crisis leadership - domestic preparedness

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Since 1998, Critical Information for Preparedness and Resilience

DomPrep Journal

Crisis Leadership

• The Next Black Swan

• Leading Through Turmoil

• Tsunami of Change 2021

• Post-Pandemic Future

•

•

http://biofiredefense.com/filmarray/

Copyright © 2020, IMR Group Inc.

December 2020, DomPrep Journal 3www.domesticpreparedness.com

BusinessOfficeP.O. Box 810Severna Park, MD 21146 USAwww.DomesticPreparedness.com(410) 518-6900 Staff

Martin MasiukFounder & [email protected]

Catherine [email protected]

Carole ParkerManager, Integrated [email protected]

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© Copyright 2020, by IMR Group Inc. Reproduction of any part of this publication without express written permission is strictly prohibited.

DomPrep Journal is electronically delivered by the IMR Group Inc., P.O. Box 810, Severna Park, MD 21146, USA; phone: 410-518-6900; email: [email protected]; also available at www.DomPrep.com

Articles are written by professional practitioners in homeland security, domestic preparedness, and related fields. Manuscripts are original work, previously unpublished, and not simultaneously submitted to another publisher. Text is the opinion of the author; publisher holds no liability for their use or interpretation.

AYearofCrisis,Progress&HopeBy Catherine L. Feinman ..........................................................................................................5

CrisisLeadership:LeadingThroughTurmoilBy Ronald Rowe ..........................................................................................................................6

TheNextBlackSwan–BioterrorismBy Robert C. Hutchinson .........................................................................................................10

ThinkRecovery,NotJustRe-Entry,forPost-PandemicFutureBy Ann Lesperance & Grant Tietje ....................................................................................17

LawEnforcement’sTsunamiofChange2021–PodcastBy Joseph W. Trindal ................................................................................................................22

Featured in This Issue

Pictured on the Cover: Secret Service, 2017

https://www.domesticpreparedness.com

http://www.proenginusa.com



A Year of Crisis, Progress & HopeBy Catherine L. Feinman

In2020,literallyeveryonewasaffectedinsomewaybycrisis.Incertainareas, communities enduredotherdisasters in addition to theworldwidepandemic. Some people fared well, some are struggling, and some willnot see 2021. However, amid the illnesses, economic uncertainties, andsocialandpoliticalunrest, therearesignsofprogress.Formore than twodecades, DomPrep has published many articles written by practitioners

onthepreparednessgapsthatexistinleadership,supplychains,interoperability, incidentmanagement,andsoon.Formorethantwodecades,thosesamepractitionershaveprovidedpossible solutions and roadmaps for closing those gaps. However, sometimes it takesexperiencing thedisaster in order to invest the time and resourcesnecessary to actuallyclosethegaps.

Yes, many communities did not heed the numerous worst-case warnings, did notadequatelyprepareforthepossibilityofaworldwidepandemic,andwereslowinrespondingtoathreatthattheythoughtwouldendwithlittleintervention.Asthecasenumberscontinuetogrow,preparednessprofessionalshavebeenofferedanopportunity toseetheireffortscome to fruition and help close critical gaps. The need for high-performing leaderswhocanmakequickdecisionsand takedecisiveaction isnotaconfrontational idea,yethigh-performing leadersarenotalwaystheones inchargewhendisasterstrikes.Thecrises in2020havespotlightedtheleaderswhowereabletomeetthenumerousnewchallengestheyfacedandprovideavisionforrecoverybeyondthecrisis.

Evenoncecommunitiesentertherecoveryphase,though,thereisstillmuchworktodobeyondthecurrentcrisis–forexample,planningandpreparingforthenextblackswanevent.Onesimpleyetpoignanttakeawayfrom2020isthatpandemicscanhappen.Therealizationthataworst-casescenariofromthatinteragencyexercisepracticedlastyearcouldemergeatanytimeiscrucialforbuildingcommunityresilience.

As2021rapidlyapproaches,therearesignsofhopethatsomelong-termpreparednessgaps may be closing: rapid vaccine development, innovative police reform, and othercommunity resilience efforts.What communities need is a cohesive approach to disasterpreparedness.Theinterestingthingaboutaworldwidecrisisisthateveryoneisinittogether(whethertheyrealizeitornot).Nowisthetimetoidentifyandleveragethepreparednessopportunitiesthatemergedin2020andbuildonthemin2021tocreatemorecohesiveandmoreresilientcommunities.


https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/resilience/crisis-leadership-leading-through-turmoil/

https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/healthcare/think-recovery-not-just-re-entry-for-post-pandemic-future/

https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/commentary/the-next-black-swan-bioterrorism/

https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/podcast/law-enforcements-tsunami-of-change-2021/


www.domesticpreparedness.com6 December 2020, DomPrep Journal

The year 2020 has certainly had an abundance of turmoil and uncertainty: a global pandemic, a roller coaster economy, a national awakening to racial injustice, and a contested presidential election. All leaders have the required skills to manage in times of calmness. However, in times of turmoil and uncertainty, the leader that can act decisively and communicate a vision forward will be the best performer in successfully leading their team through a crisis, a transition, and uncertainty.

Thepremiseofthe2015book“TeamofTeams,”whichisco-authoredbyGeneralStanleyA.McChrystal,isthatorganizationsneedtoevolveandmoveawayfromoldwaysinordertobecomemoreagile.Earlyin

thebook,McChrystaldidacomparisonofhowhiscommandwastopdown,horizontal,andapplyingastructurethatwasnotmakingthestridesitneedsinordertodefeatal-QaidainIraq(AQI)in2006.Aside-by-sideillustrationshowed how McChrystal’s task force was organized juxtaposed to AQI’s

decentralizedandasymmetricnetworkofoperatives,financiers,andsupportentities.Intheend,thetaskforceovercameAQIbyevolvingintoamoreagileorganizationbyextendingoutandformingteamsthatworkedindependently,butsynchronouswiththelargerorganization.Theybecameoneteamcomprisedofsmallerteams.

DuringamajorSecretServicedomesticsecurityoperationafewyearsago,McChrystal’sconceptofTeamofTeamswasmimicked.Thisconceptresultedinthesuccessfulcreationof23independentcellsthatfunctionedasoneteamwithstafffromdifferentagencies,differentorganizations,anddifferentworkcultures.ThegeniusofMcChrystal’spremiseiscreatingasystemofsystemstotackleissues,identifycoursesofaction,anddevelopaplan.

Regardlessof thecrisesorchallenges, thekey to leading through them isbyhavingastructure that isagileandable torespond. Inorder tobeagile, leadershave toempowersecond-levelmanagers,first-levelmanagers,andoperationalpersonneltomakedecisions.DuringtheSecretServiceoperation,alltheteamleaderswereempoweredtomakedecisionsfortheircells.Toillustrateandreinforcethis,teamleaderssawaoneslidePowerPointofMcChrystal’sdiagramswiththeinstruction,“Thisishowwearesetup.Thisiswhatweareupagainst.”Theyweretoldthat,iftheyweretowaittogetadecisionfromthetoponhowtoproceed,thenthedecisionpointwouldhavealreadypassedandtheopportunitywouldhavebeenlost.

Hearingthattheywereempoweredtomakedecisionswasaforeignconcepttotheteam.Thesewerehighlytrainedprofessionalsthathadspenttheircareersinverystrictandrigidcommandstructuresthatrequiredthemtopushdecisionsuptothenextlevel.Eventuallytheyboughtintothisconcept.Whenteammembersarenotempowered,thereisariskofbeingoverwhelmedatthefirstsignofacrisis.

Crisis Leadership: Leading Through TurmoilBy Ronald Rowe


https://www.c-span.org/video/?326325-1/general-stanley-mcchrystal-team-teams



Black SwansNassimNicholasTalebdevelopeda theory

abouthigh-impactandhigh-profileeventsthatarehardtopredict.Heusedthemetaphorofablackswan,ararityinnature,todescribetheseextreme surprise events. The paradox of theblack swanevent is that, inhindsight, leadersoftenbelievethatthesignswerethereandthattheeventcouldhavebeenavoided.Ifthatweretruly the case, then theeventwasnotablackswan. However, although the triggering eventmay not be a black swan, the second-ordereffects of that triggering event could createblackswans.Thatuncertaintycanwreakhavoconanorganization.

For example, the designation of SARS-COVID-19asapandemicwasnotnecessarilyablackswanevent.TheWorldHealthOrganizationandothersrecognizedthepotentialimpactsofthis virus beyond the borders of China. Oncethe virus became widespread in Europe andNorthAmerica, it seemedtostymie leadersacrossmanydisciplines(publicpolicy,publichealth,bordersecurity,andemergencyresponse).Furthercompoundingtheeffectsofthevirusweremisstepsbypoliticalleaders.EvenTalebhaspubliclystatedthatSARS-COVID-19wasnotablackswanbutratheraresultofgovernmentincompetence.

However, the impacts of scrambling to develop remote working infrastructure, notforeseeing budget expenditures for personal protective equipment and teleworkingcapabilities,andidentifyingandcreatingredundantstaffingplanstomaintainforcereadinesswerelikelytobeblackswansformostorganizations.Theleadershipchallengescreatedbyblackswansareindeedbornoutofuncertaintyandunknowns.Thefeelingofnotbeingincontrolorhavingaplanisnotnormalforanyleaderortheirexecutiveteam.Theleaderthatbuildsateamofteamssystemsapproachwillbeabletotakeonanyeventorsecond-orderpop-upcrisesthatcanplagueahigh-performingorganizationwithazerofailmission.

DecisivenessIn2016,HarvardBusinessReview(HBR)releasedtheresultsofa10-yearlongitudinal

studyexaminingthetraitsofgreatexecutives.Inthisstudy,HBRidentifiedparticularskillsthatseparatedgreat leaders fromgood leaders.Keyamong theseskillswas theability tomakegreatdecisions.Greatleaderscanoperateonadecisionmatrixcontinuumthatspansanentirespectrumofrelyingondataanalyticsallthewaytointuition(i.e.,trustingtheirgut).

Secret Service, 2017


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BDbuJtAiABA

https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/02/black-swan-author-nassim-taleb-on-government-covid-incompetence.html

https://hbr.org/2016/01/a-10-year-study-reveals-what-great-executives-know-and-do

https://hbr.org/2016/01/a-10-year-study-reveals-what-great-executives-know-and-do



Duringacrisis,anexecutiveteamisinundatedwithinformationanddata.Greatleaders,though,donotgive in to impulsivityorallowtheir teamstogetboggeddown inanalysisparalysis.Withoutstrikingabalancebetweenthetwo,itwillbecomedizzyingaswaveafterwaveofdataandinformationflowthroughtheorganization.Indecisivenessortheinabilitytomovequicklycouldactuallyincreaseanorganization’srisk.Leadersthatcannotmaketoughdecisionsquickly,alsorisklosingtheconfidenceoftheirteamintheleader’sabilities.FormerSecretaryofStateandGeneralColinPowellsummeditupinhis40/70Rule.Procrastinationinthenameofreducingriskwillactuallyincreaseanorganization’srisk.Waitingforenoughdatatoensure100%successwillonlycostanorganizationcriticalopportunities.

Of course, making decisions doesnot involve a haphazard process thatdisregards caution. On the contrary, inthe middle of a crisis, moving quickly isa far better approach than creating aninformationbottleneck.Forexample,inthemidstofanorganization’sCOVIDresponse,the leadership team did not have time to

becomeboggeddowninreviewingwhichdiagnostictestwasbestforscreeningtheworkforce.Attheonsetofthepandemic, thesupplychainfortestingkitswasscarce.LeadershadtomakequickdecisionsinordertosecureaminimumnumberofkitsuntilamorematureandrobustsupplychainforCOVIDtestingwasdeveloped.High-performingleadersunderstandthatmakingdecisionsearlier,faster,andwithgreaterconvictiondoesnotalwaystranslatetomakingagreatdecisionallofthetime–butitisbetterthanmakingnodecisionatall.

CommunicationCommunicatingtotheworkforcehasbeencriticalinallofthecrisesexperiencedin2020.

AstheSecretServiceandotherexecutiveteamsacrossthenationnavigatedthemyriadofuncertainties,ithasbeencriticaltoprovideupdatestoalllevelsofemployees,aswellastosustaintheworkforcephysically,emotionally,andspiritually.Althoughitwasimportantthatallemployeesknewexactlywhatactionswerebeingtakenandtheintentionsoftheexecutiveteamandagencyhead, itwasnotalwayseasy.There isthepotential tooversaturatewithcommunicationandthemessagebecomeswhitenoisetotheworkforce.Itisimportanttofindtherightbattlerhythmforexecutivecommunications.

In several situations during the pandemic, dealing with the death of an employee(fortunately, for the Secret Service not COVID-related), engaging in a dialogue with theworkforceaboutracialinequality,orrespondingtodemonstrationsonracialinjusticeattheWhiteHouse,itwasimportanttobeaccessibletoemployees.Incertainsituations,theSecretServicewasdealingwithalloftheaforementionedexamplesatthesametime.Therefore,itbecameextremelyimportantthatleaderswereseenattheoperationallevelandthatleadersheardfromemployeesastheydealtwithacrisis,grappledwiththelossofacolleague,orcopedwiththeuncertaintiesofacontagiousvirus.Thecommunicationshouldnotflowonewayfromthetopdown.Itshouldbeatwo-waystreamfromthefrontlineworkerallthewaytosenior-levelmanagersandviceversa.

High-performing leaders understand that making decisions earlier, faster, and with greater conviction is better than making no decision at all.


https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467329

https://hbr.org/2017/05/what-sets-successful-ceos-apart



AbenefitthatcameoutofthecrisisofthepandemicwasthatitforcedtheSecretServicetofindnewmediumsforemployeeengagementandcollaboration.Mostofitsworkforcearefrontline operators, but therewere still requirements for video teleconferencing tools tocommunicateoperationalordersandfulfilltheagency’sintegratedmission.Thesemediumsbecametheconveyancetohavethoughtfulandhonestdiscussionsonracialdisparitiesandinjusticethatwerecatharticandhealingforall.

Future PlanningThefollowingkeylessonslearnedfrom2020shouldbeconsideredwhenplanningfor

futurecrisesanddisasters:

•Recognizethattimesofuncertaintyandcrisiscanneutralizeeventhebestofplans.

•Defineresiliencefortheorganizationandboilitdowntothemostessentialorganizationalprioritiesormission-essentialfunctions.

•Haveacrisisplanreadytogobutunderstandthatablackswanwillhappen,anditisverylikelybuiltonassumptionsthatyoumaynothaveconsidered.

•Establishasystemsapproachandsetupateamofteams.•Assigncellstoformulateplansforspecificareasofconcentration.•Empowerthoseteamstomakedecisionsandencouragethemtonotgetboggeddowninanalysisparalysis.

•Listentotheteams’findingsandsolicittheirrecommendations.•Makedecisionsearlier,faster,andwithconvictionasthegroundsituationchangesanddataflowsintotheorganization.

•Keeptheworkforce–themostpreciousresourceandasset–intheinformationloop.

•Communicatewiththeworkforceandlistentowhattheyaresaying.Doingalloftheabovewillenableanyorganizationtoemergefromacrisisasastronger,

moreagile,andmoreresiliententity.

Ronald L. Rowe Jr. serves as the Deputy Assistant Director for the United States Secret Service’s Office of Protective Operations. From January 2017 through September 2018, he served as the Deputy Assistant Director for the Office of Intergovernmental and Legislative Affairs. Throughout his 21-year Secret Service career, he has served in a variety of leadership positions and assignments. These have included selection as the National Special Security Event (NSSE) coordinator for the 2016 Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio. In 2013, he was selected for a joint-duty assignment to the intelligence community and served on the staff of the Director of National Intelligence. He also served as a senior advisor and deputy national intelligence officer for cyber issues at the National Intelligence Council. In 2011, he was detailed to the White House-Executive Office of the President as a national security and law enforcement policy advisor. His other assignments have included selection as a Congressional Fellow to the staff of the United States Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary. In 2004, he was selected for assignment to the Presidential Protective Division and served for four years. He began his Secret Service career in the Miami Field Office and the West Palm Beach Resident Office. He entered public service 25 years ago starting as a police officer with the City of West Palm Beach, Florida. He is a 2019 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Executive Leaders Program in Homeland Defense and Security at Monterey, California.




The Next Black Swan – BioterrorismBy Robert C. Hutchinson

The world continues to wrestle with the enormous consequences of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the novel virus that caused the COVID-19 pandemic. The drastic and long-term effects and impacts of the novel virus have continued to affect the world on numerous fronts for a duration significantly longer than expected by almost anyone in February 2020. With additional waves, there appears to be no clear end in sight.

ItisstillupforvaluableandheateddiscussionifSARS-CoV-2wasablackswanevent.Formanywithabackgroundorinterestinthestudyofpublichealth,homelandsecurity,novelpathogens,andpandemics,thisworld-changingeventwasutterlyexpectedandpredictableasweretheobviousfailurestoplanforit.ItappearsthattheworldshallberespondingtoSARS-CoV-2andCOVID-19forquitesometimetocomeasmonthsmaytransitionintoyears.Duringthesemostchallengingtimes,itdoesnotappearterriblypromisingthatcommunitieswillhavetheenergy,time,focus,orresourcestoadequatelyplanandprepareforalargerandmuchmoredangerousbiologicalthreat–beiteithernaturallyoccurringorman-made.

Bioterrorism & BiodefenseBioterrorism and biowarfare continue to be significant threats to national and

homelandsecurity,ifappreciateditornot.AsclearlydemonstratedbyCOVID-19,anaturalorman-madepublichealthcrisiscanhaveincalculablehealth,social,financial,economic,political,andsomanyother immediateandlastingimpactsonacountryandtheworld.Thisportfolioofcontemplationcouldbeconsolidatedunderanumbrellaofbiodefensetoincludebiologicalweapons.

According to theWorldHealthOrganization, “biologicalweapons aremicroorganismslike virus, bacteria, fungi, or other toxins that are produced and released deliberately tocausediseaseanddeath inhumans,animalsorplants.”Theseweaponscancauseseriousdisruption, illness,anddeath inaveryshortamountof timewithoutwarning.Thethreatisnotlimitedtoafewpathogens.TheCentersforDiseaseControlandPreventionprovidesalonglistofbioterrorismagents/diseasesontheirwebsitetoincludetheplagueandviralhemorrhagicfevers.

TheBlueRibbonStudyPanelonBiodefenseissueditscriticalanddetailedreportin2015entitledA National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major Reform Needed to Optimize Efforts. The report was comprehensive and thought-provoking by identifying and re-enforcingnumerousvulnerabilitiesandinadequaciesregardingplanningandpreparednessforamyriadofbiosecurity,biodefense,andpublichealththreats.Thereport,inconjunctionwithnumerousotherstudiesandarticles,reinforcedthatfuturefailureswouldnotbefromalackofknowledgeorwarning,butprioritization,planning,andpreparedness.

TheUnitedStateshasdevelopedvariousnationalstrategiesandplanstopreparefortheseunthinkablethreatsoverthepastfewdecades.Oneofthelatesthasbeenthe2018National Biodefense Strategy.Thedocumentbeginswiththetimelyandrelevantopeningstatement:


https://www.domprep.com/healthcare/black-swans-preparing-for-pandemic-biological-threats/

https://www.iaem.org/Portals/25/documents/202004bulletinonline.pdf

https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_1

https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp

https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/a-national-blueprint-for-biodefense/

https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/healthcare/uncertain-impact-of-critical-biosecurity-reports/

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf



It is a vital interest of the United States to manage the risk of biological incidents. In today’s interconnected world, biological incidents have the potential to cost thousands of American lives, cause significant anxiety, and greatly impact travel and trade.

Thestrategystatesthatbiologicalthreatsaresomeofthemostseriousthreatsfacingthenation,anddiseaseoutbreakscancausecatastrophicharmonamassivescale.Duringthesetimes,thatstatementmaysoundalltoofamiliar.Themagnitudeofthesebiologicalthreatsmaynothavesufficientlybeenunderstoodandappreciatedtoone’sownperil.Surprisingly,theloomingthreatmaycontinuetonotbefullyrealized.

Advocating Action Through TransitionDomPrepdiscussedtheseriousconcernsregardingpreparednessforbiologicalattackor

bioterrorismin2017withafocusonthechallengesofstayingonpointfromonepresidentialadministration to another.On15November2016, thePresident’sCouncil ofAdvisorsonScienceandTechnology(PCAST)releasedaletterreporttothepresidentonAction Needed to Protect against Biological Attack.Theletterstatedthatbiotechnologyhasbeengrowingatanexponential rateover thepastseveraldecadeswithbothgreatbenefitsandseriouspotentialfordestructiveusebybothstatesandindividuals.PCASTurgedthepresidentto take immediate action to ensure thatthe nation has the ability to meet thesechallengeswithnear-,medium-, and long-termgoals.

PCASToutlinedthefederalgovernment’sapproach to defending against biologicalthreats over the past two decades with areviewofsomeoftherelevantcongressionalacts,strategies,andplans.Unfortunately,thesegovernmentalactionsmaynothaveevolvedat the same rate as the threats. Technology, research, and nature have created risks andchallengesbeyondpreviousexpectations.

ThePCASTletterwasreleasedattheveryendoftheadministration’ssecondterm(notlongafterthepreviousnationalelection),whichdidnotpermitasufficientamountoftimeforaction.However,itwasquiterelevantforthenextandfutureadministrationsinaworldofvastbiotechnologyandbiosecurityvulnerabilities–thenewlandscapeaccordingtoPCAST.

Unfortunately,asfearedin2017,thePCASTletterappearedbeaddedto,orlostin,thevastpileofnumerousreports,studies,andcollaborationscallingforactionandpreparednessforaglobalpublichealththreat.Thisthoughtfulletteradvocatingaction,inadditiontomanyother critical recommendations by others since that time,maybe lost again in a time ofpoliticaltransitionandtremendouslydivisivepolitics.

Somemayaskduringatimeofanimmenseandcontinuingpandemicandsomanyothercompetinghomeland/nationalsecurityissueswhetherthenationhasthebandwidthtoworryabout largerso-calledblackswanthreatswithpossiblymuchmoreseriousconsequences

Bioterrorism and biowarfare continue to be significant threats to national security. Imagine COVID-19, only much worse with a more serious and threatening pathogen.


https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/journals/november-2017/

https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/journals/november-2017/

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_biodefense_letter_report_final.pdf

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_biodefense_letter_report_final.pdf



at this time. The answer is yes because it can getmuchworse. The response should betocareduetothepossiblemorbidityandmortalityratesthatcouldbeagreatdealmoredevastatingthanSARS-CoV-2.PreviousfailuresandinactionhavebeenclearlydemonstratedbyCOVID-19,andthenationispayingahorriblepriceoneverylevel.

Repeateddeclarationsoverthedecadesoflackofsufficientplanningandpreparednessforlife-threateningpandemicsandbiothreatshavenotbeenoverlysuccessfulindrivingandsustainingchange.Theyareoftenlostintheexpandingnoiseandstiffcompetitionforlimitedresources.Maybeatruestoryfrom2010thatsoundsmorelikeamoviethrillerorstreamingvideoseriescouldprovideanantidotaljustificationforprioritizedconcernandmotivationforaction.Whenoverwhelmedbythedenseforest,lookatatreeforanexample.

Missing PlagueIn2003,anAmericanscientistreported30vialsofthebacteriumYersiniaPestis,which

causespneumonic,septicemic,andbubonicplague,missingfromhisuniversitylaboratory.HewasreportedlyanexpertontheplagueatamajoruniversityinthesouthwesternUnitedStates.Asanticipated,thelossofthebacteriaresultedintheimmediateresponseof60taskforceinvestigatorstotheuniversitytofindtheanswersandthevials.The9/11andanthraxattackswerefreshandfrighteningatthattime.

The scientistwas later indicted for various charges involving the improper handling,control,andtransportationoftheplaguesamples.Thispreeminentauthorityoninfectiousdiseaseswas chargedwith allegedly smuggling samples of plague into theUnited States,improperly transporting them within the country, and lying about them to authorities.Additional chargesof theft, embezzlement, and fraudwereadded ina second indictmentagainsthim.

Thescientistwasconvictedon47ofthe69federalchargesthathefacedassociatedwiththemishandlingofthepathogen,butwasacquittedonchargesoflyingtofederalauthorities,smugglingplaguesamplesintotheUnitedStatesandillegallytransportingsamples.Hewasconvictedoftheft,embezzlement,andfraudinconnectionwithhisconcealedcontractswithdrug companies.As a result of the convictions, hewas sentenced to twoyears inprison,fined$15,000,andsurrenderedhismedicallicense.TheactionsofthescientistalsoresultedinadministrativeproceedingsagainsthimbytheDepartmentofCommerceforreportedlyimporting the plague from Tanzania without adhering to the appropriate protocols andreportingrequirements.

The missing plague vials were reportedly never located or recovered during theinvestigation.Theplaguesamplesmayhavebeendestroyedbythescientistorimproperlysharedwith others. Due to thewidely documented incident and his licensing issues, thescientistreportedlylocatedemploymentoutsideoftheUnitedStates.

Welcome to MiamiIn2010,thesamescientistenteredtheUnitedStatesinthelateeveningfromSaudiArabia

viaLondonattheMiamiInternationalAirport.Hewasreportedlyemployedasaprofessorata


https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Professor-in-plague-scare-respected-expert-2089343.php

https://fas.org/butler/index.html

https://fas.org/butler/index.html

https://fas.org/butler/fr091406.html

https://abcnews.go.com/US/scientist-airport-evacuation-charged-smuggling-plague-2003/story?id=11555275



universityintheCaribbeanandteachinginSaudiArabiaatthetime.Thescientistapparentlycleared customsborder inspectionwithout incident and transitioned to screeningby theTransportationSecurityAdministration(TSA)foraflighttoPuertoRico.WhilehisluggagewasbeingscreenedbyTSA,asuspiciousobjectwaslocatedviatheirscanningtechnology.Suspiciouswasanunderstatement.Theobjectwasametalpipewiththreadedmetalendcapsonbothsidesresemblingacommonpipebomb.Itlookedexactlylikethepipebombsseeninthemediaoramovie.

As expected, the location of the possible pipe bomb in a piece of luggage next to themainexitofthefederalinspectionstationtotherestofthemassiveairportcausedaratherseriousincident.Theentireareaoftheairportwasclosedimmediatelyaffectingthousandsofinternationalanddomesticpassengers.Therespondingpoliceandbombsquadevacuatedfour of the six airport terminals, which was not a simple undertaking. Police, fire, andhazardousmaterialpersonnelandvehicleswereparkedandstagedallaroundtheairportaspartofthecoordinatedresponse.Themediatooknotice.

Theimpactoftheresponserippledthroughouttheentireairporttoincludethesecurityidentificationdisplayareaandpublic landsidearea resulting in the stoppingof all of theapproachingtraffictotheentireairportandnumerousflights.MiamiInternationalAirportisdefinitelynotaquietplace,butitbecameonethatnight.Itwasalsooneofthemostdifficultplacestodiscoverandrespondtothepossiblepipebombattheairportforoperations,butitwouldendupevengettingworse.

©iStock.com/shironosov


https://oklahoman.com/article/3491384/police-question-scientist-in-miami-airport-scare



Proper ProceduresAsthebombsquadandotherofficialsexecutedtheirresponseplans,thescientistwas

interviewedby localand federalofficials toascertainwhatwas insidetheenclosedmetaltube.Atthatpoint,thescientistwasjustanothertravelerwithaverystrangeandconcerningiteminhisbaggage.Astheinterviewprogressedattheairportpolicestation,thebombsquadfocusedonassessingandaddressingthepotentialthreat.Althoughalwaysprofessionalandwell-trained, itwouldbequitenaïve to think that thebombsquadwasnotunder strongpressure toresolve the issueassoonassafelypossible toreopentheeconomicengineofMiami-DadeCounty.

Priortodiscoveringtheworrisomehistoryof thescientist intheearlymorninghoursofthehecticincidentandinterview,thelocalpolicebombsquadattemptedtodisablethepossibleexplosivedevicebyforcefullyremovingoneoftheendcaps.Theyweresuccessful.Thesuspectdevicewasrenderedsafeandopenedtotheairforacarefulinspection.

Shortlyafterrenderingtheobjectsafefrompossibleexplosion,informationwasreceivedbythebombsquadregardingthearresthistoryofthescientistandmissingvialsoftheplague,whichresultedinanelevatedconcernabouttheliquid-likecontentsofthemetalpipe.TheinvestigatorsandbombsquadlearnedafteropeningthesuspiciousdevicethatthescientistwasreportedlyaninfectiousdiseaseinstructorinSaudiArabiaandtheCaribbean.Nooneknewwhat the visible liquidmediawas at that time,which definitely increased alreadyheightenedtensions.

Tocompoundtheconcernsevenfurther,thesuspectdevicewasreportedlyunintentionallyopenedbyforceintheareaofarathersizableheat,airventilation,andcooling(HVAC)intakezone thatwas linked to several airport terminals. If a serious biological threat had beenaccidentlyreleasedduringtheresponsetothepossiblepipebombthreat,theimpactcouldhavebeencatastrophicwiththepossiblenumberofexposedpassengersintheprocessoftravellingaroundthecountryandtheworldfromsuchabusyairport.

The impact on the airport’s infrastructurewould have resulted in vast financial andeconomic consequences throughout the county, state, region, and country. The cost ofpossibly closing twoormore large terminals formonths or years tomitigate a possiblehazardousthreatintheHVACsystemandthroughouttheterminalswasestimatedathard-to-fathomnumbers.

What IfThankfully,thecontentsofthepipewerereportedlydeemednottobeaknownpublic

healththreat.Itwasapparentlypartofthescientist’sunidentifiedresearch.Imaginethecostofahighlycontagiouspathogenspreadingaroundthestate,nation,andworldifitwereaseriouspublichealththreat.Thelevelofpreparednessandavailablemedicalcountermeasuresatthetimemaynothavebeenasrobustasneeded–andthiswouldnothaveevenbeenanintentionalbioterrorismattack.

Envisionifthesuspiciousdevicecontainedoneormoreofthemissingplaguevialsorsomethingevenmoredangerous.Thescientistmaynothavehadanyillintentions,butthe


https://fas.org/blogs/fas/2010/09/prof-thomas-butler-miami-international-airport/



properandlogicalactionsofthebombsquadwiththeinformationtheypossessedatthetimecouldhaveresultedinadisastrouseventforlifeandproperty.Theycouldhaveunknowinglyparticipatedinabiologicalrelease.

Imagineifastateornon-stateactorwishedtodoharmviabioterrorismorbiowarfare.Thisalmost routine incidentwasa learningopportunity for the first responders to thinkoutside the box alongwithmaybe thosewhowish to do harm. This is not a new threatscenariosincethe9/11andanthraxattacks,but ithas likelybeenforgottenorovertakenbysomanyothercompetingandconsumingevents.Thisstoryofthescientistandhislaterairport incidentwerewell-published forall toreadandcontemplate.Badactorshavetheinternettoo.

What NowThecurrentresponsetoazoonoticpathogenhasnotresultedinthelevelofconfidencein

previousplanningandpreparednessthateveryoneshouldexpectanddemand.Ifthenationwas not adequately prepared for SARS-CoV-2 after fairly recent experiences with otherwell-knowntroublingabbreviationssuchasSARS,MERS,andH1N1,itwouldlikelynotfarewellwithanintentionallyreleasedaggressivepathogentoday.FromthecurrentCOVID-19experience,itmaynotbethenation’sfinesthour.Anovelpathogenresultinginenhancedlevelsofcontagiousness,morbidity,andmortalitythroughgain-of-functionexperimentationcouldmakecurrentpandemic issuesappearmanageableandpreferable.Horrifyingly, theresponseandsituationtodaywithCOVID-19couldbethe“goodolddays”comparedtowhatmaybecoming.

ThestoryofthemissingplaguevialsandincidentattheMiamiInternationalAirportmaybefascinatingtothoseunfamiliarwiththescientist.More importantly, thestoryprovidesanopportunitytomullovertheramificationsofan intentionalattack inthisorhundredsofothersettingsaroundthenation.Thiswasnotabioterrorismattack,butthinkaboutthepossibleoutcomesifitwereone.Itisanimportanttreeforfocusandconsiderationinthevastbiodefenseforestofconcerns.

Pandemicandotherpublichealththreats fromzoonoticsourceshavebeenaconstantthreatandchallengethathavebeenregularlyignoredorovertakenbyotherpressingissues.Thenationisnowpayingamonumentalpricewithitsindisputablelackofadequateplanningandpreparedness.Envisionthecascadingconsequencesofashrewdlydesignedandexecutedbioterrorismattack.Ofcourse,thatblackswancouldneverhappen–justlikeSARS-CoV-2.

Robert C. Hutchinson, a long-time contributor to DomPrep, was the former deputy special agent in charge and acting special agent in charge with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Homeland Security Investigations in Miami, Florida. He retired in 2016 after more than 28 years as a special agent with DHS and the legacy U.S. Customs Service. He was previously the deputy director and acting director for the agency’s national emergency preparedness division and assistant director for its national firearms and tactical training division. His numerous writings and presentations often address the important need for cooperation, coordination and collaboration between the fields of public health, emergency management and law enforcement. He received his graduate degrees at the University of Delaware in public administration and Naval Postgraduate School in homeland security studies.


http://www.linkedin.com/in/robert-c-hutchinson-b33756bb

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Think Recovery, Not Just Re-Entry, for Post-Pandemic Future

By Ann Lesperance & Grant Tietje

Ten years ago, a team of representatives from King and Pierce counties, cities of Seattle and Bellevue, Joint Base Lewis McChord, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory set forth on developing the Regional Recovery Framework for a Biological Attack in the Seattle Urban Area. A collaboration of the Seattle Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) partners and military and federal agencies, the framework was specific to a hypothetical catastrophic, wide-area biological attack using weaponized anthrax in the Seattle urban area but was designed to be flexible and scalable to serve as the recovery framework for other chemical or biological incidents. The team revisited the framework again in 2012 to create the Denver UASI All-Hazards Regional Recovery Framework. Such frameworks have been revisited again for use during the COVID pandemic.

Theteam’sapproachwasdesignedtoassistpolicymakersandemergencymanagersinshorteningthetimelineforrecoveryandminimizingtheeconomicandpublic

health impacts of a catastrophic chemical, biological, orother attack – but from a local perspective. Together, theteamoutlinedlong-termrecoverygapsintermsofeconomicredevelopment, waste management, fatality management,

andprioritizationofcleanup,whicharehighlightedintheDomPrepJournal’sOctober2012edition,entitled“MedicalEmergencies.”

Welcome to 2020In2020,attheonsetofaworldwidepandemic,Washingtonstatewasoneofthefirst

statesinthenationtaskedtorespondtotheCOVID-19outbreak.Now–inpartduetoitsframeworkandmoreimportantlyitsregionalpartnerships–Washingtonispositionedtobeattheforefrontofshapingrecovery.

Althoughstillinthethroesofthepandemic,emergencymanagersknowthetimetoplanforrecoveryisnow(thoughyesterdaywouldhavebeenbetter).Sincethestartofthepandemicwhen frameworkswere revisited, emergencymanagershaveseensomeeventsunfoldasexpected,somekeyelementsbeingmissed,andotherthingsthatwereneverimagined.

This Was Done RightConsideringpre-establishedframeworks,thefollowingcommonrecoveryneedswere

accuratelyidentifiedasapplicabletotheCOVID-19pandemic:

• Leadership – There is a persistent need for clarity about who are in keyleadership positions today and in the long-term. This includes who hasjurisdictionoverwhatpartofresponseversusrecovery,andwhenthetransferofleadershipoccurs.


https://www.pnnl.gov/sites/default/files/media/file/RegionalRecoveryBioAttack201009_0.pdf

https://www.pnnl.gov/sites/default/files/media/file/RegionalRecoveryBioAttack201009_0.pdf

https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1910-25045-8957/51_rrkp_urban_area_recovery_attachment_1_denver_framework___cbr_annexes.pdf

https://www.domesticpreparedness.com/journals/medical-emergencies/



• Information sharing–Technologyhascomealongwaysince2010.However,the core need for consistent, well-informed communications transcendstechnology. The front lines need accurate information, regardless of theirWi-Fistrengthormobiledevice.(Andyes,insomecases,paperstillworksjustfine.)

• Forward planning – The need for forward-planning of personal protectiveequipment(PPE),storagespace,equipment,facilities,etc.becameapparent.Thisyear,PPEbecamethewordofallpeople,not just the languageof firstresponders and constructions sites. Furthermore, there is a need to knowthoseinthesupplychain–notonlyvendorsbutalsobackupvendors,perhapstwotothreelevelsdeep.

• Regional approach – As the pandemic permeates all boundaries, a regionalapproachisessentialforsituationalawarenessandacomprehensiveresponse.

This Was MissedRecovery planning is like trying to tell the future: some hazards and impacts can be

anticipated,withdrillsconductedbasedonrealisticscenariosdesignedaroundassumptionsregardingthefutureofcommunities,technology,etc.,butreallifealwaysbringstheelementofsurprise.InthecaseofCOVID-19,thesurpriseisstilllive.Learningthescienceofthevirusandbuildingsolutionsmustoccursimultaneously.

Tothatend,frameworkswerenot the ultimate crystal ball. Apandemic isadmittedlydifferentfrom the anthrax and weaponsofmass destruction attacks thatUASI addressed. As such, thefollowingwerenotaccountedfor:

• Global impacts–Thisisadisasterwithglobalimpacts,whereasmostdisastersarelocalizedorfinite.

• Behavioral changes–Becausehumanscarrythevirus–not just facilitiesormaterials–recoverywilltakemorethandecontaminationandrebuilding.Itwillrequirebehaviorchanges.

• Limited options–Nothavinganavailableorprovenvaccine,drug,ortherapeuticlimitsoptions.

• Implementation procedures–Communitiesateverylevelseemtobeinconflictonproperactionstotake.Recoveryishinderedwhenresponseeffortsarenotimplementedproperly.

• Decision factors–Thevirusisstillunknown.Withoutknowingenoughtohaveplansrootedinscience,planscanonlybebasedonthelastsimilardisaster.Inthiscase,itissevereacuterespiratorysyndrome(SARS).

Comparing previously developed frameworks with the COVID response has shown expected events, missed opportunities, and things never imagined.




This Was Not ExpectedThepandemichasbroughtwith itsomeunique21stcenturyresponsechallengesand

impacts,whichwillultimatelytransformcommunities’recoveryapproach:

• The human element (psychological impacts) – Individuals and societies areforeverchangedbydisasters.Thatisnotnew.Inthefaceofthisvirus,however,the onus is on the people. Each individual bears the responsibility to limitexposure/transmission, as do employers and communitieswhowant to dothe right thing. Yet,with COVID-19, the “right thing” keeps changing.Maskrecommendations,isolation,andquarantinerestrictionsdrovepeopleinside,wherethepsychologicalimpactsofthisdisasterarefeltinhomes,alone,andonline. For many people, support systems have become virtual: working,communicating, grocery shopping, and ingesting news and safety guidanceonline.Eveneducating(oratleastattemptingtoeducate)childrenonline.

• The business element (economic impacts) – Owners of many companiesessentially closed and walked away from their businesses. Structures areintactwithnophysicaldamage,yettheeconomictollmaybewhatdestroysthem. Compared to natural disasters, afterwhich a businessmay relocate,businessownerscannotopenanywhereelseduetowidespreadlockdowns.Orworse, the ownermayhavediedwithoutmaking arrangements for thebusiness.Citieswillnowneedtomanagetheimpactofnumerousbusinessesthat closed andprotect abandonedproperty in themidst of furloughs andstressedbudgets.Givenincreasedunemploymentandtheinabilityofpeopletopayrentandbillsandbuyfood,socialprogramsthatmanagetheseneedsareoverwhelmed.Ifmajorbusinessesabandonleases,relocatestaff,and/ortransition to fully remote operations, thismay transformbusinessmodels,andbusiness communities, indefinitely– somegood (flexibility, sick leave)andsomebad(impacts to investments inmass transit,publicsafety,smartcities,etc.).

• The information element (communication impacts) – Although effectiveinformationsharingisachallenge,2020maybetheyearofthe“overshare.”Astheyretreatedtotheirhomes,manypeoplelookedtosmartdevicesandsocialmedia tomonitor thesituationandstayconnected.Unfortunately, thesameonlineenvironmentthatsomanyrelyonisalsobecomingaplaceofdissention–an“infodemic.”Thevoidisnowfull–speculationandmisinformationaboundaspeoplefallbackoncollegiateskillstodeterminetrustworthyinformationsources. In recovery, this challenges the dissemination of accurate andconsistent safety communications. Addressing concerns raised in socialmedia that influence response and recovery is an almost daily task, andit is exhausting. This goes beyond guidance for PPE and social distancing.Businesses, managers and employees, teachers and students, even familymemberswillneedthecommunicationsskillstohaveopen,frank,andtoughconversationsaboutsafety,whilelikelyunpackingtheconflictinginformation,beliefs,and/ordoomdataingestedduringquarantine.




Next StepsAfter closures around

the world, now, county bycounty, state by state, evencountry by country, re-entryhasbegun.Safety–atthe individual, community,and business levels – is atthe forefront. In a phasedapproach, there are newdefinitions of essentialand acceptable personneland new requirements forPPE, social distancing, andcleanupinvariousspaces.

However, re-entry does not equal recovery. Wearing masks and going back intobusinessesdonotfixthedamagecausedbylostlovedones,lostincomes,andthemyriad(ifnotunknown)otherrepercussionsofaglobalpandemic.Somuchofthispandemicresponsehasbeenaboutsocialdistancingtotakecareof individuals,butrecoveryrequirestakingcareofindividualstogether.

Whatpreviousframeworksproposed,andisreiteratedhere,istheneedforaconcertedfocusonlong-termrecovery.Asthepandemicpeakremainsamovingtarget,withadditionalwavesrumoredonthehorizon–thisisthetimetorevisitandfitframeworkstothelatestcrisis.Now is the time tosketchoutwhat long-termrecoverymeansbyasking therightquestionsinthefollowingcategories:

• Sustainability:What elements of the newnormalwill need to be sustainedlong-term? What elements could be sustained indefinitely, like workplaceflexibility?

• Economic development:Howwillrecoverybeplannedandconductediftheendofthepandemicisunknown?Whathappensuntilandwhenitissafetoleavehome?Howand/orwillbusinessesresumenormaloperations?

• Health management: Hospitals stopped elective procedures, peoplediscontinuedpreventative/wellness appointments, and in somecasesothertreatmentswerepaused.DespiteincreasedneedforphysicianstotreatCOVIDpatients,hospitalsfaceddetrimentallossesofincome.HowwillthecapacityforbothCOVIDcareandgeneralhealthmanagementbesustained?

• Fatality management: With hundreds of thousands of deaths in the U.S.alone,whatresourcesareneededtoaddressthelong-termimpactsfromtheprojectedfatalities?

• Waste management:Howclean isclean?Howwillbusinessessustainsafetypracticeslong-term?

©iStock.com/arrarorro




• Prioritization:Taxrevenuesareexpected todeclinesharplyandstaydownfor the near term. With limited time and funds, what are the prioritiesfor recovery? What is the decision-making process? What happens withvulnerablepopulations?

• Operations:Basedonwhatisknownaboutpandemics,istheNationalDisasterRecoveryFrameworksuitableorisarewriteneeded?Howcanlessonslearnedaboutthevirusinformfutureoccupationalhealthguidelines?

• Mental health:What are the psychological effects fromprolonged isolation,quarantine, andotherpublic healthmeasures carriedout onnational scaleoverwhatcouldbeyears?Howwillchildrenreact?

• Preparedness:What has been learned?Whatwas done right orwrong, andhowshouldexisting frameworksandplanschange–notonly forbiologicalincidents, but all hazards? How can emergency action plans better reflectchallengeslikefamilycare,finances,etc.?

• Communications:Howcancommunityleaderscountermisinformation,restoretrust, and build the consensus that is needed for recovery to be effective?What is the most effective communication with audiences prone to vastly,generationallydifferentmediaconsumption(i.e.,millennialsvs.boomers)?

• Trust: How will trust be rebuilt – within public health institutions, withincommunities,withineachperson?

Emergencymanagementprofessionalsknowrecoveryoccurswhile response is stillunderwayandmaylastforyears.Recoveryisreplacingwhatwaslost,oftenbeforeitisknownwhatallhasbeenlostorhowlongthedisasterwilllast.Predictionsabouteconomicimpacts are grim. However, with so little experience to draw upon, those predictionscouldbewildlyoffthemark.Previousframeworkslayastrongfoundationforlong-termrecovery–thatiswheretostartonCOVID-19.

Ann Lesperance (pictured above) is the director of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Northwest Regional Technology Center for Homeland Security located in Seattle, Washington. She works with state and local emergency responders and public safety officials to understand and help prioritize their operational needs and requirements. She also has a joint appointment to Northeastern University-Seattle where she leads efforts to build the master’s program in Security and Resilience Studies and Urban Informatics and has a faculty affiliate appointment with the university’s Global Resilience Institute.

Grant Tietje (pictured above) is a national security specialist at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory who focuses on public safety research and development. He manages a series of homeland security projects directed at finding technology solutions for first responders. He has more than 35 years of experience as a paramedic, police officer, and emergency manager. He was previously the director of programs for the Northwest Healthcare Response Network, a non-profit, public-private partnership fostering disaster resilient healthcare community in Western Washington State.

Additional contributions to this article were made by Maren Disney (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory), Heather Kelly (Emergency Manager, City of Kirkland Emergency Management), and Jody Ferguson (Director, Pierce County Emergency Management).





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