freedom of religion.docx
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTManila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 106440 January 29, 1996
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICAMANOSCA, petitioners,
vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge,RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYESCLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, andREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG,J.:
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision1of the
Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled
"Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al."), this Court is
asked to resolve whether or not the "public use" requirement of Eminent
Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-
square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute
("NHI") as a national historical landmark.
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,
Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492)
square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been
the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder ofIglesia Ni Cristo, it passed
Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42of Presidential
Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The
resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked
on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the
Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:
According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or
objects that are associated with an event, achievement,
characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage
in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the
Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had
made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been
declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places
invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which
the power of eminent domain may be authorized . . . .
In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute
as an agency of the Government charged with the maintenance
and care of national shrines, monuments and landmarks and the
development of historical sites that may be declared as nationalshrines, monuments and/or landmarks, may initiate the
institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of
acquiring the lot in question in accordance with the procedure
provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
proceedings should be instituted by the Office of the Solicitor
General in behalf of the Republic.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation3before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia,
that:
Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National
Historical Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which
was approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education,Culture and Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land
which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the "Iglesia ni
Cristo," as a National Historical Landrnark. The plaintiff perforce
needs the land as such national historical landmark which is a
public purpose.
At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial
court issued, on 03 August 1989,4an order fixing the provisional market
(P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and
authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum
would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro
Manila.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the
intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that
the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support ofIglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary
to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution.5Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the
implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply
to petitioners' motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued
its denial of said motion to dismiss.6Five (5) days later, or on 20 February
1990,7another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and
academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of
03 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners' motion to dismiss.
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order
was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order.8
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorariand prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the
appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of
appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the
petition itself, in any case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion
or lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion
for the reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992resolution of the appellate court.
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known
postulates.
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent
power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to
exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more
to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain
is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose
through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.9It is a
right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public
use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of
governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty.10
The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."11
This
proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so
to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought
to be enforced.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set
by this Court in the case ofGuido v.Rural Progress Administration,12
to wit: (a)
the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited;
and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.13
Petitioners suggest that
we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public
uses,14
i.e., the
. . . taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks,
bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including
schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian
wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries,
crematories, and railroads.
This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the
President's power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire
private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale
to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the
statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines
in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the
power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confinedonly to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.
15
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution,
must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a
public exigency.16
Black summarizes the characterization given by various
courts to the term; thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory
basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation
purposes, "public use" is one which confers same benefit or
advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public.
It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities
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for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right
of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a
"public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to
constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457
P. 2d 769, 772, 773.
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of
the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain,
means a use concerning the whole community as distinguished
from particular individuals. But each and every member of society
need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and
directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public wantor exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County,
262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be
said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is
productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants
of a small or restricted locality, but must be in common, and not
for a particular individual. The use must be a needful one for the
public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss
and inconvenience. A "public use" for which land may be taken
defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of
society, new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of
scope and functions of government, and other differing
circumstances brought about by an increase in population and
new modes of communication and transportation. Katz v.
Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586.17
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional
purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public
use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that
"public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long
been discarded. This Court in Heirs ofJuancho Ardona v. Reyes,18
quoting
from Berman v. Parker(348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is
or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424,
96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the
present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It
is no for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that
stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the
power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed.
808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co.
160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.
It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co.,
19
that:
. . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public
use" to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its
demands upon the individual increase and each demand is a new
use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . .
for "whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a
public use.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time
when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such
a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the
public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least
two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use.
One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through
the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise
to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use.20
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia inJ.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land
Tenure Administration,21
has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument
and one that "is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically" so as to
enable it "to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store." Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that
what, in fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just
as broad as "public welfare."22
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) birthplace become so vital as to be a public
use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some
religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what
should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casualconsequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather
than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be
true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.23
Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of
the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be
reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to beheard;
24contrary to petitioners' argument, the records of this case are
replete with pleadings25
that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the
provisional value of the property.
Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the
trial court's order which considered inapplicable the case ofNoble v. City of
Manila.26
Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the
alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners
which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be
bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law
and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL,J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that
he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President
of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the
respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs
of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design.
The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by
1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos."
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The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part
thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought
to be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper
legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may
properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance
of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance
and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue
to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether
excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess ofthe jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs.
516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial"
used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of
Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the
Constitution is a fortiorari"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The
statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is
not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits
of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an
officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga
and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the
Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is
alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied,
or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system
of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of
separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the
historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say
that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that
the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise
when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in
the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and
state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in
the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10,
1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine
Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy
Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the
Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite
to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All
the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking
their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to
recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with
its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that
what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the
minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution,
implored "the aid ofDivine Providence, in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of thenation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the
destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions
are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our
Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively
to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment
Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a
priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is
assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines).
Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional
mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation
to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving
Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to
beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and
bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes
against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised
Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the
postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of thePhilippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF
ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF
POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the
same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated andmade immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or
any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and
as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not
revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for
the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and
other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and
issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved
by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1,
1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The
respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer
losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be
derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and
states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance
of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize
the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use
or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of
a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the
postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the
stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of
the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps
was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country."
The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"
(Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the
President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is
significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit
2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned,
contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and
an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb.
3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but
Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seatof that congress. It is
obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be
said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not
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the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the
Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.
The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere
incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S.,
295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the
petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state
and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition.
Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance andprescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political
development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may
lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular
religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of
Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to
the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at
bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage
stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a
poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the
case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a
poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists
which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act
assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981
ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS
DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners,vs.
Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of FirstInstance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia,Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, CouncilmenGAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO,Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENABALTAZAR, respondents.
AQUINO,J.:1wph1.t
This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay
council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden
image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast
day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish
priest or a layman should have the custody of the image.
On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5,
"reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April
"of the feast day of Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".
That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take
charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through
the selling of tickets and cash donations " (Exh A or 6).
On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 whichspecified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman
Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayorof the fiesta, would be
the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would
remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as
chairman of the next feast day.
It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made
available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's
feast day (Exh. B or 7).
Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly
ratified by the barangay general assembly on March 26, 1976. Two hundred
seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).
Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash donations of the
barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With
those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San
Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four
hundred pesos (Exh. F-l, 3 and 4).
On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the
Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the
saint during the mass for the fiesta.
A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio
Marilao Osmea refused to return that image to the barangay council on the
pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were
used for its acquisition.
Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his
sermon during a mass, Father Osmea allegedly uttered defamatory remarks
against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection
with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father
Osmea in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.
Father Osmea retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Velosowith the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and
Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of
authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.
Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church
of Valencia. Because Father Osmea did not accede to the request of
Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the
council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution
No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father
Osmea for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the
barangay council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its
representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9).
The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father
Osmea and Bishop Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council hadposted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmea turned over the
image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). ln his answer to the complaint for replevin,
he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).
Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan
Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed
against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a
complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the
annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).
The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the
resolutions. The petitioners appealed under Republic Act No. 5440. The
petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted
because lsidoro M. Maago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay,
was not allowed to participate in its sessions.
Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos.
86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on September
21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as
barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter.
Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are
situated. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers"
as are provided by law "for the performance of particular government
functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio
governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No.
3590).
The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barriofor at least six months, eighteen years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly
registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).
The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay
captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth
chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the
same powers and functions as a barangay councilman.
In this case, Maago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the
sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he
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was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a
construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d] Exh. 1).
Maago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render
the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions
were passed.
The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the
constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever
be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution,
or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium
(Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).
That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do
not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty,
nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest
or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax
money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay
council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitationsand donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and
making the image available to the Catholic church.
The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact
that counsel advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father
Osmea the parish priest.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the
barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the
religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta
was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed
in the church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having apatron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image)
cannot be branded as illegal.
As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its
celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves
the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden
image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church.
A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if
placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family
desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.
The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits.
Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutionsfavored the Catholic church.
On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the
resolutionsprejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the
church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).
We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state,
freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any sect or church
are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a
microcosmic test case on those issues.
This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never
have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father
Osmea had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from
his own parishioners for the purchase ofanother image of San Vicente Ferrerto be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay
council. Father Osmea claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The
barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who
should have custody thereof.
If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic
church. that action would not v iolate the Constitution because the image was
acquired withprivate funds and is its private property.
The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the
image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public
funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional
provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and
banning the use of public money or property.
InAglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which
appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of
postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines,
issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.
The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines.
The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about
the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.
Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine
Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative
postage stamps.
It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an
event of a religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the
Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed.
The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil.,
627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del
Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet
the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and
the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it
held as trustee. 0
Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the
barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended
petition is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 119673 July 26, 1996
IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), petitioner,vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING
PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE HENRIETTA S.MENDOZA, respondents.
PUNO,J.:p
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the
respondent Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a
television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every
Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and
propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times
in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992
petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures
and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and
128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the
ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law."
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board.
On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the
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classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal for on
December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the decision of the
respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly
telecast.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board
Civil Case No. Q-92-14280, with the RTC, NCR Quezon City.1
Petitioner
alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV
program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119,
121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD
No. 1986 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner's prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. The parties orally argued and then marked
their documentary evidence. Petitioner submitted the following as its
exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit "A," respondent Board's Voting S lip for
Television showing its September 9, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows:2
REMARKS:
There are some inconsistencies in the particular
program as it is very surprising for this program toshow series of Catholic ceremonies and also some
religious sects and using it in their discussion about the
bible. There are remarks which are direct criticism
which affect other religions.
Need more opinions for this particular program. Please
subject to more opinions.
(2) Exhibit "A-1," respondent Board's Voting Slip for
Television showing its September 11, 1992 subsequent
action on petitioner's Series No. 115 as follows:3
REMARKS:
This program is criticizing different religions, based on
their own interpretation of the Bible.
We suggest that the program should delve on
explaining their own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks
on other faith.
(3) Exhibit "B," respondent Board's Voting Slip for
Television showing its October 9, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 119, as follows:4
REMARKS:
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation ofthe bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the
Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it
is found in the bible that we should do so.
This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of
choice, worship and decision.
(4) Exhibit "C," respondent Board's Voting Slip for
Television showing its October 20, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 121 as follows:5
REMARKS:
I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for
reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the
Catholic religion.
I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other
religion that they are right and the rest are wrong,
which they clearly present in this episode.
(5) Exhibit "D," respondent Board's Voting Slip for
Television showing its November 20, 1992 action on
petitioner's Series No. 128 as follows:6
REMARKS:
The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of
the Catholic and Protestant's beliefs.
We suggest a second review.
(6) Exhibits "E," "E-1," petitioner's block time contract
with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation dated
September 1, 1992.7
(7) Exhibit "F," petitioner's Airtime Contract with Island
Broadcasting Corporation.8
(8) Exhibit "G," letter dated December 18, 1992 of
former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr.,
addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the
decision of the respondent Board which x-rated the
showing of petitioner's Series No. 129. The letter reads
in part:
xxx xxx xxx
The television episode in
question is protected by theconstitutional guarantee of free
speech and expression under
Article III, section 4 of the 1987
Constitution.
We have viewed a tape of the
television episode in question, as
well as studied the passages
found by MTRCB to be
objectionable and we find no
indication that the episode poses
any clear and present danger
sufficient to limit the said
constitutional guarantee.
(9) Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated November 26, 1992
of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to President Fidel V.
Ramos appealing the action of the respondent Board x-
rating petitioner's Series No. 128.
On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:
(1) Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate for Television
Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992
allowing the showing of Series No. 128 under parental
guidance.
(2) Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.
(3) Exhibit "3," letter dated October 12, 1992 of
Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian Era
Broadcasting Service which reads in part:
xxx xxx xxx
In the matter of your television
show "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
Series No. 119, please be
informed that the Board was
constrained to deny your show a
permit to exhibit. The material
involved constitute an attack
against another religion which is
expressly prohibited by
law. Please be guided in the
submission of future shows.
After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued
a writ of preliminary injunction on petitioner's bond o P10,000.00.
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their
pre-trial briefs.9
The pre-trial briefs show that the parties' evidence is
basically the evidence they submitted in the hearing of the issue of
preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several times as
the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the
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records show that after submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered a
Judgment,10
on December 15, 1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo
the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo" program.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to
refrain from offending and attacking other existing
religions in showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration11
praying: (a) for the deletion of the
second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the
Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner to submit for
review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed the
motion.12
On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. It ordered:13
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is
granted. The second portion of the Court's Order dated
December 15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain
from offending and attacking other existing religions in
showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program is hereby
deleted and set aside. Respondents are further
prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to
submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."
Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its
motion for reconsideration was denied.14
On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial court.It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review
the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) the respondent Board did not
act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition
on TV of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the
materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the
series "indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.
In this petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, petitioner raises the
following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "ANG IGLESIANI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED AS A FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND
EXPRESSION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT BEING AN
EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE "ANG IGLESIA
NI CRISTO" PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE
POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN THE EXTREME CASE
THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MTRCB IS
VESTED WITH THE POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS
PROGRAMS.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE "ANG IGLESIA
NI CRISTO," A PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS
INDECENT AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD
CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent
Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused
its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner's religious program,
series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack
against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good
customs.
The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under
PD No. 1986. Its section 3 pertinently provides:
Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. -- The BOARD shall have
the following functions, powers and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures
as herein defined, television programs, including
publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and
stills, whether such motion pictures and publicity
materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical
distribution for television broadcast or for general
viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines andin the latter case, whether they be for local viewing or
for export.
c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from
and/or prohibitthe importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition
and/or television broadcastof the motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials,
subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the
judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard, are objectionable
for being immoral, indecent, contrary to lawand/or
good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic
of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence orof a wrong or crime, such as but not limited to:
i) Those which tend to incite
subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or sedition against the
State, or otherwise threaten the
economic and/or political
stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to
undermine the faith and
confidence of the people, their
government and/or duly
constituted authorities;
iii) Those which glorify criminals
or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other
purpose but to satisfy the
market for violence or
pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the
traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or
defamatory to the good nameand reputation of any person,
whether living or dead;
vii) Those which may constitute
contempt of court or of
any quasi-judicial tribunal, or
pertain to matters which are
subjudice in nature (emphasis
ours).
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine
all "television programs." By the clear terms of the law, the Board
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has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . .
exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television
programs . . ." The law also directs the Board to apply
"contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine
those which are objectionable for being "immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of
the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong
or crime."
Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include
religious programs like its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contraryinterpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the
Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed."
We reject petitioner's submission which need not set us adrift in a
constitutional voyage towards an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has
been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws,
past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."16
We have also laboriously defined in our
jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right toreligious profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice
Isagani Cruz, our well-known constitutionalist:17
Religious Profession and Worship
The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom
to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as
the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he
pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his
own theories about life and death; worship any god he
chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion;
acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that
appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the
immortality of his soul -- in fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd
his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and
heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe
as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his
beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do
so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may
believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right
to his beliefs and he may not be called to accountbecause he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts
or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so
becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great
as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the
other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be
enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of
others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of
religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to prevent
religious practices inimical to society. And this is true
even if such practices are pursued out of sincere
religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of
evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions
of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional
provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities,
it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty,
not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from
conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma.
Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in
Satan, he may not offer the object of his piety a human
sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally
interpret the Biblical command to "go forth and
multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract
plural marriages in violation of the laws against bigamy.
A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that
it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any
authority except that of God alone. An atheist cannot
express in his disbelief in act of derision that wound
the feelings of the faithful. The police power can validly
asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee, born
of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to
immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband.
We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per
se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its
religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates
the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State
when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive
evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the
more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal
mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is
and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across
the sea and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men
were caused by irreconcilable religious differences. Our country is still not
safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring
religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to
these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in
Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and
misunderstanding between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters.
The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing violence as an article
of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy
on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act
pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny
but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For
when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
It is also petitioner's submission that the respondent appellate court gravely
erred when it affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board x-rating its TV
Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. The records show that therespondent Board disallowed the program series for "attacking" other
religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board's Voting Slip for
Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for ". . .
criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible."
They suggested that the program should only explain petitioner's ". . . own
faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths." Exhibit "B" shows that
Series No. 119 was x-rated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal
translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin
Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we
should do so. This is intolerance . . ." Exhibit "C" shows that Series No. 121
was x-rated ". . . for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically, the
Catholic religion. . . . (T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religion that they
are right and the rest are wrong
. . ." Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably
recommended because it ". . . outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs." On
second review, it was x-rated because of its "unbalanced interpretations of
some parts of the bible."18
In sum, the respondent Board x-rated petitioner's
TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of petitioner's
controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary
religious beliefs. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that
the said "attacks" are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior
restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains
speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted
with furrowed brows.19
It is the burden of the respondent Board to
overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners
TV series for "attacking" either religions, especially the Catholic church. An
examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B," "C," and "D"
will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the
deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not
viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet
they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law
and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. It
misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the
benchmark case ofCantwell v. Connecticut, so viz.:20
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xxx xxx xxx
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields, the tenets
of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor.
To persuade others to his own point of view, the
pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration,
to vilification of men who have been, or are prominent
in church or state or even to false statements. But the
people of this nation have ordained in the light of
history that inspite of the probability of excesses and
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essentialto enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of
the citizens of democracy.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other
religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such
criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve
peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State
from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences,
the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its
fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot
squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because itattacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the
most numerous church in our country. In a State where there
ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality
of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of
thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of
dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace
of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for
it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that
can fan the embers of truth.
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against
another religion" in x-rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a
sideglance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will reveal that it is not among the
grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner's television
program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by
the respondent Board in its Rules.21
This rule is void for it runs smack against
the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand
the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize" attack against any
religion" as a ground allegedly ". . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986
prohibits the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity
materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised
Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offendany race or
religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not
synonymous with the word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the
Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent
punishmentof a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to
justifyprior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the
law prior to PD 1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground for
censorship. The ground was not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its
deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent. Indeed, even
the Executive Department espouses this view.
Thus, in an Opinion dated November 28, 1985 then Minister of
Justice, now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales explained:
xxx xxx xxx
However, the question whether the BRMPT (now
MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject television
program of INC should be viewed in the light of the
provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of PD 1986, which
is substantially the same as the provision of Section 3,paragraph (c) of E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the
standards of censorship, to wit: "immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines or its people
or with dangerous tendency to encourage the
commission of violence, or of a wrong" as determined
by the Board, "applying contemporary Filipino cultural
values as standard." As stated, the intention of the
Board to subject the INC's television program to
"previewing and censorship is prompted by the fact
that its religious program makes mention of beliefs and
practices of other religion." On the face of the law itself,
there can conceivably be no basis for censorship of said
program by the Board as much as the alleged reason
cited by the Board does not appear to he within the
contemplation of the standards of censorship set by
law. (Emphasis supplied).
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to
apply the clear and present danger rule. InAmerican Bible Society v. City of
Manila,22
this Court held: "The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified
like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is
aclear and present dangerof any substantive evil which the State has theright to prevent." In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,
23we further
ruled that ". . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent
animmediate and grave dangerto the security and welfare of the community
that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger."
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the
respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify
the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks
against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of
harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the
threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot
be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present
danger rule to the case at bar. In the United States, it is true that the c lear
and present danger test has undergone permutations. It was Mr. Justice
Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US,24
as follows: ". . . the
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clearand present
dangerthat they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally designed to determine
the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-government
action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full
flowering in the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect
speech other than subversive speech.25
Thus, for instance, the test was
applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing.26
The use of the test took a
downswing in the 1950's when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis
v. United States involving communist conspiracy.27 In Dennis, the
components of the test were altered as the High Court adopted Judge
Learned Hand's formulation that ". . . in each case [courts] must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." The imminence
requirement of the test was thus diminished and to that extent, the
protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969, however, the strength of the
test was reinstated in Brandenburg v. Ohio,28
when the High Court restored
in the test the imminence requirement, and even added an intent
requirement which according to a noted commentator ensured that only
speech directed at inciting lawlessness could be punished.29
Presentlyin the
United States, the clear and present danger test is not appliedto protectlow
value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and defamation.
Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that
advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction,
out of court contempt and release of information that endangers a fair
trial.30
Hence, even follow