding military camp, soldiers’undergarmentshungfromwashinglines;garbagepiledupintheditches.He unsuccessfully tried to reassert his power, even in the intimacy of his bedroom. His legendary

sexualappetitehad ledhim tomarry three timesandmaintaindozensofmistresses.Evenafterseveraloperationsonhisprostate,hereportedlycontinuedsleepingwithhiswifeandhertwinsister,promptingprofusebleeding.8Moderation,neverhisstrongsuit,wasnotabouttogracehiminhisoldage.ThescenesplayedoutinKinshasawerebothtragicandcomic,dramaticandbanal.Plumpgeneralsin

alligatorskinshoesheldteapartiesintheirgardensassoldierssetfiretotheirbarracks.Streetchildreninragsandwhiteglovespretendedtoguidetrafficwhilearmybossessoldtanksforscrapmetalontheblackmarket.Kinshasaseemedtohavefallendownarabbithole.ThentherewasMobutu’spreoccupationwithcorpses.Twoinparticularbotheredhim.Onewasthatof

hisfirstwife,Marie-Antoinette,whowasburiedinacryptinGbadolite.Heworriedendlesslythattherebels,whowerewithinafewweeks’marchofhishometown,woulddefilehertombalongwiththoseofhissons,buriednexttoher.Onthetenthanniversaryofherdeath, tenyearsearlier,hehadorderedhertombtobehermeticallysealed,butonecouldneverbetoosure.HeradioedtoGbadolitetoaskthemtocheckhertomb,tomakesureitcouldnotbeopened.Hisaidestradedworriedlooks.Hehadlongbeenrumoredtobeworriedaboutherghosthauntinghim.Somesuggestedthatwasthereasonhehadmarriedtwins—toprotecthimfromherspirit.Withoneoneachsideofhim,theywouldwardheroff.Thesecondcorpsehadnotyetbeenburied.ItwasthatofJuvénalHabyarimana,theformerpresidentof

Rwanda,whose body had been recovered after his plane had been shot downonApril 6, 1994, overKigali.Thecadaver’sjourneyisshroudedinmystery,butIhaveheardpeopleinBukavu,Gbadolite,andKinshasawhoinsisttheytouchedit,sawit,smelleditsdecomposingmass.Mostlikely,itwashurriedoutthroughBukavu(myhousekeepertheresworethatherfather,acommanderinMobutu’sarmy,hadkeptitintheirbasementfortwonights)andthenmadeitswaytoGbadolite,whereitwaskeptembalmedandincoolstorage.MobutuhadbeenclosefriendswithHabyarimanaandwasstillhostinghiswidow,Agathe,whospent

monthsinhisjunglepalacebeforefleeingtoFrance.Mobutupromisedthatherhusbandwouldreceiveahero’sburialinRwanda,presumablyafterhechasedtheRPFfrompower.Whenitbecameclearthatthiswouldnotbethecase,andtheRPFwasclosingonGbadolite,MobutuhadthebodybroughttoKinshasa.FearingthattheRPFtroopswouldgettheirhandsonthebody,heorderedhisfriendtobecremated.CremationisnotpracticedincentralAfrica,andnooneseemedtoknowhowtogoaboutit.Doyouput

himinanovenoronapyre?Wouldn’tthechurchdisapprove?Thebodywaskeptembalmedintheholdof a cargo aircraft at the airport for three days as officials tried to figure out how to organize theceremony.AsKabila’s rebel army closed in on the capital, themilitary officer in charge of the bodypanickedandbegancallingaroundforadvice.Ifheabandonedthebody,hewouldbeguiltyoftreason;iftheRPFcaughthimwithit,hewassurelyadeadman.Hetoldajournalist:“Ifitwereuptome,Iwouldhavedumpeditintotheriver.ButforMobutu,itislikeoneofhisownchildren.Andevenifitisoneofhisownlastacts,heinsistedonthisbeingdonecorrectly.”9Finally, an IndianHindupriestwas found toofficiate.Even thoughHabyarimanahadbeenadevout

Catholic,Mobutu told them just to get onwith it.OnMay 15, 1997,Habyarimana’s bodywent up inflamesinKinshasa,overthreeyearsafterhisdeath.Nooneseemstoknowwherehisashesare.

At the end of April, Mobutu was visited by a delegation from Washington led by Bill Richardson,PresidentClinton’sspecialenvoytotheregion.TheU.S.governmentwasworriedaboutabloodbathinKinshasa when the rebels arrived, and wanted to get the autocrat to step down. They discovered ahobbledmanwhoneededhelptostandandsit.Heseemeddivorcedfromreality;theyinformedhimthathisarmy’slaststandatKenge,125milestothewestofthecapital,hadfailed.RichardsonhandedhimaletterfromClintonaskingthathestepdownwithhonoranddignity.Theambassadorrecalled:“Hewas

beingtold:‘You’llbedraggedthroughthestreets.Thesethingscouldhappentoyouandwearenotgoingtostopthem.’”10Mobutufeltbetrayed.TheUnitedStateshadsupportedhimsincethe1950s;hehadvisitedtheWhite

HousenumeroustimesandmetPresidentsKennedy,Nixon,Reagan,andBush.HewrotealettertoFrenchpresidentJacquesChirac:“Today,theUSandGreatBritainthroughtheirproxiesSouthAfrica,Uganda,RwandaandAngolaareusingtheringleaderLaurentKabilatostabmeintheback,takingadvantageofmyillness.”11Despitehisfury,Mobutuwasleftwithlittlechoice.Hisministerswerebeginningtohireboatstotake

theirfurnitureandsuitcasesacrosstherivertotheneighboringRepublicofCongo.Hisphonecallswerebeginningtogounanswered.He agreed to meet with Kabila onMay 4, 1997. Themeeting place itself was the subject of long

negotiations. Kabila refused to meet in Gabon or the Republic of Congo, fearing a French-backedassassinationplotinitsformercolonies.MobutucouldnottraveltoSouthAfricabecauseofhishealth.Finally,bothpartiesagreedonameetingontheSouthAfricannavyshipOutenika,anchoredjustoffthecoast. SouthAfrican presidentNelsonMandelawouldmediate. SinceMobutuwas unable towalk thethirty-one steps onto the boat, the hosts had to cobble together a plank strong enough for Mobutu’slimousinetobedrivenonboard.Foronce,Mobutuwasoutshoneinsuperstition.LaurentKabilarefusedtolookintohiseyesduringthe

meetingand insteadstaredat theceiling;according to theprevailing rumor,hewasafraid that theOldLeopardstillhadenoughmagicalpowerlefttocursehimwithhisstareandpreventhimfromreachinghisprize,nowsoclose.Itwastheonlytimethatthetworivalsmet;afterfightinghimforthirty-twoyears,therebelleaderhadlittletosaytohisfoe.Handoverpower,andstepdownwithoutanyconditions,hetoldhim. Mobutu, insulted by the treatment, limped off the boat, refusing to strike a deal. Mandela,seventyeighthimself,hadtoprophimupashewalkedtohiscar.During the last days of the rainy season in Kinshasa, thunderous downpours pounded down on the

rooftopsandinundatedwholeneighborhoods.Itdidn’tdampentheyouths’anticipation,however.Graffitibeganappearingonwalls.Onedowntownsaid: “Mobutu=Problème,Kabila=Solution.”Elsewhere,vandalspaintedover the“Zaire”onadministrativebuildings,scrawling“Congo,” thenameKabilahadadoptedforthecountry,above.Anenterprisingyoungmanclimbedupasixty-foot-highbillboard,paintedamustacheonMobutu’sface,andblackenedoutatooth.

Itistellingthattheclosestthingtoaherothisperiodcouldmusterwasatraitor.GeneralDonatMahelewas a lanky, tallman from the Equateur region, but not from the same tribe asMobutu.He had beentrainedatFrance’seliteSaint-Cyrmilitaryacademy,heldcommandpositionsintheShabawarsof1977and1978,andledMobutu’stroopssenttohelpHabyarimanabeatbacktheRPFin1990.HewasadevoutJehovah’s Witness and enjoyed a good reputation among foreign military advisors; when the armypillagedKinshasa in1991,hehadtheguts toorderhissoldiers toshoot their lootingcomrades,whichhelpedbringthechaosundercontrol.MahelewasnamedtoleadtheZaireanarmyinDecember1996.BythefollowingApril,aftercountless

standoffswithotherarmycommanders,herealizedthatitwasalostcause.Kabilacontrolledtwo-thirdsofthecountry,includingitsdiamondandcoppermines.“Atsomepointherealizedthatthemorallyright

thing to do was to surrender beforemore lives were lost,” José Endundo, the general’s friend and aprominentbusinessman,remembered.Everyonewasworried that theAFDL’sarrival inKinshasawouldpromptabloodbath,with running

gunbattlesindowntownstreets,revengekillings,andindiscriminateshellingofcivilianneighborhoods.At thevery least, the thousandsofdemoralizedsoldierswouldthoroughly loot thecitybefore takingtotheirheels.It was the Americans who provided General Mahele with the means to get in touch with Laurent

Kabila.AmbassadorDanielSimpson,whohadmetwithKabilaonavisittoLubumbashi,arrangedforaphonecalltotakeplaceonMay14athisresidence.MaheleandKabilaspokeforhalfanhourandthenagainafewdayslater.TheyarrangedforMaheletoreadaspeechontheradio,tellingthetroopstostanddownwhentherebelswalkedintotown.HewouldalsoflytotheZambiancapital,Lusaka,tomeetwithKabilaandofficiallyrecognizehim.12First,however,Mobutuhadtoleave.Ifhewasstill inKinshasawhentherebelsarrived,someunits

loyaltohimmighttrytoputupafight.OnMay15,MobutuhadjustcomebackfromanothertriptotheSouthAfricanshipOutenika—Kabila

hadn’t even bothered turning up this time—to bemet by hismost powerful generals at his residence.GeneralLikulia,whohadtakenovertheprimeminister’sofficeinthefinaldays,wasadamantthattheycouldstilldefend thecapital.“Iorderedattackhelicopterswithampleammunition [inSouthAfrica]. Ievenpaidasizeabledownpaymenttomakesuretheequipmentarrives.”13Likulialookedtotheotherstobackhimup.Mahele,however,hadhadenough.“Voila,Maréchal,Iam

nolongerabletoensureyoursafetyhere.”Mobutulookedathiminamazement.“Whatareyoutalkingabout?Iwasn’tawareofthis!”According

toother,probablymoredramaticwitnesses,helookedatMaheleandsaid,“Ettu,Brute?”BobiLadawa, the first lady, chimed in, “Youbetrayedyour father!After everythinghehasdone for

you!”Likulia looked to Mobutu’s nephew, General Nzimbi, the commander of the presidential guard.

“Nzimbi,yousaidyouhave15,000troopshereinthecity.Whathaveyoudonetoprepareourdefense?”Thegeneralstaredbackinembarrassedsilence.14“Isee,”Mobutusaidsoftly.“Itisdecidedthen.Weshallleavetomorrow.”The gossipmill began churning as each person involved in themeeting began propagating his own

versionofwhathadhappened.Bythefollowingmorning,thenewshadgoneoutamongtheofficercorps:Mahelehadbetrayedthenation.

The next day, Mobutu drove to the airport at dawn, opting for a small, less conspicuous vehicle,accompaniedby tencarsstuffedwithsuitcases.Otherobjectshadpreceded themandhadbeenpackedontoa747jetthatwaswaitingforMobutuandhisentourage.Hehadsomuchluggagethathehadtoleavepartofitattheairportinthevehicles.AbandonedexpensivevehicleswerebecomingacommonsightinKinshasa, especially at the various ports where Mobutu officials were fleeing across the river toBrazzavilleincanoes,speedboats,andferries.MahelespenttherestofthedaypreparingforKabila’sarrivalintown.Hewasparticularlyworried

about thepresidentialguards, theeliteforceswhohadbenefitedmostfromMobutu’s largesseandwho

wererecruitedlargelyfromhishomeregionofEquateur.Intheevening,hereceivedaphonecallfromPrimeMinisterLikulia,whotoldhimthatriotshadbrokenoutinCampTshatshi,wherethepresidentialguardwasbased.Mahele decided to go there himself, accompanied only by a few other officers. “That was typical

Mahele,”aformercolleagueandfriendtoldme.“Eveninthe1991Kinshasariots,hepatrolledtownonfootwithsoldiers.Thatwastoolow!That’snottheroleofageneral!”At the gates ofCampTshatshi, they found a gang of presidential guards shooting in the air, high on

adrenaline.Theystoppedthegroupofofficersandmadethemgetoutoftheirjeeps.Maheleenteredthecampandtriedtoreasonwiththem,buttheyshoutedhimdown:“Youhavesoldusout!Youbetrayedus,andnowyouwillcrossovertoBrazzaville!Whataboutusandourfamilies!”TheybegantalkingtoeachotherinNgbandi,Mobutu’smothertongue,sayingthattheyshouldkillthe

traitor.MahelewasfromtheMbuzatribe,buthegotthemessageandbeganbacktrackingtothecarstheyhad left outside the gate. His bodyguard Kazembe was waiting for him and forced open the gate,provokingtheoutrageofthesoldiers,whoshothim.Acommotionensued—Mahelejumpedinthecar,whilehisotherbodyguardsjumpedintothebusheson

thesideoftheroad.Thepresidentialguardopenedfireonthejeep,butwhentheylookedinside,Mahelewasnowheretobeseen.“Sorcerer!”theycriedout, lookingundertheseats.Finally, theyfoundthegeneral,hidingunderneath

thecar.“I’mhere,youfools.Dowithmewhatyouwant!”They tookhimback into thecampand toreoffhisgeneral’s stripesand redberet.A fightbrokeout

betweentheNgbandiandtheMbuzawithinthepresidentialguardaboutwhatshouldbedonewithhim,butthescufflewascutshortwhensomeone—somesayKongolo,Mobutu’snotoriousson—drewapistolandshotMaheleinthebackofhishead.CampTshatshicollapsedasthesoldiers,leaderlessanddivided,foughtovertheremainingspoils.15

12

THEKINGISDEAD;LONGLIVETHEKING

Acatgoestoamonastery,butshestillremainsacat.—CONGOLESESAYING

KINSHASA,CONGO,MAY1997

President Laurent Kabila spent his first few weeks in Kinshasa in May 1997 shellshocked. It wasunderstandable;hehadnotbeeninthecapitalsincetheearly1960s.Inhismind,Kinshasahadbecomeamythical construct, aBabylonof excess andcorruption, fromwherehis archenemyhad ruled for threedecades.The capital, called Leopoldville when Kabila had left, with its functioning administration and

expansive infrastructure, had deteriorated into the riotous commotion of modern-day Kinshasa. In theearlysixties,thecityhadbeensculptedaroundatidy,wealthynucleusofwhitebusinessmensurroundedbytheburgeoningCongoleseeliteandflankedbyneighborhoodsofblue-collarworkersinrelativelyneathousingsettlementsbuiltbytheBelgians.By1997,thepopulationhadgrownfromhalfamilliontooverfivemillion.Thecityhadburstattheseams,asvillagersstreamedintotheever-expandingshantytownsfanningsouthandeastward,awayfromdowntown.Kinshasa had become the third largest city inAfrica and among the top twenty in theworld, but it

seemedlikeanoversizedvillage.Therewasnofunctioningpostalserviceorpublictransitsystem,anddespiteanoverabundanceofrainfall,overtwomillioncitydwellersdidnothavedirectaccesstoawatersupply. Ninety-five percent of the populationworked in the informal sector: lugging bags of cassava,shining shoes, hawking everything from aphrodisiacs to cigarettes and nail polish along the bustlingstreets.Tensofthousandsofcivilservantsstillshowedupforworkinoldsuitsandties—butwererarelypaid.Garbageaccumulatedintheopensewersandonimpromptuheapsbythesideoftheroad,whereitrottedandwaseventuallyburned, filling theairwithacridsmoke.Halfof thepopulation livedononemealaday,scroungingtogetherstacksofNouveauZairebanknotes tobuycassavaflourandleavesfortheireveningmeal;aquarterlivedonamealeverytwodays.1KinlaBellehadbecomeKinlaPoubelle—KinshasatheGarbageCan.Thearchitectureofthecityhadchangedaccordingly.ThestatueatthetrainstationofKingLeopold,the

Belgian monarch who had founded the country and owned it as his private property for twenty-threeyears,wasgone.Thevariousexclusivesocialclubs,wherewhiteprivilegewascarefullygroomed,hadalso disappeared as the foreign population fled the city, first after the social upheaval aroundindependence and then during the pillage of the early 1990s.Mobutu had tried to reorganize the city,constructingwideboulevardstotheChinesebuiltparliamentandanew80,000-seatstadium,thesecondlargest in Africa. But city planning had failed: The shanties grew organically and anarchically,

appropriating empty spaces as sewage and lighting systems broke down.The rich reacted by buildinghigher walls around the few pockets of whitewashed privilege left in the Ngaliema and Gombecommunes.Thefewpublicparksweretakenoverbyhawkersandevangelistsduringthedayandbythehomelessatnight.Thepresidentialgardens,whichhadhousedMobutu’szoo,werenowovergrownwithweeds.Thezoo,

onceamodelforothersinAfrica,waslittlemorethanacollectionofrusty,dirtycagestendedbyunpaidkeeperswholookedafterstarvinganimals.Twoofthelionshadrecentlystarvedtodeath,andagroupofexpatriates had taken to collecting leftover food from upscale hotels to feed the remaining monkeys,chimpanzees,antelopes,andsnakes.Theabandonedzooworkershadtriedraisingchickensandfishontheland,buttheyhadlittlehopefortheanimals.SoonafterKabila arrived inKinshasa,his advisorsbriefedhimon the country’s economy. Itwasn’t aprettypicture.Thecountry’sincomehadshrunktoathirdofwhatithadbeenatindependencein1960.Inflationwasat750percent.Between1988and1996,copperproductionhadplummetedfrom506,000to38,000tons,whileindustrialdiamondproductiondroppedfrom10millionto6.5millioncarats.Coffee,palmoil,andteaproductionfollowedthesametrend.Only5percentofthepopulationhadsalariedjobs;many of those worked for the state on salaries as low as five dollars a month. There were 120,000soldiers and 600,000 civil servants to pay and only 2,000miles of paved roads in the twelfth largestcountryintheworld.Totopitoff,thegovernmentwasbroke.WhenKabila’sforcesarrivedinKinshasa,oneoftheirfirst

stopsnaturallyhadbeentheCentralBank.Thefuturevicegovernorofthebankhadthehonorofopeningthevaults,onlytofindthehugecementchambersempty.AlonelyfiftyFrenchfrancnotewasleftinoneofthedrawers, “as an insult.”2 In theministries,most of the files had been burned or stolen, alongwithphones,faxmachines,airconditioners,paperclips,anddoorhandles.

Kabila,whospokebrokenLingala—thelanguageofthecapital—andknewalmostnooneintown,wasdauntedbyKinshasa.HeslippedintothecityundercoverofnightonMay20,deprivingresidentsofafirstglimpseoftheirnewruler.Asilentmotorcaderushedhimtothepalaisdumarbre,amarblepalaceensconced in the leafyNgaliema neighborhood.Mobutu had had several homes in the capital; Kabilawouldcontenthimselfwith justone.Hiswife,Sifa,hisconcubines, and someofhiseighteenchildrenwerestayingelsewhereintown;hedidn’twanttomixbusinessandpleasure.Hedidn’tchangehisstyleorhispersonalhabits.Hecontinuedtowearsandalsandhisdrab,monochromesafarisuits.Hisclosetwas full of identical suits in armygreen, navyblue, andbrown, promptinghis friends to joke that histailorhadaneasy job.Hisdiet remained inspiredbyhisdays in thebush: largequantitiesofvenison,ugali—the thick maize meal preferred by Katangans—and simple vegetables stewed in palm oil.SometimesheorderedChineseandIndianfood,orhewouldgotothekitchenandaskhiscookstomakehimwhatever theywere eating themselves; he had kept a taste formanioc, squash, and potato leaves.Contrarytorumor,hedidn’tdrinkalcohol—hehadhighbloodpressureandwasdiabetic—butconsumedlargequantitiesofstrong,milkytea.3

Hisdaily schedulealso remained largelyunchanged.Hehadproblemssleeping—according to somebecause of his weight—and would wake before dawn and listen to the BBC Swahili and Englishbroadcastsonshortwaveradioonhisbalcony.Hehadahabitofwakinguphisadvisorsinthemiddleofthenighttocontinueadiscussiontheyhadhadthepreviousday.“Ihadtosleepwithmyphonenexttothebed,”DidierMumengi,hisinformationministerandprotégé,toldme.“Hewouldcallusatallhoursandcontinueconversationswherewehadleftoffdayspreviously.”Duringthesephonecallsandeverywhereelse hewent,Mzee—the respectful Swahili term for elder—carried a small, pocketsized notebook inwhichhewouldjotnotesincessantly.InthefewhoursofleisuretimeKabilaallowedhimselfattheendoftheday,hereadhistorybooks.He

wasintriguedbytheRussianandFrenchrevolutions,aswellasbytheNewDeal—hethoughthecoulddrawonthesehistoricallessonstotransformtheCongo.BiographiesofdeGaulle,Mao,andNapoleonlinedhisstudy.Onoccasion,someministerswouldstayonafterameetinganddebatephilosophy.“Hewasawell-readmanwithsomestrangeideas,”oneofhisministerstoldme.“Irememberinonecabinetmeeting,heaskedusoutofthebluewhetherwethoughtSartrewouldhaveagreedwithsomepolicywewerediscussing!”4Theimagehisformeradvisorspaintofthenewpresidentisoneofamaninflatedbyhisnewpowerbut

alsoconfusedandstifledbyloneliness.Severaltimes,hescaredhisbodyguardsbydisappearingfromhispresidentialcompoundatnightanddrivinghiscarintotown,wherehewoulddrivearoundalone,tryingtocatchthecity—whichhebarelyknew—offguard.Hissoldierswouldscrambleintopickuptrucksandchaseafterhim,onlytoseetheirpresidentgetoutofhiscarandorderthemtogetbacktohispalace.Aformerministerrememberedbeingaskedtosuperviseadredgingprojectononeofthecity’scanals.“Afewdaysafterwebeganwork,Mzeeshowedupatnight,allaloneinabatteredMercedes, toseehowworkwasprogressing.Hegaveusallafright.NotthatIwastheretoseehim—itwas1o’clockinthemorning!”5

OnMay29,twelvedaysaftertherebelsseizedKinshasa,thecountrygotitsfirstgoodlookatitsleader.LaurentKabilawasswornintooffice,thenation’sfirstnewpresidentinthirty-twoyears.Theceremonytookplaceinfrontof40,000peopleintheKamanyolastadium.Themoodwasfestive.Thewarwasover,Mobutuwasfinallygone,andanewchapterofCongolesehistorywasbeginning.Inthebakingmiddaysun,theSupremeCourt’stwenty-twojusticesstoodupinthickredrobeslinedwithleopardskintoswearintheheadofstate.Behindthemonthepodiumsatthepeoplewhohadmadethismomentpossible:thepresidents of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Zambia. One by one, they filed passed the podium andembracedKabila.Thecelebrationwasmomentarilyinterruptedbyagroupofaroundfivehundredoppositionactivistsin

the crowdwho chanted: “Where isTshisekedi?” referring to the indefatigable opposition leadermanywanted tohavea role in thenewgovernment.Theyweresoondrownedoutby themarchingbandandKabilasupporterswhoansweredwith“GotoTogo!”—thesmallwesternAfricancountrywhereMobutuhadfirstfledafterleavingKinshasa.Theincidentwasareminderthatthenewgovernmentwasnotachildofthedemocracymovement,that

ithadtakenpowerbyforce.IntheweekbeforeKabila’sspeech,statetelevisionhadbroadcastseveraldecreesthatgaveanideaabouttheorientationofthenewleaders.Thefirst,signedonMay17,announced

that all activities of political parties would be suspended until further notice. The next, signed a daybefore the inauguration, declared that the presidentwould rule by decree until a constitutive assemblyadoptedanewconstitution.Kabilawasgrantedplenipotentiarypowers:Hewould legislateaswellasnamejudgesandallhigh-rankingadministrativeandmilitaryofficials.Totheopposition, itwasapageoutofMobutu’splaybook.Manywerewillingtocutthenewleaderssomeslack.Afterall,therewereoverthreehundredpolitical

partiesinKinshasawhenKabilaarrived,manyofthemso-calledpartisalimentaires,politicalguppieswhose sole function was to “be fed” by theMobutist system. There was little culture of democraticdebate,andtheone-partyelectionsunderMobutuhadhingedoncultsofpersonality,ethnicpolitics,andthecorruptionofkeyopinionmakers.Animmediateopeningtomultipartydemocracyandelectionsinthiscontext could have led to a rebound by the Mobutists. Even Nelson Mandela, the dean of Africandemocracy,deemedit“suicidal”forKabilatoallowfreepartyactivitiesbeforehehadafirmgriponthegovernment.6AgroupofvisitingU.S.congresspeopleacceptedKabila’smeasures,sayingthatthecountryneededstabilityfirst,evenifitmeantsuppressingpoliticalprotestsintheshortterm.7Kabila himself addressed thesematterswith typical flair during his inauguration speech: “You see,

that’sveryniceallthat.However,thesegentlemen[whodemandelections]wereco-responsibleforthemisdeedsofthedictatorshipinthiscountry.Duringthreedecadestheyneverorganizedelections,nordidtheycareforhumanrights.TheynowwantfortheAFDLtoorganizeinhasteandwithoutdelayelections,asifdemocracywasnotsomethingthatbelongstoourpeoplebutonlytothem.”8Kabilapromised that thesemeasureswouldbe temporaryand that after a transitionalperiodof two

years,politicalpartieswouldbeabletooperateagainandelectionswouldbeheld.Inthemeantime,henamed a constitutional commission—all close allies and members of the AFDL—to draft a newconstitution.

Kabila’shoneymoonwasbrief.When thebanonpoliticalactivitywaschallengedby thevibrant localelite,Kabilalashedout.On November 25, Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, a former UNESCO official who had recently entered

Congolesepolitics,triedtoholdapressconferenceathisresidence.Aspecialpoliceunitbrokeintothehouse,filledtheairwithteargasandbullets,andarrestedeveryonepresent,includingseveraljournalists.Aroundtwentypeopleweretakentopoliceheadquarters,madetoliedownonthecementfloor,kickedinthestomach,neck,andhead,andthenbeatenseverelywithsticks.Zahidihimselfwasawardedfifty-onelashes,oneforeachyearofhisage.9Dozensofotherpoliticianswhodefiedthebanonpartyactivitieswereroundedupandgivensimilar

treatment.ThemostillustriouswasEtienneTshisekedi.WhenKabilafirstarrivedinKinshasa,Tshisekedireached out, saying that he wanted to work with the new leadership. However, Tshisekedi quicklywithdrewtoatypicallyhardheadedposition,demandingthatthegovernmentbedissolvedandthathebeappointedprimeminister,apositionthathadbeengiventohimbytheNationalSovereignConferencein1992.KabilathrewTshisekediintoprisonseveraltimes,butheprovedimpossibletoshutup.Finally,inFebruary 1997,Kabila lost his patience andhadhimdeported to his remote homevillage ofKabeya-Kamwanga“withatractorandsomesoyseedssohecanputhis leadershipskills totheserviceofouragriculturalsector.”10

For human rights organizations,which had spent the previous decade takingMobutu to task for hisrepressiveregime,therewaslittlerespite.WithinthefirstfewmonthsofKabila’sregime,atleasttwelvehuman rights advocates from across the country were arrested and interrogated for criticizing thegovernment or inquiring into the detention of Mobutists; many were beaten. NongovernmentalorganizationshadflourishedinsomepartsofthecountryduringthelatteryearsofMobutu’sdictatorship,offeringamuchneededcounterbalancetotheheavy-handedstate.WhentheybegantocriticizeKabila’sgovernment,someoftheirleaderswerearrestedandtoldtheyhadoversteppedtheirlimits.Intheeasterngold-miningtownofKamituga,threemembersofahumanrightsgroupweredetainedaftertheypublishedreportsaccusingthelocalprosecutorofcorruption.Theyweresubjectedtodailybeatingsofahundredtotwohundredlashesuntiltheyacceptedthesupremeauthorityofthegovernment.11In October 1997, the minister of information, Raphael Ghenda, proposed outlawing direct foreign

funding tonongovernmentalorganizations,saying that thereshouldbeagovernment intermediarysetupformanagingthesefunds.12Severalmonthslater,thegovernmentwentastepfurther,accusingallhumanrightsgroupsenblocof“destabilizingthegovernmentandcontributingtothedecreaseinforeignaidbydisseminatingfalsereportsandlies.”Thegovernmentthenbegancreatingandsponsoringtheirowncivilsocietygroups,chargedwithreportingonhumanrightsviolationsbutalsowithinformingthegovernmentof “foreignmanipulations.” 13 Soon, the government also began to pay “transport fees” for journalistsattending press conferences, and in some cases the ministry of information made direct donations toimpoverishednewspapereditors.At thesametime, theybannedcommercialsonprivateradiostations,depriving them of all legitimate revenue. Security agents began regularly visiting the offices of radiostations and newspapers, asking editors what they had slated for the upcoming show or publication.Several senior editors were arrested and taken in for questioning when they published stories thatembarrassed the government. The tactics came straight out of Mobutu’s bag of tricks—a mixture ofcoercionandco-optation—andwereeffective.Thenewspaperscriticalofthegovernment,LePhare,LePotentiel,andLaRéférencePlus,begantowaterdowntheirdenunciations.ThisrepressionledtoarenowneddiplomaticincidentthathelpedsealKabila’sfateasapariahofthe

west. InDecember1997,SecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbrightvisitedKinshasa tomeetwithKabila.Relations between the senior U.S. diplomat and the Congolese head of state were not good. Severalmonthsbeforehervisit, during theheightof the refugee crisis,AlbrighthadcalledKabila, threateningseriousconsequencesifhedidn’tallowinvestigatorsintothecountrytofindoutwhathadhappenedwiththemissingRwandanrefugees.KabilahadhunguponAlbrightmid-sentence,muttering,“Imperialist!”14Nevertheless,themeetingwentfairlywell.AlbrightarguedthatitwouldbeinKabila’sowninterestto

openuppoliticalspacetohiscritics,thatitwouldmakehimlookstronger,notweaker.Asoften,hewaseloquent and affable, expressing himself in fluent English.When they walked into the rotunda of thepresidentialpalace,whereapressconferencehadbeenorganized,hewentfirst, rattlingoffaseriesoffairlyuncontroversial statements.Then, anAmerican journalist askedKabila about the recent arrest ofZahidiNgoma,pointingout that this hadbeen interpreted as a crackdownonhis opponents.Suddenly,Kabila became agitated and began berating the reporter. “This gentleman [Zahidi Ngoma] is not apolitician,”Kabilasaid,jabbingafingerintheair.“He’snotapoliticalleader.Doyoucallapoliticalleader those who come on the street to incite people to kill each other ... whomanufacture politicalpamphletswiththeintentofdividingpeople?Doyoucallpeoplelikethatpoliticalleaders?Doyouletpeoplelikethatoutonthestreet?”15

ThenKabilaputhisfingersupinaVforvictoryandsaid,“Vivademocracy!”16TheAmericanswerenotamused.

In retrospect, Kabila’s heavy-handedness does not make much sense. The public had been relativelyfavorabletowardhimatthebeginning,andwhatlittleoppositiontherewasagainsthimwasdisorganizedandweak.Whydidhesquandertheinitialgoodwillwithsuchsquabbles?ManyhavedismissedKabila’shostilitytodomesticandforeigncriticsasevidenceofhisauthoritarian

nature.While itwasclearlyafactor,morewasbehindhisreactionthanjustadespoticpersonality.Asmuchasanythingelse,hisallergicreactiontochallengestohisregimestemmedfromtheprofoundlyweakpositionhewasin.Pressedintoacornerandfeelingvulnerable,hereactedbylashingout.Kabilacame topoweron thewingsofa rebellionsponsoredand, toa largedegree, foughtbyother

armies. He had tried to gain independence by surrounding himself with businessmen and intellectualsfromthediasporawhomhebarelyknew.Thepeoplewhosurroundedhimdayandnight—hispersonalassistant, the commander of his bodyguard, his secretary and protocol officer—were all Rwandan orCongoleseTutsi.Hisarmywasajigsawofforeigntroops,kadogo(childsoldiers),KatanganTigers,andformerMobututroops.Kabilafeltlikethemajordomoinahouseownedandlivedinbyothers.SomeofKabila’s formerassociatesascribe this lackofpoliticalcohesion to theunexpectedlyquick

successof the rebellion.ColonelPatrickKaregeya,whohadhelpedmanage the rebellion fromKigali,toldme:“WereachedKinshasa insixmonths.Evenbasic training forasoldier takesninemonths!Wewere not prepared.”Ugandans, in particular, were dismayed at the speed of their advance.Musevenidrewon his own experience fighting a guerrillawar.His insurrection lasted five years, from1981 to1986,andreceivedlittlehelpfromothercountries.Thishelpedeliminateopportunistswhoweretheretomakeaquickfortuneandfosteredcohesionandself-relianceamongtheremainingofficers.TheAFDL’sbrushfireadvanceacross thecountry,coupledwith the foreigndominationof the rebellion,producedaweakandfracturedgovernment.From this positionofweakness,Kabila sawcritics as threats.After all,most newspaperswere not

able to sell enough advertising or copies to cover even their overhead and sought funding frompoliticians.TheonlywayentrepreneursinKinshasacouldgetaheadunderMobutuwastoseekpoliticalpatronage;mostbusinesseshadlinkstothesystemKabilahadjusttoppled.Andallthemaincivilsocietygroups received funding from Europe or the United States, countries that were deeply critical of himbecauseofthemassacresofRwandanrefugees.IfKabila hadgivenway to demands formultiparty democracy and elections immediately, hewould

havemostlikelylostpower.Indeed,anindependentopinionpollinJune1997indicatedthat62percentofthecapital’spopulationsupportedoppositionleaderEtienneTshisekedi,whileonly14percentfavoredKabila.17

Moreover, the new leaders were mostly inexperienced. FollowingMobutu’s demise, hundreds of topofficials in government agencies andministries were sacked or fled into exile. “It was like what theAmericansdidwiththeBaathPartyinIraq,”oneofficialintheMinistryofMinestoldme.“Fromonedaytothenext,everybodywasgone.”18Thegovernment did not have the timeor themeans to conduct a serious job search for all the new

officials it needed. This led to ad hoc, hasty decisions. When Jean-ClaudeMasangu, the director ofCitibankinKinshasa,visitedthenewministeroffinancetointroducehimself,theministersizedhimup:“Aren’t you Congolese? Are you looking for a job?We need people like you!” Several weeks later,MasanguwasappointedgovernoroftheCentralBank(itdidn’thurtthathisfatherhadbeenachildhoodfriendofKabila’s).19ToKabila’scredit,thefirstministerialcabinetincludedseveralrespectedmembersoftheopposition:

JustineKasavubu,aformerTshisekediactivistanddaughterof thecountry’sfirstpresident,becamethehead of civil service. Two prominent doctors andMobutu opponents, JeanKinkela and Jean-BaptisteSondji,werenamedasministersoftelecommunicationsandhealth,respectively.The most important portfolios, however, went to unseasoned members of the diaspora. Mwenze

Kongolo,abailofficerfromPhiladelphia,becameinteriorminister,andMawapangaMwanaNanga,anagronomistfromtheUniversityofKentucky,wasnamedministeroffinance.Afewappointeesdidn’tevenknow Kinshasa and had to hire drivers or guides to show them around the capital, as they had justreturnedfromdecadesofexile.Twoofthenewministershadhadrun-inswiththelawabroad.ThomasKanza,whowasinchargeof

regional cooperationandaid,wasunable todealwith theU.S.governmentbecausehewaswanted inTennessee for fleeing a $300,000 fine for fraud. Celestin Lwangy’s nomination for justice ministerelicited some chuckles in the Belgian press, as he had served eight months in prison in Belgium forillegallyhookinguphiselectricitysupplytothepowergrid.Itwasnosurprisethatthismotleygrouphadtroublecarryingoutthenecessaryreforms.Nonetheless,

with thearrivalof theAFDL, theCongolesedidget their first tasteofdemocracy. In townsacross thecountry, mayors and governors were initially elected by popular vote. Kabila, never one for lengthyproceedings,madeshortshriftofballotsandsimplytoldpeopletogathertogetherinthetownsquareormarketplace.Hewouldthenparadeanumberofcandidatesinfrontof thecrowdandaskthemtoraisetheirhandsiftheywereinfavor.Theman—almostnowomenstoodforelection—forwhomthehighestnumber of handswere raisedwas immediately proclaimedwinner.Despite its improvised nature, thisprocess produced some decent results. Several well-respected university lecturers were elected bypopular acclamation.This experiment, however,wasbrought to ahasty endwhenKabila realized thatmany of the leaders that the population wanted to elect, especially in the center and the west of thecountry,belongedtoTshisekedi’sparty.OtherinitiativeswerealsoabortedwhenKabilafearedthatopponentsoftheregimecouldhijackthem.

Soon after the AFDL took power, the new minister for reconstruction announced that national andprovincial conferences on reconstruction would be held so local leaders could propose developmentpriorities. The participants, however, saw this as an opportunity to talk about much more than justdevelopment.Theybegancondemningtheirnewgovernmentfor“misguidedbehavior”and“cooperationagreements with foreign armies,” and they demanded the opening of political space.20 Kabila soonsuspendedthewholeinitiativeandadoptedamoretop-downapproachtowarddevelopment.“During that first yearwe started a dozen projects and finished almost none,”DidierMumengi, the

formerinformationminister,toldme.“Kabilawassurroundedbypeoplewithnoexperience.Wedidn’thaveanymoney.AndtheRwandanswerestillthere,lookingoverhisshoulder.”Mumengishookhishead.“Kabilawasamanwhoneededtobehelped.Buthewasn’t.”Ononeoccasion,thepresidentdecidedhewantedtocreatea“canteenforthepeople,”wherethepoorcouldcomeandeat.Mumengisaidhetriedtodissuade him, saying that itwould not be feasible, but the president insisted. “Thepeople are hungry!Theyhavearighttoeat,”hetoldthem.21“Theamountofmoneywewastedonbagsofcornandbeans!”Mumengiremembered.“Thatwasmisguidedsocialism.”

Lastly,wehavetounderstandthetimewarpthatKabilawasin.Fordecades,hehadsethiscompasstothe coldwar divide, preaching against the neocolonial domination ofAfrica by theUnited States. Topeoplewhomethimintheearlydaysofhispresidency, itwasasif thefallof theBerlinWallandthecollapseoftheSovietUnionhadpassedhimby;hegavetheimpressionofarevolutionaryfossilizedinthe1960s.Hehadcomeofageduringtheanti-westernsocialistrebellionsthatsweptthroughAfricajustafter independence.ThewritingsofKwameNkrumah,MaoTsetung,WalterRodney, andFrantzFanonlined his bookshelf; after he took power he continued to call his associates “comrade” (although,apparentlynoneofthemwasallowedtoreciprocate).22Tomakemattersworse,KabilawassaddledwithquestionsaboutthemassacreofRwandanrefugees.

According to his advisors, he initially thought this, too, was an American conspiracy to smear hisrevolutionarygovernment.OnlylaterdidhecometorealizethatRPFtroopshadcarriedoutsystematickillings.23In all his early interactions with western diplomats as head of state, the refugee crisis dominated

discussions. Immediately after he was sworn in, all contacts with the Congo’s traditional donors—Belgium,theUnitedStates,theUnitedKingdom,andFrance—focusedontheallegedmassacres.Thedayof his inauguration, the UN Security Council issued a statement calling for “an immediate end to theviolence against refugees in the country” and demanded full access for the UN human rights teams.24President Bill Clinton dispatchedUNAmbassador Bill Richardson tomeet withKabila several dayslater.HeobtainedyetanotherpromisetoallowtheUNinvestigatorsintothecountry,butKabilaturnedaroundseveraldayslateranddismissedtheinitiativeasa“Frenchinspiredsmearcampaign.”25ThefirstUNreportonthemassacreswaspublishedinJanuary1997inthemidstoftherebellionand

prompted Kabila to block any further investigations. Kabila eventually accepted the deployment ofanother team, but this time demanded that they be accompanied by Congolese officials, whose tripexpenseswould be $1.7million per day, higher than theworking costs of any governmentministry.26When the team finally deployed to the field in early 1998, they were met on several occasions by“spontaneous”mobsoflocalsarmedwithmachetesandspears.TheUnitedNationsfinallyabandoneditseffortsinApril1998.Therefugeequestionhelpedsnuffoutanychanceforrebuildingthecountry.Donorsdidn’twanttogive

thenewgovernment thewrongmessage andmade funds conditional upona serious investigation.Thisattitudecontributedtoaviciouscircle.Kabiladefaultedonhispromisesofhumanrightsandgovernance,prompting aid to be cut, which led to a further radicalization of the regime. When the World Bankconvenedadonors’meetinginBrusselsinDecember1997,Kabilaaskedfor$575milliontohelprebuildthe country but received a mere $32 million. Eritrean president Isaias Afeworki visited Washingtonaround the same time and urged theUnited States not to give up onKabila, warning that it could bedisastrous,thatKabilaneededtobehelped.“Kabilastinks,”hetoldU.S.officials,“butyouhavetojustholdyournoseandengage.”27Theydidn’t.Toadd insult to injury, theWorldBank informed thenewgovernment that theyowed$14billion in

debtsthatMobutuhadaccumulatedovertheyears,debtsonwhichinterestwouldhavetobepaideachyear.Forthenewgovernment,itwastheheightofhypocrisythattheywouldhavetopaybackmoneythathadservedlargelytoenrichMobutu’scroniesanddestroythecountry.Kabila,feelingletdown,lambastedthe“embargo”westerncountrieshadimposedontheCongo.With

littlemoney in his coffers and a collapsed economy,Kabila had to rely on donations from his allies,

including$10millionamonthfromZimbabwe,andonthestrengthofdiamondexports,themainsourceofCongo’sforeigncurrency.28

Likeacardrivenbyalearnernotyetusedtoaclutch,thegovernmentlurchedclumsilyfromonepolicyinitiativetoanother.Onethingwassure,however.Foramanwhowasinitiallyperceivedasapuppetofforeign interests,Kabila leftnodoubt thathewas incharge.Duringhis firstyear inpower,hehadnofewer than seven ministers arrested, as well as the self-styled commander in chief of the army, twodirectors of his intelligence agency, and thegovernor andvicegovernor of theCentralBank.Heusedjusticeasatoolofdisciplininghisassociatesathisdiscretion,notasameansofenforcingthelaw.Therewere rarely any trials or verdicts, and the arrests were usually short-lived. It is possible that theaccusationsagainsttheaccusedwerewell-founded,asreportsofembezzlementplaguedKabila’svariousadministrations.HehimselfwasknowntosaythattheAFDLwasa“conglomerateofcrooks.”Intheend,however,herealizedthatloyaltywasmoreimportantthanintegrity,andheusedthearrestsasameansofremindinghissubordinatesofhispower,nottoimposeaccountability.Kabila’sidiosyncraticstyleextendedtohispersonalizedmanagementofstatefunds.Hewasknownto

keeplargestashesofmoneyathisresidence,wherehewoulddoleoutstacksofbillstovisitors.Inearly1998,whenthegovernmenttriedtocontractaSwedishcompanytoprinttheCongolesefrancasthenewcurrency,theministeroffinancecomplainedtheydidn’thavethefunds.Kabilatoldhimnottoworry—hewouldgetthemoneyathome.Whenhecameback,hebroughtmorethan$1millionincashwithhimtocovertheexpenses.29Similarly,whenhisassistantsbroughttohisattentionthatCongolesestudentsinthediasporawererunningoutofstipendstopaytheir tuition,he took$1millionoutofhissafe tofoot thebill.“Hedidn’tkeeprecordsanddidn’taskforinvoicesorreceipts,”rememberedMoiseNyarugabo,hispersonalassistantatthetime.“Itwasadisaster.”Kabilahadadisdainforinstitutionsintendedtooverseetheexecutiveandholdhimincheck.Forover

twoyearsafterhetookpower,therewasnoParliamentorofficialbudget,nomeansbywhichtoholdthegovernmentaccountableforitsactions.“ThemeansbywhichmoneylefttheCentralBankandwenttopayfor state projects or for salarieswas an uttermystery to us,” rememberedMabiMulumba, the auditorgeneral.30 According to some formerAFDL officials, up to half of the country’s fundsweremanageddirectlybyKabila.31Perhapsthefunniest,albeitnotmostreliable,storyaboutKabila’spersonalbankingsystemcomesfrom

DeoBugera,theheadofhispoliticalpartywhodefectedtojoinanewrebellionagainstKabilain1998.LikesomanyoftheapocryphalstoriessurroundingKabila,itisworthretelling,inpartbecauseitcouldwellbetrue,butalsobecauseitwaspartof theconstantlygrowingandincreasinglysurrealmythologyaboutthenewregime.According toBugera, adelegationofmilitaryofficials fromvarious southernAfricancountrieswas

visitingKinshasatoseehowtheformationofthenewarmywasproceeding.ManycountrieshadinvestedinthisprojectbysendingofficerstohelptrainthenewrecruitsandintegrateCongo’sfracturedmilitias.During a longmeetingwithKabila, aTanzanian commander excusedhimself, sayinghehad touse thetoilet.Kabilalookedaroundsheepishlyandfinallyorderedabodyguardtofindthekeyforthetoilet.Thebodyguardranabout,butwasunabletocomeupwiththekey.Finally,theTanzanianwastakentoatoiletin another building much further away. After their meeting was finished, Kabila reprimanded his

bodyguardwithalaugh,fishingakeyoutofhispocket:“Youidiot!Ihadthekeythewholetime!Allmymoneyisstoredinthattoilet—Icouldn’tlethiminthere!”

Aftersixmonthsinpower,bytheendof1997,Kabilawasbecomingincreasinglyworriedforhis life.Nothing seemed to be working—his quixotic plans for the country were stymied by disorganizationaroundhimandhisownerraticbehavior.Thecoffersofthestatewereempty,anddonorswerereluctanttogivemoneytotheregime.Atthesametime,theRwandanmilitaryhadpermeatedthesecurityservicesin Kinshasa. A Rwandan, Captain David, was Kabila’s main bodyguard and accompanied himeverywhere—heheldhisglasses,hisnotebook,andhispenforhim.HestoodinfrontofhisdoorwhenMzee slept. He rode in the front seat of the presidential car. Another Rwandan, Captain FrancisGakwerere,was the commanderof thepresidential guard.Rumorsof coupattempts filtered through toKabilaregularly,fuelinghisparanoia.The population was also becoming increasingly discontent with the Rwandan presence in the city.

Kabila’sAFDL soldiers,most ofwhomwere from conservative, rural backgrounds, cracked downonwhattheysawaslewdanddisrespectfulbehavior,arrestingwomenforwearingtightdressesandpullingpeopleoutoftaxisif theyexceededthelegalpassengerlimit.Everywherechildsoldierscouldbeseencaning people splayed out on the asphalt for minor violations. It was as if they were trying to beatproprietyintoKinshasa’sinhabitants.The situation was volatile; Kabila’s paranoia became a self-fulfilling prophecy. By early 1998,

diplomats and government officials in Luanda, Kinshasa, Kigali, and Kampala were already fuelingrumorsaboutKabila’s imminentdemiseandwonderingwhowouldreplacehim.Tiredofhiswhimsiesandmonopolizationofpower,formeralliesbeganplottingagainsthim.MoiseNyarugabo,aTutsifromSouthKivuwhohadbeenhispersonalassistant,wasoneofmanyTutsi

to fall outwithMzee soon after they arrived inKinshasa.Onemorning shortly after his inauguration,KabilacalledNyarugabo intohisoffice,wherehewaspreparinga listofpeople forhis first cabinet.Accordingtohim,Kabilatoldhimwithoutpreamble:“Look, Ican’tmakeyouminister,as thatwouldbe twoTutsi inmycabinet. I’mverysorry.Youcan

leavenow.”Twoweekslater,NyarugabofoundoutthroughfriendsthathehadbeennamedasthedeputydirectorofagovernmentbodychargedwithexpropriatingstategoodsthathadbeenstolenbyMobutists.“Wehadbeentogetherthewholedayandhehadn’thadthegutstotellme!Thatday,Idecidedtofight

him.”NyarugabostormedintoKabila’soffice.“Look,Excellency, ifIbotheryoubecauseIamTutsi,Ican

leaveyou—it’snotaproblem.Butwhydidyounameallofthesepeopletoyourcabinetwhowerenotwithuswhenwewerebeingattacked?IhidwithyouundertableswhenMobutuwasbombingus!Iwasloyaltoyou!”ByNovember1997,justsixmonthsafterKabilatookpower,NyarugaboandotherTutsiwerereaching

outtoMobutu’soustedgeneralsandformerministersinBrazzavilleandEurope.Itwasn’tdifficulttofindpeople opposed toKabila andwilling to fund a new uprising. In the end, LaurentKabilawould onlypresideoverapeacefulcountryforfifteenmonths,fromMay1997toAugust1998,beforeanotherwarwouldbreakoutintheeastofthecountry.“ItwasobviousbythenthatKabilahadtogo,”Nyarugabosaid.“Italkedtoseveralpeople,including

Bugera.Theeasiestoptionwouldhavebeenacoupd’état.But—believeitornot—atthatpointRwandadidn’twanttodothat.Itwouldhavebeeneasy!Butforsomereason,theydidn’twanttogothatfar.Notyet.”32

PARTIII

THESECONDWAR

13

ONEWARTOOMANY

Nomatterhowhardyouthrowadeadfishinthewater,itstillwon’tswim.—CONGOLESESAYING

RUHENGERI,RWANDA,ANDKINSHASA,CONGO,AUGUST1998

ThewartotoppleMobutuhadcreatedserioussecurityproblemsbackinRwanda.TheRwandanarmy’sattackontherefugeecampscausedhundredsofthousandsofrefugeestostreambackintotheircountry.The authorities there knew that this influx would create trouble, as their enemies would seize theopportunity to infiltrate. “We had a discussion about what to do with them,” Vice President Kagameexplained.“Wethink that it isbetter for themtocomeandwefight themhere, [where]wecancontainthem. And you don’t get problems with the international community for fighting them outside yourcountry.”1Between10,000and15,000enemysoldiersenteredintonorthwesternRwandain themonthsfollowingtheinvasion.2These insurgents sparked theworst fighting the country had seen since the genocide. By the end of

1997, the northwest region was in upheaval, suffering dozens of insurgent attacks eachmonth againstgovernmentinstallations.Theinsurgentsalsotargetedgovernmentofficialsandsympathizersinanefforttointimidatethepopulationintosupportingthem.Theinfiltrators,however,weremilitarilyweakanddidn’ttrytoengageinconventionalbattleswiththe

government.Instead,theyadoptedterrortactics,killinghundredsofTutsi,especiallyCongoleserefugeeswhowereeasytargetsinmakeshiftrefugeecampsclosetotheCongoleseborder.BetweenJanuary1997andAugust1998,thousandsofcivilianswerekilledbyboththeRwandanarmyandtheinsurgentsasthetacticsofinsurgencyandcounterinsurgencybecameincreasinglybloody.GeneralPaulRwarakabijehimselfhadinfiltratedacrosstheRwandanborderinJuly1997andbecome

theoperational commanderof the insurgency, based around the townofNyamutera. “Ourheadquarterswasmobile,”heexplained.“Weneverspenttoolonginoneplace,butmovedaround,sleepinginthehutsoflocalsympathizers.”3Theinsurgentsheldmeetings in localschoolsatnightandbrought theirofficealong,transportingofficialletterhead,stamps,andmapswiththem.Theyavoidedusingwalkie-talkiesforfear of being detected or overheard. Instead, Rwarakabije and his comrades relied heavily on locals,sendingletterswithoperationalordersvialocalfarmersormarketwomen,whothenpassedthemontoothersympathizers.The insurgents were initially popular among some locals in northwestern Rwanda. This was the

heartland of President Habyarimana’s regime, fromwhere he andmany in his government came. The

insurgentssometimesreferredtothemselvesaslesfilsduvieux—thesonsoftheoldman(Habyarimana).Manyof thevillagers therewere returnees fromthecamps inZaireandstillharboreddeepresentmentagainst theRPF for overthrowing “their” government and for themassacres carried out in the refugeecamps.Theyarticulatedtheirgrievancesinmessianicterms—evangelismhadfoundfertilegroundinthecamps,andpreachershadbeentoutingtheirpeople’sreturntothepromisedland.Thecommandersgavetwooftheiroperationalsectorsthecodenames“Nazareth”and“Bethlehem.”4ThustheRwandancivilwarstartedupagain,afterahiatusofthreeyears.Thesamecommandersfaced

offagainonthebattlefield,onlythistimeKagame’stroopswereinpowerinKigali,andHabyarimana’sformer armywas hiding in banana groves and eucalyptuswoods.TheTutsi-ledRwandan government,intimately familiarwith the dangers of such an insurgency, having come to power on the back of onethemselves, respondedwithoverwhelming force.Theydeployed thousandsof troops to the region andbeganruthlesscounterinsurgencyoperations.Theirfirstprioritywastoconvincethepopulationthattheywouldsuffermore if theycollaboratedwith their enemy than if theydidn’t.According tohuman rightsreports,theycordonedoffareas,roundeduppeasantssuspectedtobeinconnivancewiththerebels,andthenbeat and shotmanyof them.Someof their victimswere probablyworkingwith the rebels;manyotherswerenot.5Inearly1998,Rwarakabijenoticedastrangedevelopment.Soldiersinhisrankswerequietlydefecting

andgoingtoaCongolesearmytrainingcampinRumangabo,justacrosstheborderfromwherehewasoperating.Atthesametime,CongoleseofficersbasedintheeasternCongowerebaffledbyinstructionsthatwerecomingfromKabila’sarmyheadquartersinKinshasa.“TheRwandancommanderswhowerebased with us were busy day and night fighting the ex-FAR and Interahamwe,” a senior Congoleseintelligenceofficerrecalled,“butatthesametime,KabilasentadelegationinJune1998toinstructustosendall theex-FARprisonerswehadtoamilitarybaseinthesouthofthecountry.Weheardfromourfriendstherethattheseex-FARwerebeingfreedandtrainedintheCongolesearmy.Wewerefloored!”6PresidentKabilahadmadehismove.Inhismind,ifhewaitedtoolong,theRwandansandCongolese

Tutsiwouldremovehimfrompower.Intheearlymonthsof1998,Kabila’sarmywasaloosepasticheofkadogo,KatanganTigers,andnewrecruits.TheAngolans,Ugandans,andRwandans,whohadbeenthebackbone of his rebellion, had mostly returned to their countries. He needed his own force, and indesperationhedrewon the largest,most determinedmercenary troops available in the region: the ex-FAR,Habyarimana’sformerarmy,whichhisAFDLrebellionhadsoughttodefeat.Itwasadealwiththedevil,onethatprecipitatedRwanda’snewinvasion.

MalikKijege,thehighest-rankingCongoleseTutsiintheKinshasagarrison,wasinafoulmood.InJuly1998,LaurentKabilasackedColonelJamesKabarebe,theRwandanofficerwhohadbeencommanderoftheCongolesearmy,andaskedallRwandantroopstoleavethecountry.ThedepartureoftheRwandansleftthearmywithoutarealleaderatamomentwhenhostilityagainstTutsiinKinshasawasmountingandtensionsbetweenKinshasaandKigaliwereescalating.GeneralCelestinKifwa,thenewcommander,wasoversixtyyearsoldandincompetent.Theycalledhimafetisheur,awitchdoctor,asitwasrumoredthathebelievedinmagicpotionsandinconsultingtheancestorstomakedecisions.WhenhearrivedtotakeoverhisofficefromhisRwandanpredecessor,heallegedlybroughtagoatwithhimthatheproceededtoslaughtersoastochaseawaytheevilspirits.Hehadhardlybeenseeninpublicsincehisnomination.For

MalikKijege,thiswasprobablyagoodthing.OneofKifwa’sbodyguardshadshotaTutsisoldierdeadthedaybeforeduringanargument.ThelesshegottoseeofKifwa,thebetter.Anti-TutsisentimentwasquicklyspreadingthroughKinshasa,whippedupbyKabila’spoliticiansbut

also fed by the beatings and humiliations that residents of the capital had endured at the hands of theRwandans. Congolese police and soldiers evicted dozens of Rwandan soldiers from apartments indowntownKinshasa,tookthemtotheairport,andputthemonplanesforKigali.TheenthusiasmoftheseCongolese security forces quickly boiled over; they began harassing and attacking Tutsi civilians andCongolesesoldiers,prompting the justiceminister toappearonnational television, instructingsoldiersnottobotherTutsicivilians.Malik Kijege was well acquainted with the kind of mob violence that anti-Tutsi sentiment could

provoke.Duringasimilarfrenzyin1996,soldiershadshotandkilledhisauntinthestreetinBukavu.“Everytimethereistrouble,youcanexpectthecraziestotakeitoutonus,”herecalled.7Athome,hestillkeptacopyofatapedistributedbyex-FARdemagoguesintherefugeecamps,exhortingBantupeopletorise up and chase theTutsi down theNileRiver back toEthiopia,where they claimed theTutsi camefrom.Malikbegan to reachout tootherTutsi soldiers,whoweredispersed throughoutKinshasa’svarious

militarycamps.Incaseoftrouble,hethought,itwouldbesmartforthemtoassembleinoneplacetofindsafety in numbers. “When the Rwandans left, we stayed behind,” he said. “We thought we wereCongolese,notRwandan.Wehadfoughtthewarsoastodefendourcitizenship.Weweren’tabouttobeforcedontoaplanetogotoKigali.”OneeveningshortlyafterthedepartureofRwandantroops,GeneralYavNawej,thenewlyappointed

commanderofKinshasa, telephoned after heheard thatKijegewas assemblingTutsi soldiers. “Malik!Whereareyou?”Hebarkedathim.“I’mathome.”“Getyourweapons.IamcomingtodisarmyoutotaketoyoutoMakala[thecentralprison].Don’task

mewhy—that’sanorder!”“General,Icameherewithmyweapon,andIamgoingtoleavewithit.”“That’samutiny!”“Ihavearighttoself-defense,General.”“Getreadythen.Iamcoming.”8Shortly afterwards, Malik received another phone call from General Jean-Claude Mabila, another

commander leading military operations in the capital. He threatened that he would come and disarmMalikwithatank.ThatmadeMaliklaugh:“Howdoyoudisarmacoupleofsoldierswithatank?”Malikwasworriedthatthelackofaclearchainofcommandwouldallowsoldierstotakethelawinto

theirownhandsandbeginattackingTutsisoldiersinthecapital.CongolesetroopshadchafedunderthecommandofRwandans,whotogetherwithCongoleseTutsihadformedanelitecliquewithintheAFDL.TheywereitchingforachancetogetbackattheTutsi.According to Malik, he called Joseph Kabila, the president’s son, who was in China undergoing

military training. The young army officer, just twenty-seven at the time, reassuredMalik that he knewtherewereproblemsinthegovernment.Hesoundedworried.“I’llbebackinthreedays,”hepromisedhim.“Threedaysistoolong,”Malikanswered.ByAugust2,Malikhadbeenabletoassemble586TutsisoldiersinanimprovisedbattalionatCamp

Tshatshi,alargemilitarycampinKinshasa.“Iknewexactlyhowmanytheywere;Icountedthem.”Hisfoulmoodbegan to lift. In frontofhim,on theparadegrounds,he inspected the troops.They stoodat

attention in lines of twenty, their hands flat by their sides.Somedidn’t haveboots; others didn’t havewholeuniforms.TheyweremostlyyoungTutsirecruitswhohadjoinedin1996:students,peasants,andcowherdswhohadjoinedtofightfortheircommunityandtofindadventure.Mostofthemhadendedupwalking across the country, fightingMobutu’s troops, ex-FAR, and Serbianmercenaries from town totown.“Theywereinexperienced,butthemoralewashigh,”Malikremembered.“Wehadakeyadvantage:

Wewereunited;wewerefightingforoursurvival.Theotherswerejustbandits.”Thatnightthefightingstarted,heraldingthebeginningofthesecondcongowar.

DidierMumengiwasawakenedat4o’clockinthemorningonAugust3byheavyshooting.9Helayawakefor awhilewith a sinking feeling inhis stomachashe listened to the call-and-responseof aboomingmortarandstaccatomachinegunfire.Itwasonlyayearsincehehadreturnedtothecountryafterseveraldecades living in Brussels, where he had spent most of his life studying, writing, and moving in thecirclesoftheCongolesepoliticalopposition.Amonthbefore,thethirty-six-year-oldhadbeenappointedinformationministerbyLaurentKabila.At4:30hisclunkyTelecelphonerang.TheCongowasoneof thefirstcountries inAfrica tohavea

mobile phone network, as a result of the absence ofworking landlines.Anybodyof importance in thecapitalhadaTelecelphone,adevicethesizeofamilkcartonwitharubberantennaattachedtoit.Thereweresofewnumbersthattheirownerscouldwritealltheimportantonesonthebackofanenvelopeormemorizethem.“Didier!”Kabila’sbaritonerangout.“Yes,Excellency.”“Weareunderattack.YouhavetogototheVoiceofthePeople[thenationalradiostation]andtalkto

thecountry.It’simportanttocalmpeopledown.Tellthemwehavethesituationundercontrol.”“Yes,Excellency.Whoisattackingus?”Thepresidentpaused.“Justtelltheminciviques—bandits.”Mumengiquicklygotdressedandjumpedinhisofficialcar.Onhiswaytotheradiostation,hehadto

doublebackseveraltimesandtakesideroadstoavoidcannonfire.Hismindwasracingashetriedtothinkofwhathewouldtellthecountry;hehadnoideawhatwasgoingon.Whoexactlywasattacking?Wasthislinkedtothepresident’sevictionoftheRwandancontingentseveraldaysbefore?At 5:30 he finally reached the radio station, a nineteen-story, decrepit building surrounded by an

asphaltnetworkofmajorthoroughfares.Heracedinthebackdoorandupthestairstotheradiostudio.Allthesoldierswhohadbeenpostedtherehadfled,knowingthatthebuildingwasaprimetargetforanymutineers.(Thefirstmoveinamilitaryputschisusuallytoseizetheradioandtelevisionstationsinorderto control popular sentiment and encourage desertions.) The place was deserted. The usual smell ofsewagewaftedupthroughthecementstairwell, litbyflickeringneonlights.Heheardanoisefromthebroadcastingroom:Thejournalistsonnightshifthadbarricadedthemselvesintherewhenthefightinghadstarted. Amanwith shaky hands opened the door whenMumengi told themwho he was. One of thejournalistshaddiedofheartfailure;theotherswerevisiblydistressed.MumengitoldthemtoholdonasherusheddownthestairsagainandacrossthestreettotheKokolo

militarycamp,thelargestbarracksinKinshasa.Thesunwasjustcomingup,andotherthanafewdogsand some laundry flapping in the breeze, there was no movement among the rows of cement houses.

Mumengifinallyfoundonedesolateoldman,whodidn’trecognizehimandwasn’tabletotellhimwhowas in charge. “The place had completely fallen apart!” Mumengi remembered. “Most soldiers hadmovedoutandrentedtheirhousestocivilians,whowerecoweringundertheirbeds!Partoftheparadegroundshadbeenturnedintocassavafields!”Finally,Mumengireachedbyphoneacousinwhowasageneralinthearmy.Hepromisedtocomeas

soonaspossiblewithreinforcements.Mumengirushedbacktotheradiostudiotoaddressthenation.ForMumengi, who was known for his flowery speeches, it was one of his less inspired performances:“Citizens, patriots. Do not leave your houses, and stay calm. Inciviques are troubling public order. Iassureyouthatthearmyhasfullcontrolofthesituationandwillreestablishordersoon.”Thenhehadthetechniciansplaysomemellowmusic.Hehadlied.Thearmydidn’tcontrolanything.AsMumengilefttheradiobuildingwithhiscousinand

hurriedtothepresidentialpalace,theysawthestreetsweredeserted.Mortarandmachinegunfirewaspassingoverheadwithoutanyobvioustarget.Hiscousin,thearmygeneral,shookhishead:“It’samess.Acompletemess.”

Kabila receivedMumengiat theheliportbehindhispresidentialpalace.Hewaswearingadarksafarisuit and flip-flops and holding a walkie-talkie. Grinning, he satMumengi down in the middle of theconcretelandingpad.“Didier,”hesaid,“first,don’tworry.We’llsurvive.Wewilllivethroughthis.”Insteadofcomforting

him,thepresident’swordshadtheoppositeeffect.Hethoughthisbosshadlostit.Thepresidentialpalacewasonly severalhundredyards from theTshatshimilitarycampwhereMalikhaddughimself in.Theheavyartilleryfirewasdeafening.Astheyspoke,Mumengicouldhearbulletswhistleoverhead.Given thecircumstances,Kabilawascuriously jovial.“Look,myson,”hestarted.Mumengi’s father

hadbeeninvolvedintherebellionofthe1960sandhadknownLaurentKabila.Overthepastfewmonths,Mumengihadgrownclosetothepresident,whowouldoftencallhimtodiscusspolicy.TopeoplearoundKabila,hewasknownas l’enfantcheriofMzee.“OurRwandanfriendshavealwaysdominatedus. ItwaslikethisunderMobutu—theypushedhimtoundergoZairianization,whichtheybenefitedfrom!Theyaskedhimtosignadecreethatmadeallimmigrantsintocitizens.Isthatnormal?TheTutsiintheeasthadeverything,whiletheCongolesewerestuckwithnothing.”Thefirefightcrescendoedaroundthem.Mumengisuggestedtheygoinsidethethickcementwallsofhis

residence,butKabilarefused,sayingthathispresenceoutsidewouldreassurehissoldiers,thedozensofyoungmenmanningtheparapetsofhispalaceingreenfatigues.Hetookhiswalkie-talkieandcalledoneofhiscommanders,“GeneralMabila!Whyareyoufiringthecannon?It’snotwithartillerythatyouwillgetthem!Attackonfoot!”He looked back atMumengi, whowas shaken by the fighting surrounding them. “You know, Japan

dominatedChina.Thatisnormal.ButIwillnotletourgreatcountrybedominatedbyitstinyneighbor.Canatoadswallowanelephant?No!”KabilainstructedMumengitogobacktotheradioandspeaktothepeople,tomotivatethem.“Wewill

survivewith theforceof thepeople—youhavetorally thembehindus.Wedon’thaveanarmy,sowewillneedthem.Inthemeantime,Iwillgolookforallies.”Hecalledoneofhisbodyguardsandaskedforhispistol.“Doyouhaveagun?”Mumengihadneverusedagunbefore.“Here.Youmustusethis.From

todayon,youwillbetheministerofwar!”

Meanwhile, theRwandanshad takencontrolofmuchof theeasternCongo inamatterofhours.WhileColonelKabarebehadbeencommanderoftheCongolesearmy,hehadprepositionedunitsloyaltohimwithstockpilesofweaponsintheeasternCongo.Whenhewassacked,hegaveorderstotheseunitstorebelagainstKabila.WithsupportofRwandantroopswhocrossedtheborder,theytookcontrolofGomaandBukavuandbeganadvancingonKisangani.Hubris canbreed fantastic courage.After taking theborder towns,ColonelKabarebedecided togo

straightfor thejugularbyleapfroggingKabila’sramshacklearmyandattackingthecapital,1,000milesaway.Itwasoneofthemostdaringoperationsintheregion’smilitaryhistory.The“Kitonaairlift”isstilltalkedaboutbyforeignmilitaryattachésandCongolesearmycommanders

alike.AU.S. officer based in the region laterwrote in amilitary journal:“Thiswas an operation thatexemplifiedaudacityandcourage,anditsaftermathbecameanodysseyfitforaHollywoodscript.”10Kabarebe commandeered a Boeing 707 at the Goma airport and loaded one hundred and eighty

Rwandan,Ugandan,andCongolesesoldiersonboardwithweaponsandammunition.“Everybodywantedto get a piece of the action,” remembered a senior Congolese military officer who participated.“Mobutu’sformersoldierswereoutragedattheirhumiliationbyKabila,andtheTutsiwantedtogetbackat thegovernment for the treatmentof their relatives inKinshasa.”11Soldiersdeserted from theirunitsaroundGomaandshowedupat theairportonce theygotwordof theoperation.KabarebeputabrashRwandancommandercalledButerainchargeofthefirstplanetoleave.Itcouldhave indeedbeenascene fromamovie:WithButerabrandishinghispistolbehindhim, the

distraught pilot flew 1,000miles across the country, over the capital to theKitonamilitary base, 250mileswestofKinshasaonthemouthoftheCongoRiver.12MostofthesoldiersontheflighthadnoideathatthecommanderoftheKitonabasehadsecretlydefectedtotheRwandanside—theyexpectedtolandinahailofbullets.AhundredandeightysoldiersnervouslygrippedtheirAK-47sandlookedwarilyattheflightsafetycardsintheirseatpockets.Inthebackoftheaisle,stackedtotheroof,weredozensofwoodencratesofammunition.ThesoldiersspokeLuganda,Swahili,Kinyarwanda,English,andFrenchwitheachother.Outsidethewindow,theybrokethroughthethickcloudcovertoseetherollinghillsofBas-CongoprovinceandtheCongoRiversnakingplacidlytowardtheAtlanticocean.Afterathree-hourflight,thelonglandingstripofKitonaairbasecameintoview.Despitethepistol-wavingRwandanbehindhim,thepilotbegantocomplainthattheywouldbekilledif

they landed at the heavily fortified airbase. “Don’t worry,” Butera said. “We have our people at theairport.”Using the pilot’s high-frequency radio, he programmed a frequency he said belonged to theircommanderontheground.AsurprisinglyclearvoicerespondedtohiscallincalmEnglish:“Allclear,afande. You can land.” What the pilot did not know was that the radio Butera was calling actuallybelongedtohisdeputycommander,whowaslounginginaseatatthebackoftheplane.13WhenKabarebe had been chief of staff of theCongolese army, he had studied oldBelgianmilitary

mapsoftheregionclosely.Kitonawasanobviouschoiceforseveralreasons.KinshasawasconnectedtotheAtlanticOceanbyanarrowlandcorridor.AlmostallcargogoingtoKinshasahadtopassthroughthisumbilicalcord, at the head ofwhich satKitona. Themilitary base also had a long airstrip that couldaccommodateaircraftweighinguptofifty-fourtons.ItsbarracksnowhousedthousandsofformerMobutu

soldierswhohadbeensent there for reeducation.Their livingconditionswere terrible—hundredshaddiedfromcholeraandmalnutrition—and,despitetheirnotoriousdisciplinaryproblems,theywouldneedlittleconvincingtojoininthefightagainstKabila.Lastly,KitonawasclosetotheIngaDam,thelargesthydroelectricdamincentralAfrica,whichsuppliedthecapitalwithmostofitselectricity.As the plane touched down, a few Kabila loyalists managed to shoot its nose tire out, but the

commanderoftheairportbattalionquicklydefectedtotheRwandansideasplannedandbroughthismenundercontrol,allowingthetroopstodisembark.Theairportwastakenwithbarelyanycasualties.BackinKinshasa,Kabilafumedasheheardaboutthe

airlift.“Whatkindofcountryisthis?”heaskedhisadvisors,imaginingtheairplaneflyingoverhead.“Wedon’tevenhaveanairforce?”TheadvisorscalledtheircommanderinKitonatoorderhimtostopthelandinginKitona,buttheseditiousofficeronlyrespondedwithinsults.14It was a huge victory for the Rwandans, who could now send reinforcements to take Kinshasa.

Overjoyed,ButerasetuphissatellitephoneonthetarmacandcalledbacktoKigali.SometimeseventheRwandansfoulthingsup:Buterahadforgottentotakedownthepincodeforthe

satellitephone,withoutwhichitwasuseless.InKigali,hiscommandingofficerswaitedinvainforwordfrom theyoungsoldier,whilehe tried frantically topunch indifferent six-digit combinations.No luck.(Thecorrectcodewasapparently123456.)ThepilotalsofailedtoreachKigalionhishamradio.15Buterahadtofindtheclosestmeansofcommunication:anoilriginthenearbytownofBanana.Finally,

after hours of searching, he found an oil engineer with a satellite phone who, with a bit of coaxing,allowedhimtocallhome.Sheepishly,hetoldhisbosseshehadmadeit.

Who had made the first move in sparking the war? From interviews with Rwandans and Congoleseinvolved inplanning thewar, it isnotclearwhetherKabilabegan recruitingex-FARbeforeKabarebebegandeployinghisboys to theeast.What is clear is that, afteronlya fewmonthsofKabilabeing inpower, both sides realized that their relationship was going sour, driven by Kabila’s paranoia andRwanda’s obsessionwith control. DidierMumengi remembered, “The Rwandans in Kinshasawere atimebomb.Itwasclearthat theywereaproblem,butat thesametimetheyhelpeduskeepthecountrytogether.Itwasgoingtobehardtogetridofthemandstillmaintainagriponthearmyandintelligenceservices.”ForKigali,atatimewhenthenorthwestofRwandawasconsumedbytheresumptionofabittercivil

war,Kabila’s recruitmentof its enemyconstituted a strategic threat aswell as apersonal betrayal. Itsreaction,however,wasaprimeexampleofthehubristhathadcometocharacterizetheregime.InsteadofcreatingabufferzoneintheeastofthecountryandusingmultilateralpressuretodealwithKabila,Kigalidecidedtosingle-handedlyremovehimfrompower,presumablytoinstallanew,friendlierproxyinhisplace.ItissurprisingthatRwandaapparentlydidnotconferwithAngola,whichhadplayedamajorrolein

topplingMobutu,before launchinganoperation justmiles fromitsborder.According toPresidentDosSantos, President Museveni informed him of his government’s plans several days after the Kitonaoperation. Although the Rwandan government insists that it did have the green light, other Angolanofficialsandforeigndiplomatsagreethat,attheverymost,KigalihadinformedAngolabuthadnottriedtoobtaintheirapprovalorcollaboration.16WhenKabarebe landedseveral thousandRwandansoldiers

withinearshotofAngolanterritory,thereactioninLuandawas,accordingtotheU.S.ambassadorthereatthetime,“WhatthehellaretheseRwandansdoing?That’sourbackyard.”17SomeAngolancommandershadbeenrubbedthewrongwaybytheRwandansafterhelpingbringKabilatopowerayearearlier.“Ithadbeeneverybody’svictory,notjustRwanda’s,”commentedanAngolanofficerwhowantedtoremainanonymous.“ButtheyactedliketheywereinchargeinKinshasa.”18

With amutiny festering in the slums ofKinshasa, and rebels advancing rapidly from thewest,Kabilaknewthathewouldnotbeable toholdoutwithout thesupportof theregion.Aregionalsummitof theSouthAfricanDevelopmentCommunitywasquicklycalled,andRwanda,Uganda,Congo,Angola,andZimbabwegloweredateachotheracrossatablewithoutcomingtoaconclusion.Itwasadecisivemomentinthewar.In1996,almostthewholeregionhadjumpedonthebandwagon

againstMobutu,whileworldpowers looked theotherway. It hadbeen a continentalwar, inspiredbysecurityinterestsbutalsobyideology.In1998,theoddswerestackeddifferently.Theregionsplitdownthemiddle,withRwanda,Uganda,andBurundiononesideandAngola,Namibia,Chad,andZimbabweontheother.Thistime,themotivesfordeployedtroopswerelessnoble.Zimbabwe’spresident,RobertMugabe,for

example,wasof thesamegenerationasLaurentKabilaandhadprovidedarmsandmoneyfor thefirstwar effort; Kabila still owed him somewhere between $40 and $200 million dollars for this firstengagement.19More importantly,hisownbesiegedgovernmentwas frayingat theedgesaftereighteenyears in power. Amixture of corruption, poor economicmanagement, and the expropriation of 1,500whitefarmshadpromptedfoodriots,afiscalcrisis,andinternationalopprobrium.Asexpensiveasthemilitary adventure in the Congo was, it also offered many much-needed business opportunities forMugabe’s innercabal.Shortlyafter topplingMobutu,hisstateammunitionfactoryobtaineda$500,000contract fromKabila’s government, a Zimbabwean businessman extended a loan for $45million, andbusinessmen close toMugabe began negotiating potentially lucrative transport, food, andmining dealswith the Congolese.20When Rwanda attempted anew to overthrow the regime in Kinshasa, this timewithoutrallyingaregionalalliancearoundthem,Mugabesawhisinvestmentsinjeopardy.Angola’s interestsweremuchmore related to its twenty-three-year-old civilwarwithUNITA. For

decades, the rebels had maintained rear bases in Kinshasa, where Savimbi had frequently met withMobutuandCIAoperativesandhadsold tensofmillionsofdollarsofdiamonds. InMay1998, JonasSavimbi’s rebels had scuppered a peace process that they saw as increasingly biased toward thegovernment.They launched attacks throughout northernAngola, close to the borderwith theCongo. Inaddition, another Angolan rebel movement, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda(FLEC), appeared to be making inroads in Cabinda, a tiny Angolan enclave just north of the Kitonaairbase,wherearound60percentofAngola’soil isdrilled,providingitwithabouthalfofallnationalrevenues. According to French government officials, FLEC had been in touch with the RwandangovernmentbeforetheKitonaairlift.21Thediplomatic tug-of-warcontinuedforseveraldays,withSouthAfricanpresidentNelsonMandela

attemptingtomediatebetweenthe twosides topreventacontinent-widewarbreakingout.Hisattemptearnedhim the scornofMugabe,who toldhim to shut up if hedidn’twant tohelpdefend theCongo.Kabila’s office was equally blunt, suggesting that “age had taken its toll” on the venerable African

leader.22

AtMalikKijege’smakeshiftheadquartersattheTshatshimilitarycamp,hebeganreceivingdistresscallsfromTutsishidinginKinshasa.Accordingtothereportshereceived,Kinshasawasquicklysuccumbingtothethroesofanti-Tutsifrenzy.Onceagain,leadershadresortedtoethnicdiatribetorallythepopulationbehindthem.Kabilaaddressedamarch indowntownKinshasa,wherehewhippedup thecrowdagainst theTutsi

invaders.Thedemonstrationwasfullofhistrionics.“TheywanttocreateaTutsiempire,”thepresidentannounced, dressed in military fatigues. His informationminister, DidierMumengi, also dressed in agreenuniform,toldthecrowdthattheTutsirebelshad“embarkedontheexterminationoftheCongolesepeopleofBukavu.”TshalaMwana,afamoussingerandallegedlythepresident’smistress,ledtheparadedressed inwhite, tugging twogoats on a leashwith signs identifying themasDeoBugera andBizimaKaraha,thetwomostfamousTutsiinKabila’sgovernmentwhohaddefectedtojointherebellion.Someofthemarchersbrandishedsigns:“WewillmakeRwandathetwelfthprovinceoftheCongo,”and“NotoTutsiexpansionintheDRCandAfrica.”Asthecheeringcrowdlookedon,thefamous,brawnywrestlerEdingwe—hecouldoftenbe seen joggingand singingwithhis followers along theKinshasa streets atdawn—steppedupandslittheanimals’throats.23Kabilapromisedthathewoulddistributegunstothepopulationsothatitcoulddefenditselfagainstthe

aggressors. Soon, thousands of youths, includingmany street children and delinquents,were streaminginto recruitment centers in Kinshasa. Every day, several hundred young men filed into the Martyrs’Stadium,learnedhowtouseagun,andsangsongs.Oneofthestandardswas:“YouRwandans,Godhasnotchosenyou.Ifyouwantdialogue,we’llhavedialogue.Ifyouwantwar,we’llhavewar.”The line between the Rwandan government and the Tutsi people as a whole was quickly blurring.

DemagoguesinKinshasaboreaheavyresponsibilityinwhippingupethnicanimositiesinthecapital.Buttheydidn’thave towork toohard.Rwandantroopshadhumiliatedandangeredresidents in thecapitalduringtheiryear-longstay.Kinois—astheinhabitantsofthecapitalwereknown—hadbeenworkingforyears against Mobutu’s dictatorship. They had marched in the tens of thousands and had seen theirbrothersandsisterstorturedandkilled,onlytoseetheirvictorysnatchedawaybyabunchofforeigners.AsKinois often quip: “We putMobutu in the ambulance.AllKabila didwas drive the corpse to thecemetery.”Thenthenewrulers,whodidn’tspeaktheirlanguageanddidn’tlooklikethem,beganbeatingthemandtellingthewomentheydressedlikeprostitutes.Theyfeltemasculatedandabandonedtohungerandpoverty.KabilagaveordersforsoldierstoshootanyTutsifoundwithaweapon.Amongthepeople,therewas

littledistinctionbetweenaTutsicivilianandaTutsisoldier.“Whenthefightingstarts,theyallpullgunsoutfromundertheirbeds,”Congolesewouldoftentellme.“TheTutsiinschoolwithmeyesterdayareinthestreetstodayinuniform.”CongolesesoldiersstormedaU.S.embassycompoundinKinshasa,whereAmericanfamilieswerewaitingforevacuation.TheyharassedseveralAfricanAmericanstheysuspectedofbeingTutsiindisguise,stolesomemoney,andleft.AnothergangraidedtheupscaleMemlingHotelindowntown Kinshasa, where many wealthy families had sought refuge, and went from room to roomlookingforhighcheekbonesandhookednoses.Afterseveraldays,thegovernmentorganizedasystematicroundupofallremainingTutsi,ostensibly

for theirownprotection,andcreatedacampfor themnext toamilitarybarracks in town.HundredsofTutsiwerecrammedintosqualidquarterswithlittlefood,water,ormedicalsupplies.

Back at theTshatshimilitary camp,MalikKijege fielded calls fromTutsi soldiers around the country.CongoleseTutsihadbeenleftinmilitarybasesaroundthecountryaftertheRwandansleft.Assoonastherebels announced their insurgencyagainstKabila, theseTutsiwere seenasRwanda’s fifth columnandwereattacked.InKisanganiandKalemie,dozenswerekilled.OverahundredTutsiofficersinatrainingcampinKamina,inthesouthernKatangaProvince,wereroundedupandexecuted.ItwasasifthemobsbelievedtreasonwasgeneticallyencodedinTutsiidentity.Othermessageswere coming in toMalik’s command post fromTutsi stranded in variousKinshasa

neighborhoods:fivetrappedinagarageinKintambo,anelderlywomanwhocouldn’twalkhiddenwithanon-TutsifamilyinBandal.HeformedsmallsquadstoventureoutintoKinshasaonfootandtrytorescuethem.Theystillhadtheirgovernment-issuedwalkie-talkiesandwereonthesamefrequenciesasKabila’ssoldiers.Therivalsidesinsultedeachotheroverthestaticcrackle.“Warisweird,”Maliklatertoldmewithalaugh.“Inordertopreventthemfromunderstandingus,we

resorted to a pigLatinwe usedwhenwewere kids. “We saidwords backwards:‘Teem su ta eht sagnoitats’—meetusat thegasstation.Oraddedsyllables: ‘Meetzeeatzeegaszeestationzee.’”CongoleseTutsi babbled theirway through the treacherous downtown streets at night, sometimeswalking twentymilesinasingleexpedition,raidingbanksandpharmaciesformoneyandmedicalsupplies.Finally,theysucceededinshepherdingdozensofTutsicivilianstotheembassiesofFrance,Belgium,andtheRepublicof Congo. From there, convoys were organized to bring the Tutsi in speedboats across the river toneighboringBrazzaville.

Afterhisincendiaryspeech,KabilahadretreatedtoLubumbashi,1,000milesfromKinshasaandneartheborderwithZambia. It looked to be a goodplace fromwhich to flee theCongo—if he had to,whichseemed ever more likely. From there he continued his diplomatic offensive to bring in Angolan,Namibian,andZimbabwean troops.He leftaconfusedwarcouncilbehind inKinshasa:abunchofhisministers,mostlyciviliansdressedinmilitarygarb,whoappearedonnationaltelevisionandtriedtocalmthe population. “Our army had disintegrated,”DidierMumengi remembered. “Our best units had gonewestwardstostoptheadvanceoftherebels.Wewereleftwithabunchofpolicemen.”Mumengihimselfwasseenalmostdailyatpressconferences,lookingoutofplaceinhisgreenfatigues.ItseemedimpossibletostoptheRwandanadvance.Theyweremovingtwentymilesaday,capturing

armystockpilesandsendinggovernmentsoldiersscattering.CommanderDavid,whohadbeeninchargeof President Kabila’s bodyguard, was part of the rebel advance. He had kept an address book withtelephone numbers of Kabila’s ministers and advisors. As the rebels advanced, David would maketauntingphonecallstoKinshasa.“Mumengi, you better pack your bags—we will be in Kinshasa tomorrow night,” he told the

informationministerwhentheywerestilltwohundredmilesaway.Herangotherministerstogivethem

updatesonhowfartheyhadreachedandtoridiculetheCongolesearmy’sfeebleefforts.KabilaorderedhisentirecabinettoLubumbashi.Seniormembersofgovernment,especiallythosefrom

Katanga,heededhiscall,packingtheirfamiliesintoSUVs.Attheairport, luxuryvehiclescrammedthetarmac,unloadingmattresses,suitcases,andentirewardrobes tosend toLubumbashi.DidierMumengi,whodidn’tknowanyoneinLubumbashi,decidedtostay,againstthepleasofhiswife,whoimploredhimtoflee.Heresortedtogivinghisdistressedfamilysleepingpillssotheycouldsleepthroughthenight.Then,withoutwarning,thelightswentoutthroughoutthecity.TheRwandanoffensivehadcapturedthe

Inga Dam, the huge hydroelectric power plant on the Congo River a hundred and fiftymiles west ofKinshasa.Thecityof fivemillionpeoplewentdark,withonlya fewhotelsandofficebuildings litbybackupgenerators.Even thosegeneratorsweresoonwindingdown,as the rebelsalsocut thepipelinebringingfueltothecity.Peoplewerestuckinelevators,foodrottedinfreezers,doctorsinsomehospitalemergency roomshad tooperatewith flashlights, andwaterpumps stoppedworking.When the energyminister,BabiMbayi,gaveaphoneinterviewtoaforeignjournalist,sayingthattheyhadsometechnicalproblemswith the electricity supply,CommanderDavid called him from his satellite phone and said,“Babi,youthinkthisisatechnicalproblem?WaittillwereachKinshasa.”Rwanda’sdecisiontocutelectricitytothecapitalsticksinthememoryofKinoistothisday.Thatthe

rebelswouldjeopardizethelivesofsickhospitalpatientsandhamstringwaterandfuelsupplywasthelaststrawformanyandonlyfurtherjustifiedtheirviolenthatredoftheTutsi.Thecity’sfatewaslookingincreasinglysealed.TheministerswhohadstayedbehindinKinshasaheld

anemergencymeetingat theministryofplanning.Asa signofhowdire the situationhadbecome, thearmy commander sent soldiers to provide security for theministers, but they showedupwithout guns,loafingabout sheepishly.Oneof thearmygenerals took the floorandsolemnly toldhiscolleagues thatthey wouldn’t be able to defend the city. The financeminister then cleared his throat and, somewhatembarrassed, announced that he hadmade the decision to empty the state’s coffers. “I have tallied themoneyleftintheCentralBank,”hetoldthestunnedroom.“Thereis$22,000foreachofus.Ihaveputitinsacksinatruckoutside.Useitwell.”

Finally,justasthecityhadlosthope,thetideturned.OnAugust18,seekinginternationallegitimacyforintervening,PresidentMugabeofZimbabweconvenedameetingof theSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity (SADC) security committee, an organ over which he presided. They hastily approved amilitary intervention to support Kabila against “foreign aggression,” although they did not have thequorum or the mandate to do so. The decision also deepened a row betweenMugabe and PresidentNelsonMandela,who advocated a diplomatic approach.24Mugabe, with typical gusto, toldMandela,“Thosewhowanttokeepout,fine,letthemkeepout.Butletthemkeep[their]silenceaboutthosewhowanttohelp.”25Bythemorningof thefollowingday,fourhundredZimbabweantroopswerediggingtrenchesaround

Kinshasa’s Njili airport, and several attack helicopters patrolled the skies. Two days later, AngolanpresidentDosSantos,whohadbeensittingonthefence,madeuphismindthatitwasbettertohavethedevilyouknowrulingKinshasathanapoliticalunknown.26ThousandsofAngolantroopsbeganstreamingacrosstheborderwithtanksandarmoredpersonnelcarrierstorecapturetheKitonamilitarybasefromthe Rwandans. The Angolan military, which brought with it attack helicopters and MiG 23 fighter

bombers, began raining bombs and artillery fire down on the Rwandan-led troops. Malik Kijegeremembered the Angolan air force hitting an oil pipeline, sending a plume of fire into the night,illuminatingthescatteringrebelforces.As the Angolans moved in from the west, cutting off the Rwandans’ rear base and supply chain,

Zimbabwean and Congolese forces squeezed them from Kinshasa. “It looks like there will be aBanyamulenge sandwich,” a western diplomat commented, lumping all of the invading troops—Rwandans,Ugandans,Congolese—intoonegenericterm.27Withindays,thetidehadturned.Withnoescaperoute,therebelsmadeadesperaterunforKinshasa,

hoping theywouldbeable tofulfill theirmissionwith theammunitionandfood theyhad left.Atnight,rebeltroopsinciviliandressbeganinfiltratingthedenselypopulatedMasinaandNjilineighborhoodsonthenorthwesternoutskirtsof town,close to theairport.BolsteredbyZimbabweanandAngolan troops,LaurentKabilareturnedtoKinshasaandannouncedthatvictorywastheirs.Exhortingpeopletotakeupsticks and spears todefend the city, hedeclared that, “Thepeoplemustbe completelymobilized andarmed to crush the aggressors.”28 His cigar-smoking chief of staff was less subtle. “The rebels arevermin,microbeswhichmustbemethodicallyeradicated,”hesaidonstateradio.29Thepopulationheededthecall.Theypouncedonadozenpeopletheysuspectedwererebels,looped

tires around their necks, doused them in gasoline, andmade them into human torches.Charred bodieslinedoneofthemainstreetsinthepopularMasinaneighborhood.AforeigntelevisioncrewcapturedonfilmtwoCongolesesoldiersthrowingamanoffabridgeandshootinghimdeadashetried,withhislegsbroken, to crawl out of the water to safety. The images went around the world and were latermemorialized on the Internet. It isn’t clear, however, whether these final casualties were Tutsi. TheRwandans had recruited many of Mobutu’s former soldiers. Eyewitnesses suggest that it was theserecruits,mostlyyouthsfromthewesternCongo,whoweresentasspiesintoKinshasa,astheyknewtheirwayaroundandcouldblendintothelocalpopulation.30ThelastpartofthebattleforKinshasafeaturedagroupofseveralhundredofthesesoldiersstrippingofftheiruniformsbeforebeingcorneredinafieldofeucalyptus trees outside Kinshasa. Kabila’s chief of staff laughed as he told the story at a pressconference,cigarinmouth:“Therebelsarelikemonkeys,swinginginthetreeswithnoclothes.”31

Aswithmanyepisodesofthewar,thebattleforKinshasawasnotwithoutitsshareofsurrealmoments.Agroupof around seventyTutsiwas stuck in theBurundian embassy for severalweeks, unable tomovebecauseofthefighting.TheyhadcongregatedtherefromthroughoutKinshasainthehopethattheTutsi-ledgovernmentofBurundiwouldprovidethemprotection.ThenearbySwissembassysentpackagesoffoodandwatertokeepthemafloat,butthelivingconditionsweredeterioratingbytheday.Theembassywashoused in a small building, and a dozen people slept in each room.AmbassadorMartin Sindabizera,himselfaTutsi,pacedbackandforth through thecorridors, speakingwithBurundianpresidentBuyoyaaboutpossibleevacuationplans.HisphonerangnonstopwithrequestsfromTutsithroughoutKinshasa—andevenseveralHutuwhoalsofelt targeted—tocomeandget them.“Iwasn’table todoanythingformostofthem.Itwassoul-wrenchingtoheartheirpleashourafterhourandfeelsohelpless.”32WhenhereceivedwordthattherewasaninfluentialRwandanfamilytrappednotfarfromtheembassy,

Sindabizeradecidedtogohimself.Onthestreetinfrontoftheirhideout,severalpolicemenstoppedhiscar and told him to get out.As he stepped out, one of them yelled: “Betayemasasi!”After a year in

Kinshasa,theambassadorknewenoughLingalatounderstandwhatthatmeant:Shoothim!Thepolicemanloaded his gun, but an older soldier stopped him. “He has diplomatic license plates,” he pointed outcalmly.“Youcan’tshoothimjustlikethat.Wehaverulesinthiscountry.”Givingwaytothisreasoning,the soldiers took him in for interrogation. In a small cell at the nearby police station, the ambassadorfoundabizarregroupofpeople,allofwhomwereallegedtobeguiltyofplottingagainstthestate:twoofhisownadvisors,whomhehadsentaheadtoevacuatetheRwandanfamily;agroupoffivemixed-racewomenintightjeansandmakeup,accusedofhavingbeenmistressesofTutsipoliticiansinKinshasa;andadozencowedstreet childrenandsoldierswhomayhavebeen involved in the rebellionorwere justvictims of a shakedown. “Itwas generalized paranoia,” the ambassador remembered. “They pulled inpeopletomakemoney,fortheshapeoftheirnoses,foranythingatall.”Afterfourhoursofinterrogation,theambassadorwassetfree.“Don’ttalktotheBBC!”theyordered.Backattheembassy,thesituationwasgettingworsebytheday.Severalofthepeopleseekingrefuge

hadmedical conditions, and he didn’t think theywould be able to hold outmuch longer. The sewagesystemwasbreakingdown,andthewaterpumpsonlyworkedintermittently.Finally,BurundianpresidentPierreBuyoyadecidedonariskyevacuation.HesentajetfromBujumburawithseveraltrustedsoldiers,whiletheambassadorsentatrustedIndianbusinessmanwithseveralthousanddollarsdownthefifteen-mileroadtotheairporttodoleoutbribestoalloftheroadblockcommanders.Hekeptthebiggestsumforthecommanderoftheairport.Theywouldmakearunforit.The ambassador laughed when he remembered the operation. “The pilot thought he was flying to

Brazzaville.OnlyafoolwouldhaveacceptedtoflyaBurundianaircraftintoKinshasaairportduringthatmess.”Since theBrazzavilleairportwas just severalmilesacross the river from theKinshasa landingstrip,itwaseasytopulloff.Severalminutesbeforelanding,theBurundianarmyofficeronboardpulledoutapistolinthecockpit.“Changeofplans,”hetoldtheterrifiedpilot.“WearelandinginKinshasa.”TheBurundianconvoy,crammedtocapacitywithchildren,women,anddiplomats,hurtledthroughthe

desertedstreetsasthebribedpolicemenandsoldierspulledawaytheroadblockstheyhadsetup.Attheairport,thepassengersrushedontotheplane.Atthelastmoment,justastheplanewasbeginningtotaxionto the runway,severalpickups fullof soldiers sped in frontof it,blocking itspath.Theambassadorcalledtheairportcommander,alarmed,askinghimwhathadhappenedwiththeirarrangement.“Ican’tdoanything,sir,”heresponded.“It’sthepresidentialguard.”Theambassadorsighed,looking

downtherowsoftheairplane,fullofanxiousfacesandcryingchildren.“Ithoughtthegamewasover,”heremembered.“IwassurethatKabilamusthavepulledtheplugonouroperation.”HavingseenwhathadhappenedtootherTutsiinKinshasa,theyexpectedtheworst.Theambassadortoldthepilottolowertheboarding rampsohecould talk to theCongolesecommander.The fewBurundianofficerson theplaneloadedtheirpistolsandwaitedanxiously.Thepassengersgawked through thewindowsas theysawKabila’ssoldiers, thesameoneswhohad

beenroundinguptheirfriendsandrelatives,helpaTutsiwomaninexpensiveclothesoutofablackSUVwith tinted windows. Soldiers grabbed her suitcases and designer bags and made for the Burundianairplane.NotawordwasexchangedbetweentheCongoleseandBurundiansoldiers.Thewomanbrushedpastthedumbfoundedambassadorinacloudofperfume,onlytobegreetedbyirateshrieksfromtherestof the passengers. Several Banyamulenge women got up and began attacking the newcomer, cursing,spitting,andpullingatherclothes.“Traitor!”“Bitch!”TheBurundiansoldiers,pistolsintheair,hadtointervenetobreakupthemelee.“Ididn’tknowwhethertolaughortocry,”theambassadorremembered.“ThiswasKabila’smistress!

Myotherpassengershadrecognizedher.Thepresidentobviouslydidn’tthinkitwasagoodthingforhertostayon.”

Thepilot,perplexedandnervous,cameontheintercom,orderingeverybodytositdownashetaxiedtheplanetotherunway.

14

THEREBELPROFESSOR

KIGALI,RWANDA,AUGUST1998

ErnestWambadiaWambawasanunlikelycandidatetoleadamovementtooverthrowLaurentKabila.Aquiet,unassumingmanwithaprofessorialdemeanor,hehadspentmostofhislifeinacademicinstitutionsintheUnitedStatesandTanzania,farmorefamiliarwiththeintricaciesofexistentialistphilosophythanwithrevolutionarypolitics.WhenhebecamethepresidentofthenewRwandan-backedCongoleseRallyforDemocracy(RCD)rebelliononAugust16,1998,itcameasasurpriseeventohisfamily.HisstoryillustratesthetragicstateofCongoleseleadership:Evenwhenamanwithpristinepoliticalandethicalcredentialstriestoeffectchange,theresultsarepoor.1WambahadbeenfascinatedbypoliticssincehewasaboardingstudentataSwedishmissionaryschool

inwesternBas-CongoProvince,closetotheAtlanticOcean,inthe1950s.Itwasaturbulenttimefortheregion.WambawasbornnotfarfromthebirthplaceofSimonKimbangu,a localChristianprophetandanticolonialactivistwhorejectedthewhiteclergy’smonopolyonreligion.WambawasfromtheKongoethniccommunity,whichhadmadeuponeofCentralAfrica’soldestandlargestkingdomsandwasattheforefront of the Congolese independence movement. While still a teenager, he was swept up by theweekly rallies andprotestmarches that embroiled the region.Even atWamba’s high school,when theSwedishmissionarieswereoutofearshot,theCongoleseteacherswouldencouragethemtochant:“Whatdowewant?Independence!”Wambawasaprecociousstudent.Heminedtheschoollibraryforbooksoncontemporaryphilosophy.

“Hewasn’t contentwithvillage life,with the statehis countrywas in,”MahmoodMamdani, a fellowpolitical scientist and a close friend, remembered. Studying continental philosophy was a means ofemancipatinghimself,of feelingpartof something larger.EngrossedbyJean-PaulSartre’swritings,hesentthefamousphilosopheraletterwhenhewasinhisearlyteens.Tohissurprise,Sartrewroteback,andthetwohadabriefcorrespondence.Aftergraduatingwithhighmarks,hewasoneofthreestudentsfromhisschooltoreceiveascholarship

tostudyintheUnitedStates.HewenttoWesternMichiganUniversityinKalamazoo,aboutasfarfromhistropicalhomelandashecouldimagine,wherehewrotehisseniorthesisonFrenchphilosophersMauriceMerleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre and was admitted for graduate study at Claremont University inCalifornia.AswithmanyAfricansinthediaspora,distancefromhishomelandcatalyzedhisinterestinitspolitics.

“IwasnotradicalizedaboutAfricauntilIcametotheUnitedStates,”helaterreflected.“Itisstrange,butIbecamemuchmoreawareofwhatwasgoingoninCongointheUnitedStatesthanIhadeverbeeninCongo.”2HefolloweddevelopmentsinhishomecountrycloselyandbecameastridentcriticofMobutu’sdictatorship.Hemarried anAfricanAmericanwoman and became active in theAmerican civil rightsmovementthroughtheStudentNonviolentCoordinatingCommittee.Inacademiccircles,hewasknownas

a pan-Africanist; he advocated a version of democracymore in tunewith traditionalAfrican formsofgovernment.In1980,WambareturnedtothecontinentwithhisfamilytotakeupapositionattheUniversityofDar

es Salaam, which President Julius Nyerere was promoting as a center of African learning, attractingacademicsandpoliticalactivistsfromaroundtheregion.Ayearlater,WambawasarrestedduringavisittoKinshasa,an incident thatdrew theattentionofNyerere,whohelpedgethimoutofprison.NyererethencalledonhimforadviceonGreatLakespolitics,inparticulartheBurundianpeaceprocess.When the war in the Congo started, the former Tanzanian president had been retired after several

decadesasheadofstatebutremainedcloselyinvolvedinregionalpolitics.UgandanpresidentMusevenihadaskedNyereretoendorseKabila,but theformerpresidentwasskeptical.Nonetheless,Kabilawaswellconnected,whichwascrucial:Hisright-handmanwasmarriedtothedaughterofNyerere’sformerviceprimeminister.3NyererefinallymetKabilainhisruralhometown,andtheCongoleserebelleaderspoke passionately about self-determination and his vision for the Congo. Nyerere askedWamba foradvice.TheprofessorwascriticalofKabila,givenhis reputationasa smugglerand thug,butNyererewasswayedbyother leaders in the region.HeauthorizedTanzanian intelligenceofficers, trainers,andartillery tosupport theAFDL—andtokeepaneyeonKabila.Heeven lent therebel leaderoneofhispersonalbodyguards.KabilavisitedDaresSalaamseveralmoretimes,andeachtimeNyereremadesurethatWambawas

on hand. The more he saw of Kabila, however, the more doubts he had. Kabila seemed aloof andstubborn, always friendly and charismatic in their private meetings, but unwilling to implementsuggestions the Tanzanians made. On one occasion Nyerere organized a meeting between Kabila andseveralofhisclose friends, includingWamba, tohelpdevelopacoherentpolitical ideology; the rebelleaderstoodthemup.WambarememberedNyerereshakinghishead.“Hecan’tevenshowuptomeetingson time,”he toldWamba.“Hisdeputy [KisaseNgandu]wasassassinated inmysteriouscircumstances.This is not looking good.” To top it off, Nyerere’s intelligence officers based in the field reportedconfusionandinfightingwithintherebelalliance.When theAFDL took power inKinshasa,Kabila invitedNyerere to visit. The elder statesmanwas

deeplydisappointed.Travelinginapresidentialconvoyfromtheairport,hesighedimpatientlyashesawKabila’s security detail chase other cars off the road and bring traffic to a halt. “That’s not how apresident is supposed to behave,” hemuttered toWamba,whowas accompanying him. Together theytouredthecapital,Bas-Congo,andamilitarybaseinthesouth,whereTanzanianofficersweretrainingthenew army. There his men told him that the new recruits increasingly only came from Kabila’s ownLubakat tribe. In a private meeting, he warned Kabila, “Our support was not for you; it was for theCongolesepeople.Ifyoudon’twatchout, thesamethingwillhappentoyouashappenedtoMobutu.”4Beforehe left,Nyereregaveapressconferenceathishotel,wherehe told journalists:“ Icame to theCongoandsawitsleaders.ButIdidn’tseeasinglenewroad,hospitalorschool.”5

TheCongowar spun its leaders likeacentrifuge; themore ruthless,politicallyadeptonesmanaged tostay at the center and reinvent themselves through new business deals or political alliances. Thelightweights, however,were flung to the fringesof political life.Dozensof these figures are scatteredthroughKinshasa’ssuburbs,livingoffmoneytheyhadsetasideorrealestatetheymanage.Therevolution

devouredmanyofitschildren,spittingthemoutwhenithadsuckedwhatitneededoutofthem.Wambawasoneofthesepiecesofflotsam:Aftertheendofthewar,hehadobtainedapositionasasenatorinParliament,butsoonhewasunemployed.Hehadpreferredtostayinhiscountry,envelopedbymemoriesofpastachievementsandfriends,thanreturntotheanonymoussurroundingsofDaresSalaam.In2007,during a research trip toKinshasa, Imanaged to track him down.He appeared to have given up anypoliticalambitions.WhenI toldhis former rebelcolleagues that Iwasgoing toseehim, theywereallsurprisedthathewasstillintown.“Iwouldbehappytomeet,”hetoldmeoverthephone,“butIliveabitoutsideofdowntown,andmy

carhasbrokendown.Couldyoucometomyplace?”I hadn’t realized whatWamba meant by “a bit outside of downtown.” I drove about twenty miles

throughgrimysuburbs,until thepavementgavewaytosandysidestreets linedbybroken-downhouseswithfadingpaintandrusty,corrugatedironroofing.Wambahadgivenmeastreetaddress,buttherewerenonumbersonthehouses.Iaskedaround,butnobodyseemedtoknowaProfessorWambadiaWamba.Finally,amatronlywomansellingsugarandmaniocflouronapieceofgunnysackrecognizedthename—“Ah!Thatoldpolitician!”Ihadpassedhishouseseveraltimes.Inthecourtyard,ascrawnydogbarkedatme.Apoliteladyshowedmeintothelivingroomandaskedmetowait—ProfessorWambawashavingabath.Thelivingroomwassimple.Aglossy,genericpictureofawaterfallhungononewall.Theotherhada

pictureofWambainasuitsigningthe2002peacedealinPretoria,SouthAfrica.Thesofawasdecoratedwithcirculardoiliescrochetedinneonyellowandpurpleyarn.Ileafedthroughseveralmagazinesonthetable;therewasathree-month-oldissueofJeuneAfriqueandthenewsletterofMbongiaNsi,aKongoculturalorganizationheheaded.WhenIusedthebathroom,therewasnolightorrunningwater.Several minutes later, Wamba welcomed me into his study, a small room lined with books and

magazines.OnthewallnexttohisdeskwasaseriesofA4-sizelaminatedphotographsofpeople.TherewashissonPhilippe,whohaddiedinacaraccidentin2002;RashidKawawa,theformerTanzanianviceprimeminister;aswellasCheGuevara,PatriceLumumba,andarowoffadingpicturesfromthe1950sofWamba’s family.Ashebegan tospeak, Imentallywentoverall the things IhadheardabouthimfrompeoplewhohadknownhiminDaresSalaamorduringtherebellion,tryingtoreconciletheimageofamisguidedrebelleader,dressedinarmyfatiguesandwithanine-millimeterpistolathisside,withthisavuncular,soft-spokenman.Howcouldsomeoneinvestedforsomanyyearsinpromotingdemocracyandcivilrightshavebecomederailed?

In early 1998, as the Rwandans began falling out with Kabila, Kigali began piecing together a newrebellion. Vice President Paul Kagame sent emissaries throughout the region and contacted others byphoneinBrusselsandtheUnitedStates.WhenWambaarrivedinKigaliinearlyAugust1998,mostoftheotherfutureleadersoftheRCDwerealreadythere.WambawasbaffledwhenhearrivedatthesmallguesthouseinKabuga,inthesuburbsoftheRwandan

capital,wheretheprospectiveleadershadgathered.FormerMobutistministerssatnexttoformerAFDLrebelswhohadfoughtagainstMobutu.OppositionpoliticianswhohadbeenimprisonedandtorturedbyKabilasatnexttoRwandansecurityofficerswhohadbeeninchargeofKabila’sarmy.Itwasanallianceofmalcontents; the only thing theyhad in commonwas their disdain forKabila.Howcould they ever

worktogether?Despite the disparate backgrounds,many of them, likeWamba, had solid credentials. For example,

therewasZahidiNgoma,aformerhigh-rankingofficialforUNESCO,basedinParis.Zahidihadbeenalong-standingopponentofbothMobutuandKabilaandhadbeenarrested inKinshasa shortlyafter theAFDL’s victory, beaten, and nearly starved to death in prison. Also present was JosephMudumbi, ahumanrightslawyerfromSouthKivuwhohadreportedonabusesintheRwandanrefugeecampsinthefaceofharassmentanddeaththreats.HehadbeenawardedaprestigiousprizebyHumanRightsWatchin1995. Other members included Jacques Depelchin, a Stanford-trained historian who, together withWambadiaWamba, had drafted theAfricanDeclarationAgainstGenocide, andEtienneNgangura, thehead of the philosophy department at the University of Kinshasa. To western diplomats, they seemedgenuinelybentonbringingabouta responsibleand functionalgovernment.Surely the idealismof thesescholarsandactivistswouldhelpthisrebelliontosucceedwherethepreviousonehadfailed?And yet it was clear from the beginning that their independence would be severely limited by

Rwanda’s influence. After all, it was Kigali that had brought them together and provided them withsoldiers, phones, and houses. Indeed, by the time the besuited politicians met in Kigali, the armedinsurrectiononthegroundwasalreadytwoweeksold,hadtakencontrolofthebordercitiesofBukavuandGoma, andwas advancing onKinshasa. The political leadership of the RCDwas attached as anafterthought,anappendixtothemilitarymachine.“WethoughtwewouldtakeKinshasawithinamonthatthemost,”ColonelPatrickKaregeya, oneof themasterminds of theRwandanoffensive, toldme. “Wedidn’tpaythatmuchattentiontothepoliticalwing.”6Wambacouldnotclaimthathedidn’tknowwhathewasgettinginto.Liketheothers,he,too,hadbeen

contactedbytheRwandangovernment.AfewdaysafterhisarrivalinKigali,itwasPaulKagamewho,inaclosed-doormeetingwiththeaspiringrebels,suggestedthatWambabecomepresidentofthemovement.Wambahadagoodinternationalreputation,theRwandanleaderargued,andhadnotparticipatedintheprevious rebellion,whichcouldmakehimappearaneutral arbiter among thevariousother tendenciesrepresented.Crucially,Wambawas close to formerTanzanian presidentNyerere and, by virtue of hismembership in the pan-Africanistmovement, could also sway otherAfrican leaders such asMandela,Museveni,andGraçaMachel,theformerfirstladyofMozambique.“Anyobjections?”Kagameasked.Ofcourse,therewerenone.

Wamba had his reasons for advocating a military rebellion. He had been a frontseat observer to thevariousresistancemovementsagainstMobutu’sdictatorship.Overtwenty-fiveyears,hehadwatchedtheautocrat, with the help of the United States, France, and Belgium, skillfully crush and co-opt anyoppositiontohisrule.Attheendofthecoldwar,persistentprotestsforcedMobututoacceptmultipartydemocracy,andhecalledforaNationalSovereignConference,inwhichWambaparticipated,todecidethefutureofthegovernment.WhentheconferenceelectedEtienneTshisekediasitsleader,Mobutusimplyignored the verdict and imposed his own prime minister. Wamba didn’t see much hope for pacifistoppositiontoaregimethatlockedupandtortureditsopponents.The genocide inRwanda finally rippedWambaout of academic complacency: “[It]was the turning

point, my road to Damascus. Here you are, a social scientist who has been theorizing about socialmovements, tryingtounderstandhowAfricansocietieswork,howtheymightbechangedforthebetter.

Thenyouseethatgenocideistakingplacerightinfrontofyourface,andyoufindyourselfpowerlesstodoanything.”7Whenhereceivedthephonecalltellinghimthathecouldtaketheleadinanewrebellionand,withoutthehardshipsandimprobabilitiesofgrassrootsorganizing,playadecisiveroleinshapinganew,albeitarmed,opposition,hedidn’thesitate.InaspeechtoAfricanphilosophers,heobliquelyjustifiedhisposition:“Congoleseacademicstalkof

theCongolesepopulationasbeingignorantandPresidentJ.Kabilaasknowingnothing.Theyarehappydoing their routine theoreticalworkandnotcaringmuchabout thefact that theyaresitting inasinkingboat.Ifindthisattitudedeplorable....Developmentcanonlybeconsciouslypursuedandnotlefttochanceortoothers.”8ManyotherswithsimilarlyhighidealsmadethesamedealwiththedevilasWamba.Afterall,beinga

leadertakesvisionandcharisma,butitalsorequirespropitiouscircumstances.Hadn’tCheGuevaratriedandfailed,limpingawaymalnourishedanddejected?Hadn’tTshisekedi,whohadmarchedwithtensofthousandsagainstMobutuin1992,alsobeenreducedtoamarginalfigure,withonlyahandfulofdiehardsupportersheeding calls forprotestmarches?Theyhad failedbecause the circumstanceshadnot beenripeforthem,whereasWambaandhisnewcomradesnowdidhavetherightcircumstances:aformidable,time-testedmilitarymachine that could undoubtedly take them to the summit of the state. Change andpowerwerebeingofferedonasilverplatter.

Atotaloftwenty-sixdissidentswereferriedouttoasmallhotelinKabuga,ontheoutskirtsofKigali,andspent several days debating the structure and composition of their new rebellion. As they debated,Rwandanarmyofficersmilledaboutoutsideingumboots,totingmachineguns.“Itwasastrangebunch,”Wambaremembered.Hehadatendencytoclosehiseyesforminutesonend

andstrokehisforeheadwhenwespoke.“Youhadcapitalistsandsocialists.YouhadMobutistsandthosewhohad thrown themout of power.You had academics and peoplewho apparently had never read abook.”Thisamalgamproducedtensemoments,asatthebeginning,whenKalalaShambuyi,aradicalfromthe

Belgiandiaspora,stoodupandpointedatLundaBululu,whohadbeenprimeministerunderMobutu.“Iwill not be associatedwithMobutists after all theydid tomy country!”Hewalkedout, butwas latercalmed down and brought back in. On another occasion, the Rwandans showed the draft of a pressstatement toZahidiNgoma, the rebellion’s first spokesperson,whoexploded,protesting, “ I amnot inprimaryschool!Icandraftmyownpressstatements!”Formost of those assembled, their differences of opinion didn’tmattermuch, as they believed they

wouldbeinKinshasainamatterofweeksor,atthemost,months.Wambafoundhimselfalonearguingfora “democratizing rebellion.” Military pressure for him was just a means to begin negotiations withKabila.“Mostofthepeopleinthatroomhadn’tthoughtaboutstrategy,howtheywouldusetheirpowertobring about social change. They just wanted military victory.” Some RCD leaders already begandiscussingwhichpositionstheywouldgetwhentheygottoKinshasa.Inthemeantime,WambaheldforthinlongspeechesaboutCongolesehistoryandtheirresponsibilitiestowardtheCongolesepeople.ManyinthegroupsawWambaasoutoftouchwithreality.“Hewasanoldprofessorinsandals,”one

remembered. “He knew a lot aboutMarxist theory and African history. But what did he know aboutgoverning?About leadinga rebellion?”9AUgandancommanderwhowas inchargeofUgandan troops

toldaleadingmemberoftheRCD:“Lettheoldmanwritehisbooks,we’llgettowork.”10ARwandanmilitaryescorttookthegrouptoitsnewheadquartersinGoma,Mobutu’sformerpalaceon

LakeKivu, where chandeliers andmarble floors recalled the good old days before the pillaging anddestruction.TheRwandans,inanefforttobuildteamspirit,madetheRCDleaderssleeptogetherinthesamehouse.Thissparkedindignationfromsome.Rwandan influence was initially subtle. In the meetings of the RCD assembly, delegates sent from

Kigali were often in attendance, but the Congolese debated freely and fiercely over the direction themovement should take.TitoRutaremara, an oldLeftBankParisian intellectualwhowas an influentialRPFideologue,gavepresentationsonhowtodeveloprevolutionaryideology.Butnoonecouldimposecohesionandasenseofpurpose.“Itwaslikeherdingcats,”Wambaremembered.“Mostofthepeopleinthemovementwerenotsincerelyinterestedindemocracy.”TheyhadlearnedfromtheMobutuandKabilaschoolofgovernance:They thoughtpowerwasdeveloped through intrigue.Each leaderdevelopedhispersonalcontact inKigali.Diplomatsbecameused toseeing theRCDleadersat the luxuryUmumbanoHotelinKigalieachweek,sittingatthesamecornertableontheterrace,meetingwithRwandanofficials.AllofthemainleadersoftheRCDhadhousesinKigali,justathree-hourcarridefromGoma.“Itwasdifficulttosaywhowasincharge,”Wambasaid.“Ourexecutivecouncilmetonceeverytwo

weeksandtookdecisions.But thenIfoundoutothersweresendingconflictingreports toKampalaandKigali.” It was a typical case of traffic d’influence—using personal contacts as leverage behind thescenestogetwhatyouwanted.ThecacophonybecamesobadthatVicePresidentKagamehadtointerveneonseveraloccasions.Once

he convened the leadership in Kigali and told them an anecdote about a king. “The monarch had awonderfuladvisorwhosavedhimmanytimes,”hetoldhisaudience.“Asareward,onedayhetoldhisadvisorthathecouldmakeonewishthathewouldgranthimwithoutcondition.Theadvisortoldhim:‘Ihavebutonesimplerequest.WhenIwanttotellyousomething,canIwhisperitinyourear?’Theking,baffledbytherequest,granteditimmediately.Fromthenon,whenevertherewasanimportantdecisiontotake,theadvisorwouldgouptothekingandwhisperbanalitiesinhisear—hetalkedabouttheweatherorwhatthecookwouldmakefordinner—andthekingwouldnod.Theadvisorwouldthengoandtellthecourt that the king had agreed with his recommendations regarding national policy.” Kagame thenthundered,wagginghisfinger.“SomeofyoufoolscomeandseemehereinKigali,justtosayhelloandaskaboutmyfamily!ThenyougoandtelltherestthatKagameagreeswithyourdecisiononthisorthatmatter.”Hebangedhisfistonthetable.“Iwillhavenoneofthis!”11But theRwandanswerenot just innocuousbystanders.Approval forallmajorexpenditures fromthe

RCDbudgethadtocomefromKigali.BothRCDfinanceministerEmmanuelKamanziandchiefofstaffGeneral Jean-PierreOndekane spentmost of their time inKigali,making decisionswithout conferringwiththerestoftheRCDleadership.MajorleadershipchangeswereimposedbyKigali,andallmilitaryoperationswereledbyRwandancommandersinthefield.ThemoretheRCD’sdisorganizationbecameapparent, themoreKigalibegan to intervene. “WerewedominatedbyRwanda,orwerewe justveryweak?”aformerRCDleaderaskedrhetorically.“Itwasn’tclear.”12

It quickly became obvious thatWambawas ill-suited as president of the RCD.He tired of Rwandaninterferenceandthegluttonyofhiscolleagues.Fromthefirstdaysoftherebellion,astheirsoldierswere

blazing across the country, he called for a cease-fire and negotiations with Kabila, causing Rwandancommanderstogrindtheirteethinfrustration.Finally,theheightofimpudence,hecalledforafinancialaudit of the rebellion and made its leaders declare their income and belongings. The results wereembarrassing to theRCD:While theircofferswerealmostempty,many leaderswerebuyinghouses inSouthAfrica.Jean-PierreOndekane,themilitarychiefofstaffwhohadatastefordiamondringsandusedskin-lighteningcream,hadboughtasportscarthatheimportedtoKigali.“HowwouldheeverdrivethatthingonGoma’sterribleroads?”Wambawondered.“After just four months, things were so bad between us we wouldn’t talk much together,”Wamba

remembered. The last straw came on New Year’s Eve 1998, whenWamba was scheduled to give aseasonalradioaddress.Hiscolleagueswerewithfamilyorfriends,enjoyingtheholiday,whentheyheardhim on the radio:“There is zero oversight of the leaders of the rebellion. This is why even themostnotoriousincompetencedoesnotelicittheslightestreprimand.Theprofessionalrelationshipshavebeentransformed intoanepotisticpoliticking:Scratchmybackand Iwill scratchyours.” 13ZahidiNgoma,whowasenjoyingaglassofwineathome,rushedtothephoneandcalledtheradiostation.“Cuthimoff!”heordered.Predictably,theRCDleaderswerecalledtoKigalitoexplaintheirsupremedisarray.BothRwanda’s

president, Pasteur Bizimungu, and its vice president, Paul Kagame, attended the meeting. Wambacomplained that any initiative he undertookwas blocked by others, in particular theMobutists. SomeTutsi raised their voices to say thatWambawas excluding thembasedon their ethnicity.ThenWambainterjected,“Iwasn’tevengivenaChristmasdinner!Whatkindofrebellionisthis?”Theothermemberssighed,andanoldMobutistcomplained,“Thisdebatehassunktoolow.Christmas

dinner!”Bizimunguresponded,“No!Whatthepresidentissayingisimportant!Howcanyoufeedfiftymillion

peopleifyoucan’tevenfeedyourpresident?”Kagametookthefloor.“Yourproblemisthatyoudon’tloveyourcountry.Youneedtosuffer;youare

livingthegoodlife.Whenwewereinourrebellion,weweresopoorthatwedidn’thaveplatestoeatoutof.Wetookbananaleavesandputtheminaholeinthegroundtoeatourmeals.”Thedebate turned acrimonious,withZahidi accusing the financeminister of signing contracts inhis

bathrobeathomeandnoteveninformingthem,whileWambawaslambastedforhavinghisheadin theclouds.TheRwandansintervenedtocalmthegroupdown,butitwasclearthattheriftwouldbedifficulttomend.Inearly1999,WambawastoppledasthepresidentoftheRCD.

Therebellionwasmilitarilysuccessful.Bythebeginningof1999,theRCDhadseizedoveraquarterofthe country, including the third largest city, Kisangani, and were headed toward the mining hubs ofLubumbashiandMbuji-Mayi.Under thestrictguidanceof theRwandanarmy, theCongolesebattalionsperformed relativelywell, although they becamewell-known for pillage and abuse. Facedwith aerialbombardments and artillery barrages from the well-equipped Zimbabwean and Chadian armies (theAngolans chosemostly to staybehind andguardKinshasa andBas-Congo), theRCD foughtwell on ashoestring,usingguerrillatacticstotheiradvantage.Politicallyandsocially,however,theRCDwasadisaster.OutsideoftheHutuandTutsipopulationof

NorthKivu, themovementwasnever able to convince thepopulation that itwasn’t aRwandanproxy.

Spontaneously, localmilitias—focusedonethnic self-defense—were formed, claiming tobeprotectingCongolese against foreign aggression. The RCD responded with a brutal counterinsurgency, targetingciviliansinresponsetoattacks.Withinthefirstfourmonths,severalmassacrestookplace,inwhichover1,000civilianswerekilled.“AtfirstIdidn’tbelievethereports,”WambasaidwhenIaskedhimaboutthesemassacres.“ButthenIstartedusingmyown,parallelchannelsofinformationanddiscovereditwastrue.ButIhadnocontroloverthemilitary,andbythetimeIhadfoundout,Ihadalreadyfallenoutwiththeothers.”Ipressedhimononemassacre inparticular,atKasika,whichhappened justweeksafterhe took the

helmoftheRCD,onAugust24,1998.AccordingtoUNinvestigators,aswellaswitnessesIinterviewed,atleastfivehundredcivilianswerebutcheredbyRwandanandRCDtroopsthere.Wambalookedatmeinshock.“Fivehundred?No,impossible.”ItoldhimthatIhadbeentheremyself

tointervieweyewitnesses.“No,no.Thatisn’tpossible,”heinsisted,shakinghishead.InhisofficeinGoma,Wambawasisolatedfromthesufferingofthepopulation.Theleadershipcreated

thesemblanceofafunctioningadministration,withanexecutivecouncilandlegislativeassemblyplayingtheroleofexecutiveandParliament.Lawswerepassed,pressconferencescalled,andbudgetsdiscussed,butallthiswasasideshowtothemilitaryoperations.“Sometimesitfeltliketheonlythingwedidwassitinmeetings all day,” JoséEndundo, anRCD finance commissioner, remembered. “Meetings thatwentnowhereandhadnoimpact.”Theorganization lackednotonly ideologicalvision,but also themeanswithwhich to implement it.

One ofWamba’s largest frustrations was his inability to carry out any sort of social or humanitarianprojectforthepopulation.Accordingtooneleader,80percentoftheRCD’s$2.5millionrevenueseachmonth went to feeding soldiers and buying supplies for military operations.14 “ We had health andtransport departments but no money to build roads or schools,” Wamba said. They had over 15,000soldierswhoweredeployedinanareathesizeofFrance.Theyhadtofeedthetroopsandprovideforeverythingfromcreditforthesatellitephonestofuelforthevehiclesandbulletsfortheirguns.TheRCDwasapredatorthatsuckedresourcesoutofthepopulationandprovidednexttonothinginreturn.

Accordingtomanyofhisformerrebelcolleagues,Wambawasneverinitforpersonalgain.EvenwhenIvisited him, the collar of his shirt was threadbare; he complained that he had been threatened withevictiononseveraloccasionsafterhewasunabletopaytherent.WhenIaskedhimaboutafriendofhis,hetriedcallinghim,butrealizedsheepishlythathehadrunoutofphonecredits.AnyonewhohasspentmuchtimeintheCongocanunderstandWamba’sdesiretobringaboutradical

change through armed rebellion, given the lack of viable options. But his gravest sin was to haveremainedintherebellionforsolongdespiteitsglaringflaws.AformercolleagueofhisquotedaSwahiliproverb tome: “Don’t get into a shipwith a hole in the bottom; it will eventually sink.”He said ofWamba,“Idon’tthinkherapedorkilledorstole,buthewaspartofamachinethatdid.Heisguiltyofthatatleast.”PerhapstheonlygooddecisionWambacouldhavemadewastoleavethemovement.Instead,hestayed

onandmadeincreasinglybizarrechoices.InJuly1999,Wambamadeadesperateefforttoraisefundsforinfrastructureprojects—hewantedtoopenupthehinterlands’economybyrebuildingthreehundredandfiftymiles of road fromKisangani to Bunia, close to theUgandan border. He signed a deal with the

African Union Reserve System, a previously unknown company, to set up a central bank with a newcurrency, “for the advancement and economic development for the Congo.” The company would befinancedbyCongolesegoldanddiamondsandwould remit35percentofprofits toWamba’s treasury,witha$16millionloanupfront.Thecompany’sownerwasVanArthurBrink,whopresentedhimselfastheambassadoroftheDominionofMelchisedek,afancifulspiritualorderthatsoldbankinglicensesinthenameofavirtualstate.Unsurprisingly, itwasaswindle.Thecrook’srealnamewasAllenZiegler,whowason therunfromtheU.S.SecuritiesandExchangeCommissionforfraudworth$400,000,andwhohadsetupshoponthesmallCaribbeanislandofGrenada.Therebels,ofcourse,neversawacentofthepromisedmoney.SulimanBaldo, theseniorHumanRightsWatchresearcher for theCongoat the time,shookhishead

whenIaskedhimaboutWamba.Hehadbeen in touchwithWambaforyearsduring therebellion.Theprofessorwouldcallhimfrequentlyfromhisrebelbaseonhissatellitephonetotellhissideofthestory.“Wambabecameafarce,”hetoldme.“Iwouldmeethiminthebushsurroundedbychildsoldiers,andhewouldtellmeheisanadvocateofchildren’srights.”15WhendissentbrokeoutwithinWamba’sgroup,hissoldiersrepresseditharshly,beatingallegedconspiratorstodeath.16Wamba’s theorieshadclashedwith thebrutal realitiesofCongolesepolitics.Oneperiodduring the

warepitomizesthis.InAugust1999,WambawascoopedupinHotelWagenia,arun-down,colonial-erahotelinthemiddleofKisangani,asthetowndescendedintoabloodystreetbattlebetweenUgandanandRwandantroops.HisUgandanmindershadtoldhimthat theRwandanswantedtokillhim,sohespentmuchofhis time inhis room,ona satellitephoneorwriting.His surroundingswerenot conducive tocreativethinking.Notonlyweretherethesporadicburstsofmachinegunfire,butthehotelhadsufferedthe same dilapidation as the rest of the city—the water, when it ran, was rusty; the electricity wasunreliable;andhumidityfilledthewalls,floorboards,andmattresseswithadank,fetidsmell.Theheatwas unbearable, and the extreme humidity was only leached out of the air during the late afternoonthunderstorms.Nonetheless,Wambawas prolific.Visitors to the hotelwere sometimes turned away by the guards,

whosaid,“Thepresidentiswriting.”Theprofessor’sessaysoftenseemedtohavelittlebearingonthetumultaroundhim.As theKalashnikovscrackledoutside,Wambawroteanopen letter to theBelgians,exhortingthemtoexaminetheirruleintheCongoandtofollowthevisionaryteachingsofformercolonialgovernorPierreRyckmansandPrimeMinisterPatriceLumumba.Otheropenlettersfollowed,includingone to the people of theUnited States and others to the population ofKinshasa and to theCongolesediaspora.Another letter fromthe timewas—somewhat ironicallygiven thecontext—aMaoist-inspiredreflectionontherelationbetweentheoryandpracticewithintherebelmovement:“[Thefoundingstatutesof the RCD] should affirm that the individual submit himself to the organization, the minority to themajority,thesubalternleveltotheupperlevel,thewholeorganizationtothepoliticalcouncil.”17

A Congolese friend once described the curse of Congolese politics as “the reverse Midas effect.”“AnythingtouchedbypoliticsintheCongoturnstoshit,”hetoldme.“Itdoesn’tmatteriftheHolyFatherhimself decides to run for president, hewill inevitably come out corrupt, power-hungry, and guilty ofbreakingalltenoftheholycommandments.”His view was extreme, but there is no doubt that there is little trace of responsibility in recent

Congolese politics.Wamba is not the only civil rights activist or university professorwho joined thevariousCongoleserebellions.Dozensofotherswithsolidhumanrightscredentialsjoinedandweresoonplunged into thedirtyworldofCongolese insurgentpolitics.Wambacomesout relativelyunscathed incomparison.Asmisguidedashemayhaveseemed,atleasthedidn’tbecomeinvolvedoutofself-interest.Expatriateworkers in theCongo are often heard to say, “Youknowhow it is—theydon’t have any

ideology.TheCongolese likefunanddancing.Theycanneverstandupfor themselves.”“TheywouldselltheirsisterforaGuccisuitandsunglasses;youcanbuyanybodyhere.”“Theyarelikechildren;youneedtoteachthem,kindlybutfirmly.”This sort of patronizing attitude is common among expatriates—be they Indian, European,Arab, or

American—in theCongo.Rarelydo theyponderwhy thesealleged traitshavedeveloped.The lackofresponsiblepolitics, isnotdue to somegeneticdefect inCongoleseDNA,amissing“virtuegene,”orevensomethingaboutCongoleseculture.Instead,itisdeeplyrootedinthecountry’spoliticalhistory.Sincetheseventeenthandeighteenthcentury,whenEuropeanandArabslavetraderspenetrateddeep

into the country and captured hundreds of thousands of slaves, often in complicity with local chiefs,hastening thedisintegrationof thegreatkingdomsof thesavannah that ruledfromtheAtlanticseaboardthroughoutthecenterandsouthofthecountry,theCongohassufferedasocialandpoliticaldissolution.Itwas thevictimofoneof themostbrutalepisodesofcolonial rule,when itwas turned into theprivatebusiness empire of King Leopold; under his reign and the subsequent rule by the republican Belgiangovernment,theCongo’sremainingcustomarychiefswerefought,co-opted,orsentintoexile.ReligiousleaderswhodefiedtheorthodoxyoftheEuropean-runchurchesfacedthesamefate:TheprophetSimonKimbangudiedafterthirtyyearsinprisonforhisanticolonialrhetoric.UnderMobutu,thepriceofresistancewassogreatthatfeweverdaredtostandupandbecountedfor

fearofbeingchoppeddown.Resistancetodictatorshipinothercountrieshasbeenmostsuccessfulwhenitcancallonstrong,well-organizedstructuresoflike-mindedsupporters,suchaslaborunions,churches,orstudentgroups.IntheCongo,whereinanycaseonly4percentoftheworking-agepopulationhadjobsin the formal sector, therewere few labor unions to speak of. In the early 1990s, fewer than 100,000studentsinhighereducationweredispersedamongdozensofuniversitiesandtrainingcentersacrossthecountry.Mobutu had tamed these institutions, consolidating all labor and student unions and forcefullyintegrating them into his ruling party. The country’s biggest institute of higher learning, LovaniumUniversity, previously run by the Catholic Church, was nationalized along with several Protestantuniversities.MobutuevenforcedtheCatholicChurchtoaccepttheestablishmentofcellsofhispoliticalpartywithinreligiousseminaries.Some Congolese leaders have courageously stood up in protest: Lumumba before independence,

Tshisekedi during Mobutu’s reign, and the countless journalists, priests, doctors, and human rightsdefenders who opposed oppression and injustice. Once these individuals become members ofgovernment,theyareconfrontedwithtwoproblems:thelackofapopularbaseandtheabjectweaknessofthestate.Unabletoimplementpolicyandattackedonallsidesbyrivals,theyhavebeeneitherco-opted,killed,orforcedtoquit.If the fiercest ideology or ethics that can be found in the country is ethnic, that is because no other

institution has been strong enough for the people to rally around.Unfortunately, ethnicmobilization isusuallyexclusiveinnatureanddoesnotformanequitableortrulydemocraticbasisforthedistributionofstateresources;also,giventhemanipulationofcustomarychiefs,eventhisvesselhasbeencorrupted.Itwill take generations to rebuild institutions or social organizations that can challenge the currentpredatorystatewithoutresortingtoethnicity.Wambacametopoweraloneandisolated.Hedidn’thaveapoliticalpowerbaseandhadfewalliesin

therebellionhehadjoined.Mostimportantly,theorganizationwasfracturedintodifferentinterestgroupsanddominatedbyRwandaninterference.Forapoliticalscientist,Wambahadgrosslyunderestimatedthenecessityofhavingastrongorganizationtoimplementtheloftyreformshedreamtof.Insteadofleaving,however,Wambaretreatedintothecocoonofhisideasandtheories,writinglettersandgivinginterviewstoleftistAmericanandAfricanjournals.Hebecameavictimofhisownidealism,reducedtoirrelevance.

15

THEREBELSTART-UP

The fact is thatamanwhowants toactvirtuously ineverywaynecessarilycomestogriefamongsomanywhoarenotvirtuous.

—NICCOLOMACHIAVELLI

GBADOLITE,CONGO,JULY1999

WhentheRwandanslaunchedtheirwaragainstLaurentKabilainAugust1998,Jean-PierreBemba,asix-foot-two, two-hundred-and-seventy-pound,millionaire-turned-rebel leader started his own rebellion inthe north of the country, theMovement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Although he receivedbacking from the Ugandan army and from an assortment of former Mobutists, for the most part, hisrebellionwasaboutJean-PierreBemba.InJuly1999BembacapturedMobutu’shometownofGbadolite.Overthirtyyears,Mobutuhadturned

thesleepyjungletown,whichcountedonly1,700soulsatindependencein1962,intoamonumenttohiscorruptionandprofligacy.Hebuiltthreeseparate,sprawlingpalacesforhimselfandhisvisitors.Oneofthepalaceswasa replicaofaChinesepagoda,completewithgildeddragonfigurines, jade roofs,andcarp-filled ponds. Ceramic tiles were flown in from Europe, pure-bred sheep from Argentina, andbirthdaycakesfromParis’bestpatisseries.Thevillage—oneofthemostremotecornersofthecountry,five hundred miles from Kinshasa, ensconced in thick rain forest—featured luxuries most Congolesetownscouldonlydreamof:ahydroelectricpowerplant;afour-mile-longairport,oneof the longest inAfrica,whichcouldaccommodateConcorde jets; andanuclearbunker that could shelter fivehundredpeople.Satellitedishesprovidedcrispcolortelevisionandaphonenetwork.Attheheightofhisreign,Mobutu lavished $15million amonth on themaintenance of this dreamland. It was a surrealAfricanShangri-la.BythetimeJean-PierreBembaarrivedinGbadolite,thetownhadbeenransackedbysuccessionsof

differentarmedgroups—firstRwandansandtheAFDL,thenChadiantroopsflownintohelpKabilafightBemba.Thecrystalchandeliersandsilverwarehadbeenstolenandthewallsofthepalacesstrippedbareof anything that could be looted. Large avant-garde paintings had been replaced by graffiti—“ FuckMobutu,”readone—andglassfrombrokenwindowscrunchedunderfoot.ThefleetofMercedeshadbeengutted; the carp were long since belly-up, andMobutu’s pet leopard was rumored to be stalking theovergrownpalacegardens.Thewardrobesintownwerefullofthousandsofwhitegloves,aprons,andsuitsbelongingtothehundredsofthedictator’sformerdomesticstaff,nowoutofwork.Amid the ruins, Jean-PierreBemba setuphisheadquarters.Bembawas the sonofoneofMobutu’s

closestbusinessassociatesandhadhimselfbeenaprotégéofthelatepresident.WhenhehadwalkedintoGbadolite,thestreetshadfilledwiththousandsofsupporterswearingMobutuT-shirtsandcheeringhim

on.Hisfamilycamefromtheregion,andmostofhistoparmycommandershadmadetheircareerintheZairianarmy.Eveninstyleandpersonality,hespokewithsimilarbombastandcondescensionasthelate,greatMaréchal.Bembawas a spectacle.Dressed alternately in a smart business suit or in army fatigues, hewould

receive his visitors in his father’s house in Gbadolite, surrounded by his equipment: several satellitephones,ahigh-frequencyradio,andawide-screentelevision.Fromthiscentralcommandposthewouldstayintouchwithdiplomats,hiscommandersinthefield,andfriendsandfamilyinEurope.Onthecoffeetableinfrontofhimwasastackofsocietyrags:ParisMatch,L’Express,VanityFair,all rarelymorethanthreemonthsold.HespenthourswatchingCNNandFrenchnews,stayingabreastofworldevents.Forjournalistswhohadjustflownoverhoursofimpenetrablerainforestwithoutseeingapavedroad,therebelleaderseemedlostinanotherworld,farfromthethousandsofsquaremilesofjunglesthathisarmycontrolled. One reporter who visited him tells the story of watching CNN as news broke of John F.KennedyJr.’sdeathinaplanecrashoffMartha’sVineyard.Bembawasapparentlycrestfallen,obviouslyidentifying with the dead scion of the Kennedy family. “Why did he choose to fly at night, in thoseconditions?Why?”helamented,slappinghiskneeandshakinghishead.1AsforCongolesecaricaturists,theywerefondofdepictinghimasanovergrown,spoiledbabyindiapers,cryingbecausesomeonehadtakenhisrattleaway.AsalwaysintheCongo,themythrevealsabitoftheman,butnotmuch.Bembaiscertainlyendowed

with abloated egoandanoverlykeenbusiness acumen.Buthe alsomanaged todo something thatnootherrebelleaderintheCongohaddone:Hebuiltarebelmovementthatwasabletocontrolalargepartofthecountrywhilemaintainingpopularsupport,allwithoutexcessiveoutsideinterference.

“Thisbookis thehistoryofastruggle,”Bembawrites in theafterwordofhisautobiography.“Struggleagainstdictatorship.Astruggleforfreedom.Astruggleofsomanymenandwomenfallenonthefieldofhonour so that an ideal can triumph.”2 Grand words, but hardly the reality. Over the years, Bembadeveloped intoapoliticianwithanarticulated ideology,but formostofhis lifehewasabusinessmaninterested,aboveall,inpersonalsuccess.Jean-Pierre grew upwith a silver spoon in hismouth.His father, Saolona, the son of a Portuguese

traderandaCongolesewomanfromEquateurProvince,hadworkedhiswayupfromasmall-timecoffeegrowertobeheadofoneofthelargestbusinessempiresinZaire.BasedformuchofhisearlycareerinthecoffeegrowingregionofEquateur,SaolonamadeafortunewhenthecoffeepricepeakedfollowingtheBraziliancoffeefrostsofthe1970s.HegrewclosetoMobutuandbenefitedfromthenationalizationof foreign companies in 1973, expanding his coffee business and diversifying into manufacturing andtransportation.By the1980s,heranaconglomeratewith40,000employees.Hewasoneof therichestmeninZaire,electednumeroustimesasheadoftheCongoleseBusinessFederation.Jean-Pierre’smotherdiedwhenhewasonlyeight,leavingaholeinhisupbringing.Hisfathermarried

againandhadaffairswithseveralotherwomen,providingJean-Pierrewithovertwodozenhalf-brothersandsisters.Notlongafterwards,hewassenttoboardingschoolinBrusselsandwouldonlyseehisfatherwhenhevisitedwhileonbusinesstripsorwhenJean-Pierrereturnedhomeforvacation.“Hismother’sdeath affected him deeply,” José Endundo, another affluent entrepreneur who joined his rebellion,remembered.“Fromthenon,healwaysseemedtobealone.”

ThedistanceandlonelinessfueledBemba’sdesiretosucceedandledhimtofurtheridolizehisfather.“Jean-Pierrewasthefirstchild,theoldest,”MichelLosembe,thedirectorofCitibankinKinshasaandachildhood friend, recalled. “Hewas being groomed to succeed.”During his high school vacations, hewouldreturnhometoworkinthecoffeefieldsandtohelpmanagetheever-growingnetworkoffamilybusinesses.Meanwhile,heledadiscreet lifeinBrussels.“Hewasneverhisdaddy’sboy,neverarrogant,never

throwinghiswealtharound,”Losemberemembered.Helivedinathree-thousand-square-metervillainawealthysuburbofBrussels,buthealmostneverinvitedhisfriendstohishome.Helikedtosocialize,butevenwhenhewentoutonthetown,hewouldalwayssplitthebillandevenasktohavethewinedeductedfromhisshareifhedidn’tdrink.HegotareputationamongtheCongoleseinBelgiumforhavingmabokomakasi—tightfists.WaryofCongolesewhosoughttoingratiatethemselves,hepreferredhangingoutwithBelgianaristocrats’childrenjustaswealthyashewas.TheywouldgoonhuntingtripstotheArdennesduringtheirvacationsandtest-driveeachothers’newsportscars.LookingatpicturesofBembaatthattime,onefindsithardtobelievethatit’sthesameman.Inhishigh

schoolsnapshots,heisatall,thinboywhoseemstobesmilingdespitehimself.Hewasobsessedwithexcellingineverythinghedid—tennis,squash,studies.WhenheflunkedoutofhisfirstyearofuniversityinBrussels,hewassodisappointedthathespentthewholesummercrammingtopassastateexamsohecouldgetintotheprestigiousCatholicInstituteofHigherCommercialStudies(ICHEC)businessschool.Hesucceeded.“Hewasn’tsuper intelligentorquick,”aBelgianclassmateremembered,“buthewasincrediblydeterminedandrigorous.”During this time, andcontrary to later statements,Bembadidnot showany interest inpolitics.Like

most people at ICHEC, he focused on theworld of profits and losses, economies of scale and priceelasticities.Hewaswary of criticizingMobutu, as his father’s business increasingly depended on hisrelationswiththegovernment.Onhistripshome,he,too,wouldrubshoulderswiththeKinshasaelites,ashisfatherbegandelegatingmuchofhisworktohim.Bythetimehegraduatedfromuniversityin1986,at theageof twenty-four,Bembawasmanagingmostofhisfather’sforeignbusiness interestsandbankaccounts.Withthispromotion,Bemba’scharacterchanged.HemovedtoKinshasa,andhisfathermadehimthe

managerofoneofhislargestcompanies,ScibeAirlift.InacountrythesizeofwesternEurope,wherethenationalroadnetworkhadcollapsed,therewasalotofmoneytobemadeinairtransport.Bythattime,Scibehadbecometheunofficialgovernmentcarrier,ferryinggoodsandpeoplearoundthecountry.Jean-Pierre ran the companywith an iron fist,wakingup everymorning at 4:30 to go the airport.With hisemployees and business partners, hemimicked his father’s aggressivemanagement style.He yelled atworkers, insulted air traffic officials, and fired people who didn’t perform. “The difference betweenJean-Pierreandhis father,”oneofhis friends remembered,“was thatwithSaolona,at7o’clock,afterwork,thataggressivemaskfell,andhebecameanice,relaxedguy.WithJean-Pierre,themaskstuck.”Throughout this time, Jean-Pierrehadbecomeclose toMobutu.His father brought himalongonhis

tripstoGbadolite,wherethedictatorwasspendingmoreandmoretime,andMobututookalikingtotheenterprising youngman.Mobutu’s own children hadmostly disappointed him—several had joined themilitary or intelligence services, where they were known for their crude brutality, womanizing, andcrookeddeals.Themostpromisingone,hisfavoriteson,Niwa,passedawayinthe1980s,probablyofAIDS.Over theyearsallofhisothersonsfromhisfirstmarriagewoulddieaswell.MobutubegantotreatJean-Pierrelikeamemberofhisownfamily.WhentheyoungentrepreneurvisitedEurope,hewouldflybackwithgiftsforMobutu.Ononeoccasion,hesentamassivebirthdaycakebackononeofhisScibeairplanes.

Meanwhile,Jean-Pierrewaslongingtostarthisownbusiness,toemergefromhisfather’sshadow.Theprivatization of telecommunications in the early 1990s provided the opportunity. Like the rest of thestate’sinfrastructure,thephonegridhadcollapsed,promptinginvestorstoexperimentwithnewcellularphonetechnologythatwastooexpensiveforwidespreaduseinthedevelopedworld.ACongoleseTutsibusinessman,MikoRwayitare,convincedMobutuin1986tosetupTelecel,oneofthefirstmobilephonecompaniesinAfrica.Hedistributedhundredsofclunky,brick-sizedphonestoministers,andtheserviceprovedtobebothincrediblysuccessfulandexpensive.Withchargesasmuchas$16perminute,Mobutucomplainedtohisadvisorsaboutthemillionsofdollarsintelephonebills,aswellasRwayitare’stiestohis political rivals. Jean-Pierre saw a business opportunity and stepped in: He told the president hewouldstartanewcompany,Comcell,andoffercheaper rates.Mobutuwasdelighted.SowasSaolonaBemba,whofollowedhisson’sbusinessexploitswithgreatpride.ComcellpromptedJean-Pierre’sfirstforayintopolitics.Astheyoungentrepreneursetuptransmission

towersacrossKinshasa,hemetwithsharpresistancefromthepoliticalheavyweightssurroundingMiko.They tried tounderminehis nascent company andprevent customers from signingupwithComcell. Inresponse,Jean-Pierremountedhisfirstmilitaryoperation,usingagangofpresidentialguardstosabotageaTelecel antenna inKinshasa. “Tobe in business back then, you had to havemuscle to protect you,”recalledJoséEndundo,whoat thetimewasas influentialas theBembafamily.Jean-PierreBembagotused todrivingaroundKinshasabehind tintedwindows,escortedby twovehicleswithbodyguards.Afriendofhisremembersgettingintothepassengerseatofhiscararoundthattime,onlytofindagrenadeathisfeet.As the Zairian economy capsized, economic opportunities became scarcer, and political patronage

moreimportant.WhenthepoorlypaidarmywentonarampageinKinshasain1991and1993,pillagingthousandsofstoresandhouses,theBembaslostmillionsofdollars.Increasingly,Jean-PierreusedhistiestoMobututodefendhisbusinesses.Heobtainedprocurementdealsfromthearmyforthesupplyoffuel,uniforms,andbootsandevencarriedoutconfidentialdiplomaticmissionsforMobutuintheregion.Hemadefriendswithtopgenerals,whocontrolledmuchofthegovernment’sspending,andwhenMobutufellsickwithprostatecancer,Jean-PierrevisitedhimonhissickbedinFrance.

BythetimetheAFDLarrivedinKinshasa,Jean-PierrehadfledtoEurope;bythattimeheownedseveralsumptuousvillasinPortugalandBelgium.Hisfather,however,stayed,inordertolookafterthefamilybusiness and properties. Not surprisingly, when Laurent Kabila arrived in Kinshasa, Saolona Bembabecameoneof thefirstpeoplehe lockedup.“WhenyoutalkedaboutMobutu’sbusinesselite,Saolonawasforemost,”HenriMova,Kabila’stransportministeratthetime,recalled.“Wehadtoarresthim.”When Jean-Pierre heard about his father’s arrest, he was terrified what might happen to him. He

contacted several Mobutu officers who had fled across the Congo River to Brazzaville and tried toorganizeaprisonbreakforhisfather.Atthelastminute,whenpreparationswerealreadyatanadvancedstage,Saolonahimselftoldhissontostanddown.Itwastoorisky,hesaid.Thisisjustaboutmoney.Hewasright:Afterpayinghalfamilliondollars,hewasreleased.Jean-Pierre’s investments—a dozen planes, warehouses full of goods, coffee plantations, a mobile

phonenetwork—wereallsunkcosts,basedintheCongo.WhilemanyotherentrepreneurshadbeenabletomakethetransitionbetweenMobutuandKabila,Bemba’sintimacywithMobutuwastoowell-known.

HewasalsotooproudtocomebeggingKabilatoforgivehimforpastalliances.Bemba was an avid pilot and liked talking in aviation jargon. When asked why he had doggedly

pursuedhisdreamofrebellion,heonceresponded:“Inanaircraftattake-off,youreachdecisionspeed,after which, nomatter what happens, you have to continue accelerating and take-off or else you riskcrashingtheplane.Ihadreacheddecisionspeed.”3

Somesociologistshaveputdown insurgencies to“blockedpolitical aspirations.”4 If this is true,manyothers fromMobutu’s entouragewould have had better reason to start an insurgency than Jean-PierreBemba.FollowingMobutu’sdemise,thecomplacencyofhislieutenantsandstrongmenwasastounding:All of hisministers, the heads of his powerful security services, and his personal advisors contentedthemselveswithcomfortableexilesinEuropeandSouthAfrica.Instead,itwasapoliticalneophytewhotookupthestruggleagainstKabila.OnceJean-PierreBembahaddecidedonstartingarebellion,hehadvariouschoices.Hehadnaturally

beenin touchwithMobutu’sformergenerals inexilebutwasskepticalabout theirabilitiesgiventheirrecent ineptitude. Theywere also divided into different, competing networks, the result of decades ofdivide-and-conquer manipulations by Mobutu. Bemba also wanted to avoid direct association withMobutu’sregime.Then therewas the newRwandan-backed rebellion that had begun gestating in the earlymonths of

1998.BembahadmetUgandanpresidentYoweriMuseveniduringoneofhisbusiness tripsbefore thewar andhadkept in touch since.5Museveniwasworried about thewayLaurentKabila’s regimewasshaping up, and he was eager to identify new, more reliable figures in the Congolese diaspora. HerecommendedBemba toGeneralPaulKagame,whowasbusycobbling together theRCDrebellion. InKigali,however,Bembadidn’tlikethelookofwhathesaw.“Militarily,thechoiceofthismovementtoleanexclusivelyonitsRwandanallytothedetrimentofdevelopingaCongolesecapacity,makesmethinkthatthismethodcannotleadtothecreationofacrediblepopularmovement,”hewroteafteratwo-hourmeeting with Kagame.6 He was also worried by the phalanx of Congolese political and economicheavyweightsalreadyassembledinKigali.Itwasclearthatifhejoined,hewouldnotbetheleaderofthenew movement, but milling around in mid-level bureaucracy. Back in Kampala, he explained hisreservations to Museveni and pushed for a second option, “a real alternative force to Kinshasa’sdictatorialregime.”MusevenihimselfwasbeginningtohavehisdoubtsaboutRwanda’sapproach,whichseemedtootop-

downandcontrolling.“Wehadadifferentstrategy,”ColonelShabanBantariza,thearmyspokesman,toldme.“Forus, theCongoleseweresupposedtolearnhowtomanageandrulethemselves.”TheUgandanarmywasinspiredbyitsownexperienceasrebels,fightingforsixyearsinthebushwithlittleexternalsupport,relyingonthelocalpopulation.BembafittheUgandanmodel.“Hewasconvincing,”Bantarizasaid.“Youcouldspendtwohourswithhim,andhewouldgiveyouaclear,structuredvisionofwhathewanted todowithhiscountry.”7TheUgandansagreed tobackBembaandenrolledhim inacceleratedmilitarytraining.ShortlyafterthebeginningofthesecondwarinAugust1998,theyagreedwiththeRwandanstosplit

operationalsectors,withtheUgandanstakingtheareanorthofKisanganiandtheRwandansstayingtothesouth.Kisanganiitselfwouldremainunderjointcommand.

Tostart theirownrebellion, theUgandansrecruited154Congolese inKisangani inSeptember1998and began training them alongwithBemba.That numberwould later take onmythical proportions forBemba,whoclaimedthatheconqueredtheareanorthofKisanganiwithamere154soldiers.Thatwas,atleastinitially,nottrue.AsBembasweatedawayinthetrainingcampwithhissoldiers—hewasmadetogoose-step, snake around on his considerable belly, and take apart anAK-47 in thirty seconds—RCDtroopswithUgandansupportwereadvancingtothenorth,fightingpitchedbattleswithKabila’stroops.ThekeymomentforBembacamewhenUgandaseizedthestrategic townofLisala, thebirthplaceof

Mobutu,inEquateurProvince,andtheUgandancommander,GeneralJamesKazini,assembledtheRCDtroopsandtoldthemtoturnintheirwalkie-talkies“forreprogramming.”GeneralKazinisatdownwiththe Congolese officers and gave them a choice—you can return to Kisangani and work with theRwandans,orstayherewithusandhelpusbuildanewrebellion.Mostchosethelatter.ItwasinthemidstofthisKigali-KampalacatfightthattheMovementfortheLiberationoftheCongo

(MLC)was born.Bemba,who had beenworking for severalmonthswith friends from theCongolesediasporaondraftingstatutesandapoliticalprogram,quicklycalledtheBBCradioservicetoannouncehisnewrebellion.

TheMLC’sbeginningswereshaky.Applyinghimselftotherebellionwiththesametenacityashedidtohis business empire, Bemba managed to recruit a hodge-podge of young men and women from thebusinessandpoliticalclassofKisangani.OfthefoundingmembersoftheMLC,therewasajournalistforthe state radio station, the local manager of Bemba’s phone company, a territorial administrator, twoformerMobutuofficers,andseveralbusinessmen.Noneofthemwasoverfortyyearsold.Forthemostpart,theywerepoliticalunknowns.Slowly,Bemba began to take over control of themilitarywing of theMLC from theUgandans.He

leveragedhis contacts amongMobutu’s former officers to rally someof themost capable aroundhim,makingsuretostayawayfromthemostinfamousandcorrupt.IthadnotbeenforlackofexperienceandknowledgethatMobutu’sarmyhadlostthewar,andhundredsofofficers,marginalizedorinexile,wereeagertogetbackintothefray.BembahandedthemilitarycommandovertoColonelDieudonnéAmuli,the former commander of Mobutu’s personal guard and a graduate of several international militaryacademies. Other officers’ résumés included stints at Fort Bragg and Fort Benning (United States),Sandhurst(UnitedKingdom),Nanjing(China),Kenitra(Morocco),andacademiesinEgyptandBelgium.AlthoughtheUgandanscontinuedtoprovidemilitarysupport,inparticularthroughartillery,training,andlogistics,byearly1999theCongolesewerelargelythemastersof theirownrebellion,expandingtheirrebelforcefrom150toaround10,000troopswithintwoyears.Slowly, on the backof theMLC ’s growing reputation, a secondwaveof political figures began to

boardflightsfromEuropetojoinup.Theirpedigreewasasimpressiveasthoseofthemilitaryofficers.Thistimeitwasthewell-heeleddiaspora,themembersoftheKinshasaelite,educatedinEuropeandtheUnitedStates.Thereweretheyoungandwesternized,likeOlivierKamitatu,thesonofafoundingfatheroftheCongowhohadbeenBemba’sinseparablefriendinbusinessschoolinBrussels.ThenthereweretheMobutists-turned-oppositionactivists, including former primeminister Lunda Bululu and two otherformerministers,andthebusinessmen,suchastheerstwhileheadsoftheCongolesebusinessfederationandtheCongo-Belgianchamberofcommerce.Ingroupsoftwoorthree,theyarrivedonUgandanmilitary

planes inGbadolite,which bymid-1999 had become command central of the rebellion. Theywalkedaroundthepillagedtowndumbstruck.

Thencametheluck,andwithitthebirthoftheBembamyth.Fromtheearlydaysofrebelliononwards,theportlyMLC leader,whohadhad less than amonth of formalmilitary training in his life,was presentalongthefrontlinesandinsistedonparticipatinginmilitaryoperations.WhentheChadiansandKabila’stroopstriedtoattacktheMLCbaseinLisala,Bembaflewintotownundergunfireanddrovearoundinapickuptruck,roundingupandregroupinghisscatteredsoldiers.“Ifyouhavetobelieveinmiracles,thatwasn’ttheonlyone,”helaterwrote.8Adaylater,arocket-propelledgrenadewhistledbyhim,missinghimonlybyseveralfeet.Thedayafterthat,amidashowerofgunfire,aUgandantransportplanelanded,unloaded,andtookoffagainwithoutmajordamage.“Itwasincredible,”afriend,whohadbeenintouchwithBembaonamonthlybasisbysatellitephone,recalled.“Itwasasifhewasblessedwithspecialpowers.”9TheMLCleadersbeganconstructingamytharoundBemba’sexploits,apanegyricthatfitwellintothe

Congolesetraditionofpraisesinging.Theyouthscalledhim“Baimoto,”adazzlingdiamondthatblindsthe enemy. Radio Liberté, the MLC radio station, began transmitting programs infused with Bemba’slegend.ItwassupposedtoprovidethegluetokeepthedisparateelementsoftheMLCtogether:Bembathe soldier,Bemba the liberator, alwayson the front line, alwayswith the troops. “It did the trick,” aformerMLCcommandertoldmeandthenlaughed:“Theproblemwashebegantobelieveithimself.”10BembaadoptedthetitleofChairmanoftheMLC,inpartreferencetohisbusinessupbringing,inparta

winktoChairmanMao’scultofpersonality.Progressively,hisegobecamemoreandmorebloated,evenas he himself put on more weight. “Bemba was the MLC,” said José Endundo, the MLC’s formersecretary for the economy. “He was an incredible egomaniac.”11 His commissioners and counselorscouldn’t just go andvisit him in his house inGbadolite; theywould have towait to be called.At theentrance to his house, soldiers would frisk the MLC leaders, even the frail professor Lunda Bululu,Zaire’s former primeminister, who was in his sixties. Inside, officials sprawled on Bemba’s leathercouches, but even there, they were obliged to call himMr. President or Chairman. For some of theleaders,whohadboozedanddancedwithBembainhighschoolorhadknownhimwhenhewasstillindiapers,thistreatmentgrated.Bemba’smassive ego initially had a positive impact on the organization.According tomany of his

formercolleagueswho later left the rebellion,he ruled strictlybut fairly. “He respectedus,”Endundoremembered.“Andhewasagoodmanager.”ButformostofBemba’slieutenants,thegoalwasclear:tosit tight andwait fornegotiationswithKabila’sgovernment. If theyhad to endureBemba’snarcissismuntilthen,theywould.As opposed to most other rebel movements in the Congo, which spent much of their life spans

embroiledininternecinesquabbles,BembawastheunquestionedleaderoftheMLC,politicallyaswellasmilitarily.Fromcommandcentral onhis couch, hemicromanaged theorganization, onehandon theremotecontrolofhistelevision,anotheronhissatellitephoneorhamradio.Whilehepromoteddebateaboutinternalpolicyandstrategy,hewastheonlyonetomaintaincontacts

with foreign leaders. He almost never invited other MLC leaders along when he visited PresidentMuseveni,hisbiggestally.Thesamewentforothercontacts.“Hehadafabulousaddressbook,”Endundo

recalled.“Hewouldspeakto[Gabonese]PresidentOmarBongo,[Libyanleader]MuammarGhadaffi,[RepublicofCongo]PresidentSassouNguesso.”Likewise,noneoftheotherpoliticalleadersintheMLChadmuchtosayaboutmilitaryoperations.BembasattogetherwiththecommanderoftheUgandantroopsandColonelAmuli anddiscussedmilitary strategy. In several cases, hewent so far as tooverrulehisUgandancounterparts.12

Bembadidnothaveahardtimebeingpopular inEquateurProvince.TheMLCarrivedontheheelsoftwoyearsofoccupation,pillage,andabusebyRwandan,Congolese,andChadiantroops.EachgrouphadaccusedthelocalpopulationofsupportingMobutuandblamedthemforhostingsuchluxurious,wastefulprojectsas theChinesepagodasandthehydroelectricdams.WhenBembaarrived,hewastreatedasamwanamboka, a sonof the soil, ahometownhero.People lined the streetswhenBembaarrived in atown,wavingflagsofZaireandchantingBemba’sname.More thanone formerMLCofficial I interviewedcomparedBemba’smanagement style to that of a

private entrepreneur: “He ran his army like a company,” or “theMLC for himwas an IPO, an initialpublicoffering.”Nonetheless,eventhosewhofelloutwithhimconcedethatitwasbetterorganizedandmore successful than other rebellions. Its leaders weremembers of the Kinshasa elite, and tribalism,whichwasaproblemforotherrebelmovements,wasnotanissuehere.TherewasnointerferencefromKampala in politicalmatters, and the groupof decisionmakerswas small and relatively united.MostMLCleaderswerenotmotivatedbyimmediatefinancialgain—manyofthemwereindependentlywealthy—butratherbyareturntopowerinKinshasa.In any case, therewas little profit to be gleaned fromEquateur. It was a relatively poor province,

especially since its coffee, rice, andpalmoil plantationshad fallen intodisrepair.After taking all themoney they had found in the coffers of the banks—UN investigators tallied around $1.5 million“liberated” from three banks at the beginning of the rebellion—there was little money to be made.AccordingtoFrançoisMwamba,theheadoftheirfinances,theyrarelygotmorethan$50,000amonth.“Once,Ihadtospendtenhoursonthebackofamotorcycle,hangingontoakidwithanAK-47strappedonhisback,justtocollect$2,000fromabankinthejungletownofBanalia,”Mwambatoldme.“DoyouthinkIwouldbedoingthatifwewereflushwithcash?”13Giventheirfinanciallimitations,theMLChadlittletoofferthelocalpopulationintermsofservices.

They organized communal labor to rebuild some roads and bridges, but even they admitted it wasrudimentary.14Most of theirmoneywent to buying food andmedicine for the army and paying for airtransport.What therebelscouldprovide,however,was themostsought-aftercommodity in theregion:security.A poll carried out in 2002 in the province concluded that 70 percent of locals felt protectedagainstcrime.ThesamenumberindicatedthattheywouldvoteforBembaandtheMLCifelectionswereheldthen.15Indeed,whenelectionswereeventuallyheldin2006,Equateurwastheonlyprovincewherethepopulationvotedmassivelyinfavorofthearmedgroupthathadruledthemduringthewar,casting64percentoftheirballotsforBembainthefirstroundand98percentinthesecond.Almosteverywhereelseinthecountry,thepopulationclearlyrejecteditsrulers.16

TheproblemsarosewhentheMLCbeganexpandingitsmilitaryoperationsoutsideofEquateurin2001.Thenortheastern regionof Ituri,whichbordersUganda to theeastandSudan to thenorth,wasquicklyturningintoaquagmirefortheUgandanarmy.There,asopposedtoEquateur,therewasanabundanceofnatural resources, ranging from gold to timber, on top of the lucrative customs offices at the Congo-Ugandaborder,whichcollectedmillionsofdollarsofrevenuesamonth.ThedistrictsharednofrontlinewithKabila’s forces;nonetheless,Ugandahaddeployeda largemilitarycontingent there,ostensibly toprotecttheirborder.Inaddition,Iturihadahistoryofethnicrivalries,especiallybetweenthepastoralistHemapeopleandtheLendufarmers.Ugandanarmycommandersquicklybecameinvolvedinsemiprivatebusiness ventures, with different commanders backing various local ethnicmilitias in order to cornerlucrativepartsof themarket. In January2001,PresidentYoweriMuseveni,whoapprovedofBemba’smanagement of Equateur Province, asked Bemba to move eastward to take the leadership of a newcoalition of rebel movements, including several Ituribased factions and the MLC. Bemba accepted,attractedbythegreaterstatusitwouldprovidehim,aswellasbythesubstantialrevenuestobegarnered.The alliance, dubbed the Front for the Liberation of the Congo, was a disaster. After some early

successes in calming ethnic rancor, Bembawas quickly embroiled in a strugglewith the other armedgroups for control of the region’s resources. Instead of trying to find a negotiated solution, Bembaretaliatedwithforce,launchingtheominouslynamed“CleantheBlackboard”operationintendedtowipeouthisrivals.Theattackquicklydegenerated intoamessycounterinsurgencyoperation,as3,000MLCtroopscollaboratedwithaHemamilitiatoloot,abuse,andmassacrelocalstheyaccusedofcollaboratingwiththeirenemies.Alocalwitnessdescribedthebrutalitytohumanrightsinvestigators:

TheHemaandthe“Effaceurs”[MLC]cameintotownandstartedkillingpeople.Wehidinourhouse.Iopenedthewindowandsawwhathappenedfromthere.Agroupofmorethantenwithspears,gunsandmacheteskilledtwomeninCitéSuni,inthecenterofMongbwalu.Isawthempullthetwomenfromtheirhouseandkillthem.TheytookKasore,aLendumaninhisthirties,fromhisfamilyandattackedhimwithknivesandhammers.Theykilledhimandhisson(agedabout20)withknives.Theycuthisson’sthroatandtoreopenhischest.Theycutthetendonsonhisheels,smashedhisheadandtookouthisintestines.Thefatherwasslaughteredandburnt.17

The shine had come off Bemba’s reputation. The rebel coalition fell apart, andBemba retreated toEquateur Province. “ He was getting reckless,” anMLC official confided. “We were broke and hadengagedinamassiverecruitmentdriveintheexpectationofjoininganationalarmy,soweneededmoneytofeedoursoldiers.”This money was supposed to come from another military adventure, this time on foreign soil. In

October 2002, following a coup attempt, the president of the Central African Republic, Ange FelixPatassé,askedBembatocometohisaid.Bangui,thecapitalofthestrife-torncountry,wasjustacrosstheriverfromoneofBemba’sbases.Itwasapurelymercenaryaffair,withPatassépayingBembacashinreturn for sending 1,000 troops to help ward off the attack. Once again, Bemba’s troops committedatrocities, pillaging villages and raping dozens of women. Bemba, who himself visited his troopsdeployedthereandfollowedtheoperationsclosely,sufferedanotherdenttohisreputation.Thistime,theconsequenceswouldbemoreserious.Fiveyearslater,hewouldbearrestedandforcedtostandtrialforhissoldiers’abusesinfrontoftheInternationalCriminalCourt.

Inthemeantime,lifeinGbadolitefortherestoftheMLCleaderswasbucolicandslow.Afterall,theirheadquarterswas1,000kilometersfromKinshasa.Youcouldnotreachamajortownwithoutboardinganaircraftandflyingoverathickexpanseofforest.Theleaderswouldwakeuplateintheirair-conditionedhousesinGbadoliteandspendthedayinmeetingsoronthephonewithfriendsanddiplomats.Attimes,theyworked hard, sometimes late into the night. Therewere letters towrite to theAfricanUnion andUnitedNations,adraftconstitutiontoputtogether,andpoliticalstrategytohatch.Othertimes,therewasnothingtodobutfindnewwaystowardoffboredom.Somewouldlistentoclassicalmusic,whileotherswould walk through Mobutu’s abandoned gardens, listening to parrots, hornbills, and mousebirds orhunting for Mobutu heirlooms that previous pillagers had missed. They inspected Mobutu’s privatechapel, containing the tomb to his first belovedwife,Marie-Antoinette,which in better times used toelevateonceayearonherbirthdayviaasolar-powereddevice.Intheevenings,whentherewasnoworktobedone,somewouldwatchsatelliteTVwithBemba,although“thatcouldgeta littleboringafterawhile,”oneMLCleaderadmitted.For the formerMobutists, who had been living in exile in their villas in Europe, life inGbadolite

wasn’teasy.“Gonewerethedaysofchampagnedrinking,partieswithtwohundredservants,andpeopleflowninonConcordes,”Endundoremembered.Hewasparticularlybitterabouthavingtorunhisvariousbusinessesfromtheisolationofthejungletown.Heranupsatellitephonebillsofupto$40,000amonth.ThambweMwamba,aformerministerofpublicworksforMobutu,arrivedinmid-2000,askinghisnewcolleagueswhethertherewassomewheretogetamanicureintown.SomeMLCofficialstooktoridingbicycles, a skill that somehad to relearn, as therewereonly a fewvehicles in town, all belonging toJean-PierreBemba.“Wegotintoafightwithhimonetime,”aformerMLCcommanderremembered,“becausehedidn’twanttoloanusapickuptodropusoffatourhouse.ItwasapickupwehadcapturedfromtheChadians!Nothispersonalvehicle!”18When asked about howmuch they earned during thewar, allMLC officials respondwith the same

guffaw. In the early days, when the MLC just controlled a handful of mid-sized towns in northernEquateur, the tax revenuesweren’t enough to pay salaries.High-ranking cadres received a daily foodallowanceofaround$4;lessimportantofficialshadhalfasmuch.Theirdietwasatediousrepetitionoffish, rice, and various manioc, pumpkin, and bean leaves stewed in palm oil. “Once, after muchcomplaining,” said Thomas Luhaka, theMLC defense commissioner, “the commander gaveme $40. Ithoughtthatwasalot!”Butboredomwasperhapsthebiggestchallenge.ThehydroelectricplantontheUbanguiRiverwasstill

working and supplied the town with electricity day and night. The wives of the leaders, themselvesensconcedintheirhousesinEurope,wouldsendthemcarepackagesviaKampalawithalltheluxuriesthey needed: cheese, ketchup, chocolate, smoked ham, and even condoms.The latter itemdidn’t go towaste:TherewasstillacoterieofbeautifulwomeninGbadolite,educatedatthelocalJesuitschool,oneofthebestinthecountryunderMobutu,whohadworkedattheEnlightenedGuide’scourt.ForsomeofhistimeinGbadolite,Bembalivedwithoneofthesewomen,thebeautifulandtallMayimuna,withwhomheendeduphavingseveralchildren,muchtothedismayofhiswife,whohadstayedinPortugal.

ImetwithJean-PierreBembaonceafterhehadleft therebellion, in2005,bywhich timehewasvicepresidentinthetransitionalgovernment.Hegreetedmeathisdesk,wearingasuitandtie.Infrontofhim

was a laptop onwhich “I can see all the revenues and expenditures of the government budget in realtime,” he said—his portfolio included economy and finance. Just before I had arrived, he had beenperusingabookthatlaynexttothelaptoponthetable:The48RulesofPowerbyRobertGreene.Itwasagoodindicationofhisphilosophy.HewasmoreMachiavelli—theinspirationbehindthebook—thanMaoorMarx.AswithMachiavelli,whowroteduringatimeofupheavalandinfightingamongItaly’svariouscitystates,idealismwouldn’tgetyouveryfarintheworldofCongolesepolitics,andithadneverbeenpartofBemba’sarsenal.Mostofhisownautobiography,TheChoiceofFreedom,wasghostwrittenbyhisownideologues:OlivierKamitatuandThambweMwamba.AsanMLCfriendonceputit,“youcan’tteach people with twenty years of experience in politics new tricks. Jean-Pierre Bemba was no CheGuevara.”19Congoleserebelpoliticssincethe1960shasbeeneitheraneliteoranethnicaffair,or—mostoften—a

mixtureofboth.Therehasrarelybeenasuccessfulexperimentinbuildinganinsurgencyfromthegroundupwithoutoutsidehelp.AlmosteverysingleCongoleserebelgroupwashelpedonitswaybyanoutsidepatron:Rwanda,Uganda,DRCongo,Angola,andZimbabwe.Thesemi-exceptionsarethevariousethnicself-defense forces, usually called Mai-Mai, that operate in the eastern Congo and that sprang up inresponsetooutsideaggression.Manyofthesegroups,whileinitiallyautonomous,onlybecamepowerfulwhentheywereco-optedbyKinshasatowageaproxywaragainstRwandaandUganda.Andalmostallremainedconfinedbythelimitsoftheirethnicity.AsCheGuevarahimselfhadconcludedattheendofhissojourninthecountryin1965,therebelswere“devoidofcoherentpoliticaleducation...revolutionaryawarenessoranyforward-lookingperspectivebeyondthetraditionalhorizonoftheirtribalterritory.”20It was therefore no wonder that theMLC would break up after the war. One by one, most of the

heavyweights in thepartyhadbeen thrownoutof themovement,whichwasnowbatteredandbroken.TiredofBemba’sego,andbrokeafteryearsofunpaidlabor,manygladlyacceptedoffersfromKabilatojoin his party,while others struckout on their own.EvenOlivierKamitatu, thewellspoken secretary-generaloftheparty,whohadbeeninseparablefromBembasincetheirschooldays,hadbailedonhim,taking a job asminister of planning forKabila. Rumors abounded thatOlivier’s new house had beenfinanced by Kabila, and he was often seen driving around in a new, shiny Hummer. Those who hadremainedinthepartywereconsumedbyincessantsquabbling.Thetransformationfromarebelgroupintoapoliticalpartyhadfailed:TheauthoritarianismthatBembahadusedtokeeppeopleinlineinthejunglewasnow illplaced.Opportunism,onceacentripetal force in theMLC,hadnowburst theseamsof themovement,flingingmembersinalldirections.Nonetheless, during its heyday, theMLCwas as good as it gets for a Congolese rebel movement.

AlthoughsupportedbyUganda,itwasrunbyCongoleseunderamoreorlessunifiedcommand,supportedbythelocalpopulation,andrelativelydisciplined.ButtheMLCalsoshowsusthelimitationsofrebellionin theCongo.Likemost rebellions, itwas runbyaneducatedelite,whileallof its footsoldierswerelocalpeasants.Therewaslittleideologythattookholdatthegrassrootslevelotherthanoppositiontotheenemyandtriballoyalty.

16

CAINANDABEL

KISANGANI,CONGO,MAY1999

InMay1999,thecityofKisangani,laterdubbedtheCityofMartyrs,fellvictimtotheworstboutofurbanwarfaretheCongolesewarhadeverseen.Thebattlehaddramaticconsequences:ItspelledtheendoftheRwandan-Ugandanallianceandbroughttotheforetheplunderofthecountry’sriches.Thecity’sreputationhadnotalwaysbeensobleak.Thetownofamillionpeoplewaslocatedinthe

middleofthecountryatabendintheCongoRiver.Inthe1960s, ithadbeenanattractivecitylaidoutalonggrandavenueslinedwithjacarandaandmangotrees.ItisclearthattheBelgianshadhadbigplansfor the jungle city: Italianate turrets and futuristic, Art Deco architecture; streets named after Chopin,Beethoven, and Belgian royalty; and a city divided by the great river into “Rive Droite” and “ RiveGauche,”reminiscentofParis.Kisanganiformeda tradehubwith theeasternprovincesbyroadandwithKinshasabyriver.Roads

branched out into the jungles to the north,where therewere large ranches and coffee plantations, andmerchants brought huge bags of rich palm oil down the river in dugout canoes. However, Mobutu’skleptocracyhadreversed the flowof time in the town,asbuildingscrumbledand the jungle reclaimedland.ThenovelistV.S.Naipaulportrayedthedemoralizingauraofthecityinhis1979book,ABendintheRiver:

The big lawns and gardens had returned to bush; the streets had disappeared; vine and creepers hadgrownoverbroken,bleachedwallsofconcreteorhollowclaybrick....Butthecivilizationwasn’tdead.Itwas thecivilization Iexisted inandworked towards.And thatcouldmake foranodd feeling: tobeamongtheruinswastohaveyourtimesenseunsettled.Youfeltlikeaghost,notfromthepast,butfromthefuture.Youfeltthatyourlifeandambitionhadalreadybeenlivedoutforyouandyouwerelookingattherelicsofthatlife.1

ThecountryhadonlyfurtherdecayedsinceNaipaulhadvisitedit.ThroughoutmytravelsintheeasternCongo, I would come across overgrown train tracks, phone poles devoured by termites andmoss. Inremote valleys, entire villas completewith horse stables and swimming pools had been reclaimed bynature.Thewar had further sapped the life out ofKisangani.Thewhitewash had faded from theArtDeco

facades, the pavementwas cracked and overgrownwith grass, andmost shopswere boarded up andempty.Rivertraffichadallbutceased,asnoboatswerealloweduptheriverfromKinshasaintorebel-heldterritory.Withnofuelorsparepartsavailable,theonlymotorizedtrafficonthestreetswereafewdozenvehiclesbelongingtohumanitarianorganizations.Theonlymeansofleavingthetown—unlessyouwantedtotrekonfootforaweekthroughtheforest—wasbyplane,soallluxurygoodshadthecostofanairticketslappedontheirpricetag.

Theisolationhaditsimpactonthelocals.Almost10percentofchildrenwereseverelymalnourished,retardingtheirphysicalandmentaldevelopmentandmakingthempronetodisease.2Theinhabitantsnowhadtorelyonthetensofthousandsoftoleka(“let’sgo”inLingala),thebicycletaxiswithcushionsboltedontotheirbaggageracksforpassengers.Exceptfor theparishandseveralhotels,whichhaddiesel-rungeneratorsthatsometimesworked,thecitywasleftinthedarkaftersunset.Kerosenelampsandcandlesflickeredinbarsattheroadside.Thebeerfactorywasoneoftheonlybusinessestostayopenduringthewar,churningoutawatered-down,overpricedproduct.

Kisangani became the graveyard ofRwandan andUgandan reputations,where the two countries’ loftyrhetoricgavewaytoanother,moretawdryreality.SincethebeginningofthefirstCongowarin1996,thetwocountrieshadbeenabletomaintainthepretensethattheywereinvolvedintheCongooutofdomesticsecurityconcerns.Evenwhenthisillusionbecamedifficulttomaintain—Whyweretheirtroopsstationedthreehundredmilesfromtheirborders?WhydidtheyhavetooverthrowthegovernmenttheythemselveshadputinplaceinKinshasatoprotectthemselves?—theycontinuedtobenefitfromstaunchsupportfromtheinternationalcommunity,inparticulartheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom.Then, in 1999 and 2000, the alliance betweenRwanda andUganda fell apart, as the two countries

foughtthreebattlesinthestreetsofKisangani.ThousandsofCongolesediedasthetwocountriessoughtto settle their differences on foreign soil.With this internecine violence, their pretext of self-defensecrumbled.ButwhatwastheirrealmotiveinfightingovertheCityontheRiver?Tomany,thebattleinoneofthe

region’smainhubsofthediamondtradewasthefinalproofthatthetwocountrieswerereallyjustseekingself-enrichment.The realitywas, as always,more complex.Yes, access to resourceswas increasinglysupplantingideologyandself-defenseasamotiveintheconflict,buttherootofthefightingwasjustastightlylinkedtopersonalityandregionalpolitics.

TherootofdiscordbetweenRwandaandUgandacanbetracedbacktotheanti-TutsipogromsinRwandaaroundindependencein1962.HundredsofthousandsofTutsifledtoUgandaaroundthistime,wheretheygrewupinrefugeecampsassecond-classcitizens,notallowedtoworkanddiscriminatedagainstbytheUgandangovernment.Withinthesqualidconfinesofthecamps,theylookedbackwardstoamoregloriouspastandforwardtotheirchildren’sfuture,sendingthemtoschoolonUNscholarships.In the early 1980s, Ugandan youth gangs and paramilitary groups began harassing and abusing the

Rwandanimmigrants,accusingthemoftakingtheirland.UnwillingtoreturntoRwanda,wheretheHutu-dominatedgovernmentlimitedopportunitiesforTutsi,andfacingdiscriminationinUganda,hundredsofthese young Tutsi had joinedYoweriMuseveni’s rebellion in the late 1970s. “These Rwandanswerebetter educated thanmany of us,” a Ugandan army spokesman toldme. “Many of themwere put intomilitaryintelligence;thatwaswherewecouldusethembest.”3PaulKagamewasone.When Museveni came to power in 1986, Kagame became the head of military intelligence. Other

Rwandansbecamedefenseminister,headofmilitarymedicalservices,andchiefofmilitarypolice.Therelationships between Ugandans and Rwandans were deeply personal. The best man at Kagame’sweddingwouldbecome thechiefof staffof theUgandanarmy.Later,whenKagame launchedhisownrebellion in Rwanda, he and his fighters would cross into Uganda and eat and sleep at the house ofPresidentMuseveni’smilitaryadvisor.4AseniorUgandanintelligenceofficialtoldme,“theyhaduncles,cousins,andbrothers-in-lawinourarmy.”5The heavyRwandan presence in the security services stirred resentment amongUgandans, and land

conflicts involving the200,000Tutsi refugees living insouthernUgandawerebecominganuisanceforPresidentMuseveni.Under pressure from his domestic constituencies, hewas forced to backpedal onpromises of resettlement and citizenship for these refugees, and many Rwandans in the army weredemobilized. This rejection was tantamount to betrayal for Tutsi officers who had risked their livesliberatingUganda,onlytobedismissedasforeigners.Asoneofficerputit:“Youstakeyourlifeandattheendofthedayyourecognizethatnoamountofcontributioncanmakeyouwhatyouarenot.Youcan’tbuyit,notevenwithblood.”6TheRwandansweredisappointedbutwerefocusedonothermatters.HelpingMusevenitakepowerin

Ugandahadonlybeenasteppingstone tooverthrowing thegovernment inRwanda. Justoneyearaftertheir victory in Kampala, the Rwandan Patriotic Front was formed. Museveni provided them withweapons, medicine, and a rear base from which to operate. For many Ugandans, their debt to theirRwandanallieshadbeenrepaid.

TheCongowarssawtheRwandansusurptheroleofregionalpowerfromUganda.Fromthebeginning,theyseemedeagertoshowtheirformermentorsthattheycoulddobetter.The first, bloody shock camewithin severalmonths of the initial invasion in 1996.Among the four

Congolese leaders of the rebellion, the veteran rebelKisaseNganduwas closest toKampala.He hadbeen supported byMuseveni againstMobutu for years and slept, ate, and drank at a government safehouse when he was in Kampala. Once in the Congo, however, Kisase had railed against “Tutsicolonialism”andhadshownhimselftobefiercelyindependentofLaurentKabila,whoasspokespersonwastheleaderofthegroup.InJanuary1997,KisaseNganduandhisbodyguardwerefounddeadbytheroadoutsideofGoma.“TheRwandanskilledKisase.Theydidn’twantanycompetition,”aseniorMuseveniadvisortoldme.7

TheUgandansconsideredpullingout,buttheyhesitated,knowingthatiftheydidsoalltheworktheyhadput intotherebellionwouldhavegonetowaste.Sotheygrittedtheir teethandsoldieredon,providingartillery support andmechanized units that the Rwandans, largely still a guerrilla-style infantry army,didn’thave.Nonetheless, thewarswereledandexecutedmostlybyRwanda,whichgavethemamuchstronger influencewith theCongoleseandgaveRwandanentrepreneurspreferential access tobusinessdeals.TheresultofthiscomplexhistorywasafeelingofresentmentfromtheUgandans,whofeltsidelinedin

KinshasawhenLaurentKabilacametopower.Aboveall,theyaccusedKigaliofpoliticalimmaturityindealingwith theCongolese rebellions. “Iwasworried about the direct involvement of theRwandesetroops in thecombat role,”Museveni reflected later.Musevenipreferred to let theCongolesedeveloptheirownrebellion:“Letthemunderstandwhytheyarefighting.”8

FortheRwandans,Museveni’sattitudesmackedofhypocrisy.Afterall,theyhadhelpedhimcometopowerandasrecompenseweretoldtoleavethecountry.TheylikedtoinvokeaSwahilisaying:Shukraniyapundani teke (Thegratitudeof adonkey is akick).Even in theCongo, theRwandans felt like theUgandanswereoverbearingandconstantlytryingtoteachthemhowtogoabout theirbusiness.“Itwasjealousy,”oneofKagame’sadvisors toldme.“Musevenicouldn’tdealwith thefact thatwewerenowstronger andmore successful than him.He forgot thatwewere no longer refugees in his country. Hecouldn’torderusaround!”9

Wamba diaWamba arrived inKisangani on aUgandanC-130 cargo plane inMay 1999.He had fledGomawithaUgandanmilitaryescortafterhisRCDcolleagueshadthreatenedtokillhim.HehadthenmetwithPresidentMuseveni,whoapologizedtohimforhisclashwiththeRwandans:“Wamba,youwilldie because of my mistake. I never thought our Rwandan friends could become our enemies!”10Nonetheless, Wamba and Museveni decided he should return to Kisangani to try to launch a newrebellion, this timewithoutmeddlesome interference fromKigali. The elderly professor insisted on aslow,democratizingrebellionthatwoulddevelopgrassrootssupportandafirmideologicalcommitment.Inthemeantime,fightingshouldbekepttoaminimum.“UnconditionalnegotiationswithKinshasa!”wasWamba’sslogan.WhenWambaarrivedinthecity,hefounditdividedintoaRwandanandaUgandanzone,eachwith

Congoleserebelallies.Thetwoopposingcommanderswere tauntingeachother.Thecitystreets in thecenterofthetownwerealmostdeserted.Pickupswithanti-aircraftgunsandheavymachinegunsmountedonthebackpatrolledthetown.Itwasagameofchicken,witheachsideratchetingupthepressuretoseeif theotherwouldblink.RwandansoldiershauledaCongolesemanoutofaUgandanpickupbyforce,claiminghehaddefectedfromtheRCD.Inretaliation,UgandansoldierskidnappedthebodyguardofatopRCDcommanderwhilehewasbeinglatheredupinabarbershop.GeneralJamesKazini,theUgandancommander,washoledupinatimberfactoryontheedgeoftown,

where hewould spend his afternoons drinkingUgandan gin, chain-smoking, and commanding his unitsoverawalkie-talkieonatableinfrontofhim.Hewasacolorfulcharacterwithapugnoseandareddishshinetohischeekswhereskin-lighteningcreamhadburnedhim.ToUgandanjournalistswhovisitedhimhecomplainedabouthistwenty-seven-year-oldRwandancounterpart,ColonelPatrickNyavumba,basedjustamileaway,“Patrick?Patrick is justaboy. Iamabrigadier.Whoishe todiscussanythingwithme?” He told them the Rwandans were behaving like a colonial power in the Congo and pointed toWamba’sdefectionfromtheRCDasproof thatKigaliwas tryingtomanipulate itsCongolesealliesbyremote control.When the journalistspressedhimonwhyUgandawas there, he explained, “Uganda ishereasamidwifetoCongoleseliberation.TheRwandanswanttohavethebabythemselves!”11Eventhoughthetwoarmedforcesweresupposedtomaintainajointcommandinthecity,Kazinisoon

began tomakedecisionsonhisown.Hearrested thepilotsofRwandanaircraft arriving inKisanganiwithsupplies,accusingthemofnotnotifyinghimoftheirarrival.Onenight,heorderedUgandantankstoparadethroughtheRwandanpartof townfor threehoursaftermidnight, thunderinganartillerybarrageinto the surrounding forests, “Just to show them that theywere a professional armywith tanks and theRwandanswereabunchofbushfighters,”asoneUgandan journalistwithhimat the timeput it.12 TheRwandan commander retorted, telling the reporterswhovisitedhim, “[Kazini and I]went to the same

university,butnowhethinksbecauseIliveinmanyatta[strawhuts],Iamnogood!Tellhimthatheisanafande[respectedcommander]butthatIdon’trespecthismethods.”13Almostasanafterthought,thesamejournalistsvisitedWamba,whohadbecomeaminorplayerinthe

standoff. “The answer for the problems of the Congo does not lie with the military, but in theenlightenmentofthepeople,”hetoldthem,soundingevermorelikeCandide.14

Then there were the diamonds. In dozens of riverbeds around Kisangani, locals pan for the gems,spending days knee-deep in water. As in much of central and western Africa, Lebanese traders hadcorneredthediamondtrade,takingadvantageoftransnationalfamilynetworksthatreachfromAfricatotheMiddleEastandBelgium.Whilemanyother shops inKisanganiclosed, themainstreetswerestilllinedwith dozens of small diamond storeswith huge, painted diamonds decorating theirwalls. Theirnames voiced the traders’ eclectic backgrounds and dreams of a better future:Oasis, TopCorrection,ForceTranquille,andJihad.Only traderswith close connections to themilitary commanders felt safe enough to keep their safes

flushwithhundreddollarbills tobuy the rough stones fromdiggers.Between1997and1999,officialUgandan exports of diamonds grew tenfold, from$198,000 to $1.8million.Rwanda’s official exportsleapedfrom$16,000to$1.7millionbetween1998and2000,eventhoughneithercountryhasdiamondsof its own.15 The real value of exports is likely to have beenmuch higher, as the gemswere easy tosmuggleinpocketsandsuitcases.Oneofthethirty-fourdiamondshopownersinKisanganireportedthatoversixmonthsin1998alone,hepaid$124,000tovariousUgandancommanders,andindustryinsiderssuggestedthatbothcountriestogetherboughtupto$20millioninuncutstonesamonth.16The tradeproved tobedivisive, as each sidebrought in theirown traders, lugging suitcases full of

money counters, microscopes, satellite phones, and precision scales. For the Ugandans, it was theexperiencedBelgian traderPhilippeSurowicke,whohad spent yearsdealingdiamondswith rebels inAngola.17 The Rwandans flew in a bevy of Lebanese traders. Each were protected by a phalanx ofUgandanorRwandansoldiers,respectively.Notsurprisingly,astandoffdeveloped.

Wamba’s arrival put amatch to this powder keg.Much to the chagrin of theRwandans,who had justoustedhimfromtheRCDleadership,hebeganholdingrallies indowntownKisangani to largecrowdsrivetedbyhisdemandforanimmediateendtohostilitiesandtalkswithKinshasa.Hecreatedarebellion,dubbedRCD–MovementofLiberation,whichwouldbefreeofRwanda’smeddlesomeinterference.Hewas ferried around town in a Toyota 4x4 with tinted windows, followed by a pickup bristling withUgandansoldiers.Thousandsofpeopleflockedtohisrallies,andthetolekabicycletaxisaccompaniedhim,ringingtheirbells,asheparadedthroughtown.“Hewasapoorspeaker,”oneKisanganiresidenttoldmeofWamba.“Hesoundedlikeauniversitylecturer.ButhehaddenouncedtheRwandans!Forus,thatwasverybrave.”18BoththeoriginalRCDandWamba’snewdissidentshadsetupradiostationsthattheyusedfortrading

insultsand threateningeachother.“Whydo theRwandanswant tocolonize theCongo?Thepopulationdoesn’twantyou—recognizeit!”19tauntedRadioLiberté,Wamba’sstation.Itsrivalstationrespondedbyaccusing the professor of recruiting ex-FAR génocidaires into his army, the ultimate insult for theRwandans.“TheUgandanscan’tevendealwithabunchofrebelsinUganda.HowareyougoingtodealwiththeRwandanarmy?”20DayandnightthepopulationofKisanganihadtoenduretheseinsultsbeingflungbackandforthovertheairwaves,raisingtensionstoafeverpitch.21ThefightingbrokeoutfollowingWamba’sreturnfromatwo-weekstayinUgandaonAugust7,1999.

His radio announceda rally in frontofhishotel,while the rival stationwarnedpeople to stayoff thestreets.UgandanandRwandantroopsdeployedinforcetothecitycenterandsoonheavymachinegunandmortarfirebrokeoutasbothsidesfoughtfromhousetohouseinanefforttoseizekeystrategiclocations:theCentralBank,Wamba’shotel,thetwoairports,andtheUgandanandRwandanheadquarters.Thetwosides traded insults over a shared walkie-talkie frequency. General Kazini taunted his Rwandancounterpart:“Justwait.I’llsendjustonecompanyofmenforyou—theywillbringmebackyourballsonaplate.”22The fightingbegan inseriousnessonSundayafternoonaround2:30.Thousandsof soldiers filled the

broad avenues, taking cover in people’s living rooms, in sewage ditches, and in schools. Over sixhundred people, mostly women and children, were stuck in the International Community of WomenApostlesofGodevangelicalchurchforthreedayswithoutfoodorwater.Asoccerteam,dressedincleatsandjerseysandonitswaytoplayitsrivalsacrosstown,wasforcedtoseekrefugeinsewageditchesasbullets whistled overhead. Seven barbers and their clients were stuck in the Salon Maitre Celestinbarbershop next to HotelWagenia in a room just twelve feet by twelve large. They spent three dayswithouteatingordrinking,forcedtouseacorneroftheroomasatoilet.

PastorPhilippeisaministerinalocalKisanganichurchandacarpenter.Heisasmallmanwithlarge,roughhands,awispygreybeard,andawoodencrucifixaroundhisneck.Ivisitedhiminhisworkshop,not far from the river, surrounded by hardwood shavings that gave off a rich aroma.He peered atmethroughhuge, horn-rimmedglasses.He lost three children in the fighting, he toldme, his voice barelychangingintone,hisfingersinterlocked.Whenthewarstarted,hehadbeenathome,having justcomebackfromchurch.Hewas listening to

somechurchtapesonhisstereowhenheheardthefirstmortarhittheground;thecupsonthecoffeetableshook,andapictureofhiswifeonthewallfelldownandshattered.Immediatelytherat-a-tatcracksoftheAK-47s started,whistling through the leaves of themango trees outside.He and his nine childrenraced to lie facedownon the floorof thecorridor.Theyhadexperience inwar, likemanyCongolese.TheyknewthatAK-47shadenoughpowertogothroughabrickwallandstillkill:“Youreallyneedtwobrickwallstoprotectyourself.”23Theylayinthecorridorfortherestoftheday,listeningtothechurchtapewinddownthebatteriesas

themortarsfellaroundthem.TheirTshopocommunewasoneoftheworsthit:Itwasonthefrontlinesbetweenthetwoforces.Throughthewindowstheysawsoldiersmovinghousetohouse,crouchingbehindtreesandindoorwaysforcover.TheywereinaRwandan-occupiedarea,andtheTutsiofficersfrightenedthem.In1997,theministerhadworkedinasmallvillagesouthofKisanganiwhentheRwandanarmyhad

passedthrough,chasingthefleeingHuturefugeesandmilitias.HesawthemslitthethroatsoffourHutusoldiersandthrowthemintotheriver.“Youhavetounderstand,theTutsiarelikeawoundedleopard;it’slikethey’rebrain-damagedafterwhathappenedtothem,”hesaid.“Theylashoutatanything.”Finally,afterafulldayoflyingonthefloorintheheat,thefightingstoppedforseveralminutes.The

onlysoundwasofbabiescryinginaneighbor’shouse.Throughthewindow,theycouldseethebodiesofseveralsoldierssprawledinthedust;blastcratershadchangedthelookoftheirstreetandsprayeddirtontothesurroundinghouses.Twoofhischildren—Sophie,sixteen,andClaude,twenty-two—decidedtoseeiftheycouldgooutand

trytofindsomewater;thetapintheirhousewasrunningdry,andtheywereallfeelingfaintforlackofwater.Therewasacommunaltapacrossthestreet,andtheycouldseeawomanfillingaplasticjerrycan.Theministerwatchedhistwochildrenstepoutofthehousejustasamortarhitthestreetinfrontofthem.WhenPhilippepickedhimselfupoffthefloor,hefoundSophie’sbodytwistedinfrontofhishouse,herfaceabloodypulpandherneckalmostsevered.Claudewasmoaningandgrabbinghis leg,whichhadbeenhitbyshrapnel.Bloodhadcompletelysoakedhispantsandwasoozingontothestreet.Theministertied a tourniquet aroundhis thigh, grabbedawheelbarrow from thebackyard, puthim in it, and raceddownthestreettothehealthcenterrunbytheRedCross.Thefightinghadstartedupagain,andbulletswerewhizzingthroughtheair,butheknewthatClaudewoulddieifhedidn’tgethimhelp.Atthehealthcenter, thenurseswerelyingonthecementfloor,surroundedbypatientswithbandages

soaked inMercurochromeandblood, also lyingon the floor.TheyhelpedClaudeonto thegroundandworkedonstemmingthebloodlossfromhisrupturedartery.Buttheydidn’thavesurgicalequipmentorbloodtohelphim;all theyhadleftwassomeNovocainadentisthadbrought.Thehospitalwasamileaway.Theministerunclaspedhishandsandlookedatme.“Isawhimbleedtodeathinfrontofme.Iburied

himinmycompound,rightnexttoSophie.”Hepausedforalongtime,buthisvoicewassteady.“Therewasnotimeforaproperfuneral.Actually,youcanfindhundredsofbodiesburiedinpeople’sgardensaroundthecityforthesamereason.Wearelivingontopofourdead.”

WambahimselfwaspinneddownonthefloorofHotelWageniaforthreedays.TheRwandantroopsweremore experienced in guerrilla tactics.Bolstered by the arrival of hundreds of additional troops in theearlydaysofthefighting,theyeventuallygainedtheupperhandbycuttingtheUgandantroopsintownofffromtheirheadquartersoutsideoftown.Inapanic,theUgandanofficersstationedwithWambaevacuatedhim, carrying him piggy-back into an armored vehicle that, surrounded by special forces firingcontinuouslyinalldirections,brokethroughRwandanlinesandreachedtheembankmentsoftheCongoRiver.Wamba,hugginghisleatherbriefcasewithhisdocumentsandbooksinit,wasrushedintoadugoutcanoeandpaddledacrosstherivertoatextilefactory,wheretheUgandanarmyhaddugin.The scene at the factory complexwas one of terror. The Indian-born director was holed up in his

office,wherehehidunderhisdesk,whilewomenandchildrenlayonthefloorinthebathrooms.Severalmortarshellshit thebuilding,blowingholes in thecorrugatedroofingandsendingshrapnel flying.TheUgandans barricadedWamba into a room lined with sandbags and told him to stay down; he almostcollapsedfromstressanddehydration.Hrvoje Hranjski, a Croatian reporter for the Associated Press in Kigali, was embedded with the

Rwandanarmyduringthebattle.Heflewinononeoftheirflightsandstayedinasmallhousebehindtheircommander’s residence. He was friends with some of the Rwandan officers and spent the eveningsdrinking waragi gin, smoking, and talking with them. Most were well-educated and curious aboutinternational affairs; they discussed the similarities and differences between wars in the Balkans andthoseinCentralAfrica.It was clear to Hrvoje that the Rwandans were better organized than their enemies. “ They were

motivated and followed orders. The Ugandans didn’t seem to know why they were fighting.” TheRwandanswerecutofffromtheirbaseattheairportbutquicklyorganizedanairbridgewithhelicoptersandinfiltratedtheirsoldiersthroughthejungle.TheRwandans,usedtoyearsofguerrillawarfare,foughttheirway fromhouse tohousewith theirAK-47s, dodgingbullets.After battles, theRwandanswouldalwaysmakesuretogathertheirdeadandburythem,whereastheUgandansoftenlefttheirsoldiersonthestreets, leaving the impression that hundreds of Ugandans had died and almost no Rwandans. TheUgandans, for the most part, stayed in their trenches and in their armored personnel carriers. “ TheRwandanswonthebattlewithguts,”Hrvojesaid.Hrvojehadgoodreasontoadmirethem.Earlyoninthebattle,hewashitbyaUgandansniperwhile

comingoutoftheRwandancommander’shouse.Thebulletpiercedhisshoulder,wentthroughhislung,andlodgednexttohisspinalcord.AstheRwandansdidnothavemedics,theystaunchedthebleedingandwaiteduntil thefightinghaddieddownbeforerushinghimtoaplaneforKigali.“Theysavedmylife,thoseguys.”Thesiegelastedthreedays,afterwhichtheRwandanscontrolledmuchofthecity,althoughtheyhadnot

beenabletogettoWambaorconquerthetextilefactory.Bythetimethefightingwasover,theairinthecityhadbeguntofillwiththestenchofrottingfleshinthetropicalheat.Kisangani,roundone,went to theRwandans.RedCrossvolunteerspatrolledthetownintheirwhite

uniforms,daubing the corpseswith limeuntil theycouldget a truck topick themup.They shook theirheads:OnthebodiesofmostlyyoungUgandans,somehadpicturesoftheirmothers,othersoftheiryoungwives.

Otherthanfinger-waggingbydiplomats,therewerefewconsequencesfortheoccupyingforces.AjointinvestigationbytheRwandanandUgandanarmycommandersarrivedintownandagreedontakingstepstopreventfurtherfighting,butlittlewasdone.TheUgandansmovedtheirpositionstothenorthoftownbutcontinuedtobeefuptheirarsenals.TheRCDandRwandanscouldnotrefrainfromgloating,showingthebodiesofUgandansonCongolesetelevisionandwarningspectatorsthatthiswastheconsequenceofchallengingthem.Theybannedtolekariders—around2,000inthewholetown—fromworking,accusingthemofcomplicitywithWambaandtheUgandans.TheyevendismantledthefamousscaffoldingsetupbytheWagenia fishermen in theCongoRiver; they said the fishermen had helped guide theUgandans tosafetyduringthefighting.Thescaffolding,imposingthirty-foot-tallpiecesoftimberlashedtogetherandanchoredintherapids,hadbeenatouristattractioninKisanganisincethefirstBelgiancolonialpostcardsweremade.TheRwandanscertainlydidnotknowhowtomakethemselvesloved.Thefeudinghadallthecharacteristicsoftypicalsiblingrivalry;camaraderiewasneverfarfromone-

upmanship.Atnight,intheGentryDancingClub—adingy,darkbardecoratedwithChristmaslightsandcigaretteadvertisements—UgandansandRwandansmingled,sometimesevendancingtogetherandpayingfor each others’ drinks. The bar was a study in stereotypes: the Rwandans were dressed in spotless

camouflagefatiguesandwerereserved,clusteringinsmallgroups.TheUgandanswereboisterousintheirplain green uniforms andWellington boots,minglingwith the sexworkers and singing alongwith themusic. Their respectiveCongolese rebel allieswere on the high end of the frivolity scale, sometimesevenwearingmakeupandnailpolish.The festivities couldquickly turn sour,however.Analtercationoverawoman led to recriminations

overwhohadwonthelastroundoffighting.“Wecan’tfigurewhetheryouUgandansarerealsoldiersorjustBoyScouts,”oneRwandanteased.“HaveyouseenourT-55s?”theUgandansretorted,referringtotheir Soviet tanks. “Maybewe should show you.” Tomakemattersworse, theRwandans sometimesparadedabouttownincapturedUgandanuniforms,boastingaboutthevehiclestheyhadcapturedduringthefighting.Otherfactorsaddedtothetension.Afterfiveyearsinpower,theRPF’sauthoritarianismwasbeginning

tograte,resultinginhigh-leveldefectionsfromtheRwandangovernment.Ofcourse,giventheirhistoricaltiestoUgandaandthecurrentfrostyrelations,itwasonlynaturalforthesedefectorstofleetoKampala.ThespeakerofRwanda’sparliamentandtheformerprimeministerbothfledacrossthebordertowardthenorth.AgroupofTutsiuniversitystudentsfollowedaftertheywereharassedbysecurityofficials.24Theywere all welcomed with open arms in Kampala. Irked, General Paul Kagame accused his Ugandancounterpartofarmingex-FARandInterahamwetofightagainsthim.Theaccusationsmade littlemilitary sense.At the same timeas their feuding inKisanganiwas tying

down thousands of troops, both countries were engaged in a push on Kinshasa through Equateur andKatanga, respectively, yet the vitriol reached a level never expressed toward Kabila. The strongfriendship between Rwanda andUganda had soured into a toxic brew.Museveni belittled his formerallies as “those boys,”whileRwanda’s government spokesman fired back: “For aman surrounded bymarijuanaaddictsanddrunkards,Musevenihaschosenthewronganalogy.”25Finally, on June 5, 2000, the inevitable happened. Ugandan General James Kazini, who had been

itching for months to get back at the Rwandans, launched a new offensive. This time, the Ugandansunleashed a far heavier artillery barrage on Kisangani, in complete disregard for the hundreds ofthousandsofcivilianscoweringintheirhomes.UNobserversestimatedthat6,000artilleryshellsfellonthe city over the following six days, accompanied by heavy machine gun fire and rocket-propelledgrenades.Atthesametime,residentsintheTshoponeighborhood,locatedalongtheriveronthefrontlineoftheconflict,sawUgandansandRwandansstormingtheirstreets,diggingtrenchesintheirgardens,andbreaking into their houses to fire through the windows. As the fighting began during the morning,thousandsofschoolchildrenwereonceagainpinneddownbythefighting,sometimesbetweenthefeetofsoldiers,whosespentcartridgesraineddownontheirheads.Theresultwasdevastating.Atleast760civilianswerekilledduringthesixdaysoffighting,and1,700

were wounded. According to UN investigators, 4,083 houses were damaged, of which 418 werecompletely destroyed, and forty-nine schoolswere badly damaged or destroyed.Water and electricitywerecutoffinthewholetown,anddoctorsatthemainhospitalhadtooperatewithflimsyflashlightsinthedark,usingmuddyriverwatertowashtheirhands.PastorPhilippewasnotsparedbythesecondroundofviolentexchange,whichonceagainengulfedhis

Tshoponeighborhood.Afterlosingtwochildrenthepreviousyear,hehadtriedtoschoolhischildreninhowtoactifthewarbrokeout,buttherewasonlysomuchhecoulddo.Peoplehadtogoonworking,studying,andplaying.Thefightingfoundhimathomewithmostofhisfamily.However,hissonJean-Mariehadgoneoutto

themarkettobuyriceandvegetables;fortwodays,theydidn’tknowwherehewas.Finally,aneighborcametotelltheministerthathehadseenhissononSeventeenthAvenueandthathethoughttheyouthhad

madeittotheforest,wheremanyhadfled.When the conflict finally ended, however, there was no sign of Jean-Marie. The minister went to

SeventeenthAvenuetoaskaroundforhim.Finally,aRedCrossworkershowedhimabunchofclothesandbagstheyhadfoundalongsidesomebodiesinahouse.Hisson’sschoolsatchel,cakedinblood,wasthere.AccordingtotheRedCrossworker,theresidentsofthehousewherethebaghadbeenfoundhadgottenintoanargumentwithaRwandansoldieroutside.Whatithadbeenaboutwasanyone’sguess.Thesoldierhadleanedintothehouseandsprayedtheroomwithbullets.Bythetimethefightinghadstopped,thebodieshaddecomposedsomuchthattheRedCrosshadtoburythemimmediately.“IwassadIcouldn’tburymysonnext tohissiblings,”Philippesaid inacalmvoice.“Butwestill

rememberhisbirthdayeveryyear.Weeatfriedcatfish,hisfavorite.”Hepausedagainforalongtime.“Iwasalsoangeredby thearroganceof these twocountries.Comingtosettle theirdifferences300milesfromhome,killinginnocentcivilians.Whatdidweeverdotothem?”I askedhimwhomheblamed for theirdeaths.He shrugged. “Thereare toomanypeople toblame.

Mobutu for ruiningour country.Rwanda andUganda for invading it.Ourselves for letting themdo so.Noneofthatwillhelpbringmychildrenback.”

17

SORCERERS’APPRENTICES

Deathdoesnotsoundatrumpet.—CONGOLESESAYING

EASTERNCONGO,JUNE2000

InJune2000,anonprofitcharitypublishedamortalitystudy thatestimated that1.7millionpeoplehaddied as a result of the conflict between August 1998 and May 2000. This study, conducted by theepidemiologistLesRobertsfortheInternationalRescueCommittee,shockedtheworld.Furtherstudies,published in respected medical journals and confirmed by other epidemiologists, were conducted insubsequentyears;in2004,thecharityestimatedthat3.8millionhaddiedbecauseofthewarsince1998.1Robertswas rigorous in hismethods:He sent out teams to six separate sites throughout the eastern

Congo where, using a random GPS selection of households within a grid on a map, the researchersapproached huts and asked whether anyone had died during the past year. After interviewing 2,000people,theresearchersobtainedanaveragemortalityrateforthearea.Theysubtractedfromthistherateof deaths from before the war and obtained an “excess death rate”—in other words howmanymorepeoplediedthanwasnormal.2The number of deaths is so immense that it becomes incomprehensible and anonymous, and yet the

dyingwasnotspectacular.Violenceonlydirectlycaused2percentofthereporteddeaths.Mostoften,itwas easily treatable diseases, such as malaria, typhoid fever, and diarrhea, that killed. There was,however, a strong correlation between conflict areas and high mortality rates. As fighting broke out,people were displaced to areas where they had no shelter, cleanwater, or access to health care andsuccumbed easily to disease.Health staff shuttered up their hospitals and clinics to flee the violence,leavingthesicktofendforthemselves.Almosthalfofthevictimswerechildren—themostvulnerabletodiseaseandmalnutrition.Afull60

percentofallchildrendiedbeforetheirfifthbirthday.StepoutofacarinmanyareasoftheeasternCongoduring the war, and you were often confronted with children suffering from kwashikor, or clinicalmalnutrition. Itwas abizarre sight to see such listless children surroundedby lushhills.Congo isnotNigerorSomalia,where famineandmalnutritionareclosely linked todrought.Here, the rainy seasonlastsninemonthsayearinmostparts,andthesoilisfertile.Buttheharvestswereoftenstolenbyhungrymilitias,andfarmerswereunabletoaccesstheirfieldsbecauseoftheviolence.

SohowdidCongoleseexperiencetheviolence?ManyCongoleseneverdid;theyonlyheardaboutitandsufferedtheeconomicandpoliticalconsequences.Butformillionsofpeopleintheeastofthecountry,anarearoughlythesizeofTexas,dailylifewaspunctuatedbyconfrontationswitharmedmen.By2001,fightingalongthefrontlineinthemiddleofthecountryhadcometoastandstillasaresultof

severalpeacedeals.Theeastofthecountry,however,hadseenanescalationofviolence,aslocalMai-Maimilitias formed in protest ofRwandan occupation.This insurgencywas fueled by rampant socialgrievancesandbyLaurentKabila,whosupportedthemwithweaponsandmoney.TheMai-Maiweretooweak to threaten Rwanda’s control ofmain towns and roads, but theywere able to prompt a violentcounterinsurgencycampaignthatcostRwandawhateverremaininglegitimacyitoncehad.Itwas thisproxywar foughtbetweenKigaliandKinshasa’sallies thatcaused themostsuffering for

civilians.Withoutprovidinganytraining,Kinshasadroppedtonsofweaponsandammunitionatvariousairports in the jungles of the eastern Congo for theHutumilitia as well as forMai-Mai groups. Thecountryside became militarized, as discontented and unemployed youth joined militias and set uproadblocksto“tax”thelocalpopulation.Familyandlanddisputes,whichhadpreviouslybeensettledintraditionalcourts,werenowsometimessolvedthroughviolence,andcommunalfeudsbetweenrivalclansortribesresultedinskirmishesandtargetedkillings.TheRCDrebels,Rwanda’smainallies in theeast, respondedinkind.InbothSouthKivuandNorth

Kivu,governorscreated localmilitias, so-calledLocalDefenseForces, to impose rebel control at thelocal level.By2000, at least half adozen such forceshadbeencreatedbyvariousRCD leaders.Butinsteadofimprovingsecurity,theseramshackle,untrainedlocalmilitiasforthemostpartjustexacerbatedthesufferingbytaxing,abusing,andrapingthelocalpopulation.Localtraditionalchiefs,whowerethedefactoadministratorsinmuchofthehinterlands,eitherwereforcedtocollaborateorhadtoflee.InSouthKivu, half of the dozen most important customary chiefs were killed or fled. In some areas, newcustomarychiefswerecreatedornamedbytheRCD,usurpingpositionsthathadbeenheldforcenturiesbyotherfamilies.TheRwandan,Ugandan,andCongoleseproxieseventuallyranamok,wreakinghavoc.Thesefractious

movementshadnotbeenformedorganically,didnothavetoanswertoapopularbase—afterall,theyhadbeen given their weapons by an outside power—and often had little interest other than surviving andaccumulatingresources.ThedynamicborearesemblancetoGoethe’ssorcerer’sapprentice:Aswiththeyoungmagician’sbroom, the rebel groups split into evermore factions as rebel leadersbrokeoff andcreatedtheirownfiefdoms,alwaysseekingallegianceswithregionalpowerstoundergirdtheirauthority.Accordingtoonecount,bythetimebelligerentscametogethertoformatransitionalgovernmentin2002,Rwanda,Uganda,andtheCongohadoveradozenrebelproxiesoralliesbattlingeachother.3

ThemassacreinKasika,asmalljunglevillageahundredmileswestoftheRwandanborder,wasaprimeexampleofthesetactics.4KasikahasattainedmythicalstatusintheCongo.Politicianshaveinvokeditsname in countless speecheswhen theywant to drum up populist support againstRwanda.Children inKinshasa,whohadneverbeenclose to theprovinceofSouthKivu,are taughtaboutKasika inclassesintended to instill patriotism; Kabila’s government cited it prominently in a case it brought againstRwanda in the InternationalCourt of Justice. Itwas here that theRCD took its first plunge intomassviolencejustdaysafteritscreationinAugust1998,massacringoverathousandvillagersinreprisalfor

anattackbyalocalmilitia.KasikaisnothingmorethanclustersofmudhutsbuiltaroundaCatholicparishonahilloverlookinga

valley.ItwastheheadquartersofthecustomarychiefoftheNyinduethniccommunity,whosehouseandoffice sat on a hill opposite the parish, a series of large, red-brick structures with cracked ceramicshinglesasroofing,lacedwithvines.WhenIvisited, theonlyplace tospend thenightwasat theparishguesthouse,which thechurchhad

recentlyequippedwithseveralbedssothatvisitingpriestscouldspendthenightbeforesayingMass.Justabovethehouse,onasmallhill,wasthechurchitself,alargerstructurecoveredwithgreencorrugatedironroofingandwithrowsofsmallholes in itssides forventilation.Thehall insideechoedwhenweopened thewide doors; itwas bare except for some ricketywooden benches, and a large cross hungaboveadais.“Thisiswhereitallhappened,”explainedthegroundskeeper,whowasshowingmearound.“Theywerekilledinhere?”Henodded.“Twenty-three.Includingthreenuns,thepriest,andacatechist.”Thehalldidn’tshowanysignofviolence.“Wherearetheyburied?”Iasked.“Youjustwalkedovertheirgraves,”hesaid,smiling.Outside,infrontofthechurchwasthetombofanItalianmissionary,FatherMarioRicca,setneatlyin

cementandslatewiththedate“23.6.1973”chiseledintoastoneplaque.Hehadfoundedtheparishmanydecadesagoandhadstayedthereuntilhisdeath.Nexttohistomb,overgrownwithgrass,werefiveother,barelyvisiblegraves.Myguidepointedtowhatlookedlikeavegetablegardennexttothetomb,whereseveralwoodencrosseshadbeenstuckamidsquashvinesandweeds.“We never had the time to give them a proper burial,” he said regretfully. “ We have nothing to

rememberthemby.Itisashame.”Itwasadisturbingimageforaculturethatreveresitsancestors.Ilaterwalkedthroughtownwithmy

guidetovisitothergraves.Hepointedvaguelyatpilesofdirt,longovergrownwithshrubsandvines,bythesideof theroad.Hehadno ideawhowasburiedwhere.“Therearehundredsburied like this,”hesaid.Therewerenocrosses,andnoonehadtakenthetimetoreburythebodiesinacemeteryorevenjustweedthemoundstheywerecurrentlyburiedunder.Nowhereintownwasthereamonumenttothedead.Itwasasifthetownwasstillinadazefromthemassacreand,afulldecadelater,hadn’thadthetimetocollectitswitsenoughtocommemorateitsvictims.

ThemassacrefollowedwhatwouldbecomethestandardmoldforRCDabuses.Daysaftertherebellionbegan,abattalionofRCDandRwandansoldiersmarchedthroughKasika.Theroadwasstrategic,asitledtoseverallucrativegoldmines.TheyhadbeensenttojoinupwithrebeltroopsthathadbeenstuckinKindu,amajor trade townon theCongoRiver twohundredmiles to thewest.Thosemarooned troopswere led by Commander Moise, a legendary fighter and the second-highest ranking Munyamulengecommanderamongtherebels.When theRCD rebels passed throughKasika on theirway toKindu, they stopped tomeetwith the

traditionalchief,FrançoisNaluindi,ayoungthirty-five-year-oldwhowasextremelypopularamonghisNyindu tribe. He had launched several local farming cooperatives, through which he was trying todevelop and educate the largely peasant community.Hehad recentlymarried, andhiswifewas seven

monthspregnant.NaluindimetwiththeRwandanofficersandslaughteredseveralgoatsforthemtoeat.Theatmosphere

was cordial, but the chiefwas nervous. In the backlands of his territory, a young upstart chief calledNyakilibahadbeencausingtrouble.Hehadbegunarmingsomeyouthswithspearsandoldmachineguns,saying thathewoulddefendhiscountryagainst theTutsiaggressors.Likemanyother localmilitias,hecalledhisgroupMai-Mai(“water-water”),claimingthathehadmagicthatwouldturnhisenemy’sbulletsintowater.Nyakiliba’srealgoal,Naluindiwastoldbyhisadvisors,wasmuchmoremundane:Hewantedtoclaimrightstoatraditionalterritorymuchlargerthanhisownandwastryingtoinflatehisimportance.Hewasasmall-timethugbutcouldstiruptroublenonetheless.Justbefore theRwandansarrived,NaluindihadheldanemergencysecuritymeetingwithNyakiliba,

warning him not to do anything brash. “You think you will be a hero, but you will have me and thepopulationkilled,”avillageelderwhoattendedthemeetingrememberedhimsaying.“Ihearyouhavesevenguns.Theyhavehundreds.Howwillyouwin?”5BeforetheRCDrebelspulledoutoftownonthewaytoKindu,theircommanderaskedChiefNaluindi

howthesecuritysituationwas.DamnedifItellhim,damnedifIdon’t,hethought,andhereassuredtheofficerthateverythingwaspeaceful.TheMai-Mai,however,hadn’tlistenedtothechief,andafewmilesoutsideoftowntheytookacoupleofpotshotsatthetroopsbeforerunningintothebush.Thevillagehelditsbreath,buttherewerenocasualties,andtherebelscontinuedontheirway.The troopspickedupCommanderMoise, exhausted fromhisweek-long trek through the jungle, and

madetheirwaybacktowardtheRwandanborder.OnthemorningofSunday,August23,1998,acolumnof several hundred RCD soldiers passed back through Kasika. The population recalled their typicalappearance:wearing gum boots and carrying their belongings and ammunition boxes on their head.Atruckfullofsoldiersbroughtuptherearofthecolumn,alongwithawhitepickupcarryingtheofficers.It was the dry season, so the road was in decent condition, but the pickup had some mechanical

problemsandwaslaggingbehind.AsitcamearoundabendclosetoChiefNaluindi’shouse,theMai-MailaunchedanotherattackontheRCDconvoy,openingfirefromahutoverlookingtheroadandriddlingthepickupwithbullets.CommanderMoisediedon the spot, alongwith twootherofficers.The remainingRCDsoldiersfiredback,butbythenNyakilibaandhisboyshadalreadyfledintothebushes.The commotion prevented the villagers fromgoing to church.Theywatched in dismay through their

windowsasRwandantroopscamebacktothesiteofthekilling,bundledthebodiesup,andtransportedthembacktoBukavu.TroopsmilledaboutKasikathatday,searchingforMai-Mai,butthesituationwasotherwisecalm.NyakilibaandhisMai-Maihad fled tohishomevillage in themountains, thirtymilesaway.Intheevening,anRCDofficervisitedtheparishandaskedtousethehigh-frequencyradiotheretocontact theirheadquarters inBukavu.According to thecatechistswhooverheardhisconversationoverthecracklyradio,theofficerreceivedinstructions,buttheycouldn’tmakeoutexactlywhatwassaid.

Itwasnotdifficultformetofindawitnesstothemassacre.Thegroundskeeperatthechurchshowedmetoasmallmudhutbuiltontheslopebeneaththeroad.ThiswaswherePatrice,6alocalhandymanandacatechist at the church, lived. It was a typical hut for the region: a low structure built on a frame ofbamboosticks,withmudpackedontothesides tokeepout thecoldatnight.Patrice,adeferentialmanwearing an untucked, stained shirt, toldme to sit on a bench in the corner. The shackwas barely big

enoughforbothofus,butpeopleattractedbythepresenceofaforeignerquicklygatheredbythewindowtolistentoourconversation.Onthewall therewasafadedpictureofJesusinawoodenframewithasaying in Swahili: “A drunken wife arouses anger. Her shame cannot be hidden.” Arranged on acrossbeamoverheadwerePatrice’sfewbelongings:amachete,arowofChinese-madeAAbatteriesheldtogether by a rubber band that served as a power source for his transistor radio, and a broken stormlantern.“Therewasathickmistintownthatmorning,”hebegan.“TherehadnotbeenaMassonSundaydueto

thecommotion,sothepriestrangthebelltocallthevillagetoMassthatMondaymorning.Itmusthavebeenaround6:30.WesawsomesoldiersonthewaytoMass,butdidn’tthinkanythingofit.”7IhadbeenawakenedjustthatmorningbyasimilarMass.Acatechisthadstrucktheoldrimofacartire

beforeslowchoralsinginginSwahilibegantothebeatingofdrums.WhenIpeeredthroughtheairductsinthesideofthechurch,Ihadseenseveralrowsofwomenandmenswayinggentlyandclappingtheirhands. Itwas the same air ducts, according to Patrice, throughwhich they saw theRwandan soldiersgatheringoutside.Theyhadmachinegunsandsmallhatchetsslungacrosstheirshoulders.“Thepriesthadjustbegunblessingthehost,”Patriceremembered,“whentheyenteredthechurch.The

priest was alarmed, but didn’t interrupt the consecration, motioning discreetly with one hand to thesacristybehindhim,atthebackofthechurch.Iwassittingatthefrontofthechurchandmadearunforitwithsixothers.Wehidinthethickbushesbythebackdoorbeforethesoldiersblockedofftheexit.”Atthispoint,thecrowdoutsidePatrice’swindowbegangroaningandsuckingtheirteeth.Theyknew

whatcamenext.Patrice spokecalmly,makingsurehedidn’t forgetanydetails. “TheTutsi tiedup thepeople in the

church,handsbehindtheirbacks,andthentookthepriestandthethreenunsoutside.Icouldhearthenunsscreaming,screaming:‘Don’tkillourfather—pleasedon’tkillhim.Takeusinstead!’FatherStanislas,thepriest,toldthemtocalmdown,thattheLordwouldprovide.Thesoldiersseparatedthem,takingthenunstotheconventnextdoorandthepriesttotheparish,wheretheyforcedhimtogivethemmoneyandhisradio.Myfriendtheplumberwashidingintheceilingandheardallofthis.Thentheytoldthepriesttokneeldownandpray.Andshothiminthebackofhishead.”Thecrowdoutside thehutwherewewere sittingerupted into lamentations: “Theykilled themall!”

“TheykilledourFather!”“Hewassuchagoodman!”“Hispoorfatherwentcrazyafterwards—hewasallhehad!”“Animals!”Patricelookeddownathishandsandshookhishead.Thenameofthepriest,hetoldme,wasStanislasWabulakombe.Intheirlanguage,itmeant“WhatGodwants,hedoes.”

Thegunshotsattheparishhousetriggeredthemassacreinthechurch.Thesoldiersbeganbyusingtheirhatchets to bludgeon theworshippers to death—so as not to alert the village, some of the villagers Iinterviewedsaid.Otherssaiditwastosavebullets.WhenPatriceemergedfromthebushesthenextday,he foundmost of the victimswith crushed skulls. The three nunswere lying in the conventwith theirunderweararoundtheirankles;hesuspectedtheyhadbeenraped.Oneofthemwasstillbreathingwhenhefoundher,butshediedbeforetheycouldgethertothelocalhealthcenter.Intheparish,hefoundthepriestdead,facedownonthefloorinhiswhiterobes.Ashewalkedaround,heheardthevoiceoftheplumber fromhishidingplace in theceiling:“ I’muphere!Theyshotme inmybuttocks,but I’mstillalive!”

Anothergroupofsoldiershadgonetothechief’sresidence.Theywerefurious,thevillagerssaid,thathehadliedtothemaboutthesecuritysituationandthattheyhadbeenambushedtwice.TheyalsothoughtthattheMai-Mai,whorecruitedalongethniclines,wereinherentlylinkedtothecustomarychief.ChiefNaluindi’swholeextendedfamilyhadsoughtrefugeinhishouse,thinkingthattheywouldbesafethere.“Inourtradition,themwami[chief]issacred,”thechorusoutsidePatrice’shouselamented.“Youdon’tkillthemwamiduringthewar.Killinghimislikekillingallofus.”Atleastfourteenpeoplewereinthechief’shousewhenthesoldiersarrived.Therebelskilledallof

them.Villagerswhohadrunintothebushescamebackthenextmorningandfoundthechief’spregnantwifeeviscerated,herdeadfetusonthegroundnexttoher.Theinfantsofthechief’syoungerbrotherhadbeenbeatentodeathagainstthebrickwallsofthehouse.The way the victims were killed said as much as the number of dead; they displayed a macabre

fascinationwith human anatomy. The survivors said the chief’s heart had been cut out and hiswife’sgenitalsweregone.Thesoldiershadtakenthem.Itwasn’tenoughtokilltheirvictims;theydisfiguredandplayedwiththebodies.Theydisemboweledonewomanbycuttingheropenbetweenheranusandvagina,thenproppedupthedeadbodyonallfoursandleftherwithherbuttocksfacingupwards.Anothercorpsewasgiventwoslitsoneithersideofhisbelly,wherehishandswereinserted.“Anavaakoti—theymadehimlooklikehewaswearingasuit,”thevillagerstoldme.Anothermanhadhismouthslitopentohisears,wasputinachairandhadacigarettedanglingfromhislipswhenhewasfound.Thekillerswantedtoshowthevillagersthatthiswouldbetheconsequenceofanyresistance.Therewerenolimitstotheirrevenge—theywouldkillthepriests,rapethenuns,ripbabiesfromtheirmothers’wombs,andtwistthecorpsesintoorigamifigures.“Wehadseenpeoplekilledbefore,”Patricetoldme.“Butthiswasworsethankilling.Itwaslikethey

killedthem,andthenkilledthemagain.Andagain.”

AroundtwentymilesfurthernorthontheroadtoBukavulaythetownofKilungutwe.ItwassituatedonthebanksofoneofthemanytributariesthatflowintotheCongoRiverfartothewestandwasknownasthegatewaytothejunglefromthehighlandstothenortheast.OnthedayofNyakiliba’sambushinKasika,severaldozentradersfromBukavuarrivedatKilungutweforthelargemarketthatwasheldthereeveryMonday.Michel,8athirty-nine-year-oldtraderfromBukavu,wasonatruckthathaddroppedthemoffafewmilesbeforethemarket.Therehadbeenanaccident,hewastoldbytheCongolesesoldiersthere.Notruckswerealloweddowntheroad.Anxioustogettothemarkettosellthesalt,sugar,soap,andclotheshehadbrought,Micheltookoffonfootdowntheroad,alongwitharoundsixtyothertraders.When theyarrived inKilungutwe, theynoticed something strange.The streetswerealmostdeserted,

andalargenumberofRwandansoldiersweremillingabout.AbunchofCongolesesoldierspassinginatruckwavedatthemfurtivelytogobackinthedirectiontheyhadcomefrom,buttheydidn’tunderstand.“Wethoughtithadjustbeenanaccident,”Michelremembered.9Astheypassedoveralargebridgemadeoutoftreetrunks,agroupoffourTutsisoldiershissedatthem.“Hey!You!Putdownthosebags!”Thesoldiersweretallandlankyandhadlongknivesintheirbelts.

TheyseparatedthelocalsfromtheBukavutraders.Tothegroupofaroundtenlocalstheysaid,“Ah!Soitisyourchildrenwhohavebeenkillingus!”The localsprotested that theydidn’tknowwhat theyweretalkingabout,butthesoldiersbeganbeatingthemanyway.

ItwasonlylaterthatMichelfoundoutthattherebelswhohadbeenambushedinKasikahadradioedaheadandtoldtheiradvancepartytostopwherevertheywereandto“cleanup.”Thesoldiersherdedthetradersandthelocalsintoasmallhousebelowtheroad,asturdycementstructureabouttwentyfeetbyforty feet, with blue wooden doors and windows and a corrugated iron roof. The sixty people stoodpacked like sardines in the small house.The sunwent down, leaving the room in darkness except forsomecracksinthewindow,throughwhichtheycouldseeafirethatthesoldiershadlitoutside.Itwashotandhumid,andtheairwasfilledwiththesoundofmutteringandbreathing.Severalpeopleprayedoutloud.Ababy’scryturnedintoapersistentwail,untilfinallyhermotherbegansobbingandsaidthatherbabywasabouttosuffocate.“Wecalledthesoldiersoutsideandaskedthemtohavepityonthenewborn,”Micheltoldme.Withoutaskinganyquestionsandasifoncue,thesoldiersletthewomanout.Suddenly,theprisoners

heard screams coming from outside, first from both mother and child, then just from the child, thensilence.Michelwasnotnearawindow,butsomeonewhowaswhispered,hisvoicewavering.“Knives.Theyareusingknives,”hesaid.“Theygrabbedherhandsandfeetandslitherthroat,”anothersaid.Allofa sudden, the roomwas fullofpeoplecryingandpraying toGod inFrench,Swahili, andwhateverotherlanguagecametotheirlips.Michelwasinthebackoftheroom,wherehewascrushedagainstawallastheotherstriedtogetas

faraspossiblefromthedoor,throughwhichthesoldierscameandgrabbedpeopleonebyone.“Thisisfor our brothers that you killed,” they heard the soldiers tell their victims outside. The screamsweresilencedasthethroatswereslitandthenextpersonwasdraggedoutofthehouse.IttookwhatseemedtoMicheltobeaneternitytoemptytheroom.Asthepeoplethinnedout,hewasabletogetabetterlookathissurroundingsinthehalf-light.Hesawthatoneofthethinceilingboardswasloose.Hehastilyclimbedupandbumpedintoseveralotherpeoplelyinginthesmallspacebetweentheceilingandtheroof.Itwasevenhotteranddankerhere,andhecouldfeel thebodiesofhisneighborstremblingwithfear.Hewasclosetofaintingandfeltlikevomiting.After awhile, the screams faded below them and they could hear soldiers shuffling around and the

soundofbodiesbeingmovedoutside.Someonewascounting,thenavoiceinKinyarwandasaid:“Howmanydidweputinthehouse?Didyoucount?”“Yes,therewereatleastsixty.”“Areyousure?Wheredidtherestofthemgo?”“I’llcheckagain.”Feetbegantoscrapethefloorbelowthemandthensomeonepokedtheceilingboards.“We!Youupthere!Howmanyarethere?”Michel’sneighbors’tremblingincreaseduntilhewasafraid

theywouldbegintorattletheceilingboards.“Icanhearyouupthere!Howmanyareyou?”Afterpokingforawhile, thesoldierwentoutside.Theyhear themenmutteringwitheachother,and

thenseveralcameback into theroom.Suddenly,an ironspear tipburst throughaceilingboardnot farfromwhereMichelwas lying.Theboardsweremadeout of flimsyplywood and the spear pierced iteasily.ThenextjabhitMichel’sneighborintheleg,whocriedout.“Comedownnow,orwewillgetourguns!Justtellushowmanyyouare,andthencomedown!”Severalmorespearjabscamethroughtheroof.ThreeofMichel’sfellowprisonersclimbeddownfrom

thehideout.Michelturnedtoawomanwhowaslyingnexttohim.“Wemustpraynow,”hetoldher.“Wearegoingtodie.”Shestartedcrying.

ImetMichelmanyyearslaterinBukavuthroughaministerinhischurch.Michel—hewantedmetouseafakenametoprotecthisidentity—fidgetedwhilehesatinmylivingroominBukavuandspokeinbursts.WhenIaskedhimhowhehadsurvived,hesaidIwouldnotbelievehimandwasthensilentforseveralminutes,twistinghisboneyhandsandlookingattheceiling.“WhenIlookedtomyside,Isawawomaninwhitelyingnexttome,”hefinallysaid.“Ihadn’tseen

herbefore,andIthoughtitwasstrangethatshewaswearingallwhite.Iturnedtothewomanlyingonmyotherside,whowassobbing,andaskedher,‘Doyouseeher?Thewomaninwhite?’Itwasverystrangetoseeawomandressedall inwhite.Itwasverydustythen;itwasthedryseason.Whiteclothesweremaybe things you wear to church or to a baptism. And she seemed—she seemed to be glowing. Myneighborshookherheadandcontinuedsobbing.Thenthewomaninwhitesaid—hervoicedidn’tseemtobecomingfromhermouth,butfrominsidemyhead—shesaid,‘Standup!Standupnow!’AndIgatheredmystrengthandjuststoodup.Theroofwasverylow—youcouldn’tevenkneelthere—butasIstoodup,asheetofroofingcameundonefromitsbolts,andIcouldseethenightsky.Therewasnomoonthatnight,Iremember.Istoodupandsliddowntheroof.‘Someone’sgettingaway!’oneofthesoldierscriedout,andtheyopenedfire.IcouldhearthebulletswhistlingbymeandgoingintotheceilingwhereIhadbeenlyingwiththeothers.ButIwasn’thurt.Ijumpeddownfromtheroofandbeganrunningintothebushthatsurroundedthehouse.Mylegsweremovingontheirown.”Michellookedatme.“Thatangelsavedme.Godsavedme.”Hetoldmethatheranthroughthepalmtreesandthecassavafieldsthatsurroundedthevillageasshots

rangoutbehindhim.Hekeptonrunninguntilhefoundthehutofarelativeofhisonahillseveralmilesaway.Together,theywatchedthevillageburninthevalleybelowthem.The nextmorning, theywatched the columns of soldiers departing towardBukavu.When theywere

gone,Michel and his relativeswent down into town,where ashes and smoke still filled the air.Theyfoundamoundofbodiessmolderingnexttothehousewherehehadbeenheldprisoner.Thecorpseshadbeendousedingasolineandsetonfire.Theyhadbeenreducedtoa tarrymessofcharredskin,bones,glasses,andbeltbuckles.Theyfounddozensofotherbodiesstrewnacrosstown,inhouses,onthestreet,andinditchesbesidetheroad.Insomecases,thecorpseshadbeenstuffeddownpitlatrines.Thefoundthecharredremainsofonebodyinanoildrumusedtobrewpalmoil.Overthenextseveraldays,thesurvivorsburiedhundredsofbodies.Thebetterknownamongthem—

thechief,thepriest,thenuns,anevangelicalminister,alocaladministrator—weregiventheirowngrave.Othersweredumpedinanonymousmassgravesbytheroadside,wherethesoilwassoftanddeep.Stillotherswerelefttodecomposeinthelatrines,watertanks,andsepticpitswheretheirkillershadthrownthem.Neighborsburied theirneighbors,mothersandfathersburied theirchildren,andministersburiedtheir churchmembers.Theywere in a rush; they didn’t knowwhen the rebelswould be back throughtown.Theyhadtoburytheirdeadandthenleave.PeopleIspokewithsaidtheyhadcounted704peopletheyhadburiedthemselves;aUnitedNationsinvestigationconductedyearslaterconcludedthattherehadbeenover1,000victims.10

Massviolencedoesnotjustaffectthefamiliesofthedead.Ittearsatthefabricofsocietyandlodgesinthemindsofthewitnessesandperpetratorsalike.Adecadeaftertheviolence,itseemedthatthevillagerswerestilllivinginitsaftershocks.Theyhadallfledafterthemassacre;noonewantedtostayintown.

Theyfleddeepintothejungles,wheretheycrossedthestrongcurrentsoftheLuindiRiver.Itwasonlyontheothersidethattheyfeltsafe.Theylivedinclearings,wheretheybuiltgrasshuts.Therewasnoplacetostartfarming,andnoonehadtheenergytocutdownthebrushandtreestostartplantingcassavaandbeans, so they atewhat they could find:wildyams, caterpillars, forestmushrooms, and evenmonkeyswhen they could catch them. Exposed to the cold at night and deprived of adequate nutrition, manynewbornsandoldpeopledied.A scabies infestation ravaged theirmakeshift camps, and theycouldn’tevenfindthemostrudimentarymedicinefor theirvariousafflictions.Theywouldsometimesvisit theirhomesalongthemainroad,buttheywoulddosolikeburglars,atnightandquickly,forfearofdetection.Someofthemhadradios,andtheygavethenickname“Kosovo”totheirhometownofKasikaafterthey

heardof thewarandmassacres in theBalkans.Themaindifference,ofcourse,was that thepresswasgivingthesmallBalkanregion,barelyasixththesizeofSouthKivuProvince,nonstopcoverage,whilenoforeignjournalistvisitedKasikaforadecade.Sociallifewasdeeplyaffectedaswell.Thedeathoftheirtraditionalchief,alongwiththeonlypriest,

leftthecommunitywithoutanyleaders.“Theykilledourfatherandourmother,”onevillagertoldme.Thechurchcloseddown,andthechief’sfamilywasembroiledinasuccessionbattlethattheRCDfinallyputanendtobyimposingsomeoneoftheirchoice,muchtothechagrinofmanycommunitymembers.Againandagain, thevillagers toldmehowthechief’sdeathhadaffected themmuchmore thananythingelse.Thewell-beingofthecommunitywasvestedinthechief;hepresidedoverharvestceremonies,gaveoutland,andblessedweddings.Whowouldcallforsalongo,theweeklycommunallabor,tobeperformed?Whowouldreconcilefeudingfamiliesandsolvelandconflicts?The community felt orphaned in otherways too.After themassacre, not a single national politician

came to visit them and hear their grievances. While Kasika featured in thousands of speeches thatlambastedRwanda and theRCD, no investigationwas ever launched, and no compensationwas everofferedforanyofthevictims.Thelackofjusticehadallowedthevillagerstostewintheirresentmentandhadmadetheirangerfesterintomorehatred.“IhatetheTutsi,”Patricetoldme.“IfIseeaTutsiface,Ifeelfear.”Iaskthemiftheycouldeverforgivethesoldiersforwhattheydid.“Forgivewhom?Wedon’tevenknowwhodidit,”someoneoutsidePatrice’shousesaid.

InKilungutwe, Imetwith some local elders at anopen-air baron themain street, not far fromwhereMichelhadhiddenonthenightofthemassacre.Themeetingturnedintoapopularassembly,aspeopleheardwhatweweretalkingaboutandgatheredaround.“Wearestilllivingthroughthemassacre,”oneelderwhohadlosthiswifeandtwochildrentoldme.

“Therehasbeennojustice,notevenasignonatree,oramonumentinthehonorofthosewhodiedthatday.”11“Wealllivedintheforestslikeanimalsforfiveyears,”saidamaninaplaidshirtandabaseballcap.

“Ourchildrenareallilliteratebecauseofthis.Gotoprimaryschoolhere,andyouwillfindfifteen-year-oldssittingonthebenches.”TheconversationturnedtowardNyakiliba, theMai-Maimilitiacommanderwhohadcommandedthe

fatefulattackontherebelconvoythathadsparkedthemassacre.Aftertheviolence,manyyouthsjoinedtheMai-Mai.

“Whatelseweretheysupposedtodo?”aneldersaid.“Theywantedtoavengetheirfamilies.”“Avenge?”anotherman retorted. “Theywereunemployedandhungry—aweaponmade themaman.

Don’tthinktheywereanybetterthantheTutsi!”A chorus erupted from behind themen. “Yes, theywere just as bad!”After themassacre, theRCD

rebelshadfoughtrunningbattleswiththeramshacklemilitia.WhenthepopulationfledintoRCDterritory,theywereaccusedofbeingMai-Mai,whileinMai-MaiterritorytheywereaccusedofbeingRCDspies.“Itwasallnonsense,”severalpeoplesaidatonce.“Theyjustwantedtorobus,allofus.”“Foryears,youcouldn’t finda singlechicken,goat,orguineapig inourhomes.Thatwas theMai-

Mai’sfood,”awomanpipedupfromtheback.Agroupofyoungmenloiteredaboutat thebackof thecrowd muttering among each other. This was the Mai-Mai demographic: young, unemployed, anddisaffected.Ihadheardfrommanymen,but the longerwe talked themorewomenalsogatheredaroundon their

waybackfromthefields,balancinghoesontheirheads,fadedclothswrappedaroundtheirwaists.Giventhepreponderanceofsexualviolence in theregion, Iwanted togive themachance tospeakbutdidn’twanttoembarrasstheminfrontofthemen.“I justwant togive thewomenachance tospeak,as theyareoften theoneswhosuffer themost,” I

startedcautiously.“Doesanywomanwanttotalkaboutherproblems?”Ihadbarelyfinishedwhenawomanatthebackcriedout:“Baba!Allofus,allofusherehavebeen

raped!Everysingleoneofus!”Adozenotherwomenraisedtheirvoicesinangryagreementas themenlookedat theirfeet,shaking

theirheads.Awomaninagreenheadscarfandpinksweaterpushedherwaytothefront.“Ihaveachildfromrape.

Myhusbanddoesn’tlikemeanymorebecauseofit.Andthemenwhodidittomearearoundstillinthisvillage!TheyareourownchildrenwhojoinedtheMai-Mai!”AccordingtoUnitedNationsreports,over200,000womenhavebeenrapedintheeasternCongosince

1998.Demographicsurveyssuggestthatupto39percentofwomenhaveexperiencedsexualviolence,atthe hands of civilians ormilitary personnel, at some point in their lives.12 Given the nature of sexualviolence,itisdifficulttoknowhowpervasivethephenomenonreallyisandwhatexactlyisattherootofthisepidemic,butthereisnodoubtthatthesituationisextremelydire.

Back inKinshasa severalmonths later, I brought up theKasikamassacrewithBenjaminSerukiza, theformer Munyamulenge vice governor of South Kivu. He had been friends with the slain CommanderMoiseandwaspersonallyaccusedofhavingorderedtherevengekillings.HewasdrivingmehomeinhisbatteredMercedes. On his dashboard, there was a sticker proclaiming “I ♥ Jesus Christ”—hewas adevout,evangelicalChristian,hetoldme,likemanyBanyamulenge.Of course, hedenied anypersonal involvement in themassacre, so I changed tactics and askedhim

whetherinretrospectthewarhadbeengoodfortheBanyamulenge.Heseemedtired—shortlyafterwardhewould be diagnosedwith a brain tumor andwas hospitalized in SouthAfrica—andwas obviouslyunhappywiththequestion.“You act likewe had a choice.We didn’t.We had to save ourselves,” he said as he navigated the

potholesintheroad.Afteralongpause,headded,“Thewarwasgoodandbadforus.”Measuringhis

wordscarefully,hesaid,“Butsomanyofusdied.Ifyougotothehighplateau,youwon’tseeacemetery.Buteveryfamilytherehaslostatleastonechild,ifnotmore,tothewar.OurdeadareburiedacrosstheCongo.Wehavenowhere togoandmourn for them.”13He estimated that up to aquarterof all youthsjoinedthewar.Veryfewofthemhadreturnedtothehighplateau.Thefirsttojoinandthosewhorosethehighestintherebellionwerefromthesmallnumberofeducated

youthswhohadlefttheirhomesinthehighplateautostudyinhighschoolsandseminariesintheregion.Theywere almost all under thirty-five:TheRPFwantedyoung,dynamicblood thatwouldbe loyal tothem.Theyexperiencedadoublesenseofestrangement:fromtheirfamiliesandtheirtraditionalwayoflife and from their fellow students,whomade funof themprecisely because theywere backward andTutsi.ThisalienationattractedthemtotheidealsandpromisesoftheRPF.Thiselite,withthehelpandatthepromptingoftheRwandangovernment,thenreturnedatthebeginningofthewartorallytothecausetheircousins,brothers,andfriendsinthehighplateau.Asalways,theseyouthshadmanymotivations.Thereweretheonestheytalkedaboutincessantly:the

longing tobeacceptedasCongolese citizens, toobtain land rights, and tobe represented in local andprovincial administration.Of course,manyof the youths alsowanted to succeed, to obtain power andfame. As with Serukiza, the careers of many ambitious Banyamulenge had been blocked by thediscriminationandfavoritismfosteredbyMobutu.But had this war been successful for them? The young class of Banyamulenge was extraordinarily

successful in the short run. The difference between 1994, when there had barely been a singleMunyamulenge in public office, and 1998was dramatic. During the RCD, hundreds of Banyamulengeobtainedhigh-rankingpositionsintheintelligenceservices,army,provincialadministration,andpolice.AzariasRuberwa,whohadstudiedinKalemieandbecomealawyerinLubumbashi,wasthepresidentoftheRCD;BizimaKaraha,whohad studiedmedicine inSouthAfrica,became thepowerfulministerofinterior and security chief; Moise Nyarugabo, who had also studied law in Lubumbashi, became theministerofjustice.Forashortperiod,theyhadsucceededincontrollingtheodiousstateapparatusthathadbeentheirbanefordecades.Theirascendance,however,onlyfurthersouredrelationswithothercommunities.ItwasasiftheRCD

wantedtocoercethepopulationintoreconciliation.Whenconfrontedwithresistancefromlocalmilitiasandcivilsociety,whichopposedwhattheyperceivedasRwandanaggression,theRCDrespondedwithrepression.Thismerelyfueledlocalresistance,andtheregiondescendedintovicious,cyclicalviolence.InSouthKivu,where thisviolencewasperhaps theworst, itwasoftenBanyamulengewhowere in

chargeofintelligenceoffices,armybrigades,andthepolice.TheworststereotypeoftheCongolesewasconfirmed: that of the treacherous and brutalBanyamulenge, nestled next to the cockroach, snake, andverminin theirbestiary.CommentingonthesimilarconundrumofmilitaryrulebytheTutsiminority inneighboringBurundi,formerTanzanianpresidentJuliusNyerereobserved,“Thebiggestobstacleisthatthosewhoareinpower,theminority..., theyarelikeoneridingonthebackofatiger.Andtheyreallywantalmostawater-tightassurancebeforetheygetoffthebackofthetigerbecausetheyfeeliftheygetoffthebackofthetiger,itwilleatthem.”14

Therewillbelong-termrepercussionsoftheBanyamulenge’sparticipationinthetworebellions.In2002,aopinionpollaskedpeoplewhethertheythoughtBanyamulengewereCongolese.Only26percentthought

so.15In2004,whenaMunyamulengecommanderledamutinyagainsttheCongolesearmyintheeasternborder townofBukavu, thepopulation there reactedby launchingaviciouswitchhuntagainstTutsi intown.TheUnitedNations had to evacuate the entireTutsi population, around 3,000women,men, andchildrenwithmattressesandbagspiledhighonUNcars,fromtown.In2007,whenrumorsspreadinthesouthern townofMobathataconvoyofBanyamulengerefugeesmightbereturninghomefromZambia,localpoliticiansprovoked riots,protesting the“returnof foreigners toourcountry.”These resentmentsareinpartbredbyopportunistdemagoguesbutarealsogroundedinthebrutalrulebytheAFDLandRCDintheeasternCongobetween1996and2003.As Iwas about to get out of the car, I pressedSerukiza againwhether he thought thewar hadbeen

worthwhile.Hesighed.“I’msurewedidn’thaveachoice.Forsome,itwasself-defense.Wecouldn’tsitaround

andnot do anything.But people hate us almostmore today thanbefore; it is just that they are tiredoffighting.Sono,itwasafailure.”

18

THEASSASSINATIONOFMZEE

KINSHASA,CONGO,JANUARY17,2001

On January 17, 2001, LaurentKabila’smilitary advisorColonel EdyKapendwas sitting on the lawnoutside of Kabila’s office at the official residence.1 They hadmade it into a new year, he thought tohimself,whichwasanachievement in itself.TheRwandanarmyhadalmost taken theirminingcapital,Lubumbashi,buthadbeenstoppedatthelastmoment.NowthepresidentwastryingtotransformhimselfpoliticallybyforcingaBurundianHuturebellion,whichhadbeensupportedbyKabilaagainsttheTutsimilitary junta in their country, to go to the peace table with the Burundian government, which wouldimproveKabila’s international reputation.Later that day, hewould fly toCameroon to announce thosetalks; then he would fly to Washington to try to rebuild bridges with George W. Bush’s incomingadministration.Thingswerelookingup—ataNewYear’sgathering,thepresidenthadevengivensomeofhiscloseststaffpresentsof100,000Congolesefrancs,which,eventhoughtherisinginflationmeantthatthegiftwasonlywortharound$500,wasahighlyunusualgesturefortight-fistedKabila.AsKapendwaitedoutside,Kabilawasspeakingwithhiseconomicaffairsadviser,EmileMota,about

hisupcomingtrip.Thepresidentwaswearinghishabitualsafarisuit—off-whitethistime—andwasinagoodmood.Acrosstown,alargepeacerallywasbeingheldatthenationalstadium,andthegloomofthepastyearseemedtohaveliftedfromthecapital.TheFrenchdoorswereopentotheterrace—Kabiladidnotlikeairconditioning—sothatabreezefromtheCongoRivercouldblowthrough.RashidiKasereka,oneofKabila’sbodyguards,clickedhisheelstogetheratthedoortoaskforpermissiontoenter.Itwaslunchtime,andsecuritywaslax,assomebodyguardshadgonetoeat.Like most of the president’s bodyguards, Rashidi was a former child soldier—kadogo—from the

Kivus,whohadbeenwithKabilaforyears.KabilawasusedtoRashidiapproachinghim,sohewasn’ttakenabackwhentheyoungmanbentdowntowhispersomethinginhisear.AsRashidisteppedup,hepulledoutapistolandfiredthreetimes,hittingthepresidentintheneck,abdomen,andshoulder.AnotherbulletlodgedinthesofanexttowhereEmileMotawassitting,terrified.Brieflystunnedinshockoutside,ColonelKapendgrabbedthegunofoneofthepresidentialguardsand

ranaroundthebuilding,tothepatiooutsidethepresident’soffice,onlytofindanotherbodyguardstandingoverRashidi’sdeadbody.Furious,Kapendshotanotherroundofbulletsintothecorpse.Inside,Kabila’ssecretary,Anny,ranthroughthecorridors,screamingthatlechefhadbeenshot.The

presidentlaysprawledonthefloorinapoolofblood,stillclutchingsomedocumentsinhishand.Withinseveralminutes,thepresident’sCubandoctorandtheministerofhealthhadarrived,rippedopenhisshirt,andtriedtoresuscitatehim.Hehadclenchedhistonguebetweenhisteeth,andKapendthoughthecouldhearhimmoaningstill.Finally,ahelicopterpilotwaslocatedtoflythepresidenttotheNgaliemamedicalclinicnearby.The

doctorsandsoldierstoredownthelongvelvetcurtainsfromthewindowstotransporthim.“Hewasso

heavythatevenfourofushadahardtimeliftinghim,”anaideremembered.2Immediately,thepresident’sclosestassociatescalledanemergencymeeting,togetherwiththemilitary

representatives of the Angolan and Zimbabwean armies.3 They had no idea who was behind theassassination, but they worried that dissidents within the army would take advantage of the powervacuum.Theydecidedtokeeptheassassinationasecretuntiltheycoulddecidewhattodo.TheybundledKabila’scorpse,togetherwithallthenurses,doctors,andcleaningstafffromtheclinic,

into a presidential airplane and flew them toZimbabwe.ColonelEdyKapendwent on television thatafternoonorderingthearmyhighcommandtostaycalmandmaintaindiscipline.Hedidnotsayawordaboutthecoupthatmanyinthecapitalassumedmustbeunderway.Thenextdaythegovernmentputoutaclipped statement, saying that the president had been injured in an assassination attempt and was inHarare for treatment. In the streets, Angolan and Zimbabwean soldiers patrolled and manned keyroadblocks.Whenhewasfinallypronounceddeadseveraldayslater,thenewsstunnedthecapital.Mzee,asmost

Kinoisrefertohim,hadbeentheoverwhelmingfigureofCongolesepoliticssincehisarrivalinKinshasa,no matter what one thought of him. Congolese had become used to his weekly television and radioappearances, his long, verbose, and often funny harangues about domestic and international politics.Withinhisowncabinet,itwasMzee’smetronomethatkeptthebeatandmadesurethatallthedisparateinterestgroupsstayedinlineandwerepreventedfrominfighting.Itwasasiftheconductorhaddiedinthemiddleofasymphonyandnowthehorns,strings,andpercussionwerevyingforprimacy.

NoonehadbeenamoreinsistentaugurofKabila’sdeaththanthemanhimself.“Hespokeaboutitallthetime,”InformationMinisterDidierMumengiremembered.4Thepresidenthadthoughtthatitwouldbeawesternconspiracy,thathehadpreventedforeigncorporationsfromgettingatCongo’sresources,andthattheywouldeliminatehim.HesawhimselfasPatriceLumumba,theindependenceherowhowasgunneddowninaBelgian-AmericanplotalmostexactlyfortyyearstothedaybeforeKabila’sownassassination.Kabilawasparanoidbutnotnecessarilywrong.Therewasgoodreasonforwesterncorporateinterests

to be angered.Kabila had reneged on severalmining contracts,most notablywithBanro, a Canadiancompany,andwithAngloAmerican,aLondon-basedmininggiant.ButKabilawasanobstacletomorethanjustcorporateinterests.Threeyearsafterhehadtakenpower,

his war machine was failing, Congo’s economy was in tatters, and he had failed to carry out anymeaningfulreforms.Atthebeginningofthe1998war,thesocialmiseryhadbeenmadebearablethankstotheupsurge inpatriotism that theRwandan aggressionhadprovoked. Just after theRwandan attackonKinshasainAugust1998,88percentofpeoplepolledinKinshasasaidtheyhadafavorableimpressionoftheirpresident,aleapof50percentfromayearbefore.5Forabriefperiod,thecapitalforgotaboutitsmisery and hunger and channeled its energies into supporting the government. When asked about thereasons for thewar, a full half ofKinois answered that they thought itwas “a conspiracy ofwesternpowers,”while19percentthoughtitwasdueto“TutsihegemonyincentralAfrica.”6Fewcaredabouttheincompetenceoftheirowngovernment.Theeuphoriahadbeenshort-lived,however.ThewarbankruptedthecountryandunderminedKabila’s

ambitiousdevelopmentplans.By2000,inflationhadrisento550percent,andcivilservantswerebarelypaid.Longlinesofcarsgatheredinfrontofgasstations,waitingforfuel;theonlyreliableprovidersof

gasolinewereblack-markethustlers—the so-calledGhadaffi, namedafter theoil-richLibyan leader—who set up shop under broad-rimmed umbrellas along the streets with their jerry cans and siphons.Mutiniesbrokeoutinthecapital’smilitarybarrackswhenpoorlypaidsoldiersrefusedtogotothefrontline. On several occasions, Kabila’s motorcade in Kinshasa was stoned in the densely populatedshantytowns.Ashepassedby,womenliftedtheircolorfulblousestoshowhimtheirstomachs,cryingthattheywerehungry.SeveralbillboardswithMzee’spicture,exclaiming,“It’sthemanweneeded!”hadtobetakendown,astheybecamesubjecttoregularpeltingwithrottenfruit.

Inflation, corruption, and general administrative stagnation: These were the characteristics of LaurentKabila’sregime.Inretrospect,Kabila’ssupportersblameallofhisregime’swoesonthewar.Inreality,however,Mzeehelpedbringhisproblemsonhimselfthroughaslewofincoherentandpoorlyexecutedinitiatives.Thegovernment’smonetaryand fiscalpolicieswereacase inpoint. Inorder tohoardmuch-needed

foreigncurrency, thegovernmentdecreed thatallmonetary transactionswould takeplace inCongolesefrancs,anditkeptthecurrencyatanartificiallyhighvalue.TradershadfivedaystoexchangetheirU.S.dollarsandeurosforCongolesefrancsorfacesanctions.Theythenhadtopayalloftheirtaxesaccordingtotheofficialrate.SincetherateattheCentralBankwasfourtimeslowerin2000thanthatontheblackmarket, incomes of businesses and civil servants were devastated. Of course, the few governmentemployeeswhowereallowedtobuyforeigncashattheofficialratemadeakilling,encouragingthemtokeepinflationhigh.“Mzeewantedsolutionsnow,nottwoyearsinthefuture.Wewouldgotohimwithelaborateplansfor

theeconomy,”hisinformationministerremembered,“buthewouldsay‘Twoyears!Iwillbedeadintwoyears.Bringmeprojectsthatcanbringuscashintwoweeks!’”7Thewarscuttledallplansforlong-termreformandpromptedquickfixesthatonlyfurtherdebilitated

thestate.Thediamond industrywasanotherexample.With the formercashcowsof theeconomy—thestate-runcopperandcobaltcompanies—moribund,thegovernmentwasalmostsolelyreliantondiamondsandoil,whichmadeup75percentofexports.8However,Kabila’smonetarypolicyprompteddiamondsellerstosmugglemostoftheirgoodstoneighboringcountriestoavoidtransactionsinCongolesefrancs.Tomakemattersworse, inAugust2000 thepresidentgrantedamonopolyofalldiamondsales toDanGertler,ayoungIsraeli tycoon, inreturnfor$20millionayear.Themovewasintendedtoprovidethegovernmentwith somemuch-needed cash, but as a resultKabila crippled the sector and alienated thepowerful Lebanese diamond trading community in Kinshasa. Without smuggling, the entire diamondmarket in the Congo was estimated to be worth $600 million. Under Kabila’s whimsical policies,Congoleseexportsshrunktobarely$175million.9

Inthemeantime,thenewsfromthefrontlinewasconsistentlybad.AllCongolesebelligerentsandtheirforeign allies had signed the Lusaka Cease-fire in August 1999, but—invokingMao Tsetung’s dictum“talk/fight,talk/fight”—Kabilawasdeterminedtofighttotheend.Heconsistentlyblockedthedeployment

ofaUNpeacekeepingmission,believingitwouldpreventhismilitarytriumph.ByAugust2000,however,Kabilawasaloneinstillbelievinginvictory.Thewarhadstumbledfitfully

intoitsthirdyear.TheUgandan-backedMLC(MovementfortheLiberationoftheCongo)rebelsroutedthegovernment’s troops in thenorthof thecountry,pushingdowntheCongoRiver toward theregionalhubofMbandaka,justseveralhundredmilesuptheriverfromKinshasaitself.Inthecenterofthecountry,RwandantroopsandtheirRCDallieshadsurroundedthegarrisoncityofIkela,cuttingoffCongoleseandZimbabweantroopsandslowlystarvingthem.The government readied itself for a decisive standoff in the small fishing village of Pweto, on the

southeasternborderwithZambia.“ForMzee,Pwetowasasymbolofresistance,”apresidentialadvisortoldme.“Hewantedtodefenditatallcosts.”10IfPwetofell,littlewouldstandinthewayofRwandafromtakingLubumbashi,thecountry’sminingcapitalandKabila’shometown.The leaderof theBurundianHutu rebels in theCongoat the timerememberedKabilacallinghim in

August 2000. “He said: ‘This time we will break their back,’ and told me to get ready for a newoffensive.”11Kabila freed up $20million for the operations andmoved his army command to Pweto,entrusting the offensive toGeneral JohnNumbi, an electrical engineer and former head of aKatanganyouthmilitia.Many officers didn’t share Kabila’s optimism. General JosephKabila, the titular head of the army

since1998andthepresident’sson,toldtheBurundianrebelcommanderinprivatehedidn’tbelievetheywouldsucceed.Zimbabweancommandersmutteredsimilardoubtsandsaidtheirsoldierswouldjustholddefensivepositions.TheBurundianrebelleaderhimselfhadbeenletdownonseveraloccasions,takingcontroloftownsonlytowaitinvainforreinforcementsthatKabilahadpromisedhim.HealsosharedthegeneralskepticismregardingGeneralNumbi’scompetence:“Hespenthistimeelaboratingplansonhislaptopanddrawingsketchesthatnobodypaidmuchattentionto.Hewasn’tarealsoldier.”Likemuch of the state, theCongolese armywas a hulking, decrepit edifice.Although the president

claimedtohave120,000soldiers,mostdiplomatsputtherealfigureataround50,000,amixofformerMobutists, kadogo recruited during the first war and trained by Rwandans and Ugandans, KatanganTigers,andnewrecruits.Someforeignmilitaryanalystsputprecombatdesertionrates—thosewhofledevenbeforefightinghadbegun—ashighas60percent;onlyfrontlineunitsreceivedregularpayandfood.InKinshasa,familiesofsoldiersonthefrontlinewereroutinelyevictedfromtheirhousessonewrecruitscouldbeluredbyoffersoffreelodging.Eventhen,thearmywashard-pressedtoattractnewsoldiersandby2000hadbeguntoenlisttheyoungchildrenofsoldierstosendtothefront.12While many officers had significant expertise, much like his predecessor President Kabila valued

loyaltymorethancompetenceandleftmanyimportantoperations in thehandsofoldmaquisards (bushfighters)orinexperiencedKatangans.Evenwherecompetentofficersweredeployed,thepresidentoftenmicromanagedoperationshimselfandusedparallelchainsofcommand,confusinghisownoffensive.Given this shambles of an army, Kabila had to rely on his allies. Zimbabwe had increased its

deployment to theCongo to11,000 troops,whileAngola andNamibiahad smaller contingents, taskedlargelywithdefendingKinshasa.Therewerealso15,000to25,000BurundianandRwandanHutuswhowereworkingforKabilaonamercenarybasis.

ItwasjustnorthofPweto,inthesmallvillageofMutotoMoya,that,amidthelongelephantgrassofthe

savannah, one of thewar’smost important battles took place. Located in themiddle of gently rollingplains,thevillagestoodatthegatewaytoLubumbashi,thecapitalofthemineral-richprovince,justfourdaysawaybyfootalonggoodroads.Around 3,000Rwandan andBurundian troops had been held at a stalemate formonths by twice as

manyZimbabweanandHutusoldiers.Thetwoforcesstaredateachotheracross8milesoftwintrenches,separatedbyaone-milestretchofemptyland.MutotoMoyawasoneoftheonlyinstancesoftrenchwarfareintheCongo.Bothsideshaddugman-

high trenches thatmeandered formiles. Inside themuddywalls, one could find kitchens, card games,makeshiftbars,andcotslaidoutforsoldierstosleep.ThiswasoneofthefewinstanceswhenAfrica’sGreatWarresembleditsEuropeancounterparteightyyearsearlier.For the Rwandan and Burundian soldiers, many of whom had grown up in cooler climates, the

conditionswerepoor.Itwashotandhumid,andhuge,foot-longearthwormsanddungbeetlessharedthespacewiththesoldiers.Whenitrained,thesoldierscouldfindthemselvesstandingknee-deepinmuddyrainwaterforhours,developingsoresastheirskinchafedinsidetheirrubbergaloshes.Many came downwithmalaria and a strange skin rash they thoughtwas caused by the localwater

supply.Termitesfromthetoweringmoundsnearbyateintothewoodenammunitionboxes,andjiggerslayeggsundersoldiers’skin.LuckilyfortheRwandanstaffofficers,everycoupleofmonthstheycouldgoformuch-neededR&R on a nearby colonial ranch,where therewere dairy cows, electricity, and a goodsupplyofbeer.ItwastellingthatthemostimportantfrontoftheCongowarwasbeingfoughtalmostentirelybyforeign

troops on both sides. “TheRwandans didn’t trust theRCDwith such an important task,” rememberedColonelMauriceGateretse, the commander of regular Burundian army troops. “They had behaved sobadlythatweradioedbacktotheirheadquarters,sayingtheyshouldberemoved.Theywoulduseupawholeclipinthirtyminutesandcomeandaskformore.Theseguysweremoreinterestedinpillagingthevillagesthanfighting.”13A cease-fire negotiated between the two sides held until October 2000, when Laurent Kabila

unilaterally launched his offensive. In an effort to prevail by sheer numbers, the Congolese cobbledtogetheraforceofover10,000soldiers,includingmanyRwandanandBurundianHutusoldiers.Withthesupportof armoredcars andHawker fighter aircraft from theZimbabweanarmy, theCongolese forcesoverrantheenemytrenchesandpushedtheirrivalsbacktoPepa,aranchingtowninthehillssomethirtymiles away.There,LaurentKabila’s troops took control of the strategic heights overlooking the town.Zimbabweanbomberspursuedandbombedtheretreatingtroops,forcingthemtohideduringthedayandmarchatnight.Back inKigali,PresidentKagamewas furious.Heradioedhiscommanderon theground,anofficer

nicknamedCommanderZeroZero,whowasknownforhisbrutalityandhisloveofcanealcohol.Kagametold him that if he failed to retake Pepa, “don’t even try to come back to Rwanda.” The Burundiancommander,ColonelGateretse,receivedasimilarwarningfromhiscommanderbackhome,whotoldhimhewouldhavetowalkbacktoBurundi—threehundredseventymilesthroughthebush—ifhelost.InordertoretakePepa,theywouldhavetoscaleahillwithalmostnocoverandwiththickbuttresses

prickling with heavy machine guns and mortars at the top. “It was like those movies I saw of theAmericansat IwoJima,” theBurundiancommandercommented.“Wewouldhave tohidebehindeveryhummock and bush we could find.” They received reinforcements over the lake from Burundi: Anadditional6,000RwandanandBurundiantroopsarrivedonbargesfortheonslaught.They launched their challenge early in themorning. Thousands of young soldiers clambered up the

steepslopestowardthefortificationsabove.Therewaslittlebrushforcover;thiswascattlecountry,and

all the treeshadbeenchoppeddownforpasture.“Itwasamassacre,”ColonelGateretseremembered.Kabila’sarmy“satatthetopwiththeirheavymachinegunsandjustmowedthekidsdown.Youwouldhearthemortarsthunder,therat-tat-tatofthemachinegunsandscreamsasourboysfell.”Onebyone,thewalkie-talkiesoftheirofficerstryingtoscalethehillwentdead.Aftertwodaysandhundredsofcasualties,theRwandansandBurundianssattogethertorethink.They

decidedtosendalight,mobilebattalionaroundKabila’spositiontoattackfromtherear,whilethebulkof the troops continued their frontal offensive to distract their adversaries. The flanking maneuver,however,wasrisky,astheterrainwasdifficultandtheCongolesehadpatrolsthroughoutthesurroundingareas.Thesoldierswouldhavetocoverfortymilesbyfootinonenighttocatchthembysurprise,atoughfeatevenbytheirstandards.Theyforcedsomeunluckylocalsatgunpointtoserveasguidesforthemandset out at nightfall at a light trot with little equipment other than their AK-47s, several clips ofammunition,andafewrocket-propelledgrenadelaunchers.Itworked.Afteramorningofcatfightsupthemountain, incurringevenmorecasualties,suddenlythe

machinegunsat the topof thehillwentsilent, then turnedaround,andbegan firing theotherway.Theflanking expedition had broken through Kabila’s rear guard, sandwiching the remaining troops. In adesperate surrender attempt, Kabila’s soldiers put up any white material they could find over theirsandbags: tank tops, tarps,underwear. Itdidn’tmakemuchdifference.“Wedidn’t takemanyprisoners,weweretooangry,and,anyway,wherewouldwehaveputthem?”ColonelGateretseremembered.Itwastheirturntomowdowntheenemy.MostofKabila’sforces,however,escaped,andbeganrunningbacktowardPweto,towardtheirarmy’s

forwardoperatingbase.MuchoftheCongolesetopbrasshadassembledthere,includingGeneralJosephKabila.What followedwas a three-week-long road battle as theCongolese,Hutu, and Zimbabwean forces

retreatedunder constant fire.The roadwound through thebucolic cattle country, linedwith eucalyptustreesplantedbyBelgiansdecadesbefore.TheRwandanshad the tacticaladvantage:Theywerehighlymobile,carriedonlytheessentials,andambushedtheCongoleseateveryturnintheroad.TheCongolesewereencumberedbytheirartillery,tanks,andarmoredvehicles;theysoughtrefugeonthehighgroundtothesidesoftheroad,usingbunkersandfoxholestheyhaddugthere.Butinevitably,theRwandanswouldoutpacethemandcutoffindividualunits.AWashington Post journalist who visited the road later reported: “The road south toward Pweto

remainedspecklednotonlywithgreenandwhitebutterflies,butwithcorpses—herethebodyofyoungmancutdownclutchinganAK-47,hereasplayedgreenponchotoppedbyaskull.”14In the meantime, panic was breaking out in Pweto. The government’s coalition had made the fatal

mistakeofbringingthebulkofitsarmoryacrosstheLuvuaRiver.Onlyoneferry,however,wasavailablefor transport, and therewasn’t enough time to evacuate their equipment before theRwandans arrived.Worsestill,underduress,Congoleselogisticsbrokedown.“PresidentKabila toldmethat theyhadrunoutofammunition,”oneofhiscommandersremembered.“Itwasverysuspicious.Allofasudden,weranoutofeverything—fuel,ammunition,money.”15WiththeRwandansjustafewmilesaway,thearmyhighcommand,includingGeneralJosephKabila,

triedtoboardahelicoptertofleebacktoLubumbashi,onlytofindthattherewasnofuelforthateither.“Itwas likeMobutualloveragain,”apresidentialaide toldme.“Someonehadsoldall thehelicopterfueltomakeaprofit.Wewerethevictimsofourownineptitude.”16The group of generals had to scramble to the ferry—aptly named Alliance, a dirty-pink, rusty

contraption—along with their Zimbabwean colleagues and flee across the Zambian border.When theferry got back to theCongolese side, soldiers tried frantically to load a forty-tonSovietT-62 tank on

board.Theymisjudgedthebalance,andtheferrysunkintheharboralongwithitspreciouscargo.Itwasa fittingend to the routofCongolese forces.When theRwandansarrived in the fishing town

hours later, they found a neat line of thirty-three tanks, armored personnel carriers, trucks, and oneambulancelinedupinfrontoftheferryandcharredacrispyblack.Thefleeingsoldiershaddousedtheequipmentwithdieselandsetitalight.Unopenedsyringesfromthemedicalkitscrackedunderfoot.Amidthejettisonedequipment,theyfoundanoteleftbyafleeingofficerthatread:“Attaque.”17

President Laurent Kabila, who had been following the fighting from Lubumbashi, two hundred milesaway,wasdevastated.Fortwenty-fourhourshehadnonewsfromhissonJoseph,whomheconsideredtheclosestmemberofhisconfused,sprawlingfamilynetwork.WhenheheardthathissonandtherestofthearmycommandhadfledtoZambia,hehadthemallarrested,includingJoseph,andbroughtbacktotheCongo.Kabila urgently flew to Zimbabwe to obtain assurance that they would prevent Lubumbashi from

falling,butPresidentMugabewasvisiblyupset.OneZimbabweanofficialcommented:“[Kabila]islikeamanwhostartssixfireswhenhe’sonlygotonefireextinguisher....ThefirefightersaretheZimbabweanArmy.”18Thewar in theCongowascostingMugabe$27millionamonthandaconsistentbatteringbyHarare’s newspapers,which complained about the costlywar in theCongowhile at home therewerefood riots.Shortlybefore thePwetodebacle,Mugabe lost akey referendum toamend theconstitution,while theoppositionmadehugegains inparliamentaryelections.“Enough,”he toldKabila.“Negotiatewithyourenemies.”Desperate, Kabila flew to Angola, where he met with President Edouardo Dos Santos. There, the

messagewasevenmoresevere.Bytheendof2000,theAngolanarmy,whichhadneversentmanytroopstothefrontline,hadbadlythrashedJonasSavimbi’sUNITArebelsinthenorthofthecountryandwasnolongersodependentonKabila’smilitarycollaboration.OneofKabila’saidesrecalled:“DosSantostoldhim to liberalize the diamond trade, float the exchange rate, andmeetwith his opponents.”19 In otherwords:Everythingyouhavetriedhasfailed.Thestickhasn’tworked;youhavetotrywithsomecarrotsnow.Inorder to ramthemessagehome, theAngolanpresidentconfided thatwestern intelligenceservices

were conspiring to get rid ofKabila and that several of his generals had been contacted.But then hesmiled andpattedhis counterpart on the back: “I told themnot to do anything—better a scoundrelweknowthanonewedon’t.”Kabilawas deeply affected by this conversation. “He talked about it for days after he got back to

Kinshasa,” his aide said.20 The president knew that he didn’t have the finances or the militarydomestically to prop up his dysfunctional government and that without the backing of Angola andZimbabwe his days were numbered. Kabila asked his staff to draw up a list of opponents he couldnegotiatewith,butnobodyhadfaithindealingwithhimanymore.Hesunkintoaninsomniacdepression,canceled all his meetings, and withdrew to his presidential palace. Stubble began appearing on hisusuallyclean-shavenface,andhetoldhisaides,“IfLubumbashifalls,Iwillkillmyself.”21

SowhoorderedthekillingofMzee?CongoleseimaginationisknottedaroundKabila’sdeath,entangledinmultiplenarrativesandhistoriesthatcompetetoexplainwhythescrawnybodyguardshotthepresident.Partoftheproblemisthatthereweretoomanypeoplewhohadareason,whostoodtobenefitfromhisdeath.AstheEconomistquipped,fiftymillionpeople—thecountry’sentirepopulation—hadamotive.Bythetimeofhisdeath,Kabilahadmanagedtooffendoralienatenotonlyhisenemiesbutalsomostofhisallies.Therearetwomaintheoriesabouthisdeath.Thefirst,theonesupportedbytheCongolesegovernment,

lays the blame squarely at Rwanda’s doorstep, saying that Rwanda had acted through a gang ofdiscontented former child soldiers from the Kivus close to AnselmeMasasu.When Edy Kapend hadinformedJosephKabilaofhisfather’sdeath,thetwenty-nine-year-oldreportedlyteareduponthephone,andbeforeKapendcouldfullyexplainwhathadhappened,heblurtedout,“ThosepeoplefromtheKivuskilledmyfather.”22AnselmeMasasu—knownas“Toto”tohisfriends,forhisyouthfulappearance(mtotomeans“child”in

Swahili)—hadgrownupalongtheborderbetweenRwandaandtheCongo,thesonofafatherfromtheethnicShicommunityandaTutsimother.HehadmanyTutsifriends,andwhentheyleftschooltojointheRPF rebellion in theearly1990s,Masasu,eager foradventure, joinedupaswell.Hewas twentyandrosetotherankofsergeantintheRwandanarmy.Hischarismaandkeenwitbroughthimtotheattentionofhissuperiors,andhewaschosenasthefourthmemberoftheAFDLleadershipin1996.TheRwandanarmyhoped thathewouldbeable toencouragenon-Tutsiyouth in theeasternCongo to joinwhat theyfeared might be perceived as an exclusively Tutsi affair. Even before the AFDL invasion, Masasuinfiltratedandbeganenlistingchildrenandyoungmentothecause.Hewasconsideredthecommanderofthekadogo,alwayspresentonthefrontline,eatingbeansandcornwithhis“children.”Yearslater,manyformerkadogoIspoketostillreferredtohimwithrespectandlove—hehadbeentheirfatheraftertheyhadlefthome.MasasuremainedclosetoColonelJamesKabarebe,evenaftertheRwandanshadbeenkickedoutof

theCongo.AsoneoftheoriginalfoundersoftheAFDL,Masasuoftenexaggeratedhisposition,callinghimselfcommanderinchiefofthearmyandgrantinghimselftherankofgeneral.“Herosefromsergeanttogeneralinninemonths,”recalledformerRwandanintelligencechiefPatrickKaregeya.“Ithinkitwenttohishead.”IntheethnicallyfuelledpoliticsofKinshasa,MasasurepresentedtheKivutianwingofthearmyandwasseenasathreatbyKatangansclosetoKabila.InNovember1997,PresidentKabilahadMasasuarrestedandputoutapressstatement,accusinghim

of“fraternizingwithenemiesofthestate”andclarifyingthathewasnotageneral.Hewassentencedtotwentyyearsinprison,ofwhichheservedfifteenmonths,someofitinsolitaryconfinementinacellonesquareyardinsize.Whenkadogoprotestedandsignsofapossiblemutinyappeared,Kabilaallowedhimtogofree.Nevertheless,assoonasMasasuwassetfree,hebegancriticizingKabilaagainintheforeignpress,

claimingthathehadbeenunjustlyimprisoned.InKinshasa,thesecurityservicesbecameconvincedthathewas recruiting former kadogo to attempt to overthrow the president. They accused him of holdingmeetingswith1,200kadogoaspartofanefforttostartanewinsurgency.Awitchhuntforkadogo fromtheKivuswas launched inKinshasa.Security services strippeddetaineesbare and searched for ritualscarificationon their chests andbacks, claiming thatMasasuwas anointinghis adeptswith traditionalmedicinetomaketheminvincibletobullets.Unfortunately,manysoldiersfromtheeastcarriedsuchscarsfromwhentraditionalhealershadtreatedthemforpneumoniaorbronchitisasinfants.Masasuwasarrestedalongwithoverfiftyothersoldiers.Severalweekslater,onNovember27,2000,

hewasexecutedonthefrontlineatPweto.

YoungrecruitsfromtheKivusconstituteduptoathirdofKabila’sarmyof50,000.Sincetheearlydaysofhis rebellion, Kabila had surrounded himself with child soldiers, much to the chagrin of visitingdiplomatsanddignitaries,whowereoftenaccostedbytheyouthsaskingforacoupleofdollarsorsomecigarettes.Whenone visiting foreignbusinessman, a friendof the president,warnedhim against usingthese kadogo, Kabila replied, “Oh no, they could never hurt me. They’ve been with me since thebeginning. They are my children.”23 In another frequently described incident, the kadogo preventedKabila’swifefromleavingtheresidence,protestingthattheyhadn’tbeenpaidandwerehungry.Inorderto shut them up, she opened up the chicken coop behind the residence and allowed them to helpthemselvestothehensandeggs.24Masasu’s execution prompted riots in military camps in Kinshasa, and hundreds of kadogo were

arrestedorfledacrosstherivertoBrazzaville.Althoughdetailsaremurky,atleastseveraldozenwereexecutedbyfiringsquadinthecapital.25Itwasthen,accordingtointerviewsofkadogocarriedoutbyaFrench journalist, that a fatefulmeetingwasheld among theyoungKivutianswhohad remained in thepresident’sbodyguard.26 “Iwillkillhim,”RashidiKasereka is reported tohave said, furiousover thekillingofhisfriends,toagroupoftwentyotherpresidentialguards,whocheeredtheirapproval.Aftertheassassination,agroupofkadogofledacrosstherivertoneighboringBrazzaville.According

to theCongolese authorities, theyhadbeenpartof theplot to assassinateKabila.Thepresidentof theneighboringRepublicofCongo,DenisSassouNguesso,whodidn’twanttoappeartobeshelteringcoupplotters,promptlyarrestedthemandhadthembroughtbacktoKinshasa.SeveralofthemhadbeenclosetoMasasu—theyincludedhisformerchiefofstaffandmilitaryadvisor.AccordingtoKabila’ssecurityservices,whentheyinterrogatedtheseprisoners,theyadmittedtobeingpartofaplantokillKabila.Thekadogo said they had received money to organize the coup from Lebanese businessmen; the securityserviceshadalready suspected their involvement andhadexecutedelevenLebanese.Thebusinessmenhad allegedly been incensed by Kabila’s grant of the quasi-monopoly of diamond sales to the Israelitrader. “It was strange, though,” remarked Kabila’s national security advisor, who had followed theinterrogations.“Theywereverycalmduringourquestioning.Theysaidthattheyknewtheywouldsoonescape.”27Sureenough,shortlyafterwards,theleadersoftheMasasugroupengineeredabreakfromtheMakalaprisonthroughaninsidejob.TheLeMonde journalists,whospokewith severalof the fugitives, concluded that theassassination

hadbeentheworkofabunchofbitterformerchildsoldierswhowereseekingrevenge.Thisispossible.However,thewholeaffair—thelaxsecurityatthepresidency,theescapefromprison,themurderoftheLebanese—seems to be toowell choreographed, too slickly greased to have been the doing of a fewrenegadebodyguards.ThereareseveralindicationsthatRwandawasdirectlyinvolved.First,accordingto theCongolese security services, before fleeing, theMasasu crewadmitted to being in cahootswithKigali.Second,when theydid flee,alongwithseveralaffluentLebanesebusinessmen, theymade theirwaydirectlytoRwanda,wheresomewereeventuallygiveninfluentialpoliticalandbusinesspositionsbythe government. Last, a former Rwandan security official told me that he had seen Colonel JamesKabarebe on the day of the assassination. Kabarebe, whowas still running Congo operations for theRwandanarmyandwouldsoonbepromotedtobecomeheadofthearmy,reportedlyslappedhimontheshoulderandsaid,“GoodnewsfromKinshasa.Ourboysdidit.”28

Others, however, dismiss the Rwandan conspiracy theory. If the Rwandans had wanted to get rid ofKabila,theargumentgoes,theywouldhavelaunchedanoffensive,eitherinKinshasaoralongthefrontline, to accompany their coup. Instead nothing happened. In fact, the assassination ended up workingagainst Rwandan interests, as the dead president’s successor was able to reestablish support for hiscountryamongdiplomats,reinvigoratethepeaceprocess,andemasculateRwanda’sCongoleseally,theRCD.Skeptics of the Rwandan conspiracy theory, including the French political scientist Gérard Prunier,

usually point their finger atAngola, PresidentKabila’s erstwhile ally. In 2000, theAngolan army hadcomeclose tocrushingUNITA, its rebeladversaryof twenty-fiveyears.Nonetheless,according toUNinvestigators,UNITAcontinuedtorakeinrevenuesof$200millionayearthroughdiamonddeals,anditappearedthatKabila, inadesperatebidforcash,hadbeguntoallowUNITAtodeal throughLebanesegem traders inKinshasa.TheAngolan rebelswouldmask the trueoriginof thediamonds, andKabilawouldgetheftykickbacks inreturn.According toFrenchandBritish insiderperiodicals,by theendof2000UNITAoperativeswereonceagainactiveinKinshasa.PresidentDosSantos,whohadsupportedtheinitialrebellionagainstMobutupreciselytorootoutUNITAbasesinZaire,waslivid.29This hypothesis is supported by the curious behavior of General Yav Nawej, the commander of

KinshasawhohadclosetiestoAngola,alongwithEdyKapend,thepresident’smilitaryadvisor.Thedaybefore the assassination, General Yav, as he was known, ordered the disarmament of select northernKatangan units in Kinshasa’s garrison, whowere themost loyal to Kabila. Then, within hours of theassassination,GeneralYavorderedtheexecutionofelevenLebanese,includingsixminors,belongingtoadiamondtradingfamily.Inthemeantime,Kapendhadgoneontheradioandordered thecommandersofthearmy,navy,andair force tomaintaindisciplineandcalm,rankling theseofficers,whothoughtsuchcommandstobefarabovehispaygrade.Accordingtothisscenario,theAngolansdidnotinstigatetheassassinationbutfoundoutaboutitahead

oftimeandthentoldtheirmeninKinshasa—YavandKapend—nottointervene.Indeed,itisdifficulttoimaginethekadogoactingonbehestofAngola,astheyhadfewlinkstoLuandaandweremuchclosertoRwanda. It is, however, equally difficult to believe that only the pro-Angolan officers within thepresidencywould have discovered the coup plot, given the porous information networks inKinshasa.This theory isalsochallengedby the subsequentarrestofbothKapendandYav, the former forhavingallegedlyorchestratedtheassassination,thelatterforhisextrajudicialexecutionoftheLebanesecitizens.Onewould imagine that ifAngolahadwanted toget ridof any leaksof information, theywouldhaveeliminatedbothaltogether—prisons in theCongoarenotoriouslyporous themselves. It also isn’t clearwhyJosephKabila,whoisknownforhisdeepattachmenttohisfatherandmayhavehadagoodideaofwho killed him, would have so easily assumed the presidency surrounded by people who had beeninvolvedintheplot.

AnynumberofnarrativestrandscouldhaveendedinLaurentKabila’sdeath.Othertheoriesincludeonethat he died of a natural death: He had apparently fallen sick withmalaria the day of his death, andaccordingtoahumanrightsorganization,thedoctorattheclinicwherehewastreateddidnotnoticeany

bulletwoundsonhisbody.Anotherconjecture is thathehadbeenshotbyagroupofhisowngeneralswhomhehad sacked for their shoddyperformance inPweto.Ayear later,Kabila’sdeputydirectorofprotocolappearedinexileinBrussels,suggestingthattheZimbabweanarmywasbehindthemurderbutprovidinglittleevidenceorrationaleforhisclaim.30AssooftenintheCongo,thetruthmayneverbeknown.ObserversofCongolesepoliticsshouldsteel

themselveswithadeepskepticismofsimpletruthsingeneral.Information,inparticularregardingmattersofstate,isoftenrootedinhearsayandrumor.Indeed,politicianshavebecomeadeptatusingrumorsasatacticalweapon,spreadingthemonpurposetodistractfromthetruthortosmeartheiropponents.SometimesitseemsthatbycrossingtheborderintotheCongooneabandonsanysortofArchimedean

perspectiveon truthandbecomescaughtup inawebof rumorsandallegations,as if thecountry itselfwere the stuff of some postmodern fiction. This is, in part, due to a structural deficit; institutions thatcould dig deep and scrutinize information—such as a free press, an independent judiciary, and aninquisitive parliament—do not exist.But it has also become amatter of cultural pride. Peopleweaverumorsandmyths togetheroverdrinksorwhilewaitingfor taxis tohelpgivemeaning to their lives. Itmay,forexample,beeasiertobelievethatJosephKabila’srealnameisHippolyteKanambéandthatheisaRwandan,actingintheinterestsofPaulKagame,ortobelievethattheconflictintheCongowasallanAmericancorporateconspiracytoextractmineralsfromthecountry.Eithermightbeeasiertoswallowthan the complex, tangled reality. Doesn’t it give more meaning to the Congolese’s grim everydayexistence?AmilitarytribunalinKinshasaheldanine-month-longtrialatthecentralprisonof135peoplearrested

in conjunction with Kabila’s assassination. Day after day, prisoners, soldiers, family members, andpeople in search of entertainment filed into the court, ushered to their seats by prisoners in blue-and-yellowuniforms.Thejudgessat infrontofamural thathadbeenpaintedbyaprisonerwithanartisticbent:arusticpicnicnexttoapond,garnishedwithwine,grapes,aviolin,andabouquetofroses.Asthedefendantsstoodandgavetheirtestimony,theaudiencejeeredorclapped.TheywereparticularlynoisyduringthespeechesofColonelCharlesAlamba,thechiefprosecutor,whodistinguishedhimselfbylong,irrelevantdigressions.Atonepoint,hecastigatedEdyKapendforhavinghadchildrenwithmorethanonewoman. “We practice monogamy here—we don’t recognize polygamy!”31 The audience groaned indismay.Thecourtdidnotprovidetheaccusedwithdecentdefenselawyersandbarredindependentobservers

fromthecourtroomformuchofthetrial.Theprosecutorsweremilitaryofficersandassuchansweredtotheir superiors, a fact that undermined their independence.Many had little or no legal training. Theyarrested and put on trial wives of some of the soldiers, including Rashidi’s, without any evidence toindicatetheywereinvolved.EmileMota,theeconomicaffairsadvisorwhohadbeenpresentduringtheassassination,was arrestedwhile hewas on thewitness stand because he allegedly had contradictedhimself.Atnopointdidanybodyprovideconvincingevidencethatanyoftheaccusedwasguilty,nordidthereasonsbehindKabila’sdeathbecomeanyclearer.Thejudgeeventuallysentencedthirtypeopletodeath,tenofwhomhadbeentriedinabsentia.

Bythetimeofhisdeath,Kabilahadbecomethecentralfigureinthecountry.Everythingabouthimwasbig,fromhisfiguretohisbombasticlanguagetohisacts.Inmanyways,hewasheirtothemanhehad

spentmostofhis life trying tooverthrow:MobutuSeseSeko.LaurentKabila, too,wasa strong,oftenautocratic rulerwhogovernedbydecreeand repressedallopposition. “Kabila, c’était un vrai chef,”Congolese often remember fondly.Hewas in charge, a fact he remindedmost of his associates of byarrestingthemforshortperiodsandthenreleasingthemagain;almostnooneescapedthistreatment.Butthere were no monumental relics of his rule: Kabila was not given to the same kind of Louis XIVextravagancesashispredecessor.Helivedarelativelymodestlifeandhadlittletoleranceformostkindsofcorruption.IfthereisonethingtheCongolesewillrememberMzeefor,itisthewar.ItconsumedbothKabila and his government and pushed them into a frenzy of patriotism and, at times, xenophobia.Hebecameobsessedwithwinning.Afterall,hehadgrownuparebelandfeltmuchmoreateaseintryingtowinawarthantoruleacountry.Butwhenhebecameamartyrtohismostdearcause,thecountryheavedasighofrelief.

19

PAYINGFORTHEWAR

GOMA,ZAIRE,NOVEMBER1996

“Illegal,illegal!Whatthehelldoes‘illegal’mean?”MwenzeKongolorespondedwhenIaskedwhathethoughtaboutthe“illegalexploitation”ofCongoleseresourcesbyforeigncompaniesandstates.MwenzehadbeenthepowerfulinteriorministerunderLaurentKabila,andhewashimselfashareholderinseveralminingdeals.“Weneededmoneytofinancethewar.Weusedourminesandresourcestostaveoffforeignaggression.Isthatillegal?”1ManyhavecometocriticizethedealsstruckbetweenKabila’sgovernmentandstatesintheregionto

finance thewar.OthershavecondemnedRwandanandUgandanprofiteeringduring theiroccupationofthe easternCongobetween1998and2002.Asusual, a coarsebrushwasused topaint thesedifferentformsof involvementwith the samebroad strokes, sacrificingnuance for caricature.For all the statesinvolved,economicinterestsplayedarolebutwerewovenintoacomplexwebofdomesticandregional,political and corporate considerations. In some cases, politicians did exploit natural resources forpersonalprofit; inothers, theydid so to finance thewar andgovernmentoperations, althoughoftenbyverydubiousmeans.Foreigngovernmentsandcompanieswereinvolved,butagain,inawidevarietyofforms,rangingfromdirectcomplicitytomoretangentialresponsibility.

Thefirst invasionof theCongo inSeptember1996hadeverything todowithsecurityandgeopoliticalconcernsandonlylittletodowithbusiness.ItwasMobutu’ssupportofAngolan,Ugandan,andRwandanrebels thatprovoked the incursion,nothisneighbors’greed for theCongo’sminerals.As the rebellionadvanced,however,moneysoonbecameadecisivefactor.AspartsofthecountrybecameindependentofcontrolfromKinshasa,theyslashedimportandexport

taxesby70percent.Gomabecameahotbedof entrepreneurship, as investors fromall over theworldwereattractedtotheregion.Doingbusinesswiththerebelsatthattimewasariskyproposition.NolargecorporationsthrewtheirweightbehindLaurentKabila,afraidthatMobutucouldmakeacomebackandtheywouldbeperceivedasturncoats.Thisopenedthedoorforrisk-seekingentrepreneursnotconfinedbythestricturesoflarge,publiclyownedcorporations.Jean-RaymondBoullefit thisprofile.Hewasoneofthefirstprominententrepreneurstoget intouch

withtheAFDLrebellionintheearlymonthsof1997,whentherebellioncontrollednomorethanathinsliver of the eastern border region. Boulle had a typical profile for investors in the Congo: erudite,adventurous, and risk-seeking. A soft-spoken forty-seven-year-old from Mauritius, Boulle had beeneducated inSouthAfricaand theUnitedKingdom.HedroveaBentleyandhadsettled inamansion in

Monaco,buthewasnostrangertotherough-and-tumbleofAfricanmining.Hehadbecomeinvolvedinthebusinessatanearlyage,followinghismother,whohadbeenanexperienceddiamonddealer;hehadgone towork for the SouthAfrican diamond giantDeBeers in Zaire and Sierra Leone in the 1970s.Frustratedbythecompany’sbureaucracy,helefttostarthisowncompanyin1981.In1994,hehadhisbigbreak,whenoneofhisgeologistsstumbledbyaccidenton theworld’s largestnickeldeposit inVoiseyBay,Canada,whilehewasprospectingfordiamonds.Afterstiffbargaining,Boullesoldtheconcession,walking away with $400 million, which he promptly invested in a new company, AmericanMineralFields, a jointventurewith a land surveyor fromHope,Arkansas, thehometownofPresidentClinton.BoullewasnevertooshytoremindpotentialpartnerswherehiscompanywasbasedandtomentionthathehadmetClintononseveraloccasions,includingathisinaugurationcelebrationattheWhiteHouse.2Whenthewarbrokeout,nomajorinvestorhadbeenactivelyminingintheCongoinyears.Atthesame

time, however, the Belgian and Congolese state had already invested billions over the years inprospecting and conducting feasibility studies. This considerably reduced the risk for private capital.Companiescouldbuyknownquantitiesofcopperandcobalt,anticipatingroughlyhowmuchsurfacerockneeded to be removed, water needed to be dredged, and infrastructure needed to be renovated orinstalled. In somecases, foreignbusinessmencolludedwithofficials fromGécamines, the state-ownedminingcorporation,toobtaintheirtechnicalevaluationsandfeasibilitystudies.“Theyrewrotethem,puttheir letterheadon top,and thensimplysaid that theyhaddonea technicalstudy,”aformerGécaminesofficial,who—likemostminingofficials—refusedtobenamedforthisbook,toldme.3Boulle had already attempted to get involved in mining under Mobutu, obtaining two mining

concessionsthatcontainedanestimated$20billionincopperandcobalt.4ButMobutuhadcanceledthecontracts,handingoneofthemtoAngloAmerican,thecontinent’slargestminingconglomerate.Rankledbythedictator,Boulle,whoworkedintandemwithseveralbrothers,reachedouttoMobutu’sopponents.WhenKisangani, the country’s third biggest city, fell inMarch 1997, Boullemade hismove, shuttingdownhisofficeinKinshasaandopeningadiamondtradinghouseinanareacontrolledbytheAFDL.“Doyouwaituntileverybodygetshereandbelastordoyougetinearly?”hisbrotherMaxBoulletoldthepressatthetime.“We’vemadeaconsciousdecisiontogetinearly.”5SincetheAFDLhadshutdownallotherdiamonddealersintown,Boullewasabletoturnahandsome

profit.Inreturn,hereportedlypaidtherebels$1millionin“advancetaxes”onthediamonds.6DiamondtradersweresodesperatetoselltheirdiamondsthattheyliterallybrokedownthedoorofBoulle’soffice.The Mauritian also allowed the rebellion to continue using his corporate Lear jet, although he laterclaimedthatithadbeencommandeered.InApril1997,aftertheAFDLhadseizedcontrolofLubumbashi,thecountry’sminingcapital,theyawardedBoullewiththeminingdealsthatMobutuhadrecentlycalledinto question. In return, theMauritianminingmagnatewas supposed to dole out an $80million downpayment,aquarterofwhichhereportedlyadvancedtotheAFDL.7OtherminingexecutivessoonfollowedBoulle’slead.TheSwedishventurecapitalistAlfredLundin,

who,likeBoulle,hadalreadybeeninnegotiationswithMobutu’sgovernment,begantalkswiththeAFDLoverthecountry’sgreatestminingprize, theTenkeFungurumemine, inMarch1997.Tenkewaswidelyacclaimed as the largest coppermine in theworld,with an estimated $26 billion in copper reserves.Lundingavetherebels$50millionupfrontasadownpayment,whichwassupposedtogotothestateminingcompany.8“Therearemomentsinthehistoryofminingwhenyoucanmakedealslikethisunderexcellentterms,”Lundinsaidatthetime.9Indeed,thetermswerenotbad:Inreturnfor$250millionpaidtotheCongolesestateanda$1.5billioninvestmentinmakingtheminefunctional,Lundinwouldbeabletooperatetax-freeandretaina55percentshareinthemine.10

Werethesedealsillegal?Possibly.AfterWorldWarIIvariouswarcrimetribunalsfoundGermanandJapanesecompaniesguiltyofcrimesofpillage,either through thedirect seizingofassetsorbybuyinggoods thathadbeenstolenbyothers. Inonecase, forexample, theU.S.military tribunalatNurembergfoundthemanagerofaGermanminingcompanyguiltyforhavingcarriedoutexcavationinacoalmineinPolandthathehadbeengrantedbytheNazigovernment.11IntheCongo,BoulleandLundinalsosigneddealswithrebels,notwiththelegitimategovernment.Moreover,thecashdownpayments—amountingtoperhaps$70million—cameatacrucialtimefortherebellion,twomonthsbeforeitreachedthecapital,coveringthecostofthefinalpush.

TheCongoisoftenreferredtoasageologicalscandal.Thisisnotanexaggeration.Inthelate1980s,itwastheworld’slargestproducerofcobalt,thirdlargestproducerofindustrialdiamonds,andfifthlargestproducerofcopper.Ithassignificanturaniumreserves—infamousforhavingcontributedtotheHiroshimabombs—aswellaslargegold,zinc,tungsten,andtindeposits.Like somany of the country’s problems, themismanagement of these assets dates back to colonial

times.In1906already,theBelgiangovernmentgavetheSociétégénéraledeBelgique,apowerfultrustaffiliatedtothestate,aminingtractof13,000squaremilesinKatanga,thesizeofBelgium.12Undertheexceedingly favorable termsof thedeal, thecompanywouldgetaninety-nine-yearmonopolyoveranymineraldeposits itcould identify in thenextsixyears. Itwasalsogranted themanagementof thestaterailroadlinethatwouldhelpexportthecopperandcobaltore,forwhichthecolonialstatewouldprovidelocallabor.SociétégénéralesetaboutcreatingthethreemostpowerfulcompaniesintheBelgianCongo:theUpperKatangaMiningUnion, theBas-Congo toKatangaRailroadCompany, and the InternationalForestandMiningCompany.MineralandagriculturalexportsfromtheCongofueledthecreationofsomeofthebiggestBelgianconglomeratesandpersonalfortunes,developingtheAntwerpportandcreatingacoppersmeltingindustry.MobutunationalizedtheUpperKatangaMiningUnionin1967andrebrandeditGécamines,whileother

mining companies in the Kivus and Katanga were also converted into state-owned enterprises. Thegovernmentproceededtousetheminingcompanyasacashcow,systematicallymilkingitformoneytofundMobutu’s patronage network instead of reinvesting earnings in infrastructure and development. Inordertocarryoutthisscheme,theautocratforcedallmineralexportstobesoldthroughastatemineralboard,whichwouldthenhandoveritsrevenuestothestatetreasury.Nonetheless,thankstorisingworldcopperprices,Gécamines remained the country’s largest sourceof employment and income,providingover37,000jobsatitspeak,runningthirteenhospitalsandclinics,andcontributingtobetween20and30percentofstaterevenues.AconfluenceoffactorsbroughtaboutGécamines’demiseinthe1990s.Copperpricesplungedaslow-

costproducerssuchasChilesteppedupproductionandworlddemanddipped.Thearmypillagesof1991and1993,alongwiththeethnicpurgingofKasaiansfromKatangain1993,drovemuchoftheexperiencedexpatriatestaffoutofGécaminesandcontributedtothecuttingofforeigndevelopmentaidthathadhelpedpropup theailingminingsector.Finally, theyearsofmismanagement took their toll. In1990, thehugeunderground Kamoto mine collapsed, leading to an abrupt drop in production of 23 percent. Exportsdeclinedfromahighof465,000tonsin1988to38,000tonsjustbeforethewar,whilecobaltproductionslippedfrom10,000to4,000tonsinthesameperiod.Similartrendsaffectedallothermineralexports,

leadingtoavertiginouscontractionofthecountry’sGDPby40percentbetween1990and1994.Pressuredbydonorstorelinquishthestate’sgripontheeconomyanddesperateforrevenues,Mobutu

allowedhisprimeminister,KengowaDondo,tobegingraduallyprivatizingtheminingsectorin1995.Mostof thecontracts thatwerelaternegotiatedwiththeAFDL,includingtheAmericanMineralFieldsandLundinagreements,wereamendmentstoandconfirmationsofdealsthathadalreadybeenstruckwithMobutu’sgovernmentin1996.ThenotionthatthewarwasfueledbyinternationalminingcapitaleagertogetitshandsontheCongo’swealthdoesnotholdwater;thewarsloweddownprivatizationofthesectorbyadecade,asinsecurityandadministrativechaospreventedlargecorporationsfrominvesting.Itwasnot until 2005 that major new contracts in Katanga were approved and investors began to investsignificantfunds.

Kabila’santipathytowardfree-marketcapitalismshonethroughinotherways.Therebellionapplieditshalf-Marxist,half-liberalapproachtomining,adoptingaslipshodpolicythatimposedharshconditionsonlargeforeigncompanieswhilefavoringshadowyinvestorswhooftenlackedtheresourcesandexpertisenecessarytodevelopminingconcessions.Kabilawasnothappywiththehugecopperandcobaltdepositsthathadbeendoledout—accordingtothegovernment,thepresidenthadneveractuallyputpentopaperon the deal—to AmericanMineral Fields, and he suspended the negotiations. His minister of miningaccusedtwoofthebiggestminingcompanies,DeBeersandAngloAmerican,of“monopolism”and“lackofsocial responsibility”andstripped themofsomeof theirCongoleseassets.13Thegovernmentbegandemanding that any foreign investor provide15percent of theplanned investments as a nonrefundablecashpaymentupfrontandthattheykeeptheinvolvementofexpatriatestafftoastrictminimum.Itputthelargest existing mine, the collapsed Kamoto polygon, up to an open tender but then forced the sixcompaniesthatappliedtoworktogetherasaconsortiumtodeveloptheasset.Notsurprisingly,thedealcollapsed.“C’étaitundésastre,”aGécaminesofficialtoldme,holdinghisheadinhishands.“LaurentKabila?MonDieu.”Soon, however, this approach had exhausted itself. Together with his Rwandan partners, Kabila

revived an idea he had from his days as amaquisard in the 1970s and created a parastatal companycalledtheMixedImport-ExportCompany(COMIEX).BeforearrivinginKinshasainMay1997,Kabilahad funneled a total of at least $31million in private and state capital intoCOMIEXaccounts at twoRwandanbanksinKigali.14Thefundsincludedthe$25milliondownpaymentfromLundin,$3.5millionfrom the statemining company, and several hundred thousand dollars from a state coffee plantation inNorthKivu.Theideaofcreatingalargeholdingcompanytomanagetherulingelite’sinterestsintheeconomywas

notanewidea.InRwanda,theRPFrulingpartyhadawide-rangingnetworkofinvestmentsinbanking,real estate, and industry through companies such as Tristar and Prime Holdings. In Ethiopia, thegovernmentwouldpursueasimilarmodel.Thisallowedthegovernmenttodominateandbenefitfromtheprivate sector without having to subject its activities and financial transactions to the public scrutinyrequiredofstate-ownedcompanies.COMIEXinitiallyfunctionedastherebels’bank,butKabiladidnotfuse the company with the Central Bank when he came to power in Kinshasa. “COMIEXwas neverregistered as a parastatal and put under the official control of the state,”MabiMulumba, the auditorgeneral at the time, remembered. “Itwas a private trust run by people close to PresidentKabila, but

entirelycreatedwithstateassets.”15OneofKabila’s lawyers remembershavingwarned thepresident against fundingaprivatecompany

withstateresources.Thepresidentlaughedandtoldhim,“Butthis lawyouaretalkingabout, it ismanwhomadeit,no?”16

WhenthesecondCongowarbrokeoutonAugust2,1998,PresidentLaurentKabilaknewthathedidn’thave the resources or the army to beat back the Rwandan troops who were rapidly approaching thecapital.TheirindigencewasunderscoredwhenKabilasentanurgentdelegationtoLuandatopleadformilitaryassistancetorepeltheRwandanoffensive.“Firstpayusthedebtthatyouoweus,”theAngolanforeignministertoldtheenvoys,referringtoa$6milliondebtKabilaowedformilitarysupportduringthefirstwar.17TheCongolesegovernmentalsoowed theZimbabweangovernmentover$5million fordeliveriesofweaponsandequipment,anditwasclearthatneithercountrywouldbewillingtospendtheresourcesneededwithoutsomethinginreturn.Likeanentrepreneurtryingtofendoffbankruptcy,Kabilastartedputtinguphiscountry’smostvaluable

assetsascollateraltosecurefurtherloans.HetransformedCOMIEXintoasprawlingconglomeratethatstruck up partnerships with the Zimbabwean andAngolan state inmassive timber, petroleum,mining,banking, and agricultural projects. In Harare, President Mugabe copied his comrade’s business plan,settinguphisownprivatelyregistered,state-runhybridcalled,somewhatironically,OperationSovereignLegitimacy(OSLEG),throughwhichheintendedtofunnelinvestmentsandanyeventualprofits.Theassetsinvolvedwereenormous:OSLEGwentinfifty-fiftywithCOMIEXinatimberbusinessthat

received 3,800 square miles from the Congolese state to log, as well as in Sengamines, one of thecountry’smostlucrativediamondconcessions.Severalbanksweresetuptomanagethecashflowstoandfrom thesevariousprojects, and shares in the front companieswere reserved forparliamentariansandministers in both governments.18 The management of Mugabe’s corporation OSLEG included thecommanderof theZimbabweanDefenseForces,GeneralVitalisZvinavashe,aswellas theministerofdefense,alongwithtopofficialsinthestateminingcompanyandmineralsmarketingboard.19This kind of business climate favored enterprising, rough-mannered, and unscrupulous businessmen.

BillyRautenbachfitthismold.AformerracecardriverandthesonofawealthyZimbabweantruckingmagnate,Rautenbachtookoverthefamilybusinesswhenhisolderbrotherdiedinanaccident,andhesetuplucrativecardealershipsthroughoutsouthernAfrica.Hewasknownforhissharptemper.“Heusedtorunthecompanybyyellingatpeople.Alldayhewouldyellatpeople,”aformerbusinessassociatetoldme.20Overtheyears,heaccumulatedchargesinSouthAfricancourtsrangingfromcustomsfraudtotheftto involvement in themurder of a former business rival. Themurder chargeswere later dropped andRautenbacheventuallysettledforthefraudcharges,paying$5.8millioninfines.21In September 1998, Laurent Kabila’s government handed the entire Central Mining Group over to

Rautenbach to manage as part of a deal with its Zimbabwean allies. Gécamines officials lamentedRautenbach’s bad temper and the fact that he cherry-picked the best ore, instead of systematicallyexcavatingtherock,whichdamagedthelong-termprofitabilityofhisKakandamine.“Hebroughtinthesenewmachines thatweren’tappropriate for the job,”oneGécaminesofficialwhowas thereat the timecomplained,“andpickedholes throughout theconcessions. It looked likeahalf-explodedminefield!”22MininganalystswereparticularlyoutragedwiththeimmensesizeoftheconcessionthatRautenbachhad

obtained.Therewasnowaythathewouldbeabletoworkonmorethanasmallpartoftheconcession.Inthemeantime,someofthemostlucrativecopperandcobaltdepositsinAfricalayfallow.PresidentKabilawasinitiallyhappywithRautenbach’sperformance,ashewasoneofthefewpeople

whoseemedtobeable tosqueezeanyprofitoutof thevariousmoribundstate-runcompanies,andjustmonths later made him the director of Gécamines. “Kabila would be on the phone every week withRautenbach,askinghimformoremoneyforthewar,”oneGécaminesemployeeremembered.Rautenbach did not perform poorly at first. By one estimate, he made $20 million from the

Kababankolaprocessingfacilityaloneovereighteenmonths,whileinLikasihewasprocessing150tonsofcobaltamonth,worth$6million.23“Hekickedass,gotpeopletowork,andcrankedoutproduction,”anotherminingexecutiveremembered.24However,Rautenbachwasout tomakequickcash,aswas thegovernment,anddidnot reinvestmuchofhisearnings into theupkeepof infrastructures.By theendof1999,Gécamines’mineralproductionhad fallen, andcreditorswere seizing shipments inorder topaybackdebts.Moreover,Rautenbachhadmadepowerfulenemiesby layingoff11,000stateworkersandcancelingallpreviousmarketingagreementsforcobalt,transferringthemtooneLondon-basedcompany.InMarch2000,KabilareplacedtheZimbabweanwithalocalbusinessman.Similardealsproliferated,usuallyfeaturingdubiousbusinessmenandgetrich-quickschemes.In2000,

JohnBredenkamp,aZimbabweanarmsdealerwhohasbeeninvolvedinbustingsanctionsonZimbabwe,obtained six concessions with estimatedmineral reserves of $1 billion. He gave a down payment of$400,000 andpromised68percent of net profits to theCongolese andZimbabweangovernments.Thesameyear,anotherSouthAfricanentrepreneurwithacriminal record,NikoShefer,metwithPresidentKabila and obtained a deal to trade diamonds through Thorntree Industries, a joint venture with theZimbabweanarmy.Shefer’srapsheetincludedsettingupapyramidschemewithanevangelicalchurchinFloridaandafive-yearprisonsentenceforfraudinSouthAfrica.Thistime,Sheferwasintentontakingadvantage of a discrepancy between the official and the black-market exchange rates in the Congo toprofit fromdiamondtrading.ASouthAfrican intelligencereportdetailsaconversationbetweenSheferandapotentialbusinesspartner:

Theofficial exchange rate is currently$1=CF [CongoleseFrancs]4.5.Theunofficial (referred to as“parallel”)rateis$1=CF28.Mostforeignimportscomeinattheparallelrate.KABILAhasagreedthatThorntree can buy Congolese Francs at $1 = CF 16 whilst diamond and gold purchasing will beconductedattheofficialrate.ThismechanismwillcreatehugemarginsthatwillgiveThorntreeadistinctadvantageoveritscompetitors.KABILAagreedtothisproposalbecausehewillpersonallyreceive30percentofThorntree’sdiscount.SHEFERestimatesthatCF40to60millionamonthwillbeneededtocovertherequirementsofinitialbuyingoperations....Thepotentialmarginisveryattractive.Forexample,attheendofNovember[1999],Isawapackage

of 3000 carats, 80% gemstones, bound for the Oman-backed company. The parcel was worth $2.5million;theypaidtheCFequivalentof$200,000.25

It isdifficult toknowexactlyhowmuchmoney thevariousactors involvedmade.According toUNestimates,between1998and2001theCongolesegovernmenttookroughlyathirdofGécamines’profittofund the war effort, sending tens of millions of dollars to the Zimbabwean government to cover itsmilitary expenses.26 The International Monetary Fund, working from incomplete budgetary data thatprobably excluded some revenue, concluded that at the height of the war in 2000, the Congolesegovernmentwasspending70percentofitsexpenditureson“sovereignandsecurityitems,”abudgetlinethatwasmanagedentirelyby thepresidencyanddedicatedmostly to thewar.27Thatamounted toover$130millionforthatyearalone.SomemoneyalsowentdirectlytopayingtheZimbabweanarmy—both

Rautenbach and Bredenkamp gave money directly to Zimbabwean army commanders to pay for theirbonuses,aswellasforfoodandmedicineforthesoldiers.28OthermoneytransferscircumventedtheCongolesestateandwentstraighttoHarare.Accordingtoone

account, Rautenbach sent between $1.5 and $2million a month to government officials back home.29According to several high-ranking Zimbabwean officials, when Rautenbach was removed from theleadershipofGécaminesinMarch2000,hethreatenedtorevealexactlyhowmuchPresidentMugabeandJusticeMinisterMnangagwahadmadeduringhistenureattheCongoleseparastatal.30In theend, likeeverything in theCongoat the time, theZimbabweanprofiteeringdegenerated intoa

piecemeal approach, as Zimbabwean government officials took advantage of their military links toconductprivatebusiness.InOctober1998,state-ownedZimbabweanDefenseIndustriesobtaineda$53millioncontracttosupplytheCongolesegovernmentwithfoodandequipment,muchofwhichwouldbetransported by General Zvinavashe’s private transport company.31 The head of the state weaponsmanufacturer, Colonel Tshinga Dube, also took advantage of his contact in the Congo to set up hiseponymous diamondmining company,DubeAssociates—apparently not too concernedwith hiding hisconflictofinterest—intheKasaiprovince,althoughwithoutmuchsuccess.32BythetimeofthesecondCongowar,Mugabewasbeleagueredbytradeunionstrikes,foodriots,and

mountinginflation.HehadalsojustembarkedonamovethatwouldcometodominatethenextdecadeofZimbabweanpoliticsandbringhimenemiesfromallcornersofdomesticandinternationalpolitics:theexpropriationof 45percent of the country’s commercial farmland from itsmostlywhite owners.Aftereighteen years in power, some of his former allies had begun to openly question his leadership.DzikamayiMavhaire,apowerfulparliamentarian,movedtoamendtheconstitution,arguingthatMugabeshouldbelimitedtotwofive-yearterms.“Thepresidentmustgo,”hetoldanopensessionofParliament.ThegovernmentHeraldnewspaperalsobeganrunningsurprisinglycriticaleditorials,fustigatingthelandredistributionpolicy.33In this contextMugabe was eager to maintain the loyalty of key allies, particularly in the security

services.Astheeconomyathomeshrunk,sodidopportunitiesfordomesticpatronage.TheCongowarprovidedtheopportunityheneededtokeephiscollaboratorshappyandbusyelsewhere.Thisexplainstheurgency with which the Congolese and Zimbabweans set up their joint ventures and how easilyZimbabweanofficialsgaveupongettingtheirdebtsreimbursedthroughtheminingventures.

At the end of the day, and despite the considerable profits that some Zimbabwean businessmen andofficersmade,OperationSovereignLegitimacydidnotgetagoodreturnonitsinvestmentsintheCongo.Luredbythepromiseofvastmineraldeposits,theZimbabweangeneralsdidnotrealizethatrichveinsofturquoise copper and blue cobaltwere locked up in layers of granite and slate.Unable to finance thebillionsofdollarsofinfrastructurerehabilitationandinvestmentneeded,Zimbabwehadtocontentitselfwithsmallerdeals—slagheaps,artisanaldiamondproduction,andsmall-scalemining.Manyloansgivento the Congolese government were never paid back, and Rautenbach, like other clever businessmen,preemptedmuchofhisprofitsgoingtoHararethroughsomeaccountingtechnicalities.Hewouldselltheore tooneofhis offshoreholding companies at productionprice, reducing anyprofits that couldhavebeentaxedbytheCongolesestateorsharedwithhisZimbabweanbackerstoalmostzero.34“Zimbabweendedupwith the dirty endof the stick,”ProfessorKampata, an official in theCongoleseministry of

mines,toldme.“TheCongo,atleast,gotwhatitwanted:militaryassistance.”35TheZimbabweans did notwant to invest the billions of dollars needed to get the various diamond

mines,copperprocessors,andtimbermillsupandworkingagain.IntheSengaSengadiamondmine,theZimbabwean-appointed managers tried to run the elaborate mining equipment on diesel, which theyimportedoverthousandsofkilometers,insteadofinvestinginrepairingthenearbyhydroelectricplant.AttheKababankolamine,Bredenkamp’smanagerscontentedthemselveswithcartingoffandprocessingthetailingsandslagheapsthatwereleftoverfrompreviousminingoperations;anyfurtherexcavationwasdeemed too expensive. The Zimbabwean Electricity Supply Authority thought it could make moneythroughhydroelectricpowerproductionontheCongoRiver,buthereagaintheywouldhavehadtoinvestbillionsinrefurbishingturbinesandsettinguppowerlines.36AsfortheenormousloggingconcessioninnorthernKatanga,theZimbabweanmanagerscouldnotattracttheinvestorstheyneededtobuytrucksand,aboveall,fixthehundredsofmilesofroadsthatwereneededtoexportthetimber.ThepromisedminingElDoradofailedtomaterialize.

As Kinshasa leveraged its copper, cobalt, and diamond mines to obtain Zimbabwean support, theRwandans and their RCD allies funded their military operations in the Congo largely by trading inCongo’sgold,coltan (used forcapacitors incellphonesandvideogameconsoles), tin,anddiamonds.The key difference is that a racket run largely by Rwandans and their allies, not by Kinshasa, wasperceived as foreign exploitation, a strange distinction given that Laurent Kabila had been brought topowerbytheRwandansandhadnotbeenconfirmedbyelections.Tounderstandmining in theeasternCongo,airportsareagoodplace tostart.Given thecollapseof

roadsandrailwaysinthecountry,planeswereoftentheonlywaytogetfromoneplacetoanother.PierreOlivierwasaninstitutioninGoma.37ThesonofalocalchiefwhohadworkedfortheBelgian

colonialadministration,hehaschestnut-coloredeyesandbig,muscularfeaturesthatmakehislimbsseemoversized,almostbloated.Igottoknowhimoverseveralyears;hecouldoftenbefoundonlocalsoccerfieldsontheweekend,protectingthegoallineandchattingwithfriends.Hehadbeentaughttoflybyhisfather,whohadhadapassionforhunting.Inthelate1970s,whenthehinterlandsoftheKivusonlyhostedaquarterofitscurrentpopulation,theywouldtakeasmallCessnatoovergrownairstripsinthejunglesofWalikaleandManiematocampout in thewildernessandhuntforantelopeandhippopotamus.Insomeplaces,pygmy trackerswithbowsandpoisonarrowswouldaccompany them;once,he remembered,alocalchiefwithafeatheryheaddresscametomeetthem,borneonapalanquin.Byagefourteen,Pierrehadlearnedtoflyandshootadouble-barreledshotgun.Whenhewassixteen,

heandhisfatherfoundedtheirownairplanecompany,flyingmerchandiseintojungletownstothewestofGoma and taking bags of minerals and palm oil out. They would land on roads and on bumpy, dirtairstripsovergrownwithelephantgrass.“Backthen,ouronlyproblemwaspayingoffMobutu’sthugs,”hesaid,laughing.“Thatwasproblemenough.”38

AssoonasthesecondwarstartedinAugust1998,itwasclearthattherehadbeenashiftinmotivation.“Business,”Oliviersaidemphatically.“ThefirstwarhadbeenaboutgettingridoftherefugeecampsandoverthrowingMobutu.Thesecondwasaboutbusiness.”ThesecurityimperativewasstillpresentforRwanda.Thenorthwestoftheircountrywasengulfedina

brutal insurgency, led by Rwarakabije’s Hutu rebels. But the second war was a much more costlyexercise, involving up to 35,000 Rwandan soldiers who became bogged down in trench andcounterinsurgency warfare hundreds of miles into the Congolese jungle. In addition, some Rwandanbusinessmen,togetherwithleadingRPFpoliticians,hadbecomeawarethattherewereheftyprofitstobemadeintheCongo,particularlyinthemineralstrade.Rwanda’s shifting priorities became clear to Pierre in his flights. He flew their troops intomining

areas,whereRwandancommanderswouldbeinchargeofloadingtonsoftinandcoltanintoairplanes.Pierreproceededtocounttownsoffonhisthickfingers:“Lulingu,Punia,Kalima,Kindu,Walikale—weemptiedthemineralsstockpiledthereatthebeginningofthesecondwar.Therewassomuchore,ittookusweeks.”39This first phaseofprofiteering targeted the low-hanging fruit, assets thatwere easily converted into

cash.BetweenNovember1998andApril1999,theRwandanarmyanditsRCDalliesremovedbetween2,000and3,000tonsoftinoreandupto1,500tonsofcoltanfromthewarehousesofSOMINKI,astate-runminingcompanyactiveintheKivus,worthbetween$10and$20million,dependingonthegradeofthe ore.40 The Congolese commander of the RCD troops, Jean-Pierre Ondekane, brazenly entered theCentralBankoffices inKisangani and seizedbetween$1million and$8million inCongolese francs,which he then dispatched to Kigali.41 Similar looting was carried out in the area controlled by theUgandanarmy.Forthemostpart,thisinitialpillagetargetedstatecompaniesandlargebusinessmen.Inmanytownsthe

Rwandan troops were relatively disciplined and even arrested or executed soldiers who stole. Theoccupyingarmy,however,hadadifficulttimemaintaininglogisticschainsintothedeepCongoleseforest,and they often granted advancing columns the right to sustain themselves through pillage. A BelgianmissionarybasedinKongolo,northernKatanga,describedthearrivalofRwandantroopsthere:

Going from house to house, they first stole everything they could find for food, including goats andchickens.Forfirewood,theytookfurniturethattheyfoundinthehouses,eventhecradles!Afterwards,astheywere installingthemselvesfora longperiod, theystolebeds,mattressesandsheets.Theyalsogottheirhandsongeneratorsandheavymaterial,sendingthesehometoRwandabyroadandair....Theytookmorethanfivehundredgallonsoffuelandtwovehiclesbelongingtothemedicalservice,nottomentionthebeatingandinjuryoftheparishpriestandthetheftofhisbelongings.42

Theoccupyingforcesthensetupstructuresthroughwhichtheycouldextractnewresources.IntheareaoccupiedbytheRwandans,thiswasdonesystematically,bycontrollingallstagesofmineralproduction,from thedigging toair transport to theexportcompany inKigali.TheRwandanarmysenthundredsofprisoners—mostly Hutu who had been accused of taking part in the genocide—from jails in westernRwandatoworkincoltan,gold,andtinminingpits.“Youshouldhaveseenthelookonthefacesofthosepeople,” Pierre said, recalling the ones he transported. “They were sad, exhausted, depressed.”Elsewhere, the diggers came voluntarily andwere paid for their work, but were often supervised bysoldiers.Atthelandingstrips,itwasalwaysRwandansoldiersortheirRCDallieswhoaccompaniedtheshipmentsofcoltanandcassiterite(unrefinedtinore).AccordingtoPierre,onlyseveralbusinessmenclosetoKigaliwereallowedtoshipmineralsoutfrom

the Rwandan-controlled mines. “They monopolized the mines,” he insisted. Benjamin Serukiza, the

formerRCDvicegovernorofSouthKivu,confirmedthis:“IhadtomediatebetweenlocalbusinessmenandtheRwandanbrigadecommanderhere.HeonlywantedtoallowoneRwandantrader,whowasclosetotheRwandangovernment,tohaveaccesstothemine.Hesaiditwasforsecurityreasons,butweknewitwasn’t.”43

Theinitialprofits,however,werenothingcomparedtowhatwastocome.“Everythingchangedin2000,when the coltan price soared,” Pierre Olivier remembered. It was a fluke. That year, the informationtechnologybubblecoincidedwithheighteneddemandforcellphonesandtheChristmasreleaseofaSonyPlayStation console. Demand for tantalum, the processed form of coltan, had been rising steadily foryears, but now themarkets got caught up in a buying frenzy.Withinmonths, the localmarket price oftantalumshotupfrom$10to$380perkilo,dependingonthepercentageoforecontent,whiletheworldprice peaked at $600 per kilo of refined tantalum.44 Dozens of comptoirs—mineral trading houses—openedupinBukavuandGomatotakeadvantageofthecoltanrush.Thatrushinjectedmillionsintothelocaleconomy.ExportsfromtheeasternCongoandRwandasoared

tosomewherebetween$150and$240millionin2000alone,andprofitmarginswerehigh.45Citiesintheregionwere flush with cash, andwild rumors circulated of small-time traders becomingmillionaireswithinmonths.AsmostCongolesedonothavedomesticbankaccounts,theirinvestmentswentoverseasor were put into local real estate, fueling a construction boom. Everywhere you looked there wasscaffolding made out of eucalyptus saplings, especially along the popular lakefront properties. Thenightclubswerefull,andpatronspayinginhundred-dollarbillswerenotuncommon.Olivierhadhisownstoriesofopulence.In2000,inthemiddleofthecoltanboom,heflewtoKigali,

where a sullenman in a cheap suit boarded the planewith a jeep-load of battered cardboard boxes,sealedwithcheaptape.Itwasevening,andthemaninsistedonsleepingonboardtheairplane,alongwithseveralofhisbodyguards,beforeflyingtoBukavuthefollowingday.Itwasonlywhenhiscustomerwasdisembarkingthatthestrangemanapproachedhimwithanimpishsmileandconfidedtohim:Hehadbeensleepingon$15million inCongoleseandU.S.bills,hecackled,andhurriedoff.“Cashflow,”Oliviersaid,shakinghishead,“wasalwaysahugeproblem.Thebanksdidn’twork,sopeoplehadtotravelwithtensofthousandsofdollarsonthem.”

ThecoltanpricestayedhighbetweenJune2000andJuly2001,producingrecordprofitsfortheRCD,theRwandangovernment,andtheirbusinessassociates.SomeresearchersestimatethatnetprofitsmadebyRwandancompaniescouldhavebeenashighas$150millionforthisperiodforcoltanalone,whileotherresearcherscalculatetotalprofitsmadeoffthemineralstradeat$250millionperannumthroughouttheiroccupation.46ForRwanda,whoseentireannualbudgetwas$380millionatthetime,thisincomemadeitsexpensiveinvolvementintheCongopossible.PresidentKagamehimselfdescribedtheirinvolvementintheCongo as “self-sustaining.”47 Hewasmore than right. Rwanda’s officialmilitary budgetwas $55millionin2001,almostathirdoftotalspending,buttheLondon-basedInternationalInstituteforSecurity

Studiesputtherealamountat$135million.48Butwasitjustaboutsordidgreed?Werethevampiressuckingbloodjusttoquenchtheirgrislythirst,

orwasthereamorenuancedexplanation?IndividualRwandancommandersdidgetrich—itwasdifficultnot tonotice the influxof luxurySUVsand theconstructionofeleganthouses inKigaliduring thewar.Nevertheless,forthemostpart,theprofitsfacilitatedthewar.TheRwandangovernmenthadanarmyof60,000soldierstopayandsupply.Atthesametime,theregimewasfacingitsownpoliticalchallenges.Itsfirsttwoprimeministershaddefected,alongwithdozensofhighcourtjudges,ministers,diplomats,armyofficers,andevensoccerplayers.Theyallprotestedwidespreadabusesbythesecurityservices,arepressivepoliticalclimate,andageneralauthoritariandrift.Likemanyone-partyregimesthatfacedstiffopposition, theRwandanPatrioticFront increasingly resorted topatronageandrepression todealwithdissent.“Itwouldbeamistaketoseethisjustaspersonalgreed,”theformerhigh-rankingRCDofficertoldme.

“Theywereveryorganized;theyprovidedmilitaryescortstomineralshipmentssothatwecouldn’tstopthemattheborder;theydecidedwhichbusinessmencoulddobusiness.ButIalsosawRwandanofficersjailedandbeatenforhavingstolenmoney!”49 Indeed,accordingtoonehumanrightsreport,despite theprofitscomingoutoftheCongo,civilservantsinRwandawereaskedtogiveuptoonemonth’ssalaryperannumascontributiontothewareffort.50FormanyRwandans,fromthepresidencydowntotheschoolteacher,thewarintheCongowasanideologicalproject,notjustanopportunitytoplunder.ThegovernmentsetupaCongoDeskwithintheexternalintelligenceofficethatdealtwithallaspects

ofCongooperations.Anyone interested indoingbusiness in theCongowouldhave topass throughtheCongo Desk, which would help them with security and to obtain tax exemptions. “There were manyRwandanbusinessmenwhocameto theCongotodobusiness—this is true,”PatrickKaregeya,whoasintelligencechiefplayedakeyroleinprovidingprotection,toldme.“Butitwasalllegalbusiness,therewasnothingillegalaboutit.”51Nonetheless,manyofthesecompanieshadclosefamilyorfinancialtiestotheRwandangovernment,

employing army officers as directors or allotting substantial shares to the party. Rwanda Metals, acompanythattherulingpartycontrolled,wasthemainbuyerofmineralsfromtheeasternCongo,andthemanagingdirectorwasappointeddirectlybythepresidency.Therewasalsoahostofsmallercompanies,suchasGreatLakesGeneralTrade,whichwascomanagedbyMajorDanMunyuza,aninfluentialRPAofficerwhoworkedfortheexternal intelligenceoffice.ThechiefofsecurityforRwandaintheCongo,Major Jean Bosco Kazura, was a partner in another Kigali-based company that imported coffee anddiamonds from the Congo. According to UN investigators, General James Kabarebe himself wouldsometimescoordinatethepurchaseandtransportofcoltan,tin,andgoldthroughRwanda.52

“Iwasjustdoingbusiness,”PierrerespondedwhenIaskedhimifhehadanyregretsaboutworkingwiththe rebels and mining companies during the war. That is the usual refrain echoed by businessmenthroughout thewarzone.“Inanycase,” theburlypilotcontinued,“all the flights for the rebelswedidwereprettymuchatgunpoint.”Itwasdifficultnottobelievethegood-naturedpilot.Helaughed.Thesubtextread:Ofcourseyouhad

to cut corners, bribe people, dealwith dubious clientele.But this is theCongo—ifwe didn’t get ourhandsdirtyonceinawhile,wewouldbeoutofbusiness.

Hehadapoint.AccordingtoaWorldBankstudy, ifyoupaidallofyour taxes in theCongo—afullthirty-twodifferentpayments—youwouldbedishingout230percentofyourprofits.53 Inotherwords,you can only survive by cutting corners. The tax system had lost its overall coherence, as revenue-collectingagencieshadproliferatedovertheyears,eachusingexorbitanttaxratesasblackmailtoobtainbribes.Thetaxcodewasneverintendedtobefollowed;thestatehadcreatedregulationsthatbeggedtobebrokenandhaddreamtupitsownsubversion,pushingalargepartoftheeconomyintotheinformalsectorsothatindividualscouldprofit.Theindividualswhoprofitedwere,obviously,thoseincharge.DuringrebelruleintheeasternCongo,

thebusinessmenwhoprosperedwere,for themostpart, thosewhocurriedfavorwiththepoliticalandmilitary leaders. “We all had our friends in the rebel high commandwe could call up when we hadproblems,”PierreOliviersaid.“Theyneededusbecauseweflewforthem.Weneededthembecausetheywere thebosses.”Didhe feeluncomfortableabout this symbiosis?“That’s theway thingswork.Did Ihaveachoice?”BusinessintheCongorequiredahealthydoseofpragmatism.Formany,cutand-drymoralitywasoutof

placehere.Thisconundrumbecamecleartointernationalcharities,aswell,whichsetuptheirbasesinGomatoprovidefoodandhealthcaretovictimsoftheviolence.Manyrentedthehousesofbusinessmenclose to the rebels, as they, of course, had the nicest compounds with sumptuous gardens, oftenoverlooking the lake.Humanitarian groups also used trucking companies and shopped for groceries instoreslinkedtothemilitaryenterprise.Itwasalmostimpossibletoavoid.

Similar moral dilemmas affect affluent western consumers, as well. It wasn’t just Congolese andRwandanswhomadeafortune.Themineralsweretransported,processed,andconsumedbycompaniesand consumers elsewhere, especially in Europe, Asia, and the United States. In some cases, thesecompanieshadcloserelationshipswithrebelgroups.Forexample,theBelgium-basedcompanyCogecombought tinandcoltandirectly fromtheRCDmonopoly,sendingmoney intoRCDcoffers.Another jointventurebyAmericanandDutchbusinessmen,EagleWingsResources,engagedPaulKagame’sbrother-in-lawasitslocalrepresentative,whichgaveiteasierandcheaperaccesstotheCongoleseminerals.Thesecompanies then sold their minerals on to large processing companies, including U.S.-based CabotCorporation, Chinese Ningxia, and German H. C. Starck. The transport was assured bymultinationallogisticscompaniessuchasthestateairlineofBelgium,Sabena,whilefinancingwassuppliedbylargeregionalbanksand,inonecase,byCitibank.54This supply chain was unearthed by UN investigators and other analysts, triggering an immediate

reactionfrominternationalbusinesscircles.Somedeniedallegationsoutright;othersprotestedthattherewas nothing illegal about buying or transportingminerals from the easternCongo. This is partly true.Internationallawdoeslittletoregulatehumanrightsabusesassociatedwithtrade.TheOrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)putforwardGuidelinesforMultinationalEnterprises,but these arevoluntary, andviolationshave fewconsequences.Somecountries, like theUnitedStates,have domestic laws that can be used to hold companies based there responsible for their conductoverseas.Awaveoflawsuits,forexample,wasfiledinU.S.courtsinthe1990sand2000sbasedontheAlienTortsStatute,butplaintiffshavetoprovethatcompanieshadnotonlyknowledgeofabusebutalsointent,whichisdifficulttoproveevenaboutcompaniesdirectlyinvolvedwithrebels,letalonethosefour

stepsremovedalongthesupplychain.Someinternationallawyersarguethatcompaniescanbeheldliableunderinternationallawforbuyingmisappropriatedgoods,muchthewayonecanbechargedindomesticcourtsforpurchasingstolengoods,butthislogichasnotgainedmuchtractionoutsideofUNtribunals.55In other words, consumers are not held responsible for the conditions under which minerals are

produced.IntheCongo,despitetheoccasionalhueandcryraisedbythemedia,corporateresponsibilityhas been largely ignored—the supply chain is more convoluted, passing through traders, brokers,smelters,andprocessingcompanies.ThetinandcoltanthatcomefromtheCongoaremixedwiththosefromBrazil,Russia,andChinabeforetheymakeitintoourcellphonesandlaptops.Thereisaburgeoningconsensus in international law thatwe should care about the conditions underwhich the productsweconsume—sweatpants,sneakers,andeventimber—areproduced.Ifwecanholdcompaniesaccountablefortheirbusinesspractices,wewillgiveanincentivetotheCongolesegovernmenttocleanuptheminingsector.The“conflictminerals” legislation signed into lawbyPresidentObama in July2010 is a step,albeitasmallone,intherightdirection.

PARTIV

NEITHERWARNORPEACE

20

THEBEAREROFEGGS

KINSHASA,CONGO,JANUARY2001

ThereareseveralversionsofthestoryofhowJosephKabilawaschosentosucceedhisfather.Apopularonegoesasfollows:ThedayafterLaurentKabila’sassassination,theinnercabalofthepresidencymeetstodecidewhowouldbecomepresident.AroundatablearetheWho’sWhoofCongolesepowerpolitics:Katanganstrongmen,thehighbrassofthearmy,andtheregime’seconomickingpins.A cacophony ensues as the group argues overwho is best suited for the job.GaetanwasKabila’s

favorite,oneclaims;VictorhasthebesttiestoAngolaandZimbabwe,anothersuggests.1Finally,asthetensionsreachaclimaxandthecountryteetersonthebrinkofcivilwar,GeneralSylvestreLwetcha,theold,frailcommanderofthearmedforcesandarenownedwitchdoctor,bangshisfistonthetable.“Silence!”Thegeneral,whohad fought side-by-sidewithLaurentKabila during thebush rebellion,

pullsouthis sidearm,aMagnumnine-millimeterpistol, cocks it tohis temple, andshootshimself sixtimes.Smokebillowsuparoundhishead,fillingtheroom,ashiscolleaguescoughandwavetheirhandsindisbelief.Whenthesmokeclears, thebulletproofgeneralslamshispistoldownonthetable,slowlyclearshis

throat,andsays,“Ihavedecided thatGeneral JosephKabilawillbecomepresidentof theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo!”Helooksaroundthetableslowlyandaskscalmly,“Arethereanyquestions?”

Ofcourse,thisisnotwhatreallyhappened.Thetruthisburiedunderhundredsofcompetingrumorsandmay never be entirely uncovered. But according to various peoplewho took part in themeetings, thefollowingisasaccurateaswemightget.OnthemorningfollowingMzee’sdeath,hisclosestassociatesmetattheCityoftheAfricanUnion,a

sprawlingcomplexofgovernmentbuildingsoverlookingtheCongoriver.EdyKapend,LaurentKabila’spowerfulmilitaryadvisor,presidedoverthemeeting.2Thepresident’staciturnsonJosephhadflowninthepreviousnightfromLubumbashi,stillinshock.Kapendbeganbyremindingeverybodyofanoralwillthatthedeceasedpresidenthadgivenhisclose

associatesseveralyearsearlier,whenhewassufferingfromasevereillness.“Hetoldusthatincasehedied,his son Josephwas supposed to takepower,”Kapend reminded the smallgroup.Severalpeoplenodded. Others contested the will, claiming that Joseph was only supposed to take command of themilitary, while the political leadership should be handed to someone else. Let’s set up a specialcommitteetostudythematter,someoneelsesuggested.

Adebateensuedintheair-conditionedrooms,whichKapendcutshortbypullingdownamilitarymapof the eastern Congo. Bold, red arrows marked where the Rwandan offensive was threateningLubumbashiandMbuji-Mayi.“Wecandebatethisallnightifyoulike,butifweareweakanddivided,ourenemieswilltakeadvantage.Weneedtodecidenow.”Aftersomesquabbling,everyone in the roomrealized therewas littlechoice.Theyneededsomeone

who could command the respect of the army and their allies alike. If they chose anyone else besidesJoseph, the governmentwas at risk of collapsing into internecine fighting. Josephwasyoung, shy, andpracticallyunknownonthepoliticalscene,butthiscouldbeagoodthing.“Thelogicwas:Theweakerthepersonwechose,thelesshewaslikelytobecontested,astheythoughttheycouldinfluencehim,”oneofthepeoplewhoattendedthemeetingtoldme.3Theayatollahsof theCongolesegovernmentwere inforasurprise.Theweak, introvertedsuccessor

turnedout tobemuch smarter andmore independent thananybodyhad suspected.Withinayearofhisnomination,Josephwouldridhimselfofalmosteverybodywhohadputhiminpower.Healsolaunchedapeaceprocess,settingthegearsinmotiontobringanendtothewarandpavingthewayforelections.

ItwouldhavebeendifficulttofindsomeonemoredifferentfromhisfatherthanJosephKabila.Wherehisfather was authoritarian and confrontational, Joseph was shy and reclusive. In his first speech to thenationonJanuary26,2001,hestumbledthroughhisprewrittentextinhalting,uninspiredFrench.Hewasnotveryfluent,ashehadgrownupmostlyinTanzaniaandwasmorecomfortableinSwahiliandEnglish.Severaldayslater,heaskedanadvisortohelphimthroughhisfirstmeetingwiththediplomaticcorps.“Youdothetalking,”hesaiduneasily.4For the Congolese public, the contrast was jolting. “He doesn’t smoke, doesn’t drink, doesn’t like

goingouttodinner,doesn’thavealargewardrobe,doesn’thavealotofgoodfriends,anddoesn’tspeakthelanguagesofthepeoplehe’sgoingtogovern,”anAmericanreporterobserved.5InanearlytelevisioninterviewintheUnitedStates—heavoidedthepressinhishomecountryuntilhehadabettercommandofFrench—hisexpressionwaswooden,hishandsfoldedinfrontofhim,barelymovingwhenheansweredquestions.Sowhowas JosephKabila? From the first day of his presidency, theCongolese rumormill began

churning.Asusual,mostofthetalkwasnotaboutgovernmentaffairs,butabouthisethnicityandorigins.Hewasn’t the real sonofhis father, some said.He is reallyTanzanian, others tattled—hecan’t speakFrench.Oreven:Hekilledhisownfathertotakepower!

JosephKabilaandhistwinsister,Janet,wereborninMpiki,SouthKivu,onJune4,1971,inthegrass-thatched rebelheadquartersofhis father.Overlooking thecampwas the so-calledMlimayadamu, theMountainofBlood,namedforthebattlesthathadtakenplacethereagainstMobutu’sarmy.Mostagree thatJoseph is thesonofLaurentKabila.Thedeepattachmentbetween the twoattests to

this:MzeedotedonJosephwhileinofficeandelevatedhimfromasimplesoldiertothecommanderofhis army.However, shortofDNA testing, themysteryof Josephand Janet’sbiologicalmotherwillbe

moredifficulttosolve.Theofficialmother,SifaMahanya,marriedtherebelleaderin1970andwouldremainhiswifeuntilhe

died,albeitalongsideagaggleofmistresses.Shewasresponsibleforthewomen’swingoftherebellionandamemberoftherevolutionarycourts.ItwasMamaSifa,assheisknowntoday,whommostofMzee’sformercomradesrecognizeasthemotherofthecurrentpresident.6A second, plausible version is provided by members of Joseph Kabila’s entourage. They say that

Joseph’s mother was a Rwandan Tutsi called Marcelline Mukambuguje, who was one of the manyRwandanswhojoinedKabila inhismaquis in thehopeofusingZaireasarearbase tooverthrowtheHutu-dominated dictatorship in Rwanda. Mukambuguje was allegedly kept from public sight whenLaurentKabilawaspresident inorder toprevent thepublic fromdiscovering Joseph’s realmother.ATutsimotherwouldobviouslynotdoinacountryatwarwithRwanda.As soonashebecamepresident,his allegedmotherwasbundledaway to theUnitedStates to live.

This is not just Internet apocrypha—although the blogosphere does abound with these rumors—butallegationsrelayedbypeopleclosetothepresident,includingacloseformeradvisor,abodyguard,andmembersofhisfamily.7Everyonceinawhile,rumorsmaketheroundsamongdiplomatsandtheeliteinKinshasathatamysteriouselderlywomanwasseeninthepresidentialchambersorgardens.Ofcourse,thisversionofhisparentage is lappedupby theoppositionandmanyKinois,who thinkKabilaneverstoppedworkingfortheRwandangovernment,asortofTutsiManchuriancandidate.

ShortlyafterJoseph’sbirth,Kabila’s troopskidnappedagroupofAmericanstudents fromaTanzanianchimpanzeeresearchproject,earningtheminternationalinfamy.Whiletherebelsdidmanagetoobtainaheftyransom,Mobutu’sarmylaunchedanewoffensiveagainstKabila,pushinghissoldiersoutoftheirhighland redoubt into inhospitable jungles to the west. Given the danger and poor living conditions,LaurentKabiladecideditwasbestforhisfamilytomovetoTanzania,wherehehadgoodconnectionsinsidethesecurityservices.InDaresSalaam,JosephandJanetenrolledintheFrenchschoolunderfakenames,pretendingtobe

fromawesternTanzaniantribeinordertoescapetheattentionofZairianintelligenceagentsactivethere—LaurentKabila’sdeputywasscoopedupbysuchspiesandtakentoKinshasa,afterwhichhewasn’theardfromagain.AccordingtooneofJoseph’sclassmates,hewasintelligent,proficient inEnglish,andanadmirerof

martial arts and sports cars. Nonetheless, even then he was a silent loner.When he did speak aboutpolitics,helikedtodiscusstheexploitsoftheheroesofhisfather’sgeneration—CheGuevara,ThomasSankara,andYoweriMuseveni.8“Thesmallboyalreadyhadthepersonalityofaleader,hedreamedofbeingasoldier,of leadingan

army,”recalledhismother,SifaMahanya,who,accordingtoTanzaniansecuritysources,waswithJosephduringhiswholechildhood.Heusedtoplaywithsmallmodelcarsandtrucksintheirhouse,liningthemupintomilitaryconvoys.9JosephunderwentabriefmilitarytraininginsouthernTanzaniabutspentmostofhisyouthhelpinghis

fatherwith his businesses,which for awhile included transporting large shipments of fish alongLakeTanganyika. The young man drove trucks for thousands of miles, from Zambia through Tanzania toUganda.10

WhenLaurentKabilagotintouchwiththeRwandanarmyin1995topreparefortheinvasionofZaire,Josephaccompaniedhimtothemeetings.Oncethewarstarted,thetwenty-five-year-oldwasentrustedtoColonel JamesKabarebe, theRwandan field commander of operations.The two livedunder the sameroof and traveled together to the front lines to inspect the troops. Officers remember seeing JosephKabila, known as Afande Kabange11 by his soldiers, everywhere along the front lines, but he rarelyspoke.Theimagethatremainsformostfromthattimeisofayoungman,hismilitarycappulledlowoverhissunkeneyes,asilentfixtureintheroom.Thewarhadaseriousimpactonhispsyche.“Theworstthingthat I have ever seen is the sight of a village after a massacre; you can never erase that from yourmemory.”12AftertheAFDL’svictory,JosephkeptalowprofileinKinshasa.Helivedinthesamehouseasseveral

Rwandan commanders and began to explore the capital.He visited the famous bars and nightclubs ofBandal andMatonge, where ambianceurs (lovers of the nightlife) and sapeurs (dandies) strutted thelatest fashion and ate grilled goat washed down with bottles of Primus or Skol beer. Until today,scurrilousKinoisstillclaimtohavedrunkbeerwithJosephorhaveseenhimtryingoutadancemove.(“Heusedtolovethewomen!”someclaim.“No!Hewastootimid,hecouldn’tevendance.”“Alligatorskinshoes,that’swhatheliked.Mylittlebrothersoldhimhisfirstpair!”)Inearly1998,his father senthimonamilitary trainingcourse toChina;his fatherhadhimselfonce

visitedtheNanjingmilitaryacademydecadesearlier.Thistraining,however,wasshort-lived,ashewascalledbackhomewhen the secondwarbegan.Despitehis briefmilitary career—at that point, hehadservedagrandtotalofthreeyearsinmilitaryuniform,includingayearofbasictraininginTanzania—hewaspromotedtotherankofgeneralandnamedactingchiefofstaffofthearmy.It was an abrupt change for him; he had had little experience in military operations. 13 Now he

commandedtensofthousandsofCongolesetroopsagainst theveryRwandanswhohadtrainedhim.AssoonashegotofftheplanefromChina,herushedtodefendthecapitalfromhisformermentorandfriend,JamesKabarebe.FewremembermuchofJosephKabiladuringthenextfewyears.Herarelymetwithforeignmilitary

advisors,andeveninmeetingswithhisownstaffhespentmostofthetimelistening.Inanycase,itisnotclearhowmuchpowertheyounggeneralhad;hisfathermademanyimportantmilitarydecisions,like,forexample,thebattleforPwetoin2000,andZimbabweanandAngolangeneralsalsohadstronginfluence.TheCongoleseofficercorpswasanamalgamof formerMobutuofficers,KatanganTigers trained in

Angola, Mai-Mai from the Kivus, and newly recruited child soldiers. Without much experience, thepresident’ssonshowedhewasadeptatnavigating the tensionsbetween thesedifferentgroups,makingfriendsandlisteningtotheiradvice.Heestablishedasmallcoterieofyoungarmyofficers,someofwhomhadalsogonefortraininginChina—notthemostexperiencedofficers,butfiercelyloyaltohim.

AsmuchasJosephadmiredhisfather,healsorealizedthathisviewswereoutdated.Inhisfirstaddresstothenation,justdaysafterhehadlaidhisfathertorest,Josephannouncedaseachangeinforeignpolicy.GeorgeW.Bushhad justbeenelected in theUnitedStates,andKabila’smessagewasdirectedathim:“Without beating around the bush, I recognize there has beenmutualmisunderstandingwith the formeradministration.TheDRCintendstonormalizebilateralrelationswiththenewadministration.”14At thesame time, he promised to liberalize the diamond trade and float the currency, promote a newmining

code,and—mostimportantly—immediatelytrytoresuscitatethepeaceprocess.Severalmonthslater,heallowed political parties to operate again.Where his father had governed by ideology, Josephwas apragmatist.To underscore his point and to bolster his position, Joseph immediately embarked on a diplomatic

offensive.Asonepoliticalanalystoftheregionremarked,“Devoidofanynationalconstituency,hehaddecidedtotreattheinternationalcommunityashispowerbase.”15TheAmericanambassadorinKinshasa,WilliamSwing,invitedhimtotakeupaninvitationtotheNationalPrayerBreakfast inWashingtonthathadbeenextendedtohisfather.HetraveledfirsttoParis,wherehemetwithPresidentJacquesChirac,andthenontoWashington,wherehemetwithSecretaryofStateColinPowellandlater,privately,withPresidentKagame,withwhomhediscussedthepossibilityofapeacedeal.HefinishedoffhistourwithanaddresstotheUNSecurityCouncilinNewYork,allwithinafewmonthsofbecomingpresident.His presidencymarked an abrupt U-turn in government policy. His father had insisted that thewar

wouldbe“longueetpopulaire.”Ithadbeentheformer,butcertainlynotthelatter.Hissonimmediatelyabandonedthispurelymilitaryapproach.AfterhisspeechattheUN,diplomatslineduptoshakeJosephKabila’shandandapplaudedhisdesire

torestartthepeaceprocess.HiseagernesstocomplywiththedemandsoftheUnitedNationsputRwandaonthedefensiveforthefirsttimesincethebeginningofthewar.Otherfactorsalsoplayedinhisfavor.TheAmericanrepresentativetotheUNremarked,“WedonotbelievethatRwandacansecureitslong-termsecurityinterestsviaapolicyofmilitaryoppositiontothegovernmentofCongo.”TheBritishUNambassador asked President Kagame to bring an end to the plunder of the eastern Congo.16 Severalmonths later, aUN report concluded that Rwanda andUgandawere plundering the easternCongo forpersonalenrichmentandinordertofinancethewar.ThenewKabilawasnopacifist.Hedidnotstopfightingwithhisenemies;hejustchangedtactics.He

largely respected the front line cease-fire but provided weapons and supplies to fuel the Mai-Maiinsurgencyonhisenemies’turf.Itwasasbrilliantinitslogicasitwasbrutal.TheramshackleMai-MaiwerelittlemilitarythreattotheRCDandtheirRwandanallies,whohadmuchgreaterfirepower,buttheyprovoked ruthless counterinsurgency operations by Rwanda and its allies, making them even moreunpopular. Itwas typical guerrillawarfare, as practiced byMaoTsetung andCheGuevara:Keep theenemyswingingwithnine-poundsledgehammersatflies.Suddenly, it was Rwanda and Uganda who were seen as the obstacles to peace. The RCD rebels

refused to allowUN peacekeepers to deploy into their territory, seeing it as a “declaration of war,”promptingdemonstrations against them inKisangani andGoma.17Kabila, on the other hand, urged theSecurityCouncil to increase itsdeploymentsand torelaunch the investigation into themassacres in therefugeecampsthathisfatherhadsoadamantlyblocked.

WithinhisowngovernmentinKinshasa,thenewpresidenttookequallydrasticsteps.Threemonthsafterhecametopower,hesackedalmosthisentirecabinet,includingmostofthepeoplewhohadchosenhimashisfather’ssuccessor.Theaginggeneralswhohadfoughtsidebysidewithhisfathersincethe1960sreceivedhandsomepensionsandwereretired.Intheirplace,heappointedanewgroupof technocrats,youngCongolesewhohadnotbeenastaintedbycorruptionandwarmongering.ThenewfinanceministercamefromtheInternationalMonetaryFund,thenewinformationministerwasaU.S.-educatedjournalist.

Theaverageageofthenewministerswasthirty-eight.18Butwhowasinchargeduringtheseturbulentreforms?WhoallowedJosephKabilatotakesuchdrastic

stepsandreversehisfather’spolicy?Toacertainextent,during theearlydaysofhispresidency, thegovernmentwasguidedbyKabila’s

internationalpartners.Westernambassadorscamewithwishlistsofpeopletheywouldliketoseesackedandmade decisions that needed to bemade to advance the peace process.Both theAngolans and theZimbabweansweretiredofthewarandencouragedKabilatobringanendtotheconflict.Afterall,mostof the population saw the various rebel factions—with the possible exception of Jean-PierreBemba’sMLC—as foreignproxies andwouldnot vote for themduring elections. “Sign apeacedeal, stand forelections,andconsolidateyourpower”wastheadviceofwesternandAfricandiplomatsalike.Ingeneral,JosephKabilaseemedmuchless incharge thanhisfather,whohadmanagedstateaffairs

with an iron fist. Josephwas not often seen on television and rarely took charge in cabinetmeetings.Wherealmostofallhis father’sministershadspentat leasta fewdays inprison,Josephalmostneverarrestedanycollaborators.Insteadheslowlymarginalizedthemiftheyfelloutoffavor.Governmentofficialsoftendidnotknowwhere theystoodwith thepresident,astyleofmanagement

thatkepteveryoneguessing.Whentheywenttopresentprojects,hewouldnodattheircommentsbutnotsayanything.Thinkingthathewantedmoreexplanations,theywouldexpoundfurther,onlytobemetbymoresilenceorafewwords.Encouragedbyhispolitesmilesandsilence,theywouldleavethinkingtheyhadsucceededinconvincinghim,onlytofindoutweekslaterthathehadcanceledtheproject.Thiskindofprevaricationoftenshone through inhiscontactswith internationalpartnersaswell.“It

usedtoinfuriateKagameandMuseveni,”aUNofficialwhoattendedmeetingsoftheheadsofstatetoldme.“Kabilawouldbesilentthroughoutthemeeting;thensomeonewouldcomeandwhispersomethinginhisear,andhewouldanswer.”19

Kabila’sreticencealsomarkedhispersonal life.Hekeptoutof thelimelight,avoidingcocktailpartiesandothersocialevents.Hewouldwakeupataround6o’clockinthemorning,checkthenewsandhise-mail,andworkout inhisexerciseroom, liftingweightsandsweatingonhisstationarybike.Beforeheassumed the presidency, he lived in amodest townhousewith his common-lawwife,Olive Lemba, alight-skinnedwomanhehadmetintheeasternCongoduringtheAFDL.Hedotedonhisyoungdaughter,Sifa,namedafterhismother.Surroundedbywell-groomedbureaucrats,Josephwasconsciousofhismodestbackground.Hebegan

French classes soon after he arrived in Kinshasa and enrolled in an online course in internationalrelations atWashington InternationalUniversity, a small outfit based inKingofPrussia, Pennsylvania,fromwhichheobtainedabachelor’sdegreeaftercompleting tencoursesonline.HisFrench improvedconsiderably,asdidhisself-confidence.Diplomats who met him regularly were often impressed by his knowledge of world affairs and

understanding of the region. A favorite rhetorical tool he liked to use was to defend his record bycomparing theCongowithwestern countries. “You criticize democracy here, but our elections turnoutwasover80percent—intheU.S.,barelyhalfof thevotersshowup,”he toldanAmericandiplomat.20Whenconfrontedwithallegationsofcorruption,hecounteredwiththeEnronscandalintheUnitedStatesandSilvioBerlusconi’smanipulationoflawstoprotecthimselffromprosecution.

He did not have many close friends. His twin sister, Janet, and his younger brother, Zoé, visitedfrequently,andaTanzanianfriendshowedupfromtimetotime.Intheevenings,hewouldrelaxinfrontofthe televisionandplayvideogameswithhisbrother, ahabit that earnedhim thenickname“Nintendo”fromaskepticalFrenchambassador.21He also began to take an interest in designer watches, clothes, and sports cars. On weekends, he

relaxedinhisKingakatiranchoutsideofKinshasa,droverallycarsaroundadirttrack,andreceivedafewselectdiplomatsandbusinessmen.Onehadtheimpressionofrepressedenergy,amanlookingforareleasevalve.InKinshasa,foreignersgoingforamorningjogalongtheCongoRiver—asecluded,leafyarea with shady streets and ambassadorial residences—would sometimes be surprised by the youngpresident whizzing by on a motorcycle, followed by a pickup full of sheepish presidential guards.Unfortunately, he could only drive his Maserati around the street outside his presidential house inKinshasa,andthenonlyuptohalfitsmaximumspeed;thereweretoomanypotholes.

JosephKabila’sgreatestaccomplishmentwasthepeacedealwithhisrivals.Ofcourse,peacewasinhisinterest,ashewasrecognizedastheincumbentpresidentandcontrolledthebulkofeconomicassetsandstateadministration,whilehismainmilitaryrivalsweretarnishedbytheirassociationwithRwandaandUganda.In February 2002, after several false starts, Kabila finallymetwith hismainmilitary and political

challengers in South Africa for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, peace talks that would result, after tenmonths,inacomprehensivedealthatwouldunifythecountry.The setting for the Inter-CongoleseDialoguewas surreal.TheSouthAfricangovernmenthad leased

part of the SunCity luxury resort, once an entertainment haven for apartheid SouthAfrica elites. TheinauguralceremonytookplaceintheEntertainmentCenter’sSuperbowlarea,astone’sthrowawayfromJungle Casino and the Bridge of Time, gaudy buildings decorated with stone elephants and artificialwaterfalls.ThreehundredandthirtyCongolesedelegatesspenttheirfreetimetrollingtheslotmachinesandrackinguptabsatthebars.Aftertwomonthsoftalks,ontheeveofthedeadlinefixedbythefacilitators,thegovernmentandthe

MLC shocked the conference. Following late-night meetings in a nearby hotel, the two delegationsannouncedthattheyhadreachedabilateralagreement,makingJosephKabilapresidentandJean-PierreBembaprimeministerinthejointgovernment.Thetalkscollapsedinfuror,asKabilaandBembawentbacktotheirrespectiveheadquarterstosetupthegovernment,whiletheRCDwentbacktothetrenches.Thedealwasboundtofail.BembarefusedtocometoKinshasatotakeuphisposition,citingsecurity

concerns.Inthemeantime,regionalfaultlinesbegantoshift.TogetherwiththeirBritishcounterparts,theAmericandiplomatswentontheoffensivewithRwandaandUganda.Washingtonabstainedfromavotetorenew the International Monetary Fund’s loans to Rwanda, while London privately made clear toKampalathatitwouldnotextendfurtherloansifitdidnotwithdrawitstroops.InJune2002,PresidentKagamecommittedtowithdrawingallRwandantroopswithinthreemonths.Musevenifollowedsuit inNovember.Journalistslinedupatborderpoststoseeatotalof30,000foreigntroopsmarchacross,ascrowdsofCongolesecelebrated.TheRCDandMLC,alreadydestabilizedbytheirallies’withdrawal,furtherweakenedtheirpositions

withblundersonthebattlefield.InMay2002,RCDcommandersbrutallyputdownamutinyinKisangani,

killingoverahundredsixtycivilians.Bodies thathadbeenevisceratedandweigheddownwithstonesfloatedtothesurfaceintheCongoRiverinplainsightofjournalistsandUNinvestigators.Tothenorth,theMLC launchedanattackagainst a rival factionof theRCDwhilealsodeploying troops to supportPresidentPatassé in theneighboringCentralAfricanRepublic.Onboth fronts,Bemba’s soldierswereguiltyofegregioushumanrightsviolations.In November, the delegates trudged back to South Africa. This time President Mbeki, wary of

prolonging the Sun City circus, tookmatters into his own hands. Instead of allowing commissions todeveloptheirownpower-sharingproposals,Mbekipresentedhisplanandgavedelegatesfirmdeadlinesto come back with counterproposals. “Mbeki had a bash-heads-together philosophy,” one of theorganizerscommented.“Hetoldthedelegatesthatiftheydidn’tagreeonasolution,hewouldshutdownshopandtellthemtogohome.”22Backhome,churchesandhumanrightsactivistsdemonstratedinstreetsacrossthecountryagainsttheirleaders’turpitude.InBukavu,womenmarchedbare-breastedthroughthestreetsinprotest.Mbekicombinedstrong-armingwithcopiousincentives.WhileKabilaobtainedthepresidencyaswell

as a vice president, the RCD and theMLC garnered vice presidential positions, as did the politicalopposition.Sixty-oneministries,sixhundredtwentyparliamentaryseats,andoverfiftystatecompanieswouldbesplitupamongthesignatories.Theformerbelligerentswereattractedbyageneroussharingofspoils;impunityandcorruptionwere,toacertainextent,theglueholdingthefragilepeacetogether.AsopposedtoothertransitionsinSierraLeoneandLiberia,wherewarlordswerenotallowedtostandforpublic office, the transition in the Congo stacked the new government with the very people who hadplungedthecountryintointernecineconflict.“Itwastheonlywayout,”PhilipWinter,thechiefofstaffoftheFacilitation, remarked later. “Did it compromise the future?Yes.But itwas the onlywayout of adifficultsituation.”23OnDecember16,Mbekisubmitteda finalproposal to thedelegates in theplenarysessionandgave

themhalfanhourtodeliberate.Anhourlater,asthebewildereddelegationswerestillsquabblingoverclausesanddetails,heinvitedJean-LucKuye,theheadofthecivilsocietygroup,tothepodiumtosignthedeal.Underalmostphysicalpressurefromtheirhosts,theremainingdelegationheadssolemnlyfileduptothepodiumasapplause,atfirsthesitant,begantocrescendobehindthem.Afteranall-nightsession,at7:30inthemorning,MbekiaskedthedelegatestoriseandsingtheCongolesenationalanthem.Afterfiveyearsofwarandmillionsofdeaths,thecountrywasunifiedonceagain.

Figuringouthowpowerworks inKinshasa isacomplicatedaffair.ForeignbusinessmenarrivingfromEurope or China have to spend weeks to get to the right people in government. Connections areeverything. Il a un bon carnet d’adresses—“He has a good address book”—is high praise fromentrepreneursinthecapital.This institutional weakness of the courts, whose members are appointed by the government, and

politicalparties,whohavenotraditionalbaseinCongo,hasprivilegedtheemergenceofasmallcliqueofpowerbrokersaroundthepresident,akitchencabinetofroughlyadozenindividualswithdirectaccesstothepresidentandwhohelphimrule.This state of affairs developed slowly, during Joseph Kabila’s tenure in the army, as he traveled

through the country and realized that his father’s defiant militarism was going nowhere. He became

friendswithagroupofyoung,sophisticatedCongoleseofficials,allconvincedthatLaurentKabilawasonthewrongtrack,especiallyinregardtohisdismissiveattitudeoftheUnitedStates,SouthAfrica,andEurope.Themost important of theseYoung TurkswasKatumbaMwanke.He has since acquired an almost

mythicalstatusinKinshasacourtpoliticsastheéminencegrisebehindthethrone.Asayoungman,heleftZaire tostudyandworkinSouthAfricaasabankerforHSBCEquatorBank.Whenthewarbegan,hefoundhimselfinanidealposition,givenhistieswithbusinessinSouthAfricaandhisfamilyconnections.HeismarriedtothesisterofLaurentKabila’sformerfinanceminister,and,importantly,heisalsofromKabila’shomeprovinceofKatanga,althoughnotfromthesametribe.Katumbaarrivedonamissionforhisbankintheearlydaysoftherebellionand,becauseofLaurent

Kabila’sdesperateneed for competent officials,was immediatelyoffered aposition in theministryoffinance. Itwasdifficultnot to likehim:Hewasshort,unpretentious,andpolite;hespokewithaslightstammerwhenexcited.WhentheLundaandLubakat,thetwomainethniccommunitiesinKatanga—bothof which claimed Laurent Kabila through hismother and father, respectively—began squabbling overleadershippositionsintheprovincein1998,KabilaaskedaroundforagoodKatanganofficialwhowasnot fromeitherof thosecommunitiesandhadnotbeenaMobutist.KatumbaMwanke,who is from theminorityZelacommunity,wasaperfectfit.Katumbaspentthenextthreeyearsasthegovernorofthecountry’srichestprovince,endearinghimself

withKabila’sfamilyandgettingclosetothepowerfulminingcorporationsactiveintheprovince.HewasakeyplayerinthetransferofminingconcessionstoZimbabweanbusinessmen,puttinghissignatureonstatecontractswithexecutivessuchasBillyRautenbach.24In 2000, when the Rwandan army launched its onslaught on Lubumbashi, and Laurent Kabila sent

Josephtotakecommandofthedefenseofhishomeprovince,KatumbashieldedJosephfromthedrovesof familymemberswhoall arrived in thecountry’sminingcapitalwanting favors fromhim.Ata timewhenproblemsabounded—payforthesoldiersdidn’tarriveontime,therewasnofuelorsparepartsforthevehicles,thesatellitephonewasoutofairtime—Katumbahad“onegreatquality,”aUNanalysttoldme.“Asopposedtomanyothers,whenhepromisedsomething,hewouldalwaysdeliver.”25Hewasbothbusiness-savvyandveryreliable,aprizedcombination.WhenJosephbecamepresident,hebroughtKatumbatoKinshasa,givinghimthebroadtitleofminister

of the presidency and state portfolio. Working out of a modest office in the downtown Gombeneighborhood, Katumba was officially in charge of state assets, the various national companies thatincluded themaindiamond and copper concessions, aswell as steelmills, coffee plantations, and thenationalwaterandelectricitycompany.Inpractice,however,Katumbawastaskedwithnotjustrunningthesecompaniesbutmilkingthemfor

funds to supplement the presidency’s discretionary budget. Bank records, for example, show that hesigned orders for the state diamond company to transfer $2.3 million directly to several weaponsmanufacturersineasternEurope,withoutpassingthroughtheCentralBankortheMinistryofFinance.26KatumbawasalsothepointmanforbringinginmuchneededinvestmenttotheCongo.Inpart,thishad

beenmadepossiblethroughreformsininvestmentandminingcodes,whichtheWorldBankhadhelpedcreate.Butdespite the streamlined systemsetupby theminingcode, investorshad toobtainapprovalfromthepresidencyforlargeinvestments.ThiswasKatumba’sjob—brokeringandapprovingdealswithinternationalcompanies.Accordingtonumerouspeoplewithintheminingindustry,Katumba’sofficeisanunavoidablestoponthewaytosecuringanimportantcontract.AUNinvestigationcalledKatumba“akeypowerbrokerinmininganddiplomaticdeals”andrecommendedhimforsanctions;theFinancialTimescalledhim“theprimuspilus,theDickCheneyoftheCongo.”27

Themining sector, which had remained relatively locked up during the war for lack of interest byinvestors, suddenly experienced a massive privatization spree, helped along by Katumba. BetweenFebruary 2004 and November 2005, the government concluded deals for 75 percent of the Congo’scopperreserves.This fire sale of assetswent against all principles of best practice in internationalmining. Several

nonprofit companies got hold of twoof these contracts belonging toDanGertler andBelgianmagnateGeorgeForrest,whichhadbeenkeptstrictlyconfidential,andgavethemtothereputedmininglawfirmFaskenMartineauDuMoulinforanalysis.Thelawyers’conclusionwasthatthecontractsweresopoorlystructured that theprivate companies “will havebeen totally reimbursed in capital and interests of allloanandadvancesandwillhavederivedsubstantialbenefitsfromthecontrolexercisedontheoperationspriorto[theDRCpartner]receivinganyremunerationonitscontributions.”28TheWorldBank’stopminingexpert,whohadpushedlongandhardfortheprivatizationofthemining

sector, cautioned in an internalmemo that neitherGertler’s nor Forrest’s company,which nowownedsomeoftheworld’slargestcopperconcessions,hadanyexperienceinindustrialmining.“Therehasbeenacompletelackoftransparencywithrespecttothenegotiationandapprovalofthesecontracts,”hewrote,furtherworryingthatthedealscoulddeeplyembarrasstheBank.29The reason for these rushed and shoddy contracts, diplomats and industry experts indicated, was

becauseofimpendingelectionsin2006.EverybodyintheindustryIspoketotoldmethesamething:BothGertlerandForrestcontributedconsiderably toKabila’scampaigncoffers,althoughbothdenythis.30 Itwasexpensivetocanvasssuchavastcountry,setupofficesinallofthe145territories,printhundredsofthousands of T-shirts and posters, and buy the loyalty of musicians, customary chiefs, priests, andpoliticians.

AkeywordintheCongoleselexiconofcorruptionisenveloppe.IfyouwanttobuyvotesinParliamenttosquelch the audit of your state-run company, you pass around envelopes.When you want to obtain alucrativecontracttosupplythepolicewithbeansandrice,youmakesuretheofficialsontheprocurementboardallgetenvelopesdeliveredtotheirhome.Theoperativeverbisusually“tocirculate,”andtypicallyusedinthepassivevoice,asiftheenvelopes

werefloatingaroundontheirownaccord.Onafaitcirculerdesenveloppes(envelopeswerecirculatedaround). The enveloppe preserves the dignity of the recipient:You avoid the crude embarrassment ofreceivingnakedcashfromyourbenefactor.Afterall,whocanturndownananonymousenvelopewhosecontentsareunknown?KatumbaMwankewasamasteroftheenvelopperie.Anoppositionparliamentariantoldmethat,after

beingcalledtoameetingatthepresidencytodiscussanupcomingvote,Katumbathankedhimforcomingandgavehimasmall,whiteenvelope.“It’sforyourtransportcosts,”hesaid.Insidewas$1,000incrisphundred-dollarbills.31Anotherfriend,alawyerwhohadtodealwithhimregularly,toldmethatKatumbahadaLittleRedBookwithnameswritteninit.QuiteincontrasttoMao’ssynonymousbooklet,thisonehad names accompanied by a series of arrows, checks, and asterisks. “This was the off-the-bookspayroll,”myfriendtoldme.Thenamesincludedjudges,generals,ministers,oppositionparliamentarians,and journalists. Perform your job well, and Katumba could augment your salary by several thousanddollars;performpoorly,andyoucouldfindyourselfbrokeandonthestreet.32

Thismode of governance is typical ofKabila,what some inKinshasa call the “informalization” ofgovernment.“Thepresidentprefersinformalnetworks,parallelcommandstructures,”aveteranpoliticalanalystfortheUnitedNationstoldme.“Itgiveshimgreaterleewaytorule.”33InsteadofpassingthroughhisMinistry of the Interior, for example,Kabilawill call governors ormilitary commanders directly.Insteadofauthorizingdecentofficialsalariesforcivilservants,heallowsmanytoscrapebyonsalariesof less than$100amonth,only tosendthemenvelopesofseveral thousanddollarsathisdiscretion tokeepthemhappy.Thisparallelmanagementweakensinstitutionsbutmakesofficialsdependdirectlyonthepresidency.

UntilKabilawonthe2006elections,manyobserverscuthimsomeslack.Whenhefirstcametopower,thecountryhadbeendividedbywar,andhedidanadmirablejobinunitingthecountryandmarginalizinghisopponents.Duringthetransitionalgovernment,between2003and2006,hehadtosharepowerinaclumsyarrangementwithsevendifferentparties.Inthistangleofgraftandpower-sharing,itwasdifficulttogetanythingdone.Hewasapplaudedforhavingbroughtanendtothewarthathaddividedthecountry.Forthis,hewon58percentofthenationalvotein2006.Peoplebelievedinhiscampaignmotto:“JosephKabila—TheBearerofEggs,HeDoesn’tSquabble,HeDoesn’tFight.”Kabilawasbalancingthefragilepeaceinhishands;hecouldbetrustednottostartfightingagain.But three years after the elections, Kabila struggled to articulate a vision for the country. In the

economic arena, there has only been little improvement in the lives of the average Congolese. InKinshasa,wherefewappreciateJosephKabila’ssomberandlacklustercharacter,peoplesay,“Mobutuusedtostealwithafork—atleastsomecrumbswouldfallbetweenthecracks,enoughtotrickledowntotherestofus.ButKabila,hestealswithaspoon.Hescoopstheplateclean,spotless.Hedoesn’tleaveanythingforthepoor.”Kabila’s presidency has beenmarred, above all, by an ongoing insurgency in the easternCongo. In

2004, during the transitional government, General Laurent Nkunda launched an insurgency against thefledglingCongolesegovernment.ATutsi fromNorthKivu,Nkundahadbeenacommander in theRCDandclaimedthathewasonlytryingtoprotecthiscommunityfromtheex-FARandInterahamwewhostilllurkedintheprovince.Therewere,however,other,lessnoblereasonsbehindhisrebellion,aswell.TheRCDwasawareof

itslackofpopularityamongCongoleseandhadlittlehopeofwinninginthe2006elections.FortheRCDleadershipandtheRwandangovernment,bothofwhomencouragedNkundatogointorebellion,thenewrebellionwas ameans of keeping their influence in the easternCongo in the case of electoral defeat.Theirfearscametrue:Inpresidentialandparliamentarypolls,theRCDwasn’tabletogarnermorethan5percentof thevote.Theyhadgonefromcontrollingalmosta thirdof theCongo, includingsomeof themost lucrative tradeandminingareas, toalmostnothing.34Thefearofanti-Tutsipersecutioncombinedpotentlywithbusinessandpoliticalintereststofuelanewrebellion.KabilatriedinvaintodefeatNkundamilitarily,launchingfourmajoroffensivesagainsttherebellion

andsendingover20,000troopstotheKivus.Repeatedly,duringthelullsinfighting,hisgovernmenttriednegotiatingpeacedeals.Finally, in2009,Kabila struck adeal directlywith theRwandangovernment,allowing themtosend troops into theCongo tohuntdown theDemocraticForces for theLiberationofRwanda(FDLR)inreturnforarrestingNkundaandintegratinghistroopsintotheRwandannationalarmy.

Atthesametime,KabilafacedchallengesinBas-CongoProvinceinthefarwestofthecountry,wherethe mystical Bundu dia Kongo sect was protesting abuses by the regime and demanding—sometimesviolently—therightofself-determination.HealsohadtodealwiththehundredsofbodyguardsloyaltoformervicepresidentJean-PierreBemba,whohadrefusedtodisarmandintegrateintothenationalarmyaftertheirleaderwasnarrowlydefeatedinthepresidentialelections.Inbothcases,JosephKabilareactedwithdisproportionalforce,eschewingnegotiationsandsendingin

hundredsofpoliceandsoldierstoputdownbothchallengestohispower.Hundredsofunarmedciviliansdied in Bas-Congo, some brutally dismembered; over three hundred were killed during the battle fordowntownKinshasa.Hundredsofotherswereroundedupandtortured.35Inthewordsoftheopposition,“theBearerofEggshasmadeonehugeomelet.”Encumberedbyweaksecurityservices,thegovernmentseemsstuckbetweenbrutalrepressionandpallidnegotiation.

ButJosephKabila’sproblemsgofurther thanjustweakstate institutions.Heissurroundedbybusinessandpolitical leaderswith theirown interestsandpowerbases.He isanoutsiderwhowashanded thepresidencyonaplatter,withouthavingtoclimbhiswayupthroughtheranksofapartyorarmy,earningtherespectandloyaltyofhisfellows.Heknowsthathecanjustaseasilyberemovedfrompower;theexampleofhisfatherisfreshinhismemory.Reformingthestatewillrequiretacklingentrenchedinterestsandmafia-likenetworksthatpermeatethe

administration.Indoingso,herisksoffendingpowerfulpeople,whocouldthentrytounseathim.In2004,afterabotchedcoupattemptindowntownKinshasa,Irememberspeakingwithoutragedsecurityagentswhotoldme,“Weknowwhoisbehind[thecoupattempt],butwecan’tdoanything!”36It is therefore perhaps not surprising that Kabila has chosen not to promote neutral, efficient state

institutions, but rather to strengthen his own personal security and business networks. This attitude isperhapsmostpalpableinthedomainofsecuritysectorreform.Aftertheelections,Kabilahadanarmyof150,000patchedtogetherfromhalfadozendifferentarmedgroups.Manyof itsofficerswere illiterateandhadneverhadanyformalmilitarytraining.Therewereonlyafewmilitaryprosecutorsforthewholeprovince of North Kivu, where over 20,000 soldiers are based. There was no formal process ofprocurement,andarmyofficersregularlycommandeeredciviliantrucksandairplanesfortransport.“Wemanagedthearmyinformally,”ageneraltoldme.“Therealpowerwasheldbypeopleinthepresidencyorclosetothepresident,notbytheofficialchainofcommand.”37Thisstateofaffairscouldbeunderstoodforthedurationofthetransition,whenKabilawaswaryofhis

formerrivalsonthebattlefieldpullingafastoneonhim.Afterall,hedidn’twanttomeethisfather’sfate.But he has scarcely showed more willingness for reform since the elections. Purchases of militaryequipmentcontinuetobecarriedoutbyofficersclosetothepresidency,notthelogisticsdepartment,andKabila himself has a reputation for micromanaging military operations against Nkunda, sometimescountermanding his officers and sowing confusion. He has maintained a relatively large and well-equippedpresidentialguardofover10,000troopsunderhisdirectcontrol,buthehasnotbeenable toimprove theperformanceof therestofhisarmy.AsunderMobutu, thisapproachmaypreventhisowntroops from overthrowing him, but it will also keep him from consolidating peace in the rest of thecountry.Does Kabila want a strong state? Or does he perceive strong institutions, such as an independent

judiciaryandlivelyopposition,asachallengetohisauthority?Ishecondemnedtonegotiatewithmilitiasand other power barons around the country, orwill he be able to suppress these parallel networks ofpower?Theseareperhapsthemostimportantquestionsforthecountry’sfuture.Theattitudeofhisadvisorsis

notencouraging:

Politics isalwaysdirty, isalwaysafight.This isnotSwitzerland!Ifweliberalize thepoliticalsphereand the economy, allow for unrestrained democracy, the same self-obsessed people who drove thiscountryintothegroundunderMobutuwillcometopoweragain!Youseefreepressandpoliticalactivity—weseeopponents,plottingourdemise.Inordertoreformandpromotegrowth,weneedtocurtailsomecivillibertiesandcontrolpartoftheeconomy.Itisalesserevilforagreatergood.38

ThislanguageiseerilyreminiscentoftheMobuturegime’searlierdays.PresidentKabilaisintentoncentralizing power to the detriment of an efficient state bureaucracy and the rule of law. In 2009, hesuggested that hewanted to change the constitution to prevent decentralization, extend term limits, andbring the judiciaryfurtherunderhiscontrol.Hisgovernmenthasexpropriatedseveral lucrativeoilandminingconcessions frommultinationalcorporations,allegedly inorder todistribute them tocompaniesclosetohim.Assoofteninpolitics,whatappearstobepoliticallyexpedientforthoseinpowerrarelyoverlapswith the public interest.The lesser evils of the regimebecome entrenched,while the greatergoodisneverrealized.

Conclusion:TheCongo,OnItsOwnTerms

Africaisneverseenaspossessingthingsandattributesproperlypartof“humannature.”Orwhenit is, itsthingsandattributesaregenerallyoflesservalue,littleimportanceandpoorquality.Itisthiselementarinessand primitiveness that makes Africa the world par excellence of all that is incomplete, mutilated andunfinished,itshistoryreducedtoaseriesofsetbacksofnatureinitsquestforhumankind.

—ACHILLEMBEMBE

TheCongocastsaspellonmanyvisitors.Itisdifficulttoexplainwhy.TheauthorPhilipGourevitchoncewrote, “Oh Congo, what a wreck. It hurts to look and listen. It hurts to turn away.”1 The Congolesetragedycertainlyhassomethingofacar-wreckattractiontoit.NinegovernmentsbattledthroughacountrythesizeofwesternEurope,walking thousandsofmilesonfoot throughjunglesandswamps.Overfivemillionpeoplehavedied,andhundredsofthousandsofwomenhavebeenraped.2Ifanythingshouldbeimportant,itisthedeathsoffivemillionpeople.Or is it?TheCongowar is actually rarely seen as a problemof joint humanity. Instead, it is either

portrayed inwesternmediaas anabjectmess—amorassof rebelgroups fightingoverminerals in theruinsofafailedstate—orasawarofgoodversusevil,withtheroleofvillainplayedalternativelybytheRwandangovernment, internationalminingcompanies, theU.S.government,orCongolesewarlords. Inthetwenty-four-hournewscycle,inwhichinternationalnewsisdevotedlargelytothewaronterroranditsspin-offs,thereislittleinterestinadeeperunderstandingoftheconflict,littleappetitefornumbersasunimaginably large as fivemillion. Instead, a few shocking individual images command the headlines.Activist andVaginaMonologues founderEveEnslerwrote in theHuffingtonPost that she had heardhorrificstoriesrangingfrom“womenbeingrapedbyfiftymeninonedaytowomenbeingforcedtoeatdeadbabies,”3whiletheNewYorkTimesreportedhowawomanwas“kidnappedbybanditsintheforest,strapped to a tree and repeatedly gang-raped. The bandits did unspeakable things, she said, likedisembowelingapregnantwomanrightinfrontofher.”4Allof these stories are true.Theconflict has seenactsof cannibalism,girls asyoungas fivebeing

rapedwithgunbarrelsandsticks,andwomenburiedalive.Journalistshavearesponsibilitytoreportontheseatrocities,andpeopleareoftenjoltedawakebysuchhorrors.Inaddition,millionsofdollarshavegonetodedicatedorganizationsandhealthcentersintheregionthatarehelpingsurvivorscopeandrestarttheirlives.Theseadvocacyeffortshavealso,however,hadunintendedeffects.Theyreinforcetheimpressionthat

theCongoisfilledwithwantonsavages,crazedbypowerandgreed.Thisview,byfocusingontheutterhorroroftheviolence,distractsfromthepoliticsthatgaverisetotheconflictandfromthereasonsbehindthebloodshed.Ifallweseeisblackmenrapingandkillinginthemostoutlandishwaysimaginable,wemightfindithardtobelievethat there isanylogic to thisconflict.WearereturnedtoJosephConrad’s

notionthattheCongotakesyoutotheheartofdarkness,aninscrutableandunimprovablemess.Ifwewanttochangethepoliticaldynamicsinthecountry,wehaveabovealltounderstandtheconflictonitsownterms.Thatstartswithunderstandinghowpoliticalpowerismanaged.

Perhapsthemostnagging,persistentproblemIhavewitnessedwhileresearchingandwritingthisbookhas been the lack of visionary, civic-minded leadership. The constant refrain from Congolese andforeignersalikeis:WhydomostCongolesepoliticalofficeholdersseemsomorallybankrupt?IfchangecanonlycomefromCongolesethemselves,howwillthisbepossible?OnoneofmytripsbacktotheUnitedStatesfromtheCongo,IspenttimeinalibraryreadingThomas

Hobbes.TheEnglishphilosopher,afounderofwesternpoliticalthought,waswritinginthewakeoftheThirty Years’ War (1618–1648), which devastated much of central Europe and caused the deaths ofmillions of civilians. That war was the result of a complex mixture of political competition, violentlocalism,ideology,andgreed.Hundredsofdifferentfiefdomsbattledagainsteachother,eggedonbythedividebetweenCatholicismandProtestantism,aswellasbycompetitionforpowerintheHolyRomanEmpire.Thewarwasnotoriousforitsmaraudingbandsofmercenarysoldiers,whofoughtforthehighestbidderandwholaidwaste toentireregionssearchingforbounty.Historiansoftenuse theLatinphrasebellum se ipsum alet to describe the phenomenon—the war feeds itself. This is a concept manyCongolesecommanderswouldunderstand.WritingthreeyearsaftertheendoftheThirtyYears’War,Hobbeshadgoodreasontobepessimistic

aboutthestateofnature,whichhebelievedtobeoneof“warofmanagainstman.”Lifeinthisstatewas“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” In view of this, it was in the common interest to forfeitindividualrightstothestate—theLeviathan,inHobbes’sparlance—inreturnforprotection.Thiswasthefirst notion of a social contract, which justified a government’s rule and made it responsible to itscitizens.But the Congo does not have a Leviathan, a state that can protect its citizens or even impose a

monopolyofviolence.IncontrastwiththeThirtyYears’War,whichhelpedproducetheEuropeansystemofnation-states, it isunlikely that theCongowarswill forgea strongstate.As thesepageshavemadeclear, the story of theCongowars is one of stateweakness and failure,which hasmade possible theceaselessproliferationofinsurgentgroups,stillnumberingaroundtwenty-nineinlate2010.Thesearmedgroupsfightbrutalinsurgenciesandcounterinsurgenciesthat,astheUnitedStatesdiscoveredinVietnamandIraq,arenotsomuchaboutcontrollingterritoryasaboutcontrollingcivilians,whoarebrutalizedinordertoobtainresourcesandasretaliationforattacksbytheirrivals.Congolesestateandsocietyhavenotalwaysbeensoweak.Inthefifteenthcentury,largekingdomswith

sophisticatedgovernancestructuresbeganforminginthesavannahsinthecenterandwestofthecountry.TheKongokingdom,basedinthefarwestalongtheAtlanticcoast,atonepointwasabletofieldover20,000infantrymenandarchersinbattle,fundedthroughanelaboratesystemoftaxes,andhaddiplomaticrepresentativesatthePortuguese,Spanish,andpapalcourts.TheLundaandLubakingdoms,basedinthecenter of today’sCongo, in the savannahs along theAngolan border, developed a successfulmodel ofgovernmentbasedonsacredkingshipandlocalcouncilsthatspreadthroughneighboringregions.Sincethen,however, theCongohasbeenthevictimoffourhundredyearsofpoliticaldisintegration.

Startinginthesixteenthcentury,severalmillionslaveswereexportedfromtheCongobybothEuropean

andArab slave traders, sparkingdevastatingwars between rival kingdomsover the lucrative trade aswellashugepopulationshortagesinpartsofthecountry.Then,startinginthenineteenthcentury,Belgiancolonial administrators dismemberedwhat remainedofmostCongolesekingdoms, naminghundredsofnewchiefs,severingtiesbetweentherulersandtheirlocalcouncils,expropriatingvasttractsofland,andallowingBelgianofficials to takeovermanyfunctionsof thecustomaryrulers.Theycreatedacolonialstate whose purpose was to extract resources and—in its later days—provide basic services to thepopulation,but thisstatewasnever intendedtobeaccountable to itscitizens.Unions,politicalparties,andother formsofmobilizationwerebrutallysuppressedbycolonialauthoritiesuntil the finaldaysoftheirrule.ThecolonialauthoritiesthenhandedovergovernmenttoaCongolesepeoplealmostwhollyunprepared

tomanagetheirvaststate.Therewereahandfuloflawyersanduniversitygraduatesinthecountry;underBelgian rule, noAfrican could become an enlisted officer in the army, and all important positions inadministrationwereheldbywhiteforeigners.Atthesametime,Belgianbusinessinterestsandcoldwarpoliticsledtotheexternalbackingofmilitarystrongmenandtherepressionofnationalistmobilization.Thishistoricallegacyweighsheavilyonthepresent.Sinceindependence,thestoryofpoliticalpower

from JosephMobutu to Joseph Kabila has been about staying in power, not about creating a strong,accountablestate.This isunderstandable.In theCongo,everythingflowsfrompoliticaloffice: thebestbusinessdeals, influence,andstatus.For thoseoutsideofpower, there is scantopportunity toprosper.Theserulershave treatedstrongpublic institutionsas threats,erodingthecapacityof thearmysoas tomaintain tight control over key units and undermining an independent judiciary and parliament. ThebiggestfearofMobutu’sandKabila’sregimeshasnotbeenaforeigninvasion—Mobutuwasincreduloustotheendthataneighboringcountrycouldousthim—butinternalcollapse.Theyfearedeventheirownbodyguardsandministerswouldstabthemintheback.TheCongooftodayisinsomewaysmoresimilarto the sixteenthcentury Italy of Machiavelli—and its court intrigues comparable—than to any moderntwenty-first-centurystate.Acentral reason, therefore, for the lackofvisionary leadership in theCongo isbecause itspolitical

system rewards ruthless behavior and marginalizes scrupulous leaders. It privileges loyalty overcompetence,wealth and power overmoral character.Well-intentioned (albeitmisguided) leaders likeWamba diaWamba are spun to the outside of this centrifuge,while themore guileful ones stay at thecenter.SpendsometimeintheGrandHotelinKinshasa,wherepoliticiansmingleanddealsarestruck,andyouwillrealizethat thewelfareof theCongolesepeopleisabsentfromtheirconversations,whilecourtintriguesandbattlesforpowerareamatterofobsession.ThisisnottosaythereisnoideologyintheCongo.Itisfulloffirebrandnationalistswhoaretiredof

thehumiliationofbeing“thedoormatofCentralAfrica,onwhichvisitingarmiescleantheirshoes,”asonefriendgriped.Butthepoliticalsystemhasfailedtochannelthisideologyintoresponsibleleadership.Theonlyviablemeansofpopularmobilization remainsethnicity,althougheven thathasbeenguttedofmuchofitsmoralcontentbygenerationsofcustomaryrulersco-optedandrepressedbythestate.Theseethnicity-basedorganizations,whetherpoliticalpartiesorarmedgroups,mobilizeforgreaterresourcesfortheirownnarrowcommunity,notforthepublicgood.Thisinturnfuelscorruptsystemsofpatronage,wherebyethnicleadersembezzlepublicfundsinordertorewardtheirsupporters.

InEurope,stateswereforgedthroughwar,trade,andtechnology.Therulerswhocouldnotraiseenoughtaxes to fund large standing armies were ultimately overthrown. War required taxes, which in turnspawnedlargebureaucraciestogatherandadministertherevenues.In theCongo, there has been little pressure on rulers to create strong armies or bureaucracies. For

years,Mobutureliedonoutsidehelp toputdownrebellions,callingonSouthAfricanmercenariesandMoroccan,Belgian,andFrenchsoldiers,whomhecouldpayincashorcommodities.Hehadlittleneedtocreateastrongadministration—whichcouldthenbecomeabreedinggroundforpoliticalopposition—ashecouldgetplentyofrevenuesfromthecopperminesandforeigndonors.JosephKabilahaslargelyprivatizedtheeconomyandhasstrengthenedtaxcollection,butheiswaryaboutcreatingastrongruleoflawthatcouldtiehishands.EventheviolenceintheKivusregion,whichcontinuesuntiltoday,hasnotpromptedmajorreformsinhisarmyorpolice;hehaspreferredtoco-optdissentratherthantopromoteanimpartial,disciplinedsecurity service.And insteadofbusinesselitesdemandinggreateraccountabilityand less corruption from the government, they are often themselves dependent on patronage fromKinshasa.No one factor has produced the kleptocratic, venal political elite. Certainly social and educational

issuesalsoplayarole.Butitisclearthatpoliticalelitesreacttoincentivesandthatnomeaningfulreformwill resultas longas these incentivesareskewedagainst thecreationofstronginstitutions.Buoyedbyforeignsupportandrevenuesfromcopper,oil,anddiamonds,thegovernmentfeelslittleneedtoserveitscitizens and promote sustainable development. Why empower nettlesome parliaments, courts, andauditingbodiesiftheywilljustturnaroundandharassyou?Thisstateofaffairsshouldforceforeigndonorstothinkmorecarefullyaboutcontributingbillionsof

dollarstodevelopmentintheCongowithoutponderingthelong-termrepercussions.Thedonors—mainlytheWorldBank,theInternationalMonetaryFund,theEuropeanUnion,theUnitedStates,andtheUnitedKingdom—usuallyinsistthatthismoneyispoliticallyneutral,thatitdoesnotdirectlybenefitthepoliticalelite.This is true, asmostof themoney is for schools, roads, health care, andwaterprojects.But alldevelopment is deeply political. By taking over the financing of most public services, donors takepressureofftheCongolesegovernmenttorespondtotheneedsofitscitizens.Ultimately,theruleoflawwill be created not through a capacity-building project in theministry of finance but through a powerstrugglebetweenthegovernment,localelites,andbusinesscircles.Donorsneedtofigureouthowtomostresponsiblyinsertthemselvesinthisdynamicandnotjustpaveroads,buildhospitals,andreformfiscalsystems.

Butwhy shouldwehelp at all?First, because it is not just an act of joint humanity.Weowe it to theCongolese.Mostobviouslybecauseofthecenturiesofslavery,colonialism,andexploitationofrubber,copper,anddiamonds,whichbenefitedwesterncompaniesandhelpedbuildBelgiancities.Thosepastinjusticesshouldbereasonenoughforfeelingamoraldebttowardthecountry,butwedon’tneedtogosofar. Most of the foreign companies operating in the Congo today are listed on stock exchanges, areincorporatedinEuropeorNorthAmerica,orobtaintheirfinancingfrombanksbasedinthosecountries.Manyofthesecompaniesareengaginginquestionablebehaviorthatwouldbeproscribedintheirhomecountries.Bigminingcompanieshavesignedcontracts thatprovide little revenue to thestateandhaveallegedlyprovidedlargekickbackstogovernmentofficials.Smallertradingcompaniesbuymineralsfrom

the easternCongowithout scrutinizing theorigins of their shipments tomake sure they are not fundingarmedgroups.SoweshoulddowhatwecantoallowtheCongolesetobenefitfromtheirriches,notbeheldbackbythem.This is not to say that thewar has been fueled bywestern governments eager to get their hands on

Congoleseriches.Thereislittleevidenceforthat.Itiscertainlytruethatmanycompanies,Congoleseandforeign,havebenefitedenormouslyfromtheconflict.Nevertheless,forthemostpartitwassmall,junioroutfits thatmade a fortune—the conflict postponedmajor industrial mining and investment for over adecade.Similarly,whilesomewesterndiplomatsflourishedthroughtheircorruptdealingsintheCongo,itwouldbewrongtoflipcausalityonitsheadandsaythatwesternbusinessesanddiplomatscausedthewar.For themostpart, theminingcompaniesgowhereprofitmargins take them,and theembassies inKinshasa do their mandated job of helping them. The problem has been one of regulatory failure; ofmining cowboys allowed to get away with mass fraud, hiding behind shell companies registered inCaribbean islands and working the corrupt stratosphere of Congolese politics; and of westerngovernmentsnotcaringaboutthebehavioroftheircompaniesoncetheyleavetheirborders.Second,weshouldgiveCongoleseanopportunitytodecideonhowtodealwiththeirviolentpast.A

key fallacyof international engagementhasbeen the idea that justice is an impediment topeace in theregion.Timeandtimeagain,diplomatshaveactivelyshiedawayfromcreatinganinternationalcourttoprosecute those responsible for the many atrocities committed during the war. One of the mostdishearteningmomentsinmyresearch,repeatedcountlesstimes,washearingsurvivorsexplainthattheydidn’thaveanythingtohelpthemaddresstheirloss—thekillershadn’tbeenbroughttojustice,andoftentheydidn’tevenknowwheretheirlovedoneswereburied.TheCongoissomethingofanoutlierin thissense:SierraLeone,Kosovo,EastTimor,Rwanda,andtheformerYugoslaviahaveallhadtribunalstodealwiththepast.YetintheCongo,wheremanyoftheperpetratorsarestillinpower,thevictimsarelefttostewintheirfrustration.It is precisely becausemany former warlords are still in power that diplomats have beenwary of

launchingprosecutions.This has resulted in an army andgovernment repletewith criminalswhohavelittledeterrenttokeepthemfromresortingtoviolenceagain.Atthetimeofthiswriting,inOctober2010,theUnitedNationsreleasedareportsummarizingthemostegregiouswarcrimescommittedinthecountrybetween1993and2003andrecommendingthataspecialcourtbeestablished.Thistime,donorsandtheCongolese government must seize the opportunity. This is not to say that we should impose aninternationaltribunalontheCongo;itmaynotbethebestsolution.ButtheCongolesepeopleshouldbegiventhechancetoknowsomeofthetruthofwhathappenedduringthewarandtoholdaccountablethoseresponsible.TwohundredandtwentyCongolesecivilsocietyorganizationshavewritteninsupportoftheUNreportandhavecalledforaconferencetodecideonhowbesttoproceed.Suchaninitiativewouldbeanimportantsignaltotheelite,provingthatimpunityisnottheglueofthepoliticalsystem.

Inlargepart,however,oursinshavebeenofomission.Wesimplydonotcareenough.ContrarytowhatsomeCongolesebelieve,PresidentObamadoesnotwakeuptoasecuritybriefingontheCongowithhismorningscone.Generally,wedonotcareaboutastrangewarfoughtbyblackpeoplesomewhereinthemiddleofAfrica.This sadhypocrisy is easy to see—NATOsent50,000 troops fromsomeof thebestarmiestoKosovoin1999,acountryone-fifththesizeofSouthKivu.IntheCongo,theUNpeacekeeping

missionplateauedat20,000troops,mostlyfromSouthAsia,ill-equippedandwithlittlewilltocarryoutriskymilitaryoperations. Inexchange, theCongohas receivedplentifulhumanitarianaid—ashort-termsolutiontoabigproblem.This apathy has allowed simplistic notions to dominate policy toward the region. This was most

evidentindealingwithUgandaandRwanda.Throughouttheconflict,donoraidmadeupforoverhalfofthe budget of Rwanda and over a third of that of Uganda. The largest providers were the EuropeanCommission,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates,governmentsthatfeltunderstandablyguiltyfornothavingcometoRwanda’saidduringthegenocide.In addition, both Central African countries had impressive records of development and poverty

reduction:overaperiodof tenyears,donoraidhelped lift13percentofRwandansand20percentofUgandansoutofpoverty.ComparedwithotherAfricancountries,suchasthatoftheCongo,atleastheredonorsknewthattheiraiddollarsandpoundswerebeingputtogooduse.The donors were, however, myopic. They clearly recognized the relatively positive developments

takingplacewithinRwanda’sbordersbutweregenerallyindifferenttowardtheconflictnextdoor.WhenRwanda reinvaded theCongo inAugust 1998,Washington andLondon protested but did not use theirmightydiplomaticandfinancial leverageonCongo’sneighbors.“Wedid theright thingwithRwanda,”SueHogwood, a formerUK ambassador toRwanda, said. “We needed to help them rebuild after thegenocide.Weengagedandchallengedthemoverhumanrightsabuses,buttheyalsohadgenuinesecurityconcerns.”5Rwandadidhavesecurityconcerns.OneofKagame’spoliticaladvisorsexpressedatypicalviewto

me: “When theUnitedStateswas attackedonSeptember 11, 2001, youdecided to strikeback againstAfghanistanforharboringthepeoplewhocarriedouttheattack.Manyinnocentciviliansdiedasaresultof U.S. military operations. Is that unfortunate? Of course. But howmany Americans regret invadingAfghanistan?Veryfew.”6Thispointofviewdoesnotallowformoralnuances.Oncewehaveestablishedthatthegénocidaires

areintheCongo,anymeanswilljustifytheendsofgettingridofthem,evenifthosemeansarenotstrictlyrelatedtogettingridofthegénocidaires.WasthedestructionofKisanganinecessarytogetridofthem?Thekillingoftensofthousandsofcivilians?Thepillagingofmillionsofdollarstofinancethewareffort?Policymakers in the regionhaveoftenonlyhadblunt instruments todealwithcomplex issues. In the

case of the Rwandan refugee crisis, for example, it would have been best to send in an internationalmilitaryforcetodemilitarizetherefugeecampsandseparatethesoldiersfromthecivilians.Thatwouldhave required hundreds of millions of dollars, and a risky intervention soon after the UN fiasco inSomalia.7In the absence of such large-scale engagement, dealing with the refugee problem, especially after

Rwandahadinvaded,waslikedoingbrainsurgerywithovenmitts.AsseveralhundredthousandrefugeesfledacrossZaire, theU.S.ambassador toKigali toldhisbosses inWashington,“Thebestwaywecanhelp is to stop feeding the killers whowill then run away to look for other sustenance, leaving theirhostagesbehind.Ifwedonot,wewillbetradingthechildreninTingi-TingiagainstthechildrenwhowillbekilledandorphanedinRwanda[bythekillerswhentheyreturn].”8Whathedidn’tmentionisthattheonlywaytostopfeedingthekillerswastostopfeedingtheciviliansaswell.Wecannotdopeacemakingonthecheap,withfewdiplomatsandnoresources.Itwillnotonlyfailbut

alsoleadtosimplisticpoliciesthatcandomoreharmthangood.

TheCongowarhadnoonecause,noclearconceptualessencethatcanbeeasilydistilledinacoupleofparagraphs.LikeanancientGreekepic, it is amessofdifferentnarrative strands—someheroic, somevenal,allcombinedinanarrativethatisnotstraightforwardbutlayered,shifting,andincomplete.Itisnotawarofgreatmechanicalprecisionbutofraggedhumanedges.Thisbookisanexhortationtoraisethebarandtryhardertounderstandthislayeredcomplexity.The

Congo’ssufferingisintenselyhuman;ithasexperiencedtraumaonamassiveandprolongedscale,andthevictimsareourneighbors,ourtradingpartners,ourpoliticalconfreresandrivals.Theyarenotalien;theyarenotevil;theyarenotbeyondourcomprehension.ThestoryoftheCongoisdenseandcomplicated.Itdemandsthatallinvolvedthinkhard.ThismeansdivingintothenutsandboltsofCongolesepoliticsandworking to help themore legitimate and responsible leaders rise to the top. Thismeans better, moreaggressive, and smarter peacekeeping and conflict resolution; more foreign aid that is conditional onpoliticalreformsandnotjustonfiscalperformance;andmoreresponsiblecorporateinvestmentandtradewiththeCongo.Weshouldnotdespair.IfthereisonethingIknowafterhavingworkedontheCongoforadecade,itis

theextremeresilienceandenergyoftheCongolesepeople.AstheeccentricsingerKoffiOlomidesings,referringtohiscountry,“Thisishell’ssystemhere.Thefireisraging,andyetwedon’tgetburned.”Withalloftheirhardships,onewouldimaginetheCongolesetobelessvibrantandmorecynical.Yettheyarenot.Therearenoeasysolutions for theCongo,nosilverbullets toproduceaccountablegovernmentand

peace.TheultimatefateofthecountryrestswiththeCongolesepeoplethemselves.Westernersalsohavearoletoplay,inpartbecauseofourhistoricaldebttothecountry,inpartbecauseitistherightthingtodo.Thisdoesnotmean imposinga foreignvisionon thecountryor simplysending foodandmoney. Itmeans understanding it and its politics and rhythms on their own terms, and then doing our part inprovidinganenvironmentconducivetogrowthandstability.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1JulieHollar,“CongoIsIgnored,NotForgotten,”FairnessandAccuracyinReporting,May2009,www.fair.org/index.php?page=3777,accessedMarch8,2010.2NicholasKristof,“DarfurandCongo,”OntheGround(blog),NewYorkTimes,June20,2007,kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/darfur-and-congo/,accessedMarch8,2010,quotedinHollar,“CongoIsIgnored.”3TheCongolesecolloquiallycalltheBelgiansnoko,oruncles,andliketomakefunoftheirfondnessformayonnaiseontheirFrenchfries.4AchilleFlorNgoye,Kin-la-joie,Kin-la-folie(Paris:L’Harmattan,1993),147(mytranslation).5Thecountry’snamewasswitchedbacktotheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoin1997.Whendiscussingtheperiod1971to1997,IwillrefertothecountryasZaire.6GauthiersdeVillersandJean-ClaudeWillame,RepubliquedemocratiqueduCongo:Chroniquepolitiqued’unentre-deux-guerres,octobre1996–juillet1998,CahiersAfricains35(Paris:L’Harmattan,1998),85.7Hisnamehasbeenchangedtoprotecthisidentity.

CHAPTER1

1Acontroversystillsurroundsthedowningoftheplane.OpponentsofthecurrentregimeandsomeacademicsinsistthattheRPFrebelsshotitdown,whiletheRPFandotherregionalexpertsmaintainthatitwasextremistswithintheHabyarimanagovernment.2ScottStraus,“HowManyPerpetratorsWereThereintheRwandanGenocide?”JournalofGenocideResearch6,no.1(2004):85–98.3KathiL.Austin,RearmingwithImpunity:InternationalSupportforthePerpetratorsoftheRwandanGenocide,HumanRightsWatch,vol.7,no.4(May1995).4Unlessotherwiseindicated,informationaboutRwarakabije’slifeinthischapterisbasedonaseriesofinterviewswithhiminKigalibetween2007and2009.5HannahArendt,EichmanninJerusalem:AReportontheBanalityofEvil(NewYork:Penguin,2006),135.6ThissectiondrawsonadiscussionofidentityformationinRwandainDavidNewbury,KingsandClans:IdjwiIslandandtheLakeKivuRift(Madison:UniversityofWisconsin,1991);aswellasJean-PierreChrétien,TheGreatLakesofAfrica:TwoThousandYearsofHistory,trans.ScottStraus(NewYork:ZoneBooks,2003),171–190,281–290;andCatherineNewbury,TheCohesionofOppression:ClientshipandEthnicityinRwanda,1860–1960(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1988),73–150.7QuotedbyChrétien,TheGreatLakesofAfrica,283.8GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide(London:Hurst,1997),143n27.9PhilipVerwimp,AnEconomicProfileofPeasantPerpetratorsoftheGenocide:Micro-levelEvidencefromRwanda,HiCNWorkingPaper8,HouseholdsinConflictNetwork,UniversityofSussex,2003,www.hicn.org/papers/perp.pdf.10Straus,“HowManyPerpetrators?,”94.Otherauthorscontestthisfigure;therangevariesfrombetweentensofthousandstoseveralmillionperpetrators.11Jean-PaulKimonyo,Ungenocidepopulaire(Paris:Karthala,2008);ScottStraus,TheOrderofGenocide:Race,Power,andWarinRwanda(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2006).12Prunier,TheRwandaCrisis,100–102,147,148;AlisonDesForges,EricGillet,andTimothyLongman,LeaveNonetoTelltheStory:GenocideinRwanda(NewYork:HumanRightsWatch,1999),506–507.13Austin,RearmingwithImpunity,www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Rwanda1.htm,n25.14DesForges,Gillet,andLongman,LeaveNonetoTelltheStory,506.15LindaMelvern,APeopleBetrayed:TheRoleoftheWestinRwanda’sGenocide(London:ZedBooks,2000),131.16AfricanRights,Rwanda:TheInsurgencyintheNorthwest(London:AfricanRights,1998),103.17AfricanRights,Rwanda:Death,Despair,andDefiance,rev.ed.(London:AfricanRights,1995),657,quotedbyPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis,314.18AmosElon,“Introduction,”inArendt,EichmanninJerusalem,xiv.

CHAPTER2

1GérardPrunier,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),30.2QuotedbyJoelBoutroue,MissedOpportunities:TheRoleoftheInternationalCommunityintheReturnoftheRwandanRefugeesfromEasternZaire,July1994–December1996,RosemarieRogersWorkingPaper1,Inter-UniversityCommitteeonInternationalMigration,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,June1998.3BeatriceUmutesi,FuirouMourirauZaire(Paris:L’Harmattan,2000),95.4Prunier,Africa’sWorldWar,26,quotingUNHCRfieldnotes.5JohandeSmedt,“ChildMarriagesinRwandanRefugeeCamps,”Africa:JournaloftheInternationalAfricanInstitute68,no.2(1998):211–237.6Umutesi,FuirouMourirauZaire,93,94.7BreakingtheCycle:CallsforActionintheRwandeseRefugeeCampsinTanzaniaandZaire,DoctorsWithoutBorders,November10,1994,http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=1465.8JohnEriksson,“SynthesisReport”oftheInternationalResponsetoConflictandGenocide:LessonsfromtheRwandaExperience,DanishInternationalDevelopmentAssistance,March1996,29,quotedbyFionaTerry,CondemnedtoRepeat?TheParadoxofHumanitarianAction(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2002),175.9Umutesi,FuirouMourirauZaire,88.10Terry,CondemnedtoRepeat?186,187.11Ibid.,204,205.12Ibid.,190.13Author’soff-the-recordinterviewwithaUNofficial,NewYork,July2007.14KurtMills,“RefugeeReturnfromZairetoRwanda:TheRoleofUNHCR,”inWarandPeaceinZaire/Congo:AnalyzingandEvaluatingIntervention,1996–1997,ed.HowardAdelmanandGovindC.Rao(Trenton,NJ:AfricaWorldPress,2004),163–185;FinalReportoftheUnitedNationsTechnicalMissionontheSecuritySituationintheRwandanRefugeeCampsinZaire,1994,www.grandslacs.net/doc/2745.pdf.15Boutroue,MissedOpportunities,62–64.16QuotedbyBoutroue,MissedOpportunities,31,32.17Terry,CondemnedtoRepeat?171.18Boutroue,MissedOpportunities.19Rwanda/Zaire:RearmingwithImpunity,HumanRightsWatchArmsProject,May1995.20TheGreatLakesregionofAfricaconsistsofthecountrieslocatedaroundlakesintheGreatRiftValley.TheregionislooselydefinedbutusuallyincludesUganda,Rwanda,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Burundi,Kenya,andTanzania.21GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1995),279n139.22AgenceFrance-Presse,Brussels,October29,1996.23QuotedbySimonMassey,“OperationAssurance:TheGreatestHumanitarianInterventionthatNever

Happened,”JournalofHumanitarianAssistance,February15,1998,jha.ac/1998/02/15/operation-assurance-the-greatest-intervention-that-never-happened.24Ibid.

CHAPTER3

1StephenKinzer,AThousandHills:Rwanda’sRebirthandtheManWhoDreamedIt(Hoboken,NJ:Wiley&Sons,2008),254.2PhilipGourevitch,“AfterGenocide,”Transition72(1996):188.3Kinzer,AThousandHills,232.4GérardPrunier,TheRwandaCrisis:AHistoryoftheGenocide(London:Hurst&Co.,1997),62.5RichardGrant,“PaulKagame:Rwanda’sRedeemerorRuthlessDictator?”DailyTelegraph(London),July22,2010.6“WhenKagameTurned50,”NewTimes(Kigali),October25,2007.7Author’sinterviewwithAndrewMwenda,NewHaven,Connecticut,March2010.8Author’sinterviewwithformerRPFsoldier,Nairobi,July2007.9Author’stelephoneinterviewwithU.S.intelligenceofficer,June2009.10SteveVogel,“StudentofWarfareGraduatesonBattlefieldsofRwanda;RebelLeaderRanaTextbookOperation,”WashingtonPost,August25,1994.11Prunier,TheRwandaCrisis,62.12FilipReyntjens,LaGuerredesGrandsLacs(Paris:L’Harmattan,1999),52;ReportoftheJointMissionChargedwithInvestigatingAllegationsofMassacresandOtherHumanRightsViolationsOccurringinEasternZaire(NowDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo)SinceSeptember1996,UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,A/51/942,July2,1997,17,18.13QuotedinthefilmAfriqueenmorceaux(1999),directedbyJihanElTahran.14PeterRosenblum,“IrrationalExuberance:TheClintonAdministrationinAfrica,”CurrentHistory(May2002):197.15TheUgandanrebelsincludedtheLord’sResistanceArmy(LRA),abrutalrebelgroupthatinitiallydrewsupportfromtheAcholicommunityofnorthernUganda,whohadmadeupalargepartofMiltonObote’sarmyandhadbeenmarginalizedafterMuseveni’sarrivalinpower.TheLRAwerenotyetactiveinZaire,butseveralotherUgandanrebelgroupswere,withsupportfrombothMobutuandtheKhartoumgovernment.Shortlyafterwards,SudaneseintelligenceoperativesbasedoutofnortheasternZairehelpedcreatetheWestNileBankLiberationFront(WNBLF),madeupofformerpartisansandsoldiersclosetoformerUgandandictatorIdiAmin.Inaddition,Sudanlentsupporttoseveralotherrebelgroups,includingtwosmallUgandanIslamistorganizations,theTabliqandtheUgandaMuslimLiberationArmy(UMLA),bothofwhichclaimedtobeoutragedbytheallegedmassacreofMuslimsatthehandsofMuseveni.Tocomplicatethepicturefurther,therewasalsoagroupofleadersfromtheBagandacommunity,theAlliedDemocraticMovement(ADM),whoattackedMuseveniforcontinuingtorepressthekingdomofBaganda,thelargestprecolonialmonarchyintheregion,andalsobegantorecruitsoldiers.AsneitherADMnorUMLAhadsignificantgrassrootssupport,theSudaneseputthemincontactwithremnantsoftheNationalArmyfortheLiberationofUganda(NALU),arebelmilitiabasedamongtheKonjoethniccommunityintheRuwenzoriMountainsofwesternUganda,whohadfeltmarginalizedfromUgandapoliticssincethecolonialera.Together,thesethreegroupsformedtheAlliedDemocraticForces(ADF).16“CongoRebelsWereMuseveni’sIdea,”Monitor(Kampala),June1,1999.17“SupplementaryReportoftheMonitoringMechanismonSanctionsAgainstUNITA,”SecurityCouncilDocumentS/2001/966,October8,2001.

18ThefigurefordisplacedpeoplecomesfromtheUNconsolidatedappealforAngola,January–December1996;militaryexpenditureinformationcomesfromtheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI).19MatthewHart,“HowtoStealaDiamond,”AtlanticMonthly,March1999.20Author’sinterviewwithRwandanintelligenceofficial,SouthAfrica,January2009.21Author’sinterviewwithDonSteinberg,formerU.S.ambassadortoAngola,NewYork,June2007.22“KabilaShoutsDownMuseveni,”Monitor(Kampala),June2,1999.23ThaboMbeki,“StatementonBehalfoftheAfricanNationalCongress,ontheOccasionoftheAdoptionbytheConstitutionalAssemblyof‘TheRepublicofSouthAfricaConstitutionBill1996.’”

CHAPTER4

1Author’sinterviewwithhumanrightsactivist,Bukavu,March2008.2BBCmonitoringofVoixduZairenewscast,October9,1996.Hiscommentsaboutsixdaysweremadeoffairtooneoftheinternationaljournalists.3See,forexample,hissubmissiontotheGomapeaceconferencein2008:“ReactiondeMonsieurLwabanjiLwasiNgabo,Vice-GouverneurHonoraireduSudKivu,àladeclarationduporteparoledesBanyamulengeàlaconferencedeGoma,”January15,2008.4Muchofthischapterisbasedontheauthor’sinterviewwithSerukiza,Kinshasa,November2007.Hepassedawaynotlongafterwardsfromcomplicationsfromcancer.5IsidoreNdaywel,HistoireGénéraleduCongo:Del’héritageancienàlaRépubliquedémocratique(Paris:Duculot,1998),382–383(mytranslation).AlsoseeKoenVlassenroot,“Citizenship,IdentityFormationandConflictinSouthKivu:TheCaseoftheBanyamulenge,”ReviewofAfricanPoliticalEconomy29,nos.93–94(2002):499–515.6IowethisinsighttoMauroDeLorenzo,whostudiedtheBanyamulengeforhisdoctoraldissertationatOxfordUniversity.7HistoriansofRwandaalsorecordemigrationsfromsouthernRwandatowardCongoaroundthistime.CatherineNewbury,TheCohesionofOppression:ClientshipandEthnicityinRwanda,1860–1960(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1988),48–49.8LazareSebiterekoRukundwa,“JusticeandRighteousnessinMattheanTheologyandItsRelevancetotheBanyamulengeCommunity,”PhDthesis,UniversityofPretoria,November2005,317.9Ibid.,292.10Ibid.,129.11QuotedbyCosmaWilungula,LeMaquisKabila,Fizi1967–1986(Paris:L’Harmattan,1997),24(mytranslation).12ManasséRuhimbika,LesBanyamulengeentredeuxguerres(Paris:L’Harmattan,2001),25.13LeslieCrawford,“HutusSeeFranceasTheirSaviour,”FinancialTimes(London),June27,1994.14AnzuluniBembe,thepresidentofthenationalassemblyandhimselfaBembefromSouthKivu,authoredthedecree,implyingthattheBanyamulengewereRwandanimmigrantswhohadfraudulentlyacquiredCongolesecitizenship.15HautConseildelaRépublique,ParlementdeTransition,“ResolutionsurlesréfugiésetpopulationdéplacésdanslesregionsduNordetduSud-Kivu,”signedinKinshasa,April28,1995.16LetterfromtheCommissairedeZoned’Uvira,October26,1995,quotedbyRuhimbika,LesBanyamulenge,32.17AgroupofBanyamulengeleaders,ledbyDuguwaMulenge,theironlyprovincialparliamentarian,wrotetodenouncethisrecruitmentofBanyamulenge.TheestimatesforthenumberofBanyamulengeintheRPFcomefromRuhimbika,LesBanyamulenge(300)andSerukiza(1,000).

CHAPTER5

1Muchofthischapterisbasedontheauthor’sinterviewwithDeogratiasBugera,Johannesburg,April2008.ThomasNtiratimana,Bugera’sformerchiefofstaff,alsoprovidedhelpfulinformation.2Author’sinterviewwithformerAFDLmember,Kinshasa,November2007.3Theexactsizeisamatterofcontention.AccordingtoBrookeGrundfestSchoepfandClaudeSchoepf,“Gender,Land,andHungerinEasternZaire,”inAfricanFoodSystemsinCrisis,vol.2,ContendingwithChange,ed.RebeccaHuss-AshmoreandSolomonH.Katz,FoodandNutritioninHistoryandAnthropology,vol.7(NewYork:GordonandBreach,1990),KingLeopoldceded12millionhectares,or46,000squaremiles,totheNationalCommitteefortheKivus,astateagency,butthatwassoonreducedto300,000hectares,whichisatenthofthesizeofBelgium.4SéverinMugangu,“Lespolitiqueslegislativescongolaiseetrwandaiserelativesauxrefugiésetémigrésrwandais,”inExilé,réfugiésetdeplacésenAfriqueCentraleetorientale,ed.AndréGuichaoua(Paris:Karthala,2004),639.5PaulMathieuandMafikiriTsongo,“Enjeuxfonciers,déplacementsdepopulationetescaladesconflictuelles(1930–1995),”inConflitsetguerresauKivuetdanslarégiondesgrandslacs:Entretensionslocalesetescaladerégionale,ed.P.MathieuandJean-ClaudeWillame,CahiersAfricains39(Paris:L’Harmattan,1999),20–25.6Jean-PierrePabanel,“LaquestiondelanationalitéauKivu,”PolitiqueAfricaine(1993):41,43.7Therewasnoefforttoimplementthelawuntil1989,whenthegovernmentbegantoidentifyvoters.Thisprocessprovokedviolence—BanyarwandainMasisiburneddownregistrationbooths.8TheUNSpecialRapporteuronHumanRightsinZaireputthefigureat3,000,whileAmnestyInternationalsuggesteditcouldbeashighas7,000,citinghumanitarianofficialsRobertoGarretón,UNSpecialRapporteur,ReportontheSituationofHumanRightsinZaire,December23,1994,paragraph90;AmnestyInternational,Zaire:ViolenceAgainstDemocracy,September16,1993.9BugerawasintouchwithtwoleadingRwandanofficerswhowerecoordinatingtheseoperations,MajorJackNzizaandColonelKayumbaNyamwasa,bothofwhomwouldplaymajorrolesinthesubsequentRwandaninvasionoftheCongo.10JoelBoutroue,MissedOpportunities:TheRoleoftheInternationalCommunityintheReturnoftheRwandanRefugeesfromEasternZaire,July1994–December1996,RosemarieRogersWorkingPaper1,Inter-UniversityCommitteeonInternationalMigration,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,June1998.11Thiswaslaterconfirmedbydocumentstheyrecoveredaftertheyhadcapturedtherefugeecamps.12AnonymoustractwrittenbytheCollectiveofCongolesePatriots(COPACO),datedFebruary10,2000.

CHAPTER6

1ErikKenneswithJeanOmasombo,EssaibiographiquesurLaurentDésiréKabila(Paris:L’Harmattan,2003),29.2Ibid.,29.3QuotedbyPieroGleijeses,ConflictingMissions:Havana,Washington,andAfrica,1959–1976,EnvisioningCuba(ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress,2002),72.4Kennes,Essaibiographique,72.5Ernesto“Che”Guevara,TheAfricanDream:TheDiariesoftheRevolutionaryWarintheCongo,trans.PatrickCamiller(NewYork:Grove,2000),6.6Ibid.,86.7Ibid.,244.8WilliamGalvez,LerêveAfricaindeChe(Antwerp:EPO,1998),302,quotedbyKennes,Essaibiographique,174.9WilungulaCosma,LeMaquisKabila,Fizi1967–1986(Paris:L’Harmattan,1997),112;Kennes,Essaibiographique,264.10Kennes,Essaibiographique,302.11Jean-BaptisteSondji,ahospitaldirectorinKinshasawhowentontobecomehealthministerunderLaurentKabila,metwithKahindaOtafire,oneofPresidentMuseveni’spointmenontheCongo,inBrusselsasearlyas1993todiscussregimechangeinhiscountry.HespoketoTshisekediaboutUganda’sproposal,buttheoppositionleaderdidn’twanttohaveanythingtodowithanarmedinsurrection.PatrickKaregeyaconfirmedthis.Author’sinterviewwithJean-BaptisteSondji,Kinshasa,February2008.12LemeraisatowninSouthKivuwherethefirstAFDLtrainingcampwouldbelocated.Coincidentally,theneighborhoodinKigaliwheresomeoftheCongoleserebelswerestayingwasalsocalledLemera.

CHAPTER7

1ThisdescriptioncomesfromThomasNtiratimana,chiefofstaffofDeoBugeraandlatervicegovernorofSouthKivu,whomIinterviewedinKinshasa,July2006,aswellasGeneralMalikKijege,aleadingMunyamulengecommander,whomIinterviewedinKinshasa,November2007.2“West‘Fooled’byBanyamulenge,”VoixduZaire,Bukavu,October25,1996.3Author’sinterviewwithBembecivilsocietyactivist,Baraka,March2008.4ManasséRuhimbika,LesBanyamulengeentredeuxguerres(Paris:L’Harmattan,2001),47.5Ibid.,49.6Alex’snamehasbeenchangedtoprotecthisidentity.7SeealsoReportoftheMappingExerciseDocumentingtheMostSeriousViolationsofHumanRightsandInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedWithintheTerritoryoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoBetweenMarch1993andJune2003,UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights,October2010,74.ThedeathtollgivenbyUNinvestigatorswas152forthisincident.8Severaldayslater,aGermanjournalistventuredintothesqualidcampontheRwandansideoftheborder,towheretheTutsisurvivorshadfled.AmidtheblueUNHCRtents,awizenedmanapproachedhimwithablackbook.MusafiriMushambaro,thepresidentoftheUviracommunitythere,pagedthroughthebook,countingthedead:“Sange20,Muturure9,inBurugera3,Lweba89,Kamanyola37.”Hehad217namesinhisbook,allmen.Theywereseparatedfromtheirfamilies,driventogether,andshot,hesaid.9AccordingtoaUNreportpublishedin2010,101peoplediedthatdayinAbala.ReportoftheMappingExercise,135.

CHAPTER8

1TheinformationonProsperNabyolwa’sexperiencesstemsfromaseriesofinterviewsbytheauthorwithGeneralNabyolwainKinshasainJuly2005,December2007,andJuly2008.2“DeclarationofthePopulationofSouthKivuFollowingthe‘MarchofAnger,ProtestandDenunciationAgainsttheAggressionbyTutsiRwandansofWhichZaireandItsPeopleHaveBecomeVictims,’”Bukavu,September18,1996,quotedbyOlivierLanotte,Guerressansfrontiers:DeJoseph-DésiréMobutuaJosephKabila(Brussels:GRIP,2003),42.3DemainleCongo,no.244(1997):7,quotedbyIsidoreNdaywel,HistoireGénéraleduCongo:Del’héritageancienàlaRépubliquedémocratique(Paris:Duculot,1998).4Author’sinterviewswithhospitalstaff,Lemera,March2008;AmnestyInternational,Zaire:ViolentPersecutionbyStateandArmedGroups,November29,1996,5.5“AHoleintheMiddleofAfrica,”Economist,July8,1995.6LibraryofCongress,CountryStudy:Zaire,1994,312.7CrawfordYoungandThomasTurner,TheRiseandDeclineoftheZairianState(Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress,1985),275.8HonoréNgbandaNzambo,Ainsisonneleglas:LesderniersjoursduMaréchalMobutu(Paris:EditionsGideppe,1998),46(mytranslation).9WilliamReno,“SovereigntyandPersonalRuleinZaire,”AfricanStudiesQuarterly1,no.3(1997),www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v1/3/4.htm.10Author’sinterviewwithGeneralProsperNabyolwainKinshasa,December2007.11YoungandTurner,RiseandDecline,259.12MichaelG.Schatzberg,TheDialecticsofOppressioninZaire(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988),59.13LibraryofCongress,Zaire,303.14Author’sinterviewwithJoséEndundo,ownerofalargeaviationcompany,Kinshasa,December2007.15Nzambo,Ainsisonneleglas,88.16Author’sinterviewwithDeoBugera,Johannesburg,March2008.17Author’sinterviewwithPatrickKaregeya,DaresSalaam,January2008.18“PlusjamaisleCongo,”Observatoiredel’Afriquecentrale6,no.10,March4,2003,www.obsac.com.19CherifOuazani,“JamesKabarebeetlamémoiredelaguerredelibérationdel’AFDL,”JeuneAfriqueIntelligent,April29,2002(mytranslation).20WhenJosephKabilacametopowerin2001,someofhisclosestmilitaryadvisorswereformerKatanganTigers.21Author’sinterviewwithformerFARcommander,Kinshasa,July2009.22StephenSmith,“L’ArmadademercenairesauZaïre:CommandésparunBelge,280‘affreux’mènentlacontre-offensive,”Libération,January24,1997;PhilippeChapleauandFrancoisMisser,MercenairesS.A.(Paris:DescléedeBrouwer,1998),Chapter6.23GérardPrunier,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),129.24QuotedinthefilmAfriqueenmorceaux(1999),directedbyJihanElTahran.

25GordanaIgri,“Alleged‘Assassins’WereNoStrangerstoFrance,”inBalkanCrisisReport,InstituteforWarandPeaceReporting,November26,1999.26JamesAstill’sinterviewwithGeneralJamesKabarebe,Kigali,May2004.27Author’sinterviewwithColonelFelyBikaba,Kinshasa,July2006.28Prunier,Africa’sWorldWar,142.29“CanadianDealWorthMillionstoZaire’sRebels:$50MillionInvestmentLikelytoFindItsWayintoKabila’sWarChest,”AssociatedPress,May10,1997.30MarkSherman,“McKinneyReassuredAboutZairianRefugees,Elections,”AtlantaConstitution,May14,1997.

CHAPTER9

1RobertGribbin,IntheAftermathofGenocide,U.S.CongressHearingbeforetheSubcommitteeonInternationalOperationsandHumanRights,December4,1996,198.2NoonereallyknewexactlyhowmanyrefugeesremainedinZaire.Atonepoint,theUNrefugeeagencysuggestedthenumbercouldbeashighas600,000,theUNDepartmentofHumanitarianAffairssaid439,500,whiletheU.S.generalEdwinSmithputthefigureat202,000andtheCanadiangeneralMauriceBarilat165,000.FilipReyntjens,TheGreatAfricanWar:CongoandRegionalGeopolitics,1996–2006(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),85–86.3QuotedbyJohanPottier,Re-imaginingRwanda:Conflict,SurvivalandDisinformationintheLateTwentiethCentury(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),175.4Ibid.,175.5BeatriceUmutesi,FuiroumourirauZaire(Paris:L’Harmattan,2000),131.6Ibid.,147.7ForcedFlight:ABrutalStrategyofEliminationinEasternZaire,MédecinsSansFrontières(DoctorsWithoutBorders),May1997,www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=report&objectid=A63A4532-BEA0-4BB1-A7AE1EEB4BD27AC7&method=full_html.8AccordingtoDoctorsWithoutBorders,mortalityrateswereashighas21deathsper10,000peopleinsomecamps.Bycomparison,themortalityrateinahealthypopulationisaround0.6per10,000,arateof2per10,000constitutesanemergency,and4per10,000isanout-of-controlemergency.9ForcedFlight.10Ibid.11SeeKisanganiEmizet,“TheMassacreofRefugeesinCongo:ACaseofUNPeacekeepingFailureandInternationalLaw,”JournalofModernAfricanStudies33,no.2(2000):173–179;GérardPrunier,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),148.Bothoftheseauthors,however,use1.1millionrefugeesasastartingpoint,afigureofunknownaccuracy,giventhelackofacensusinthecamps.12AlanL.HeilJr.,VoiceofAmerica:AHistory(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2003),264.13ReportoftheMappingExerciseDocumentingtheMostSeriousViolationsofHumanRightsandInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedWithintheTerritoryoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoBetweenMarch1993andJune2003,UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforHumanRights,October2010,278.14Ibid.,77–116,273–277.15ColinNickerson,“RefugeeMassacreUnfoldsinCongo:WitnessesTellofSlaughterofHundredsbyKabila’sSoldiers,”BostonGlobe,June1,1997,A1.ThefigureofninehundredbodiesburiedcomesfromAndrewMaykuth,“TutsisSlaughterHutuRefugees,”Knight-RidderNewspapers,June8,1997.UNinvestigators,whowerebarredfromvisitingMbandaka,suggestedthatbetween200and2,000peoplemayhavebeenkilledthere.16Nickerson,“RefugeeMassacreUnfoldsinCongo.”17Author’sinterviewwithBeatriceUmutesi,Brussels,August2009.18ThomasP.Odom,“GuerrillasfromtheMist:ADefenseAttachéWatchestheRwandanPatrioticFrontTransformfromInsurgenttoCounter-Insurgent,”SmallWarsJournal,n.d.,

smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v5/odom.htm#_ftn11,accessedMarch20,2009.19HowardFrench,“Kagame’sHiddenWarintheCongo,”NewYorkReviewofBooks,September24,2009.

CHAPTER10

1MuchofthematerialforthischapterstemsfromseveralinterviewswithKizito(whosenamehasbeenchangedtoprotecthisidentity)inBukavuinearly2008.IalsointerviewedsixotherformerAFDLsoldiers,allofwhomhadsimilarexperiences.2Allcommanderswerecalledafande,awordderivedfromtheSwahiliandTurkisheffendi,anhonorableperson.3WatchlistonChildreninArmedConflict,CountryReport:DRCongo,www.watchlist.org/reports/files/dr_congo.report.20060426.php?p=15,accessedJuly29,2010.4Author’sinterviewwithColonelFelyBikaba,Kinshasa,November2007.5Author’sinterviewwithGeneralSiatiloNgizo,Kinshasa,July2009.6Author’sinterviewwith“Trésor,”Kinshasa,July2009.

CHAPTER11

1MichelaWrong,IntheFootstepsofMr.Kurtz:LivingontheBrinkofDisasterintheCongo(London:FourthEstate,2000),263.2QuotedinthefilmAfriqueenmorceaux(1999),directedbyJihanElTahran.3TheironyherewasthattheBangalaidentitywaslargelythecreationofcolonialauthoritiesoutofaconglomerationoftribes,althoughMobutuwastryingtopresenthimselfasaprecolonialauthority.4MichaelG.Schatzberg,TheDialecticsofOppressioninZaire(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988),72.5Foranexampleofthis,seethefilmMobutu,RoiduZaire(1999),directedbyThierryMichel.6ValentinNagifi,LesderniersjoursdeMobutuaGbadolite(Paris:L’Harmattan,2003),52(mytranslation).7ScottStraus,“AmericansMeddling,ZairiansChargeU.S.UnpopularwithResidentsConvincedItBackedFirstMobutuandNowRebelLeader,”GlobeandMail(Toronto),April12,1997.8Nagifi,LesderniersjoursdeMobutu,77.9HowardFrench,“EndingaChapter,MobutuCrematesRwandanAlly,”NewYorkTimes,May16,1997.10Wrong,IntheFootstepsofMr.Kurtz,272.11FélixVundwaweTePemako,Al’ombreduLéopard:VéritéssurlerégimedeMobutuSeseSeko(Brussels:EditionsZaïreLibre,2000),322(mytranslation).12Wrong,IntheFootstepsofMr.Kurtz,274–277.13TshilomboMunyegayi,“LachutedeMobutuetlamortMaheleracontéesparlegénéralLikulia,”LePotentiel,July10,2005(mytranslation).14TshilomboMunyengayi,“LachutedeMobutuetlamortMaheleracontéesparlegénéralLikulia,”LePotentiel,June25,2005.15ThisversionofthestorywasrelatedtoGeneralSiatiloNgizoandGeneralProsperNabyolwabythesurvivorsoftheincident,includingGeneralMatthieuAgolowa.

CHAPTER12

1EricTollens,“FoodSecurityinKinshasa:CopingwithAdversity,”inReinventingOrderinCongo:HowPeopleRespondtoStateFailureinKinshasa,ed.TheodoreTrefon(London:ZedBooks;Kampala,Uganda:Fountain,2004),48.2Author’sinterviewwithNestorDiambwama,Kinshasa,November2007.3InformationaboutKabila’slifestylecamefromtheauthor’sseparateinterviewswithDidierMumengi,MwenzeKongolo,JeanMbuyu,andMoiseNyarugaboinKinshasa,October2007,andfromaninterviewwithDeogratiasBugerainJohannesburg,April2008.4Author’sinterviewwithBabiMbayi,formerministerofplanninganddevelopment,Kinshasa,November2007.5Ibid.6“Mandela,MuseveniMeetOverRegionalIssues,”XinhuaNewsAgency,May27,1997.7TomCohen,“KabilaSworninasPresident,PromisesElectionsWithinTwoYears,”AssociatedPress,May29,1997.8GauthiersdeVillersandJean-ClaudeWillame,RepubliquedemocratiqueduCongo:Chroniquepolitiqued’unentre-deux-guerres,octobre1996–juillet1998,CahiersAfricains35(Paris:L’Harmattan,1998),76.9Ibid.,107;UncertainCourse:TransitionandHumanRightsViolationsintheCongo,HumanRightsWatch,vol.9,no.9(December1997);HowardFrench,“Congo’sOppositionPaysPriceofDefyingKabila,”NewYorkTimes,December3,1997.10OlivierLanotte,GuerresansfrontiersenRDC(Brussels:Complexe,2003),74.11HumanRightsWatch,UncertainCourse:TransitionandHumanRightsViolationsintheCongo(NewYork:HumanRightsWatch,1997),41.12Duringtherebellion,theAFDLhadanofficeinchargeofnongovernmentalorganizations.13InternationalCrisisGroup,HowKabilaLostHisWay,DRCReport#3,May21,1999,15.14InterviewwithDidierMumengi,theformerministerofinformation,Kinshasa,November2007.15LauraMyers,“BeDemocratic,AlbrightTellsCongo’sKabila,”AssociatedPress,December13,1997.16Author’sinterviewwithHowardWolpe,Bukavu,February2008.17HowardFrench,“InCongo,ManyChafeUnderRuleofKabila,”NewYorkTimes,July17,1997.18Author’sinterviewwithMinistryofMinesofficial,Kinshasa,July2009.19Author’sinterviewwithbusinessofficial,Kinshasa,July2009.20DeVillersandWillame,RepubliquedemocratiqueduCongo,121.21Author’sinterviewwithDidierMumengi,Kinshasa,November2007.22Author’sinterviewwithBabiMbayi,Kinshasa,November2007.23Author’sinterviewwithDidierMumengi,Kinshasa,November2007.24RobertReid,“SecurityCouncilStrugglestoGetActTogetheroverCongo,”AssociatedPress,May29,1997.25GérardPrunier,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),157.26KisanganiEmizet,“TheMassacreofRefugeesinCongo:ACaseofUNPeacekeepingFailureand

InternationalLaw,”JournalofModernAfricanStudies38,no.2(2000):170.27Author’sinterviewwithTonyGambino,Washington,DC,July2007.28Prunier,Africa’sWorldWar,166.29Author’sinterviewwithMabiMulumba,Kinshasa,January2008.30Author’sinterviewwithMulumba,Kinshasa,November2007.31Author’sinterviewswithMoiseNyarugabo,Kinshasa,November2007,andDeoBugera,Johannesburg,March2008.Onecandisputetheirreliability,astheylaterfelloutwithKabilaandwentintoarmedopposition.32Author’sinterviewwithNyarugabo,Kinshasa,October2007.

CHAPTER13

1CharlesOnyango-Obbo,“InterviewwithKagame:HabyarimanaKnewofPlanstoKillKim,”Monitor(Kampala),December19,1997.2FinalReportoftheInternationalCommissionofInquiry(Rwanda),S/1998/1096,November18,1998,5.Otherreports,includingbythehumanrightsgroupAfricanRights,putthefiguremuchhigher,ataround30,000–40,000.3Author’sinterviewwithPaulRwarakabije,Kigali,March2008.4AfricanRights,Rwanda:TheInsurgencyintheNorthwest(London:AfricanRights,1999),45.5HumanrightsgroupsdifferonwhetherthekillingsbytheRPAwerepartofasystematicstrategyorduetoindividuals’indisciplineandabuse.AmnestyInternationalarguedfortheformerinthereportsEndingtheSilence(1997)andCiviliansTrappedinArmedConflict(1997),whileAfricanRightsdoesnotfindevidenceforapolicyofkillingciviliansinits1999reportRwanda.6Author’sinterviewwithanonymoussource,Kinshasa,October2007.7Author’sinterviewwithMalikKijege,Kinshasa,October2007.8Ibid.9ThissectionisbasedonfourseparateinterviewsbytheauthorwithDidierMumengi,Kinshasa,October2007,January2008,andJune2009.10ComerPlummer,“TheKitonaOperation:Rwanda’sAfricanOdyssey,”May6,2007,www.MilitaryHistoryOnline.com/20thcentury/articles/kitona.aspx,accessedMarch17,2010.11Author’sinterviewwithanonymoussource,Kinshasa,November2007.12HowardFrench,“Pilot’sAccountSeemstoConfirmRwandaRoleinCongoStrife,”NewYorkTimes,August10,1998.13Author’stelephoneinterviewwithRwandanintelligenceofficial,January2008.14Author’sinterviewwithDidierMumengi,Kinshasa,October2007.15Author’sinterviewwithToddPitman,AssociatedPresscorrespondentwhovisitedKitonashortlyaftertheseevents,Bukavu,July2006.16GérardPrunier,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),189;author’sinterviewwithDonaldSteinberg,formerU.S.ambassadortoAngola,NewYork,July2007;author’sinterviewwithU.S.StateDepartmentofficials,Washington,DC,July2007.17InterviewwithSteinberg.18Author’sinterviewwithAngolanofficer,Kinshasa,July2009.19IanStewart,“AngolansSeizeCongoRebelStronghold,”AssociatedPress,August24,1998.ThesamefigurewasadvancedbyGérardPrunierinAfrica’sWorldWar,421n59,citinganarticleintheSouthAfricanmagazineBusinessDay.20Prunier,Africa’sWorldWar,192.21Ibid.,189.22MaryBraidandRossHerbert,“CongoCivilWarDrawsinRivalNeighbours,”Independent(London),August23,1998.23GauthiersdeVillerswithJeanOmasomboandErikKennes,RepubliquedemocratiqueduCongo:Guerreetpolitique:LestrentederniersmoisdeL.D.Kabila,août1998–janvier2001(Paris:

L’Harmattan,2001),28(mytranslation).24ThedecisionwasmadebytheInter-StateDefenseandSecurityCommission,anSADCorganthatMugabewaspresidingover.Onlyfourofthefourteenmembershadsenttheirdefenseministers,whileothercountrieshadsentlower-leveldelegates.AccordingtoSADCstatutes,thedecisiontosendaregionalmilitaryforcewouldhaverequiredanSADCpresidentialsummit.25PatrickLawrence,“MugabeandMandelaDividedbyPersonalitiesandPolicies,”IrishTimes,August21,1998,quotedbyKatharinaP.Coleman,InternationalOrganisationsandPeaceEnforcement:ThePoliticsofInternationalLegitimacy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),153.26TheCongolesegovernmenttriedtoconvincetheAngolansthatRwandawasbackingtheUNITArebels,butitisnotclearthatthiswasthecaseatthetimeoftheKitonaoffensive.However,whentheRwandan-ledtroopswithdrewunderAngolanfire,theyfoundrefugeinUNITA-controllednorthernAngola,whichfueledspeculationaboutearliercontacts.Thereisoverwhelmingevidence,documentedinUNreportsandelsewhere,thatUNITAbegantradingdiamondsthroughKigaliby1999atthelatest.27NorimitsuOnishi,“CongoRecapturesaStrategicBase,”NewYorkTimes,August23,1998.28NorimitsuOnishi,“ThreatEased,CongoLeaderArrivesBackinHisCapital,”NewYorkTimes,August25,1998.29“RaceChargeAgainstCongoMinister,”BBCWorldService,July5,2000.30Author’sinterviewswithCongoleseinMasinaneighborhood,October2007.31RossHerbert,“RebelSuspectsDieatHandsofMobinCongo,”Independent(London),August30,1998.TheRwandanandUgandansoldiersfledtonorthernAngola.InordertogetbacktoRwanda,theyhadtocapturealocalairstripfromtheAngolanarmywiththehelpofUNITArebels.Astheairstripwassmall,ittookthemamonthandthirtyairplanerotationstoevacuatethelastoftheirsoldiers,duringwhichtimetheywereunderconstantattackbythewell-armedAngolanarmy.SeeCharlesOnyango-Obbo,“DaringRPARaidinCongo,Angola;AndaHeroicUPDFUnit,”SundayMonitor(Kampala),April16,2000.32ThissectionisbasedoninterviewswithMartinSindabizeraandColonelMartinNkurikiye(retired),theformerBurundianambassadortotheCongoandtheformerheadoftheBurundianintelligenceservices,respectively,Bujumbura,March2008.

CHAPTER14

1MuchofthischapterisbasedoninterviewswithWambadiaWambainNovember2007andJuly2009.InformationontheRCDwasalsoprovidedbyDellySessanga,ThomasLuhaka,MbusaNyamwisi,MoiseNyarugabo,BenjaminSerukiza,andJoséEndundo.2RandyKennedy,“HisFatherIsaRebelLeader...,”NewYorkTimesMagazine,August29,1999.3DidierKazadiNyembwe,thefutureheadofKabila’sintelligenceservices,wasmarriedtoRashidKawawa’sdaughter.4Author’sinterviewwithErnestWambadiaWamba,Kinshasa,November2007.5Author’sinterviewwithformerTanzanianintelligenceofficial,DaresSalaam,January2008.6Author’sinterviewwithPatrickKaregeya,DaresSalaam,January2008.7MichaelColinVazquez,“TheGuerrillaProfessor:AConversationwithErnestWambadiaWamba,”Transition10,no.1(2000):146.8ErnestWambadiaWamba,“OntheStateofAfricanPhilosophyandDevelopment,”JournalofAfricanPhilosophy2(2003),www.africanphilosophy.com/issue2/diawamba.html.9Author’sinterviewwithMoiseNyarugabo,formervicepresidentoftheRCD,Kinshasa,November2007.10ThecommanderwasGeneralJamesKazini.Author’sinterviewwithformerRCDleader,Kinshasa,October2007.11Author’sinterviewwithThomasLuhaka,November2007.ThestoryisaversionofaparabletoldaboutEthiopianemperorHaileSelassie.12Author’sinterviewwithLuhaka.13WrittencopyofErnestWambadiaWamba’sNewYear’sspeech,December31,1998.14Author’sinterviewwithMoiseNyarugabo,Kinshasa,October2007.15Author’sinterviewwithSulimanBaldo,NewYork,December2007.16ThiswasthecaseofDesiréLumbuLumbu,whowasaccusedofconspiringalternatelywiththeMai-MaiandwiththeoriginalRCDandbeatentodeathinButemboinDecember1999.17GauthiersdeVillerswithJeanOmasomboandErikKennes,RepubliquedemocratiqueduCongo:Guerreetpolitique:LestrentederniersmoisdeL.D.Kabila,août1998–janvier2001(Paris:L’Harmattan,2001),79(mytranslation).

CHAPTER15

1Author’sinterviewwithArnaudZajtmann,formerBBCcorrespondent,Kinshasa,May2009.2Jean-PierreBemba,Lechoixdelaliberté(Gbadolite,D.R.Congo:EditionsVenus,2002),241.3Author’sinterviewwithThomasLuhaka,Kinshasa,May2009.4ChristopherClapham,ed.,AfricanGuerrillas(Oxford:JamesCurrey;Kampala:Fountain;Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1998),5.5BembahimselfinsiststhathewasshippingfishthroughUgandatoEuropeonhisairline,butmanyothersmaintainthatitwasweaponsontheflights,andthattheyweregoingfromKampalatotheAngolanwarlordJonasSavimbiinexchangefordiamonds.6Bemba,Lechoixdelaliberté,10.7Author’sinterviewwithColonelShabanBantariza,Kampala,December2007.8Bemba,Lechoixdelaliberté,35–36.9Author’sinterviewwithafriendofBemba’s,whowishedtoremainanonymous,Kinshasa,June2008.10Author’sinterviewwithaformerMLCcommanderwhowishedtoremainanonymous,Kinshasa,November2007.11Author’sinterviewwithJoséEndundo,Kinshasa,November2007.12ThiswasthecaseforanattackonBasankusuin1999,whichtheUgandansdidnotwanttocarryout.13Author’sinterviewwithFrançoisMwamba,Kinshasa,November2007.14Author’sinterviewswithThomasLuhakaandFrançoisMwamba,Kinshasa,November2007.15TatianaCaryannis,ElectionsintheCongo:TheBembaSurprise,UnitedStatesInstituteofPeaceSpecialReport,February2008,7.16ThesecondexceptionwasKatanga,thehomeprovinceofJosephKabila,whichvotedoverwhelminglyforhim.17Ituri:“CoveredinBlood”:EthnicallyTargetedViolenceinNortheasternDRCongo,HumanRightsWatchreport,July7,2003,32.18Author’sinterviewwithMLCleader,Kinshasa,November2007.19Ibid.20Ernesto“Che”Guevara,TheAfricanDream:TheDiariesoftheRevolutionaryWarintheCongo,trans.PatrickCamiller(NewYork:Grove,2000),227.

CHAPTER16

1V.S.Naipaul,ABendintheRiver(London:Vintage,1989),27.2UNSecurityCouncil,ReportoftheInter-AgencyMissiontoKisangani,S/2000/1153,December4,2000,paragraph51.3Author’sinterviewwithShabanBantariza,Kampala,February2008.4ThecommanderofthearmywasFredRwigyema,whowasoneofthirtysoldierswhohadbeguntheNRMrebellionwithMuseveni;theheadofmedicalserviceswasPeterBayingana,whiletheheadofmilitarypolicewasSamKaka;thebestmanatKagame’sweddingwasArondaNyakairima,wholaterbecamethecommanderoftheUgandanarmy.5Author’sinterviewwithColonelJamesMujira,actingheadofMilitaryIntelligence,Kampala,February2008.6MahmoodMamdani,WhenVictimsBecomeKillers:Colonialism,Nativism,andtheGenocideinRwanda(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001),174.7OthersourcesconfirmthatKisasewaskilledbyRwandans,perhapsonKabila’sprodding.AformermemberofhisbodyguardtoldmethatRwandansecurityagentshadtippedhimoffregardingtheambush,sparinghislife.GérardPrunieralsohasanaccountinhisbookbasedontwoseparateinsideraccounts,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),403n112.8CharlesOnyango-Obbo,“KabilaShoutsDownMuseveni,”Monitor(Kampala),June2,1999.TheUgandanswereinspiredbytheirownexperience.Museveni’srebellionhadoriginallycometopowerin1980,backedbytheTanzanianarmy,whichwasintentonoverthrowingIdiAmin’sdictatorship.WhentheTanzanianswithdrew,theUgandanalliancethathadbeenputinplacehadnointernalcohesion,andtheybrokeintofactions,forcingMusevenitoreturntothebush.Duringhissecondattempt,Musevenihadlittleexternalsupportandoversixyearsofguerrillawarfarewasforcedtodevelopgrassrootssupportandstronginternalorganization.ItwasthissecondexperiencethatconvincedMuseveni,atleastonatheoreticallevel,thattoomuchexternalinfluencewouldcausetherebelliontofail.9Author’sinterviewwithpresidentialadvisor,Kigali,February2008.10Author’sinterviewwithWambadiaWamba,Kinshasa,November2007.11Author’sinterviewwithUgandanjournalist,Kampala,February2008.12Ibid.13Ibid.14LeviOchieng,“MachtpokeramgrossenFluss,”DieTageszeitung,June22,1999(mytranslation).15ReportoftheUnitedNationsPanelofExpertsontheIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesandOtherFormsofWealthoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,S/2001/357,UnitedNations,April12,2001,21.16LaraSantoro,“BehindtheCongoWar:Diamonds,”ChristianScienceMonitor,August16,1998.17Prunier,Africa’sWorldWar,215.18Author’sinterviewwithKisanganiresident,June2004.19Author’sinterviewwithMLCleaderwhowasinKisanganiatthetime,Kinshasa,June2009.20The“bunchofrebels”isareferencetotheLord’sResistanceArmy,whohaddisplacedalmostamillionpeopleinnorthernUganda.

21Author’sinterviewwithLeviOchieng,UgandanjournalistinKisanganiatthetime,Nairobi,June2007.22Author’sinterviewwithThomasLuhaka,Kinshasa,November2007.23Thissectionisbasedontheauthor’sinterviewwithPastorPhilippe,Kisangani,June2004.24Prunier,Africa’sWorldWar,240.Thestudents,whohadbeenborninUganda,wereprotestingagainsthavingtotakeexamsinFrench,alanguagetheydidnotspeak.25DavidKibirige,“UPDFCommandersHooligans,”Monitor(Kampala),June11,2000.

CHAPTER17

1RichardBrennenetal.,“MortalityintheCongo:ANationwideSurvey,”Lancet367,no.9504(January2006):44–51.2Roberts’smethodologyhasbeenquestionedbyotherresearchers,althoughmostconcurwithhisbroadconclusions.Theinitialtwostudiescarriedoutonlysurveyedasmall,randomsampleofhealthzones,raisingquestionsabouthowrepresentativethestudywas.Also,thebaselineofmortalityfrom1998,withwhichtheywerecomparingtheirresults,hadnotbeenfirmlyestablished.3ForRwanda,thisincludedtheCongoleseRallyforDemocracy(RCD),theUnionofCongolesePatriots(UPC),theMudundu40,aswellasseveralsemi-independentlocalmilitiasaffiliatedwiththeRCD,suchasGovernorEugeneSerufuli’sLocalDefenseForceinNorthKivuandGovernorXavierChiribanya’smilitiainSouthKivu.ForUganda,thisincludedthePatrioticResistanceForcesofIturi(FRPI),theNationalandIntegrationistFront(FNI),theCongoleseRevolutionaryMovement(MRC),theMovementfortheLiberationoftheCongo(MLC),andtheCongoleseRallyforDemocracy-National(RCD-N).TheCongolesegovernmentwasalliedtohalfadozenMai-Maigroups,rangingfrom8,000strongtojustseveralhundred,spreadthroughouttheKivus.4Thissectionisbasedontheauthor’sinterviewswithresidents,Kasika,March2008.TheeventshavebeencorroboratedbyinterviewsconductedbytheUnitedNationsMappingTeamin2008and2009inKasika,ReportoftheMappingExerciseDocumentingtheMostSeriousViolationsofHumanRightsandInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedwithintheTerritoryoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongobetweenMarch1993andJune2003,176.NumerousCongoleseNGOsalsodocumentedthemassacre;theirreportsincludeMassacresdeKasikaausud-Kivu,CADDHOM,1998;Reportof20November1998,COJESKI,1998;ReportofJanuary1999,COJESKI,1999;andJeanMigaboKalere,GénocideauCongo?Analysedesmassacresdespopulationsciviles,BroederlijkDelen,2002.SeealsoAmbroiseBulambo,MourirauKivu:Dugénocidetutsiauxmassacresdansl’estduCongoRCD(Paris:L’Harmattan,2001).5Interviewswithresidents,Kasika.6Hisnamehasbeenchangedtoprotecthisidentity.7Author’sinterviewwithPatrice,Kasika,March2008.8Hisnamehasbeenchangedtoprotecthisidentity.9Author’sinterview,Bukavu,March2008.10ReportoftheMappingExercise,176.11Thissectionisbasedontheauthor’sinterviewsinKilungutwe,March2008.12GeorgeLerner,“Activist:RapeofWomen,GirlsaWeaponofWarinCongo,”CNN,October30,2009,edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/10/24/amanpour.congo.rape.documentary/index.html;DemographicandHealthSurvey,2007,MinistryofDevelopmentandMinistryofHealth,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,August2008;KirstenJohnsonetal.,“AssociationofSexualViolenceandHumanRightsViolationswithPhysicalandMentalHealthinTerritoriesoftheEasternDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,”JournaloftheAmericanMedicalAssociation304,no.5(August2010):553–562.13Author’sinterviewwithBenjaminSerukiza,Kinshasa,November2007.14“InterviewwithJuliusNyerere,”PBSNewshour,December27,1996.15TatianaCarayannisandHerbertWeiss,“ReconstructingtheCongo,”JournalofInternationalAffairs

58,no.1(2004):134.

CHAPTER18

1Thisdescriptionofeventsisaccordingtotheauthor’sinterviewswithJeanMbuyu,thenationalsecurityadvisor;EdyKapend,Kabila’smilitaryadvisor;andMwenzeKongolo,ministerofinterior,Kinshasa,June2009.2Author’sinterviewwithaformeraidetoKabila,whowishedtoremainanonymous,Kinshasa,November2007.3Therollcallgaveagoodideaofwhohadpoweraroundthepresidentatthetime:GaetanKakudji,theinteriorministerwhohadbeenKabila’srepresentativeinEuropeduringthe1980s;theoilministerVictorMpoyo,thepresident’séminencegriseforfinancialdealswithmultinationals;YerodiaNdombasi,theeccentriceducationministerwhohadknownMzeesincehisearlyrebeldays;andEdyKapend,theyoungmilitaryadvisorwithcloselinkstoAngola.4Author’sinterviewwithDidierMumengi,Kinshasa,November2007.5HerbertWeiss,WarandPeaceintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,CurrentAfricanIssuesno.22(Uppsala,Sweden:NordiskaAfrikaninstitutet,2000),15.6GauthiersdeVillersandJean-ClaudeWillame,RepubliquedemocratiqueduCongo:Chroniquepolitiqued’unentre-deux-guerres,octobre1996–juillet1998,CahiersAfricains35(Paris:L’Harmattan,1998),233.7InterviewwithMumengi.8InternationalMonetaryFund,CountryReportNo01/123,July2001,29.9AddendumtotheUnitedNationsReportofthePanelofExpertsontheIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesandOtherFormsofWealthofDRCongo,S/2001/1072,UnitedNations,November10,2001,paragraphs67–68.10Author’sinterviewwithJeanMbuyu,Kinshasa,June2009.11Author’sinterviewwithJean-BoscoNdayikengurukiye,Bujumbura,May2009.12InternationalCrisisGroup,ScramblefortheCongo:AnatomyofanUglyWar,AfricaReportno.26,December20,2000,52.13Author’sinterviewwithColonelMauriceGateretse,Bujumbura,March2008.14KarlVick,“DesperateBattleDefinesCongo’sWarlikePeace,”WashingtonPost,January2,2001.15InterviewwithNdayikengurukiye.16InterviewwithMbuyu.17Vick,“DesperateBattle.”18InternationalCrisisGroup,ScramblefortheCongo,64.19InterviewwithKabilaaide,Kinshasa,June2009.20InterviewwithtwoseparateKabilaaides,Kinshasa,June2009.21InterviewwithMumengi.22ThisdescriptionofeventsisaccordingtomyinterviewswithJeanMbuyu,thenationalsecurityadvisor,andEdyKapend,Kabila’smilitaryadvisor,Kinshasa,June2009.23StephenSmithandAntoineGlaser,“CesenfantssoldatsquiouttuéKabila,”LeMonde(Paris),February9,2001.24ThistaleisrecitedfrequentlyinKinshasa.SeealsoNorimitsuOnishi,“SlainCongoLeaderBuriedtoPompandConfusion,”NewYorkTimes,January24,2001.

25StateDepartmentReportonHumanRightsPractices,DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,2001;author’sinterviewwithformerkadogo,Kinshasa,October2007.26SmithandGlaser,“Cesenfantssoldats.”27InterviewwithMbuyu.28Author’stelephoneinterviewwithformerRwandansecurityofficial,June2010.29“Kabilachercheàvendresespierres,”LaLettreduContinent,August24,2000;“DroppingKabila,”AfricaConfidential41,no.20,October13,2000,quotedinGérardPrunier,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),253nn152,153.30Marie-FranceCros,“L’assassinatdeKabila:Unquasi-témoinparle,”LaLibreBelgique,December24,2001.31NorimitsuOnishi,“SuspectsbytheScoreand,Oh,SuchDigressions!”NewYorkTimes,April21,2001.

CHAPTER19

1Author’sinterviewwithMwenzeKongolo,Kinshasa,July2009.2RichardMorais,“FriendsinHighPlaces,”Forbes,August10,1998.3Author’sinterviewwithGécaminesofficial,Kinshasa,July2009.4AndrewMaykuth,“OutsideMiningFirmsFindZaireanUntappedVein,”PhiladelphiaInquirer,May11,1997.5Ibid.6Ibid.7“HugeFortunesatStakeinZaire,”BusinessTimes(Johannesburg),April20,1997;author’sinterviewwithformerAmericanMineralFieldsexecutive,CapeTown,February2008.8Author’sinterviewwithLundinexecutive,CapeTown,February2008.9Maykuth,“OutsideMiningFirms.”10Thesecompanieswerenotalone.ACanadiancompany,FirstQuantum,wasalsoreportedtohavegivenamultimillion-dollaradvancetotherebelsinreturnforaconcessionbeforetheyarrivedinKinshasa.11JamesG.Stewart,CorporateWarCrimes:ProsecutingthePillageofNaturalResources(NewYork:OpenSocietyJusticeInitiative,2010),33–36.12LudodeWitte,TheAssassinationofLumumba,trans.AnnWrightandRenéeFenby(London:Verso,2001),31.13“DemandsandDerailment,”AfricaEnergy&Mining,May21,1997.14SpecialCommissionChargedwithExaminingtheValidityofEconomicandFinancialConventionsConcludedDuringtheWarsof1996–1997and1998:TheLutundulaReport,NationalAssemblyoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,February26,2006,35.15Author’sinterviewwithMabiMulumba,Kinshasa,December2007.16Author’sinterviewwithformerpresidentialadvisor,Kinshasa,November2007.17Ibid.18LutundulaReport,32–33.19ThecommanderofthearmedforceswasGeneralVitalisZvinavasheandtheministerofdefenseSidneySekeramayi.20Author’sinterviewwithbusinessmaninParis,February2008.21“RautenbachDeniesMurderAllegation,”SouthAfricanPressAgency,December16,1999.22Author’sinterviewwithGécaminesofficial,Kinshasa,July2009.23ReportoftheUnitedNationsPanelontheIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,UnitedNations,October8,2002,11;GérardPrunier,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),218.24Author’soff-the-recordtelephoneinterviewwithaminingexecutive,May2009.25ConfidentialSouthAfricanintelligencereportintheauthor’spossession.26ReportoftheUnitedNationsPanelontheIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,UnitedNations,April12,2001,33.27InternationalMonetaryFund,DemocraticRepublicoftheCongo:SelectedIssuesandStatistical

Appendix,CountryReport1/123,July2001,16.28Author’sinterviewwithJeanMbuyu,Kinshasa,November2007;author’sinterviewwithMwenzeKongolo,Kinshasa,May2009.29ConfidentialindustryintelligencereportonBillyRautenbach,August10,2000.30Ibid.31CliffTaylor,“CongoWealthLuresAfrica’sPower-Players,”Independent(London),October31,1998;MichaelNest,“Ambitions,ProfitsandLoss:ZimbabweanEconomicInvolvementintheDRC,”AfricanAffairs100,no.400(2001):484.32ReportoftheUnitedNationsPanel,8.33MartinMeredith,OurVotes,OurGuns:RobertMugabeandtheTragedyofZimbabwe(NewYork:PublicAffairs,2002),142.34Author’sinterviewwithminingofficials,Kinshasa,May2009.Thereare,unfortunately,almostnolegalsafeguardsintheCongotopreventsuchtransferpricing.35Author’sinterviewwithDonaKampata,Kinshasa,July2009.36Prunier,Africa’sWorldWar,239.37Hisnamehasbeenchangedtoprotecthisidentity.38ThissectionisbasedonseveralinterviewswiththepilotintheEasternCongo,March2008.39TheUNpanelofexpertsthatwasresearchingtheillegalexploitationofnaturalresourcesintheCongoatthetimewasgivensimilarinformationregardinghowlongittooktoflythestockpilestoKigali.40AccordingtoGlobalWitness,akilooftinwasbeingsoldfor$6inGomain1998,whentheworldcoltanpricewashoveringaround$60perkiloofrefinedtantalum.ColtansoldinGomausuallyincludedaround20to40percenttantalum.SeeDidierdeFailly,“Coltan:Pourcomprendre...,”inL’AfriquedesGrandsLacs:Annuaire2000–2001(Paris:L’Harmattan,2001),13,and“Under-MiningPeace,”GlobalWitness(June2005):28.41ReportoftheUnitedNationsPanel,8.42GauthiersdeVillerswithJeanOmasomboandErikKennes,RepubliquedemocratiqueduCongo:Guerreetpolitique:LestrentederniersmoisdeL.D.Kabila,août1998–janvier2001(Paris:L’Harmattan,2001),114–115.43Author’sinterviewwithBenjaminSerukiza,formerRCDvicegovernorofSouthKivuandaprominentmemberoftheBanyamulengecommunity,Kinshasa,October2007.44JeroenCuvulierandTimRaeymaekers,SupportingtheWarEconomyintheDRC:EuropeanCompaniesandtheColtanTrade,InternationalPeaceInformationService(IPIS),January2002,8.45Asalways,reliablestatisticsarehardtocomebyintheregion.AccordingtotheUnitedStatesGeologicalSurvey,columbo-tantaliteexportsfor2000amountedto1,011tonsforRwandaandtheCongocombined,whileaUNexpertspanelestimatedexportstobearound1,200tonsforthesameperiod.Rwandahasseveral,smallercoltanmines,butthebulkoftheirexportscomesfromtheEasternCongo.ThelocalpriceinGomapeakedinthesecondhalfof2000at$75perkiloof20to40percentcoltanand$150forhigher-gradeproduct.Theworldprice,however,peakedataround$600forrefinedtantalum,somiddlemenhadhandsomeprofitmargins.SeeGeorgeCoakley,TheMineralIndustryofCongo-Kinshasa,U.S.GeologicalSurveyCountryReport,2002,10.3,www.usgs.gov.46StephanMarysseandC.Andre,“GuerreetpillageéconomiqueenRépubliqueDemocratiqueduCongo,”inL’AfriquedesGrandsLacs;seealsoBjornWillum,“PurelyBeneficialorContributingtoWar,”PhDdiss.,October21,2001,UniversityofCopenhagen.Willumconductsacomprehensiveanalysisofgold,coltan,anddiamondexportsfromtheEasternCongoandconcludesthattheRwandanarmyanditsbusinessassociatesweremakingaround$250millioninprofitsfrommineraltradeinthe

EasternCongoattheheightofthewar.47ReportoftheUnitedNationsPanel,27.48InternationalInstituteforSecurityStudies,TheMilitaryBalance(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002).49Author’sinterviewwithColonelVincentKitoko,Kinshasa,July2008.50Rwanda:TheSearchforSecurityandHumanRightsAbuses,HumanRightsWatch,vol.12,no.1(A),April2000.51Author’sinterviewwithPatrickKaregeya,DaresSalaam,January2008.52FinalReportoftheUnitedNationsPanelofExpertsontheIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesandOtherFormsofWealthoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,S/2002/1146,UnitedNations,October16,2002,15.53WorldBank:DoingBusiness2009(Washington:WorldBank,2008),43.54FinalReportoftheUnitedNationsPanel;ReportoftheUnitedNationsPanel;CuvulierandRaeymaekers,SupportingtheWarEconomy.55Stewart,CorporateWarCrimes,34–36.

CHAPTER20

1GaetanKakudjiwasalongtimeassociateofKabila,hisrepresentativeinBelgiumduringthe1980s,andhisinteriorministeroncehecametopower;VictorMpoyowasministerofthestateportfolioforseveralyearsandhandledmuchofKabila’sfinancialdealings.2AccordingtoEdyKapend,thefollowingpeopleattendedthismeeting:severalofLaurentKabila’soldcomradesfromhisearlydaysasarebel,namelyGeneralCelestinKifwa,GeneralSylvestreLwetcha,GeneralFrancoisOlenga,VictorMpoyo,GaetanKakudji,andYerodiaNdombasi;andmembersofthenewvanguard,includingMwenzeKongolo,DidierMumengi,NonoLutula,andHenriMova.Otherssaythegroupwassmallerbutdidnotincludeanyothernames.3Author’sinterviewwithanonymouspresidentialaide,Kinshasa,July2009.4Ibid.5DannaHarman,“AShySoninCongo’sHotSeat,”ChristianScienceMonitor,January23,2001.6JeanOmasomboandErikKennes,Biographiesdesacteursdelatransition(Terveuren,Belgium:MuséeRoyaledel’AfriqueCentrale,2006),70.TanzaniansecurityofficialsandnumerousmembersofJosephKabila’sentouragehaveconfirmedthis.7Author’sinterviewsconductedinKinshasain2007–2009;interestingly,thisversionisalsosupportedbyLaurentNkunda,whofoughtalongsideJosephKabila—albeitasajuniorofficer—intheAFDLwar.8ErikKenneswithJeanOmasombo,EssaibiographiquesurLaurentDésiréKabila(Paris:L’Harmattan,2003),300.9ColetteBraeckman,“MamaSifa,lamèredupresidentparle,”LeSoir(Brussels),June6,2006(mytranslation).10Author’sinterviewwithKenyansecurityofficial,Nairobi,June2009;“Portrait:JosephKabila,”LaRevue(July/August2006):37.11“Kabange”denotesthesecondbornoftwinsinLaurentKabila’snativelanguage,Kiluba.12FrancoisSoudan,“Portrait:JosephKabila,”LaRevue(July/August2006):41.13HehadbeennominallyinchargeofsomemilitaryoperationsduringtheAFDLoffensive,butaccordingtosoldiersservingunderhimatthetime,heworkedintheshadowofRwandancommanders.14GérardPrunier,Africa’sWorldWar:Congo,theRwandanGenocide,andtheMakingofaContinentalCatastrophe(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),258.15Ibid.16ChrisMcGreal,“WesternAlliesUrgeRwandatoLeaveCongo,”Guardian(Manchester,U.K.),February9,2001.17“CongoRebelsDenyClearancetoU.N.TroopsTryingtoLand,”AssociatedPress,April16,2001.18Prunier,Africa’sWorldWar,263.19Author’sinterviewwithUNofficial,Nairobi,June2009.20Author’sinterviewwithAmericandiplomat,Kinshasa,July2009.21Author’sinterviewwithforeignjournalist,Kinshasa,July2008.TheambassadorinquestionwasGeorgesSerre.22Author’sinterviewwithUNofficial,Nairobi,June2008.23Author’sinterviewwithPhilipWinter,Kinshasa,June2008.24NetherlandsInstituteforSouthernAfrica(NIZA),TheStatevs.ThePeople,2006,,41.

25Author’sinterviewwithUNofficial,Nairobi,June2008.26SpecialCommissionChargedwithExaminingtheValidityofEconomicandFinancialConventionsConcludedDuringtheWarsof1996–1997and1998:TheLutundulaReport,NationalAssemblyoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,February26,2006,63–64.27FinalReportoftheUnitedNationsPanelofExpertsontheIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesandOtherFormsofWealthoftheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,#S/2002/1146,UnitedNations,October16,2002,7;TobyHeaps,“AGlimpseoftheWorld:JosephKabila,”TeawiththeFT,FinancialTimes(London),April9,2006.28BrooderlinkDelen,“MemorandumtotheAttentionoftheMinistersofForeignAffairsoftheMemberStatesoftheInternationalCommitteeofSupportfortheTransitionintheDRC,”RightsandAccountabilityinDevelopment,11.11.11,February20,2006,8.29“OfficeMemorandumfromCraigAndrews,PrincipleMiningSpecialist,toPedroAlba,CountryDirectorfortheDRC,”September4,2005,intheauthor’sarchive.30Author’sinterviewwithpresidentialadvisor,Kinshasa,November2007;author’sinterviewwithpresidentialpilot,Kinshasa,June2008;GertlerisalsonamedinReportoftheUnitedNationsPanelontheIllegalExploitationofNaturalResourcesintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,UnitedNations,April12,2001.31Author’sinterviewwithCongolesepolitician,Kinshasa,July2009.32Author’sinterviewwithCongolesemininglawyer,Kinshasa,July2009.33Author’sinterviewwithGérardGerold,Kinshasa,January2007.34ForastudyofLaurentNkunda,seeJasonStearns,“TheEmergenceofaNewRebellioninNorthKivu,”inAfriquedesGrandsLacs:Annuaire2007–2008,eds.StefaanMarysseandFilipReyntjens(Paris:L’Harmattan,2008);forRwandansupporttoNkunda,seeFinalReportoftheUnitedNationsGroupofExpertsontheDRCongo,S/2008/773,UnitedNations,December12,2008.35WeWillCrushYou,HumanRightsWatchReport,November2008.36IwasspeakingwithapresidentialintelligenceofficerafteranabortivecoupattemptbyMajorEricLengeinJuly2004.37Author’sinterviewwithofficerinstaffheadquarters,Kinshasa,July2009.38Author’sinterviewwithpresidentialadvisor,Kinshasa,July2009.

CONCLUSION

1PhilipGourevitch,“Forsaken,”NewYorker,September25,2000,65.2TheInternationalRescueCommittee,initsmostrecentmortalitystudyin2007concludedthat5.4millionpeoplehaddiedasaresultoftheconflictintheCongobetween1998and2007,notcountingthosewhohaddiedbetween1996and1998,orthosewhohavediedsince2007intheongoingviolence.“IRCAffirmsCongoMortalityFindings,”January21,2010,www.irc.org.Figuresofrapearenotoriouslydifficulttoestimate,buttheUnitedNationsbelievesthatover200,000womenhavebeenvictimsofsexualviolencesince1998.“Nearly200WomenandChildrenRapedinSystematicAttackinEasternDRC,”MedicalFoundationfortheCareofVictimsofTorture,August27,2010,www.torturecare.org.uk/news/latest_news/3173,accessedSeptember30,2010.3EveEnsler,“TheBeginningofHopeortheEndofIt,”HuffingtonPost,October30,2008,www.huffingtonpost.com/eve-ensler/the-beginning-of-hope-or_b_139423.html.

4JeffreyGettleman,“RapeVictim’sWordsHelpJoltCongointoChange,”NewYorkTimes,October17,2008.5Author’sinterviewwithSueHogwood,Bujumbura,March2008.6Author’sinterviewwithpresidentialadvisor,Kigali,February2008.7In1993,alargeUNmission(UNOSOM)wasdeployedtoSomaliatosecurethedistributionoffoodaidtoastarvingpopulation.Itbecameembroiledinurbanfirefightswithlocalmilitiacommanders,leadingtothehighlypublicizeddeathofU.S.soldiers.8“CodeCable00283fromAmericanEmbassyinKigalitoRwandaCollective,SecretaryofState,WashingtonDC,”January6,1997.

Index

Afande,RobertAFDLbackgroundblockshumanitarianaccesstocampscommitsatrocities,massacreskadogoabused,deployedmobilizesCongoleseTutsirepressioninnewCongoregimewelcomedbyZairiansasanti-MobutuAlbright,MadeleineAlex(Banyamulengeboy)AllianceofDemocraticForcesfortheLiberationofZaire.SeeAFDLAmericanMineralFieldsAminAmnestyInternationalAngloAmericanMiningCorporationAngolaincoalitiontooverthrowMobutuandL.Kabila’sassassinationsendsKatanganTigerstohelpRPFsupportsKabilaagainstRCDadvanceandUNITArebelsdropsL.Kabila(2000)Anti-TutsiideologyattacksinKinshasabredbyAFDL,RCDandcitizenshipbanbyMobutuexacerbatedbyyouthinRPFasFARmilitarytacticasjustificationforviolenceinUgandainZaireSeealsoStereotypingArendt,Hannah

Bagosora,ThéonesteBaldo,Suliman

Bantariza,ShabanBanyamulenge(CongoleseTutsi)attainRCDpositionsbarredfromcitizenshipbyMobutuciviliansmassacredconditionsafterRwandansdepartDRCevacuatedbyUNfromBukavuevictedfromZairepersecutedprotectedbyembassiesassoldierstooverthrowofMobutuBaramoto,PhilemonBaril,MauriceBas-CongoProvinceBBCSwahiliServiceRadioBelgiancolonialera.SeeColonialeraoftheCongounderBelgiumBemba,Jean-PierreaboutasMLCpolitical,military,leaderasprimeminsterofCongoBemba,SaolonaBembe,AnzuluniBembetribeABendintheRiver(Naipaul)BiblicaltheoryofTutsiandHutuBisengimana,BarthélémyBizimungu,PasteurBokassa,BedelBonino,EmmaBoulle,Jean-RaymondBoutrosGhali,BoutrosBrazzaville,RepublicoftheCongorefugeforkadogorefugeforMobutuofficialsrefugeforTutsiciviliansBredenkamp,JohnBugera,DeogratiasbackgroundchosentoleadRwandarebellionasRPFleaderdefectsfromRPFfornewTutsirebellionandL.KabilaBukavu,Zaire

anti-Tutsisentimentscivilians,army,fleeattackingRwandansL.KabilarecruitskadogorefugeecampBululu,LundaBurundiembassyprotectsKinshasaTutsi–HuturefugeesinRwandaandmasskillingofHutumercenariesworkforL.KabilawithTutsirefugees(1962)Bush,GeorgeW.Butera(Rwandancommander)Buyoya,Pierre

CanadaCaritasCatholicaidgroupCastro,FidelCatholicparishesandpriestsBembetribeprophesyleadprotestsofRwandaninvasionmassacredseekrevengeforHayarimana’sdeathseminariesforcedtoacceptMobutu’scellsTrappistmonksCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR)ChildmalnutritionandmortalityinKisanganiinrefugeecampsthroughoutCongoconflictareasChildmarriagesChildsoldiers.SeeKadogoChinaTheChoiceofFreedom(Bemba)ChurchesCatholicofKasikamassacreMalkiawaUbembeinAbalaMethodist(MariamKinyamarura)PentecostalinsiegeofKisanganiinTingi-Tingirefugeecamp

CIA(CentralIntelligenceAgency)andLumumba’sassassinationandMobutuandSavimbiCitizenshipdeniedtoCongoleseTutsiinZairedeniedtorefugeesinUgandaissuesparksinvasionofZaireMobutuchangespositionusedtofuelanti-TutsisentimentColonialeraofCongounderBelgiumbrutalityofdismemberskingdoms,localruleethnicprejudicesagainstHutu–TutsiHamitictheoryofraceandL.Kabila’sfatherLeopold’sprivatebusinessempiremismanagementofmineralassetsRwandansbroughttoKivuwithweakmilitaryColonialeraofRwandaunderGermanyColtanminingandmarketConflictmineralsasmoralissueCongo,DemocraticRepublicofthe(DRC)backgroundMobutuoverthrownL.Kabila’sweakregimeJ.Kabilasucceedsfatheraspresidentunification(2002)SeealsounderspecifictownsandbattlesCongoFreeStateCongowarsaboutfirstwar(1996–1997)secondwar(1998–2003)thirdwar(2003–present)Congolesearmy(secondwar)disintegratesasRwandansadvanceKabarebeleadsrebellionagainstlosesPwetosupportedbyZimbabwe,Angola,NamibiaJ.Kabila’sofficercorpsCongoleseRallyforDemocracy(RCD)

fundsmilitarywithCongo’sresourcesleadership,politicalstrategymassacresinKasikaandEasternCongorebellionbacked,controlled,byRwandarefusesUNpeacekeepersUganda/BembaformMLCWambaaspresident,oustedfuelsinsurgencyagainstJ.KabilaCongoleseTutsi.SeeBanyamulengeCoupsd’étatofMobutu,Zaire(1960,1965)ofHabyarimana,Rwanda(1973)onL.Kabila,Congo(2001)(attempt)onPatassé,CAR(2002)(attempt)onJ.Kabila,Congo(2004)

David(commander)DeBeerscompanyDeCharette,HervéDesForges,AlisonDestexhe,AlainDiamondsunderL.Kabila’sregimeMbuji-MayifallstoRwandansminedinAFDL-controlledareasschemesfinanceCongo,Zimbabwe,militariestraffickedbyAngolanrebelsUganda–RwandastandoffinKisanganiDiscriminationagainstBanyamulengeinUgandaagainstrefugeesSeealsoAnti-TutsiideologyDoctorsWithoutBordersDonors(foreign)refugeecrisisseenasequaltogenocidereliedonbyMobutureluctanttogivetoL.Kabila’sregimerepercussionsoffinancingpublicservicessupplyhalfofgovernmentbudgetsSeealsoHumanitarianorganizationsDosSantos,JoséEduardoandL.Kabila

sendsKatanganTigerstoKagamesupportsrebellionagainstMobutuDoublegenociderevisionistconceptDRC.SeeCongo,DemocraticRepublicofthe

EasternCongobrutalruleofAFDL,RCDasmineralexportingregionmortalityrateongoinginsurgencyplunderedbyRwanda,UgandaRwandainvades,takescontrolEichmann,AdolphEndundo,JoséEnveloppemethodofinfluenceEritreaEthiopiaEthnicityasdecidingfactorforMobutu’sarmy,stafffailstoexplainTutsi–Hutuviolencelimitsrebellionsmobilizationvs.institutionalresistanceEvil,natureofEx-FAR(ex-RwandanArmedForces)armedbyFranceasfearedmilitiamassacredbyRPFwithMobutu’stroopsrecruitedbyL.KabilaforsecondwarreturntomassacreRwandanTutsi,Hutu

FAR.SeeEx-FAR(ex-RwandanArmedForces)FDLRForcesArméesZairoises(FAZ)The48RulesofPower(Greene)Francearms,trains,Interahamwe,ex-FARKinshasaembassyprotectsTutsiciviliansmobilizessoldierstoaidrefugeessupportsHutugovernment-in-exileFrancophonevs.anglophonecountries

Frenchmercenaries

Gateretse,MauriceGbadolite,CongoasMobutu’smonumenttoselfcommandcenterforMLCrebellionGécaminesstate-ownedminingcompanyGeneralHistoryoftheCongo(Ndaywel)GenocideinDarfur,SudanGenocideinRwandaintroducedcomparedtoCongowars,refugeecrisisimpactonRwandaInterhamweasrapists,génocidairesmilitarydimensionofmassacresbyHutunoperpetratorsinrevisionistversionasstimulusforidealisticactionGenocideofHuturefugeesinZaireGisenyi,RwandaGoma,Zaire/DRCcampofHuturefugees,ex-FARrefugeesrepatriatedtoRwandabyRPFinvadedbyRwandansasRCDheadquartersTutsideathsquadGoodall,JaneGourevitch,PhilipGribbin,RobertGuevara,ChedeclaresCongounreadyforrevolutionguerrillawarfaresupportfailsofL.Kabila

Habyarimana,AgatheHabyarimana,Juvénalaboutdeath,cremationinsurgentsinRwandacivilwarorganizesmassacresseizesRwandatreasuryHamitichypothesis

Hobbes,ThomasHogwood,SueHospitalsandhealthcenterselectricitycutpatientsandstaffmassacredstaffflee,abandonpatientssuppliesdepletedHranjski,HrvojeHumanrights.SeealsoMortalityratesHumanitarianorganizationsaccesstocampsclosedbyRwandansappeartofavorRwandanrefugeesoverCongolesebasedinGomaforcedtoaidgénocidaireslinkedtomilitaryrefugeecampconditionsHundeofZaire/DRCHutumilitiasanti-Tutsi/BanyamulengeactionsarmedbyKabilainEasternCongoattackedbyRwandans,RPFdeployoutofrefugeecampsasgénocidairesRwandan,asmercenariesImmigrationofBanyamulengeofHutu,Zairians,in1,000-mileescapefromRwanda,toBurundi,toBukavuandRwandans’citizenshipissueSeealsoRefugeesImpuzamugambiyouthmilitiaInera,Zaire,refugeecampInfrastructurecannibalizedbyMobutucollapseleadstocellphonetech.neededforproductiveminingInterahamweyouthmilitiaasfearedvigilantes,génocidairesmassacreTutsi,HuturefugeesretrainedforCongolesearmytrainedbyFranceInter-CongoleseDialogue

Kabarebe,JamesandJ.KabilaleadsrebellionagainstL.KabilaleadsRwandaninvasionofZaireandLemeraAgreementtransportsmineralsthoughRwandaKabila,JosephbackgroundastitularheadofCongolesearmyarrestedbyfatherafterlosingPwetosucceedsfatherasDRCpresidentattemptstoreformgovernmentbrutallyrepressesrebellionsinternational/diplomaticpoliciesandKabarebesecurityforcesworkspeacedealwithrivalsKabila,LaurentbackgroundandCongoleseTutsifailedrebellionperiod(1965–1994)firstCongowar:leadsAFDLrebellionagainstMobutufirstCongowar:recruitskadogofirstCongowar:KinshasasurrenderssecondCongowar:battleforKinshasasecondCongowar:incendiaryanti-TutsistancesecondCongowar:losestoRwandansinPwetosecondCongowar:rebelledagainstbyCongolesesoldiersregime:corruption,repression,inflationassassinationKadogo(childsoldiers)hazinginbootcampimplicatedinL.Kabila’sdeathofL.Kabila’sarmystereotypesofKagame,PaulbackgroundinUgandaonaidtogénocidairesnotvictimsformsalliancetooverthrowMobutuorganizesRCDrebellionagainstKabilaonself-sustainingCongomineraltradeandWambawarnsU.S.ofinvasionplans

Kamanzi,PapybackgroundcommitsmassacreasorderedinRPFinRwandandeathsquadKamitatu,OlivierKampata,DonaKapend,EdyKaraha,BizimaKaregeya,PatrickasAFDLintelligencechiefdirectsoffensiveonKinshasainfiltratesMobutuofficersonL.KabilaonMasasuonRwandansdoingbusinessinCongoKasika,Congo,massacreofciviliansKatanganTigersKatanga’sattempttosecedefromCongoKatumbaMwanke,AugustinKazini,JamesKengowaDondoKicha,KimoniKigaethnicgroupofRwandaKigali,RwandaKijege,MalikKilungutwe,Congo,massacreKimbangu,SimonKinshasa,Zaire/DRCfirstCongowar:fallstoL.KabilaunderL.Kabila’sregimesecondCongowar:anti-TutsiviolencesecondCongowar:asrebellionagainstL.KabilasecondCongowar:RwandansblockedbyallianceKinyamarura,Mariam(prophetess)KinyarwandalanguageKisangani,Zaire/DRCfallstoRwandan-ledforceshistoryUganda–RwandasiegeendsallianceKisaseNgandu,AndreKitonaairliftKitukurefugeecamp,Zaire

Kongolo(Mobutu’sson)Kongolo,MwenzeKristof,Nicholas

LebanesediamondtradersLemeraAgreementLeopoldII(kingofBelgium)Losembe,MichelLouisXIV(kingofFrance)LubakattribeofKatangaLubumbashi,Zaire/DRCLuhaka,ThomasLumumba,PatricechaosinCongofollowsassassinationcitedasvisionarydeatharrangedbyCIA,Belgium,KatangansLundatribeofKatangaLundila,NenoLundin,AlfredLusakaCease-fireLwabanji,Lwasi

MachiavelliMahanya,“MamaSifa,”Mahele,DonatMaheshe,KizitoMai-MailocalmilitiasattackRCD,sparkingKasikamassacreasethnicdefenseforceofNyakilibaasrapistssupportedbyL.Kabila,J.KabilaMalkiawaUbembechurchMamdani,MahmoodMandela,NelsonMasasu,AnselmeMassacresinBas-CongobyJ.Kabila’stroopsinIturiregionbyMLC,HemainKasikabyRCDrebelsinKilungutwe

inKisanganilong-termeffectsinMbandaka,ZairemeasuredagainstRwandangenocideorganizedbyHabyarimanaregimereasonssuggestedSeealsoMortalityratesMawapanga,MwanaNangaMbayi,BabiMbeki,ThaboMbuji-Mayi,Zaire/DRCMcKinney,CynthiaMcNamara,DenisMercenariesassembledbyU.S.,SouthAfricafromBembaaidPatasséfromEuropeancountriesMobutu’sdependenceoninThirtyYears’WarworkingforL.KabilaMethodistchurchofMariamKinyamaruraMichel(witnesstoKilungutwemassacre)MilitarytacticsRwandans’advantagestrenchwarfareMilitiasex-FAR,Hutu,attackinZairefleefromRwandanarmyofHutuinRwandaasgenocidallocalCongoleseofMai-MaiofMobutu,asfractured,corruptnotdisarmedbyUNinrefugeecampsprivate,ofNgbanda/MobutuSeealsoYouthmilitiasMineralresourcesCongo–ZimbabwejointventuresinEasternCongounderJ.Kabila,privatizedminingKababankolamineKamotominecollapsesinKatangaprovinceunderL.Kabila

LubumbashicopperfallstoRwandansunderMobutuprofitsfinancewarRCDprofiteeringWesternpurchasersfacemoralissuesSeealsoDiamondsMitterrand,FrançoisMixedImport-ExportCompany(COMIEX)MLC.SeeMovementfortheLiberationoftheCongoMobutu,BobiLadawaMobutu,Marie-AntoinetteMobutuSeseSekointroducedallowsdiamondtraffickingbyUNITAbackingofforeignrebelsprovokeswarbalkanizesarmyandHabyarimanalosesZairetoL.KabilapowerslipspressuredtoreformbyU.S.,Belgium,FrancestripsHutu,Tutsi,ofcitizenship,propertysupportedmilitarily,technically,byWestwarlostduetoweak,corrupt,regimeinfailinghealth,leavesZaireMoise(Banyamulengecommander)Moralityinvertedforkillersasvictimsofmassacresvs.RwandangenocideandobscurityofscrupulousleadersofsufferinginSudanvs.CongowelfareofCongoleseabsentfromleadersofWest’spurchaseofconflictmineralsMortalityrates5millionpeoplefrom1998–2004,ofciviliansinKisanganisiegeofCongowarscomparedtootherconflictsdiseasescorrelatewithconflictareasofHuturefugeesdyinginZaire/DRCofKilungutwemassacrefromKisanganisiege(1999)ofmassacresinrefugeecampsbyRwandansMota,Emile

MovementfortheLiberationoftheCongo(MLC)createdcommitsatrocitieswhilesupportingPatasséprovidessecuritytoEquateurinsecondCongowarfailsrebelliontopoliticalpartytransitionMugabe,RobertbacksL.KabilainbeginningofsecondCongowarsetsjointminingventureswithCongofinallydropsL.KabilaMugunga,DRCMukambuguje,MarcellineMulumba,MabiMumengi,Didieranti-TutsistanceonbeginningofsecondCongowarondisintegrationofCongolesearmyasL.Kabila’sinformationministerMuseveni,YoweriMushaki,ZaireMutotoMoyabattleMuyengezaMwamba,Thambwe

Nabyolwa,Prosper“Naby”attemptstocommandZairiansoldiersbarredfrompositionsbyMobuturetreatsfromRwandaninvasiononweaknessofMobutu’sarmyNaipaul,V.S.NationalResistanceMovement(NRM)ofUgandaNationalSovereignConferenceNationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola.SeeUNITANdadaye,MelchiorNdaywel,IsidoreNgabo,RemyNgbanda,Honoré“Terminator,”Ngbanditribe(ofMobutu)Ngoye,AchilleNkunda,LaurentNorthKivuProvince,DRCAFDLin

citizenshipissuesHutuvillagerskilledRCDrebelsandRwandacivilwarTutsicommunityNRM.SeeNationalResistanceMovementNyakiliba(Mai-MaileaderinKasika)NyangaofZaire/DRCNyarugabo,MoiseNyerere,JuliusfriendshipwithWambaaspresidentofTanzaniaonruleofTutsiinBurundi

Olivier,PierreOlomide,KoffiOndekane,Jean-PierreOperationSovereignLegitimacy(OSLEG)OperationTurquoiseOrth,RickOxfam

Pan-AfricanismParamilitaryunitsofMobutuPastorPhilippe(ofKisangani)Patassé,AngeFelixPatrice(witnesstoKasikamassacre)PentecostalchurchPetrusic,Jugoslav“Yugo,”PillagingbyBemba’stroopsbyCongoleseguidedbyRwandansbyInterahamweinKinshasabyRwandansoldiersPogromsagainstTutsicommunitiesPoliticsandgovernment(Congolese)deliberatelyweakinstitutionsaseliteand/orethnicfocusedonstayinginpowerassplintered,corrupt,decayed

PopularRevolutionaryMovement(MPR)ProphetsofevangelicalChristianityPwetobattlePygmies

RadioFranceInternationalRadioLibertéofMLCRadioMuhaburaofRPFRadioRwandaRadioTelevisionLibreMilleCollinesRadioVoiceofthePeople,KinshasaRapingsestimatednumbersbyInterahamweofnunsinKasikabyRCDrebelsthroughoutEasternCongoRashidiKaserekaRautenbach,BillyRCD.SeeCongoleseRallyforDemocracyRedCrossinRwandainZaire/DRCRefugees(Hutu)andcampsattacked,massacred,byRwandansconductdeathsquadraidsintoRwandajoinZairiansin1,000-mileescapefromRwandansleadersstealfromaidgroupsasRPFsoldiersUmutesi’sexperiencesUNinvestigationsblockedbyL.KabilaSeealsoRepatriationRefugees(Tutsi)fleefromHutupogromsinUgandacamps(1962)Repatriation(forced)BanyamulengeHutuskilledforreturningtoRwandarefugeesfromZaireRepublicofCongoResources,natural.SeeMineralresourcesRichardson,BillRoberts,Les

RPF.SeeRwandanPatrioticFrontRujugira(kingofRwanda)Rwandamilitarytactics,strengthsseenasobstacletopeaceuseofdonoraidwithdrawstroopsfromCongoRwandagenocide.SeeGenocideinRwandaRwanda-ledinvasionofZairebackgroundbeginningsascoalitiontooverthrowMobutucommandedbyKabarebeconditionsofsoldiersgenocideagainstHutusuggestedimplicatedinL.Kabila’sdeathreasonsformassacresandstatisticsSeealsoAFDLRwandanarmy(secondCongowar)rebelsagainstL.Kabila,ledbyKabarebeadvancesonKinshasablockedbyCongolesealliessiegeofKisanganiendsalliancetargetsprofiteeringtomineralresourceswinsPwetoagainstL.KabilaRwandancivilwarRwandanPatrioticFront(RPF)replacesHutugovernmentinRwanda(1990–1994)authoritarianismresultsindefectionsanti-MobutualliancewithCongoleseTutsiwithHutusoldiersinfiltratesMobutuofficersinvadesrefugeecampsinZaireRwarakabije,Paulbackgroundcommandsex-FAR,Interahamwe,militiaasleaderofinsurgencyinRwandaonmilitarydimensionofgenocide

Salikashvili,JohnSassouNguesso,Denis

Savimbi,JonasSeleelwa,WahiSengaminesSerbianmercenariesSerukiza,BenjaminbackgroundonBanyamulengefightinginEasternCongoonmineralminingbyRwandansonMobutuSevenMistakesoftheRevolution(Kabila)Sexualviolence.SeeRapingsSimpson,DanielSindabizera,MartinSlavetradein/fromtheCongoSocialist/MarxistideologyinearlyCongoregimeofL.Kabila’srebelsSevenMistakesofRevolution(L.Kabila)asunattractivetoCongoleseofWambaSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC)Speke,JohnHanningStereotypingofBanyamulengeoftheCongoofHutu–TutsiconflictsofphysicalappearancesofTutsi,HutuSudanSwarbrick,Peter

TanzaniainalliancetooverthrowMobuturefugeecampinNgaraassiteofUgandanrebellionagainstAminsupports,withdrawssupportof,L.KabilaTavernier,ChristianTembele,YangandaweleTenkeFungurumemineTerry,FionaTingi-Tingi,Zaireandaid-to-killersconceptconditionsandsufferingoflocals

massacreTshisekedi,EtienneunderKabila’sregimeasMobutu’sprimeministerpublicsupportforreducedtomarginalfigureTutsiasethnicgroupaseliteinNorthKivu,deniedcitizenshipfleefromHutupogroms(1961–1962)fleetoRwanda(1995–1996)originslinkedtobiblicaltheorytargetedbygenocideSeealsoAnti-Tutsiideology;Banyamulenge(CongoleseTutsi)Tutsi–Hutuconflictsbackgroundwithclass-basedidentitiesethnicpolarizationfailstoexplainviolence

UgandahistoryofdiscordwithRwandansandKagamefirstCongowar:coalitionoverthrowsMobutusecondCongowar:dropsKabila,backsBembasecondCongowar:battlesRwandansuseofdonoraidUNaccusationsofplunderingWamba’snewrebellionfailswithdrawstroopsfromCongoUmutesi,BeatriceinrefugeecampsfleesacrossCongooninjusticesUNITAUnitedNationsevacuateTutsifromBukavu–FrenchmissionstallsHutuflightinvestigatorsnotallowedinDRCmassacreinvestigationsandrefugeecampsinZairereportonrapingssettleRwandansintoCongo(1959–1964)troopsdeployedinKivus

UnitedNationsHighCommissionforRefugees(UNHCR)UnitedNationsMulti-NationalTaskForceUnitedNationspeacekeepingmissionUnitedStatesembassyinKinshasastormednewrelationswithJ.KabilaandrefugeesincampstellsMobututostepdownSeealsoCIA

WambadiaWamba,ErnestbackgroundandendofRwandan–UgandaallianceasRCDleader,oustedfromRCDasvictimofownidealismforms,failswith,newKisanganirebellionWarofLiberationWinter,PhilipWorldBank

YavNawejYouthmilitiasofBanyamulengeCongoleserecruitstrainedbyAFDLInterahamwe,ImpuzamugambiofL.Kabila

ZahidiNgomaZahidiNgoma,ArthurZaire,Republicof(1971–1997)inColdWar,Westprovidesmilitaryaid,trainingincreasinghostilitiestoTutsiunderMobutu,fallstoKabilaZairianarmyofMobutubalkanized,weakenedcommandersascorruptcompetentofficersexecutedbyMobutumassacreBanyamulengewithmercenaries,failstodefendKisangani

rarelyreceivesalariesreasonsforlosingfirstCongowarsellweaponstoRwandanarmyterrorizeslocalswhilefleeingRwandansZimbabwebacksRwandans’overthrowofMobutusupportsL.Kabila(secondCongowar)dropsL.Kabila(2000)Zvinavashe,Vitalis

JasonK.StearnshasworkedontheconflictintheCongoforthepasttenyears,mostrecentlyastheheadofaspecialUnitedNationspanelinvestigatingCongoleserebelgroups.HefirsttraveledtotheCongoin2001 to work for a local human rights group in the border town of Bukavu, which was then at theepicenter of thewar.He laterworked for theUnitedNations peacekeeping operation and as a senioranalyst for the International Crisis Group. His journalism and opinion pieces have appeared in theEconomist,AfricaConfidential,theWashingtonPost,theWallStreetJournal,andtheFinancialTimes.HeisalsoaregularguestontheBBC,RadioFranceInternational,NPR,andCNN.Hewritestheblog“CongoSiasa”andiscompletingaPhDatYaleUniversity.

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