consti2 religion.docx

8/13/2019 CONSTI2 Religion.docx

1/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION

[G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937.]

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS PERFORMED WITHOUTJURISDICTION. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue torestrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial function (50 C. J., 658),its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to ". . .inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial orministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board,or person . . .." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)

2.ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS. The term "judicial" and "ministerial" used withreference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challengeact of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to beviolative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction."

3.ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS OR TRIBUNALS. Thestatutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confinedexclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and toprevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, inappropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Notinfrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, orthe prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or amultiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

4.CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. What is guaranteedby our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however,as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denialof its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds andelevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purestprinciples of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

5.ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052. The respondentDirector of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provision of Act No. 4052 of thePhilippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of platesand printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, andauthorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often asmay be deemed advantageous to the Government."

6.ID.; ID.; ID. Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What itgives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of specialpostage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase""advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It doesnot authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use,benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the

postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious

denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman CatholicChurch. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.

7.ID.; ID.; ID. The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertisethe Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely tookadvantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippinesand its people." The stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing aCatholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location ofthe City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,

Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital ofthe Philippines, as the seat of that congress.

8.ID.; ID.; ID. While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be saidto be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any,received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. TheGovernment should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, moreor less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately beundertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by itssubordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S.,295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

D E C I S I O N LAUREL, J p:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the PhilippineIndependent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent therespondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of theThirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that hewould order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manilaof the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. Inspite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent tothe United States the designs of the postage for printing as follows:

"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. Thestamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. Thedenominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36, and 50 centavos." the said stamps were actually issued andsold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps issought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legalremedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerialfunctions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain orcontrol the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 658), itsissuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to ". . .inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial orministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board,or person . . .." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial"used with reference to "functions" in the s tatute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include thechallenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged

to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." Thestatutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined


2/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONexclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and toprevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals but will issue, inappropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Notinfrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, orto prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or amultiplicity of actions," (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of theConstitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the

Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent isviolative of the provisions of section 13, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, whichprovides as follows:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support ofany sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system ofreligion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except whensuch priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armedforces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separationof church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of thisprinciple in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of

mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasionsmight arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in thefurtherance of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principleof separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it wasinserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898,reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in thePhilippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in theConstitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the F ilipino People. It is almost triteto say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of theGovernment, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend theConstitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religiousfreedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what isguaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition ofprofound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as aprofession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized.And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeplyfelt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody theirideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, andsecure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice,liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placedunfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevatinginfluence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain generalconcessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitutionand laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14,

subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto;Assessment Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest,

preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces orto any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of thePhilippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandateallowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad. Code).Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legalholidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive tobeneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certaincrimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state(see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued thepostage stamps in question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. thisAct is as follows:

No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTYTHOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANYFUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FORTHE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEWDESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representativesof the Philippines in legislature assembled and by the authority of thesame:

"SECTION 1.The sum of sixty thousand pesos is herebyappropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in theInsular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the cost of plates, andprinting of postage stamps with new designs, and other expensesincident thereto.

"SECTION 2.The Director of Posts, with the approval ofthe Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorizedto dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount hereinappropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemedadvantageous to the Government.

"SECTION 3.This amount or any portion thereof nototherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

"SECTION 4.This act shall take effect on its approval.

"Approved, February 21, 1933."

It will be seen that the Act appropriate the sum of s ixty thousand pesos for the costof plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto,and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often asmay be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postagestamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippinesin a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A.The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writprayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stampsin question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worthP1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Directorof Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps


3/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONwould be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to theGovernment" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize theappropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of aparticular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps inquestion by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was notinspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. Thestamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were moneyderived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from theletter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's

complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippinesand attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of anevent considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"(Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications in the President of thePhilippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps asactually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originallyplanned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and aninscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What isemphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as theseat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question maybe said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, ifany, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. Weare of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply becauseof incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which

could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not befrustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs.Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner tomaintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringeby indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religiousintolerance and persecution, care should be taken that at this stage of our political developmentnothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the G overnmentis taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very seriousreflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we havecome to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act. No.4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works andCommunications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may bedeemed advantageous to the Government. "Even if we were to assume that these officials made

use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of thepetitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and theunconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court insetting aside the official act assailed a s coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a wr it of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs.So ordered.


4/35


[G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.]

ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS DAGAR andJESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge ofthe Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL ofValencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, CouncilmenGAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay

Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR,respondents.

SYNOPSIS

A wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised bymeans of solicitations and cash donations pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of said council, duly ratified bythe barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feastday of the saint. The image was brought to the Catholic parish church during the saint's feast day asper Resolution No. 6 which also designated the hermano mayor as the custodian of the image. Afterthe fiesta, however, petitioner parish priest refused to return custody of the image to the council untilafter the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required bond.The parish priest and his co-petitioners thereafter filed an action for annulment of the council's

resolutions relating to the subject image contending that when they were adopted, the barangaycouncil was not duly constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was n ot allowed toparticipate; and that they contravened the constitutional provisions on separation of church andstate. freedom of religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church. The lower courtdismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the resolution.

On petition for review, the Supreme Court held, that the absence of the Kabataang Barangaychairman, despite due notice from the sessions of the barangay council, did not render the resolutionsthen adopted void since there was a quorum; and that the questioned resolutions did not contraveneany constitutional provision since the image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money,and in connection with a socio-religious affair, the celebration of which is an ingrained tradition inrural communities.

Judgment of the lower court a ffirmed.

SYLLABUS

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; LOCAL AUTONOMY;BARANGAY; BARANGAY COUNCIL; COMPOSITION THEREOF. The barrio council, now barangaycouncil, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A.No. 3590). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that"the barangay youth chairman shall be ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the samepowers and functions as a barangay councilman.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE IN SESSION OF DULY NOTIFIED MEMBER DOES NOT RENDERRESOLUTION ADOPTED DURING SAID SESSION VOID IF THERE WAS A QUORUM. In the case at bar,the absence of the barangay youth chairman from the sessions of the barangay council when the

questioned resolutions were adopted, did not render said resolutions void, because there was aquorum and he was duly notified of said sessions.

3.ID.; SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; BARANGAY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION PROVIDING FORPURCHASE OF SAINT'S IMAGE WITH PRIVATE FUNDS IN CONNECTION WITH BARANGAY FIESTA,CONSTITUTIONAL. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, "revivingthe traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor SanVicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image ofSan Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects, funds forwhich would be obtained through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly orindirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit ofany sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The

construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image was purchased inconnection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, andnot for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious beliefs of the barrioresidents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patronsaint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothingunconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activityintended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image)cannot be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Itscelebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony anddrudgery of the lives of the masses.

4.ID.; ID.; BARANGAY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION DESIGNATING CUSTODIAN OF SAINT'S IMAGE WHICHWAS BOUGHT WITH COUNCIL'S PRIVATE FUNDS IN CONNECTION WITH BARRIO FIESTA, VALID ANDCONSTITUTIONAL. Resolution No. 6 of the Barangay Council of Valenzuela, Ormoc City, adopted in

connection with Resolution No. 5 (providing for the purchase of an image of San Vicente Ferrer withfunds from solicitations and cash donations) and which specified that, in accordance with the practicein Eastern Leyte, the chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the imageof San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until theelection of his successor as chairman of the next fiesta, and that the image would be made availableto the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day, does not involve at all,even remotely or indirectly, the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom ofreligion and the use of public money to favor any sect or church, contrary to the contradictorypositions of the petitioners petitioner Garces swearing that the said resolutions favored theCatholic Church, and petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swearing that the resolutions prejudiced theCatholics because they could sec the image in the church only once a year during the fiesta. There canbe no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmea's claimthat it belongs to the church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right todetermine who should have custody thereof. The barangay council designated a layman as thecustodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholicchurch. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman'scustody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection withprayers and novenas. If the council chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to theCatholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired withprivate funds and is its pr ivate property.

5. ID.; ID.; BARANGAY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE HIRING OF A LAWYER TO FILEREPLEVIN CASE AND APPOINTING REPRESENTATIVE IN SAID CASE; VALID. The barangay council ofValencia has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image of San Vicente Ferrer,which is its private property, from the parish priest of Valenzuela by enacting Resolution No. 10,authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmea for the recovery of theimage, as well as Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case.

6.ID.; ID.; NOT ALL GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY HAVING RELIGIOUS TINT VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTION. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which hassome religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and


5/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONstate, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. (Sec Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64Phil. 201)

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO, J p:

This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, OrmocCity, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in thecelebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether theparish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image. Cdpr

On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditionalsocio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, thepatron saint of Valencia."

That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976festivity. It provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the constructionof a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained throughthe "selling of tickets and cash donations" (Exh. A or 6).

On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordancewith the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the chairman or hermano mayor ofthe fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image wouldremain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the nextfeast day.

It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholicparish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day (Exh. B or 7).

Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified by the barangaygeneral assembly on March 26, 1976. Two hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions(Exh. 2 and 5).

Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and thoseof the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and thewooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for fourhundred pesos (Exh. F-1, 3 and 4).

On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of BarangayValencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. cdphil

A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused toreturn that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the churchbecause church funds were used for its acquisition.

Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, FatherOsmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso,apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file againstFather Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.

Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor'soffice and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of

immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.

Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. BecauseFather Osmea did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and"maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 ResolutionNo. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmea for therecovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 12,appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9).

The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmea and Bishop CiprianoUrgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, FatherOsmea turned over the image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). In his answer to the complaint forreplevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).

Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and twoCatholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and itsmembers (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, prayingfor the annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).

The lower court dismissed the complaint. It upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitionersappealed under Republic Act No. 5440.

The petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because Isidoro M.

Maago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions.LibLex

Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A).Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on September 21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed thatall barrios should be known as barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the BarangayCharter.

Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers" as are provided by law "for the performance ofparticular government functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governmentsin conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590).

The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six months,eighteen years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly registered in the list kept by the barriosecretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).

The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen(Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, providesthat "the barangay youth chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having thesame powers and functions as a barangay councilman.

In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangaycouncil to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because hewas working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d], Exh. 1).

Maago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void.There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed.

The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutionalprovisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public


6/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONmoney or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for theuse, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher ordignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armedforces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium" (Sec. 8, Article IV andsec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution). prcd

That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectlyestablish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the

benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with taxmoney. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.

Manifestly puerile and flimsy is petitioners' argument that the barangay council favored the Catholicreligion by using the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint'swooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church.

The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advancedthat argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmea, the parish priest.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring thepatron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering withreligious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta wasthe mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass

was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for thebarrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisitionand display of his image) cannot be b randed as illegal.

As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is aningrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives ofthe masses.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestallany suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangementwould be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any familydesiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces sworethat the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar andEdullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image inthe church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).

We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion and the useof public money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely orindirectly. It is not a microcosmic test case on those issues.

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. It would never have arisen if theparties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmea had taken the trouble of causingcontributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of SanVicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.

There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. FatherOsmea's claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image,

has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. cdrep

If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church, that actionwould not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is itsprivate property.

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting ResolutionsNos. 10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has somereligious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixtythousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs.

Under that law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department Head and the President ofthe Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rdInternational Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.

The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design of thestamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No religious purposewas intended.

Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought toenjoin the sale of those commemorative postage stamps.

It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religiouscharacter, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit wasdismissed. llcd

The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil. 627 and 55 Phil. 307,where a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the pu rposeof raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament andthe Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it held as trustee.

Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay resolutions,

the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED


7/35


[G.R. No. L-9637. April 30, 1957.]

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellee.

SYLLABUS 1.STATUTES; SIMULTANEOUS REPEAL AND RE-ENACTMENT; EFFECT OF REPEAL

UPON RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES WHICH ACCRUED UNDER THE ORIGINAL STATUTE. Where theold statute is repealed in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enacts all or certain portionsof the pre-existing law, the majority view holds that the rights and liabilities which have accruedunder the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the re-enactment neutralizesthe repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption. (Crawford, StatutoryConstruction, Sec. 322). In the case at bar, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 of the City of Manilawere enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it bysection 2444, Subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 13, 1949,by section 13, Subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City ofManila. The only essential difference between these two provisions is that while Subsection (m-2)prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated underSubsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shallnot be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding Section 18, subsection (o) of Republic ActNo. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retaildealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of authorities

aforementioned, City ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000 are still in force and effect.

2.MUNICIPAL TAX; RETAIL DEALERS IN GENERAL MERCHANDISE; ORDINANCEPRESCRIBING TAX NEED NOT BE APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT TO BE EFFECTIVE. The businessof "retail dealers in general merchandise" is expressly enumerated in subsection (o), section 18 ofRepublic Act No. 409: hence, an ordinance prescribing a municipal tax on said business does nothave to be approved by the President to be effective, as it is not among those businesses referredto in subsection (ii) Section 18 of the same Act subject to the approval of the President.

3.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM; DISSEMINATION OF RELIGIOUSINFORMATION, WHEN MAY BE RESTRAINED; PAYMENT OF LICENSE FEE, IMPAIRS FREE EXERCISEOF RELIGION. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religiousprofession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraintof such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the groundsthat there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to

prevent." (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). Inthe case at bar, plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sales of bibles and religious articles. TheCity Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of generalmerchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, inviolation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, and requiredplaintiff to secure the corresponding permit and license. Plaintiff protested against thisrequirement and claimed that it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. Held: It is truethe price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actualcost of the same, but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the b usiness or occupation ofselling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reasons, the provisions of City Ordinance No. 2529,as amended, which requires the payment of license fee for conducting the business of generalmerchandise, cannot be applied to plaintiff society, for in doing so, it would impair its free exerciseand enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination ofreligious beliefs. Upon the other hand, City Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the

obtention of the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades oroccupations enumerated therein, does not impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right

granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. Hence, it cannot beconsidered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 is notapplicable to plaintiff and the City of Manila is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiffsociety involved herein, for the reasons above stated, Ordinance No. 3000 is also inapplicable tosaid business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

D E C I S I O N

FELIX, J p:

Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionarycorporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agencyestablished in Manila in November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City.The defendant-appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised inconformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the Cityof Manila.

In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing andselling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughoutthe Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29, 1953, theacting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business ofgeneral merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor'spermit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and OrdinancesNos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three d ays, the correspondingpermit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded thatplaintiff deposit and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in courtregarding the same (Annex B). To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines andpenalties in the premises, on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest thesaid permit and license fees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time notice to theCity Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances underwhich the said fees were being collected (Annex C), which was done on the same date by filing thecomplaint that gave rise to this action. In its complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered

declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028and 3364 illegal and unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiffthe sum of P5,891.45 paid under protest, together with legal interest thereon, and the costs,plaintiff further praying for such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just andequitable.

Defendant answered the complaint, maintaining in turn that said ordinanceswere enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to itby section 2444, subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18,1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter ofthe City of Manila, and praying that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff.This answer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances.

Before trial the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

"COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, thrutheir undersigned attorneys and respectfully submit the following


8/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONstipulation of facts:

1.That the plaintiff sold for the use of the purchasers atits principal office at 636 Isaac Peral, Manila, Bibles, New Testaments,bible portions and bible concordance in English and other foreignlanguages imported by it from the United States as well as Bibles, NewTestaments and bible portions in the local dialects imported and/orpurchased locally; that from the fourth quarter of 1945 to the firstquarter of 1953 inclusive the sales made by the plaintiff were as follows:

QuarterAmount of Sales

4th quarter 1945P1,244.21 1st quarter 19462,206.85 2nd quarter19461,950.38 3rd quarter 19462,235.99 4th quarter 19463,256.04 1stquarter 194713,241.07 2nd quarter 194715,774.55 3rd quarter194714,654.13 4th quarter 194712,590.94 1st quarter194811,143.90 2nd quarter 194814,715.26 3rd quarter194838,333.83 4th quarter 194816,179.90 1st quarter194923,975.10 2nd quarter 194917,802.08 3rd quarter194916,640.79 4th quarter 194915,961.38 1st quarter195018,562.46 2nd quarter 195021,816.32 3rd quarter195025,004.55 4th quarter 195045,287.92 1st quarter195137,841.21 2nd quarter 195129,103.98 3rd quarter195120,181.10 4th quarter 195122,968.91 1st quarter

195223,002.65

2nd quarter 195217,626.96

3rd quarter195217,921.01 4th quarter 195224,180.72 1st quarter 195329,516.21

2.That the parties hereby reserve the right to presentevidence of other facts not herein stipulated.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be setfor hearing so that the parties may present further evidence on theirbehalf (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-16)".

When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff proved, among other things, that it hasbeen in existence in the Philippines since 1899, and that its parent society is in New York, UnitedStates of America; that its contiguous real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from realestate taxes; and that it was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war,nor does the American Bible Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for thesale of bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the saleof its bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintainits operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntarycontributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the United States and in the Philippines,which are interested in its missionary work. Regarding plaintiff's contention of lack of profit in thesale of bibles, defendant retorts that the admissions of plaintiff-appellant's lone witness whotestified on cross-examination that bibles bearing the price of 70 cents each from plaintiff-appellant's New York office are sold here by plaintiff- appellant at P1.30 each; those bearing theprice of $4.50 each are sold here at P10 each; those bearing the price of $7 each are sold here atP15 each; and those bearing the price of $11 each are sold here at P22 each, clearly show thatplaintiff's contention that it never makes any profit from the sale of its bible, is evidentlyuntenable.

After hearing the Court rendered judgment, the last part of which is as follows:

"As may be seen from the repealed section (m-2) of the

Revised Administrative Code and the repealing portions (o) of section 18of Republic Act No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the way thelegislative intent is expressed, yet their meaning is practically the samefor the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legalprovisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in thenature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 3000, asamended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as amended byOrdinance No. 3364).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, thisCourt is of the opinion and so holds that this case should be dismissed,as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merits, with costs against theplaintiff."

Not satisfied with this verdict plaintiff took up the matter to the Court of Appealswhich certified the case to Us for the reason that the errors assigned to the lower Court involvedonly questions of law.

Appellant contends that the lower Court erred:

1.In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, asrespectively amended, are not unconstitutional;

2.In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444 of theRevised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos. 2529 and

3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of Republic ActNo. 409;

3.In not holding that an ordinance providing forpercentage taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to be validunder the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be approved bythe President of the Philippines; and

4.In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial proportions, it cannot escape fromthe operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religiousprivilege.

The issues. As may be seen from the preceding statement of the case, the issuesinvolved in the present controversy may be reduced to the following: (1) whether or not the

ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, areconstitutional and valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not tothe case at bar.

Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution of the Republic of thePhilippines, provides that:

"(7)No law shall be made respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exerciseand enjoyment of religious profession and worship, withoutdiscrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion testshall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends thatOrdinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are unconstitutional and illegal in so faras its society is concerned, because they provide for religious censorship and restrain the freeexercise and enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and


9/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONother religious literature to the people of the Philippines.

Before entering into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, We shallfirst consider the provisions of the questioned ordinances in relation to their application to thesale of bibles, etc. by appellant. The records show that by letter of May 29, 1953 (Annex A), theCity Treasurer required plaintiff to secure a Mayor's permit in connection with the society'salleged business of distributing and selling bibles, etc. and to pay permit dues in the sum of P35for the period covered in this litigation, plus the sum of P35 for compromise on account ofplaintiff's failure to secure the permit required by Ordinance No. 3000 of the City of Manila, asamended. This Ordinance is of general application and not particularly directed against institutionslike the plaintiff, and it does not contain any provisions whatsoever prescribing religiouscensorship nor restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. Section 1of Ordinance No. 3000 reads as follows:

"SEC. 1.PERMITS NECESSARY. It shall be unlawful forany person or entity to conduct or engage in any of the businesses,trades, or occupations enumerated in Section 3 of this Ordinance orother businesses, trades, or occupations for which a permit is requiredfor the proper supervision and enforcement of existing laws andordinances governing the sanitation, security, and welfare of the publicand the health of the employees engaged in the business specified insaid section 3 hereof, WITHOUT FIRST HAVING OBTAINED A PERMITTHEREFOR FROM THE MAYOR AND THE NECESSARY LICENSE FROM THECITY TREASURER."

The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is notparticularly mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permitis required therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the proper supervision andenforcement of their provisions governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public andthe health of the employees engaged in the business of the plaintiff. However, section 3 ofOrdinance 3000 contains item No. 79, which reads as follows:

"79.All other businesses, trades or occupations notmentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which the City is notempowered to license or to tax . . . P5.00".

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of theCity to license or tax said business, trade or occupation.

As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila required the societyto pay from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 1st quarter of 1953 in the sum of P5,821.45, includingthe sum of P50 as compromise, Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821and 3028 prescribes the following:

"SEC. 1.FEES. Subject to the provisions of section 578of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila, as amended, there shallbe paid to the City Treasurer for engaging in any of the businesses oroccupations below enumerated, quarterly, license fees based on grosssales or receipts realized during the preceding quarter in accordancewith the rates herein prescribed: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a personengaged in any business or occupation for the first time shall pay theinitial license fee based on the probable gross sales or receipts for thefirst quarter beginning from the date of the opening of the business asindicated herein for the corresponding business or occupation.

xxx xxx xxx

GROUP 2. Retail dealers in new (not yet used)merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of anymunicipal tax, such as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise; (2) retaildealers exclusively engaged in the sale of . . . books, including stationery.

xxx xxx xxx

As may be seen, the license fees required to be paid quarterly- in Section 1 of saidOrdinance No. 2529, as amended, are not imposed directly upon any religious institution but uponthose engaged in any of the business or occupations therein enumerated, such as retail "dealers ingeneral merchandise" which, it is alleged, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles, books,etc.

Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code which includes section 2444,subsection (m-2) of said legal body, as amended by Act No. 3659, approved on December 8, 1929,empowers the Municipal Board of the City of Manila:

"(M-2)To tax and fix the license fee on (a) dealers in newautomobiles or accessories or both, and (b) retail dealers in new (not yetused) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the payment of anymunicipal tax.

"For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall beclassified as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise, and (2) retail dealersexclusively engaged in the sale of (a) textiles . . . (e) books, including

stationery paper and office supplies . . . PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That thecombined total tax of any debtor or manufacturer, or both, enumeratedunder these subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether dealing in one or all ofthe articles mentioned herein, SHALL NOT BE IN EXCESS OF FIVE HUNDREDPESOS PER ANNUM."

and appellee's counsel maintains that City Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, wereenacted in virtue of the power that said Act No. 3669 conferred upon the City of Manila.Appellant, however, contends that said ordinances are no longer in force and effect as the lawunder which they were promulgated has been expressly repealed by Section 102 of Republic ActNo. 409 passed on June 18, 1949, known as the Revised Manila Charter.

Passing upon this point the lower Court categorically stated that Republic Act No.409 expressly repealed the provisions of Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code but in theopinion of the trial Judge, although Section 244 (m-2) of the former Manila Charter and section 18

(o) of the new seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent was expressed, yet their meaningis practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in both legalprovisions and, consequently, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, are to be consideredas still in full force and effect uninterruptedly up to the present.

"Often the legislature, instead of simply amending thepreexisting statute, will repeal the old statute in its entirety and by the sameenactment re-enact all or certain portions of the preexisting law. Of course,the problem created by this sort of legislative action involves mainly theeffect of the repeal upon rights and liabilities which accrued under theoriginal statute. Are those rights and liabilities destroyed or preserved? Theauthorities are divided as to the effect of simultaneous repeals and re-enactments. Some adhere to the view that the rights and liabilities accruedunder the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes from which theysprang are actually terminated, even though for only a very short period oftime. Others, and they seem to be in the majority, refuse to accept this view


10/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONof the situation, and consequently maintain that all rights and liabilitieswhich have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may beenforced, since the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal, thereforecontinuing the law in force without interruption". (Crawford-StatutoryConstruction, Sec. 322).

Appellant's counsel states that section 18 (o) of Republic Act No. 409 introduces anew and wider concept of taxation and is so different from the provisions of Section 2444(m-2)that the former cannot be considered as a substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the latter.We have quoted above the provisions of section 2444 (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Codeand We shall now copy hereunder the provisions of Section 18, subdivision (o) of Republic Act No.409, which reads as follows:

"(o)To tax and fix the license fee on dealers in generalmerchandise, including importers and indentors, except those dealerswho may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipaltax under the provisions of this section.

Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a)wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retaildealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes:namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essentialcommodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license sh all beprescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes aresold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the ownerto secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate oftax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license taxas such, as may be provided by ordinance.

For purposes of this section, the term 'Generalmerchandise' shall include poultry and livestock, agricultural products,fish and other allied products."

The only essential difference that We find between these two provisions that mayhave any bearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combinedtotal tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m- 2),whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 perannum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain anylimitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum.

Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that"all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may beenforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in forcewithout interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still inforce and effect.

Plaintiff, however, argues that the questioned ordinances, to be valid, must first beapproved by the President of the Philippines as per section 18, subsection (ii) of Republic Act No.409, which reads as follows:

"(ii) To tax, license and regulate any business, trade oroccupation being conducted within the City of Manila, not otherwiseenumerated in the preceding subsections, including percentage taxesbased on gross sales or receipts, subject to the approval of thePRESIDENT, except amusement taxes."

but this requirement of the President's approval was not contained in section 2444 of the former

Charter of the City of Manila under which Ordinance No. 2529 was promulgated. Anyway, asstated by appellee's counsel, the business of "retail dealers in general merchandise" is expresslyenumerated in subsection (o), section 18 of Republic Act No. 409; hence, an ordinance prescribinga municipal tax on said business does not have to be approved by the President to be effective, asit is not among those referred to in said subsection (ii). Moreover, the questioned ordinances arestill in force, having been promulgated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila under theauthority granted to it by law.

The question that now remains to be determined is whether said ordinances areinapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of distribution and saleof bibles to the people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society,plaintiff herein.

With regard to Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821and 3028, appellant contends that it is unconstitutional and illegal because it restrains the freeexercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant.

Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted,guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as 'aprofession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator' (Aglipay vs. Ruiz,64 Phil., 201). It has reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligationsthey impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason,133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religiousprofession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraintof such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the groundsthat there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right toprevent". (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). Inthe case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution andsale of bibles and other religious literature.

"In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held thatan ordinance requiring that a license be obtained before a person couldcanvass or solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares ormerchandise cannot be made to apply to members of Jehovah'sWitnesses who went about from door to door distributing literature andsoliciting people to 'purchase' certain religious books and pamphlets, allpublished by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society. The 'price' of thebooks was twenty-five cents each, the 'price' of the pamphlets five centseach. It was shown that in making the solicitations there was a request

for additional 'contribution' of twenty-five cents each for the books andfive cents each for the pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted, however,and books were even donated in case interested persons were withoutfunds.

On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it couldnot be said that petitioners were engaged in commercial rather than areligious venture. Their activities could not be described as embraced inthe occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Courtcontinued:

'We do not mean to say that religious groups and thepress are free from all financial burdens of government. See Grosjean vs.American Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56 S. Ct. 444.We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on theincome of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on propertyused or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to


11/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONimpose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite anotherthing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon.The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment ofwhich is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges.The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control orsuppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of thisreligious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of theresources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax theprivilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all

its doors to all 'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religiousbeliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied theneedy. . . .

It is contended however that the fact that the license taxcan suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so.But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax a flattax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . .. The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms isindeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court hasrepeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal fee imposed as aregulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities inquestion. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied andcollected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment isguaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion andinevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformlyrecognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.'

Nor could dissemination of religious information beconditioned upon the approval of an official or manager even if the townwere owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State ofAlabama (326 U.S. 501) or by the United States itself as held in the caseof Tucker vs. Texas (326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Courtexpressed the opinion that the right to enjoy freedom of the press andreligion occupies a preferred position as against the constitutional rightof property owners.

'When we balance the constitutional rights of owners ofproperty against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press andreligion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latteroccupy a preferred position. . . . In our view the circumstance that theproperty rights to the premises where the deprivation of property hereinvolved, took place, were held by others than the public, is notsufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern acommunity of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties andthe enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute.'"(Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4thed., p. 304-306).

Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the NationalInternal Revenue Code, provides:

"SEC. 27.EXEMPTIONS FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS. The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respectto income received by them as such

"(e)Corporations or associations organized and operatedexclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . .Provided however, That the income of whatever kind and characterfrom any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activityconducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income,shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Code;"

Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has exempted theplaintiff from this tax and says that such exemption clearly indicates that the act of distributingand selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and does not fall under the above legal provisions.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and otherreligious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, butthis cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said"merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of ManilaOrdinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impairits free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights ofdissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention ofthe Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupationsenumerated therein, We do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a rightgranted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. In the case of Coleman vs.City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this point was elucidated as follows:

"An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that thepractice of distributing either by hand or otherwise, circulars,handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articlesare being delivered free, or whether same are being sold within the citylimits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permissionfrom the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be deemed a nuisanceand punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin, does not deprivedefendant of his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoymentof religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him fromintroducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit toclaim as a part of his religious system."

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be consideredunconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of

Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerlessto license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it wouldimpair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship,as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, asamended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decisionappealed from, sentencing defendant to return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collectedfrom it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.


12/35


13/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGIONmay, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that advocates dangerous ideas, speechthat provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court contempt and release of information thatendangers a fair trial. Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason toapply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks otherreligions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religioustruths disturb and disturb terribly.

11.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE APPLIES TO VIDEO TAPES THAT ARE PRE-TAPED. It is also opined that it isinappropriate to apply the clear and p resent danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves

the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech isfirst allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and theevil apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at barinvolves videotape that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is known and not an Xquantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to assume that therespondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about thesubstantive evil feared by the law.

12.ID.; CONGRESS; MAY GRANT ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER TO PREVIEW ANDCLASSIFY T.V. PROGRAMS. We are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for Congress to grantan administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV programs and enforce itsdecision subject to review by our court.

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting opinion:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF RELIGION; THERE CAN BE NOPRIOR RESTRAINTS IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF. In this country there can be no prior restraints onthe exercise of free speech, expression or religion, unless such exercises poses a clear and presentdanger of a substantive evil which the State has the right and even the duty to prevent. The banagainst such prior restraints will result, as it has resulted in the past, in occasional abuses of freespeech and expression but it is immeasurably preferable to experience such occasional abuses ofspeech and expression than to arm a governmental administrative agency with the authority tocensor speech and expression in accordance with legislative standards which albeit apparentlylaudable in their nature, can very well be bent or stretched by such agency to convenient latitudes asto frustrate and eviscerate the precious freedoms of speech and expression.

MELO, J., concurring and dissenting opinion:

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; DENOTES RIGHT TO DISSEMINATERELIGIOUS INFORMATION; PRIOR RESTRICTION ON RIGHT TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION, ARESTRICTION ON RIGHT OF RELIGION. The enjoyment of the freedom of religion is always coupledwith the freedom of expression. For the profession of faith inevitably carries with it, as a necessaryappendage, the prerogative of propagation. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise andenjoyment of religious profession and worship thus denotes the right to disseminate religiousinformation (American Bible Society vs. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 [1957]). Any prior restrictionupon a religious expression would be a restriction on the right of religion. We recognize the role andthe deep influence that religion plays in our community. No less than the fundamental law of the landacknowledges the elevating influence of religion by imploring the aid of almighty God to build a justand humane society. Any restriction that is to be placed upon this right must be applied with greatestcaution.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; GROUND FOR PRIOR RESTRAINT. Freedom of religion and expression is the rule andits restriction, the exception. Any prior restriction on the exercise of the freedom to profess religiousfaith and the propagation thereof will unduly diminish that religion's authority to spread what itbelieves to be the sacred truth. The State can exercise no power to restrict such right until the

exercise thereof traverses the point that will endanger the order of civil society. Thus we have ruled inthe case of Ebralinag vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (219 SCRA 270 [1993]): Thesole justification for a given restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existenceof a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to publicsafety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the state has the rightand duty to prevent. Correspondingly, the MTRCB has no authority to use as standard, the dangeroustendency rule, which we have long abandoned, and for which reason, the dangerous tendencystandard under Subparagraph C, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1986 has no place in our statutebooks.

KAPUNAN, J., concurring and dissenting opinion:

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; CANNOT BE SUBJECT TO PRIOR RESTRAINT BY THEBOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION (now MTRCB). While I concur in theresult of the majority's decision reversing that of the Court of Appeals insofar as it set aside the actionof respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner's TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119 and 121 with due respect,I cannot agree with its opinion that respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television(now MTRCB) has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." The religious TVprogram enjoys the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of religion, and of speech and expression,and cannot be subject to prior restraint by the Board by virtue of its power and functions underSection 3, P.D. 1986. It is my submission that the government, under the guise of its regulatorypowers in the censorship law (P.D. 1986 and its corresponding implementing rules and regulations),does not have the power to interfere with the exercise of religious expression in film or t elevision byrequiring the submission of the video tapes of petitioner's religious program before their publicviewing, absent a showing of a compelling state interest that overrides the constitutional protectionof the freedom of expression and worship. Even if government can demonstrate a compelling stateinterest, it would only burden such fundamental right like the free exercise of religion by the leastintrusive means possible. There is no demonstration here of any sufficient state interest to justify theinfringement.

2.ID.; ID.; RELIGIOUS SECT OR DENOMINATION ALLOWED FREE CHOICE OF UTILIZING MEDIA INDISSEMINATING RELIGIOUS INFORMATION. The freedom to disseminate religious information is aright protected by the free exercise clause of the Constitution. It encompasses a wide range of ideasand takes many forms. In the process of enlightening the adherents or convincing non-believers of thetruth of its beliefs, a religious sect or denomination is allowed the free choice of utilizing variousmedia, including pulpit or podium, print, television film, and the electronic mail.

3.ID.; ID.; ENTITLED TO THE HIGHEST PRIORITY AND GENERALLY INSULATED FROM COURT ACTION. It is settled that religious freedom is a fundamental right entitled to the highest priority and amplestprotection among human rights. Because of its exalted position in our hierarchy of civil rights, therealm of religious belief is generally insulated from state action, and state interference with suchbelief is allowed only in extreme cases.

4.ID.; ID.; CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL, SOLE JUSTIFICATION FOR PRIORRESTRAINT OR LIMITATION. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held that anyrestraint on the right to disseminate religious information "can only be justified like other r estraints offreedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evilwhich the State has the right to prevent." Affirming the use of this "clear and present danger"standard in cases involving religious freedom and worship, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankeewarned that "[t]he sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religiousfreedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent of aserious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, thatthe State has a right (and duty) to prevent."


14/35

CONSTI 2 FREEDOM OF RELIGION5.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION; POWER TOPROHIBIT EXHIBITION OF TELEVISION BROADCASTS AND TV PROGRAMS; PETITIONER'S RELIGIOUSPROGRAM ON TV, NOT OBJECTIONABLE AND THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO CENSORSHIP. UnderSection 3 of P.D. 1986 the MTRCB, while nominally a classification board, is granted the power notonly to classify, but also to approve or disapprove/prohibit exhibition of film or television broadcastsof motion pictures and TV programs. Petitioner's religious programs, which in their very essence andcharacterization are the exercise of religious freedom, cannot possibly come under the category of theobjectionable matters enumerated in Section 3(c) of P.D. 1986 or analogous thereto. It is not likelythat propagation of religion which has been spoken of as "a profession of faith that binds and elevates

man to his Creator" will involve pornography, excessive violence or danger to national security.Significantly, the enumeration in Section 3(c) does not include the standard "attack against anyreligion" as among those considered objectionable and subject to censorship.

6.STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; SPECIFIC STANDARD FOLLOWING A GENERALENUMERATION CANNOT GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE LATTER. While the law's enumeration isconcededly not exclusive, inclusion of other standards should be made in the strict context of thewords "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs." Specific standards following ageneral enumeration cannot go beyond the scope of the latter.

7.ID.; CENSORSHIP LAW; WORD "INDECENT" CONFINED TO OBSCENITY REGULATION. The word"indecent" in censorship law has a narrow meaning, confined to obscenity regulation. It cannot beconveniently employed as a catch-all term embracing all forms of expression considered noxious bythe Board.

8.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; P.D. 1986; OMISSION OF "ATTACK AGAINST ANY RELIGION," MANIFESTINTENTION TO DO AWAY WITH THAT STANDARD. In the light of what the Solicitor Generaldescribes as the "transitional" nature of P.D. 1986, the better view would be that the omission of"attack against any religion" among the enumerated standards was intentional and part of theevolving process of fashioning a system of strict classification of films and television programs asopposed to censorship. As this phrase was ubiquitous in the old censorhip law (particularly E.O. 868and E.O. 876), its elimination in P.D. 1986 expresses the manifest intention of the law-makingauthority to do away with the standard.

9.ID.; ID.; PHRASE "CONTRARY TO LAW" CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD TO REFER TOARTICLE 201 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. The phrase "contrary to law" cannot and should not beunderstood to refer to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as respondents mistakenly suggest.Article 201 deals with the subject of subsequent punishment; P.D. 1986 clearly treats with analtogether different matter prior restraint and censorship. The two laws stand at opposite poles inthe continuum of regulation and punishment.

10.REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; DETERMINATION OF QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOTVILIFICATIONS, EXAGGERATION FALLS WITHIN OR LIES OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF FREE SPEECHAND EXPRESSION, A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. We are faced with a case of censorship and restraintwhich, I stated earlier, touches upon one of the most private and sensitive of domains: the realm ofreligious freedom, thought and expression. In this domain, sharp differences may arise such that thetenets of one individual may seem the "rankest error" to his neighbor. In the process of persuadingothers about the validity of his point of

consti2 religion.docx

Documents