consti2 liberty
TRANSCRIPT
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CONSTI 2 LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
[G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.]
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, F ERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M.ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICOE. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAMDEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretaryof Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively,respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY, NOT AMONG THE
RIGHTS GUARANTEED. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
2.ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW. It is the court's well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of international law and under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
3.ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN, DISTINCT AND SEPARATE FROM THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. It is distinct
and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
4.ID.; ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT A GRANT OF ALL THE
POWERS INHERENT THERETO. As the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)]
pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the
judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government."
[At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a
combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested
in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official
the President.
5.ID.; PRESIDENT'S POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; EXTENT AND LIMITATION.
Consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different
constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the
President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations
on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered
as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
6.ID.; PRESIDENT'S RESIDUAL POWER TO PROTECT THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE; THE
POWERS INVOLVED. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to doanything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The
President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds
of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative
want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
7.ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE
PHILIPPINES; TO BE TREATED AS ADDRESSED TO THE RESIDUAL UNSTATED POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abodeand the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In
that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
8.ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; POWER TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. The present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show
that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of
justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, theConstitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
9.ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL OF REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN
TO THE PHILIPPINES, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We find that from the pleadings filed by
the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein
petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country,
as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more
chaos. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously
and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: dissenting:
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; ITS PROVISIONS PROTECT ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES AND
UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. "The Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866]).
2.ID.; POLITICAL QUESTIONS; OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION. It is a well-settled
doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or
statutory provisions.
3.ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to
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CONSTI 2 LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
determine what matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie
outside the scope of the judicial power. More properly, however, it means those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.
4.ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL POWER VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS, BEYOND
PROHIBITION OR EXAMINATION BY THE COURT REQUIRED FOR ITS EXISTENCE. For a political
question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or
Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary orinherent power against a civil right which claim is not found in a specific provision is dangerous.
Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public officials to strike where they please
and to override everything which to them represents evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule
of law. The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist because no law has
been enacted specifying the circumstances when the right may be impaired in the interest of national
security or public safety. The power is in Congress, not the Executive.
5.ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; RIGHT TO TRAVEL INCLUDES RIGHT TO TRAVEL OUT
OF OR BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES. Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty
of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a
lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6 further
provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the
Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
6.ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE NO LONGER UTILIZED BY THE COURT; COURT COMPELLED TO
DECIDE THE CASE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. The framers of the Constitution believed that
the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back
on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear
that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike
down an exercise of authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their
counsel were among the most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the
political question doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its
mandate from refusing to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the
political question doctrine. We are compelled to decide what would have been non-justiceable under
our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.
7.ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. We do
not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not
the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial
notice of the implications of a Marcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion. In the first place,
there has never been a pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national
security and public safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the
Philippines. It was only after the present petition was filed that the alleged danger to national security
and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents' pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino
herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to (1) national welfare and interest and (2) the
continuing need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability. Neither ground
satisfies the criteria of national security and public safety. The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor
General or what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone sustains the claim of danger to
national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult problem or any troublesome
person can be substituted for the Marcos threat as the catalysing factor. It was precisely the banning
by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of
other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate period which led the
framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this
right.
D E C I S I O NCORTES, J p:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-
violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of
power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of
Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the
support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously
return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila
Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even
from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of
the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the
constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to
the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February
Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There
were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same
a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over the
military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a
fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements in the military
establishment and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency
and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to
the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own in the areas they
effectively control while the separatists are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has
been no let up in these groups' determination to wrest power from the government. Not only through
resort to arms but also through the use of propaganda have they been successful in creating chaos
and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of
the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts ateconomic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results
in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs.
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and
into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who
within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
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This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of thefollowing issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former PresidentMarcos and his family to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos
and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national
security, public safety or public health"
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of formerPresident Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety or public
health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding, i. Have the requirements of due process been complied
with in making such finding?
ii. Has there been prior notice to petitioners?iii. Has there been a hearing?iv. Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed
with, has the President's decision, including the
grounds upon which it was based, been made known
to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of formerPresident Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety, or public
health a political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return offormer President Marcos and his family is a clear and present
danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have
respondents established such fact?3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision
to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family, acted and
would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar
the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines?
[Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.]
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1.No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6.The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President
impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that
before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must
be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to
return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13.(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the
Philippines, provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within thatterritory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions
except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (order public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other
rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his owncountry.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a
political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and
liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo
without reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or
not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to
the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination
by the President that such return and residence will endanger national
security and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a
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political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law
provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed
by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the
more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety
of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can
not consider it. cdrep
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to
the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a
justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to
the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and
residence here will endanger national security and public safety? This is still
a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand
E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their
residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court
can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of
the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11;Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights.
In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4.The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5.The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are
essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala,
Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and
Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their
homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S.
Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and
its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties'
formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the
controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to
travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles
[357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt. 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt. 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d
640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof,
respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the
right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country,
and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately
from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On
the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose
his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art.
12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as
distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived."
[Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to
one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it isdistinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig, which refer to the issuance of passports for the
purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only
tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a
protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in
American jurisprudence. Cdpr
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be
limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary.
An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for
its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve
whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court
under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139
(1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.] Thus, the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress ofthe Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
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Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish
a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer
plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the
Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a
grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power
means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.]
If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined
membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a
hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official thePresident.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by
"executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the
President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power
to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address
Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers
of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Arethese enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view
that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly
denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." [Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4; Rollo p. 233.]
This argument brings to mind the institution of the U. S. Presidency after which ours is legally
patterned. **
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same
problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those
who think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand it
should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that
constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play
of political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article II in its opening words: "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." . . . [The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the
office from Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to
Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in
important measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger, who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. It
remained, of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying
demands and duties no matter who was President. But, more than most
agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to
the man in charge. Each President's distinctive temperament and character,
his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, idiosyncrasies,
compulsions, phobias recast the White House and pervaded the entire
government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon,
taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The
thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered
from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood
it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and
hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to thenation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the
constitutional order. [At 212-213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the
consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different
constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the
President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President
with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify
the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but
through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was
also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of
government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws,
for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g.,
his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the
Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors
in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding
the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:
. . . Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the
"board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the
performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which
is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting
aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these
members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear
that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are
not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of
these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall withinthat of the remaining one among which the powers of government are
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divided . . . [At 202-203; emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find
reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of
black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a
penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise
it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between
legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.[At
210-211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to
serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for
these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the
President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the
President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an
allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereignpowers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the
powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution
reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country
are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from
whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The
constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the
preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits
and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988].
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good againstthe exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the
people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty
to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand
[See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the
Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the
view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in
the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
[Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited
merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties
in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of
powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief
powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning has been
recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House
of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as
irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not
question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it
appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to
the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are
implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. llcd
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the
Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to
the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court'sjurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people
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themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's
recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may
appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is
totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a
dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political
question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that
the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to
settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitutionlimits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave
abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned
and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it
would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining
"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government,
incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11,
1971, 42 SCRA 448] that:
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified
conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute.
What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances,
under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the
privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by
the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so
acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to
check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise
the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act .. [At 479-
480.].
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for
the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that
she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed
during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual
bases for the President's decision.
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from
within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers
and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses
and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters theconclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military
establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it
is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw
that would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of
violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the
commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against
threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State
the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn
to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from
that responsibility. LLjur
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the
hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close
associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize thecountry, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover
the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore
the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during
the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of
widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would
wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given
what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue
with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at
the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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[G.R. No. L-62100. May 30, 1986.]
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E.CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the Court of First Instance ofRizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES & EXCHANGECOMMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and theChief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM), respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; PROHIBITION AGAINST LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES, A
NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the
court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in
People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety)
to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders
and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued
does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECT. Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the
power of the court as if he were in custody of proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the
accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of
record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the
public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been
regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with
full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving
the state. If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then
has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person
of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of
the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty
to leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the
first place, if it were otherwise.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; SHEPHERD CASE (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) DIFFERENTIATED FROM
CASE AT BAR. To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals'
ruling in People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the
following passage: ". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the
pleasure of the Court. . . . The law does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable
only when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the
appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit provisional,
is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the granting
state. This principle perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring
that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country." The faith reposed
by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The rather broad and
generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither law nor
jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries
of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court. Also, petitioner's case is not
on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent
necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to theproposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail
bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above.
6.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; LACK OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE DENIAL OF
MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WAS PREMISED ON THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER
TO SATISFY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE URGENCY OF HIS TRAVEL. As petitioner has failed to satisfy
the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the
consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having
denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with
contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in
allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the
conditions of her bail bond.
7.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL; IMPAIRED BY ORDER OFTHE TRIAL COURT RELEASING PETITIONER ON BAIL. The constitutional right to travel being invoked
by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: "The liberty
of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary
in the interest of national security, public safety or public health." To our mind, the order of the trial
court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision.
D E C I S I O NFERNAN, J p:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a
criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-InsularManagement, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said
business, but acts as president of the former corporation. LexLib
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co-
stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a
management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No.
001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc
Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management
committee was organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested thethen Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a
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memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the
Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a
fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza,
Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course,
corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court
of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent
Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases,
petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU InsuranceCorporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and opportunities." 1The prosecution opposed said motion andafter due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9,
1982, reads:
"Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the
all embracing ground that his trip is '. . . relative to his business transactions
and opportunities.'
"The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any
magnitude is discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.
"In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo
Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated."
2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
"6. Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the
Court would allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety
companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might claim that they could
no longer be held liable in their undertakings because it was the Court which
allowed the accused to go outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not to return.
"WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED." 3
It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall
or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also denied
in a letter dated May 27, 1982.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively,
as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave
to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the
Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him
for departure.
On October 5,1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion,petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention of
foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of thechief executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller 9requesting his presence in the United States to "meet the people and companies who would be
involved in its investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases
Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been
dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the ground that after verification of the records
of the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . (he) was not in any way connected with the ManotocSecurities, Inc. as of the date of the commission of the offenses imputed to him." 10Criminal CasesNos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained pending as Judge
Camilon, when notified of the dismissal of the other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the
cases before him, ordered merely the informations amended so as to delete the allegation that
petitioner was president and to substitute that he was "controlling/majority stockholder," 11 ofManotoc Securities, Inc. prLL
On September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release
of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him,
pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if
he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer
the call of the court and do what the law may require of him." 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v.
Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the
accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower
court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory,
and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does
not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force
outside of said jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner
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released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him
in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a
continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the
person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state." 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the
court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the
principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the
court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to
leave the country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in thefirst place, if it were otherwise.
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People
vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage:
". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants
at the pleasure of the Court. . . . The law does not limit such undertaking of
the bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial
confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the appellants are out of
the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit
provisional is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as
without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle perhaps
accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring
that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of thecountry."
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The
rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed,
neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was
able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her
sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions
of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As
aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his comment:
"A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will
show that it is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United
States where he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and
search for business opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's
motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant
of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that
there is absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion
bears no indication that the alleged business transactions could not be
undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint that
petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him
from taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any
showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause
him irreparable damage or prejudice." 15
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to
it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety because in
accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any
proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies
against him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a
stipulation inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result has
been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition of
other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or country." 16Thus, although the order ofMarch 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to
petitioner of the criminal cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.
As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel,the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in
much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been
committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself
that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health."
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order ascontemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court
finds that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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[G.R. No. 94284. April 8, 1991.]
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G.GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch I X, and PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL, DEFINED. "Bail is the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance
before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO TRAVEL RESTRICTED BY CONDITIONS OF BAIL.
The condition imposed upon an accused on bail to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, et al., No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional
Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138).
3.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; A PERSON RELEASED ON BAIL MAY BE RE-ARRESTED;
GROUND. An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is
pending.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION ON THE RESTRICTION ON THE RIGHT. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even
without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did
not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p.
263).
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A LIMITATION ON THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT TO USE ALL MEANS TOCARRY THEIR ORDERS INTO EFFECT. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no
means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to
carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts
by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right
to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
D E C I S I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA , J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision
of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio v. Hon. Benigno
C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying
reconsideration, be set aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities
Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for
his provisional liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People
of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-
departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times
without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled
hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and
the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based
primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the
accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled
for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the
country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45).Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990.
Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to
decide the case. Cdpr
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4
April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the
scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the
Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court,
even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1)Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent
that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments
had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to
Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and
conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:
"1.The records will show that the information was filed on October 14,
1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several
scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure
of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to
appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States ofAmerica;
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"2.Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never
appeared in person before the Court;
"3.The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and
warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the same reason
failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused
Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit had long been reached"
(Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based
on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency
of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and
cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.
2)Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that
the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the
"interest of national security, public safety or public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been
cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his
failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for
violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security givenfor the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon
his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional
Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-
arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without
prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par.]).
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the
Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable
impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutio