consti2 q&a for midterms

Held: It is defined as the imposition ofcomparable taxes in two or more states onthe same taxpayer in respect of the samesubject matter and for identical periods.(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA87, 102, June 25, 1999)

174. What is the rationale for doingaway with international juridicaldouble taxation? What are themethods resorted to by tax treatiesto eliminate double taxation?

Held: The apparent rationale for doingaway with double taxation is to encouragethe free flow of goods and services and themovement of capital, technology andpersons between countries, conditionsdeemed vital in creating robust anddynamic economies. Foreign investmentswill only thrive in a fairly predictable andreasonable international investment climateand the protection against double taxationis crucial in creating such a climate.

Double taxation usually takes place when aperson is resident of a contracting stateand derives income from, or owns capitalin, the other contracting state and bothstates impose tax on that income or capital.In order to eliminate double taxation, a taxtreaty resorts to several methods. First, itsets out the respective rights to tax of thestate of source or situs and of the state ofresidence with regard to certain classes ofincome or capital. In some cases, anexclusive right to tax is conferred on one ofthe contracting states; however, for otheritems of income or capital, both states aregiven the right to tax, although the amountof tax that may be imposed by the state ofsource is limited.

The second method for the elimination ofdouble taxation applies whenever the stateof source is given a full or limited right totax together with the state of residence. Inthis case, the treaties make it incumbentupon the state of residence to allow relief in

order to avoid double taxation. There aretwo methods of relief - the exemptionmethod and the credit method. In theexemption method, the income or capitalwhich is taxable in the state of source orsitus is exempted in the state of residence,although in some instances it may be takeninto account in determining the rate of taxapplicable to the taxpayer's remainingincome or capital. On the other hand, inthe credit method, although the income orcapital which is taxed in the state of sourceis still taxable in the state of residence, thetax paid in the former is credited againstthe tax levied in the latter. The basicdifference between the two methods is thatin the exemption method, the focus is onthe income or capital itself, whereas thecredit method focuses upon the tax.(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA87, 102-103, June 25, 1999)

175. What is the rationale for reducingthe tax rate in negotiating taxtreaties?

Held: In negotiating tax treaties, theunderlying rationale for reducing the taxrate is that the Philippines will give up apart of the tax in the expectation that thetax given up for this particular investment isnot taxed by the other country.(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., 309 SCRA87, 103, June 25, 1999)

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

The Due Process Clause

176. Discuss the Due Process Clause.Distinguish substantive due processfrom procedural due process.

Held: Section 1 of the Bill of Rights laysdown what is known as the due processclause of the Constitution.

ELS: Political Law Copy of Twenty19 116

In order to fall within the aegis of thisprovision, two conditions must concur,namely, that there is a deprivation and thatsuch deprivation is done without properobservance of due process. When onespeaks of due process of law, however, adistinction must be made between mattersof procedure and matters of substance. Inessence, procedural due process refers tothe method or manner by which the law isenforced, while substantive due processrequires that the law itself, not merely theprocedures by which the law would beenforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.(Corona v. United Harbor PilotsAssociation of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31,Dec. 12, 1997 [Romero])

177. Respondents United HarborPilots Association of the Philippinesargue that due process was notobserved in the adoption of PPA-AONo. 04-92 which provides that: (a)llexisting regular appointments whichhave been previously issued by theBureau of Customs or the PPA shallremain valid up to 31 December 1992only, and (a)ll appointments toharbor pilot positions in all pilotagedistricts shall, henceforth, be onlyfor a term of one (1) year from dateof effectivity subject to renewal orcancellation by the Philippine PortsAuthority after conduct of a rigidevaluation of performance,allegedly because no hearing wasconducted whereby relevantgovernment agencies and theharbor pilots themselves couldventilate their views. They alsocontended that the sole andexclusive right to the exercise ofharbor pilotage by pilots hasbecome vested and can only bewithdrawn or shortened byobserving the constitutionalmandate of due process of law.

Held: They are obviously referring to theprocedural aspect of the enactment.

Fortunately, the Court has maintained aclear position in this regard, a stance it hasstressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v.Hon. Exevea, where it declared that (a)slong as a party was given the opportunity todefend his interests in due course, hecannot be said to have been denied dueprocess of law, for this opportunity to beheard is the very essence of due process.Moreover, this constitutional mandate isdeemed satisfied if a person is granted anopportunity to seek reconsideration of theaction or ruling complained of.

In the case at bar, respondents questionedPPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four timesbefore the matter was finally elevated tothis Tribunal. Their arguments on thisscore, however, failed to persuade. X x x

Neither does the fact that the pilotsthemselves were not consulted in any waytaint the validity of the administrative order.As a general rule, notice and hearing, asthe fundamental requirements ofprocedural due process, are essential onlywhen an administrative body exercises itsquasi-judicial function. In the performanceof its executive or legislative functions,such as issuing rules and regulations, anadministrative body need not comply withthe requirements of notice and hearing.

Upon the other hand, it is also contendedthat the sole and exclusive right to theexercise of harbor pilotage by pilots is asettled issue. Respondents aver that saidright has become vested and can only bewithdrawn or shortened by observing theconstitutional mandate of due process oflaw. Their argument has thus shifted fromthe procedural to one of substance. It ishere where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails tomeet the condition set by the organic law.

Pilotage, just like other professions, may bepracticed only by duly licensed individuals.Licensure is the granting of licenseespecially to practice a profession. It isalso the system of granting licenses (as for


professional practice) in accordance withestablished standards. A license is a rightor permission granted by some competentauthority to carry on a business or do anact which, without such license, would beillegal.

Before harbor pilots can earn a license topractice their profession, they literally haveto pass through the proverbial eye of aneedle by taking, not one but fiveexaminations, each followed by actualtraining and practice. X x x

Their license is granted in the form of anappointment which allows them to engagein pilotage until they retire at the age of 70years. This is a vested right. Under theterms of PPA-AO No. 04-92, [a]ll existingregular appointments which have beenpreviously issued by the Bureau ofCustoms or the PPA shall remain valid upto 31 December 1992 only, and (a)llappointments to harbor pilot positions in allpilotage districts shall, henceforth, be onlyfor a term of one (1) year from date ofeffectivity subject to renewal or cancellationby the Authority after conduct of a rigidevaluation of performance.

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilotsto enjoy their profession before theircompulsory retirement. In the past, theyenjoyed a measure of security knowing thatafter passing five examinations andundergoing years of on-the-job training,they would have a license which they coulduse until their retirement, unless soonerrevoked by the PPA for mental or physicalunfitness. Under the new issuance, theyhave to contend with an annualcancellation of their license which can betemporary or permanent depending on theoutcome of their performance evaluation.Veteran pilots and neophytes alike aresuddenly confronted with one-year termswhich ipso facto expire at the end of thatperiod. Renewal of their license is nowdependent on a rigid evaluation of

performance which is conducted only afterthe license has already been cancelled.Hence, the use of the term renewal. It isthis pre-evaluation cancellation whichprimarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. Ina real sense, it is a deprivation of propertywithout due process of law. (Corona v.United Harbor Pilots Association of thePhils., 283 SCRA 31, December 12, 1997[Romero])

178. Does the due process clauseencompass the right to be assistedby counsel during an administrativeinquiry?

Held: The right to counsel, which cannotbe waived unless the waiver is in writingand in the presence of counsel, is a rightafforded a suspect or an accused duringcustodial investigation. It is not an absoluteright and may, thus, be invoked or rejectedin a criminal proceeding and, with morereason, in an administrative inquiry. In thecase at bar, petitioners invoke the right ofan accused in criminal proceedings to havecompetent and independent counsel of hisown choice. Lumiqued, however, was notaccused of any crime in the proceedingsbelow. The investigation conducted by thecommittee x x x was for the sole purpose ofdetermining if he could be heldadministratively liable under the law for thecomplaints filed against him. x x x As such,the hearing conducted by the investigatingcommittee was not part of a criminalprosecution. X x x

While investigations conducted by anadministrative body may at times be akin toa criminal proceeding, the fact remains thatunder existing laws, a party in anadministrative inquiry may or may not beassisted by counsel, irrespective of thenature of the charges and of therespondent's capacity to represent himself,and no duty rests on such a body to furnishthe person being investigated with counsel.In an administrative proceeding x x x a


respondent x x x has the option ofengaging the services of counsel or not. xx x Thus, the right to counsel is notimperative in administrative investigationsbecause such inquiries are conductedmerely to determine whether there arefacts that merit disciplinary measuresagainst erring public officers andemployees, with the purpose of maintainingthe dignity of government service.

The right to counsel is not indispensable todue process unless required by theConstitution or the law. Lumiqued v.Exevea, 282 SCRA 125, Nov. 18, 1997[Romero])

179. Discuss the Void for VaguenessDoctrine, and why is it repugnant to theConstitution. Distinguish a perfectlyvague act from legislation couched inimprecise language.

Held: 1. Due process requires that theterms of a penal statute must be sufficientlyexplicit to inform those who are subject to itwhat conduct on their part will render themliable to its penalties. A criminal statutethat fails to give a person of ordinaryintelligence fair notice that hiscontemplated conduct is forbidden by thestatute, or is so indefinite that itencourages arbitrary and erratic arrestsand convictions, is void for vagueness.The constitutional vice in a vague orindefinite statute is the injustice to theaccused in placing him on trial for anoffense, the nature of which he is given nofair warning.

We reiterated these principles inPeople v. Nazario:

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to bevague when it lacks comprehensiblestandards that men of commonintelligence must necessarily guess at itsmeaning and differ as to its application. Itis repugnant to the Constitution in tworespects: (1) it violates due process for

failure to accord persons, especially theparties targeted by it, fair notice of theconduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves lawenforcers unbridled discretion in carryingout its provisions and become an arbitraryflexing of the Government muscle.

We added, however, that:

X x x the act must be utterly vague on itsface, that is to say, it cannot be clarified byeither a saving clause or by construction.Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, theU.S. Supreme Court struck down anordinance that had made it illegal for threeor more persons to assemble on anysidewalk and there conduct themselves ina manner annoying to persons passing by.Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standardat all because one may never know inadvance what annoys some people butdoes not annoy others.

Coates highlights what has been referredto as a perfectly vague act whoseobscurity is evident on its face. It is to bedistinguished, however, from legislationcoached in imprecise language but whichnonetheless specifies a standard thoughdefectively phrased in which case, it maybe saved by proper construction. X x x(People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163,Jan. 24, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

2. The doctrine has beenformulated in various ways, but iscommonly stated to the effect that a statuteestablishing a criminal offense must definethe offense with sufficient definiteness thatpersons of ordinary intelligence canunderstand what conduct is prohibited bythe statute. It can only be invoked againstthat specie of legislation that is utterlyvague on its face, i.e., that which cannot beclarified either by a saving clause or byconstruction.

A statute or act may be said to bevague when it lacks comprehensiblestandards that men of common intelligence


must necessarily guess at its meaning anddiffer in its application. In such instance,the statute is repugnant to the Constitutionin two (2) respects it violated due processfor failure to accord persons, especially theparties targeted by it, fair notice of whatconduct to avoid; and, it leaves lawenforcers unbridled discretion in carryingout its provisions and becomes an arbitraryflexing of the Government muscle. But thedoctrine does not apply as againstlegislations that are merely couched inimprecise language but which nonethelessspecify a standard though defectivelyphrased; or to those that are apparentlyambiguous yet fairly applicable to certaintypes of activities. The first may be savedby proper construction, while no challengemay be mounted as against the secondwhenever directed against such activities.With more reason, the doctrine cannot beinvoked where the assailed statute is clearand free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether acriminal statute is void for uncertainty iswhether the language conveys asufficiently definite warning as to theproscribed conduct when measured bycommon understanding and practice. Itmust be stressed, however, that thevagueness doctrine merely requires areasonable degree of certainty for thestatute to be upheld not absoluteprecision or mathematical exactitude, aspetitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,rather than meticulous specificity, ispermissible as long as the metes andbounds of the statute are clearlydelineated. An act will not be held invalidmerely because it might have been moreexplicit in its wordings or detailed in itsprovisions, especially where, because ofthe nature of the act, it would be impossibleto provide all the details in advance as in allother statutes. (Joseph Ejercito Estradav. Sandiganbayan [Third Division], G.R.No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001, En Banc[Bellosillo])

180. Does Article 13 (b) of the LaborCode defining recruitment andplacement violate the due processclause?

Held: In support of her submission thatArticle 13 (b) is void for vagueness,appellant invokes People v. Panis, wherethis Court x x x criticized the definition ofrecruitment and placement x x x.

Appellant further argues that the acts thatconstitute recruitment and placementsuffer from overbreadth since by merelyreferring a person for employment, aperson may be convicted of illegalrecruitment.

These contentions cannot be sustained.

Appellants reliance on People v. Panis ismisplaced. The issue in Panis waswhether, under the proviso of Article 13(b),the crime of illegal recruitment could becommitted only whenever two or morepersons are in any manner promised oroffered any employment for a fee. TheCourt held in the negative x x x.

X x x The Court, in Panis, merelybemoaned the lack of records that wouldhelp shed light on the meaning of theproviso. The absence of such recordsnotwithstanding, the Court was able toarrive at a reasonable interpretation of theproviso by applying principles in criminallaw and drawing from the language andintent of the law itself. Section 13(b),therefore, is not a perfectly vague actwhose obscurity is evident on its face. If atall, the proviso therein is merely couched inimprecise language that was salvaged byproper construction. It is not void forvagueness.

X x x

That Section 13(b) encompasses whatappellant apparently considers ascustomary and harmless acts such as


labor or employment referral (referringan applicant, for employment to aprospective employer) does not render thelaw overbroad. Evidently, appellantmisapprehends concept of overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroadwhere it operates to inhibit the exercise ofindividual freedoms affirmativelyguaranteed by the Constitution, such as thefreedom of speech or religion. A generallyworded statute, when construed to punishconduct which cannot be constitutionallypunished is unconstitutionally vague to theextent that it fails to give adequate warningof the boundary between theconstitutionally permissible and theconstitutionally impermissible applicationsof the statute.

In Blo Umpar Adiong v. Commission onElections, for instance, we struck down asvoid for overbreadth provisions prohibitingthe posting of election propaganda in anyplace including private vehicles otherthan in the common poster areassanctioned by the COMELEC. We heldthat the challenged provisions not onlydeprived the owner of the vehicle the useof his property but also deprived the citizenof his right to free speech and information.The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was sobroad that it covered even constitutionallyguaranteed rights and, hence, void foroverbreadth. In the present case, however,appellant did not even specify whatconstitutionally protected freedoms areembraced by the definition of recruitmentand placement that would render the sameconstitutionally overbroad. (People v.Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163, Jan. 24,2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

181. Is the Plunder Lawunconstitutional for being vague?

Held: As it is written, the PlunderLaw contains ascertainable standards andwell-defined parameters which wouldenable the accused to determine the nature

of his violation. Section 2 is sufficientlyexplicit in its description of the acts,conduct and conditions required orforbidden, and prescribes the elements ofthe crime with reasonable certainty andparticularity. X x x

As long as the law affords somecomprehensible guide or rule that wouldinform those who are subject to it whatconduct would render them liable to itspenalties, its validity would be sustained. Itmust sufficiently guide the judge in itsapplication; the counsel, in defending onecharged with its violation; and moreimportantly, the accused, in identifying therealm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, itcan be understood with little difficulty thatwhat the assailed statute punishes is theact of a public officer in amassing oraccumulating ill-gotten wealth of at leastP50,000,000.00 through a series orcombination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1,par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Informationitself closely tracks the language of the law,indicating with reasonable certainty thevarious elements of the offense whichpetitioner is alleged to have committed x xx.

We discern nothing in the foregoingthat is vague or ambiguous as there isobviously none that will confuse petitionerin his defense. Although subject to proof,these factual assertions clearly show thatthe elements of the crime are easilyunderstood and provide adequate contrastbetween the innocent and the prohibitedacts. Upon such unequivocal assertions,petitioner is completely informed of theaccusations against him as to enable himto prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails thefailure of the law to provide for the statutorydefinition of the terms combination andseries in the key phrase a combination orseries of overt or criminal acts found in


Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the wordpattern in Sec. 4. These omissions,according to petitioner, render the PlunderLaw unconstitutional for beingimpermissibly vague and overbroad anddeny him the right to be informed of thenature and cause of the accusation againsthim, hence, violative of his fundamentalright to due process.

The rationalization seems to us tobe pure sophistry. A statute is not rendereduncertain and void merely because generalterms are used therein, or because of theemployment of terms without definingthem; much less do we have to defineevery word we use. Besides, there is nopositive constitutional or statutorycommand requiring the legislature to defineeach and every word in an enactment.Congress is not restricted in the form ofexpression of its will, and its inability to sodefine the words employed in a statute willnot necessarily result in the vagueness orambiguity of the law so long as thelegislative will is clear, or at least, can begathered from the whole act, which isdistinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settledprinciple of legal hermeneutics that wordsof a statute will be interpreted in theirnatural, plain and ordinary acceptation andsignification, unless it is evident that thelegislature intended a technical or speciallegal meaning to those words. Theintention of the lawmakers who are,ordinarily, untrained philologists andlexicographers to use statutoryphraseology in such a manner is alwayspresumed. Thus, Websters NewCollegiate Dictionary contains the followingcommonly accepted definition of the wordscombination and series.

Combination the result or product ofcombining; the act or process of combining.To combine is to bring into such closerelationship as to obscure individualcharacters.

Series a number of things or events ofthe same class coming one after another inspatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the wordscombination and series to beunderstood in their popular meanings ispristinely evident from the legislativedeliberations on the bill which eventuallybecame RA 7080 or the Plunder Law x x x.

X x x

Thus when the Plunder Law speaksof combination, it is referring to at leasttwo (2) acts falling under differentcategories or enumeration provided in Sec.1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasuryin Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), andfraudulent conveyance of assets belongingto the National Government under Sec. 1,par. (d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute aseries there must be two (2) or more overtor criminal acts falling under the samecategory of enumeration found in Sec. 1,par. (d), say, misappropriation,malversation and raids on the publictreasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par.(d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislatureintended a technical or distinctive meaningfor combination and series, it wouldhave taken greater pains in specificallyproviding for it in the law.

As for pattern, we agree with theobservations of the Sandiganbayan thatthis term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, inrelation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2

x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a patternconsists of at least a combination orseries of overt or criminal actsenumerated in subsections (1) to (6) ofSec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 ofthe law, the pattern of overt or criminal actsis directed towards a common purposeor goal which is to enable the public


officer to amass, accumulate or acquireill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there musteither be an overall unlawful scheme orconspiracy to achieve said commongoal. As commonly understood, the termoverall unlawful scheme indicates ageneral plan of action or method whichthe principal accused and public officer andothers conniving with him follow to achievethe aforesaid common goal. In thealternative, if there is no such overallscheme or where the schemes or methodsused by multiple accused vary, the overt orcriminal acts must form part of aconspiracy to attain a common goal.

X x x

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contendedthat the law does not give a fair warningand sufficient notice of what it seeks topenalize. Under the circumstances,petitioners reliance on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestlymisplaced.

X x x

Moreover, we agree with, hence weadopt, the observations of Mr. JusticeVicente V. Mendoza during thedeliberations of the Court that theallegations that the Plunder Law is vagueand overbroad do not justify a facial reviewof its validity

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states thata statute which either forbids or requiresthe doing of an act in terms so vague thatmen of common intelligence mustnecessarily guess at its meaning and differas to its application violates the firstessential of due process of law. (Connallyv. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391,70 L. Ed. 328 [1926] cited in Ermita-MalateHotel and Motel Operators Assn. v. CityMayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 [1967]) Theoverbreadth doctrine, on the other hand,decrees that a governmental purpose maynot be achieved by means which sweep

unnecessarily broadly and thereby invadethe area of protected freedoms. (NAACPv. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L. Ed325, 338 [1958]; Shelton v. Tucker, 364U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 [1960])

A facial challenge is allowed to be made toa vague statute and to one which isoverbroad because of possible chillingeffect upon protected speech. The theoryis that [w]hen statutes regulate orproscribe speech and no readily apparentconstruction suggests itself as a vehicle forrehabilitating the statutes in a singleprosecution, the transcendent value to allsociety of constitutionally protectedexpression is deemed to justify allowingattacks on overly broad statutes with norequirement that the person making theattack demonstrate that his own conductcould not be regulated by a statute drawnwith narrow specificity. (Gooding v. Wilson,405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408, 413[1972] [internal quotation marks omitted])The possible harm to society in permittingsome unprotected speed to go unpunishedis outweighed by the possibility that theprotected speech of others may bedeterred and perceived grievances left tofester because of possible inhibitory effectsof overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penalstatutes. Criminal statutes have general interrorem effect resulting from their veryexistence, and, if facial challenge isallowed for this reason alone, the Statemay well be prevented from enacting lawsagainst socially harmful conduct. In thearea of criminal law, the law cannot takechances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrinethen have special application only to freespeech cases. They are inapt for testingthe validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.Supreme Court put it, in an opinion byChief Justice Rehnquist, we have notrecognized an overbreadth doctrineoutside the limited context of the First


Amendment. In Broadwick v. Oklahoma(413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L Ed. 2d 830,840-841 [1973]), the Court ruled thatclaims of facial overbreadth have beenentertained in cases involving statuteswhich, by their terms, seek to regulate onlyspoken words and, again, thatoverbreadth claims, if entertained at all,have been curtailed when invoked againstordinary criminal laws that are sought to beapplied to protected conduct. For thisreason, it has been held that a facialchallenge to a legislative act is the mostdifficult challenge to mount successfully,since the challenger must establish that noset of circumstances exists under which theAct would be valid. (United States v.Salerno, supra.) As for the vaguenessdoctrine, it is said that a litigant maychallenge a statute on its face only if it isvague in all its possible applications. Aplaintiff who engages in some conduct thatis clearly proscribed cannot complain of thevagueness of the law as applied to theconduct of others. (Village of HoffmanEstates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L Ed. 2d 362,369 [1982])

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny,overbreadth, and vagueness are analyticaltools developed for testing on their facesstatutes in free speech cases or, as theyare called in American law, FirstAmendment cases. They cannot be madeto do service when what is involved is acriminal statute. With respect to suchstatute, the established rule is that one towhom application of a statute isconstitutional will not be heard to attack thestatute on the ground that impliedly it mightalso be taken as applying to other personsor other situations in which its applicationmight be unconstitutional. (United Statesv. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524,529 [1960]. The paradigmatic case isYazoo & Mississippi Valley RR. v. JacksonVinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 l. Ed. 193[1912]) As has been pointed out,vagueness challenges in the First

Amendment context, like overbreadthchallenges typically produce facialinvalidation, while statutes found to bevague as a matter of due process typicallyare invalidated [only] as applied to aparticular defendant. (G. Gunther & K.Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 [2001])Consequently, there is no basis forpetitioners claim that this Court review theAnti-Plunder Law on its face and in itsentirety.

Indeed, on its face invalidation of statutesresults in striking them down entirely on theground that they might be applied to partiesnot before the Court whose activities areconstitutionally protected (Id. at 1328). Itconstitutes a departure from the case andcontroversy requirement of the Constitutionand permits decisions to be made withoutconcrete factual settings and in sterileabstract contexts (Constitution, Art. VIII,Sections 1 and 5. Compare Angara v.Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158[1936]). But, as the U.S. Supreme Courtpointed out in Younger v. Harris (401 U.S.37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 [1971];others omitted.)

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute,pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiringcorrection of these deficiencies before thestatute is put into effect, is rarely if ever anappropriate task for the judiciary. Thecombination of the relative remoteness ofthe controversy, the impact on thelegislative process of the relief sought, andabove all the speculative and amorphousnature of the required line-by-line analysisof detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily resultsin a kind of case that is whollyunsatisfactory for deciding constitutionalquestions, whichever way they might bedecided.

For these reasons, on its face invalidationof statutes has been described asmanifestly strong medicine, to beemployed sparingly and only as a lastresort, (Broadwick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.


at 613, 37 L.Ed.2d at 841; NationalEndowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.569, 580 [1998]) and is generallydisfavored (FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,493 U.S. 223, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 [1990];Cruz v. Secretary of Environment andNatural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6December 2000 [Mendoza, J., SeparateOpinion]). In determining theconstitutionality of a statute, therefore, itsprovisions which are alleged to have beenviolated in a case must be examined in thelight of the conduct with which thedefendant is charged (United States v.National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29,32-33, 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565-6 [1963])

In light of the foregoing disquisition,it is evident that the purported ambiguity ofthe Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimedand argued at length by petitioner, is moreimagined than real. Ambiguity, where noneexists, cannot be created by dissectingparts and words in the statute to furnishsupport to critics who cavil at the want ofscientific precision in the law. Everyprovision of the law should be construed inrelation and with reference to every otherpart. To be sure, it will take more thannitpicking to overturn the well-entrenchedpresumption of constitutionality and validityof the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitionercannot feign ignorance of what the PlunderLaw is all about. Being one of the Senatorswho voted for its passage, petitioner mustbe aware that the law was extensivelydeliberated upon by the Senate and itsappropriate committees by reason of whichhe even registered his affirmative vote withfull knowledge of its legal implications andsound constitutional anchorage. (JosephEjercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan[Third Division], G.R. No. 148560, Nov.19, 2001, En Banc [Bellosillo])

182. Does an extraditee have the rightto notice and hearing during theevaluation stage of an extraditionproceeding?

Held: Considering that in the case at bar,the extradition proceeding is only at itsevaluation stage, the nature of the rightbeing claimed by the private respondent isnebulous and the degree of prejudice hewill allegedly suffer is weak, we accordgreater weight to the interests espoused bythe government thru the petitionerSecretary of Justice. X x x

In tilting the balance in favor of theinterests of the State, the Court stressesthat it is not ruling that the privaterespondent has no right to due process atall throughout the length and breadth of theextradition proceedings. Procedural dueprocess requires a determination of whatprocess is due, when it is due, and thedegree of what is due. Stated otherwise, aprior determination should be made as towhether procedural protections are at alldue and when they are due, which in turndepends on the extent to which anindividual will be "condemned to suffergrievous loss." We have explained why anextraditee has no right to notice andhearing during the evaluation stage of theextradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No.1069 which implements the RP-USExtradition Treaty affords an extraditeesufficient opportunity to meet the evidenceagainst him once the petition is filed incourt. The time for the extraditee to knowthe basis of the request for his extraditionis merely moved to the filing in court of theformal petition for extradition. Theextraditee's right to know is momentarilywithheld during the evaluation stage of theextradition process to accommodate themore compelling interest of the State toprevent escape of potential extraditeeswhich can be precipitated by prematureinformation of the basis of the request forhis extradition. No less compelling at thatstage of the extradition proceedings is theneed to be more deferential to thejudgment of a co-equal branch of thegovernment, the Executive, which hasbeen endowed by our Constitution withgreater power over matters involving our


foreign relations. Needless to state, thisbalance of interests is not a static but amoving balance which can be adjusted asthe extradition process moves from theadministrative stage to the judicial stageand to the execution stage depending onfactors that will come into play. In sum, werule that the temporary hold on privaterespondent's privilege of notice andhearing is a soft restraint on his right to dueprocess which will not deprive him offundamental fairness should he decide toresist the request for his extradition to theUnited States. There is no denial of dueprocess as long as fundamental fairness isassured a party. (Secretary of Justice v.Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465,Oct. 17, 2000, En Banc [Puno])

183. Will Mark Jimenezs detentionprior to the conclusion of theextradition proceedings not amount to aviolation of his right to due process?

Held: Contrary to his contention, hisdetention prior to the conclusion of theextradition proceedings does not amount toa violation of his right to due process. Weiterate the familiar doctrine that theessence of due process is the opportunityto be heard but, at the same time, point outthat the doctrine does not always call for aprior opportunity to be heard. Where thecircumstances such as those present inan extradition case call for it, asubsequent opportunity to be heard isenough. In the present case, respondentwill be given full opportunity to be heardsubsequently, when the extradition courthears the Petition for Extradition. Hence,there is no violation of his right to dueprocess and fundamental fairness.

Contrary to the contention ofJimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, inthe immediate deprivation of his libertyprior to his being heard. That his arrestand detention will not be arbitrary issufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filingin court the Petition with its supporting

documents after a determination that theextradition request meets the requirementsof the law and the relevant treaty; (2) theextradition judges independent prima faciedetermination that his arrest will best servethe ends of justice before the issuance of awarrant for his arrest; and (3) hisopportunity, once he is under the courtscustody, to apply for bail as an exception tothe no-initial-bail rule.

It is also worth noting that before theUS government requested the extraditionof respondent, proceedings had alreadybeen conducted in that country. Butbecause he left the jurisdiction of therequesting state before those proceedingscould be completed, it was hindered fromcontinuing with the due processesprescribed under its laws. His invocation ofdue process now had thus become hollow.He already had that opportunity in therequesting state; yet, instead of taking it, heran away.

In this light, would it be proper andjust for the government to increase the riskof violating its treaty obligations in order toaccord Respondent Jimenez his personalliberty in the span of time that it takes toresolve the Petition for Extradition? Hissupposed immediate deprivation of libertywithout due process that he had previouslyshunned pales against the governmentsinterest in fulfilling its Extradition Treatyobligations and in cooperating with theworld community in the suppression ofcrime. Indeed, [c]onstitutional liberties donot exist in a vacuum; the due processrights accorded to individuals must becarefully balanced against exigent andpalpable government interest.

Too, we cannot allow our country tobe a haven for fugitives, cowards andweaklings who, instead of facing theconsequences of their actions, choose torun and hide. Hence, it would not be goodpolicy to increase the risk of violating ourtreaty obligations if, through overprotection


or excessively liberal treatment, personssought to be extradited are able to evadearrest or escape from our custody. In theabsence of any provision in theConstitution, the law or the treaty expressly guaranteeing the right to bail inextradition proceedings, adopting thepractice of not granting them bail, as ageneral rule, would be a step towardsdeterring fugitives from coming to thePhilippines to hide from or evade theirprosecutors.

The denial of bail as a matter ofcourse in extradition cases falls into placewith and gives life to Article 14 (It states: Ifthe person sought consents in writing tosurrender to the Requesting State, theRequested State may surrender the personas expeditiously as possible without furtherproceedings.) of the Treaty, since thispractice would encourage the accused tovoluntarily surrender to the requesting stateto cut short their detention here. Likewise,their detention pending the resolution ofextradition proceedings would fall intoplace with the emphasis of the ExtraditionLaw on the summary nature of extraditioncases and the need for their speedydisposition. (Government of the UnitedStates of America v. Hon. GuillermoPurganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24,2002, En Banc [Panganiban])

The Equal Protection Clause

184. Explain and discuss the equalprotection of the law clause.

Held: 1. The equal protection of the law isembraced in the concept of due process,as every unfair discrimination offends therequirements of justice and fair play. It hasnonetheless been embodied in a separateclause in Article III, Sec. 1, of theConstitution to provide for a more specificguaranty against any form of unduefavoritism or hostility from the government.Arbitrariness in general may be challenged

on the basis of the due process clause.But if the particular act assailed partakes ofan unwarranted partiality or prejudice, thesharper weapon to cut it down is the equalprotection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equalprotection simply requires that all personsor things similarly situated should betreated alike, both as to rights conferredand responsibilities imposed. Similarsubjects, in other words, should not betreated differently, so as to give unduefavor to some and unjustly discriminateagainst others.

The equal protection clause does notrequire the universal application of the lawson all persons or things without distinction.This might in fact sometimes result inunequal protection, as where, for example,a law prohibiting mature books to allpersons, regardless of age, would benefitthe morals of the youth but violate theliberty of adults. What the clause requiresis equality among equals as determinedaccording to a valid classification. Byclassification is meant the grouping ofpersons or things similar to each other incertain particulars and different from allothers in these same particulars.(Philippine Judges Association v.Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 711-712, Nov. 11,1993, En Banc [Cruz])

2. The equal protection clause exists toprevent undue favor or privilege. It isintended to eliminate discrimination andoppression based on inequality.Recognizing the existence of realdifference among men, the equal protectionclause does not demand absolute equality.It merely requires that all persons shall betreated alike, under like circumstances andconditions both as to the privilegesconferred and liabilities enforced. Thus,the equal protection clause does notabsolutely forbid classifications x x x. If theclassification is based on real andsubstantial differences; is germane to the


purpose of the law; applies to all membersof the same class; and applies to current aswell as future conditions, the classificationmay not be impugned as violating theConstitution's equal protection guarantee.A distinction based on real and reasonableconsiderations related to a properlegislative purpose x x x is neitherunreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.(Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538, Oct.7, 1994, En Banc [Kapunan])

185. Congress enacted R.A. No. 8189which provides, in Section 44thereof, that "No Election Officershall hold office in a particular city ormunicipality for more than four (4)years. Any election officer who,either at the time of the approval ofthis Act or subsequent thereto, hasserved for at least four (4) years in aparticular city or municipality shallautomatically be reassigned by theCommission to a new station outsidethe original congressional district."Petitioners, who are City andMunicipal Election Officers, theorizethat Section 44 of RA 8189 isviolative of the "equal protectionclause" of the 1987 Constitutionbecause it singles out the City andMunicipal Election Officers of theCOMELEC as prohibited fromholding office in the same city ormunicipality for more than four (4)years. They maintain that there is nosubstantial distinction between themand other COMELEC officials, andtherefore, there is no validclassification to justify the objectiveof the provision of law under attack.Resolve.

Held: The Court is not persuaded bypetitioners' arguments. The "equalprotection clause" of the 1987 Constitutionpermits a valid classification under thefollowing conditions:

1) The classification must rest onsubstantial distinction;

2) The classification must begermane to the purpose of thelaw;

3) The classification must not belimited to existing conditionsonly; and

4) The classification must applyequally to all members of thesame class.

After a careful study, the ineluctableconclusion is that the classification underSection 44 of RA 8189 satisfies theaforestated requirements.

The singling out of election officers in orderto "ensure the impartiality of electionofficials by preventing them fromdeveloping familiarity with the people oftheir place of assignment" does not violatethe equal protection clause of theConstitution.

In Lutz v. Araneta, it was held that "thelegislature is not required by theConstitution to adhere to a policy of 'all ornone'". This is so for underinclusiveness isnot an argument against a validclassification. It may be true that all otherofficers of COMELEC referred to bypetitioners are exposed to the same evilssought to be addressed by the statute.However, in this case, it can be discernedthat the legislature thought the noblepurpose of the law would be sufficientlyserved by breaking an important link in thechain of corruption than by breaking upeach and every link thereof. Verily, underSection 3(n) of RA 8189, election officersare the highest officials or authorizedrepresentatives of the COMELEC in a cityor municipality. It is safe to say that withoutthe complicity of such officials, large-scaleanomalies in the registration of voters canhardly be carried out. (Agripino A. DeGuzman, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC (G.R.No. 129118, July 19, 2000, en Banc[Purisima])


186. Are there substantial distinctions

between print media and broadcastmedia to justify the requirement forthe latter to give free airtime to beused by the Comelec to inform thepublic of qualifications and programof government of candidates andpolitical parties during the campaignperiod? Discuss.

Held: There are important differences inthe characteristics of the two media whichjustify their differential treatment for freespeech purposes. Because of the physicallimitations of the broadcast spectrum, thegovernment must, of necessity, allocatebroadcast frequencies to those wishing touse them. There is no similar justificationfor government allocation and regulation ofthe print media.

In the allocation of limited resources,relevant conditions may validly be imposedon the grantees or licensees. The reasonfor this is that the government spendspublic funds for the allocation andregulation of the broadcast industry, whichit does not do in the case of print media.To require radio and television broadcastindustry to provide free airtime for theComelec Time is a fair exchange for whatthe industry gets.

From another point of view, the SC hasalso held that because of the unique andpervasive influence of the broadcast media,[n]ecessarily x x x the freedom oftelevision and radio broadcasting issomewhat lesser in scope than thefreedom accorded to newspaper and printmedia. (TELEBAP, Inc. v. COMELEC,289 SCRA 337, April 21, 1998 [Mendoza])

187. Does the death penalty law (R.A.No. 7659) violate the equalprotection clause considering that,in effect, it punishes only peoplewho are poor, uneducated, andjobless?

Held: R.A. No. 7659 specifically providesthat [T]he death penalty shall be imposedif the crime of rape is committed x x x whenthe victim is a religious or a child belowseven (7) years old. Apparently, the deathpenalty law makes no distinction. It appliesto all persons and to all classes of persons rich or poor, educated or uneducated,religious or non-religious. No particularperson or classes of persons are identifiedby the law against whom the death penaltyshall be exclusively imposed. The lawpunishes with death a person who shallcommit rape against a child below sevenyears of age. Thus, the perpetration ofrape against a 5-year old girl does notabsolve or exempt an accused from theimposition of the death penalty by the factthat he is poor, uneducated, jobless, andlacks catechetical instruction. To holdotherwise will not eliminate but promoteinequalities.

In Cecilleville Realty and ServiceCorporation v. CA, the SC clarified thatcompassion for the poor is an imperative ofevery humane society but only when therecipient is not a rascal claiming anundeserved privilege. (People v. JimmyMijano y Tamora, G.R. No. 129112, July23, 1999, En Banc [Per Curiam])

188. The International School Allianceof Educators (ISAE) questioned thepoint-of-hire classification employedby International School, Inc. tojustify distinction in salary ratesbetween foreign-hires and local-hires, i.e., salary rates of foreign-hires are higher by 25% than theirlocal counterparts, as discriminatoryand, therefore, violates the equalprotection clause. The InternationalSchool contended that this isnecessary in order to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile andwork here. Resolve.


Held: That public policy abhors inequalityand discrimination is beyond contention.Our Constitution and laws reflect the policyagainst these evils. X x x

International law, which springs fromgeneral principles of law, likewiseproscribes discrimination x x x. TheUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, theInternational Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights, the InternationalConvention on the Elimination of All Formsof Racial Discrimination, the Conventionagainst Discrimination in Education, theConvention (No. 111) ConcerningDiscrimination in Respect of Employmentand Occupation - all embody the generalprinciple against discrimination, the veryantithesis of fairness and justice. ThePhilippines, through its Constitution, hasincorporated this principle as part of itsnational laws.

[I]t would be an affront to both the spirit andletter of these provisions if the State, inspite of its primordial obligation to promoteand ensure equal employmentopportunities, closes its eyes to unequaland discriminatory terms and conditions ofemployment x x x.

Discrimination, particularly in terms ofwages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code.Article 135, for example, prohibits andpenalizes the payment of lessercompensation to a female employee asagainst a male employee for work of equalvalue. Article 248 declares it an unfairlabor practice for an employer todiscriminate in regards to wages in order toencourage or discourage membership inany labor organization. X x x

The foregoing provisions impregnablyinstitutionalize in this jurisdiction the longhonored legal truism of Equal pay forequal work. Persons who work withsubstantially equal qualifications, skill,effort and responsibility, under similarconditions, should be paid similar salaries.

This rule applies to the School(International School, Inc.), its "internationalcharacter" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has notadduced evidence that local-hires performwork equal to that of foreign-hires. TheCourt finds this argument a little cavalier. Ifan employer accords employees the sameposition and rank, the presumption is thatthese employees perform equal work. Thispresumption is borne by logic and humanexperience. If the employer pays oneemployee less than the rest, it is not forthat employee to explain why he receivesless or why the others receive more. Thatwould be adding insult to injury. Theemployer has discriminated against thatemployee; it is for the employer to explainwhy the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case failed todischarge this burden. There is noevidence here that foreign-hires perform25% more efficiently or effectively than thelocal-hires. Both groups have similarfunctions and responsibilities, which theyperform under similar working conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need toentice foreign-hires to leave their domicileto rationalize the distinction in salary rateswithout violating the principle of equal workfor equal pay.

X x x

While we recognize the need of the Schoolto attract foreign-hires, salaries should notbe used as an enticement to the prejudiceof local-hires. The local-hires perform thesame services as foreign-hires and theyought to be paid the same salaries as thelatter. For the same reason, the"dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires'limited tenure also cannot serve as validbases for the distinction in salary rates.The dislocation factor and limited tenureaffecting foreign-hires are adequatelycompensated by certain benefits accorded


them which are not enjoyed by local-hires,such as housing, transportation, shippingcosts, taxes and home leave travelallowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State toprotect the rights of workers and promotetheir welfare, to afford labor fullprotection. The State, therefore, has theright and duty to regulate the relationsbetween labor and capital. These relationsare not merely contractual but are soimpressed with public interest that laborcontracts, collective bargaining agreementsincluded, must yield to the common good.Should such contracts contain stipulationsthat are contrary to public policy, courts willnot hesitate to strike down thesestipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hireclassification employed by respondentSchool to justify the distinction in the salaryrates of foreign-hires and local-hires to bean invalid classification. There is noreasonable distinction between theservices rendered by foreign-hires andlocal-hires. The practice of the School ofaccording higher salaries to foreign-hirescontravenes public policy and, certainly,does not deserve the sympathy of thisCourt. (International School Alliance ofEducators (ISAE) v. Hon. Leonardo A.Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1,2000, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

189. Accused-appellant Romeo G.Jalosjos filed a motion before theCourt asking that he be allowed tofully discharge the duties of aCongressman, including attendanceat legislative sessions andcommittee meetings despite hishaving been convicted in the firstinstance of a non-bailable offense.Does being an elective official resultin a substantial distinction thatallows different treatment? Is beinga Congressman a substantialdifferentiation which removes the

accused-appellant as a prisonerfrom the same class as all personsvalidly confined under law?

Held: In the ultimate analysis, the issuebefore us boils down to a question ofconstitutional equal protection.

X x x

The performance of legitimate and evenessential duties by public officers has neverbeen an excuse to free a person validly inprison. The duties imposed by themandate of the people are multifarious.The accused-appellant asserts that theduty to legislate ranks highest in thehierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members ofthe House of Representatives, not tomention the 24 members of the Senate,charged with the duties of legislation.Congress continues to function well in thephysical absence of one or a few of itsmembers. Depending on the exigency ofGovernment that has to be addressed, thePresident or the Supreme Court can alsobe deemed the highest for that particularduty. The importance of a functiondepends on the need for its exercise. Theduty of a mother to nurse her infant is mostcompelling under the law of nature. Adoctor with unique skills has the duty tosave the lives of those with a particularaffliction. An elective governor has to serveprovincial constituents. A police officermust maintain peace and order. Never hadthe call of a particular duty lifted a prisonerinto a different classification from thoseothers who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications isessential lest wittingly or otherwise,insidious discriminations are made in favorof or against groups or types of individuals.

The Court cannot validate badges ofinequality. The necessities imposed bypublic welfare may justify exercise ofgovernment authority to regulate even if


thereby certain groups may plausibly assertthat their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to theposition of Congressman is not areasonable classification in criminal lawenforcement. The functions and duties ofthe office are not substantial distinctionswhich lift him from the class of prisonersinterrupted in their freedom and restrictedin liberty of movement. Lawful arrest andconfinement are germane to the purposesof the law and apply to all those belongingto the same class.

X x x

It can be seen from the foregoing thatincarceration, by its nature, changes anindividuals status in society. Prisonofficials have the difficult and oftenthankless job of preserving the security in apotentially explosive setting, as well as ofattempting to provide rehabilitation thatprepare inmates for re-entry into the socialmainstream. Necessarily, both thesedemands require the curtailment andelimination of certain rights.

Premises considered, we are constrainedto rule against the accused-appellantsclaim that re-election to public office givespriority to any other right or interest,including the police power of the State.(People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Feb.3, 2000, En Banc [Ynares-Santiago])

190. Appellant, who was charged withIllegal Recruitment in the RTC ofZamboanga City, invokes the equalprotection clause in her defense.She points out that although theevidence purportedly shows thatJasmine Alejandro handed outapplication forms and even receivedLourdes Modestos payment,appellant was the only one criminallycharged. Alejandro, on the otherhand, remained scot-free. From this,appellant concludes that the

prosecution discriminated againsther on grounds of regional origins.Appellant is a Cebuana whileAlejandro is a Zamboanguena, andthe alleged crime took place inZamboanga City.

Held: The argument has no merit.

The prosecution of one guilty while othersequally guilty are not prosecuted, however,is not, by itself, a denial of the equalprotection of the laws. Where the officialaction purports to be in conformity to thestatutory classification, an erroneous ormistaken performance of the statutory duty,although a violation of the statute, is notwithout more a denial of the equalprotection of the laws. The unlawfuladministration by officers of a statute fairon its face, resulting in its unequalapplication to those who are entitled to betreated alike, is not a denial of equalprotection, unless there is shown to bepresent in it an element of intentional orpurposeful discrimination. This mayappear on the face of the action taken withrespect to a particular class or person, or itmay only be shown by extrinsic evidenceshowing a discriminatory design overanother not to be inferred from the actionitself. But a discriminatory purpose is notpresumed, there must be a showing ofclear and intentional discrimination.Appellant has failed to show that, incharging appellant in court, that there wasa clear and intentional discrimination onthe part of the prosecuting officials.

The discretion of who to prosecutedepends on the prosecutions soundassessment whether the evidence before itcan justify a reasonable belief that a personhas committed an offense. Thepresumption is that the prosecuting officersregularly performed their duties, and thispresumption can be overcome only byproof to the contrary, not by merespeculation. Indeed, appellant has notpresented any evidence to overcome this


presumption. The mere allegation thatappellant, a Cebuana, was charged withthe commission of a crime, while aZamboanguena, the guilty party inappellants eyes, was not, is insufficient tosupport a conclusion that the prosecutionofficers denied appellant equal protectionof the laws.

There is also common sense practicality insustaining appellants prosecution.

While all persons accused of crime are tobe treated on a basis of equality before thelaw, it does not follow that they are to beprotected in the commission of crime. Itwould be unconscionable, for instance, toexcuse a defendant guilty of murderbecause others have murdered withimpunity. The remedy for unequalenforcement of the law in such instancesdoes not lie in the exoneration of the guiltyat the expense of society x x x. Protectionof the law will be extended to all personsequally in the pursuit of their lawfuloccupations, but no person has the right todemand protection of the law in thecommission of a crime (People v.Montgomery, 117 P.2d 437 [1941]).

Likewise,

[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce thecriminal laws as to some persons shouldbe converted into a defense for otherscharged with crime, the result would be thatthe trial of the district attorney fornonfeasance would become an issue in thetrial of many persons charged with heinouscrimes and the enforcement of law wouldsuffer a complete breakdown (State v.Hicks, 325 P.2d 794 [1958]).(People v. Dela Piedra, 350 SCRA 163,Jan. 24, 2001, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

The Right against UnreasonableSearches and Seizures

191. Discuss the constitutionalrequirement that a judge, in issuinga warrant of arrest, must determineprobable cause personally.Distinguish determination ofprobable cause by the prosecutorand determination of probable causeby the judge.

Held: It must be stressed that the 1987Constitution requires the judge todetermine probable cause personally, arequirement which does not appear in thecorresponding provisions of our previousconstitutions. This emphasis evinces theintent of the framers to place a greaterdegree of responsibility upon trial judgesthan that imposed under previousConstitutions.

In Soliven v. Makasiar, this Courtpronounced:

What the Constitution underscores is theexclusive and personal responsibility of theissuing judge to satisfy himself of theexistence of probable cause. In satisfyinghimself of the existence of probable causefor the issuance of a warrant of arrest, thejudge is not required to personally examinethe complainant and his witnesses.Following established doctrine andprocedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluatethe report and the supporting documentssubmitted by the fiscal regarding theexistence of probable cause and, on thebasis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or(2) if in the basis thereof he finds noprobable cause, he may disregard thefiscals report and require the submission ofsupporting affidavits of witnesses to aid himin arriving at a conclusion as to theexistence of probable cause.

Ho v. People (Ibid.) summarizes existingjurisprudence on the matter as follows:

Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish toemphasize three vital matters once more:First, as held in Inting, the determination of


probable cause by the prosecutor is for apurpose different from that which is to bemade by the judge. Whether there isreasonable ground to believe that theaccused is guilty of the offense chargedand should be held for trial is what theprosecutor passes upon. The judge, on theother hand, determines whether a warrantof arrest should be issued against theaccused, i.e., whether there is a necessityfor placing him under immediate custody inorder not to frustrate the ends of justice.Thus, even if both should base theirfindings on one and the same proceedingor evidence, there should be no confusionas to their distinct objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different,the judge cannot rely solely on the report ofthe prosecutor in finding probable cause tojustify the issuance of a warrant of arrest.Obviously and understandably, thecontents of the prosecutors report willsupport his own conclusion that there isreason to charge the accused for anoffense and hold him for trial. However, thejudge must decide independently. Hence,he must have supporting evidence, otherthan the prosecutors bare report, uponwhich to legally sustain his own findings onthe existence (or nonexistence) of probablecause to issue an arrest order. Thisresponsibility of determining personally andindependently the existence ornonexistence of probable cause is lodgedin him by no less than the most basic law ofthe land. Parenthetically, the prosecutorcould ease the burden of the judge andspeed up the litigation process byforwarding to the latter not only theinformation and his bare resolution findingprobable cause, but also so much of therecords and the evidence on hand as toenable the His Honor to make his personaland separate judicial finding on whether toissue a warrant of arrest.

Lastly, it is not required that the completeor entire records of the case during thepreliminary investigation be submitted to

and examined by the judge. We do notintend to unduly burden trial courts byobliging them to examine the completerecords of every case all the time simply forthe purpose of ordering the arrest of anaccused. What is required, rather, is thatthe judge must have sufficient supportingdocuments (such as the complaint,affidavits, counter-affidavits, swornstatements of witnesses or transcript ofstenographic notes, if any) upon which tomake his independent judgment or, at thevery least, upon which to verify the findingsof the prosecutor as to the existence ofprobable cause. The point is: he cannotrely solely and entirely on the prosecutorsrecommendation, as Respondent Court didin this case. Although the prosecutorenjoys the legal presumption of regularity inthe performance of his official duties andfunctions, which in turn gives his report thepresumption of accuracy, the Constitution,we repeat, commands the judge topersonally determine probable cause in theissuance of warrants of arrest. This Courthas consistently held that a judge fails inhis bounden duty if he relies merely on thecertification or the report of theinvestigating officer. (Citations omitted)

In the case at bench, respondent admitsthat he issued the questioned warrant asthere was no reason for (him) to doubt thevalidity of the certification made by theAssistant Prosecutor that a preliminaryinvestigation was conducted and thatprobable cause was found to exist asagainst those charged in the informationfiled. The statement is an admission thatrespondent relied solely and completely onthe certification made by the fiscal thatprobable cause exists as against thosecharged in the information and issued thechallenged warrant of arrest on the solebasis of the prosecutors findings andrecommendations. He adopted thejudgment of the prosecutor regarding theexistence of probable cause as his own.(Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1, Feb. 18,2000, 3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes])


192. In an application for search

warrant, the application wasaccompanied by a sketch of thecompound at 516 San Jose de laMontana St., Mabolo, Cebu City,indicating the 2-storey residentialhouse of private respondent with alarge X enclosed in a square.Within the same compound areresidences of other people,workshops, offices, factories andwarehouse. The search warrantissued, however, merely indicatedthe address of the compound whichis 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,Mabolo, Cebu City. Did this satisfythe constitutional requirement underSection 2, Article III that the place tobe searched must be particularlydescribed?

Held: This Court has held that theapplicant should particularly describe theplace to be searched and the person orthings to be seized, wherever andwhenever it is feasible. In the presentcase, it must be noted that the applicationfor a search warrant was accompanied bya sketch of the compound at 516 San Josede la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. Thesketch indicated the 2-storey residentialhouse of private respondent with a large"X" enclosed in a square. Within the samecompound are residences of other people,workshops, offices, factories andwarehouse. With this sketch as the guide,it could have been very easy to describethe residential house of private respondentwith sufficient particularity so as tosegregate it from the other buildings orstructures inside the same compound. Butthe search warrant merely indicated theaddress of the compound which is 516 SanJose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City.This description of the place to besearched is too general and does notpinpoint the specific house of privaterespondent. Thus, the inadequacy of thedescription of the residence of private

respondent sought to be searched hascharacterized the questioned searchwarrant as a general warrant, which isviolative of the constitutional requirement.(People v. Estrada, 296 SCRA 383, 400,[Martinez]) 193. Can the place to be searched, as

set out in the warrant, be amplifiedor modified by the officers ownpersonal knowledge of the premises,or the evidence they adduce insupport of their application for thewarrant?

Held: Such a change is proscribed by theConstitution which requires inter alia thesearch warrant to particularly describe theplace to be searched as well as thepersons or things to be seized. It wouldconcede to police officers the power ofchoosing the place to be searched, even ifit not be that delineated in the warrant. Itwould open wide the door to abuse of thesearch process, and grant to officersexecuting a search warrant that discretionwhich the Constitution has preciselyremoved from them. The particularizationof the description of the place to besearched may properly be done only by theJudge, and only in the warrant itself; itcannot be left to the discretion of the policeofficers conducting the search.

It is neither fair nor licit to allow policeofficers to search a place different from thatstated in the warrant on the claim that theplace actually searched although not thatspecified in the warrant is exactly whatthey had in view when they applied for thewarrant and had demarcated in theirsupporting evidence. What is material indetermining the validity of a search is theplace stated in the warrant itself, not whatapplicants had in their thoughts, or hadrepresented in the proofs they submitted tothe court issuing the warrant. (People v.Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 400, June26, 1998 [Narvasa])


194. Is a respondent in an ExtraditionProceeding entitled to notice andhearing before the issuance of awarrant of arrest?

Held: Both parties cite Section 6 of PD1069 in support of their arguments. X x x

Does this provision sanction RTCJudge Purganans act of immediatelysetting for hearing the issuance of awarrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.

1. On the Basis of the ExtraditionLaw

It is significant to note that Section 6of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses theword immediate to qualify the arrest of theaccused. This qualification would berendered nugatory by setting for hearingthe issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearingentails sending notices to the opposingparties, receiving facts and arguments fromthem, and giving them time to prepare andpresent such facts and arguments. Arrestsubsequent to a hearing can no longer beconsidered immediate. The law could nothave intended the word as a meresuperfluity but, on the whole, as a means ofimpairing a sense of urgency and swiftnessin the determination of whether a warrant ofarrest should be issued.

By using the phrase if it appears,the law further conveys that accuracy is notas important as speed at such early stage.The trial court is not expected to make anexhaustive determination to ferret out thetrue and actual situation, immediately uponthe filing of the petition. From theknowledge and the material then availableto it, the court is expected merely to get agood first impression a prima faciefinding sufficient to make a speedy initialdetermination as regards the arrest anddetention of the accused.

X x x

We stress that the prima facieexistence of probable cause for hearing thepetition and, a priori, for issuing an arrestwarrant was already evident from thePetition itself and its supporting documents.Hence, after having already determinedtherefrom that a prima facie finding didexist, respondent judge gravely abused hisdiscretion when he set the matter forhearing upon motion of Jimenez.

Moreover, the law specifies that thecourt sets a hearing upon receipt of theanswer or upon failure of the accused toanswer after receiving the summons. Inconnection with the matter of immediatearrest, however, the word hearing isnotably absent from the provision.Evidently, had the holding of a hearing atthat stage been intended, the law couldhave easily so provided. It also bearsemphasizing at this point that extraditionproceedings are summary (See Sec. 9, PD1069) in nature. Hence, the silence of theLaw and the Treaty leans to the morereasonable interpretation that there is nointention to punctuate with a hearing everylittle step in the entire proceedings.

X x x

Verily x x x sending to personssought to be extradited a notice of therequest for their arrest and setting it forhearing at some future date would givethem ample opportunity to prepare andexecute an escape. Neither the Treaty northe Law could have intended thatconsequence, for the very purpose of bothwould have been defeated by the escapeof the accused from the requested state.

2. On the Basis of the Constitution

Even Section 2 of Article III of ourConstitution x x x does not require a noticeor a hearing before the issuance of awarrant of arrest. X x x


To determine probable cause for theissuance of arrest warrants, theConstitution itself requires only theexamination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses theymay produce. There is no requirement tonotify and hear the accused before theissuance of warrants of arrest.

In Ho v. People and in all the cases citedtherein, never was a judge required to go tothe extent of conducting a hearing just forthe purpose of personally determiningprobable cause for the issuance of awarrant of arrest. All we required was thatthe judge must have sufficient supportingdocuments upon which to make hisindependent judgment, or at the very least,upon which to verify the findings of theprosecutor as to the existence of probablecause.

In Webb v. De Leon, the Court categoricallystated that a judge was not supposed toconduct a hearing before issuing a warrantof arrest x x x.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency ofevidence on record, judges merely furtherexamine complainants and their witnesses.In the present case, validating the act ofrespondent judge and instituting thepractice of hearing the accused and hiswitnesses at this early stage would bediscordant with the rationale for the entiresystem. If the accused were allowed to beheard and necessarily to present evidenceduring the prima facie determination for theissuance of a warrant of arrest, what wouldstop him from presenting his entire plethoraof defenses at this stage if he so desires in his effort to negate a prima faciefinding? Such a procedure could convertthe determination of a prima facie case intoa full-blown trial of the entire proceedingsand possibly make trial of the main casesuperfluous. This scenario is alsoanathema to the summary nature ofextraditions. (Government of the UnitedStates of America v. Hon. Guillermo

Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24,2002, En Banc [Panganiban])

195. What is search incidental to alawful arrest? Discuss.

Held: While a contemporaneous search ofa person arrested may be effected todiscover dangerous weapons or proofs orimplements used in the commission of thecrime and which search may extend to thearea within his immediate control where hemight gain possession of a weapon orevidence he can destroy, a valid arrestmust precede the search. The processcannot be reversed.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, asthe precedent arrest determines the validityof the incidental search, the legality of thearrest is questioned in a large majority ofthese cases, e.g., whether an arrest wasmerely used as a pretext for conducting asearch. In this instance, the law requiresthat there be first a lawful arrest before asearch can be made the process cannotbe reversed. (Malacat v. Court of Appeals,283 SCRA 159, 175 [1997])(People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432,June 17, 1999, En Banc [Davide, Jr.,C.J.])

196. What is the plain viewdoctrine? What are its requisites?Discuss.

Held: 1. Objects falling in plain view of anofficer who has a right to be in the positionto have that view are subject to seizureeven without a search warrant and may beintroduced in evidence. The plain viewdoctrine applies when the followingrequisites concur: (a) the law enforcementofficer in search of the evidence has a priorjustification for an intrusion or is in aposition from which he can view aparticular area; (b) the discovery of theevidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) itis immediately apparent to the officer thatthe item he observes may be evidence of a


crime, contraband or otherwise subject toseizure. The law enforcement officer mustlawfully make an initial intrusion or properlybe in a position from which he canparticularly view the area. In the course ofsuch lawful intrusion, he cameinadvertently across a piece of evidenceincriminating the accused. The object mustbe open to eye and hand and its discoveryinadvertent.

It is clear that an object is in plain view ifthe object itself is plainly exposed to sight.The difficulty arises when the object isinside a closed container. Where theobject seized was inside a closed package,the object itself is not in plain view andtherefore cannot be seized without awarrant. However, if the packageproclaims its contents, whether by itsdistinctive configuration, its transparency,or if its contents are obvious to anobserver, then the contents are in plainview and may be seized. In other words, ifthe package is such that an experiencedobserver could infer from its appearancethat it contains the prohibited article, thenthe article is deemed in plain view. It mustbe immediately apparent to the police thatthe items that they observe may beevidence of a crime, contraband orotherwise subject to seizure. (People v.Doria, 301 SCRA 668, Jan. 22, 1999, EnBanc [Puno, J.])

2. For the doctrine to apply, the followingelements must be present:

a) a prior valid intrusion based onthe valid warrantless arrest inwhich the police are legallypresent in the pursuit of theirofficial duties;

b) the evidence was inadvertentlydiscovered by the police whohave the right to be where theyare; and

c) the evidence must beimmediately apparent; and

d) plain view justified mere seizureof evidence without furthersearch.

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Baluttestified that they first located the marijuanaplants before appellant was arrestedwithout a warrant. Hence, there was novalid warrantless arrest which preceded thesearch of appellants premises. Notefurther that the police team was dispatchedto appellants kaingin precisely to searchfor and uproot the prohibited flora. Theseizure of evidence in plain view appliesonly where the police officer is notsearching for evidence against theaccused, but inadvertently comes acrossan incriminating object. Clearly, theirdiscovery of the cannabis plants was notinadvertent. We also note the testimony ofSPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area,they first had to look around the areabefore they could spot the illegal plants.Patently, the seized marijuana plants werenot immediately apparent and furthersearch was needed. In sum, themarijuana plants in question were not inplain view or open to eye and hand.The plain view doctrine, thus, cannot bemade to apply.

Nor can we sustain the trial courtsconclusion that just because the marijuanaplants were found in an unfenced lot,appellant could not invoke the protectionafforded by the Charter againstunreasonable searches by agents of theState. The right against unreasonablesearches and seizures is the immunity ofones person, which includes his residence,his papers, and other possessions. Theguarantee refers to the right of personalsecurity of the individual. X x x, what issought to be protected against the Statesunlawful intrusion are persons, not places.To conclude otherwise would not onlymean swimming against the stream, itwould also lead to the absurd logic that fora person to be immune againstunreasonable searches and seizures, he


must be in his home or office, within afenced yard or a private place. The Bill ofRights belongs as much to the person inthe street as to the individual in thesanctuary of his bedroom. (People v. AbeValdez, G.R. No. 129296, Sept. 25, 2000,En Banc [Quisumbing])

3. Considering its factual milieu, this casefalls squarely under the plain view doctrine.

When Spencer wrenched himself free fromthe grasp of PO2 Gaviola, he instinctivelyran towards the house of appellant. Themembers of the buy-bust team werejustified in running after him and enteringthe house without a search warrant for theywere hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal.Once inside the house, the police officerscornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust money from him. They also caughtappellant in flagrante delicto repacking themarijuana bricks which were in full view ontop of a table. x x x.

Hence, appellants subsequent arrest waslikewise lawful, coming as it is within thepurview of Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure x x x.

Section 5(a) is commonly referred to as therule on in flagrante delicto arrests. Heretwo elements must concur: (1) the personto be arrested must execute an overt actindicating that he has just committed, isactually committing, or is attempting tocommit a crime; and (2) such overt act isdone in the presence or within the view ofthe arresting officer. Thus, when appellantwas seen repacking the marijuana, thepolice officers were not only authorized butalso duty-bound to arrest him even withouta warrant. (People v. Elamparo, 329SCRA 404, 414-415, March 31, 2000, 2ndDiv. [Quisumbing])

197. What is a stop-and-frisksearch?

Held: 1. In the landmark case of Terry v.Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as thevernacular designation of the right of apolice officer to stop a citizen on the street,interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):

x x x (W)here a police officer observes anunusual condu

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